The Diasynchronoscope is a hybrid artwork that pursues an aesthetic unmediated by the camera or screen, animating through attention to bring real objects to apparent life. See Figure 1. The project takes traditional craft media and processes and brings these to the digital age by relying on three modern software tools: (i) A 3D content generator, (ii) An image manipulation tool and (iii) A digital movie management platform. See Figure 2. In the words of Getty Museum curator Barbara Stafford, current modern technologies often “glimmer with mysterious and sensual ancestors” [1] and the Diasynchronoscope is no exception: the name Diasynchronoscope combines diachronic, (the study of a phenomenon as it changes through time), with synchronous and scope (view). In being so named, it evokes animation simulators from the early nineteenth century such as the phenakistoscope and zoetrope, direct ancestors of the project in that they too acted both as art objects and experimental media [2]. Thi...

This book discusses the relation between morality and self-interest. It argues that being moral is rationally required, all-things-considered, even in cases where morality conflicts with self-interest by requiring self-sacrifice (e.g., donating money to charity, or refusing to go along with immorality despite punishment). Thus, it denies that self-interest (prudence) can justify immorality. Still, normative conflict between morality and prudence raises deep concerns about the rational authority of morality and the coherence of practical reason. Ruth Chang writes, “If being moral involves making one’s life go worse, why should one be moral? And if conflicts between moral and prudential values [or reasons] are genuine, how in such cases can practical reason guide decision about what to do?” (2004: 118). There are several difficult questions that arise with such conflicts: First, is practical reason is divided against itself, and therefore unable to guide action, all-things-considered? Second, is it rationally required, all-things-considered, to be moral? Immoralism denies the latter. But the problem follows from the former issue, known as Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason, in which competing moral and prudential reasons fail to make anything rationally required, all-things-considered. The same problem arises with normative pluralism (although the literature rarely mentions it): For we seem unable to resolve normative conflict if we lack a standard that allows rational comparison and ranking of competing reasons, all-things-considered. However, the problem here is not just immoralism that denies moral requirements. For normative pluralism also undermines moral anti-rationalism that sees moral requirements as being defeatable, all-things-considered. Like moral rationalism, anti-rationalism requires an overall judgment, all-things-considered, which is exactly what normative pluralism (and the dualism of practical reason) undermines.

Înțelegerea unei norme legale, articol din aceasta sau carte de specialitate juridică, ori a modului în care legea se aplică concret pentru un caz, presupune adoptarea și respectarea unei serii de convenții de redactare și interpretare a textului. Acesta este scopul lucrări, care încearcă a se ocupa succesiv de modul corect de citare și referință asupra unei legi sau altui act cu valoare normativă, idee sau opinie, acronime și abrevieri, majuscule și italice, semne de punctuație, formatul textului, numele unor instituții și alte asemenea chestiuni referitoare în special la tipografie.