Special Issue
R875
Empathy and
compassion
Tania Singer1,*
and Olga M. Klimecki2,3,4
As humans we are a highly social
species: in order to coordinate our
joint actions and assure successful
communication, we use language
skills to explicitly convey information
to each other, and social abilities
such as empathy or perspective
taking to infer another person’s
emotions and mental state. The
human cognitive capacity to draw
inferences about other peoples’
beliefs, intentions and thoughts has
been termed mentalizing, theory of
mind or cognitive perspective taking.
This capacity makes it possible, for
instance, to understand that people
may have views that differ from our
own. Conversely, the capacity to
share the feelings of others is called
empathy. Empathy makes it possible
to resonate with others’ positive and
negative feelings alike — we can thus
feel happy when we vicariously share
the joy of others and we can share
the experience of suffering when we
empathize with someone in pain.
Importantly, in empathy one feels with
someone, but one does not confuse
oneself with the other; that is, one still
knows that the emotion one resonates
with is the emotion of another. If this
self–other distinction is not present,
we speak of emotion contagion, a
precursor of empathy that is already
present in babies.
While shared happiness certainly
is a very pleasant state, the sharing
of suffering can at times be difficult,
especially when the self–other
distinction becomes blurred. Such
a form of shared distress can be
especially challenging for persons
working in helping professions, such
as doctors, therapists, and nurses.
In order to prevent an excessive
sharing of suffering that may turn
into distress, one may respond to the
suffering of others with compassion.
In contrast to empathy, compassion
does not mean sharing the suffering
of the other: rather, it is characterized
by feelings of warmth, concern and
care for the other, as well as a strong
motivation to improve the other’s
wellbeing. Compassion is feeling for
and not feeling with the other. Given
Empathy
Compassion
Empathic distress
Other-related emotion
Self-related emotion
Positive feelings: e.g., love
Negative feelings: e.g., stress
Good health
Poor health, burnout
Approach & prosocial motivation
Withdrawal & non-social behavior
Current Biology
Figure 1. Compassion and empathic distress.
Schematic model that differentiates between two empathic reactions to the suffering of others.
the potentially very different outcomes
that empathic or compassionate
responses to others’ distress may
have, it is of great importance to
understand which factors determine
the emergence of these different
social emotions and to know more
about whether and how such
emotional responses can be trained
and changed.
Psychological perspective
Although the concepts of empathy
and compassion have existed for
many centuries, their scientific
study is relatively young. The term
empathy has its origins in the Greek
word ‘empatheia’ (passion), which is
composed of ‘en’ (in) and ‘pathos’
(feeling). The term empathy was
introduced into the English language
following the German notion of
‘Einfühlung’ (feeling into), which
originally described resonance with
works of art and only later was used
to describe the resonance between
human beings. The term compassion
is derived from the Latin origins
‘com’ (with/together) and ‘pati’ (to
suffer); it was introduced into the
English language through the French
word compassion. In spite of the
philosophical interest for empathy and
the fundamental role that compassion
plays in most religions and secular
ethics, it was not until the late 20th
century that researchers from social
and developmental psychology
started to study these phenomena
scientifically.
According to this line of
psychological research, an empathic
response to suffering can result in
two kinds of reactions: empathic
distress, which is also referred to as
personal distress; and compassion,
which is also referred to as empathic
concern or sympathy (Figure 1). For
simplicity, we will refer to empathic
distress and compassion when
speaking about these two different
families of emotions. While empathy
refers to our general capacity to
resonate with others’ emotional
states irrespective of their valence —
positive or negative — empathic
distress refers to a strong aversive
and self-oriented response to the
suffering of others, accompanied
by the desire to withdraw from a
situation in order to protect oneself
from excessive negative feelings.
Compassion, on the other hand, is
conceived as a feeling of concern
for another person’s suffering
which is accompanied by the
motivation to help. By consequence,
it is associated with approach and
prosocial motivation.
Research by Daniel Batson and
Nancy Eisenberg in the fields of
social and developmental psychology
confirmed that people who feel
compassion in a given situation help
more often than people who suffer
from empathic distress. Furthermore,
Daniel Batsons’ work showed that
the extent to which people feel
compassion can, for instance, be
increased by explicitly instructing
participants to feel with the target
person. Interestingly, the capacity to
feel for another person is not only a
property of a person or a situation,
but can also be influenced by
training.
In order to train social emotions like
compassion, recent psychological
Current Biology Vol 24 No 18
R876
Figure 2. Neural network underlying empathy for pain.
Depicted functional neural activations on the right are the result of a meta-analysis based on
nine fMRI studies investigating empathy for pain. AI, anterior insula; aMCC, anterior middle
cingulate cortex; IFG, inferior frontal cortex. Right side of figure reproduced with permission
from Lamm et al. (2011).
research has increasingly made use
of meditation-related techniques
that foster feelings of benevolence
and kindness. The most widely used
technique is called ‘loving kindness
training’. This form of mental practice
is carried out in silence and relies on
the cultivation of friendliness towards
a series of imagined persons. One
would usually start the practice by
visualizing a person one feels very
close to and then gradually extend
the feeling of kindness towards
others, including strangers and, at
a later stage, also people one has
difficulties with. Ultimately, this
practice aims at cultivating feelings
of benevolence towards all human
beings.
Using this kind of training,
researchers around Barbara
Fredrickson have shown that several
weeks of regular compassion training
can have a beneficial impact on selfreported feelings of positive affect,
personal resources, and well-being
during everyday life. Interestingly,
the beneficial effects of compassion
training are not limited to the person
who is training, but can also benefit
others. More recent research in our
lab has shown that participants
who undergo loving kindness and
compassion training increased their
helping rates towards strangers in
a computer game when compared
to an active memory control group.
Interestingly, the amount of time
participants practiced compassion
predicted how much a certain type of
helping behavior increased, namely
pure altruistic helping as opposed
to reciprocity-based helping. This
indicates that compassion training
especially increases prosocial
motivation rather than just normadherence.
A neuroscientific perspective on
empathy
This purely behavioral psychological
research is more and more supported
and extended by recent findings from
social neuroscience. Some years
ago, this relatively new discipline
embarked on the investigation of
social emotions such as empathy
and compassion and their plasticity.
A multitude of neuroimaging
studies using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has, for
example, shown that empathizing
with another person’s feelings relies
on the activation of neural networks
that also support the first-person
experience of these feelings.
A very prominent way to study
such ‘shared neuronal networks’
underlying empathic experiences
is the domain of pain. In such
‘empathy for pain paradigms’,
scanned participants typically either
receive painful stimulation to body
parts themselves or are presented
with pictures or cues that indicate
that another person is currently
experiencing pain. By then comparing
the brain activations that are elicited
by the first-hand experience of pain
with those purely elicited by the
vicarious observation of another
person in pain, researchers have
repeatedly found evidence for the
existence of such shared neuronal
networks (Figure 2). For example,
meta-analyses on empathy for pain
studies have revealed that a portion
of the anterior insula and a specific
part of the anterior cingulate cortex
were consistently activated, both
during the experience of pain as well
as when vicariously feeling with the
suffering of others.
Importantly, the magnitude of these
empathy-related activations was
modulated by individual differences
in the degree to which participants
reported having experienced negative
feelings while empathizing with the
other. Although empathy has been
studied most extensively in the
domain of pain, similar paradigms
have also been used for the study
of touch, disgust, taste or social
rewards. Depending on the emotion in
question, such shared networks were
observed in somatosensory cortex
for vicarious neutral touch, medial
orbitofrontal cortex for vicarious
pleasant touch, ventral striatum for
shared social rewards and parts of the
anterior insula when empathizing with
taste and disgust.
After having established this basic
neural mechanism underlying our
ability to share feelings with others,
a second generation of empathy
studies — again mostly focusing on
vicarious pain — has investigated the
modulation of such empathic brain
responses by various factors. Indeed,
the results reveal that empathic brain
responses are modulated by factors
that range from person-specific
characteristics, such as gender,
to context-specific factors. For
example, in several fMRI studies in
our lab we could show that perceived
group membership or fairness of
another person matters for how much
empathy one will actually experience
for the other. Thus, witnessing the
suffering of a perceived in-group
member (same football team) or
of someone who played fairly in
economic games beforehand evoked
more pronounced empathy-related
anterior insula activations than when
witnessing an unfair person or an
out-group member (rival football
team) suffering pain. Importantly, the
magnitude of the empathy-related
signal in the anterior insula predicted
the extent to which participants
later engaged in altruistic helping
behavior.
Special Issue
R877
Plasticity of the socio-emotional
brain
Despite existing psychological
findings suggesting the possibility of
transforming social emotions through
training, it was only very recently that
neuroscience began to investigate
the neural plasticity underlying our
capacity for empathy and compassion
(Figure 3A). As usual in plasticity
research, one begins with crosssectional studies which compare
experts in a given field to novices. In
the case of studying the malleability
of the compassionate brain, the
experts were long-term meditators
that had trained compassion over
many years. The results of a study
conducted by Antoine Lutz and
Richard Davidson revealed that
when exposed to distressing sounds,
expert meditators reveal increased
activations in middle insula as
compared to novice meditators.
These studies were then followed
by longitudinal designs in which
meditation-naïve subjects underwent
short-term training of affective
capacities.
In a series of studies performed
in our lab, for example, the brains
of meditation-naïve participants
were scanned before and after
they underwent either empathy or
compassion training. During the
scanning, participants were watching
short film excerpts depicting others’
suffering. Throughout the experiment,
participants provided self-reports
on their feelings in response to each
of these film clips. These studies
revealed that, in comparison to a
memory control group, short-term
compassion training of several days
was able to increase positive affect
and activations in a neural network
usually related to positive emotions
(spanning medial orbitofrontal cortex
and striatum; Figure 3B). This finding
underlines the malleability of social
emotions as it shows that a shortterm compassion training of several
days can foster positive feelings and
related brain activations, even when
persons are exposed to the distress
of others.
Interestingly, this compassionrelated brain network differed from
the above-mentioned networks
implicated in empathy for pain
(encompassing anterior insula and
anterior middle cingulate cortex). In
order to formally compare whether
plasticity involved in empathy training
A
aMCC
VS
NAcc
AI
Compassion network
B
VTA, SN mOFC
Memory
x = 10
Pre
Measurement
Training 1
AI
-43
GP, Put
Compassion
Memory
group
Time
C
sgACC mOFC
VTA
SN
Empathy for pain network
Compassion
group
GP
Put
x=8
aMCC sgACC mOFC
-32
-10
x=2
x=2
Post 1
Measurement
8
12
Empathy
32
Compassion
AI
44
VS, NAcc
52
18
Overlaps with empathy meta-analysis
Affect
group
Empathy
Compassion
Memory
group
Memory
Memory
Time
Pre
Measurement
Training 1
Post 1
Measurement
Training 2
Post 2
Measurement
Current Biology
Figure 3. Differential neural networks for empathy and compassion.
(A) Training compassion or empathy leads to differential plasticity in neural networks. (B) Compassion training compared to memory training augments activations in ventral tegmental area/
substantia nigra (VTA/SN), medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), and striatum, the latter spanning globus pallidus (GP) and putamen (Put). (C) Empathy training (in blue) leads to increased
activations in anterior insula (AI) and anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC), while subsequent compassion training (in red) augments activations in medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC),
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) and the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens (VS,
NAcc). Original brain data in (B) and (C) adapted with permission from Klimecki et al. (2013).
differs from plasticity involved in
compassion training, we conducted
another longitudinal study in which
participants first engaged in empathy
training before receiving compassion
training in a second step (Figure 3C).
This study revealed that several
days of empathy training led to an
activation increase in insula and
anterior middle cingulate cortex,
as well as to an increase in selfreported negative affect. In contrast,
subsequent compassion training in
the same participants could reverse
this effect by decreasing negative
affect and increasing positive
affect. In line with previous results,
compassion training again led to
an increase in a non-overlapping
brain network, including medial
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral
striatum (Figure 3C). The comparison
of the effects of both training regimes
on observed functional brain plasticity
thus indicates that empathy and
compassion training indeed elicited
changes in differential brain networks
associated with opposed patterns in
experienced affect.
Taken together, these results
underline the important distinction
between empathy and compassion,
Current Biology Vol 24 No 18
R878
both on a psychological and
neurological level. Accordingly,
exposure to the distress and suffering
of others can lead to two different
emotional reactions. Empathic
distress, on the one hand, results in
negative feelings and is associated
with withdrawal. When experienced
chronically, empathic distress most
likely gives rise to negative health
outcomes. On the other hand,
compassionate responses are based
on positive, other-oriented feelings
and the activation of prosocial
motivation and behavior. Given the
potentially detrimental effects of
empathic distress, the finding of
existing plasticity of adaptive social
emotions is encouraging, especially
as compassion training not only
promotes prosocial behavior, but
also augments positive affect and
resilience, which in turn fosters better
coping with stressful situations.
This opens up many opportunities
for the targeted development of
adaptive social emotions and
motivation, which can be particularly
beneficial for persons working in
helping professions or in stressful
environments in general.
Future outlook
Despite these recent advances in
the neuroscientific study of social
phenomena such as empathy and
compassion and their plasticity,
many questions remain to be
answered. Currently, researchers are
investigating the longer-term effects
of different types of such socioaffective training techniques, focusing
not only on their effect on functional
brain plasticity but also on changes
in brain structure, health-related
variables (stress hormones, immune
parameters, neurogenetic markers)
as well as ecologically valid everyday
behavior and cognition (thoughts,
prosocial actions, relationships to
others).
Longitudinal follow-up studies will
also have to determine how long
such beneficial changes can be
maintained and how these changes
can be sustained. In addition, future
research is needed to delineate
in more detail the neurobiological
mechanisms underlying the
differential changes observed after
empathy and compassion training.
One such question relates to the
neurotransmitters that are involved.
And finally, future developmental
neuroscience research may be able to
determine critical periods throughout
ontogeny which indicate when it is
best to teach these socially relevant
skills during development. Such
knowledge could help to assure
an effective education fostering
subjective wellbeing, adaptive
emotion-regulation, meaningful
relationships and human prosociality.
Further reading
Batson, C.D. (2009). These things called empathy:
eight related but distinct phenomena. In The
Social Neuroscience of Empathy, J. Decety
and W. Ickes, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press),
pp. 3–15.
de Vignemont, F., and Singer, T. (2006). The
empathic brain: how, when and why? Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 435–441.
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and
moral development. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 51,
665–697.
Fredrickson, B.L., Cohn, M.A., Coffey, K.A., Pek, J.,
and Finkel, S.M. (2008). Open hearts build lives:
positive emotions, induced through lovingkindness meditation, build consequential
personal resources. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 95,
1045–1062.
Frith, C.D., and Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of
mentalizing. Neuron 50, 531–534.
Hein, G., Silani, G., Preuschoff, K., Batson, C.D.,
and Singer, T. (2010). Neural responses to
ingroup and outgroup members’ suffering
predict individual differences in costly helping.
Neuron 68, 149–160.
Klimecki, O.M., Leiberg, S., Lamm, C., and
Singer, T. (2013). Functional neural plasticity
and associated changes in positive affect
after compassion training. Cereb. Cortex 23,
1552–1561.
Klimecki, O.M., Leiberg, S., Ricard, M., and
Singer, T. (2014). Differential pattern of
functional brain plasticity after compassion and
empathy training. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.
9, 873–879.
Lamm, C., Decety, J., and Singer, T. (2011). Metaanalytic evidence for common and distinct
neural networks associated with directly
experienced pain and empathy for pain.
Neuroimage 54, 2492–2502.
Leiberg, S., Klimecki, O., and Singer, T. (2011).
Short-term compassion training increases
prosocial behavior in a newly developed
prosocial game. PLoS One 6, e17798.
Lutz, A., Brefczynski-Lewis, J., Johnstone, T., and
Davidson, R.J. (2008). Regulation of the neural
circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation:
Effects of meditative expertise. PLoS One 3,
e1897.
Singer, T. (2012). The past, present and future of
social neuroscience: a European perspective.
Neuroimage 61, 437–449.
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H.,
Dolan, R.J., and Frith, C.D. (2004). Empathy
for pain involves the affective but not sensory
components of pain. Science 303, 1157–1162.
¹Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive
and Brain Sciences, Department of Social
Neuroscience, Leipzig, Germany. ²Swiss
Center for Affective Sciences, University of
Geneva, Switzerland. ³Laboratory for the
Study of Emotion Elicitation and Expression,
Department of Psychology, University
of Geneva, Switzerland. 4Laboratory for
Behavioral Neurology and Imaging of
Cognition, Department of Neuroscience,
Medical School, University of Geneva,
Switzerland.
*E-mail: singer@cbs.mpg.de
Cochlear implants
Olivier Macherey1,*
and Robert P. Carlyon2
Cochlear implants are the first
example of a neural prosthesis that
can substitute a sensory organ: they
bypass the malfunctioning auditory
periphery of profoundly-deaf people
to electrically stimulate their auditory
nerve. The history of cochlear
implants dates back to 1957, when
Djourno and Eyriès managed, for the
first time, to elicit sound sensations
in a deaf listener using an electrode
implanted in his inner ear. Since
then, considerable technological
and scientific advances have been
made. Worldwide, more than 300,000
deaf people have been fitted with a
cochlear implant; it has become a
standard clinical procedure for borndeaf children and its success has
led over the years to relaxed patient
selection criteria; for example, it is
now not uncommon to see people
with significant residual hearing
undergoing implantation. Although
the ability to make sense of sounds
varies widely among the implanted
population, many cochlear implant
listeners can use the telephone and
follow auditory-only conversations in
quiet environments.
The core functions of a cochlear
implant are to convert the input
sounds into meaningful electrical
stimulation patterns, and then to
deliver these patterns to the auditory
nerve fibers. In this primer, we shall
describe how these two steps are
performed, show how the original
information present in the sounds is
degraded as a result of both device
and sensory limitations, and discuss
current research trends aiming
to improve speech perception,
particularly in challenging listening
conditions.
Normal and impaired hearing
In normal hearing, sound pressure
waves travel down the ear canal and
cause the eardrum to vibrate. These
vibrations are directly transmitted
to the entrance of the cochlea by
the small bones of the middle ear
(Figure 1). The cochlea is responsible
for transducing these mechanical
vibrations into action potentials that
will further propagate towards the
brain and eventually elicit a sound