AFRICAN
MILITARY
STUDIES
Volume 2
In Different Times
The War for Southern Africa
1966–1989
Ian van der Waag & Albert Grundlingh
Editors
In Different Times: The War for Southern Africa, 1966–1989
Published by AFRICAN SUN MeDIA under the SUN PReSS imprint
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Contents
Foreword ...................................................................................................................
vii
Acronyms & Abbreviations ......................................................................................
ix
Introduction: South Africa’s Border War in retrospect ...........................................
2
Ian van der Waag & Albert Grundlingh
PLACES AND EVENTS
1
The Namibian/Angolan border in the Namibian War
for Independence ..............................................................................................
14
Chris Saunders
2
Operation Blouwildebees, 1966: The helicopter assault
on Ongulumbashe .............................................................................................
28
McGill Alexander
3
Operation Savannah, 1975‑76: The initial South African Armour
deployments into Anglo ....................................................................................
44
Jean-Pierre Scherman
4
Namibia: Effective strategic buffer zone or draining foreign
military adventure? ............................................................................................
92
James Jacobs
WAR AND SOCIETY
5
The SADF and the militarisation of white South African Society ................ 136
Rodney Warwick
6
The Kavango Jeugbeweging and the South African counterinsurgency
campaign in Namibia ........................................................................................ 168
Evert Kleynhans
7
Caught in the crossfire: The Progressive Federal Party and defence
politics during the 1980s in South Africa ........................................................ 192
Albert Grundlingh
8
“Ek het iemand op die grens”: The Southern Cross Fund and
mobilisation of white South African society ................................................... 208
Anneke van Heerden
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
9
Confessions of a conscript, disclosures of a historian:
An autobiographical essay about the Border War ........................................... 248
Gary Baines
10 Socialised to serve: An auto‑ethnographical exploration
of the making of the (citizen) conscript in South Africa ............................... 266
Ian Liebenberg
11
The evolution of 32 Battalion: From renegade guerillas
to township troopers ......................................................................................... 298
Will Gordon
12 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and military canteens in the SADF ........................ 322
Ian van der Waag
Contributors ............................................................................................................. 350
Foreword
African Military Studies
Series Editor
Ian van der Waag, Stellenbosch University
African Military Studies is an exciting, new series of books on war, conflict and armed
forces in Africa. Covering the whole span of African history, and the full conflict
continuum, the series seeks to encourage works on the drivers of armed conflict,
the ways in which societies and armed forces prepare for and conduct war, the
development of technology, strategy, tactics, and logistics in the African battlespace,
and the impact of warfare on African societies. African Military Studies presents the
latest research and accepts high‑quality monographs, collections of essays, conference
proceedings, and annotated military and historical texts. It is a library for the academic
specialist, for the policymaker, and for the practitioner with “boots on the ground”.
Acknowledgements
A book of this nature incurs many debts. In the first instance, the contributors are
thanked for their individual chapters as well as the contributions they made to the
discussions during the symposium, The South African “Border War”, 1966-2016;
a quinquagenarial reflection, which led to this book. The Department of History
at Stellenbosch hosted the symposium. Dr Anton Ehlers, the head of the department,
is thanked for the support lent and the personal contribution he made to the success
of the day, which went well beyond the call of duty. The same must be said for
Dr Evert Kleynhans who drew all the maps for this volume. The five‑person panel
that peer reviewed all the papers submitted for this publication are equally thanked
for their critical comments and insightful suggestions. And, finally, the team at African
SunMedia have been fantastic. Special thanks must go to Emily Vosloo and Wikus van
Zyl for their patience and understanding, and to Davida van Zyl for her careful eye
and creativity.
vii
Acronyms & Abbreviations
AFG
Air Force Gymnasium
ANC
African National Congress
Apla
Armscor
BAA
BOSS
C Army
CDFA [HWA]
CDS [HVS]
CF
CG [KG]
Azanian People’s Liberation Army (formerly known as Poqo),
military wing of the PAC
Armaments Corporation of South Africa
Brigade Administrative Area
Bureau of State Security
Chief of the Army
Chief of Defence Force Administration
[Hoof van Weermagsadministrasie]
Chief of Defence Staff [Hoof van Verdedigingstaf ]
Citizen Force
Commandant General [Kommandant Generaal]
CGS
Chief of the General Staff (predecessor of Commandant
General, SADF)
CIR
Centro de Instrução Revolucionária – Centre for Revolutionary
Instruction
CLS
Chief of Logistics Services
COIN
Counterinsurgency
CSI
Chief of Staff Intelligence
DC
Secretary for Defence
DGGA [DGAA]
DMZ
DSADFI [DSAWI]
DTA
Director General of General Administration
[Direkteur-Generaal van Algemene Administrasie]
Demilitarised Zone
Director SADFI [Direkteur SAWI]
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
ix
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
ECC
End Conscription Campaign
Fapla
Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola – People’s Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola (armed wing of MPLA)
FAR
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias – Cuban Revolutionary
Armed Forces
FME
Focus of Main Effort
FNLA
Frelimo
Frente para Liberação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front
HIO
high‑intensity operations
HMO
high‑mobility operations
HSRC
Human Sciences Research Council
Idasa
Institute for Democracy in South Africa
LMG
light machinegun
MA
Military Area
MK
Umkhonto we Sizwe (military wing of the African National
Congress [ANC])
MMCA
Misión Militar Cubana en Angola – Cuban Military Mission
in Angola
MPLA
NAAFI
NAM
NP
Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola – Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola
Navy Army Air Force Institute (not to be confused with the
term ‘naafi’)
Non‑Aligned Movement
National Party
NSM
National Servicemen
OAU
Organisation of African Unity
OCs
Officers Commanding
PAC
Pan Africanist Congress
PAIGC
x
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola – National Front for the
Liberation of Angola
Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – African
Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape Verde
Progressive Federal Party
PLAN
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
POW
prisoner of war
PTSD
post‑traumatic stress disorder
PU for CHE
QMG [KMG]
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education
Quartermaster General [Kwartiermeestergeneraal]
RAU
Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit
(today University of Johannesburg)
RDL
Revolta do Leste – The Eastern Revolt
Recce/s
Reconnaissance Commando/s
SAAC
South African Armoured Corps
SAAF
South African Air Force
SABC [SAUK]
SADF
SADFI [SAWI]
SAGI
SAI
SANDF
South African Broadcasting Corporation
[Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie]
South African Defence Force
South African Defence Force Institute
[Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut]
South African Garrison Institute
South African Infantry Battalion Group
South African National Defence Force
SAP
South African Police
SCF
Southern Cross Fund [Suiderkruisfonds]
SG [GG]
Surgeon General [Geneesheer Generaal]
SMG
submachinegun
SSB
Special Service Battalion
SSC
State Security Council
SWA
SWA Command
Swapo
Acronyms & Abbreviations
PFP
South West Africa
Command General Commanding South West Africa Command
South West Africa People’s Organisation
xi
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
SWATF
TRC
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF
Union Defence Force
UDFI
Union Defence Force Institute
UMU
University Military Unit
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
Unisa
University of South Africa [Universiteit van Suid-Afrika]
Unita
União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola –
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USMU [USME]
Wham
ZDF
xii
South West African Territorial Force
University Stellenbosch Military Unit
[Universiteit Stellenbosch Militêre Eenheid]
winning the hearts and minds
Zairian Defence Force
12
SAWI! LEISURE, COMFORTS AND
MILITARY CANTEENS IN THE SADF
Ian van der Waag
The British canteens have been the focus of ongoing work, often by men and women
long associated with SAGI and the Navy Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI) of the
British armed forces. Sir John Fortescue, historian of the British Army and Royal
Librarian at Windsor, wrote the first history of the British canteens. He approached
this from the early sutlers through to the reforms, undertaken by his brother, that
led to the creation of the Canteen and Mess Society and its successors, SAGI (1900)
and NAAFI (1921). Fortescue’s book, published in 1928, was followed by several
publications at different intervals during the twentieth century.2 Much less has
been done in terms of the canteens in the South African armed forces.3 Fransjohan
Pretorius analysed the questions of supply and leisure within the Boer Commandos
during the Second Anglo‑Boer War4 and James Bourhill has done the same for the
6th South African Armour Division in Italy during the Second World War.5 Neil
Roos, working on the same period, reasoned that leisure, sex and the social control
of white South African volunteers was a critical concern of the defence authorities in
323
Ian van der Waag
Soldiers get up to all kinds of mischief. Whether on a campaign or in the barracks,
there are accusations of alleged looting and scrounging, of illicit sexual encounters,
and even murder. Leisure‑time programmes are now designed to keep young men,
adventurous and emboldened by a sense of power endowed by the profession of arms,
in camp and under military discipline. For millennia, the physical and emotional
well‑being of the soldier was no specific organisation’s official concern. Loot and
plunder all too often supplemented inadequate or non‑existent rations, while soldiers
also fell victim to traders – the sutlers immortalised by Bertolt Brecht in Mother
Courage – who followed armies and adjusted prices according to the intensity of the
campaign and the temperature of battle. Things changed gradually. Regular pay and
embryonic medical and chaplain services were instituted in most European armies
from the Thirty Years War, although the improvement of living conditions for soldiers
and the provision of comforts, refreshments and small luxuries – to supplement those
sparse and mediocre rations – would wait at least another two hundred years. The
canteen organisations created during the latter half of the nineteenth century were
dependent on the goodwill of senior officers and the raising of public awareness. Their
chequered history in the British Army continued until 1900, when Lord Roberts, the
British Commander‑in‑Chief in South Africa during the Second Anglo‑Boer War,
established the South African Garrison Institute (SAGI) as a unified canteen facility to
offer goods and services at reasonable prices to Imperial troops on campaign in South
Africa. The Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI) and the South African Defence
Force Institute (SADFI) (Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut – SAWI) were
direct successors to SAGI and aspired from 1916 to continue this tradition in service
of the South African armed forces.1
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
OPEN FOR BUSINESS
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
Pretoria, highlighting the close relationship between recreation, canteen and military
discipline.6 The entertainment units of the Second World War have been the separate
focus of two journal articles and an MA thesis.7 However, despite the wealth of
archival material on funds and institutions related to the SADF, there has been little,
deeper‑level historical analysis of these issues. This chapter seeks to fill something of
the historiographic gap, by analysing the role and function of SAWI – known better
by the Afrikaans acronym – and examining the measures taken to provide canteen and
shopping facilities and leisure activities to South African troops and military families
during the Border War era.
MILITARY EFFICIENCY, THE ‘TROEPIE’ AND SOCIAL CONTROL
The watchword in all armed forces is military effectiveness.8 This refers to the
combat readiness of the soldier individually and within the organisation as a whole.
Anything that compromises that effectiveness is combatted through regulation and the
application of firm military discipline. Nevertheless, soldiers historically have presented
their commanders with a complexity of problems. Military service – and conscription,
introduced in South Africa in 1967 – served as a rite of passage into adulthood. It
brought freedom from the parental home, uncertainty but the promise of hardship, and
initiation into the military as experienced by older relatives and friends. Geographical
remoteness and social isolation introduced an unnatural environment, with often
empty hours. The SADF organised leisure activities, laid on sporting equipment and
games, and supplemented rations in a variety of ways.
There has been very little historical analysis on leisure and consumption in the South
African armed forces; with the regimental histories tending to follow the battle and
emphasising camaraderie and deeds of valour.9 There are a small, but growing number
of references in the recent Border War memoirs, which can be supplemented by the
vast archives generated by the SADF on institutions and funds, canteens, and sport.
The SADF faced several unfavourable factors on ‘The Border’. A low ratio of force
to space facilitated breakthroughs in the battlespace but imposed severe logistical
problems, made worse by the climate and the nature of the terrain. Large river systems
and flooding in the semi‑arid south of Angola during the rainy season (February
to April) combined with the poverty of the country, fewer bridges and roads, more
unpaved tracks, and less cleared growth and thicker vegetation, exacerbated these
supply difficulties.10 Food was a factor, the bush of the war zone offered little, and all
requirements had to be brought forward by the SADF.
Notwithstanding, complaints – about the quantity, quality and lack of variety of food
– regularly feature in the writings of soldiers. Food, Richard Holmes argues, has a
marked effect on a soldier’s performance, shortages doing ‘more than merely make
324
The South African involvement in the broader war for Southern Africa lasted
from 1966 to 1989. It would be naïve to presume that the near half‑million young
men conscripted from 1967, as well as the older Permanent Force personnel of
the SADF, had no sexual contact over this 23‑year period along a “Border” that
was geographically, logistically, and psychologically a long way from home.14 The
recent writings of former National Servicemen sometimes reveal sordid tales: of
alleged rapes,15 group sex,16 and heavy drinking,17 the feeding of prostitution, and
the circulation of Scope, a soft‑porn magazine,18 and screening of ‘blue movies’.19
Some units were more affected than others. A National Service Medical Officer
records that nearly all the soldiers of 32 Battalion had a venereal disease: “… the
gonococcus has found a home here in Ovamboland, the chaos of war offering the
perfect environment.”20 This “Border”, and military service more generally, was a
rite of passage into manhood. Rituals might involve the consumption of alcohol and
drugs, exposure to pornographic material, and perhaps sexual behaviour and even
violence that would be frowned upon or deemed unacceptable at home. The need to
contain and control the troops, and so minimise any mischief, perhaps particularly on
the part of young National Servicemen, enjoyed paramount importance. The SADF
mitigated the isolation of the Border and the boredom of base life in various ways.
325
Ian van der Waag
But canteens play other roles too. Healthy young men, removed from the normal
female company and home surroundings, are housed in a barracks environment.
Whether in training camps or combat zones, they are often limited to female
contact that may verge on promiscuity if not professional prostitution. This comes
as no surprise. Throughout the history of armed forces, sexual liaisons, ranging from
romantic passion to cold commerce, was widespread and entailed rapture and abuse
on both sides of the gender divide. Casual sex and prostitution, and corresponding
bouts of sexually transmitted diseases, flourish during times of conflict, when sexual
behaviour is freer and pleasure‑seeking and intemperance is fostered by the horror
of war and notions, often very real, about the brevity of life. The rate of admission
for venereal diseases in the Dominion armies during the First World War was 24 per
thousand troops in France and 32 per thousand in Egypt.12 The Second World War
presented similar statistics, but in Korea, the South African rate per thousand shot
up to 130 per thousand in March 1953.13 Regular medical inspection of personnel;
lectures on STDs and preventative measures; the running of prophylactic centres (the
‘Blue Light Depots’); and abundant well‑organised sporting and recreational facilities,
all removed from the influences of local towns, formed part of the military solution.
Primarily, it remains a hidden history, “an aspect perhaps best forgotten”, and no
statistics are presently available for the SADF troops during the Border War.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
men hungry, dispirited and increasingly ineffective’.11 However, battle rations could
be improved and varied and might include chocolates and cigarettes, and supplies and
small luxuries might also be bought from a SAWI whenever one was in the area.
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
They provided sporting equipment, distributed games, dug swimming pools, built
tennis courts, revitalised ‘rat packs’, and opened shops and canteens on military bases
and in military towns. Soldiers were thereby encouraged to spend leisure time within
unit lines, removed from the allure of neighbouring suburbs and towns, and remained
safely under military discipline. SAWI was the primary organisation that managed
these shops and canteens, ran the mobile canteens in the operational area, and, from
the proceeds of the business so conducted, sponsored the building and maintenance of
recreational facilities.
PUTTING THE RIGHT FOOT FORWARD:
STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT
SAWI has had something of a chequered history. Starting as the UDFI in 1916 it
performed this task, for the most, quite adequately, supplying members of the Union
Defence Force (UDF) with canteen facilities in South West Africa (SWA) during the
First World War and then serving South African and Allied servicemen and women
in no fewer than five theatres during the Second World War. Fragmentation of the
business within South Africa during the interwar years led to the emergence of local
institutes, in the form of the Pretoria Garrison Institute, the Cape Peninsula Garrison
Institute, and the Algoa Bay Garrison Institute, until re‑amalgamation and a name
change in 1957 to SADFI.
The organisation underwent far‑reaching changes from 1916, changing from a
mainly civilian organisation into a military unit. However, poor management and a
lack of business acumen led to an extremely pitiable public image. Several inquiries
into the affairs of the Institute followed – in December 1939, September 1952, and
February 1961 – and, on each occasion, insufficient remedial action compounded
matters. The Institute was at times charged with the abuse of its credit system,
condemned as a social evil, and for making victims of the military families buying
goods on credit. Customers accused the Institute of inflating prices to cover losses,
maintaining an inadequate stock, having an officer‑preferential policy and delivering
a generally poor, often‑grudging service. As a result, many members of the UDF
who could afford to take their custom elsewhere did so. Opinion gauged during the
inquiries (perhaps at best a perception within only a small portion of the military
community) was that the Institute no longer justified its existence as it no longer
fulfilled the function of supplying the soldier cheaply and expeditiously. Such negative
threads were not continuous or ubiquitous, and the Institute cannot be judged solely
from the ‘negative overload’ in the archival ‘residue’ of the Institute, which was of
course the result of SADFI’s specific documentary process. It is also true that few
businesses would have survived the vicissitudes of the five decades preceding 1968
when the SADF took the Institute out of the purely business arena.
326
The condition of SADFI improved dramatically after 1968. Between June and
November 1968, the Institute achieved an overall price reduction of approximately
17.5% throughout the Transvaal, with smaller reductions in the Cape. ‘Sticking stocks’
were disposed of in the Transvaal and replaced by a wider variety and a greater range
of new stocks at competitive prices. Customer support increased by more than 60%
327
Ian van der Waag
Massive changes followed in 1968, the year of the first National Service intake.
Brigadier Larry Hopkins was appointed as general manager, with a new Permanent
Force management team to run the Institute, under the overall control of the
Quartermaster General.21 In peacetime, SADFI, confined to the Republic of South
Africa, was divided into two regions for effective control: the Cape and the Transvaal.
For the first time in the history of the Institute, the managers formed a management
team, and the different branches were run as one organisation. Militarisation brought
about an immediate re‑assessment and a reorientation of attitude by many senior
officers. Hopkins’s appointment gave SADFI new status and authority both within
the Defence Force and in negotiations with trading associates. SADFI now was no
ordinary trading concern, but an integral and vitally important part of the SADF,
promising enormous benefits if adequately supported.22 “For the first time”, according
to Brigadier Brian Slater, who would succeed Hopkins in 1976, “the soldier felt that
the soldier was controlling SADFI to the benefit of the soldier”.23 Militarisation
brought other benefits. The entry of a large number of civilians and delivery vehicles
to units and military bases was averted. All problems regarding institutions and funds,
such as the non‑payment of accounts, could be settled within the organisation so as
not to tarnish the image of the SADF. And, with time, SADFI established itself as the
sole supplier of all commodities required by units. It not only introduced uniform
prices but saved the individual institutions money and manpower. By the end of the
1970s, the Institute had established a productive Citizen Force element able to supply
canteen services at isolated places at short notice.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
However, this is only part of a complex story. The 1952 board of inquiry found
that the convenience of a nearby shop for married members of the UDF living on
military bases where they could not obtain necessities at reasonable prices justified the
continued existence of the Institute. During the implementation of several changes and
an improvement in the finances of the organisation, the Institute remained burdened
with the most significant problem which had been haunting it since 1916. It was the
fact that the Institute remained an attempt to run a civilian shopping organisation
inside the SADF for members of the SADF. In 1968, the General Staff decided to take
the whole structure out of the purely business arena and adapt it to suit the military
environment. South Africa was slowly being drawn into a war on her borders and,
as a result thereof, the Institute’s activities were re‑evaluated with a view towards the
growing need for an effective field canteen system. This involved a shift on the part of
SADFI from retail trade to operational trade.
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
between August and November 1968 and soon adverse criticism was almost entirely
restricted to factors arising from the struggle to offer a modern shopping service in
obsolete shops and stores. Relationships with military units also improved given a
growing understanding of and increasing support for the new SADFI based on the
NAAFI model. While the Institute could not meet all unit requirements at better
prices than elsewhere, the average prices level per unit was unquestionably lower.
Army units as far afield as Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Potchefstroom, Middelburg and
Nigel began to purchase many of their requirements from SADFI Voortrekkerhoogte
voluntarily.24 The trading accounts for the six months ending on 31 August 1968
reflected, for the first time in two years, a small profit in the Transvaal. With growing
support and increasing turnover, the Institute rehabilitated to such an extent that
the Director General of General Administration could report to the Defence Staff
Council: “There is no way in which a meaningful comparison can be made between
the disreputable and bankrupt SADFI of early 1968 and new SADFI.”25 As activities
of SADFI expanded, and beyond official expectation, Hopkins held the hope that
SADFI might develop as NAAFI of the SADF and that all unit institutions would
become SADFI outlets.26
SADFI, as an enterprise, achieved some stability by 1974. Surplus assets, excluding
buildings and major equipment, exceeded R650 000 and was invested in stock that
realised an average turnover of R500 000 per month. Although sufficient for wholesale
buying, this fell far short of the amount needed to finance long‑term development
programmes essential for future growth. The reversal of inherited debt, the reduction
of loans, and the financing of growth of about 475% between 1968 and 1974 largely
absorbed trading profits. The financial problem, compounded by the late payment
of credit sales, in April 1974 caused the Chief of the SA Defence Force to instruct
all formations, units and sections to pay their SADFI accounts within 30 days.
Furthermore, and much to Hopkins’s indignation, the assets of the SADFI Trust Fund,
that would have settled all outstanding loans, were instead spent on a residence for the
commanding officer of SWA Command.27 The lack of trading capital was certainly
slowing growth.28
Hopkins won other battles. On one front were the shops and canteens run by individual
units for their benefit. They represented a motley crew, and no real improvement had
taken place since the introduction of National Service. The reasons for this were
equally multifarious: some unit commanders showed little interest and gave little
direction and guidance, others did not have the time to set aside for the unit shop,
and all battled with small ranges and erratic supply. Importantly, these unit shops did
not keep pace with the needs of large numbers of National Servicemen.29 As a result,
SADFI became the preferred wholesaler, and all units were instructed to purchase all
goods and services from the Institute. In August 1973, Admiral Hugo Biermann, the
Chief of the SA Defence Force, decided that all institutions, sports clubs and funds
328
SHOPPING FACILITIES:
MILITARY TOWNS, GARRISONS, UNITS
By 1974, growth had taken place at such a rate that reference in policy to ‘branches’ of
SADFI had become mostly meaningless.37 SADFI was initially permitted to provide
services where it had a shop or a ‘branch’. However, in preparation for possible
wartime mobilisation and in compliance with the direction to ‘provide a service to
units and troops under arms anywhere within or outside the Republic wherever they
may be’, SADFI developed a network of approved suppliers throughout South Africa.
With this, the Institute met the needs of units it could not, for practical reasons, serve
directly. These ‘approved suppliers’ became SADFI ‘branches’.38
At first, SADFI mainly restricted attention to the Transvaal. This region and Pretoria,
in particular, had been identified as the most profitable point for growth after 1968.
329
Ian van der Waag
Hopkins consolidated matters before his retirement. A difficult process, he had listed
several ‘demands for continued service’ in a letter to the Chief of the SA Defence
Force. It resulted in the provision of additional trading capital and the review of the
management and control structure. As general manager of SADFI, Hopkins now
also became Director of Institutions on the Quartermaster General’s staff, while an
assistant general manager was appointed and additional Permanent Force personnel
were allotted to the Institute.33 Liaison between the general manager and senior
representatives of the Arms of Service became more effective and more frequent
following the disbandment of the old SADFI Board of Control and the creation of
a liaison committee comprising representatives from all of the Services.34 Trading
restrictions were relaxed to allow unit shops to supply all of the needs of National
Servicemen confined to their respective military areas and lacking the freedom to buy
from the shops in town during business hours.35 These steps enhanced the status of
SADFI and SADFI interests, and vastly improved the service given by direct SADFI
outlets as well as unit shops. They also confirmed the important place the shopping
facilities and field services of SADFI had assumed in the SADF.36 These functions –
the larger shopping facilities and the mobile field service – will be dealt with in turn.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
do likewise. Biermann accepted the position that SADFI would not always be able to
quote the lowest price but would be the lowest most of the time. Moreover, whereas
civilian suppliers were in business for profit, SADFI was an integral part of the SADF,
ploughing back profits to improve and extend services for the benefit of military units
and members of the SADF and their families.30 Notwithstanding, he and Magnus
Malan, then Chief of the Army, and others believed that the Institute ought to obtain
support through persuasion rather than compulsion.31 In this, they were seemingly
proved correct. Units, at first somewhat cautiously, later wholehearted gave support
to SADFI.32
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
In fact, during the ‘rescue years’, the management, facing the genuine possibility of
liquidation, had little choice. Having to convince higher authorities that the position
of SADFI was redeemable and that the Institute was capable to make a profit,39
Hopkins focused on the only region capable of rapid growth. “Nothing”, he noted,
“was expected from the Cape other than they keep their heads above the water.”40
However, once he consolidated the Institute’s position and the Transvaal had enjoyed
the incredible growth of 1973/74, the growing demand for SADFI services elsewhere
could not be satisfied. The most significant problem facing the Cape business was
the dispersion of the few training bases for National Servicemen situated in the
Cape province, the largest element being the Navy – the smallest of the Services
– and Naval Headquarters moved from Simon’s Town up to Pretoria in 1977.41
Although the situation improved to a limited extent with the opening of the Da
Gama Park branch and the expansion of the shop and area depot at Wynberg, there
was no military complex in the Cape comparable to Voortrekkerhoogte. Growth was,
therefore, much more expensive and contained the prospect of far smaller returns.
Distance complicated advertising, limited personal client contact, and delayed the
delivery of goods.42 The Cape regional manager, a civilian until 1972, seemingly added
to the difficulties.43 The Cape repeatedly yielded to the needs of Pretoria, the seat of
Defence Headquarters since the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912,
and the hub of all SADF activity. The Institute’s growth in the Transvaal was therefore
not replicated in the south.
By the end of the 1970s, business was slowing down across the country. Supermarkets,
just getting off the ground when the SADFI militarised in 1968, were new competition
and SADFI was not ‘supermarket’ orientated. The buildings were not conducive to
modern trading and most of its shops were corner cafés, that traditionally only had
to compete with corner cafés. The task of repositioning SADFI in terms of buildings
and infrastructure and client base mostly fell to Brigadier Brian Slater, who succeeded
Hopkins in August 1976. He implemented two critical measures. The first was the
decision taken in 1978 to create facilities that were modern and offered an engaging
shopping experience. Secondly, steps were taken to make SADFI more competitive in
terms of price.44
The physical infrastructure remained a problem. The Institute had no property rights
to any of their buildings, owned or hired, all of which had been erected on state
property. Alterations or renovations led to growing debt to the UDFI Trust Fund,45
while the Institute remained hesitant to invest in accommodation it did not own.46
Most of the premises where SADFI conducted business were ineffective or inadequate
to carry on modern business.47 Although SADFI, over the previous ten years, procured
more than 50% of the buildings occupied by the Institute in 1954, these buildings
were already old and, in some cases, dilapidated on the date of acquisition (Table 12.1).
330
Notwithstanding, converted to a general dealer’s store, it was still in a fair state of repair
in 1944 despite bad light, insufficient ventilation and inadequate storage.49 The position
was similar elsewhere. The wood and iron building used as the Voortrekkerhoogte
dairy, also gifted by the Imperial Government in 1921, had been condemned by the
Surgeon General in 1957.50
TABLE 12.1
Classification of UDFI premises according to the year of construction and the year of
occupation by the Institute
Year
Pre‑1925
1925‑34
1935‑44
1945‑54
unknown
Construction
8
6
Occupation
2
7
5
2
5
3
14
-
TABLE 12.2 New SADFI branches, 1968-1975
Branch
Date opened
Form of accommodation
Eersterivier
20 Mar 1970
Converted bungalow at 2 SACC Bn
Da Gama Park
01 Oct 1972
Converted bungalow
Grootfontein
1974 (exact unknown)
Tent
Naval Dockyard Simon’s Town
01 Aug 1975
Old NAAFI canteen
A reassessment of SADFI policy came in 1974, including guidelines for expansion.
SADFI may not have had the capital, but expansion could also not take place at the
cost of other priority projects in the SADF. New branches had to be limited to places
331
Ian van der Waag
Successive inquiries into the Institute’s affairs raised the issue of the state of the
buildings. In 1961, the Peat, Marwick and Mitchell team found that the “premises
[were] poorly planned, dull in appearance and in a bad state of repair”.51 Five years
later, the Groenewald Investigation recommended that immediate steps be taken to
provide suitable premises and services at state cost.52 Renovations were a matter of
urgency, and there had been some positive developments. In May 1966, for example,
SADFI entered an agreement with Mobil Oil Southern Africa to build a modern
service centre and shopping centre at Voortrekkerhoogte.53 The first petrol was sold
on 29 July 1968.54 Four new branches were added to the existing ten between 1968
and 1975, although, in all four cases, existing buildings and temporary accommodation
had to be used (Table 12.2). The recommendations made by Hopkins regarding new
developments in Voortrekkerhoogte, to cater for the growing residential complexes
and the first National Service intake, received a mixed reception.55 Reduced liquidity
delayed renovations and new constructions. The Institute had to stabilise its finances
and repay loans before they could undertake major development.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
Ten of the twenty‑eight buildings occupied by the Institute in that year were of wood,
or wood and iron construction.48 The Wynberg shop, for example, was housed in an
old timber and iron bungalow taken over from the Imperial Government in 1921 and,
back in August 1930, had been condemned as rodent‑infested.
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
where the private sector could not provide a service. And, as far as deployability and
expansibility went, the family shopping service had to be on such a scale and manner
that the organisation, trade experience and contracts could be extended to ensure
that SADFI was able to deliver an effective shopping service to troops in the field
after mobilisation.56 Growing insecurity on the northern borders and the impending
deployment of troops proved to be a lifeline.
An expansion programme was planned to meet increasing demands. SADFI erected
a new, modern supermarket in 1974 at Langebaan Road at the cost of R167 000; the
project had been in the pipeline for almost ten years. The new dairy and warehouse
complex for Voortrekkerhoogte, requested in 1967 and delayed due to site problems,
was completed in September 1975.57 The unit canteen at SAS Saldanha was taken
over in 1975. They upgraded and extended other facilities and introduced a milk
service from Voortrekkerhoogte to canteens and families in units deployed in the
north‑eastern Transvaal. SADFI opened a new café or restaurant in Voortrekkerhoogte
in October 1975 and constructed similar facilities in the Naval Dockyard, Simon’s
Town. They modernised the family shop at Dunottar and erected a new shop and
warehouse at Grootfontein. This period, on the other hand, also saw the closure, after
five consecutive years of losses, of the family shop at Port Elizabeth.58 Rapid expansion
marked the thirteen years after 1975. SADFI established no less than 31 branches. The
number of branches doubled between 1983 and 1989. Predictably, most of the growth
took place in the Transvaal and SWA (Table 12.3).
TABLE 12.3 Geographical location and date of opening of SADFI branches, 1968-1989
Date
Transvaal
Orange Free State
Cape
South West Africa
Totals
%
Pre-1968
4
-
6
-
10
19.6
1969-1975
-
-
3
1
4
7.8
1976-1982
8
-
-
1
9
17.7
1983-1989
12
-
3
7
22
43.1
Unknown
2
2
2
-
6
11.8
Totals
26
2
14
9
51
100
%
51
3.9
27.5
17.6
100
-
The Northern Transvaal area, particularly, experienced much growth. In 1984, a
canteen in the Liberty Life Building, in Vermeulen Street, Pretoria was opened,59
and this service to the ‘soldier in the office’ was extended to the Hallmark Building
on 5 April 1988.60 A new shop, far larger than the existing facility, was opened at
Potchefstroom on 8 April 1986.61 Given this tremendous growth, the Northern
Transvaal area was divided with effect from 1 July 1988 with the appointment of
a Captain Jooste as area manager of the new Far Northern Transvaal Area.62 The
enterprise in SWA (Namibia) commenced in 1974 with two mobile canteens and a
small shop initially housed in a tent at Grootfontein. By 1989, there were no fewer
than nine branches in the territory, excluding several depots and lesser facilities.
332
The same survey in 1979 found that National Servicemen and junior ranks tended to
support SADFI better than senior ranks.67 To a greater or lesser extent, this phenomenon
can be ascribed to several factors, the first of which was the geographic problem faced
by SADFI. Residential patterns reflected that senior officers, concentrated in the
neighbouring suburbs, supported SADFI less than members of lower rank, who were
concentrated in and around the training camps of Voortrekkerhoogte and hence had
a greater opportunity to buy from the conveniently situated SADFI.68 The market
SADFI catered for was a second factor. In the past, SADFI tended to concentrate on
National Servicemen. This confirmed in the minds of many Permanent Force families
that their needs could better be met by the supermarkets, hypermarkets, and family
stores which mushroomed in South African suburbs from the end of the sixties.69
A third factor, public perception, was equally important. The junior ranks were
relatively new in the SADF and were therefore only acquainted with the ‘new’ SADFI
of the post1968 era. They were not aware of the previously poor reputation that, for
years, remained implanted in the minds of many members of the Permanent Force.70
SADFI launched a massive advertising campaign in the 1980s to reach the military
community, who remained the Institute’s only customer base. SADFI introduced new
innovative ideas and implemented a marketing strategy and began to set competitive
prices.71 ‘New‑look’ shops gradually replaced older facilities; they extended services
and the number of SADFI outlets increased (Table 12.3). The outlets granted credit
333
Ian van der Waag
Much depended as well on the image of the Institute and loyalty of its customers.
Clearly, by the late 1970s, SADFI had changed from an enterprise relatively unpopular
with the military community to one that had obtained their respect and confidence.
Notwithstanding dramatic improvements in the benefits and facilities offered, some
servicemen remained critical.64 Colonel François Dannhauser, who became assistant
general manager on 1 January 1983, found that poor market orientation brought a
breakdown in communication between Institute and customers. Customers, unaware
of various discounts, felt prices were higher than what they were. Market research
confirmed that some customers did not understand the complicated price structure,
and the widespread perception remained that SADFI was still very expensive.65
A survey conducted in 1979 confirmed the notion that the military community
were not giving their maximum support to SADFI. Residents of Voortrekkerhoogte
spent approximately 64% of their monthly grocery budget at SADFI, while service
personnel resident in neighbouring areas, such as Valhalla, where competition existed,
tended to support SADFI considerably less. As a result, the discounts were done away
in 1980, and SADFI reduced all prices by an average of 10%.66 SADFI was now
becoming more competitive in terms of price.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
The Windhoek operation was taken over from SWADFI (the short‑lived SWA
Defence Force Institute) in 1982.63 This is a clear reflection of the increased demand
placed on SADFI by the military community.
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
under controlled circumstances. Considerable sums of money were diverted to provide
facilities for the military community, including two kindergartens in Voortrekkerhoogte.72
SADFI had become a dynamic and profitable organisation capable of delivering real
benefits to servicemen.
SADFI had a growing presence in the military towns and on military bases. Many
units now had smaller SADFI outlets. These shops, cafés and canteens offered
groceries, personal items, and additional rations, perhaps mostly fast foods, to resident
military families and the large biannual influxes of National Servicemen. Complaints
regarding official rations, perhaps mainly by National Servicemen, extended from the
large training bases to deployment in the operational area. “Anthony”, an 18‑year‑old
National Service chef, relates:
They taught me to cook, but it’s different when you are cooking for over 1 000
guys. Everything’s boil and oil. Catering in the army was about good quality food
fucked up.73
The sister of two National Servicemen and girlfriend of another stated:
Really – those rat packs! For a guy who’s eighteen, there was not enough food in
them for one proper lunch, let alone a day or longer. They didn’t even get given
those often, either, when they were out in the bush – at least, not every day.74
Food and culinary experience differed vastly.75 And then there was the omnipresent
SADFI seeking to fill the need. François Verster, a National Serviceman in the late
1980s, describes the general dealer role played by SADFI at the time:
Ons koop baie by die SAWI, want die armykos is maar min en nie altyd lekker nie. Die
ouens sê ons sal sien as die voorrade opraak, kry ons net pap. … Ons koop ook Themde
en onderbroeke by die SAWI. Jy kan omtrent enigiets daar kry, maar ons soek meestal
kos. [We buy many things at the SADFI, because army rations are meagre and
not always pleasant. The chaps here say that we will notice when the supplies
run short. Then we get porridge. …We also buy Tshirts and underpants at the
SADFI.You can get anything there, but we mostly look for food.]76
Besides, while SADFI met the demand for additional rations and other items, there
were also notions that SADFI emptied the pockets of servicemen.Verster, who served
as a National Service teacher on the Omega base, describes the SADFI there as a
“… massiewe weermagswinkel wat soos ’n vliegtuigloods gelyk het”. National Servicemen
and the teachers with bigger salaries spent their salaries and danger pay here.
Ons danger pay is in kontant uitbetaal. Dit was altyd welkom, hoewel die meeste van ons
ons geld in die SAWI gaan mors het en die geld dus net weer terug na die weermag se
koffers is. Veral die Boesmans het seker omtrent elke sent van hul salarisse in die SAWI
‘teruggeploeg’.Waar anders? Daar was net die een winkel. [Our danger pay is paid out
334
In 1984, South Africa entered the worst recession since 1933. Despite an increase
of 15.5% in the Institute’s turnover, net profit dropped by 1.7%. The cost of repairs to
and the maintenance of the buildings increased from R206 636 to R314 502. Salaries
increased by 23%, of which 10% was attributable to the employment of additional staff
for the new outlets.78 No less than 36% of the SADFI outlets operated at a loss. Certain
of the smaller outlets, often situated in isolated places, were run at a calculated loss to
deliver a service to the local military communities.79 Under these circumstances, any
civilian organisation would probably have closed these branches. A large amount of
stock shrinkage compounded the difficult financial situation.80
Despite calls for greater privatisation and complaints from the private sector that they
could not compete with SADFI, an investigation in 1986 found compelling arguments
against privatisation. There was no way to privatise SADFI if the Institute was still
to offer a service. The principle of low prices with minimum profit (as a benefit to
servicemen) would be lost.
Moreover, the question arose as to which large firm would be willing to operate
small shops in bungalows at isolated places for small communities (in 1986,
approximately 50% of SADFI branches operated with no profit). And then, profit‑
driven organisations would not be willing to divert funds from financially secure
branches to subsidise non‑profit branches as a service. Private firms could not offer
a service in the operational areas. These same firms would also not be willing to pay
rent for the dilapidated buildings and operate in isolated areas where it would have to
increase prices drastically to cover overheads. Perhaps most of the criticism directed by
the private sector was based on a poor understanding of the SADFI enterprise. Local
chambers of commerce stressed the use of state accommodation, state transport in the
operational area, and some state‑paid Permanent Force personnel. However, as far as
possible, SADFI was operated financially independent of the state. The Permanent
335
Ian van der Waag
The later 1980s saw something of a renaissance. The activities of SADFI had quadrupled
since 1976.This was due to the growth of the trade in SWA as well as the establishment
and expansion of SADFI services to isolated bases.81 SADFI opened new malls
and shops at Voortrekkerhoogte (1979), Bloemfontein (1982), Bloemspruit (1983),
Potchefstroom (1986), Port Elizabeth (1986) and Windhoek (1987). Prices were visibly
competitive. A comparison of 400 grocery items carried out by Dannhauser in 1986,
reflected a benefit for SADFI customers that varied between 5.16% and 7.14%.82
Although SADFI was normally 4% to 5% cheaper than other supermarket chains, the
Institute was as much as 8.49% cheaper than its cheapest opposition in July 1989.83
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
in cash. This was always welcome, although we mostly wasted our money in the
SADFI and the money in this way returned to the army coffers. The Bushmen
(sic), particularly, probably ‘ploughed back’ every cent of their salaries in the
SADFI. Where else? There was only the one shop.]77
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
Force element was kept to a minimum and concentrated on the command and
control, and the operational trade. As such, SADFI did not compete with the private
sector. Advertising campaigns were limited to the military community and civilians
were turned away at SADFI outlets. A strict application of the regulations dissipated
the tremendous amount of opposition from commercial quarters.84
In 1989, the end of the Border War, SADFI had almost 100 outlets across South
Africa and SWA. The Institute offered diverse services to the military community,
from convenient outlets for groceries and clothing to petrol, sports goods, furniture,
household appliances, and vehicle financing. During the 1988/89 financial year,
SADFI had a turnover of R145 million and engaged approximately 1 200 employees.
It was no small enterprise.
FIELD SERVICE: OPERATIONAL ROLE, 1968-1989
The Institute’s other role, the delivery of a mobile canteen services under battle
conditions, saved SADFI in 1968. Until the changes that had followed militarisation
took effect, the military community had viewed SADFI with much suspicion and
disregard. The Institute, which did not accompany the South African contingent to
Korea, had last seen operational deployment in 1945.85 Over the following years, the
Institute suffered from its poor image. Even Major General P.H. Grobbelaar, then
Army Chief of Staff, had objected in 1956 to ‘the presence of UDFI vehicles within
the tactical area, even on exercise’.86 Grobbelaar arranged for unit canteens to supply
non‑ration items to his exercising troops during Operation ORANJE. As a result
of this kind of opposition, the SADFI mobile field element was still non‑existent
by 1968.87
The first steps taken to provide the field services followed the militarisation of the
Institute in 1968. The Army Order of Battle then provided for a mobile SADFI to
form on mobilisation. They ordered the first of a series of mobile canteens and a
Permanent Force post for a ‘Mobile Shop Manager’ was created for the permanent
establishment of the Institute.88 Militarisation, and then growing SADF involvement
in the Border War reinstated the idea of a unified canteen system and led to the
acceptance of the principle of an operationally capable and active Institute.
SADFI practised their mobile field function for the first time in May 1972 during
exercise BROLLY TREE, a simulated defence of South Africa. It introduced a new
primary role. Until then, the Institute had concentrated on what was its secondary
role, namely the provision of static shopping facilities to the military community
in South Africa. During this exercise, which lasted from 5 to 27 May 1972, SADFI
proved its competence in satisfying the canteen requirements of a full brigade under
336
The first SADFI shop opened in SWA in 1974. It first operated from a tent at
Grootfontein.93 During Operation SAVANNAH, a bulk trade section was established
at Grootfontein. Orders placed by bases and units in the operation area were dispatched
from this depot and, from January 1976, two mobile canteens ploughed through
the day to service units in transit in the Grootfontein area.94 Overnight SADFI was
presented with an operational task, conducted under combat conditions.
However, several factors constrained the SADFI operational service. Misunderstanding
about where SADFI fitted into the command and control structure during operations
remained. SADFI also did not have the necessary personnel, vehicles and equipment
to handle the mobilisation task. This led to an inefficient distribution of commodities
from the base area (Grootfontein) to the front. Some units travelled from as far
as Calueque and Moçâmedes, some 700 kilometres away, to collect supplies at
Grootfontein. Canteen facilities were lacking at some centres, including Rundu, while
SADFI retail facilities were inadequate at Grootfontein. Problems were compounded
by an ineffective pay system that limited the buying power of the troops.95 All in all,
in 1976, SADFI was able to deliver a praiseworthy service as far as Grootfontein and
would suffer the challenges of the distances and physical geography beyond that.
337
Ian van der Waag
The real test came soon with operational deployment to the northern borders.
From 1969, military personnel might have experienced a minimum of six months
service in the operational area and, as a result, soldiers were away from home for
reasonably extensive periods. Military bases in South West Africa were situated in
distant, isolated areas, the climate was one of extremes, and servicemen often worked
and lived under trying circumstances. There were no mobile canteens or cinemas, as
the UDFI had operated during the Second World War, and opportunities for effective,
quality, leisure programmes were limited, although the Director General Personnel did
organise entertainment groups and provide film shows to a limited extent. Grass sports
fields were practically non‑existent, and it was not uncommon for a rugby match to
be temporarily stopped when the ball was lost in the swirl of dust churned up by the
players’ bare feet.92 The need for an institute able to meet the canteen and recreational
needs of the troops was evident.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
mobile, war‑simulated conditions. During the first ten days of the exercise, they sold
approximately 16 800 tins of cool drink, almost 88 000 packets of twenty cigarettes,
seven dozen (84) electric razors, twenty‑three boxes of shoe polish, numerous
souvenirs, and crates of sweets.89 The reaction was tremendous and in sharp contrast
to the sentiments expressed after Operation ORANJE. The Commanding Officer
of North‑Western Command requested a SADFI presence at the next exercise.90
SADFI teams operated in the field on every major exercise between 1972 and 1990,
while providing a service in one form or another to many Citizen Force units and
Commandos during training camps.91
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
A committee, to investigate the role of SADFI in the operational areas, was appointed
on 24 March 1976.96 Chaired by Major General W.A. Lombard, this committee found
that a decentralised system supplying services directly to frontline troops and based
on the NAAFI ideal, could not exist in the SADF. The supply of canteen facilities to
small, highly mobile forces operating over a vast area in the African bush was too costly
and personnel intensive.97 The same lessons had to be learnt again: the old UDFI (V)
was largely unable to render a service to the frontline during the mobile periods of
the North African campaign and even battled to do so during the static months of
the Italian campaign in 1944. The Lombard Committee recommended that, under
conventional circumstances, the final wholesale distribution point of SADFI be in the
Brigade Administrative Area (BAA) and other more fixed bases. From these points,
units were to undertake the distribution of commodities through the normal echelon
system. The final point‑of‑provision would, therefore, be through the unit canteens
and not the SADFI mobiles. This released the latter canteens for service in fixed bases,
BAAs and on return routes where they expected amassing of troops, such as in the
demobilisation areas.98
Adjusting rapidly to the circumstances, SADFI became increasingly proficient and,
from 1981, participated in all SADF operations. During Operation DOLFYN, canteen
supplies were transported from the SADFI depot in Oshakati to the SADFI element
in the front maintenance area, from where provisions were supplied by road, air and
parachute to combat groups at the front. During this operation and its successor,
ASKARI (1983), SADFI suffered losses in transport. However, improved security, the
presence of SADFI personnel, and the optimum use of the echelon system vastly
diminished the incidence of theft.99 The SADFI bulk stores that operated during all
operations since PROTEA (1981) fulfilled the dual function of wholesale provision
to unit canteens and the Institute’s mobiles, which as a rule did not operate in
competition with unit facilities.100
This extract from a letter written by Major F. Eckhardt, the second‑in‑command of
the Cape Town Highlanders, reflects the appreciation operational troops had for the
services offered by SADFI in the operational area:
Our meeting with you on our recent tour of operational duty was truly a
Godsend, and it certainly was a great boost to our sagging morale. Not only
were you directly responsible for coming to our aid with SADFI necessities and
allowing us the sole use of one of your trucks, but in so doing you ensured that
an important aspect of life on the border was able to be carried out and made
life that little bit easier.101
However, SADFI support largely took place on an ad hoc basis.102 No policy directives
or procedures existed save a broad outline in the General Regulations. This had a
detrimental effect on the service provided.103 SADFI only reached an agreement with
the Army on its role and deployment during cross‑border operations in 1987. The
338
In May 1988, events in SWA took a new turn when negotiations between South
Africa, Angola and Cuba commenced in London. This culminated in the signing
of two accords on 22 December 1988, and the implementation of the negotiated
peace settlement plan for SWA on 1 April 1989. The withdrawal of South African
troops from Namibia and the closure of all SADFI outlets in the country ended
an interesting phase in the Institute’s history. The Institute managed to execute its
operational task with exceptional efficiency despite the changes brought about by
the recent militarisation and the fact that service often had to be provided with very
little notice.110
339
Ian van der Waag
Operation PACKER was launched early in 1988, with a view to a tactical disengage‑
ment of the South African forces involved in the repulsion of the Fapla offensive of
1987.106 Supplies were forwarded from the SADFI depots in South Africa by road
and rail to the SADFI depot in Grootfontein. SADFI bulk trucks distributed these
provisions to the various bulk stores scattered along the length of northern SWA, from
Oshakati in the west to Mpacha in the east. These provisions were sold in wholesale to
the local units and also provided the local SADFI shops with goods for retail trade to
the local military community. Operation PACKER was executed through Rundu; and
this boosted the turnover of the small shop, opened barely twenty months before, to
over R1 million per month.107 Supplies were forwarded from the bulk store at Rundu
by convoys of 3 Maintenance Unit to the brigade administrative and demobilisation
areas. The mobile field depot deployed in the BAA consisted of two wholesale
trucks (Samil 100 6x6 insulated vehicles) and two mobile canteen trucks (Samil 100
6x6 vehicles equipped with large fridges). This mobile field depot netted an average
turnover of R262 800 per month.108 At the demobilisation or transit area, three SADFI
canteens served approximately two thousand troops throughout Operation PACKER.
These mobiles stocked all necessities from toiletries and chocolates to wines, malts
and tinned mussels. However, the buying power of troops moving north was greatly
restricted as they did not have their first pay. It was, however, made up by those troops
moving south, who had many months’ pay and several ‘Victory Vouchers’ (or ‘Bakgat
Bewyse’) that they could exchange for beers or cool drinks. These three canteens
produced a turnover of R90 000 between 28 February and 28 March 1988.109
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
content of this agreement was included in the Army’s Report on the Logistic System
and provided a foundation for a number of policy documents: a policy directive
or ‘philosophy and doctrine of the SADFI’; a logistics pamphlet regarding SADFI
activities; and a directive in respect of the tasks of the general manager, SADFI.104
They implemented these procedures during Operations MODULER (1 July to
15 December 1987), and HOOPER (15 December 1987 to March 1988) and SADFI
played a key role in supplying troops when and where canteen support was needed.
For the first time, they made night drops where this was the only way of getting
supplies to the troops in forward positions. Great appreciation was expressed, with an
emphasis on the SADFI ability to offer its services from the outset of the operation.105
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
Unlike the liquidation of the UDFI in 1921, the SADFI had no organisation to which it
could transfer the canteen infrastructure. An SWA Defence Force Institute (SWADFI)
had been established in 1978 to meet the eventuality of Namibian independence and
the withdrawal of the SADF. However, because of bad management and imminent
bankruptcy, SADFI took over SWADFI, accepting all the losses, and turned it into a
flourishing and profitable trade.111 The final curtain dropped on the Institute’s business
in Namibia with the closure of most of the branches on 6 June 1989. The remaining
facilities closed towards the end of 1989. While these developments left a feeling of
melancholy with the people who were acquainted with SADFI facilities in Namibia,
it was certainly true that there were new challenges and new horizons facing the
management and staff of a much‑reduced Institute.
Following the implementation of Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South African
troops from Namibia, the SADF estimated that the turnover of SADFI reduced
by 30%.112 The management made an effort to grasp the challenge of a lower turnover
by promoting productivity, streamlining the management and providing a better
service.113 However, as the Institute could not open branches on existing bases if this
placed them in competition with the local commercial infrastructure, there was no
way in which SADFI could expand its business on a large scale within South Africa.114
Two avenues remained: the extension of existing facilities and the replacement of
certain old buildings; and the establishment of new branches simultaneously with the
inauguration of new bases.115
In May 1988, SADFI opened a temporary shop on the new Air Force Base at Louis
Trichardt. This service started in a mobile canteen but soon expanded. Shortly after,
the construction of a new, modern shop. Another success story was the new store
that opened in Pomfret when 32 Battalion was transferred there from Buffalo in
Namibia.116 This shop had to open its doors at short notice as SADFI was called in
at the last minute to provide the service. The facility was already too small, and plans
were soon underway once more to double the size of the existing building. Perhaps
the most significant success came with the new shopping complex, erected in 1990,
which housed the SADFI head office, a furniture shop, a sports shop, a supermarket,
a bakery, a café and branches of Absa and First National Bank. This complex was
planned to allow for at least ten years of expansion.117 In these ways, SADFI attempted
to mitigate the loss of the South West enterprise and a shrinking clientele, following
the abolition of National Service, and to continue a proud tradition of service to the
military community.
340
“It is the dramatic and momentous events at the sharp end of the war”, Keegan
and Holmes remind us, “that jostle for our attention. But the inexorable advance of
armoured columns … depend upon logistics.”118 Logistics, or the sinews of war, is a
complex if often hidden subject. Ponderous columns of logistics vehicles have to bring
ammunition and equipment and, of course, food forward. Where this fails, soldiers
might live off local resources and ruin the hopes of farmers and local townspeople.
Many modern armed forces now have regimented canteen systems. These may vary in
nature and structure, but most are embedded within the armed forces, utilising some
military personnel. These canteen systems can operate shopping malls on military
bases as well as mobile canteens, and provide recreational facilities for servicemen
from small permissible profits margins.
341
Ian van der Waag
The SADFI (or SAWI) fulfilled this function in the SADF between 1957 and 1994.
SADFI and its predecessors did not have an easy history. They were the subject of
several inquiries and investigations. It led to the militarisation of the Institute in 1968,
a time when National Service and the development of a war on the northern borders
were a lifeline. However, withdrawal from SWA (soon to become Namibia) in 1989
and the concomitant rationalisation of the SADF, ushered in a new round of challenges.
The extent to which the Institute accommodated these changes is perhaps an area for
future research into a floundering business. The Border War brought rapid growth, not
sustainable after the ending of the war followed by the abolition of National Service
and the rationalisation of the armed forces. It ushered in a new era in more than one
sense. The Institute had to settle down to retail and wholesale trade, within a much
smaller, peacetime Defence Force. How the Institute adjusted to these changes is a
story for another day.
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
CONCLUSION: CLOSING SHOP
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
Endnotes
1
2
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
342
Ian van der Waag, A History of the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI),
1914-1990 (MA thesis, Pretoria, 1997), Ch. 1.
See for example, John Fortescue, A Short Account of Canteens in the British Army
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928); NAAFI Public Relations Branch, The
Story of NAAFI (1 April 1944); Harry Miller, Service to the Services: The Story of NAAFI
(London: Newman Neame, 1971), and Don Bridge, ed., Naafi up! More than just char and
wad: the official history of NAAFI commemorating 75 years of serving the services (Tavistock,
UK: AQ and DJ publications, 1996).
The first histories were largely official in nature, although sometimes delivered for degree
purposes through South African universities. See T.R. Ponsford, War Record of Union
Defence Force Institutes (YMCA – Toc H), 1939-1946 (Cape Town: Hortors Printers, 1946);
François Dannhauser, ’n Ondersoek na die beeld van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut by
sy klante, 1979 (MBA dissertation, Pretoria, 1979); Ian van der Waag, ‘Traces of a military
trading organization; archives appertaining to the South African Defence Force Institute’,
South African Archives Journal, 32, 1990; and Ian van der Waag, A History of the South African
Defence Force Institute (SADFI), 1914-1990 (MA thesis, Unisa, 1997), available at: [https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/34667507_A_history_of_the_South_African_
Defence_Force_Institute_SADFI_1914_‑_1990_microform].
Fransjohan Pretorius, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902
(Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1999).
James Bourhill, ‘Red Tabs’: Life and death in the 6th South African Armoured Division,
1943-1945 (PhD dissertation, Pretoria, 2016), Ch. 5 in particular.
Neil Roos, Ordinary Springboks; White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa,
1939-1961 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005).
MH Swift, ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Group in South Africa,
World War II’, Militaria, 4(2), 1974; MH Swift, ‘The Union Defence Force
Entertainment Group in the Middle East’, Militaria, 4(3), 1974; and Henri Bantjes,
Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep van die Unie-Verdedigingsmag gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog:
’n Historiese Ontleding (MA dissertation, Pretoria, 1990). Bantjes was a National
Serviceman at the SADF Archives at the time of research for his thesis.
Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, 1:The First World War
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Abel Esterhuyse and Lindy Heinecken, Report to the
Chief of the SA Army on the Military Culture and Institutional Ethos of the South African Army
(unpublished paper, Stellenbosch, January 2012).
Neil Orpen, The Cape Town Highlanders, 1885-1985 (Cape Town: San Printing Press,
1986). Francis Coleman, The Kaffrarian Rifles, 1876-1986 (East London: The Kaffrarian
Rifles Association, 1988). Stanley Monick, A Bugle Calls;The Story of the Witwatersrand
Rifles and its Predecessors, 1899-1987 (Germiston: Witwatersrand Rifles Regimental
Council, 1989). Stanley Monick and Ossie Baker, Clear the Way;The Military Heritage of
the South African Irish, 1880-1990, 2 (Johannesburg: SA Irish Regimental Association,
1991). James Mitchell, Tartan on the Veld;The Transvaal Scottish, 1950-1993 (Johannesburg:
Transvaal Scottish Regimental Council, 1994). John Dorrington, Semper Eadem;The Cape
Town Rifles (Dukes) 1855-2010 (Goodwood: DEOR Trust, 2010).
Ian van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball
Publishers, 2015), 258.
Richard Holmes, Acts of War;The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, 2003), 128.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
343
Ian van der Waag
20
These statistics were calculated for the period August 1914 to June 1917.
Ian van der Waag, ‘War, Sex and Politics: the South African Medical Section in Korea,
1950‑1953’, Historia, 46(1), 1 May 2001, 101, available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/26687288_War_sex_and_politics_the_South_African_medical_section_in_
Korea_1950‑1953].
David Williams, On the Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965-1990
(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2008), 11‑24.
Bertie Cloete, Pionne (Hermanus: ABC Press, 2009), 93; Cameron Blake, From Soldier to
Civvie: Reflections on National Service (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010), 8; Cobus Bothma,
Los Af! Terugblik op nasionale diensplig deur die oë van ’n dienspligtige (Hermanus: Hemel &
See Boeke, 2009), 113.
Bothma (2009), 124.
Blake (2010), 20‑21, 70.
Kobus van Rooyen, A South African Censor’s Tale (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010), 4.
Bothma (2009), 122. Barry Fowler, ed., ‘Parabat’ in Pro Patria: Sentinel SADF Monographs,
1 (Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1995), 23‑4 and ‘Guard Commander’, 74‑5. François Verster,
Omega, Oor en Uit: Die stories van ’n opstandige troep (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016), 132.
Anthony Feinstein, Battle Scarred; Hidden Costs of the Border War (Cape Town: Tafelberg,
2011), 48. See also Clive Wills ‘Doctor’ in Barry Fowler, ed., Pro Patria: Sentinel SADF
Monographs, 1, 125.
Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives): Quartermaster General
(QMG), Group 12, box 2, file KMG/K1/2/7, vol.1 ‘SAWI – Beherende Gesag, Raad
van Beheer’, Chief of Personnel to QMG, 9 January 1969. DOD Archives: HVS,
box 763, file HVS/417/2, vol.2 Inrigtings: SAWI, Enc 35B ‘South African Defence Force
Institute (SADFI)’.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAWI – Stigting, Enc. 94
‘SADFI: Report to 25 November 1968’.
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAWI – Stigting, Enc. 94
‘SADFI: Report to 25 November 1968’.
DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/1, vol.1, Instituut en
Inrigtings, SAWI: Beleid ‘Notes prepared for the Defence Council’, SADFI, June 1973.
DOD Archives: HVS, box 764, file HVS/417/2, vol.4 Inrigtings: SAWI, QMG to Chief
of Defence Force Administration (CDFA), 1 July 1971.
DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI
Korrespondensie, QMG to Chief of Staff Logistics, 7 May 1974.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/2/4 SAWI Bestuur en Kontrole
– Beheerraad, document ‘SADFI Linked Loan and Purchases Scheme to raise trading
capital and benefit participating institutions’.
DOD Archives: HVS, box 764, file HVS/417/2, vol.4, Inrigtings: SAWI,
Brig L.B. Hopkins to Maj Gen H.A. Kotze, 29 January1971.
DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF Institute –
Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/1/1 SAWI – Stigting en
Organisasie, Notule van Verdedigingstafraadvergadering gehou te VHK, 14 August 1973;
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
12
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
344
and DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF
Institute – Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974.
Brig L.B. Hopkins (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, East
London, 13 March 1989).
DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI
Korrespondensie,Vergadering oor SAWI Aangeleenthede, 21 May 1974.
SADFI Archives: file Board of Control SADF: Members, Circular issued by the QMG,
10 May 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/2/4, SAWI Bestuur
en Kontrole – Beheerraad, QMG to Chief of the Army, Chief of the Air Force, Chief of
the Navy, and the Surgeon General, 10 May 1974; and QMG to Maj Gen I. Lemmer,
17 June 1974.
DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI
Korrespondensie), Director General of General Administration to QMG, 17 April 1974.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KMG/KK1/1/1, 1, SAWI – stigting en
organisasie, Chairman of the Board of Control, SADFI to CDFA, 12 July 1972.
General Regulations IX and South African Defence Force Order (SADFO) 95/66.
DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF Institute –
Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974.
Brig L.B. Hopkins (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, East
London, 13 March 1989).
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI – Bestuur en Kontrole:
Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, 2 Director SADFI to QMG,
27 February 1975.
Brig B.D. Slater (1989); and J.D. Bredenkamp, ‘Die Onstaan en Ontwikkeling van die
Vloot, 1912‑1982’, Scientia Militaria 12(2), 1982, available at: [http://scientiamilitaria.
journals.ac.za/pub/article/download/620/624], 37.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI – Bestuur en Kontrole:
Verslae, Balanstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, Director SADFI to QMG,
27 February 1975.
Major S.V.M. van Heerden (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der
Waag, Wynberg, Cape Town, 15 March 1989). In 1975, Brig Hopkins stated that the
establishment of a PF post for the manager of the Da Gama Park branch was “the only
solution to improve management of the SADFI as a military institution for service to
military personnel”. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI –
Bestuur end Kontrole:Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, ASP (3)
INST – SSO A, n.d. [archives damaged].
DOD Archives: Unit History Archives: file QMG, 1 ‘Geskiedenis van die KMG’.
DOD Archives: archives of the Secretary for Defence (DC), box 208, ‘Report by Hoek,
Wiehahn and Cross, Enquiries into UDF Institutes’.
SADFI Archives: file B of C Loans from UDFI Trust Fund, Chairman, Board of Control
to the Honorary Secretary, UDFI Trust Fund, 16 October 1951.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 102, file KK1/2/1 UVM Instituut, beleid
en instruksies, Notule van Pretoria Weermaginstitute skakelkomitee vergadering,
24 August 1959.
Statistics worked from following: DOD Archives: DC, box 1895, file DC 247/0, Union
Defence Force Institutes (Garrison Institutes) General, Appendix ‘Buildings occupied by
the Garrison Institutes’ attached to Chief of the General Staff (CGS) to the Secretary
for Defence, 26 October 1954; and SADFI Archives: file B of C Payment of Rent and
50
51
52
53
54
55
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
345
Ian van der Waag
56
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
49
Domestic Charges, Appendix ‘Buildings occupied by Garrison Institutes’ attached to
QMG to General Manager, UDFI, 24 November 1956.
DOD Archives: CGS, 20/1 Garrison Institutes, Lt Col T.H. Rowell, Secretary, Board of
Control to the CGS, 4 November 1944.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAW Institute ‑ stigting,
Surgeon General to QMG, 30 March 1957.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/2/2, vol.1, SAW Institute ‑
roetine, Confidential report on SADFI for period 28 February to 30 March 1961
attached to Col P.M. Retief, Chairman, Board of Control to the Commandant General
(CG), SADF, 30 March 1961.
DOD Archives:Verslae, box 46, file K79/1 Report ‘Die Groenewoudkomitee se verslag
oor die SA Weermag’, 31 January 1966.
DOD Archives: DC Group 3, box 3, file DC 11/2, Ch. 2, SADFI Trust Fund, Chairman,
Board of Control to the Secretary, SADFI Trust Fund, 6 June 1967.
SADFI Archives: Minutes of the 78th meeting of the SADFI Board of Control,
28 June 1968.
Inadequate accommodation was the genesis of numerous administrative and other
problems, including the loss of stock through theft and damage (SADFI Archives:
file SAWI/FIN/2, Auditors Reports and Correspondence, Transvaal Area, Report
By Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., 8 May 1967). DOD Archives: HVS, box 763,
file HVS/417/2, vol.1, Inrigtings, SAWI, Chairman, Board of Control to Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS), 19 May 1967.
DOD Archives: HVS, box 126, file HS/42/1/1, 1, Institute en Inrigtings, SAWI – beleid,
Chief of Staff Logistics to Chief of Staff, 19 September 1974.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KMG/KK1/1/1, vol.1, SAWI ‑ stigting
en organisasie, Director SADFI to QMG, 18 June 1974.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5, vol.2, SAWI, bestuur en kontrole,
verslae, balansstate en notules van vergaderings, Director SADFI to QMG, 2 July 1976.
DOD Archives: ‘General Manager, SADFI – QMG’, and ‘Director SADFI to QMG,
14 October 1975.
SADFI Archives: Notules‑SSO Vergaderings: minutes of meeting, 26 March 1984.
SADFI News, August 1988, 1.
‘New SADFI for Potchefstroom’, Paratus, May 1986, 31.
SADFI News, August 1988, 1.
Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 28 August 1988).
Dannhauser (n.d.), 53.
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989) and Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by
Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989).
V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 20 July 1989).
Dannhauser (n.d.), 54‑55.
V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 20 July 1989).
Personal information: Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill, Pretoria, 5 July 1989.
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
70
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
76
71
72
73
74
75
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
346
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
Col F. Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
As quoted in JH Thompson, An Unpopular War: From afkak to bosbefok (Cape Town: Zebra
Press, 2006), 26.
Quoted in Blake (2010), 193.
Cameron Blake, Troepie: From call-up to camps (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2009), 73‑75.
Verster (2016), 132.
Verster (2016), 68‑70.
SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, QMG to the Chief
of the South African Defence Force, 31 October 1974.
SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, Director SADFI to
QMG, 22 October 1974.
SADFI News, February 1985, 1.
DOD Archives:Verslae, box 200, Report K86/83: KMG(1)503/1/10, 1 (D SAWI),
Report ‘Verslag oor ondersoek na die organisasie van SAWI’, 23 December 1985.
SADFI Archives: file Notules – SSO Vergaderings, ‘Minutes of SSO meeting’,
5 May 1986.
Col F. Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
DOD Archives: QMG, Registry of the HQ Unit, file QMG 507/4/1, vol.1. Bedryf
van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, Order (QMG Order KMG 507/4/1), 23 November 1988.
Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der
Waag, Pretoria, 12 January 1989); Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication,
interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989);V Adm M.A. Bekker
(personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 20 July 1989);
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
The South African Korea contingent was small and largely symbolic. South African
soldiers were serviced by NAAFI and the PX (Post Exchange) of the United States.
DOD Archives: 2 Sqn Korea, box 47, file 2SQD/1101/MED Medical General, Policy
and Instructions, BCOF Administrative Instruction 186, 30 October 1950. Carol
Habgood and Marcia Skaer, One Hundred Years of Service: A History of the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service, 1895-1995 (Dallas: Texas Headquarters: Army and Air Force
Exchange Service, 1994 [Cynthia Reiber, ed.]), 265‑280.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 102, file KMG/K/1/2/4 UVM Institute ‑ Stigting
vir vredestydse veldoefeninge, Army Chief of Staff to QMG, October 1956.
SADFI Archives: file Policy prior to December 1968, Appendix C to Chairman of the
Board of Control to the CDS, 19 May 1967.
DOD Archives: HVS, box 763, file HVS/417/2, 2, Inrigtings – SAWI, CDFA to CG,
c. March 1968.
‘Oefening Brolly Tree: SAWI se bydrae’, Paratus, June 1972, 22‑25, 71.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 103, file KK1/4/2 Operasies en Oefeninge ‑
Roetine, OC North Western Command to General Manager, SADFI, 3 July 1972.
92
93
94
95
96
97
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
347
Ian van der Waag
98
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
DOD Archives: Aanvullende Dokumente‑versameling, box 31, L. Jooste ‘Die SAW in
SWA, 1969-1973’, 5‑10.
Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern
Angola, 26 April 1988).
SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings – SAWI, Memo ‘SAWI
Grootfontein’ attached to D SADFI to QMG, January 1977; and P. Coetzee, ‘Die leuse bly
diens’, Paratus, June 1976, 10.
DOD Archives: HVS (KG DGAA), box 126, file HVS/42/1/2, 1, Institute en Inrigtings:
SAWI: Roetine, Enc 32A Report ‘Komitee van Ondersoek na SAWI se rol in Operasionele
Gebiede’, 8‑9.
DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5, SAWI ‑ Bestuur en Kontrole
‑ Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, General Manager SADFI to
QMG, 2 July 1976.
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
DOD Archives: HVS (KG DGAA), box 126, file HVS/42/1/2, 1, Institute en Inrigtings:
SAWI: Roetine, Enc. 32A Report ‘Komitee van Ondersoek na SAWI se rol in Operasionele
Gebiede’); and Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van
der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
SADFI Archives: ‘Voorlegging aan die Kwartiermeester-generaal oor die rol en funksie van SAWI
tydens operasies’. This document dates from somewhere between the disbandment of the
Joint Monitoring Commission (16 May 1985) and the commencement of Operation
MODULER (1 July 1987).
Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern
Angola, 26 April 1988).
Quoted in SADFI News, October 1983, 3.
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
SADFI Archives: file QMG/507/4/1, Bedryf van Inrigtings: SAWI, vol.1, QMG to Chief
of the Army’, 9 December 1982.
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
SADFI Archives: file QMG/507/4/1, Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, vol.2, QMG to
Chief of the South African Defence Force, 20 January 1989.
Forças Populares de Libertação de Angola – the Angolan government troops.
Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern
Angola, 26 April 1988).
Capt D. Pretorius (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern
Angola, 27 April 1988).
Lt David Rees (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern
Angola, 26 April 1988).
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 20 July 1989).
SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF
91
THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE
IN DIFFERENT TIMES
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
348
Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria,
25 July 1989).
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
QMG HQ Registry: file QMG 507/4/1, vol.1, Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, C SADF
Policy Directive 4/2/81, 21 January 1981.
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989).
Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag,
Pretoria, 5 July 1989); and Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by
Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989).
SADFI Archives: file Nuwe SAWI kompleks VTH, Director SADFI to QMG,
1 April 1983.
John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (London: Sphere
Books, 1985), 221.