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A Professional Roman Army?*
Doug Lee
It is very common in modern scholarly books and articles to see the word
‘professional’, or variants of it, invoked with reference to the Roman army. Such
usages occur most frequently in relation to the military reforms introduced by
the emperor Augustus, as in the following examples from recent decades:
The army . . . created by Augustus is heavily professionalised, at least in its
rank and file, and in its centurions.1
[F]rom the time of Augustus onwards, from first enlistment many men
spent their entire lives as professional soldiers, seeing in their comradesin-arms their own social framework and the friends with whom they
chose to retire when too old to fight.2
In one area Augustus’ reforms had precisely the opposite effect to that
which he had intended. So effectively were the legions depoliticized, and
so distant was the professional army that he created from the idea of
a citizen militia, that a dichotomy gradually grew up within Roman
society, between the army and everyone else.3
Augustus . . . demobilized the permanent citizen legions and replaced
them with professional armies.4
*
1
2
3
4
My thanks to conference participants and above all to the volume editors for helpful
feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.
Dobson 1986: 17.
Goodman 1997: 113.
Bispham 2008: 161–2.
Harper 2017: 9. For further examples relating to Augustus’ reforms, see Raaflaub 1980: 1011
(‘military professionalism’); Burton 1996: 1328 (‘Augustus . . . had created a fully professional army’); Scheidel 1996: 94 (‘the creation of a standing professional army under
Augustus’); Cherry 2001: 175 (‘the professionalization of the army was completed under
Augustus’); Pollard 2006: 207 (‘Augustus . . . professionalized the remaining force’); Haynes
2013: 50 (‘building a professional army’); Howarth 2013: 34 (‘the institution of a fully
professional army’).
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The terminology of professionalism sometimes also features in discussions of the steps taken by Marius with regard to recruitment in the
late second century BC, or developments during the final decades of the
Republic when troops served for extended periods under the same commander, as in the following:
It must be stressed . . . that Marius’ activities did not lead to any thorough
overhaul or reform of the conditions of military service . . . Yet it is
probably true to say that the balance shifted further towards the nearprofessional army.5
By the first century BC, the soldiers were becoming increasingly
professionalized and the military increasingly separate from the rest of
the population.6
And, unsurprisingly, it is used with reference to the army more generally
during the post-Augustan period of the Principate, in the early
centuries AD:
In imperial Rome wars were fought not by upper class citizens but by
professional troops commanded by generals and officers.7
The Roman army [of the Principate] was small for the area of
ground that it occupied, but it was a professional and extremely
efficient force.8
What is striking, however, is that when terms such as ‘professional’ or
‘professionalization’ are used in these contexts, it is usually done
without any explicit discussion of them; they are often assumed, it
seems, to be self-explanatory. Yet, as this volume demonstrates, ‘professionalization’ and ‘professional’ are terms with a wide range of potential
connotations.
A rare exception to the absence of explicit discussion of the term ‘professional’ in relation to the Roman army is worth quoting to show how the
issue might be handled. It is noteworthy that it is provided by an ancient
historian who was also a sociologist, in a paper written for a collection of
essays with a sociological focus. In a discussion of the process of ‘structural
5
6
7
8
Keppie 1984: 62.
Alston 1998: 210.
Hölscher 2003: 14.
Goldsworthy 2007: 118. For further examples, see Lewis and Reinhold 1955: 490
(‘Throughout the Principate, this professional army remained, as established by
Augustus’); Campbell 1987: 27 (‘professional army’); Hope 2003: 85 (‘the military was
now populated by professional soldiers’); Sidebottom 2004: 29 (‘Wars [in the Principate]
were now fought by professional soldiers’).
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differentiation’9 in Roman society during the final two centuries of the
Republic, Keith Hopkins included consideration of the changing character
of the Roman army:
In a particular military crisis towards the end of the second century BC,
soldiers were legally recruited for the first time without regard to property
qualifications, even from the urban proletariat. This was the beginning of
a professional army, in the sense that soldiering was separated from
agricultural labour and was recognized as a full-time (if short-term)
occupation. But the short-term service of the Roman army, recruited
from an underemployed lower class – whether peasantry or proletariat –
was significant. For it marked a transitional stage between the former
peasant army and the fully professional army of the early Empire (after
31 BC). The fully professional army is tied to a stable relationship to the
state by the regularity of its pay, by a career structure and the opportunity
of promotion, by the chance of civilian employment on completion of
service, possibly bolstered by a pension or bounty.10
Hopkins uses the term ‘professional’ with reference to the Roman army, but
provides more detail as to what the term entails, no doubt because he is
considering it as part of his larger treatment of ‘structural differentiation’. As
such, it is a refreshing change from the usual pattern, but even so, the
terminology remains problematic.11
In his helpful discussion of the transition from the chivalric ethos of the
Middle Ages to the military professionalism of early modern Europe, David
9
10
11
I.e., ‘the process by which an institution, previously charged with several overlapping
functions, develops in such a way that these functions are taken over by other more
specialized institutions’ (Hopkins 1968: 63).
Hopkins 1968: 64–5. This item was omitted from the recent posthumous collection of his
‘sociological studies on Roman history’ (Hopkins 2017), perhaps because some of its
discussion was absorbed into Hopkins 1978: ch. 1. See also Cornell 1993: 164.
For other scholars showing awareness of the issues raised by the terminology of professionalism, see Brunt 1988: 256: ‘it is misleading to speak of a professional army [in the late
Republic]; no one who enlisted could count on making a career in the army which would
occupy most of his active life’ (this is new text added to the revised version of his famous
1962 article on the army and land); and De Blois 2000: 30: ‘The professionalism of the
Roman armies of the Late Republic never was the professionalism of mercenaries, but the
near professionalism of volunteers who enlisted time and time again, serving in one
campaign after the other, a professionalism of year-to-year military practice and routine.
The Roman Republic did not have professional armies in the modern sense of the word,
but only armies consisting of citizens under arms, some of which through prolonged
military service in far-off lands developed into cohesive homogeneous blocks in society.
They had common material interests and were recognised as separate groups by contemporary and later ancient writers.’
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Trim offers the following observation on the issue of terminology: ‘The first
step is to deconstruct the term “profession” and its cognates, “professional”,
“professionalism” and “professionalisation.” The problem is that though
these terms are in common use, they always have been and still are
remarkably ambiguous and mutable.’12 This question of linguistic usage is
an important issue because some of the connotations of these terms risk
importing anachronistic, modernizing assumptions into how the Roman
army is conceived. In particular, there is a danger of reinforcing the
common, but unhelpful, idea of the Roman army as a well-oiled, smoothly
functioning machine, with its implication of unerring efficiency and superhuman invincibility.13 The reservations of Adrian Goldsworthy from two
decades ago remain pertinent:
The popular image of the Roman army is of an incredibly modern force,
highly organised and rigidly disciplined. When the army fought a war, it
operated in a very methodical way . . . In all situations a legion would
apply a carefully rehearsed battle-drill, the legionaries moving like the
components of some large machine. Individual soldiers were mere
automata, reduced by the army’s brutal discipline to a point where they
were incapable of taking independent action . . . The Roman military
machine was so perfect that it had no need for the overall direction of
commanders. All they had to do was deploy this machine and point it in
the right direction . . . Scholarly works on the Roman army have portrayed a force not substantially different from the popular image . . . In
this book I have attempted to show that both the popular and the
scholarly view of the Roman army is at best highly misleading, and in
most cases utterly false.14
One response to the charge of unthinking use of the language of ‘professionalism’ in the context of the Roman army might be that the term
‘professionalization’ is not a simple metaphor in the way that ‘machine’
is, and that it is merely being used as convenient shorthand for a package of
12
13
14
Trim 2003: 6, emphasis added.
For examples of use of the term, see Birley 1988 [1952]: 5 (‘the structure of the machine’);
Frank 1969: 79 (‘during the fourth century a new military machine . . . [was] created’);
Keppie 1984: 169 (‘the machinery of the new professional army’); Peddie 1994 (‘The Roman
War Machine’); Williams and Friell 1994, ch. 6 (‘The War Machine’); Bradley 2004: 308
(‘the Roman war machine’); McLynn 2005: 102 (‘The Roman army had always
functioned . . . as a fighting machine’); Howarth 2013: 34 (‘the third significant phase of
the Roman military machine’); Harper 2017: 7 (‘The legions [of the Republic] destroyed
their rivals one by one . . . The war machine whetted its own appetite’).
Goldsworthy 1996: 283–4. See also Carrié 1993: 100; Alston 1995: 3–5, Coulston 2013: 8–9;
and above all James 2002: 9, 32 (an invaluable, extended methodological critique of Roman
military studies in Britain).
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Augustan measures and its consequences – and there is no doubt something in this. Nonetheless, it is shorthand with a lot of accompanying
baggage and its widespread default usage warrants interrogation, which is
the purpose of this chapter. To what extent is it justifiable to talk of
a ‘professional’ Roman army?
The particular changes made by Augustus which tend to attract the label
of ‘professionalization’ are, first, his introduction of legionary service for
a substantial fixed period of time – initially (from 13 BC), sixteen years, with
four years as a reserve, and then from AD 5 onwards, twenty years, with five
years as a reserve;15 and, secondly, his institution of a discharge bonus
provided by the state in addition to the regular pay legionaries received –
initially taking the form of land, but later changed to money.16 In other
words, what Augustus effectively did was to establish a full-time standing
army in which individuals could find uninterrupted employment for
a substantial portion of their adult working life, with retirement benefits.
This stands in contrast to the original principles of military service during
the earlier Republican period, when the Roman army was essentially a parttime citizen militia. As Rome’s overseas commitments increased during the
middle Republic, some legions did remain in service for a number of years,
but although individuals were liable for sixteen years of service overall, they
could normally expect discharge after a maximum of six years’ continuous
service.17 Military service was not, then, generally a permanent form of fulltime employment in this period of Roman history, although the intense
demands on manpower during the civil wars of the first century BC did
mean some troops ended up serving for more extended periods, which
anticipated Augustan changes. Furthermore, liability for military service
during the Republic was based in part on ownership of property, which was
regarded as a legionary’s primary source of income, rather than them
relying on their intermittent military service, where the stipendium which
soldiers received was intended only to mitigate some of the financial
burden of serving in the legions.18 Against this background, the Augustan
changes marked a very significant development – there is no denying that.
But does it warrant the term ‘professionalization’?
There are a number of different ways of approaching this question.
There is a substantial scholarly literature in the field of sociology
15
16
17
18
Cass. Dio 54.25.5 (13 BC), 55.23.1 (AD 5), with Rich 1990: 203–4 (who, incidentally, refers to
Augustus maintaining a ‘standing long-service army’).
For details of these changes, see Raaflaub 1980.
Brunt 1962: 80–1.
Keppie 1996: 371–2.
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concerning professionalization in the modern era, while there has also
been scholarly discussion of the professionalization of military forces
in more modern contexts. With regard to the former, ‘few ideas have
been more central to understanding the organization of societies than
the division of labor, and few segments of labor have sustained as much
long-lasting interest than professions’.19 Consideration of the latter has
partly taken place as an aspect of the broader sociological analysis of
modern professions, with particular reference to the officer corps of
armies, but also in the context of the historical development of armed
forces from early modern Europe through to the contemporary world.20
In what follows, the relevance of each of these approaches to the
Roman empire will be considered in turn, with the question of military
officers as professionals given separate attention in the latter stages of
this chapter.
Turning first, then, to modern sociological studies, defining ‘profession’
has been a subject of debate, but some examples of definitions will help to
highlight generally accepted central features:
Professions are privileged occupations. Their members enjoy, if not
always, above average incomes, relative security, social esteem and cultural authority, based on their command of a specialized knowledge.
Organized as corporate bodies, the most established professions govern
themselves and discipline their own members.21
Characteristics of a profession: (1) the use of skills based on theoretical
knowledge; (2) education and training in these skills; (3) the competence
of professionals ensured by examinations; (4) a code of conduct to ensure
professional integrity; (5) performance of service that is for the public
good; (6) a professional association that organizes members . . .
Professionals normally have high pay, high social status and autonomy
in their work.22
A ‘profession’, then, refers to certain types of work that involve specialized
knowledge and skills gained through specific education, are a full-time
occupation for which individuals receive good remuneration, and have
developed agreed standards of performance and an associated corporate
ethos, with an accompanying high level of social status for practitioners, as
19
20
21
22
Hermanowicz and Johnson 2014: 209.
Huntington 1957: chs. 1–3; Lang 1972: ch. 2; Collins 1990: 34–5; Kniskern and Segal 2015:
511–12.
Larson 2006: 539.
Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 2006: 309. Further discussions in Burrage 1990; Siegrist
2015.
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exemplified in the evolution of the modern medical profession.23 It is worth
reiterating that, perhaps because professions are social phenomena rather
than clearly bounded legal entities, there remains scope for disagreement
about how to define a profession. The criteria detailed here attempt to
impose some degree of order on the semantic fuzziness which often
surrounds use of the term and thereby provide a helpful heuristic framework within which to assess the appropriateness of the term with reference
to the Roman military.
As already noted, military service in modern contexts has sometimes
been treated as being a profession in this sense. However, it is difficult to see
that the term can be used unreservedly in this way with reference to the
Augustan military reforms, or even the development of Roman military
service across a broader time span. To be sure, there are some elements in
the definitions above which can be identified in the context of the Roman
military in the imperial period. ‘Performance of service that is for the public
good’ can be seen in the army’s role in protecting the empire’s frontiers
against foreign attack, and their work involved the use of skills.24 However,
these are very broad criteria, and there are other definitional aspects which
are difficult to identify in the Roman context. The question of training will
be discussed in more detail below, but it is immediately evident that the
skills of the ordinary Roman soldier were not based on theoretical knowledge and did not entail formal examinations in the manner of modern
professions, and while the Roman military had a corporate identity, it did
not govern itself or have autonomy in its work – it operated at the behest of
the emperor and his subordinates. These are significant divergences from
the modern sociological paradigm of professions.
The conclusion that the imperial Roman army was not ‘professional’ in
the modern sense is strengthened by the difficulty of identifying other types
of work in the Roman world analogous to a profession in the modern sense.
While those who presented themselves as medical doctors in the Roman
world could possess important specialized knowledge and skills, there was
no professional accreditation of doctors, while the fact that many were
23
24
Freidson 1988; Larson 2013: ch. 3 for the medical profession. Whether all these criteria
apply to all types of work popularly thought of as professional remains a moot point (e.g.,
actors and musicians may enjoy minimal job security, while many teaching in UK schools
and universities would dispute the idea that they receive good remuneration), highlighting
the definitional problem, even with reference to modern society.
The criterion of ‘above average incomes’ and ‘high pay’ is less straightforward: one recent
discussion has placed the basic rate of military pay in the first century AD in ‘the middle
range of civilian earnings’ (Rathbone 2009: 311), but in the absence of ancient statistics, this
is necessarily based on incomplete evidence and assumptions which are open to debate.
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slaves or former slaves was a further impediment to public esteem or high
status for the occupation as a whole.25 By contrast, Roman jurists came from
the aristocratic elite during the Republic and Principate, but paradoxically
this militated against the development of anything approximating to
a professional identity, since they were not dependent on their legal
activities for their social status or their livelihood. Moreover, as John
Crook notes, ‘there were no professional associations, . . . nor were any
formal educational qualifications needed’.26 If other obvious candidates for
professions are not easily identified in the Roman context, then this must
give pause for thought about the validity of using such language with
reference to the Roman army.
In the more specific context of military studies, ‘professionalization’
features in discussions of the emergence of modern armies in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries against the background of technological
innovations and the growth of the power of the state.27 One important
aspect of this was the formation of a professional officer corps through the
establishment of training colleges in the nineteenth century, as distinct
from the aristocratic, chivalric ethos which prevailed previously, and this
raises the question of the extent to which officers in the Roman army can be
described as professionals. This issue will be considered later in this chapter, but first there is the broader question of the army at large. While gamechanging technological innovations comparable to the introduction of
gunpowder were not a feature of Roman military history, there are other
respects in which a number of the changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be paralleled in the Roman context. A helpful summary of these changes is provided by Michael Howard in his study War in
European History, specifically in the opening paragraphs of a chapter
entitled ‘The Wars of the Professionals’:
By the eighteenth century European wars were being conducted by
professional armed forces of a kind with which we would be familiar
today. Their officers were not primarily members of a warrior caste
fighting from a concept of honour or feudal obligation; nor were they
contractors doing a job for anyone who would pay them. They were
servants of the state who were guaranteed regular employment, regular
wages, and career prospects and who dedicated themselves to the service
of the state, or rather of their ‘country’ . . . come peace, come war . . . By
1700 the essential outlines were there: a state machine responsible for,
25
26
27
Galen On Recognising the Best Doctor 1.3–4; Nutton 1985; Jackson 1988: 56–9.
Crook 1995: 42, cf. 41–5; Harries 2006: 34–5.
Abrahamsson 1972: 21–39.
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and capable of, maintaining a full-time force on foot in war and peace –
paying, feeding, arming, and clothing it; and a coherent hierarchy of
men with a distinct sub-culture of their own, set apart from the rest of the
community not only by their function but by the habits, the dress, the
outlook, the interpersonal relations, the privileges, and the responsibilities which that function demanded.28
How does the army which emerged from the Augustan reforms measure
up against these criteria? Although Roman administrative arrangements
during the Principate hardly warrant being described as ‘a machine’,29
Augustus’ reforms did formally establish a full-time standing army paid
and armed by the state. That army had a coherent hierarchy of command,
from the legate in overall command of a legion down through the ranks of
tribune, camp prefect, and so on, to various grades of centurion at the level
of cohort and century.30 It also developed a distinct identity, reflected in the
emergence of a term for the new phenomenon of non-combatant citizens –
pagani31 – and in other features of military life.32 The posting of legions on
the distant frontiers of the empire served to reinforce that sense of distinct
identity, as did various aspects of soldiers’ legal position. On the one hand,
there was the prohibition on soldiers marrying (a measure usually attributed to Augustus), while on the other, there was their gradual acquisition of
a range of legal privileges, such as greater freedom from some of the formal
powers of their father compared with ordinary citizens, and having more
flexibility in the formulation of a valid will.33 These characteristics of the
army in the period following Augustus can be regarded, then, as amounting
to professionalization in the sense defined by Michael Howard, but it is
professionalization in the much simpler sense of the contrast between the
professional and the amateur – and, indeed, this is the contrast which is
sometimes used or implicit in some of the quotations concerning Augustus’
reforms deployed at the start of this chapter.
However, if parallels can be drawn between Augustus’ reforms and the
professionalization of armies in early modern Europe, there is also
a significant difference to bear in mind. Where changes in early modern
Europe were introduced with the conscious aim of improving military
28
29
30
31
32
33
Howard 1976: 54–5; cf. Trim 2003: 6–11.
Cf. Garnsey and Saller 1987: ch. 2 (‘Government without bureaucracy’).
For a summary, see Le Bohec 1994: 36–46, with further discussion in Isaac 1995. For
changes in late antiquity, see Rance 2007b: 395–7.
Carrié 1993: 103; Eck 2014.
MacMullen 1984. However, the proposal that the army should be viewed as a ‘total
institution’ (Shaw 1983) has been challenged: Stoll 2001.
Campbell 1984: chs. 4–7; Phang 2001.
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effectiveness, Augustus’ military reforms had a different purpose. They were
not formulated with a view to creating a more efficient army; rather they
were his solution to the problem of military intervention in political life,
which had become a recurrent issue during the late Republic. Augustus
needed to establish a clear separation between the political and military
spheres, and as far as the rank-and-file troops were concerned, this involved
meeting the material needs of soldiers through providing a regular salary
and discharge bonus. In this way, an obvious source of discontent was
removed, while at the same time there was a reinforcement of the troops’
loyalty to the emperor as the provider of their material needs.34 In this
important sense, Augustus’ ‘professionalization’ of the army was very different from the early modern European phenomenon.
As previously noted, a further feature of Roman military service which is
relevant to the question of professionalization is the role of training in
relevant skills, which appears to have become more institutionalized during
the Principate. This was at least partly a consequence of soldiers being
based permanently in camps and therefore at the regular disposal of their
superiors to undertake training. There is a range of evidence from the
Principate, both textual and archaeological, which shows a concern with
developing and maintaining the fighting skills of troops, at the levels of both
individual weapons training and larger-scale group manoeuvres and mock
battles.35 Institutionalization of training has seemed particularly evident
because of the appearance, in sources from the Principate, of a range of
titles for instructors in military contexts, some quite specialized, in contrast
to oversight of training during the Republic by military tribunes and
centurions.36 The term ‘institutionalization’ can, however, suggest
a greater degree of central planning than was necessarily the case, and
the picture of more formal training procedures following on the back of the
Augustan reforms requires qualification in a number of respects. On the
one hand, there were continuities from the Republican period, which
mean that the Augustan reforms did not represent such a clear new start
with respect to training, while on the other, there was a lack of uniformity in
training during the Principate, which implies that the evidence for training
should not be interpreted as reflecting part of a systematic, centrally coordinated approach.
Examining each of these points in more detail, it is evident, first, that the
importance of training was appreciated during the Republican period, as
34
35
36
Raaflaub 1980.
Horsmann 1991; Rance 2000; Phang 2008: ch. 2; Coulston 2015.
Horsmann 1991: 82–92.
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reflected in both anecdotal evidence37 and Polybius’ detailed description of
camp construction, whose precision presupposes practice in that activity.38
This and other forms of training activity had pedigrees stretching back well
into the Republican period.39 It has further been argued that the technical
demands of manipular tactics, which emerged in the late fourth
century BC, must have required intensive training of recruits, corroborated
by evidence for armies spending longer in the field from an earlier date
than traditionally assumed.40 All this may serve as a warning against assuming a progression towards professionalization from Republic to Principate
analogous to the tendency in scholarship on more recent periods to think in
terms of ‘the rise of professionalism’.
Secondly, training during the Principate may not have been as rigorously
monitored and uniformly organized as often assumed. ‘The training of
[Roman] soldiers was not fully rationalized in the Weberian sense. The
sources do not emphasize a discrete period of training such as modern basic
training or boot camp; training was ideally ongoing and was the responsibility
of individual commanders.’41 Moreover, the way in which particular commanders during the Principate are praised for re-establishing disciplined
training regimes when taking up their post implies that maintenance of
standards could be variable, especially in a period when the reduced incidence
of warfare may have encouraged a more relaxed attitude.42 This may be the
implication of the (admittedly moralizing) comment in the military treatise of
Vegetius that ‘a sense of security born of long peace has diverted mankind
partly to the enjoyment of private leisure, partly to civilian careers. Thus
attention to military training was at first discharged rather neglectfully, then
omitted, until finally consigned long since to oblivion’.43
It is also noteworthy that training rarely features in surviving duty rosters.
In his well-known discussion of the daily routine of Roman soldiers, Roy
Davies relied primarily on Vegetius’ treatise for evidence of training, and
could cite only one instance of artillery practice and one of cavalry manoeuvres from the rosters preserved on papyrus.44 As for the emergence of
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Horsmann 1991: ch. 1.
Polyb. 6.27–32; Horsmann 1991: 164–71.
See Rance 2000: 260–8 for the evidence concerning mock battles.
Rosenstein 2004: 30–5.
Phang 2008: 37.
E.g., Domitius Corbulo (Tac. Ann. 13.35), Julius Agricola (Tac. Agr. 18), Avidius Cassius
(HA, Avidius Cassius 5–6).
Veg. Mil. 1.28 (tr. N. P. Milner). For Vegetius as a source, see the astute comments of
Rance 2007a: 344–5.
Davies 1974: 310–11.
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specialist instructors during the Principate, a range of titles is known, from
the generalized (e.g., doctor (‘instructor’), exercitator (‘trainer’), magister
(‘teacher’)) to the more specific (e.g., campidoctor (‘supervisor of training
on the exercise ground’), doctor armorum (‘weapons instructor’), hastiliarius (‘spear trainer’)).45 However, the extant evidence remains quite limited
in quantity and much of it comprises bare titles in soldiers’ epitaphs which
are short on interpretive context, so that efforts to impose uniformity and
hierarchy entail a significant element of speculation. This has led one
commentator to conclude that ‘the titulature of training-instructors appears
to have remained flexible and varied between units of different classes, and
there is no clear evidence for a consistent hierarchy or fixed complement of
trainers in operation throughout the army’.46 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this training was above all practical and physical in nature, rather
than involving mastery of a body of knowledge, as in the case of modern
professions. Even at the level of weapons training, there is a significant
difference between the ancient and modern contexts. To be sure, stamina,
balance, and manual dexterity were required to wield a Roman sword
effectively, and strength and coordination were needed for javelin throwing
and archery, but given suitable recruits, competence could readily be
acquired through simple physical practice. By contrast, the technological
complexity of modern firearms and artillery, not to mention sophisticated
electronic equipment such as radios, radar, and electro-optics, means that
competence can only be achieved through extended training at both
practical and theoretical levels.
Within the ranks of the imperial army, there existed a wide range of more
specialized support roles which might be considered of relevance to the
issue of ‘professionalization’.47 The clearest summary of these roles is
provided by a jurist in the following passage:
Some [soldiers] are entitled by their conditions of service to relief from
more onerous duties. These are men such as surveyors, assistants in the
hospital, surgeons and dressers, artisans and those who dig ditches,
veterinary surgeons, architects, helmsmen, shipwrights, artillery constructors, glass fitters, craftsmen, arrowsmiths, coppersmiths, shield boss
makers, wagon makers, shinglers, swordsmiths, water engineers, trumpet
makers, horn makers, plumbers, blacksmiths, masons and lime burners,
woodcutters and charcoal burners. In the same category are usually
45
46
47
For the evidence, see Horsmann 1991: 84–92.
Rance 2007b: 401.
See the helpful discussion in Speidel 2001, who does, however, take as his starting point the
assumption of ‘professional specialisation’ (439).
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included butchers, huntsmen, keepers of sacrificial animals [victimarii],
assistants in the workshop, those who are in charge of the sickbay, also
clerks who are capable of teaching, granary clerks, savings bank clerks,
clerks responsible for monies left without heirs, assistants to the adjutants,
grooms, polishers, weapons keepers, the herald, and the trumpeter. All
these are classed among the immunes.48
On the one hand, the fact that these roles were collectively classified as
immunes – that is, those who did not have to undertake more onerous
tasks – implies that they held a higher status within the army. On the other
hand, it has been noted that soldiers did not refer to themselves as immunes
on their tombstones, they were still expected to train and fight, and they
were paid at the same rate as soldiers who were not exempt.49 Furthermore,
this category covered a very diverse range of roles, from those involving
a certain level of education – some of the medical roles and those requiring
literacy – to those involving artisanal skills – craftsmen and builders of
various sorts – to those relying primarily on physical strength – ditch diggers
and woodcutters. Victimarii might also be included in this last group,
insofar as their duties included the physical handling of sacrificial animals
which could be large (e.g., oxen), although their religious associations were
surely also relevant to their status as immunes.50 At any rate, given the sheer
diversity of roles among those classified as immunes, and the fact that it
included activities which required little in the way of education, it is
difficult to see how this aspect of Roman military organization makes
a difference with regard to the issue of professionalization.
Returning to the more general question of Augustus’ military reforms
and their impact on the status of ordinary legionaries, they can be characterized as introducing significant elements of what might be described as
‘professionalization’ in a loose sense, but it is important to recognize that
the term also has connotations arising from modern professions which risk
importing anachronistic assumptions. For this reason it is important to be
clear about what the term means, and does not mean, in the Roman
context – and this is rarely addressed. In my view, it is much more preferable to refer to Augustus’ formalization of a paid standing army and to make
no reference at all to professionalization.
As noted earlier, studies of military professionalization in more modern
periods of history have given particular attention to the emergence of
48
49
50
Dig. 50.6.7 (Tarrutienus Paternus).
Phang 2008: 45.
For victimarii, see Lennon 2015 (with specific comment on their presence in the army at
pp. 74–5).
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professional officer corps, which has also been the focus of some sociological studies of the modern military, particularly with reference to military influence on civilian government, whether in the United States or in
the developing world.51 This prompts consideration of a further, more
specific question in the Roman context: in what respect, if any, is there
any discernible degree of ‘professionalization’ of the commanders and
officers of the Roman army over time?
During the Republic, army commanders were senatorial aristocrats who
had gained the office of consul (or sometimes praetor), but while military
duties were their most important role, military experience or competence
was by no means always the major factor in determining who held these
offices: a range of political and social factors might influence the outcome
of elections. Nonetheless, during the middle Republican period it was
evidently a requirement to have ten years’ military experience before one
was eligible to hold political office.52 That experience could range from the
pressures of active campaigning to the longueurs of garrison duty,53 but it
does imply a concern to ensure familiarity with war on the part of those who
might one day be commanding an army. It seems, too, that there were
handbooks about aspects of military organization and procedure for use by
military tribunes in this period,54 which might imply an appreciation of the
value of providing some sort of training to junior officers. If so, however, it
also seems that this appreciation diminished during the late Republican
period, when the requirement of ten years’ service appears to have lapsed.55
The long service of ‘middle-cadre officers’ of the centurionate has also
prompted some to regard them as having ‘become near professionals in
daily practice through military activities, not by training in a military school
or through enlistment in a mercenary force’.56 However, the reference here
to the lack of any sort of training school is a tacit acknowledgement that the
terminology of professionalism is being used in a much looser sense than in
modern military studies of officer corps.
During the Principate commanders continued to be drawn from the
senatorial aristocracy, in their capacity as provincial governors, and since
there are occasional references in the sources to viri militares (‘military
51
52
53
54
55
56
Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Sandhoff and Segal 2014: 264–5.
Polyb. 6.19.4, with discussion in Hopkins 1978: 27–8; Harris 1979: 11–14.
Cf. the caution of Campbell (1987: 20 n. 42): ‘I am not certain how demanding the
requirement to serve ten campaigns was in practice. The campaigning season might last
only a few months and involve no fighting.’
Rawson 1971: 14–15 (= Rawson 1991: 36–7).
Harris 1979: 12 n. 4; Birley 2000: 98.
De Blois 2000: 13.
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men’), this has prompted some scholars to suggest that there was a group of
aristocrats who gained particular experience in military command. The fact
that a figure of Ronald Syme’s repute favoured the phrase has lent it
credibility, even though in one of his later works he also acknowledged
that ‘for generals of rank and station, the Romans, it is salutary to recall, set
no great store by a prolonged training in the science of war’.57 Debate about
the significance of these ‘military men’ has sometimes been framed in
unhelpfully stark terms as a choice between characterizing commanders
as either professional or amateur, rather than in terms of a spectrum. It has
focused partly on the question of numbers – counting both individuals and
years of experience in relevant posts – with gaps in the epigraphic record of
careers leaving scope for uncertainty.58 However, there is also the question
of cultural context and expectations. On this latter aspect, there seems little
doubt that Roman society during the Principate did not place a high
premium on the value of specialization, whether in military or administrative matters, with patronage the most important consideration in
appointments.59 Moreover, there was no attempt to institutionalize the
training of military commanders and officers. In the words of Brian
Campbell, ‘the Romans had no military academy, no formal process for
educating officers in ordnance, tactics and strategy, and no systematic
means for testing the qualities of aspirants to top commands’.60
There are, then, some hints of recognition during the Republic and
Principate of the value of training and experience for competency in
military command, but not enough to warrant use of the term ‘professionalization’. The one period when a stronger case can be made for a move in
this direction is late antiquity. From the mid-third century onwards, it was
increasingly the case that senatorial aristocrats no longer held military
commands. This development has sometimes been linked to a brief report
that the emperor Gallienus (253–68) ‘was the first to prohibit senators from
57
58
59
60
Syme 1983: 323, with Campbell 1975: 11 n. 1 for references to Syme’s discussions of the term
viri militares in earlier works.
See Campbell 1975; Campbell 1984: 325–47; Mattern 1999: 16–20 (minimizing the importance attached to military experience); and Cornell 1993: 165–6; Birley 2000 (arguing that it
was more significant).
Campbell 1975: 27 (‘In the context of Roman society, ideas of specialisation and professionalism are largely anachronistic’); Saller 1982: ch. 3. With regard to the specialized roles
of immunes discussed earlier, Speidel 2001 argues that their specialization does not appear
to have improved their chances of promotion.
Campbell 1987: 22; cf. Goldsworthy 1996: 122. Naiden 2007: 40 argues that the Macedonian
army of Philip and Alexander was the first to have an officer corps, but differentiates this
from professionalization.
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undertaking a military career or entering the army’.61 However, the motive
attributed to Gallienus is not a desire to improve military effectiveness, but
rather ‘fear that imperial power would be transferred to the best of the nobility
on account of his inactivity’ – in other words, concern about a military
challenge from among the senatorial ranks. Moreover, the plausibility of the
report of a specific prohibition on senators holding military commands has
been doubted because of the gradual change in the character of senatorial
careers, as reflected in the epigraphy of the third century.62
However, the broad shift is not in question. Military posts were increasingly held by individuals who had been career soldiers, a trend reinforced
by the wider administrative reforms of the emperors Diocletian and
Constantine. They themselves came from military backgrounds and
effected a clear division between military and civilian posts.63 In particular,
Constantine created the new senior military post of magister (‘master’),64
which facilitated the development of clearer career paths for ambitious
military men, often starting as one of the junior officers known as protectores
or domestici: ‘In the fourth century the corps of the protectores and the
domestici served as a kind of staff college in which potential regimental
commanders were given practical training and their initiative and capacity
for taking responsibility was tested.’65 These officers are found serving as
aides to senior commanders, thereby gaining experience of what more
senior roles entailed. The best-known example is the future historian
Ammianus Marcellinus who, as a protector, served under the magister
Ursicinus in the 350s – although he did not go on to become a general
himself.66
Also of relevance here is the Strategikon, the late sixth-century handbook for generals attributed to the emperor Maurice. Unlike most
military treatises from antiquity, the Strategikon had official status, and
it was not a literary composition but drew together a range of documentary materials relating to disciplinary regulations, drill, and campaign procedures. Hence, it is of great interest that its stated aim was to
provide guidance to middle-ranking field officers ‘who aspire to be
a general’ (preface 24) – an aim which carries considerable significance
in the context of discussions about the professionalization of officers.67
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Aur. Vict. Caes. 33.34 (at a later point (37.6) he refers to this measure as an edictum).
De Blois 1976: 57–83; Christol 1982; Davenport 2018: 485–7, 534–9.
Jones 1964: 43–4, 101.
Jones 1964: 97; Demandt 1970: 560–2.
Jones 1964: 638.
See further Matthews 1989: 75–7.
Rance 2004: 267–9.
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At the same time, even by the sixth century and the end of antiquity
there was still nothing remotely resembling an officer training college
providing formal military education, so the term ‘professionalization’ is
still probably best avoided.68 However, there does appear to have been
a greater appreciation of the benefits of some degree of specialization
over the course of late antiquity.
To conclude: Augustus’ reforms to the character of the Roman legions
were very important changes and included certain features which might be
characterized as ‘professionalization’ – specifically, establishing
a substantial period of service as the norm, with due rewards both during
service and upon retirement. This allowed men to spend a significant
portion of their adult life as soldiers and to support themselves through
that role, in a way which had not formally been the case previously, even if
there was movement towards that pattern in the final stages of the Republic.
This development in turn facilitated the emergence of soldiers as a distinct
social entity and subculture. The army also had a coherent hierarchy –
another of Michael Howard’s criteria for professionalization. However,
we have also noted some important qualifications to the idea of the
Roman army as a professionalized body. There was no formal system for
training officers, and the training of the rank and file was not as homogeneous or focused on mastery of a body of knowledge as one would
expect from analogy with modern professions. Moreover, while the
Roman military had a corporate identity, it did not govern itself or have
autonomy in its work in the way that is expected of professions in the
modern world.
Above all, however, the slippery nature of the terminology ‘professional’
and ‘professionalization’ deserves emphasis. Because of the widespread
familiarity of these terms in the context of modern professions, their use
with reference to the Roman military risks importing unhelpful anachronistic and modernizing assumptions about the nature of the Roman army; it
risks suggesting that the Roman imperial army was closer in its structures
and ethos to more modern armies than was the case. So, while there are
certain features which might be described as ‘professional’ in a loose sense,
the wide range of connotations of this terminology makes it preferable to
avoid this and cognate terms, and to speak instead of a paid standing army in
the Roman imperial context.
68
Pace Birley 2000: 118 (‘the rise of the “true professional”’ identified from the later third
century); James 2011: 243 (‘the development . . . of a fully professional officer corps’ by the
fourth century); and Coulston 2015: 1013 (‘From the 3rd century CE onwards, commanders
became “professionalized”’).
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