The Taboo Of The Nation

The Taboo Of The Nation By Ali El-Saleh Published in Arabic 2016 The current Syrian revolt reintroduces the question of identity that has long preoccupied us since the Syrian General Congress that was held in 1919, and in which the first Arab parliamentary state was established in Damascus as an aftermath the collapse of Ottoman empire. The Arab nation was described in this conference in a broader sense, as "a nation that is entitled to be on the same level as other nations ... and that the Arab revolt against the Ottomans took place to liberate the Arab people in Syria". Furthermore, and in the same context, the following was expressed: "The members of this conference ... as representatives of the Syrian nation throughout the Syrian land ... have unanimously declared the complete independence of our Syrian land within its natural borders, including Palestine, ... so that the Syrian-Arab nation can achieve a high level of progress and it will be an aspiring member of the civilized world".1 Accordingly, a century ago the members of the Syrian General Congress did not really sense any contradiction or feel any alienation when they spoke of the Arab nation and the Syrian Arab nation at the same time. The French colonialists of the time, who occupied the country almost immediately after the dissolution of the conference, however, had a different opinion, which they put into practice in word and facts. They regarded the "suppleness" of the Syrians thought and speech about the "Syrian nation" as part of the "Arab nation" and, conversely, not only menacing for their interests in 1 1981 ‫ أﯾﻠﻮل‬118 ‫ اﻟﻌﺪد‬،‫ ﻣﺠﻠﺔ ﺷﺆون ﻓﻠﺴﻄﯿﻨﯿﺔ‬،‫ ﺗﺴﻌﻮن ﻋﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻔﺎح‬،‫ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﺰت دروزة‬. Mohamed Ezzat Darwazeh, 90 Years of Struggle, Palestinian Affairs Magazine, N 118, Sept. 1981. 1 The Taboo Of The Nation the Middle East, but also especially for those in their Arab colonies in North Africa. They considered, therefore, the Syrian resistance and the demands for independence would encourage the dissent of their brothers in North Africa against French rule too.2 In 1921 the researcher and French mandate official Henri Lammens published a book entitled: "Syria, a historical overview",3 following guidelines issued by the French High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon. The book not only justified the French occupation of Syria. The most dangerous thing about it was, that the author went further by attempting to highlight the differences between Syrians and Arabs, not only to degrade the role of the Arabs in history, but also to promote local regionalism and induce the sensitization of minorities in Syria. This attempt to paralyze the national affiliation of the Syrians was accompanied by actions on the ground by the French occupier, namely by destroying the geographical unity of the country by partitioning it into five states in Aleppo, Damascus, the Alawite region, the Druze mountain, and the proclamation of the separate State of Greater Lebanon. As is known, the occupying power also worked throughout its rule in Syria to stir up sectarian and ethnic conflicts and to declare themselves as the protectors of the minorities. These practices of French occupation did not stay without consequences, as a result of which the Syrians still suffer until today. The associated "identity" problem had remained unresolved ever since. I will not go into detail on the pitfalls and tragedies of the quest for identity in the period stretching from Syria's independence in 1946 to the outbreak of the Syrian revolt in 2011. It suffices to say in this context that the modern state of Syria in this period of 2 Philip S. Khoury, ed. Linda Shatkowski Schilcher, Stuttgart 1989, Eine Neubewertung der Französischen Kolonialpolitik in Syrien: Die Mandatsjahre, p. 70-78. 3 Henri Lammens, La Syrie, Précis historique, Imprimerie catholique, Beyrouth 1921. 2 The Taboo Of The Nation time has not even tried to resolve the existing contradiction between regional and national, the latter being the only bearer of historical continuity from the golden era of the Arab-Muslim Empire to in our day. Furthermore, it has been difficult for other young Arab regional states to claim, each country being as part of the common historical heritage, individually and at will, the whole for itself. Therefore, each state alone has to bear the consequences of the fragmentation of the collective memory, parallel to the new demarcation of the dividing lines imposed on our region by the colonialist powers.4 Even at the regional level, the Syrian state represented by the Assad regime has not even attempted to help its citizens, with their different ethnic and confessional affiliations, to adapt to the historical developments that accompanied the birth of the modern Syrian state. Hence, the myriad of complications the revolt is currently facing. Another factor that made it difficult for regional Arab states to bring about the necessary changes in Arab historical consciousness, was the strong return to the biblical age in the region, in connection with the establishment of a Jewish state on Palestinian soil that paved the way for similar Islamic and Christian claims and attempts. This was reflected in the previous Lebanese civil war, and is repeated in the ongoing civil wars in Syria and also in Iraq. Accompanying these religious and sectarian complications, other nationalistic affiliations rule together in the Syrian scene today, in a state of desperation, loss, phobia, neurosis and schizophrenia. Some Syrian Kurds, consequently, regard themselves as Kurds first. And the originally Turkish party of the Kurdish Democratic 4 260-16 .‫ ص‬،2006 ‫ ﺑﯿﺮوت‬،‫ دار اﻟﻔﺎراﺑﻲ‬،2006-1956 ‫ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر اﻟﻤﺸﺮق اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ‬،‫ﺟﻮرج ﻗﺮم‬ George Korm, The Explosion of the Levant 1956-2006, Dar Al-Farabi, Beirut, 2006, p. 16-260. 3 The Taboo Of The Nation Union went one step further, when it set up self-administration in the areas it is ruling in present, in a way that displays all the characteristics of separatism. In Afrin, a city in northern Syria with a Kurdish majority, the teaching of Arabic has been banned at some elementary levels, in an isolated step that is no less nationalistic and chauvinistic than that of Damascus regime. Additionally, the current protests by the Assyrian Christian communities (Chaldean / Syriac) in the north were directed against the Kurdish factions that had met recently in the city of Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan. The subject of the meeting was the socalled "autonomous administration of the province of Al-Jazeera", without inviting the other population components of the northeastern region such as the Arab majority, Armenians and Assyrians to participate. All of these events increase and exacerbate the dimensions of the current "Syrian problem". In other words, if our current regional identity in Syria is so distorted, then this is because it reflects the extent of the historical weakness of a key component of that identity, namely, that of the Arab component (especially the Sunni Muslims among them), whose identity as a majority collides with those of the minorities, which are in their turn also in the developing process. The fact remains that, in order to fill the historical void created by the fall of the last unifying Ottoman Empire, the current lack of any great political, economic and cultural power on the Arab side, disturbs our historical memory, and is negatively reflected in the current reality of the Syrian revolt. In addition, it largely prevents the formation of a convincing and new Syrian identity in a broader sense. The responsibility, however, remains with the Syrians themselves to define their own identity and to find the means to overcome the historical impasse created by the contradiction between the creation, on the one hand, of the Syrian regional state and, on the 4 The Taboo Of The Nation other hand, the dream of a broader Arab Union. A contradiction that has been paralyzing the Syrian memory, but also the collective Arab memory, for a century. 5