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PHILOSOPHIA
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13 · 2019
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SOMMARIO
accordo e concordia, homologia e homonoia
Johannes Bronkhorst, What did Indian Philosophers Agree on? With Special
Reference to the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha
Franco Ferrari, Homologia e dialettica in Platone
Silvia Gastaldi, Amicizia politica e concordia in Platone e in Aristotele
Béatrice L’Haridon, L’accord et sa dimension rituelle dans le confucianisme ancien
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23
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discussioni e ricerche
José Alberto Ross Hernández, Hedoné, teleíosis y enérgeia en Aristóteles
Andrea Beghini, Il caso ‘Crantore’. Contributo alla storia dell’Academia ellenistica
Michele Alessandrelli, Περιφάνεια e πίστις τὴς καταλήψεως. La risposta
neo-stoica a Carneade
Gianni Pellegrini, Federico Squarcini, Al posto del posto. Dialettiche e semiotica della soggettività nella Chāndogya Upaniṣad
91
101
Norme redazionali della Casa editrice
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127
157
WHAT DID INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS AGREE ON?
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE SARVADARŚANASAṂGRAHA
Johannes Bronkhorst
Abstract · This article asks what qualified a view to be considered a darśana ‘philosophy’ in classical India. It focuses in particular on the 14th century text called Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ‘Compendium of all philosophies’. It turns out that this text includes views that we would not call philosophies (such as alchemy) but does not include Islamic philosophy, which must yet have been
known (if only by hearsay) to its author. Different possible answers are reviewed before reaching
a conclusion.
Keywords · Philosophy, darśana, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, Vijayanagara, liberation.
i
ndia has a long tradition of rational debate, in which representatives of different
schools of philosophy confronted each other. These schools belonged primarily to
three different socio-religious currents: Brahmanism, Buddhism and, to a lesser extent,
Jainism. The antagonism between debaters was at times ferocious, the language to describe these confrontations warlike, and it appears that the consequences of a lost debate might on occasion be catastrophic. In other words, the debates might take place
between sworn enemies, who yet bothered to listen to their opponents and present arguments to refute their positions. Why did they do so?
The answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the connection with political
power. Ideally, inimical debates took place at the royal courts, if possible in the presence
of the ruler. It was the ruler who could reward the winner and punish the loser. Winning debates was particularly important in view of the fact that religious institutions
depended for their finances on political authorities. A major role was played by so-called
agrahāras, ‘gifts’ of land and its inhabitants to donees entitled to its produce, which they
were supposed to use to dedicate themselves to their religious observances. These
might include studying philosophy. Also Buddhist monastic establishments – including
its big ‘universities’, such as Nālandā – depended on the surrounding villages to whose
produce they were entitled. Arrangements like these provided a certain continuity over
time, but clearly political rulers were free to change them when they felt like it. Debates
were one of the factors that might convince local rulers that they were betting on the
right horse.
Debates – and especially public debates – require a minimal acquaintance with the
positions of one’s opponents. Such acquaintance is reflected in the philosophical texts
belonging to various schools, and clearly increased over time, being minimal at the beginning. A very early ‘philosophical’ text, the Buddhist Kathāvatthu (latter half of the second century BCE), criticizes rival Buddhist views, but does not appear to understand
johannes.bronkhorst@unil.ch, University of Lausanne.
https://doi.org/10.19272/201930201001 · «antiquorum philosophia», 13, 2019
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johannes bronkhorst
them at all.1 Also in the following centuries, roughly until the sixth century of the
Common Era, Buddhist texts were mainly concerned with rival Buddhist views, about
which they were now better informed, but they only rarely mentioned Brahmanical
schools of thought; Brahmanical texts of that period returned the compliment by ignoring Buddhist views. It is only from the middle of the first millennium CE onward that
philosophical texts fully engage with each other. To quote Eltschinger (2012: 60 n. 143):
With a few exceptions (Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, the pseudo-Nāgārjuna’s Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, discussions scattered throughout Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya), the Buddhists start criticising Brahmanical (and sporadically Jaina) philosophies systematically during the first half of the
sixth century, or slightly earlier in the case of Dignāga (Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti,
Bhāviveka, Guṇamati, Sagāthaka of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, etc.). The same seems to hold true of
the Brahmanical philosophers’ critique of Buddhist doctrines (Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāyavārttika,
Vṛttikāragrantha and especially [Ślokavārttika], Yuktidīpikā). More generally, sustained philosophical confrontation between Buddhists and non-Buddhists starts to be reflected in extant philosophical literature from the beginning of the sixth century onwards.
It is also from this period onward that a new type of text comes into being: surveys of
different philosophies.2 By their nature, these texts concentrate on what different philosophies do not agree on. However, by presenting those philosophies together, they also
reveal what they have in common, at least from the point of view of the authors of
these surveys. In the present article I will consider one of these texts in particular: the
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ‘Compendium of all philosophies’, a presentation of sixteen
philosophies in sixteen chapters.
The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was composed toward the end of the fourteenth century,
in the still young Vijayanagara Empire, situated in the south of the subcontinent. The
text claims to have been composed by Mādhava the son of Sāyaṇa, but there are reasons
to think that it was composed by the son – called Cannibhaṭṭa – of this Mādhava’s
teacher Sarvajñaviṣṇu. Moreover, it is possible or even probable that the final chapter,
on Śaṅkara’s philosophy, had been composed by someone else.3 Whatever the details,
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha originated in surroundings that were close to royal power:
both Sāyaṇa and his older brother Mādhava (different from Sāyaṇa’s son of that name)
had intimate links to the court.4
This last detail is not without significance. At the time of the Vijayanagara Empire,
Islam had made major inroads into India, and various neighbouring rulers who were
Muslims threatened its very existence. Indeed, its capital was going to be completely
destroyed some two centuries later, after those neighbours had beaten its army. Islam
was therefore hardly unknown to the intellectuals of the Vijayanagara Empire. And yet,
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha completely ignores it. Assuming that its author knew that
there was intellectual life also in Islam, how would he justify this omission?
The example of Islam suggests that there are views not dealt with in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha that may yet have been known to its author. Does it merely mean that he
did not agree with them? The answer must be no, for his book is full of ideas with
1 Bronkhorst 1993.
2 Mainly composed by Mādhyamika Buddhists, Śvetāmbara Jainas and Advaita Vedāntins; see Halbfass 1988,
pp. 350-351, Qvarnström 1999, pp. 174. Qvarnström (1999, pp. 176) draws attention to an earlier doxography,
Āryadeva’s Skhalitapramathanayukti-hetusiddhi (English translation by Clark & Jamspal 1979), but this one is of an
altogether different genre.
3 Bronkhorst forthcoming.
4 See, e.g., Galewicz 2009.
what did indian philosophers agree on?
13
which he did not agree. In an important sense, he did not agree with any of the philosophies he described, with the exception of Advaita Vedānta (the chapter on which may
not even be by his own hand). What qualified all these philosophies to be included in
his book? Since its title proclaims that it deals with all philosophies, we must perhaps
reformulate this question: What qualified a view to be considered a philosophy, a darśana? This is the question to be addressed in this article.
Let us consider some possibilities (most of which we will refute below):
– Philosophies associated with other religions do not count as darśana.
– Philosophies produced or adhered to in politically inimical states do not count as
darśana.
– Philosophies produced by thinkers belonging to a lower social class do not count as
darśana.
– A darśana is and has to be expressed in Sanskrit.
– Only old traditional systems of thought can be accepted as darśanas.
– Only systems of thought that accept the authority of the Veda and/or Purāṇas can
be darśanas.
– Darśanas accept the succession of time cycles.
– Darśanas aim at liberation.
Let us look at these points one by one.
1. Religious Affiliation
This is perhaps the most natural way to try to explain what is and what is not included
in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Most of its philosophies, one might be tempted to think,
are Hindu philosophies. Indeed, we have the testimony of perhaps the first Muslim visitor to India to take a serious interest in its religious and philosophical traditions, AlBīrūnī, who commented several centuries before the composition of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha that «we believe in nothing in which they believe, and vice versa» (Sachau
1888, p. 19). We may assume that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha had similar
ideas about Muslim beliefs (if he had any information about them at all). The question
is whether he considered those beliefs more different from his own than the philosophies of Buddhism and Jainism and the philosophy of Cārvāka, which he yet included
in his compendium, and if so, why.1 What is more, it is not even obvious that he looked
upon the schools discussed in the other chapters as being part of one religion, as being
different expressions of ‘Hinduism’. The view according which the Vijayanagara Empire was a defensive bulwark of Hinduism against the onslaught of Islam has been
shown to be overdrawn.2 The Vijayanagara Empire, for example, sometimes supported
Islam, and this was not felt as a contradiction.3 Moreover, the religious traditions known
1 Romila Thapar’s (2018, p. 147-148) claim that «the author of the compendium [i.e. the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha],
Madhavacharya, states that although he personally did not subscribe to the Lokayata philosophy, others did, and
so it had to be given recognition», besides overlooking the fact that this author did not subscribe to most of the
philosophies in his book, does not explain why Muslim thought is not even mentioned.
2 See Lycett & Morrison 2013.
3 «The early fifteenth-century court seems to have actively supported Islam, a fact made evident in Ahmad
Khan’s having dedicated the founding of a mosque in the capital city to his patron Devarāya II» (Stoker 2016, p.
188, with a reference to Verghese 1995, p. 126). Olle Qvarnström ’s (1999, p. 176) conjecture that «[the presence
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johannes bronkhorst
from inscriptions at Vijayanagara are not in close correspondence with the philosophies
described in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. The chapter headings of a study of these inscriptions (Verghese 1995) give a good impression of those religious traditions: Śaivite
traditions (ch. 2); the Narasiṃha cult (ch. 3); the Rāmāyaṇa tradition (ch. 4); Kṛṣṇa and
Viṭhala cults (ch. 5); Śrī-Vaiṣṇava traditions from the Tamil country (ch. 6); minor cults
and popular religion (ch. 7); temples and festivals (ch. 8); ascetics, maṭhas and agrahāras
(ch. 9); non-Hindu religions (ch. 10). From among these, the following are not dealt with
in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: the Narasiṃha cult; the Rāmāyaṇa tradition; the Kṛṣṇa
and Viṭhala cults; the minor cults and popular religion (Harihara, Caturviṃśatimūrtis
and Daśāvatāras of Viṣṇu, goddesses, Hanumān, Nāgas, Satīs and heroes); temples and
festivals; maṭhas and agrahāras. From among this list, only Śaivaism, Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and
some non-Hindu religions (Buddhism and Jainism) are dealt with, primarily in their
most philosophical shape. Devotion (bhakti) appears here and there, most prominently
in the chapter on the philosophy of Rāmānuja, where devotion is central.
2. Veda and Purāṇas
We can be brief about acceptance of the authority of the Veda as a requirement for
being a darśana in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. It is not. The inclusion of the Buddhist and
Jaina philosophies as well as the philosophy of Cārvāka shows this sufficiently. For the
author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, also thinkers who rejected the authority of the
Veda could produce darśanas, worthy of inclusion in his survey.1
The same can be said about the Purāṇas, which played a unifying role in the making
of Hinduism (Bisschop 2018). They are not frequently referred to in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, not even in the ‘Hindu’ chapters. The most striking exception is chapter
five, which presents the philosophy of Madhva. Unfortunately, many of the so-called
references to different Purāṇas in this chapter are not real references at all: Madhva invented them, as Roque Mesquita (2007) has shown. The other chapters sporadically
refer to a Purāṇa. Where identifiable, all these references appear to be to one Purāṇa:
the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. A passage in the final chapter suggests, moreover, that its author (who
appears to be different from the author of the preceding fifteen chapters) looked upon
this Purāṇa as śruti, i.e. as a Vedic text with Vedic authority.2
3. Political Considerations
One might think that Islamic thought is ignored in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha because
it was associated with political entities, i.e. neighbouring Muslim states, that threatened
the existence of the Vijayanagara Empire. This would not be correct. The Sarvadarśa-
of Islam] may have functioned as an incentive to the composition of doxographies introducing one’s own philosophy (and others’) to adherents of an ideology that was far more foreign than those with which it had coexisted
in the past and that had not posed any immediate threat, either in a political or a religious sense» may therefore
have to be read with caution.
1 The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not even distinguish between āstika philosophies that are Vedic, and nāstika
ones that are non-Vedic; it appears to consider Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā a nāstika philosophy. See Bronkhorst forthcoming a.
2 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (ed. Abhyankar) ll. 16.771-773 appears to present a verse that occurs in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa
(5.17.14) as śruti. Some of the other chapters refer to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa by name.
what did indian philosophers agree on?
15
nasaṃgraha says nothing that might support (or refute) this idea. Moreover, a more recent episode in the history of Vijayanagara shows that bellicose confrontation did not
stand in the way of philosophical interaction. At the beginning of the sixteenth century
CE, King Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagara waged war with the state of Kaliṅga. In spite
of this war, or perhaps because of it, the ruler of Kaliṅga sent Kṛṣṇadevarāya a philosophical work accompanied by the challenge that his court pandit refute it.1 Philosophical confrontation was in this case an extension of political confrontation.
4. Social Class
The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not say that only twice-born people may produce philosophy, and it seems unlikely that this was its silent presupposition. Some of the schools
it represents were critical of the class-caste system, and some of its texts may have been
composed by authors who were not twice-born. This applies to Buddhism, Jainism and
to the philosophy of Cārvāka.
5. Sanskrit
The texts that are used or referred to in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha are all in Sanskrit. It
seems reasonable to assume that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was convinced that there was no philosophy worth the name in languages other than Sanskrit
and its cognates.2 It seems equally probable that he could not read texts in languages
too different from Sanskrit (such as Arabic or Persian, associated with Muslim culture).
This does not necessarily mean that he thought other philosophies had to be inferior –
i.e., not darśanas – because they did not find expression in Sanskrit. He certainly does not
say anything of the kind. What is more, he cites authors who also wrote in other languages than Sanskrit, as, for example, Veṅkaṭanātha (quoted l. 4.204; equally known as
Vedānta Deśika), who also wrote in Tamil.3 And his seventh chapter, which deals with
the philosophy of the followers of Śiva (śaivadarśana), concerns what is better known
by the name Śaiva-Siddhānta, which by that time had produced philosophical works in
Tamil.4 Language in itself can hardly have been a condition for being considered a
darśana. Having said this, it is good to remember that the Vijayanagara Empire appears
to have emphasized the use of Sanskrit more than its predecessors. To quote Sheldon
Pollock (2006, p. 337): «The Vijayanagara empire … saw a dramatic decrease in the production of expressive political inscription in Kannada (also in Telugu and Tamil), while
a Sanskrit imperial idiom modestly reasserted itself».
6. Ancient Systems
It would be conceivable that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha started from the assumption
that anything of philosophical value had been expressed ages ago, by the ancient sages
1 Bronkhorst, Diaconescu & Kulkarni 2013.
2 He would then disagree with the following statement: «Indian philosophy has been written in many languages, including Pali, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Malayalam, Urdu, Gujerati, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Persian,
Kannada, Punjabi, Hindi, Tibetan, Arabic, and Assamese» (Ganeri 2017, p. 1).
3 Freschi 2018. The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha refers to some specific languages different from Sanskrit in its 15th
chapter, where it mentions karṇāṭagauḍalāṭabhāṣā ‘the languages of Karnataka, Bengal and Lāṭa’.
4 Brunner 1981, p. 104.
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johannes bronkhorst
whose names are connected with the fundamental texts of various schools.1 This does
not however appear to be the case. Some of the chapters carry the names of individuals
who lived just a few generations before the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, and
who he knew were historical figures belonging to a recent past. This is particularly true
of the chapters called after Rāmānuja (no. 4) and Pūrṇaprajña (= Madhva; no. 5).
Several modern scholars have been struck by this. Halbfass (1988, p. 353), for example,
stated: «it is … remarkable that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha steers clear of the six-fold (as
well as any other numerical) scheme, and also includes several doctrines that were considered quite modern at the time it was written. It is also interesting that this work
makes a clear distinction between sectarian philosophies and the classical systems, setting the former alongside the latter as something new». Stoker (2016, p. 72) adds: «These
[systems that were of relatively recent origin and often prevailed in the Sringeri
Smārtas’ milieu] would include chapters on Rāmānuja’s thought, Madhva’s thought,
and several different systems of Śaivism». There was apparently place in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha for recently developed philosophies. [A proviso must be added. Is it possible
that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha thought that these philosophies, though
associated with recent names, had ancient roots? Stoker (2016, p. 77) points out that
Madhva appears to say something of the kind: «In Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna 2.2, v. 549,
a minicommentary on his own commentary on foundational Vedānta scriptures, the
Brahma Sūtras, Madhva expresses the idea that all currents of thought are, like streams
of water, beginningless».]2
7. Cyclical Nature of Time
One of the characteristics that most ‘Hindu’ sects share with Buddhism and Jainism is
their belief in time cycles: long periods of time at the end of which the world begins all
over again. It is tempting to think that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha took this
belief for granted in the philosophers he was willing to take seriously. This temptation
is not justified. Nowhere does the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha mention this particular belief.
What is more, while discussing the philosophy of Jaimini (= Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā; ch. 12),
he quotes a verse from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (7.366) that states that there is a beginningless and uninterrupted tradition of handing down Vedic knowledge from teacher
to pupil,3 which suggest that this particular school believed in an eternal and essentially
unchanging world, not in time cycles.
8. Liberation
There is, finally, one topic that is referred to in most chapters of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: liberation. It is even mentioned in the first chapter, dealing with the philos1 This would agree with Qvarnström ’ s (1999, p. 174) following observation: «The most salient [generic property of the different doxographical texts] is their lack of a historical point d’appui; the various philosophical strands
are treated as once and for all fixed systems (siddhānta) and not as products of history …».
2 A note specifies: darśanānāṃ pravṛttatvān manda āśaṅkate punaḥ/ anādikālato vṛttāḥ samayāḥ hi pravāhataḥ/
«The fool doubts that [the darśanas] are streams that flow in [real] time in a continuous way from time that is beginningless, because [he is confused] by the fact that the different darśanas are proclaimed [by specific individuals]».
3 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha l. 12 140-141: vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam/ vedādhyayanasāmānyād
adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā// «All study of the Veda is preceded by a teacher’s study, because Vedic study is always the
same, like study today».
what did indian philosophers agree on?
17
ophy of Cārvāka, where its possibility is rejected.1 The chapter on Nyāya speaks of the
belief that in the state of liberation there is complete annihilation of pain as established
doctrine in all schools of thought (sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddha).2 This belief is here
called ghaṇṭāpatha, lit. the chief road in a village, and therefore a or the central notion in
all these philosophies. Liberation is mentioned only in passing in the chapter on
Vaiśeṣika, but in a manner that indicates that the role of liberation (here: niḥśreyasa) is
taken for granted; indeed, the very first lines of this chapter emphasize the role that
knowledge of Vaiśeṣika plays on the path toward the end of suffering. It is not mentioned in chapter 8, on the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā, no doubt because the goal of this
philosophy, identity with the Highest Lord, here plays the role that liberation plays in
the other chapters. The only real exception is chapter 12, on Jaimini’s philosophy, i.e. on
Mīmāṃsā. And here one may suspect that the fundamental role of ritual Mīmāṃsā with
respect to all schools of Vedānta – including the philosophy of Rāmānuja (ch. 4), the philosophy of Madhva (ch. 5) and the philosophy of Śaṅkara (ch. 16) – made it impossible to
leave this school out.3 Moreover, ideas about liberation did enter ritual Mīmāṃsā, for
example in the work of the commentator Kumārila Bhaṭṭa,4 who is extensively referred
to in the chapter on Jaimini’s philosophy, though not on the topic of liberation.5
We are therefore left with the question: Could it be that, in order to qualify for being
a darśana, ideas have to include views on liberation?
This seems to make sense. It is clearly not the case that all philosophies discussed in
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha say the same about liberation. Indeed, liberation can be conceived of in quite different ways. The liberated person is identical with Brahma in one
of them, separate from but associated with the Supreme Lord in another, completely
on his own in a third, etc. etc. But liberation is a recurring theme in all. This seems to
justify the conclusion that a philosophy is only worthy of being included in the
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, and is therefore one of «all the darśanas» promised by its title, if
it has a position with respect to liberation.
This conclusion answers questions that might otherwise remain puzzling. It explains
the absence of Muslim thought. However little the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha
may have known of Muslim thought, it may have sufficed to convince him that it had
no place for anything like liberation as conceived of in Indian thought. It also explains
the presence of chapters dealing with ideas that we may not be inclined to call «philosophical». A very clear example is the one dealing with «the philosophy of the Lord of
Mercury» (raseśvaradarśana; no. 9), which shows the way to attaining the perennity of
the body (piṇḍasthairya) with the help of mercury, i.e. by alchemical means. This per-
1 Could this be an illustration of Doniger ’ s (2018, p. 154) observation that «Indian philosophers kept the
Charvakas alive because the viewpoints attributed to them, satirically or not, disclosed hidden questions upon
which much of the Indian philosophical edifice reposed»?
2 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha l. 11.104-106: sarveṣāṃ mokṣavādinām apavargadaśāyām ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttir astīty
asyārthasya sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddhatayā ghaṇṭāpathatvāt/. In the then following lines the text illustrates this
with the help of an analysis of the doctrines of the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavādins, the Jainas, of Cārvāka and
of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña.
3 Note in this connection that Mīmāṃsā is not included in certain early enumerations of schools; see Gerschheimer 2007.
4 See e.g. Mesquita 1994.
5 Note that the chapters on Pratyabhijñā (ch. 8) and on Jaimini’s philosophy (ch. 12) do not use the expressions
puruṣārtha (‘human goal’) either, unlike virtually all other chapters. Liberation is, of course, the highest human
goal (paramapuruṣārtha).
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johannes bronkhorst
ennity of the body is here called jīvanmukti ‘liberation-in-life’; the chapter uses this expression in a way quite different from other thinkers (see below). Liberation of sorts
clearly plays a central role, even in this chapter.
This expression ‘liberation-in-life’ is only used in the chapter on alchemy. This is peculiar. The author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha must have been aware of the existence
of the book called Jīvanmuktiviveka ‘Investigation of Liberation-in-Life’, or at the very
least of the ideas promulgated therein. This Jīvanmuktiviveka was composed by
Mādhava the older brother of Sāyaṇa (after he had adopted the name Vidyāraṇya upon
taking saṃnyāsa). This Mādhava was the uncle of the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha or at least, if Cannibhaṭṭa was indeed its author, someone he knew or knew
about. There is evidence that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was closely acquainted with at least one earlier work of this Mādhava: Its chapter on the philosophy
of Jaimini (i.e., Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) shows the influence of the latter’s Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara.1 And yet, the notion of liberation-in-life as dealt with in the Jīvanmuktiviveka
– i.e. liberation before death, but different from the perennity of the body – is absent
from the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Only the chapter on alchemy mentions the terms
jīvanmukta and jīvanmukti several times, but uses these in an altogether different
manner, as we have seen.2 This same chapter specifies that in all other philosophies (as
it puts it: in all six philosophies) liberation takes place after death.3 This last claim is historically incorrect. Some earlier authors, among them Śaṅkara himself, knew the notion of liberation before death and used the expression jīvanmukti to refer to it.4 However, the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not correct this claim, neither here
nor elsewhere in his book. Liberation tout court, on the other hand, is a frequent topic,
as we have seen. We cannot but conclude that the ideas of Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya had
not convinced him.
The above claim as to the absence of the term jīvanmukti in all chapters of the
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with the exception of the chapter on alchemy has been challenged. According to Raffaele Torella (1980, p. 409), the word did originally occur in
chapter 8, which deals with the philosophy of pratyabhijñā. In his study of this chapter,
Torella points out that parts of it have been taken verbatim from other works, including
the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta. On the basis of that text, he proposes
to emend a passage of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha that does not contain the word
jīvanmukti in such a manner that it now does contain this word.
Torella’s proposal cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the passage as it occurs in all editions of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha makes perfect sense.5 Rather than
emending the text, we have occasion to observe that, to all appearances, the author of
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha modified the wording of the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī in
such a manner that the word jīvanmukti does not occur in his own text. In other words,
he consciously avoided this term.
1 Kurata 1994.
2 This chapter quotes many verses from the Rasārṇava, an alchemical text that promises jīvanmukti in the form
of an immortal body through the use of mercury.
3 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (ed. Abhyankar) l. 9.11: ṣaṭsv api darśaneṣu dehapātānantaraṃ mukter uktatayā «Because
it has been stated in all the six philosophies that liberation takes place after the death of the body».
4 See Oberhammer 1994, pp. 15-17; Fort 1991, p. 2015; Slaje 1986; 2000, p. 172.
5 For details, see the Appendix to my article The Vaiśeṣika Path to Liberation in Context (in preparation).
what did indian philosophers agree on?
19
How can we make sense of the fact that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ignored ideas about liberation-in-life that were so close to his own concern with liberation, ideas that were being developed under his nose, so to say? One reason may be
that the Jīvanmuktiviveka «departs from the mainstream Advaita of Śaṅkara by prescribing in addition to knowledge a further program of yogic discipline based on such texts
as the Bhagavad Gītā …, the Pātañjala Yogasūtras …, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās …, and
the Laghu-Yogavāsiṣṭha … He integrates the structures of thought from the Śaṅkaran
Advaita and the Pātañjalīya Yoga systems into one system bearing on the life and goal
of the renouncer». (Goodding 2002, pp. 1-2). This may not have been to the taste of the
author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. It is also not impossible that the Jīvanmuktiviveka,
which appears to be a product of its author’s last years (Sprockhoff 1964, p. 225), had not
yet been composed at the time of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.
However, perhaps the most important reason for the absence of liberation-in-life in
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha may be the following: The Jīvanmuktiviveka and its ideas had
a political dimension. By establishing the possibility of liberation-in-life within the Advaita tradition and criticizing the rejection of this possibility by the followers of
Viśiṣṭādvaita, Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya emphasized the superiority of his own (Advaita)
tradition, and the special spiritual status of its gurus.1 Stoker (2016, p. 61) describes the
situation as follows:
By regarding many of their monastic heads as having achieved this state [of jīvanmukti], Smārta
Advaitins implicitly claimed a particularly authoritative spiritual status for their religious leaders.
In a paradoxical way, the sect extended its worldly influence through the presumed liberation of
their leader from this world. Śaṅkara (c. eighth century) and especially Vimuktātman (c. tentheleventh century) each argued for the necessity of a qualified teacher to achieve mokṣa and
strongly implied that the most qualified teacher would be one who is in the state of mokṣa himself. We should not then find it surprising that, as proponents of the Advaita tradition became
organized into monastic institutions, leading teachers in these communities came to be regarded
as jīvanmuktas.
A response to this challenge came more than a century later, when another form of
Vedānta, Dvaita Vedānta, inspired by the teachings of Madhva, had come to predominate in the Vijayanagara Empire. Its mouthpiece was Vyāsatīrtha.2 Vyāsatīrtha argued
that jīvanmuktas have their place in Dvaita Vedānta as much as, if not more than, in Advaita Vedānta.3
Whatever the details of this later development, what interests us at present is that
the introduction of liberation-in-life in the Jīvanmuktiviveka, i.e. liberation before death,
was not politically innocent. Is it possible that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,
in spite of his preference for Advaita Vedānta, did not wish to be involved in this political drama? It cannot be denied that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha would be a very different
work if its preference for Advaita Vedānta was not, or not exclusively, based on arguments that support it, but rather on the claim that liberation-in-life is its exclusive
privilege.
1 Goodding 2002, p. 19; Stoker 2016, p. 55. Goodding points out that Vidyāraṇya may have countered criticism
with respect to the Advaita notion of jīvanmukti from the side of Vedānta Deśika.
2 Also known as Vyāsarāya. This is the name under which he and his works are discussed in the relevant volume
of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Potter 2016, p. 380 ff.)
3 For details, see Stoker 2016, p. 61.
20
johannes bronkhorst
Where does all this leave us with respect to the question what Indian philosophers agreed
on? Judging by the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, there were few if any topics about which all
philosophers agreed. However, all the philosophies considered worthy of inclusion in
this book agreed that liberation was a central concern, whatever precise interpretation
is given to it.
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Dicembre 2019
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