AFRICAN MILITARY STUDIES Volume 2 In Different Times The War for Southern Africa 1966–1989 Ian van der Waag & Albert Grundlingh Editors In Different Times: The War for Southern Africa, 1966–1989 Published by AFRICAN SUN MeDIA under the SUN PReSS imprint All rights reserved Copyright © 2019 AFRICAN SUN MeDIA and the authors This publication was subjected to an independent double-blind peer evaluation by the publisher. The authors and the publisher have made every effort to obtain permission for and acknowledge the use of copyrighted material. Refer all enquiries to the publisher. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic, photographic or mechanical means, including photocopying and recording on record, tape or laser disk, on microfilm, via the Internet, by e-mail, or by any other information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission by the publisher. Views reflected in this publication are not necessarily those of the publisher or Stellenbosch University. First edition 2019 ISBN 978-1-928480-34-1 ISBN 978-1-928480-35-8 (e-book) https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480358 Set in Bembo Std 11/14 Cover design, typesetting and production by AFRICAN SUN MeDIA Photographs appearing in this publication were obtained from the Department of Defence Archives (South Africa), except where stated otherwise. SUN PReSS is an imprint of AFRICAN SUN MeDIA. Scholarly, professional and reference works are published under this imprint in print and electronic formats. This publication can be ordered from: orders@africansunmedia.co.za Takealot: bit.ly/2monsfl Google Books: bit.ly/2k1Uilm africansunmedia.store.it.si (e-books) Amazon Kindle: amzn.to/2ktL.pkL Visit africansunmedia.co.za for more information. Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................... vii Acronyms & Abbreviations ...................................................................................... ix Introduction: South Africa’s Border War in retrospect ........................................... 2 Ian van der Waag & Albert Grundlingh PLACES AND EVENTS 1 The Namibian/Angolan border in the Namibian War for Independence .............................................................................................. 14 Chris Saunders 2 Operation Blouwildebees, 1966: The helicopter assault on Ongulumbashe ............................................................................................. 28 McGill Alexander 3 Operation Savannah, 1975‑76: The initial South African Armour deployments into Anglo .................................................................................... 44 Jean-Pierre Scherman 4 Namibia: Effective strategic buffer zone or draining foreign military adventure? ............................................................................................ 92 James Jacobs WAR AND SOCIETY 5 The SADF and the militarisation of white South African Society ................ 136 Rodney Warwick 6 The Kavango Jeugbeweging and the South African counterinsurgency campaign in Namibia ........................................................................................ 168 Evert Kleynhans 7 Caught in the crossfire: The Progressive Federal Party and defence politics during the 1980s in South Africa ........................................................ 192 Albert Grundlingh 8 “Ek het iemand op die grens”: The Southern Cross Fund and mobilisation of white South African society ................................................... 208 Anneke van Heerden THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE 9 Confessions of a conscript, disclosures of a historian: An autobiographical essay about the Border War ........................................... 248 Gary Baines 10 Socialised to serve: An auto‑ethnographical exploration of the making of the (citizen) conscript in South Africa ............................... 266 Ian Liebenberg 11 The evolution of 32 Battalion: From renegade guerillas to township troopers ......................................................................................... 298 Will Gordon 12 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and military canteens in the SADF ........................ 322 Ian van der Waag Contributors ............................................................................................................. 350 Foreword African Military Studies Series Editor Ian van der Waag, Stellenbosch University African Military Studies is an exciting, new series of books on war, conflict and armed forces in Africa. Covering the whole span of African history, and the full conflict continuum, the series seeks to encourage works on the drivers of armed conflict, the ways in which societies and armed forces prepare for and conduct war, the development of technology, strategy, tactics, and logistics in the African battlespace, and the impact of warfare on African societies. African Military Studies presents the latest research and accepts high‑quality monographs, collections of essays, conference proceedings, and annotated military and historical texts. It is a library for the academic specialist, for the policymaker, and for the practitioner with “boots on the ground”. Acknowledgements A book of this nature incurs many debts. In the first instance, the contributors are thanked for their individual chapters as well as the contributions they made to the discussions during the symposium, The South African “Border War”, 1966-2016; a quinquagenarial reflection, which led to this book. The Department of History at Stellenbosch hosted the symposium. Dr Anton Ehlers, the head of the department, is thanked for the support lent and the personal contribution he made to the success of the day, which went well beyond the call of duty. The same must be said for Dr Evert Kleynhans who drew all the maps for this volume. The five‑person panel that peer reviewed all the papers submitted for this publication are equally thanked for their critical comments and insightful suggestions. And, finally, the team at African SunMedia have been fantastic. Special thanks must go to Emily Vosloo and Wikus van Zyl for their patience and understanding, and to Davida van Zyl for her careful eye and creativity. vii Acronyms & Abbreviations AFG Air Force Gymnasium ANC African National Congress Apla Armscor BAA BOSS C Army CDFA [HWA] CDS [HVS] CF CG [KG] Azanian People’s Liberation Army (formerly known as Poqo), military wing of the PAC Armaments Corporation of South Africa Brigade Administrative Area Bureau of State Security Chief of the Army Chief of Defence Force Administration [Hoof van Weermagsadministrasie] Chief of Defence Staff [Hoof van Verdedigingstaf ] Citizen Force Commandant General [Kommandant Generaal] CGS Chief of the General Staff (predecessor of Commandant General, SADF) CIR Centro de Instrução Revolucionária – Centre for Revolutionary Instruction CLS Chief of Logistics Services COIN Counterinsurgency CSI Chief of Staff Intelligence DC Secretary for Defence DGGA [DGAA] DMZ DSADFI [DSAWI] DTA Director General of General Administration [Direkteur-Generaal van Algemene Administrasie] Demilitarised Zone Director SADFI [Direkteur SAWI] Democratic Turnhalle Alliance ix IN DIFFERENT TIMES ECC End Conscription Campaign Fapla Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola – People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (armed wing of MPLA) FAR Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias – Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces FME Focus of Main Effort FNLA Frelimo Frente para Liberação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front HIO high‑intensity operations HMO high‑mobility operations HSRC Human Sciences Research Council Idasa Institute for Democracy in South Africa LMG light machinegun MA Military Area MK Umkhonto we Sizwe (military wing of the African National Congress [ANC]) MMCA Misión Militar Cubana en Angola – Cuban Military Mission in Angola MPLA NAAFI NAM NP Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Navy Army Air Force Institute (not to be confused with the term ‘naafi’) Non‑Aligned Movement National Party NSM National Servicemen OAU Organisation of African Unity OCs Officers Commanding PAC Pan Africanist Congress PAIGC x Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola – National Front for the Liberation of Angola Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape Verde Progressive Federal Party PLAN People’s Liberation Army of Namibia POW prisoner of war PTSD post‑traumatic stress disorder PU for CHE QMG [KMG] Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education Quartermaster General [Kwartiermeestergeneraal] RAU Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (today University of Johannesburg) RDL Revolta do Leste – The Eastern Revolt Recce/s Reconnaissance Commando/s SAAC South African Armoured Corps SAAF South African Air Force SABC [SAUK] SADF SADFI [SAWI] SAGI SAI SANDF South African Broadcasting Corporation [Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie] South African Defence Force South African Defence Force Institute [Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut] South African Garrison Institute South African Infantry Battalion Group South African National Defence Force SAP South African Police SCF Southern Cross Fund [Suiderkruisfonds] SG [GG] Surgeon General [Geneesheer Generaal] SMG submachinegun SSB Special Service Battalion SSC State Security Council SWA SWA Command Swapo Acronyms & Abbreviations PFP South West Africa Command General Commanding South West Africa Command South West Africa People’s Organisation xi IN DIFFERENT TIMES SWATF TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UDF Union Defence Force UDFI Union Defence Force Institute UMU University Military Unit UNGA United Nations General Assembly Unisa University of South Africa [Universiteit van Suid-Afrika] Unita União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola USMU [USME] Wham ZDF xii South West African Territorial Force University Stellenbosch Military Unit [Universiteit Stellenbosch Militêre Eenheid] winning the hearts and minds Zairian Defence Force 12 SAWI! LEISURE, COMFORTS AND MILITARY CANTEENS IN THE SADF Ian van der Waag The British canteens have been the focus of ongoing work, often by men and women long associated with SAGI and the Navy Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI) of the British armed forces. Sir John Fortescue, historian of the British Army and Royal Librarian at Windsor, wrote the first history of the British canteens. He approached this from the early sutlers through to the reforms, undertaken by his brother, that led to the creation of the Canteen and Mess Society and its successors, SAGI (1900) and NAAFI (1921). Fortescue’s book, published in 1928, was followed by several publications at different intervals during the twentieth century.2 Much less has been done in terms of the canteens in the South African armed forces.3 Fransjohan Pretorius analysed the questions of supply and leisure within the Boer Commandos during the Second Anglo‑Boer War4 and James Bourhill has done the same for the 6th South African Armour Division in Italy during the Second World War.5 Neil Roos, working on the same period, reasoned that leisure, sex and the social control of white South African volunteers was a critical concern of the defence authorities in 323  Ian van der Waag Soldiers get up to all kinds of mischief. Whether on a campaign or in the barracks, there are accusations of alleged looting and scrounging, of illicit sexual encounters, and even murder. Leisure‑time programmes are now designed to keep young men, adventurous and emboldened by a sense of power endowed by the profession of arms, in camp and under military discipline. For millennia, the physical and emotional well‑being of the soldier was no specific organisation’s official concern. Loot and plunder all too often supplemented inadequate or non‑existent rations, while soldiers also fell victim to traders – the sutlers immortalised by Bertolt Brecht in Mother Courage – who followed armies and adjusted prices according to the intensity of the campaign and the temperature of battle. Things changed gradually. Regular pay and embryonic medical and chaplain services were instituted in most European armies from the Thirty Years War, although the improvement of living conditions for soldiers and the provision of comforts, refreshments and small luxuries – to supplement those sparse and mediocre rations – would wait at least another two hundred years. The canteen organisations created during the latter half of the nineteenth century were dependent on the goodwill of senior officers and the raising of public awareness. Their chequered history in the British Army continued until 1900, when Lord Roberts, the British Commander‑in‑Chief in South Africa during the Second Anglo‑Boer War, established the South African Garrison Institute (SAGI) as a unified canteen facility to offer goods and services at reasonable prices to Imperial troops on campaign in South Africa. The Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI) and the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI) (Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut – SAWI) were direct successors to SAGI and aspired from 1916 to continue this tradition in service of the South African armed forces.1 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF OPEN FOR BUSINESS  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES Pretoria, highlighting the close relationship between recreation, canteen and military discipline.6 The entertainment units of the Second World War have been the separate focus of two journal articles and an MA thesis.7 However, despite the wealth of archival material on funds and institutions related to the SADF, there has been little, deeper‑level historical analysis of these issues. This chapter seeks to fill something of the historiographic gap, by analysing the role and function of SAWI – known better by the Afrikaans acronym – and examining the measures taken to provide canteen and shopping facilities and leisure activities to South African troops and military families during the Border War era. MILITARY EFFICIENCY, THE ‘TROEPIE’ AND SOCIAL CONTROL The watchword in all armed forces is military effectiveness.8 This refers to the combat readiness of the soldier individually and within the organisation as a whole. Anything that compromises that effectiveness is combatted through regulation and the application of firm military discipline. Nevertheless, soldiers historically have presented their commanders with a complexity of problems. Military service – and conscription, introduced in South Africa in 1967 – served as a rite of passage into adulthood. It brought freedom from the parental home, uncertainty but the promise of hardship, and initiation into the military as experienced by older relatives and friends. Geographical remoteness and social isolation introduced an unnatural environment, with often empty hours. The SADF organised leisure activities, laid on sporting equipment and games, and supplemented rations in a variety of ways. There has been very little historical analysis on leisure and consumption in the South African armed forces; with the regimental histories tending to follow the battle and emphasising camaraderie and deeds of valour.9 There are a small, but growing number of references in the recent Border War memoirs, which can be supplemented by the vast archives generated by the SADF on institutions and funds, canteens, and sport. The SADF faced several unfavourable factors on ‘The Border’. A low ratio of force to space facilitated breakthroughs in the battlespace but imposed severe logistical problems, made worse by the climate and the nature of the terrain. Large river systems and flooding in the semi‑arid south of Angola during the rainy season (February to April) combined with the poverty of the country, fewer bridges and roads, more unpaved tracks, and less cleared growth and thicker vegetation, exacerbated these supply difficulties.10 Food was a factor, the bush of the war zone offered little, and all requirements had to be brought forward by the SADF. Notwithstanding, complaints – about the quantity, quality and lack of variety of food – regularly feature in the writings of soldiers. Food, Richard Holmes argues, has a marked effect on a soldier’s performance, shortages doing ‘more than merely make 324 The South African involvement in the broader war for Southern Africa lasted from 1966 to 1989. It would be naïve to presume that the near half‑million young men conscripted from 1967, as well as the older Permanent Force personnel of the SADF, had no sexual contact over this 23‑year period along a “Border” that was geographically, logistically, and psychologically a long way from home.14 The recent writings of former National Servicemen sometimes reveal sordid tales: of alleged rapes,15 group sex,16 and heavy drinking,17 the feeding of prostitution, and the circulation of Scope, a soft‑porn magazine,18 and screening of ‘blue movies’.19 Some units were more affected than others. A National Service Medical Officer records that nearly all the soldiers of 32 Battalion had a venereal disease: “… the gonococcus has found a home here in Ovamboland, the chaos of war offering the perfect environment.”20 This “Border”, and military service more generally, was a rite of passage into manhood. Rituals might involve the consumption of alcohol and drugs, exposure to pornographic material, and perhaps sexual behaviour and even violence that would be frowned upon or deemed unacceptable at home. The need to contain and control the troops, and so minimise any mischief, perhaps particularly on the part of young National Servicemen, enjoyed paramount importance. The SADF mitigated the isolation of the Border and the boredom of base life in various ways. 325  Ian van der Waag But canteens play other roles too. Healthy young men, removed from the normal female company and home surroundings, are housed in a barracks environment. Whether in training camps or combat zones, they are often limited to female contact that may verge on promiscuity if not professional prostitution. This comes as no surprise. Throughout the history of armed forces, sexual liaisons, ranging from romantic passion to cold commerce, was widespread and entailed rapture and abuse on both sides of the gender divide. Casual sex and prostitution, and corresponding bouts of sexually transmitted diseases, flourish during times of conflict, when sexual behaviour is freer and pleasure‑seeking and intemperance is fostered by the horror of war and notions, often very real, about the brevity of life. The rate of admission for venereal diseases in the Dominion armies during the First World War was 24 per thousand troops in France and 32 per thousand in Egypt.12 The Second World War presented similar statistics, but in Korea, the South African rate per thousand shot up to 130 per thousand in March 1953.13 Regular medical inspection of personnel; lectures on STDs and preventative measures; the running of prophylactic centres (the ‘Blue Light Depots’); and abundant well‑organised sporting and recreational facilities, all removed from the influences of local towns, formed part of the military solution. Primarily, it remains a hidden history, “an aspect perhaps best forgotten”, and no statistics are presently available for the SADF troops during the Border War. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF men hungry, dispirited and increasingly ineffective’.11 However, battle rations could be improved and varied and might include chocolates and cigarettes, and supplies and small luxuries might also be bought from a SAWI whenever one was in the area.  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES They provided sporting equipment, distributed games, dug swimming pools, built tennis courts, revitalised ‘rat packs’, and opened shops and canteens on military bases and in military towns. Soldiers were thereby encouraged to spend leisure time within unit lines, removed from the allure of neighbouring suburbs and towns, and remained safely under military discipline. SAWI was the primary organisation that managed these shops and canteens, ran the mobile canteens in the operational area, and, from the proceeds of the business so conducted, sponsored the building and maintenance of recreational facilities. PUTTING THE RIGHT FOOT FORWARD: STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT SAWI has had something of a chequered history. Starting as the UDFI in 1916 it performed this task, for the most, quite adequately, supplying members of the Union Defence Force (UDF) with canteen facilities in South West Africa (SWA) during the First World War and then serving South African and Allied servicemen and women in no fewer than five theatres during the Second World War. Fragmentation of the business within South Africa during the interwar years led to the emergence of local institutes, in the form of the Pretoria Garrison Institute, the Cape Peninsula Garrison Institute, and the Algoa Bay Garrison Institute, until re‑amalgamation and a name change in 1957 to SADFI. The organisation underwent far‑reaching changes from 1916, changing from a mainly civilian organisation into a military unit. However, poor management and a lack of business acumen led to an extremely pitiable public image. Several inquiries into the affairs of the Institute followed – in December 1939, September 1952, and February 1961 – and, on each occasion, insufficient remedial action compounded matters. The Institute was at times charged with the abuse of its credit system, condemned as a social evil, and for making victims of the military families buying goods on credit. Customers accused the Institute of inflating prices to cover losses, maintaining an inadequate stock, having an officer‑preferential policy and delivering a generally poor, often‑grudging service. As a result, many members of the UDF who could afford to take their custom elsewhere did so. Opinion gauged during the inquiries (perhaps at best a perception within only a small portion of the military community) was that the Institute no longer justified its existence as it no longer fulfilled the function of supplying the soldier cheaply and expeditiously. Such negative threads were not continuous or ubiquitous, and the Institute cannot be judged solely from the ‘negative overload’ in the archival ‘residue’ of the Institute, which was of course the result of SADFI’s specific documentary process. It is also true that few businesses would have survived the vicissitudes of the five decades preceding 1968 when the SADF took the Institute out of the purely business arena. 326 The condition of SADFI improved dramatically after 1968. Between June and November 1968, the Institute achieved an overall price reduction of approximately 17.5% throughout the Transvaal, with smaller reductions in the Cape. ‘Sticking stocks’ were disposed of in the Transvaal and replaced by a wider variety and a greater range of new stocks at competitive prices. Customer support increased by more than 60% 327  Ian van der Waag Massive changes followed in 1968, the year of the first National Service intake. Brigadier Larry Hopkins was appointed as general manager, with a new Permanent Force management team to run the Institute, under the overall control of the Quartermaster General.21 In peacetime, SADFI, confined to the Republic of South Africa, was divided into two regions for effective control: the Cape and the Transvaal. For the first time in the history of the Institute, the managers formed a management team, and the different branches were run as one organisation. Militarisation brought about an immediate re‑assessment and a reorientation of attitude by many senior officers. Hopkins’s appointment gave SADFI new status and authority both within the Defence Force and in negotiations with trading associates. SADFI now was no ordinary trading concern, but an integral and vitally important part of the SADF, promising enormous benefits if adequately supported.22 “For the first time”, according to Brigadier Brian Slater, who would succeed Hopkins in 1976, “the soldier felt that the soldier was controlling SADFI to the benefit of the soldier”.23 Militarisation brought other benefits. The entry of a large number of civilians and delivery vehicles to units and military bases was averted. All problems regarding institutions and funds, such as the non‑payment of accounts, could be settled within the organisation so as not to tarnish the image of the SADF. And, with time, SADFI established itself as the sole supplier of all commodities required by units. It not only introduced uniform prices but saved the individual institutions money and manpower. By the end of the 1970s, the Institute had established a productive Citizen Force element able to supply canteen services at isolated places at short notice. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF However, this is only part of a complex story. The 1952 board of inquiry found that the convenience of a nearby shop for married members of the UDF living on military bases where they could not obtain necessities at reasonable prices justified the continued existence of the Institute. During the implementation of several changes and an improvement in the finances of the organisation, the Institute remained burdened with the most significant problem which had been haunting it since 1916. It was the fact that the Institute remained an attempt to run a civilian shopping organisation inside the SADF for members of the SADF. In 1968, the General Staff decided to take the whole structure out of the purely business arena and adapt it to suit the military environment. South Africa was slowly being drawn into a war on her borders and, as a result thereof, the Institute’s activities were re‑evaluated with a view towards the growing need for an effective field canteen system. This involved a shift on the part of SADFI from retail trade to operational trade.  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES between August and November 1968 and soon adverse criticism was almost entirely restricted to factors arising from the struggle to offer a modern shopping service in obsolete shops and stores. Relationships with military units also improved given a growing understanding of and increasing support for the new SADFI based on the NAAFI model. While the Institute could not meet all unit requirements at better prices than elsewhere, the average prices level per unit was unquestionably lower. Army units as far afield as Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Potchefstroom, Middelburg and Nigel began to purchase many of their requirements from SADFI Voortrekkerhoogte voluntarily.24 The trading accounts for the six months ending on 31 August 1968 reflected, for the first time in two years, a small profit in the Transvaal. With growing support and increasing turnover, the Institute rehabilitated to such an extent that the Director General of General Administration could report to the Defence Staff Council: “There is no way in which a meaningful comparison can be made between the disreputable and bankrupt SADFI of early 1968 and new SADFI.”25 As activities of SADFI expanded, and beyond official expectation, Hopkins held the hope that SADFI might develop as NAAFI of the SADF and that all unit institutions would become SADFI outlets.26 SADFI, as an enterprise, achieved some stability by 1974. Surplus assets, excluding buildings and major equipment, exceeded R650 000 and was invested in stock that realised an average turnover of R500 000 per month. Although sufficient for wholesale buying, this fell far short of the amount needed to finance long‑term development programmes essential for future growth. The reversal of inherited debt, the reduction of loans, and the financing of growth of about 475% between 1968 and 1974 largely absorbed trading profits. The financial problem, compounded by the late payment of credit sales, in April 1974 caused the Chief of the SA Defence Force to instruct all formations, units and sections to pay their SADFI accounts within 30 days. Furthermore, and much to Hopkins’s indignation, the assets of the SADFI Trust Fund, that would have settled all outstanding loans, were instead spent on a residence for the commanding officer of SWA Command.27 The lack of trading capital was certainly slowing growth.28 Hopkins won other battles. On one front were the shops and canteens run by individual units for their benefit. They represented a motley crew, and no real improvement had taken place since the introduction of National Service. The reasons for this were equally multifarious: some unit commanders showed little interest and gave little direction and guidance, others did not have the time to set aside for the unit shop, and all battled with small ranges and erratic supply. Importantly, these unit shops did not keep pace with the needs of large numbers of National Servicemen.29 As a result, SADFI became the preferred wholesaler, and all units were instructed to purchase all goods and services from the Institute. In August 1973, Admiral Hugo Biermann, the Chief of the SA Defence Force, decided that all institutions, sports clubs and funds 328 SHOPPING FACILITIES: MILITARY TOWNS, GARRISONS, UNITS By 1974, growth had taken place at such a rate that reference in policy to ‘branches’ of SADFI had become mostly meaningless.37 SADFI was initially permitted to provide services where it had a shop or a ‘branch’. However, in preparation for possible wartime mobilisation and in compliance with the direction to ‘provide a service to units and troops under arms anywhere within or outside the Republic wherever they may be’, SADFI developed a network of approved suppliers throughout South Africa. With this, the Institute met the needs of units it could not, for practical reasons, serve directly. These ‘approved suppliers’ became SADFI ‘branches’.38 At first, SADFI mainly restricted attention to the Transvaal. This region and Pretoria, in particular, had been identified as the most profitable point for growth after 1968. 329  Ian van der Waag Hopkins consolidated matters before his retirement. A difficult process, he had listed several ‘demands for continued service’ in a letter to the Chief of the SA Defence Force. It resulted in the provision of additional trading capital and the review of the management and control structure. As general manager of SADFI, Hopkins now also became Director of Institutions on the Quartermaster General’s staff, while an assistant general manager was appointed and additional Permanent Force personnel were allotted to the Institute.33 Liaison between the general manager and senior representatives of the Arms of Service became more effective and more frequent following the disbandment of the old SADFI Board of Control and the creation of a liaison committee comprising representatives from all of the Services.34 Trading restrictions were relaxed to allow unit shops to supply all of the needs of National Servicemen confined to their respective military areas and lacking the freedom to buy from the shops in town during business hours.35 These steps enhanced the status of SADFI and SADFI interests, and vastly improved the service given by direct SADFI outlets as well as unit shops. They also confirmed the important place the shopping facilities and field services of SADFI had assumed in the SADF.36 These functions – the larger shopping facilities and the mobile field service – will be dealt with in turn. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF do likewise. Biermann accepted the position that SADFI would not always be able to quote the lowest price but would be the lowest most of the time. Moreover, whereas civilian suppliers were in business for profit, SADFI was an integral part of the SADF, ploughing back profits to improve and extend services for the benefit of military units and members of the SADF and their families.30 Notwithstanding, he and Magnus Malan, then Chief of the Army, and others believed that the Institute ought to obtain support through persuasion rather than compulsion.31 In this, they were seemingly proved correct. Units, at first somewhat cautiously, later wholehearted gave support to SADFI.32  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES In fact, during the ‘rescue years’, the management, facing the genuine possibility of liquidation, had little choice. Having to convince higher authorities that the position of SADFI was redeemable and that the Institute was capable to make a profit,39 Hopkins focused on the only region capable of rapid growth. “Nothing”, he noted, “was expected from the Cape other than they keep their heads above the water.”40 However, once he consolidated the Institute’s position and the Transvaal had enjoyed the incredible growth of 1973/74, the growing demand for SADFI services elsewhere could not be satisfied. The most significant problem facing the Cape business was the dispersion of the few training bases for National Servicemen situated in the Cape province, the largest element being the Navy – the smallest of the Services – and Naval Headquarters moved from Simon’s Town up to Pretoria in 1977.41 Although the situation improved to a limited extent with the opening of the Da Gama Park branch and the expansion of the shop and area depot at Wynberg, there was no military complex in the Cape comparable to Voortrekkerhoogte. Growth was, therefore, much more expensive and contained the prospect of far smaller returns. Distance complicated advertising, limited personal client contact, and delayed the delivery of goods.42 The Cape regional manager, a civilian until 1972, seemingly added to the difficulties.43 The Cape repeatedly yielded to the needs of Pretoria, the seat of Defence Headquarters since the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912, and the hub of all SADF activity. The Institute’s growth in the Transvaal was therefore not replicated in the south. By the end of the 1970s, business was slowing down across the country. Supermarkets, just getting off the ground when the SADFI militarised in 1968, were new competition and SADFI was not ‘supermarket’ orientated. The buildings were not conducive to modern trading and most of its shops were corner cafés, that traditionally only had to compete with corner cafés. The task of repositioning SADFI in terms of buildings and infrastructure and client base mostly fell to Brigadier Brian Slater, who succeeded Hopkins in August 1976. He implemented two critical measures. The first was the decision taken in 1978 to create facilities that were modern and offered an engaging shopping experience. Secondly, steps were taken to make SADFI more competitive in terms of price.44 The physical infrastructure remained a problem. The Institute had no property rights to any of their buildings, owned or hired, all of which had been erected on state property. Alterations or renovations led to growing debt to the UDFI Trust Fund,45 while the Institute remained hesitant to invest in accommodation it did not own.46 Most of the premises where SADFI conducted business were ineffective or inadequate to carry on modern business.47 Although SADFI, over the previous ten years, procured more than 50% of the buildings occupied by the Institute in 1954, these buildings were already old and, in some cases, dilapidated on the date of acquisition (Table 12.1). 330 Notwithstanding, converted to a general dealer’s store, it was still in a fair state of repair in 1944 despite bad light, insufficient ventilation and inadequate storage.49 The position was similar elsewhere. The wood and iron building used as the Voortrekkerhoogte dairy, also gifted by the Imperial Government in 1921, had been condemned by the Surgeon General in 1957.50 TABLE 12.1 Classification of UDFI premises according to the year of construction and the year of occupation by the Institute Year Pre‑1925 1925‑34 1935‑44 1945‑54 unknown Construction 8 6 Occupation 2 7 5 2 5 3 14 - TABLE 12.2 New SADFI branches, 1968-1975 Branch Date opened Form of accommodation Eersterivier 20 Mar 1970 Converted bungalow at 2 SACC Bn Da Gama Park 01 Oct 1972 Converted bungalow Grootfontein 1974 (exact unknown) Tent Naval Dockyard Simon’s Town 01 Aug 1975 Old NAAFI canteen A reassessment of SADFI policy came in 1974, including guidelines for expansion. SADFI may not have had the capital, but expansion could also not take place at the cost of other priority projects in the SADF. New branches had to be limited to places 331  Ian van der Waag Successive inquiries into the Institute’s affairs raised the issue of the state of the buildings. In 1961, the Peat, Marwick and Mitchell team found that the “premises [were] poorly planned, dull in appearance and in a bad state of repair”.51 Five years later, the Groenewald Investigation recommended that immediate steps be taken to provide suitable premises and services at state cost.52 Renovations were a matter of urgency, and there had been some positive developments. In May 1966, for example, SADFI entered an agreement with Mobil Oil Southern Africa to build a modern service centre and shopping centre at Voortrekkerhoogte.53 The first petrol was sold on 29 July 1968.54 Four new branches were added to the existing ten between 1968 and 1975, although, in all four cases, existing buildings and temporary accommodation had to be used (Table 12.2). The recommendations made by Hopkins regarding new developments in Voortrekkerhoogte, to cater for the growing residential complexes and the first National Service intake, received a mixed reception.55 Reduced liquidity delayed renovations and new constructions. The Institute had to stabilise its finances and repay loans before they could undertake major development. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF Ten of the twenty‑eight buildings occupied by the Institute in that year were of wood, or wood and iron construction.48 The Wynberg shop, for example, was housed in an old timber and iron bungalow taken over from the Imperial Government in 1921 and, back in August 1930, had been condemned as rodent‑infested.  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES where the private sector could not provide a service. And, as far as deployability and expansibility went, the family shopping service had to be on such a scale and manner that the organisation, trade experience and contracts could be extended to ensure that SADFI was able to deliver an effective shopping service to troops in the field after mobilisation.56 Growing insecurity on the northern borders and the impending deployment of troops proved to be a lifeline. An expansion programme was planned to meet increasing demands. SADFI erected a new, modern supermarket in 1974 at Langebaan Road at the cost of R167 000; the project had been in the pipeline for almost ten years. The new dairy and warehouse complex for Voortrekkerhoogte, requested in 1967 and delayed due to site problems, was completed in September 1975.57 The unit canteen at SAS Saldanha was taken over in 1975. They upgraded and extended other facilities and introduced a milk service from Voortrekkerhoogte to canteens and families in units deployed in the north‑eastern Transvaal. SADFI opened a new café or restaurant in Voortrekkerhoogte in October 1975 and constructed similar facilities in the Naval Dockyard, Simon’s Town. They modernised the family shop at Dunottar and erected a new shop and warehouse at Grootfontein. This period, on the other hand, also saw the closure, after five consecutive years of losses, of the family shop at Port Elizabeth.58 Rapid expansion marked the thirteen years after 1975. SADFI established no less than 31 branches. The number of branches doubled between 1983 and 1989. Predictably, most of the growth took place in the Transvaal and SWA (Table 12.3). TABLE 12.3 Geographical location and date of opening of SADFI branches, 1968-1989 Date Transvaal Orange Free State Cape South West Africa Totals % Pre-1968 4 - 6 - 10 19.6 1969-1975 - - 3 1 4 7.8 1976-1982 8 - - 1 9 17.7 1983-1989 12 - 3 7 22 43.1 Unknown 2 2 2 - 6 11.8 Totals 26 2 14 9 51 100 % 51 3.9 27.5 17.6 100 - The Northern Transvaal area, particularly, experienced much growth. In 1984, a canteen in the Liberty Life Building, in Vermeulen Street, Pretoria was opened,59 and this service to the ‘soldier in the office’ was extended to the Hallmark Building on 5 April 1988.60 A new shop, far larger than the existing facility, was opened at Potchefstroom on 8 April 1986.61 Given this tremendous growth, the Northern Transvaal area was divided with effect from 1 July 1988 with the appointment of a Captain Jooste as area manager of the new Far Northern Transvaal Area.62 The enterprise in SWA (Namibia) commenced in 1974 with two mobile canteens and a small shop initially housed in a tent at Grootfontein. By 1989, there were no fewer than nine branches in the territory, excluding several depots and lesser facilities. 332 The same survey in 1979 found that National Servicemen and junior ranks tended to support SADFI better than senior ranks.67 To a greater or lesser extent, this phenomenon can be ascribed to several factors, the first of which was the geographic problem faced by SADFI. Residential patterns reflected that senior officers, concentrated in the neighbouring suburbs, supported SADFI less than members of lower rank, who were concentrated in and around the training camps of Voortrekkerhoogte and hence had a greater opportunity to buy from the conveniently situated SADFI.68 The market SADFI catered for was a second factor. In the past, SADFI tended to concentrate on National Servicemen. This confirmed in the minds of many Permanent Force families that their needs could better be met by the supermarkets, hypermarkets, and family stores which mushroomed in South African suburbs from the end of the sixties.69 A third factor, public perception, was equally important. The junior ranks were relatively new in the SADF and were therefore only acquainted with the ‘new’ SADFI of the post1968 era. They were not aware of the previously poor reputation that, for years, remained implanted in the minds of many members of the Permanent Force.70 SADFI launched a massive advertising campaign in the 1980s to reach the military community, who remained the Institute’s only customer base. SADFI introduced new innovative ideas and implemented a marketing strategy and began to set competitive prices.71 ‘New‑look’ shops gradually replaced older facilities; they extended services and the number of SADFI outlets increased (Table 12.3). The outlets granted credit 333  Ian van der Waag Much depended as well on the image of the Institute and loyalty of its customers. Clearly, by the late 1970s, SADFI had changed from an enterprise relatively unpopular with the military community to one that had obtained their respect and confidence. Notwithstanding dramatic improvements in the benefits and facilities offered, some servicemen remained critical.64 Colonel François Dannhauser, who became assistant general manager on 1 January 1983, found that poor market orientation brought a breakdown in communication between Institute and customers. Customers, unaware of various discounts, felt prices were higher than what they were. Market research confirmed that some customers did not understand the complicated price structure, and the widespread perception remained that SADFI was still very expensive.65 A survey conducted in 1979 confirmed the notion that the military community were not giving their maximum support to SADFI. Residents of Voortrekkerhoogte spent approximately 64% of their monthly grocery budget at SADFI, while service personnel resident in neighbouring areas, such as Valhalla, where competition existed, tended to support SADFI considerably less. As a result, the discounts were done away in 1980, and SADFI reduced all prices by an average of 10%.66 SADFI was now becoming more competitive in terms of price. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF The Windhoek operation was taken over from SWADFI (the short‑lived SWA Defence Force Institute) in 1982.63 This is a clear reflection of the increased demand placed on SADFI by the military community.  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES under controlled circumstances. Considerable sums of money were diverted to provide facilities for the military community, including two kindergartens in Voortrekkerhoogte.72 SADFI had become a dynamic and profitable organisation capable of delivering real benefits to servicemen. SADFI had a growing presence in the military towns and on military bases. Many units now had smaller SADFI outlets. These shops, cafés and canteens offered groceries, personal items, and additional rations, perhaps mostly fast foods, to resident military families and the large biannual influxes of National Servicemen. Complaints regarding official rations, perhaps mainly by National Servicemen, extended from the large training bases to deployment in the operational area. “Anthony”, an 18‑year‑old National Service chef, relates: They taught me to cook, but it’s different when you are cooking for over 1 000 guys. Everything’s boil and oil. Catering in the army was about good quality food fucked up.73 The sister of two National Servicemen and girlfriend of another stated: Really – those rat packs! For a guy who’s eighteen, there was not enough food in them for one proper lunch, let alone a day or longer. They didn’t even get given those often, either, when they were out in the bush – at least, not every day.74 Food and culinary experience differed vastly.75 And then there was the omnipresent SADFI seeking to fill the need. François Verster, a National Serviceman in the late 1980s, describes the general dealer role played by SADFI at the time: Ons koop baie by die SAWI, want die armykos is maar min en nie altyd lekker nie. Die ouens sê ons sal sien as die voorrade opraak, kry ons net pap. … Ons koop ook Themde en onderbroeke by die SAWI. Jy kan omtrent enigiets daar kry, maar ons soek meestal kos. [We buy many things at the SADFI, because army rations are meagre and not always pleasant. The chaps here say that we will notice when the supplies run short. Then we get porridge. …We also buy Tshirts and underpants at the SADFI.You can get anything there, but we mostly look for food.]76 Besides, while SADFI met the demand for additional rations and other items, there were also notions that SADFI emptied the pockets of servicemen.Verster, who served as a National Service teacher on the Omega base, describes the SADFI there as a “… massiewe weermagswinkel wat soos ’n vliegtuigloods gelyk het”. National Servicemen and the teachers with bigger salaries spent their salaries and danger pay here. Ons danger pay is in kontant uitbetaal. Dit was altyd welkom, hoewel die meeste van ons ons geld in die SAWI gaan mors het en die geld dus net weer terug na die weermag se koffers is. Veral die Boesmans het seker omtrent elke sent van hul salarisse in die SAWI ‘teruggeploeg’.Waar anders? Daar was net die een winkel. [Our danger pay is paid out 334 In 1984, South Africa entered the worst recession since 1933. Despite an increase of 15.5% in the Institute’s turnover, net profit dropped by 1.7%. The cost of repairs to and the maintenance of the buildings increased from R206 636 to R314 502. Salaries increased by 23%, of which 10% was attributable to the employment of additional staff for the new outlets.78 No less than 36% of the SADFI outlets operated at a loss. Certain of the smaller outlets, often situated in isolated places, were run at a calculated loss to deliver a service to the local military communities.79 Under these circumstances, any civilian organisation would probably have closed these branches. A large amount of stock shrinkage compounded the difficult financial situation.80 Despite calls for greater privatisation and complaints from the private sector that they could not compete with SADFI, an investigation in 1986 found compelling arguments against privatisation. There was no way to privatise SADFI if the Institute was still to offer a service. The principle of low prices with minimum profit (as a benefit to servicemen) would be lost. Moreover, the question arose as to which large firm would be willing to operate small shops in bungalows at isolated places for small communities (in 1986, approximately 50% of SADFI branches operated with no profit). And then, profit‑ driven organisations would not be willing to divert funds from financially secure branches to subsidise non‑profit branches as a service. Private firms could not offer a service in the operational areas. These same firms would also not be willing to pay rent for the dilapidated buildings and operate in isolated areas where it would have to increase prices drastically to cover overheads. Perhaps most of the criticism directed by the private sector was based on a poor understanding of the SADFI enterprise. Local chambers of commerce stressed the use of state accommodation, state transport in the operational area, and some state‑paid Permanent Force personnel. However, as far as possible, SADFI was operated financially independent of the state. The Permanent 335  Ian van der Waag The later 1980s saw something of a renaissance. The activities of SADFI had quadrupled since 1976.This was due to the growth of the trade in SWA as well as the establishment and expansion of SADFI services to isolated bases.81 SADFI opened new malls and shops at Voortrekkerhoogte (1979), Bloemfontein (1982), Bloemspruit (1983), Potchefstroom (1986), Port Elizabeth (1986) and Windhoek (1987). Prices were visibly competitive. A comparison of 400 grocery items carried out by Dannhauser in 1986, reflected a benefit for SADFI customers that varied between 5.16% and 7.14%.82 Although SADFI was normally 4% to 5% cheaper than other supermarket chains, the Institute was as much as 8.49% cheaper than its cheapest opposition in July 1989.83 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF in cash. This was always welcome, although we mostly wasted our money in the SADFI and the money in this way returned to the army coffers. The Bushmen (sic), particularly, probably ‘ploughed back’ every cent of their salaries in the SADFI. Where else? There was only the one shop.]77  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES Force element was kept to a minimum and concentrated on the command and control, and the operational trade. As such, SADFI did not compete with the private sector. Advertising campaigns were limited to the military community and civilians were turned away at SADFI outlets. A strict application of the regulations dissipated the tremendous amount of opposition from commercial quarters.84 In 1989, the end of the Border War, SADFI had almost 100 outlets across South Africa and SWA. The Institute offered diverse services to the military community, from convenient outlets for groceries and clothing to petrol, sports goods, furniture, household appliances, and vehicle financing. During the 1988/89 financial year, SADFI had a turnover of R145 million and engaged approximately 1 200 employees. It was no small enterprise. FIELD SERVICE: OPERATIONAL ROLE, 1968-1989 The Institute’s other role, the delivery of a mobile canteen services under battle conditions, saved SADFI in 1968. Until the changes that had followed militarisation took effect, the military community had viewed SADFI with much suspicion and disregard. The Institute, which did not accompany the South African contingent to Korea, had last seen operational deployment in 1945.85 Over the following years, the Institute suffered from its poor image. Even Major General P.H. Grobbelaar, then Army Chief of Staff, had objected in 1956 to ‘the presence of UDFI vehicles within the tactical area, even on exercise’.86 Grobbelaar arranged for unit canteens to supply non‑ration items to his exercising troops during Operation ORANJE. As a result of this kind of opposition, the SADFI mobile field element was still non‑existent by 1968.87 The first steps taken to provide the field services followed the militarisation of the Institute in 1968. The Army Order of Battle then provided for a mobile SADFI to form on mobilisation. They ordered the first of a series of mobile canteens and a Permanent Force post for a ‘Mobile Shop Manager’ was created for the permanent establishment of the Institute.88 Militarisation, and then growing SADF involvement in the Border War reinstated the idea of a unified canteen system and led to the acceptance of the principle of an operationally capable and active Institute. SADFI practised their mobile field function for the first time in May 1972 during exercise BROLLY TREE, a simulated defence of South Africa. It introduced a new primary role. Until then, the Institute had concentrated on what was its secondary role, namely the provision of static shopping facilities to the military community in South Africa. During this exercise, which lasted from 5 to 27 May 1972, SADFI proved its competence in satisfying the canteen requirements of a full brigade under 336 The first SADFI shop opened in SWA in 1974. It first operated from a tent at Grootfontein.93 During Operation SAVANNAH, a bulk trade section was established at Grootfontein. Orders placed by bases and units in the operation area were dispatched from this depot and, from January 1976, two mobile canteens ploughed through the day to service units in transit in the Grootfontein area.94 Overnight SADFI was presented with an operational task, conducted under combat conditions. However, several factors constrained the SADFI operational service. Misunderstanding about where SADFI fitted into the command and control structure during operations remained. SADFI also did not have the necessary personnel, vehicles and equipment to handle the mobilisation task. This led to an inefficient distribution of commodities from the base area (Grootfontein) to the front. Some units travelled from as far as Calueque and Moçâmedes, some 700 kilometres away, to collect supplies at Grootfontein. Canteen facilities were lacking at some centres, including Rundu, while SADFI retail facilities were inadequate at Grootfontein. Problems were compounded by an ineffective pay system that limited the buying power of the troops.95 All in all, in 1976, SADFI was able to deliver a praiseworthy service as far as Grootfontein and would suffer the challenges of the distances and physical geography beyond that. 337  Ian van der Waag The real test came soon with operational deployment to the northern borders. From 1969, military personnel might have experienced a minimum of six months service in the operational area and, as a result, soldiers were away from home for reasonably extensive periods. Military bases in South West Africa were situated in distant, isolated areas, the climate was one of extremes, and servicemen often worked and lived under trying circumstances. There were no mobile canteens or cinemas, as the UDFI had operated during the Second World War, and opportunities for effective, quality, leisure programmes were limited, although the Director General Personnel did organise entertainment groups and provide film shows to a limited extent. Grass sports fields were practically non‑existent, and it was not uncommon for a rugby match to be temporarily stopped when the ball was lost in the swirl of dust churned up by the players’ bare feet.92 The need for an institute able to meet the canteen and recreational needs of the troops was evident. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF mobile, war‑simulated conditions. During the first ten days of the exercise, they sold approximately 16 800 tins of cool drink, almost 88 000 packets of twenty cigarettes, seven dozen (84) electric razors, twenty‑three boxes of shoe polish, numerous souvenirs, and crates of sweets.89 The reaction was tremendous and in sharp contrast to the sentiments expressed after Operation ORANJE. The Commanding Officer of North‑Western Command requested a SADFI presence at the next exercise.90 SADFI teams operated in the field on every major exercise between 1972 and 1990, while providing a service in one form or another to many Citizen Force units and Commandos during training camps.91  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES A committee, to investigate the role of SADFI in the operational areas, was appointed on 24 March 1976.96 Chaired by Major General W.A. Lombard, this committee found that a decentralised system supplying services directly to frontline troops and based on the NAAFI ideal, could not exist in the SADF. The supply of canteen facilities to small, highly mobile forces operating over a vast area in the African bush was too costly and personnel intensive.97 The same lessons had to be learnt again: the old UDFI (V) was largely unable to render a service to the frontline during the mobile periods of the North African campaign and even battled to do so during the static months of the Italian campaign in 1944. The Lombard Committee recommended that, under conventional circumstances, the final wholesale distribution point of SADFI be in the Brigade Administrative Area (BAA) and other more fixed bases. From these points, units were to undertake the distribution of commodities through the normal echelon system. The final point‑of‑provision would, therefore, be through the unit canteens and not the SADFI mobiles. This released the latter canteens for service in fixed bases, BAAs and on return routes where they expected amassing of troops, such as in the demobilisation areas.98 Adjusting rapidly to the circumstances, SADFI became increasingly proficient and, from 1981, participated in all SADF operations. During Operation DOLFYN, canteen supplies were transported from the SADFI depot in Oshakati to the SADFI element in the front maintenance area, from where provisions were supplied by road, air and parachute to combat groups at the front. During this operation and its successor, ASKARI (1983), SADFI suffered losses in transport. However, improved security, the presence of SADFI personnel, and the optimum use of the echelon system vastly diminished the incidence of theft.99 The SADFI bulk stores that operated during all operations since PROTEA (1981) fulfilled the dual function of wholesale provision to unit canteens and the Institute’s mobiles, which as a rule did not operate in competition with unit facilities.100 This extract from a letter written by Major F. Eckhardt, the second‑in‑command of the Cape Town Highlanders, reflects the appreciation operational troops had for the services offered by SADFI in the operational area: Our meeting with you on our recent tour of operational duty was truly a Godsend, and it certainly was a great boost to our sagging morale. Not only were you directly responsible for coming to our aid with SADFI necessities and allowing us the sole use of one of your trucks, but in so doing you ensured that an important aspect of life on the border was able to be carried out and made life that little bit easier.101 However, SADFI support largely took place on an ad hoc basis.102 No policy directives or procedures existed save a broad outline in the General Regulations. This had a detrimental effect on the service provided.103 SADFI only reached an agreement with the Army on its role and deployment during cross‑border operations in 1987. The 338 In May 1988, events in SWA took a new turn when negotiations between South Africa, Angola and Cuba commenced in London. This culminated in the signing of two accords on 22 December 1988, and the implementation of the negotiated peace settlement plan for SWA on 1 April 1989. The withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the closure of all SADFI outlets in the country ended an interesting phase in the Institute’s history. The Institute managed to execute its operational task with exceptional efficiency despite the changes brought about by the recent militarisation and the fact that service often had to be provided with very little notice.110 339  Ian van der Waag Operation PACKER was launched early in 1988, with a view to a tactical disengage‑ ment of the South African forces involved in the repulsion of the Fapla offensive of 1987.106 Supplies were forwarded from the SADFI depots in South Africa by road and rail to the SADFI depot in Grootfontein. SADFI bulk trucks distributed these provisions to the various bulk stores scattered along the length of northern SWA, from Oshakati in the west to Mpacha in the east. These provisions were sold in wholesale to the local units and also provided the local SADFI shops with goods for retail trade to the local military community. Operation PACKER was executed through Rundu; and this boosted the turnover of the small shop, opened barely twenty months before, to over R1 million per month.107 Supplies were forwarded from the bulk store at Rundu by convoys of 3 Maintenance Unit to the brigade administrative and demobilisation areas. The mobile field depot deployed in the BAA consisted of two wholesale trucks (Samil 100 6x6 insulated vehicles) and two mobile canteen trucks (Samil 100 6x6 vehicles equipped with large fridges). This mobile field depot netted an average turnover of R262 800 per month.108 At the demobilisation or transit area, three SADFI canteens served approximately two thousand troops throughout Operation PACKER. These mobiles stocked all necessities from toiletries and chocolates to wines, malts and tinned mussels. However, the buying power of troops moving north was greatly restricted as they did not have their first pay. It was, however, made up by those troops moving south, who had many months’ pay and several ‘Victory Vouchers’ (or ‘Bakgat Bewyse’) that they could exchange for beers or cool drinks. These three canteens produced a turnover of R90 000 between 28 February and 28 March 1988.109 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF content of this agreement was included in the Army’s Report on the Logistic System and provided a foundation for a number of policy documents: a policy directive or ‘philosophy and doctrine of the SADFI’; a logistics pamphlet regarding SADFI activities; and a directive in respect of the tasks of the general manager, SADFI.104 They implemented these procedures during Operations MODULER (1 July to 15 December 1987), and HOOPER (15 December 1987 to March 1988) and SADFI played a key role in supplying troops when and where canteen support was needed. For the first time, they made night drops where this was the only way of getting supplies to the troops in forward positions. Great appreciation was expressed, with an emphasis on the SADFI ability to offer its services from the outset of the operation.105  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES Unlike the liquidation of the UDFI in 1921, the SADFI had no organisation to which it could transfer the canteen infrastructure. An SWA Defence Force Institute (SWADFI) had been established in 1978 to meet the eventuality of Namibian independence and the withdrawal of the SADF. However, because of bad management and imminent bankruptcy, SADFI took over SWADFI, accepting all the losses, and turned it into a flourishing and profitable trade.111 The final curtain dropped on the Institute’s business in Namibia with the closure of most of the branches on 6 June 1989. The remaining facilities closed towards the end of 1989. While these developments left a feeling of melancholy with the people who were acquainted with SADFI facilities in Namibia, it was certainly true that there were new challenges and new horizons facing the management and staff of a much‑reduced Institute. Following the implementation of Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, the SADF estimated that the turnover of SADFI reduced by 30%.112 The management made an effort to grasp the challenge of a lower turnover by promoting productivity, streamlining the management and providing a better service.113 However, as the Institute could not open branches on existing bases if this placed them in competition with the local commercial infrastructure, there was no way in which SADFI could expand its business on a large scale within South Africa.114 Two avenues remained: the extension of existing facilities and the replacement of certain old buildings; and the establishment of new branches simultaneously with the inauguration of new bases.115 In May 1988, SADFI opened a temporary shop on the new Air Force Base at Louis Trichardt. This service started in a mobile canteen but soon expanded. Shortly after, the construction of a new, modern shop. Another success story was the new store that opened in Pomfret when 32 Battalion was transferred there from Buffalo in Namibia.116 This shop had to open its doors at short notice as SADFI was called in at the last minute to provide the service. The facility was already too small, and plans were soon underway once more to double the size of the existing building. Perhaps the most significant success came with the new shopping complex, erected in 1990, which housed the SADFI head office, a furniture shop, a sports shop, a supermarket, a bakery, a café and branches of Absa and First National Bank. This complex was planned to allow for at least ten years of expansion.117 In these ways, SADFI attempted to mitigate the loss of the South West enterprise and a shrinking clientele, following the abolition of National Service, and to continue a proud tradition of service to the military community. 340 “It is the dramatic and momentous events at the sharp end of the war”, Keegan and Holmes remind us, “that jostle for our attention. But the inexorable advance of armoured columns … depend upon logistics.”118 Logistics, or the sinews of war, is a complex if often hidden subject. Ponderous columns of logistics vehicles have to bring ammunition and equipment and, of course, food forward. Where this fails, soldiers might live off local resources and ruin the hopes of farmers and local townspeople. Many modern armed forces now have regimented canteen systems. These may vary in nature and structure, but most are embedded within the armed forces, utilising some military personnel. These canteen systems can operate shopping malls on military bases as well as mobile canteens, and provide recreational facilities for servicemen from small permissible profits margins. 341  Ian van der Waag The SADFI (or SAWI) fulfilled this function in the SADF between 1957 and 1994. SADFI and its predecessors did not have an easy history. They were the subject of several inquiries and investigations. It led to the militarisation of the Institute in 1968, a time when National Service and the development of a war on the northern borders were a lifeline. However, withdrawal from SWA (soon to become Namibia) in 1989 and the concomitant rationalisation of the SADF, ushered in a new round of challenges. The extent to which the Institute accommodated these changes is perhaps an area for future research into a floundering business. The Border War brought rapid growth, not sustainable after the ending of the war followed by the abolition of National Service and the rationalisation of the armed forces. It ushered in a new era in more than one sense. The Institute had to settle down to retail and wholesale trade, within a much smaller, peacetime Defence Force. How the Institute adjusted to these changes is a story for another day. SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF CONCLUSION: CLOSING SHOP  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE Endnotes 1 2 IN DIFFERENT TIMES 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 342 Ian van der Waag, A History of the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI), 1914-1990 (MA thesis, Pretoria, 1997), Ch. 1. See for example, John Fortescue, A Short Account of Canteens in the British Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928); NAAFI Public Relations Branch, The Story of NAAFI (1 April 1944); Harry Miller, Service to the Services: The Story of NAAFI (London: Newman Neame, 1971), and Don Bridge, ed., Naafi up! More than just char and wad: the official history of NAAFI commemorating 75 years of serving the services (Tavistock, UK: AQ and DJ publications, 1996). The first histories were largely official in nature, although sometimes delivered for degree purposes through South African universities. See T.R. Ponsford, War Record of Union Defence Force Institutes (YMCA – Toc H), 1939-1946 (Cape Town: Hortors Printers, 1946); François Dannhauser, ’n Ondersoek na die beeld van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut by sy klante, 1979 (MBA dissertation, Pretoria, 1979); Ian van der Waag, ‘Traces of a military trading organization; archives appertaining to the South African Defence Force Institute’, South African Archives Journal, 32, 1990; and Ian van der Waag, A History of the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI), 1914-1990 (MA thesis, Unisa, 1997), available at: [https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/34667507_A_history_of_the_South_African_ Defence_Force_Institute_SADFI_1914_‑_1990_microform]. Fransjohan Pretorius, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1999). James Bourhill, ‘Red Tabs’: Life and death in the 6th South African Armoured Division, 1943-1945 (PhD dissertation, Pretoria, 2016), Ch. 5 in particular. Neil Roos, Ordinary Springboks; White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005). MH Swift, ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Group in South Africa, World War II’, Militaria, 4(2), 1974; MH Swift, ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Group in the Middle East’, Militaria, 4(3), 1974; and Henri Bantjes, Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep van die Unie-Verdedigingsmag gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog: ’n Historiese Ontleding (MA dissertation, Pretoria, 1990). Bantjes was a National Serviceman at the SADF Archives at the time of research for his thesis. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, 1:The First World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Abel Esterhuyse and Lindy Heinecken, Report to the Chief of the SA Army on the Military Culture and Institutional Ethos of the South African Army (unpublished paper, Stellenbosch, January 2012). Neil Orpen, The Cape Town Highlanders, 1885-1985 (Cape Town: San Printing Press, 1986). Francis Coleman, The Kaffrarian Rifles, 1876-1986 (East London: The Kaffrarian Rifles Association, 1988). Stanley Monick, A Bugle Calls;The Story of the Witwatersrand Rifles and its Predecessors, 1899-1987 (Germiston: Witwatersrand Rifles Regimental Council, 1989). Stanley Monick and Ossie Baker, Clear the Way;The Military Heritage of the South African Irish, 1880-1990, 2 (Johannesburg: SA Irish Regimental Association, 1991). James Mitchell, Tartan on the Veld;The Transvaal Scottish, 1950-1993 (Johannesburg: Transvaal Scottish Regimental Council, 1994). John Dorrington, Semper Eadem;The Cape Town Rifles (Dukes) 1855-2010 (Goodwood: DEOR Trust, 2010). Ian van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2015), 258. Richard Holmes, Acts of War;The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003), 128. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 343  Ian van der Waag 20 These statistics were calculated for the period August 1914 to June 1917. Ian van der Waag, ‘War, Sex and Politics: the South African Medical Section in Korea, 1950‑1953’, Historia, 46(1), 1 May 2001, 101, available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/26687288_War_sex_and_politics_the_South_African_medical_section_in_ Korea_1950‑1953]. David Williams, On the Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965-1990 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2008), 11‑24. Bertie Cloete, Pionne (Hermanus: ABC Press, 2009), 93; Cameron Blake, From Soldier to Civvie: Reflections on National Service (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010), 8; Cobus Bothma, Los Af! Terugblik op nasionale diensplig deur die oë van ’n dienspligtige (Hermanus: Hemel & See Boeke, 2009), 113. Bothma (2009), 124. Blake (2010), 20‑21, 70. Kobus van Rooyen, A South African Censor’s Tale (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010), 4. Bothma (2009), 122. Barry Fowler, ed., ‘Parabat’ in Pro Patria: Sentinel SADF Monographs, 1 (Halifax: Sentinel Projects, 1995), 23‑4 and ‘Guard Commander’, 74‑5. François Verster, Omega, Oor en Uit: Die stories van ’n opstandige troep (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016), 132. Anthony Feinstein, Battle Scarred; Hidden Costs of the Border War (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2011), 48. See also Clive Wills ‘Doctor’ in Barry Fowler, ed., Pro Patria: Sentinel SADF Monographs, 1, 125. Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives): Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 12, box 2, file KMG/K1/2/7, vol.1 ‘SAWI – Beherende Gesag, Raad van Beheer’, Chief of Personnel to QMG, 9 January 1969. DOD Archives: HVS, box 763, file HVS/417/2, vol.2 Inrigtings: SAWI, Enc 35B ‘South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI)’. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAWI – Stigting, Enc. 94 ‘SADFI: Report to 25 November 1968’. Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAWI – Stigting, Enc. 94 ‘SADFI: Report to 25 November 1968’. DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/1, vol.1, Instituut en Inrigtings, SAWI: Beleid ‘Notes prepared for the Defence Council’, SADFI, June 1973. DOD Archives: HVS, box 764, file HVS/417/2, vol.4 Inrigtings: SAWI, QMG to Chief of Defence Force Administration (CDFA), 1 July 1971. DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI Korrespondensie, QMG to Chief of Staff Logistics, 7 May 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/2/4 SAWI Bestuur en Kontrole – Beheerraad, document ‘SADFI Linked Loan and Purchases Scheme to raise trading capital and benefit participating institutions’. DOD Archives: HVS, box 764, file HVS/417/2, vol.4, Inrigtings: SAWI, Brig L.B. Hopkins to Maj Gen H.A. Kotze, 29 January1971. DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF Institute – Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/1/1 SAWI – Stigting en Organisasie, Notule van Verdedigingstafraadvergadering gehou te VHK, 14 August 1973; SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF 12  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 344 and DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF Institute – Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974. Brig L.B. Hopkins (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, East London, 13 March 1989). DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI Korrespondensie,Vergadering oor SAWI Aangeleenthede, 21 May 1974. SADFI Archives: file Board of Control SADF: Members, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 May 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KK1/2/4, SAWI Bestuur en Kontrole – Beheerraad, QMG to Chief of the Army, Chief of the Air Force, Chief of the Navy, and the Surgeon General, 10 May 1974; and QMG to Maj Gen I. Lemmer, 17 June 1974. DOD Archives: HWA DGAA (H SAW), box 81, file DGAA/42/2/2, vol.2 SAWI Korrespondensie), Director General of General Administration to QMG, 17 April 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KMG/KK1/1/1, 1, SAWI – stigting en organisasie, Chairman of the Board of Control, SADFI to CDFA, 12 July 1972. General Regulations IX and South African Defence Force Order (SADFO) 95/66. DOD Archives: Surgeon General Group 8, box 129, file Q/INNS/1/0 SADF Institute – Policy, Circular issued by the QMG, 10 December 1974. Brig L.B. Hopkins (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, East London, 13 March 1989). DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI – Bestuur en Kontrole: Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, 2 Director SADFI to QMG, 27 February 1975. Brig B.D. Slater (1989); and J.D. Bredenkamp, ‘Die Onstaan en Ontwikkeling van die Vloot, 1912‑1982’, Scientia Militaria 12(2), 1982, available at: [http://scientiamilitaria. journals.ac.za/pub/article/download/620/624], 37. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI – Bestuur en Kontrole: Verslae, Balanstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, Director SADFI to QMG, 27 February 1975. Major S.V.M. van Heerden (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Wynberg, Cape Town, 15 March 1989). In 1975, Brig Hopkins stated that the establishment of a PF post for the manager of the Da Gama Park branch was “the only solution to improve management of the SADFI as a military institution for service to military personnel”. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5 SAWI – Bestuur end Kontrole:Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, ASP (3) INST – SSO A, n.d. [archives damaged]. DOD Archives: Unit History Archives: file QMG, 1 ‘Geskiedenis van die KMG’. DOD Archives: archives of the Secretary for Defence (DC), box 208, ‘Report by Hoek, Wiehahn and Cross, Enquiries into UDF Institutes’. SADFI Archives: file B of C Loans from UDFI Trust Fund, Chairman, Board of Control to the Honorary Secretary, UDFI Trust Fund, 16 October 1951. DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 102, file KK1/2/1 UVM Instituut, beleid en instruksies, Notule van Pretoria Weermaginstitute skakelkomitee vergadering, 24 August 1959. Statistics worked from following: DOD Archives: DC, box 1895, file DC 247/0, Union Defence Force Institutes (Garrison Institutes) General, Appendix ‘Buildings occupied by the Garrison Institutes’ attached to Chief of the General Staff (CGS) to the Secretary for Defence, 26 October 1954; and SADFI Archives: file B of C Payment of Rent and 50 51 52 53 54 55 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 345  Ian van der Waag 56 SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF 49 Domestic Charges, Appendix ‘Buildings occupied by Garrison Institutes’ attached to QMG to General Manager, UDFI, 24 November 1956. DOD Archives: CGS, 20/1 Garrison Institutes, Lt Col T.H. Rowell, Secretary, Board of Control to the CGS, 4 November 1944. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/1/2 SAW Institute ‑ stigting, Surgeon General to QMG, 30 March 1957. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 1, file KMG/K1/2/2, vol.1, SAW Institute ‑ roetine, Confidential report on SADFI for period 28 February to 30 March 1961 attached to Col P.M. Retief, Chairman, Board of Control to the Commandant General (CG), SADF, 30 March 1961. DOD Archives:Verslae, box 46, file K79/1 Report ‘Die Groenewoudkomitee se verslag oor die SA Weermag’, 31 January 1966. DOD Archives: DC Group 3, box 3, file DC 11/2, Ch. 2, SADFI Trust Fund, Chairman, Board of Control to the Secretary, SADFI Trust Fund, 6 June 1967. SADFI Archives: Minutes of the 78th meeting of the SADFI Board of Control, 28 June 1968. Inadequate accommodation was the genesis of numerous administrative and other problems, including the loss of stock through theft and damage (SADFI Archives: file SAWI/FIN/2, Auditors Reports and Correspondence, Transvaal Area, Report By Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., 8 May 1967). DOD Archives: HVS, box 763, file HVS/417/2, vol.1, Inrigtings, SAWI, Chairman, Board of Control to Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), 19 May 1967. DOD Archives: HVS, box 126, file HS/42/1/1, 1, Institute en Inrigtings, SAWI – beleid, Chief of Staff Logistics to Chief of Staff, 19 September 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 10, box 138, file KMG/KK1/1/1, vol.1, SAWI ‑ stigting en organisasie, Director SADFI to QMG, 18 June 1974. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5, vol.2, SAWI, bestuur en kontrole, verslae, balansstate en notules van vergaderings, Director SADFI to QMG, 2 July 1976. DOD Archives: ‘General Manager, SADFI – QMG’, and ‘Director SADFI to QMG, 14 October 1975. SADFI Archives: Notules‑SSO Vergaderings: minutes of meeting, 26 March 1984. SADFI News, August 1988, 1. ‘New SADFI for Potchefstroom’, Paratus, May 1986, 31. SADFI News, August 1988, 1. Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 28 August 1988). Dannhauser (n.d.), 53. Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989) and Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 20 July 1989). Dannhauser (n.d.), 54‑55. V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 20 July 1989). Personal information: Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill, Pretoria, 5 July 1989.  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE 70 IN DIFFERENT TIMES 76 71 72 73 74 75 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 346 Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). Col F. Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). As quoted in JH Thompson, An Unpopular War: From afkak to bosbefok (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006), 26. Quoted in Blake (2010), 193. Cameron Blake, Troepie: From call-up to camps (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2009), 73‑75. Verster (2016), 132. Verster (2016), 68‑70. SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, QMG to the Chief of the South African Defence Force, 31 October 1974. SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, Director SADFI to QMG, 22 October 1974. SADFI News, February 1985, 1. DOD Archives:Verslae, box 200, Report K86/83: KMG(1)503/1/10, 1 (D SAWI), Report ‘Verslag oor ondersoek na die organisasie van SAWI’, 23 December 1985. SADFI Archives: file Notules – SSO Vergaderings, ‘Minutes of SSO meeting’, 5 May 1986. Col F. Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). DOD Archives: QMG, Registry of the HQ Unit, file QMG 507/4/1, vol.1. Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, Order (QMG Order KMG 507/4/1), 23 November 1988. Col Francois Dannhauser (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 12 January 1989); Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989);V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 20 July 1989); Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). The South African Korea contingent was small and largely symbolic. South African soldiers were serviced by NAAFI and the PX (Post Exchange) of the United States. DOD Archives: 2 Sqn Korea, box 47, file 2SQD/1101/MED Medical General, Policy and Instructions, BCOF Administrative Instruction 186, 30 October 1950. Carol Habgood and Marcia Skaer, One Hundred Years of Service: A History of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 1895-1995 (Dallas: Texas Headquarters: Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 1994 [Cynthia Reiber, ed.]), 265‑280. DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 102, file KMG/K/1/2/4 UVM Institute ‑ Stigting vir vredestydse veldoefeninge, Army Chief of Staff to QMG, October 1956. SADFI Archives: file Policy prior to December 1968, Appendix C to Chairman of the Board of Control to the CDS, 19 May 1967. DOD Archives: HVS, box 763, file HVS/417/2, 2, Inrigtings – SAWI, CDFA to CG, c. March 1968. ‘Oefening Brolly Tree: SAWI se bydrae’, Paratus, June 1972, 22‑25, 71. DOD Archives: QMG Group 8, box 103, file KK1/4/2 Operasies en Oefeninge ‑ Roetine, OC North Western Command to General Manager, SADFI, 3 July 1972. 92 93 94 95 96 97 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 347  Ian van der Waag 98 Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). DOD Archives: Aanvullende Dokumente‑versameling, box 31, L. Jooste ‘Die SAW in SWA, 1969-1973’, 5‑10. Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern Angola, 26 April 1988). SADFI Archives: file QMG 507/4/1 Bedryf van Inrigtings – SAWI, Memo ‘SAWI Grootfontein’ attached to D SADFI to QMG, January 1977; and P. Coetzee, ‘Die leuse bly diens’, Paratus, June 1976, 10. DOD Archives: HVS (KG DGAA), box 126, file HVS/42/1/2, 1, Institute en Inrigtings: SAWI: Roetine, Enc 32A Report ‘Komitee van Ondersoek na SAWI se rol in Operasionele Gebiede’, 8‑9. DOD Archives: QMG Group 12, box 2, file KK1/2/5, SAWI ‑ Bestuur en Kontrole ‑ Verslae, Balansstate en notules van vergaderings, vol.2, General Manager SADFI to QMG, 2 July 1976. Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). DOD Archives: HVS (KG DGAA), box 126, file HVS/42/1/2, 1, Institute en Inrigtings: SAWI: Roetine, Enc. 32A Report ‘Komitee van Ondersoek na SAWI se rol in Operasionele Gebiede’); and Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). SADFI Archives: ‘Voorlegging aan die Kwartiermeester-generaal oor die rol en funksie van SAWI tydens operasies’. This document dates from somewhere between the disbandment of the Joint Monitoring Commission (16 May 1985) and the commencement of Operation MODULER (1 July 1987). Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern Angola, 26 April 1988). Quoted in SADFI News, October 1983, 3. Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). SADFI Archives: file QMG/507/4/1, Bedryf van Inrigtings: SAWI, vol.1, QMG to Chief of the Army’, 9 December 1982. Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). SADFI Archives: file QMG/507/4/1, Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, vol.2, QMG to Chief of the South African Defence Force, 20 January 1989. Forças Populares de Libertação de Angola – the Angolan government troops. Col G. van Biljon (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern Angola, 26 April 1988). Capt D. Pretorius (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern Angola, 27 April 1988). Lt David Rees (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, southern Angola, 26 April 1988). Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). V Adm M.A. Bekker (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 20 July 1989). SAWI! Leisure, comforts and militar y canteens in the SADF 91  THE SOLDIERS’ EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT TIMES 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 348 Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). QMG HQ Registry: file QMG 507/4/1, vol.1, Bedryf van Inrigtings ‑ SAWI, C SADF Policy Directive 4/2/81, 21 January 1981. Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989). Lt Gen K.M. Pickersgill (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 5 July 1989); and Brig B.D. Slater (personal communication, interviewed by Ian van der Waag, Pretoria, 25 July 1989). SADFI Archives: file Nuwe SAWI kompleks VTH, Director SADFI to QMG, 1 April 1983. John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (London: Sphere Books, 1985), 221.