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"Unity of consciousness and other minds: the concept of monad from Brentano to Husserl" in I. Apostolescu (Ed), Husserl and Leibniz: Metaphysics, Monadology and Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, exp. date 2021

Springer, 2021
In this paper, I shall investigate the historical context and the origin of Husserlian concept of monad as an effect of the main reception of Lebniz's monadology in the 19th century German philosophy. My aim is to suggest that one can find a very first root of this Husserlian interpretation of monadology in the discussion that Brentano develops in the fourth chapter of the second book of his Psychology from an empirical standpoint, where he argues for the unity of consciousness but against the idea of monad as a simple entity. I divide my paper in three parts: after a presentation of the reception of Leibnitian monadology in the German historical context (Herbart, Bolzano, Lotze), I analyze the model of Brentanian anti-monadic consciousness and, finally, in the last part, compare this conception with the use of monad in Husserl's latest works....Read more
ABSTRACT Draft Federico Boccaccini University of Brasilia Unity of consciousness and other minds: the concept of monad from Brentano to Husserl in I. Apostolescu (Ed), Husserl and Leibniz: Metaphysics, Monadology and Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, exp. date 2021 Leibnitian monadology in Husserlian phenomenology is an issue that affects consciou- sness and intersubjectivity. By the beginning of the 20th century, Leibniz’s metaphysics was a matter of central impor- tance in European intellectual life (Couturat, Russell, Cassirer). However, Husserl does not seem interested in monads as a basic elements of reality but rather in their non-metaphy- sical use. In this sense, over the years Husserl develops a phenomenology of the monadic ego where monads have “windows” (Hua XV, 609). Husserl claims that transcendental su- bjectivity exists in consort with others. In this paper, I shall investigate the historical context and the origin of Husserlian concept of monad as an effect of the main reception of Lebniz's monadology in the 19th century German philosophy. Although, from around 1907/08, Husserl already uses the concept of monad, the very first development of this Leibnitian notion is discussed extensively in sub- sequent years (Hua XIII-XV; Crisis, supplement VIII; Cartesian Meditation). This rediscove- ry of Leibniz's monadology in Husserl is not, therefore, an original theme; what is original about this topic is how Husserl recasts this concept to fit his phenomenology of transcen- dental ego. My aim is to suggest that one can find a very first root of this Husserlian interpretation of monadology in the discussion that Brentano develops in the fourth chapter of the second book of his Psychology from an empirical standpoint, where he argues for the unity of con- sciousness but against the idea of monad as a simple entity. If for Leibniz the monad is a simple substance without parts, for Brentano consciousness is a unity rich in parts and re- lations (unity without simplicity). I divide my paper in three parts: after a presentation of the reception of Leibnitian monado- logy in the German historical context (Herbart, Bolzano, Lotze), I analyze the model of Brentanian anti-monadic consciousness and, finally, in the last part, compare this concep- tion with the use of monad in Husserl’s latest works.
ABSTRACT Draft Federico Boccaccini University of Brasilia Unity of consciousness and other minds: the concept of monad from Brentano to Husserl in I. Apostolescu (Ed), Husserl and Leibniz: Metaphysics, Monadology and Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, exp. date 2021 Leibnitian monadology in Husserlian phenomenology is an issue that affects consciousness and intersubjectivity. By the beginning of the 20th century, Leibniz’s metaphysics was a matter of central importance in European intellectual life (Couturat, Russell, Cassirer). However, Husserl does not seem interested in monads as a basic elements of reality but rather in their non-metaphysical use. In this sense, over the years Husserl develops a phenomenology of the monadic ego where monads have “windows” (Hua XV, 609). Husserl claims that transcendental subjectivity exists in consort with others. In this paper, I shall investigate the historical context and the origin of Husserlian concept of monad as an effect of the main reception of Lebniz's monadology in the 19th century German philosophy. Although, from around 1907/08, Husserl already uses the concept of monad, the very first development of this Leibnitian notion is discussed extensively in subsequent years (Hua XIII-XV; Crisis, supplement VIII; Cartesian Meditation). This rediscovery of Leibniz's monadology in Husserl is not, therefore, an original theme; what is original about this topic is how Husserl recasts this concept to fit his phenomenology of transcendental ego. My aim is to suggest that one can find a very first root of this Husserlian interpretation of monadology in the discussion that Brentano develops in the fourth chapter of the second book of his Psychology from an empirical standpoint, where he argues for the unity of consciousness but against the idea of monad as a simple entity. If for Leibniz the monad is a simple substance without parts, for Brentano consciousness is a unity rich in parts and relations (unity without simplicity). I divide my paper in three parts: after a presentation of the reception of Leibnitian monadology in the German historical context (Herbart, Bolzano, Lotze), I analyze the model of Brentanian anti-monadic consciousness and, finally, in the last part, compare this conception with the use of monad in Husserl’s latest works.
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