José Rama and José Javier Olivas
The Profiteers
of Fear?
Right-wing Populism and the COVID-19 Crisis
in Europe
Spain
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
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This is the aim of the new Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung project »Politics for Europe«. It
shows that European integration can be done in a democratic, economic and socially
balanced way and with a reliable foreign policy.
The following issues will be particularly important:
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Democratic Europe
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We focus on these issues in our events and publications. We provide impetus and
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About this publication
Spain has been one of the countries hardest hit by the Covid-19 crisis in terms of
both the number of victims and the economic impact. Thus, on March 13, 2020 the
government of Pedro Sánchez decreed a state of alarm, giving way to one of the
most restrictive confinements in Europe.
Meanwhile, the Spanish right-wing party VOX has clashed hard with the government during the Covid-19 crisis and even filled a no-confidence motion last October,
21st 2020. The party has also encouraged several protests against lockdown last May
and October.
This study aims to analyse VOX’s behaviour during the Covid-19 crisis and see to
what extent it has taken advantage (or not) of the crisis. As VOX is a quite recent
political party, the paper comes back on VOX’s trajectory from its foundation in
2013 to 2018/2019, when it gets parliamentary representation. It then focuses on
VOX’s actions and discourse, at the Congress and other arena.
Having positioned themselves as the radical opposition to Pedro Sánchez’s government during the first wave, where it is assumed that all parties will muck in together,
does not seem to have damaged them yet. However, it does not seem as if they
have benefited from the situation, at least not in the short term.
About the authors
José Rama, Lecturer in Comparative Politics in the Department of Political Science,
Universidad Carlos III, Madrid.
José Javier Olivas, Principal Investigator ICPPS, UNED & Research Associate,
LSE IDEAS
Responsible for this publication within the FES
Luise Rürup, head of FES in Spain
María Pallares, programme coordinator at FES Madrid
Further information on the project can be found here:
fes.de/c19rex
1
The Profiteers
of Fear?
Right-wing Populism and the COVID-19 Crisis
in Europe
Spain
INTRODUCTION
The use of the term populism has become a constant over
the last few years,1 the relevance of this phenomenon has
reached such heights that analysts refer to a populist “moment” or “Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004: 542–563 and Mouffe
2016). The media, political representatives and the general
population use it recurrently although often implying meanings that do not fit its scientific conceptualisation and that in
general seek to disqualify certain discourses and political
leaders. Several definitions are used in academia, one of the
most influential comes from Cas Mudde who understands
populism as “[…] a thin-centered ideology that considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous
and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”
(Mudde 2004: 543).
There has been a wide variety of populist movements
throughout the world, including the Russian “narodnichestvo”
and 19th century North American populism, Latin American
populisms, left-wing populisms in southern European countries, Euro-sceptic and pro-sovereignty right-wing, personalist in India and many others (Berlin 1968: 137–79 and Rovira-Kaltwasser et al. 2017). In Spain, interest in populism was
revived by the global financial crisis and the fascination for the
“indignados” or “15-M” mass movements in 2011 (Kyriakidou
& Olivas Osuna 2017: 457–472). Podemos emerged from
this in 2014, as a party that capitalises on this dissatisfaction
with strong, initially transversal, discourse against corruption
and “caste” (political and business elites) that led them to
become the country’s third political force the following year,
winning over twenty percent of the vote. However, while
Podemos slowly slid into positions edging closer to the traditional left, and their electoral base dwindled from 2016
onwards, another protest party, in this case the right-wing
formation VOX, has begun to generate concern among defenders of a pluralist conception of democracy by gaining
a stunning increase in voters and media attention over the
last few years.
1
In 2017, the Cambridge Dictionary made the term populism its word
of the year: https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press
VOX has exploited political instability in Spain, with a unilateral declaration of independence in Catalonia in 2017, a successful vote of no confidence in 2018, two general elections
in 2019 and a minority government, to bring itself to the
centre of the Spanish political debate. As Unidas Podemos2
entered Pedro Sánchez’s socialist government, VOX managed to carve out its place as the main populist opposition.
On 21 October, Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX, defended
his vote of no confidence against the Government of Spain
from the benches of the Congress of Deputies. In Abascal’s
own words, there was no alternative but to bring a necessary
vote of no confidence as, without a doubt, Pedro Sánchez’s
Government “is the worst Government in the last eighty
years” (RTVE 2020). Furthermore, according to the VOX leader, more than a Government, the people who are leading
Spain today are a “communist social popular front in alliance
with separatists and terrorists”, in other words “a Mafia”
(Abascal 2020)3. This use of aggressive and deliberately exaggerated rhetoric with moral connotations is not an isolated or anecdotal incident. It is part of a political strategy and
a communication style common to other populist movements, that, in the context of the Coronavirus pandemic,
seems to have reached new levels (Moffitt 2016: 17–25 and
Ostiguy 2017:17).
The severity of the Covid-19 pandemic in Spain4 and the
shortcomings of how it was managed by the central and
regional governments, have been used by this radical rightwing party as a pretext to exacerbate their antagonistic
discourse against the coalition government of the Spanish
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Unidas Podemos (UP)
(Franco 2020 and García-Basteiro et al. 2020: 529–530).
With the exception of the first request to approve the state
2
Unidos Podemos is an electoral coalition of Podemos and Izquierda
Unida (IU) – formerly the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) – that was
formed in 2016 for the general elections that took place in June.
3
It is worth noting that the democratic period began in Spain when
the Constitution was approved in 1978. By referring to the last eighty
years, the VOX leader is suggesting that the current government is
worse than the Francoist dictatorship governments.
4
Spain is one of the countries most severely affected by the Covid-19
pandemic with excess death figures estimated at 44,593 during the
first wave (10 March to 9 May 2020) and 18,752 during the second
wave (20 July to 10 November 2020) according to the daily Mortality Monitoring Systems (MoM0) https://momo.isciii.es/public/momo/
dashboard/momo_dashboard.html
2
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
Table 1
Main political milestones in the history of VOX
2013
17 December
VOX registered as a new political party founded by former PP members Alejo Vidal-Quadras, Santiago Abascal and José
Antonio Ortega Lara.
2014
16 January
VOX was formally presented as a liberal centre-right party that intended to topple the current Autonomous Regions
funding model (RTVE 2014).
8 March
Alejo Vidal-Quadras was elected president of VOX.
25 May
VOX obtained 1.6% of the vote at the European Parliament elections with a total of 246,833 votes.
20 September
Abascal was elected the new president and Iván Espinosa de los Monteros General Secretary.
2015
22 March
VOX stood in the Andalusia regional elections and obtained 0.23% of the vote.
24 May
VOX obtained 0.29% in the municipal elections and 0.62% of the vote on average in 9 regional elections where it put
forward a candidate.
20 December
VOX obtained 0.23% of the vote in the general elections.
2016
26 June
VOX obtained 0.20% of the vote in the general elections.
25 September
VOX obtained 0.07% of the vote at the Basque Country regional elections even though Abascal, the party leader, was
the candidate. The party did not send a candidate to the regional elections in Galicia.
2017
6 November
VOX stood as a private prosecutor in the case against pro-independence leaders who had organised an illegal
referendum in Catalonia.
2018
10 September
The regional member of parliament for the PP in Extremadura, Juan Antonio Morales, left the PP and joined VOX.
6 October
More than 9000 VOX followers filled the Vistalegre sports arena at a rally that focussed on defending the unity of
Spain, against the autonomous regions funding model, immigration and feminism (Hernández 2018).
2 December
VOX obtained 10.96% of the vote at the Andalusia regional elections.
2019
16 January
Thanks to external support from VOX, a PP and Ciudadanos coalition formed a government in Andalusia.
22 April
VOX was excluded from the first televised debate among candidates for the new general elections (because they had
no representation in parliament)
28 April
VOX obtained 10.26% of the vote in the General Elections and 10.59% in the Valencian Community (which held its
concurrent regional elections earlier than the other regions)
26 May
VOX obtained 6.21% of the vote in the European Parliament elections, 3.57% in the municipal elections and an
average of 6.97% of the vote in the regional elections that all took place on the same day.
26 July
Thanks to support from VOX, a PP and Ciudadanos coalition formed a government in Murcia.
14 August
Thanks to support from VOX, a PP and Ciudadanos coalition formed a government in Madrid.
10 November
VOX obtained 15.09% in the repeat general elections.
2020
12 July
VOX achieved 1.26% of the vote in the Basque regional elections and 2.03% in Galicia.
22 October
VOX’s vote of no confidence against the government was defeated as it failed to gain support from any other party.
Source: own work based on Rama et al. (2021)
of alarm to determine a stay-at-home order or lockdown,
VOX has directly opposed all measures suggested by the
government, to the point of bringing a vote of no confidence against the Government in the middle of the pandemic.
However, to understand the VOX phenomenon it is important to analyse its trajectory (see Table 1). Formally, the party
emerged in late 2013, mainly driven by former leaders of the
conservative Partido Popular (PP). After several failed attempts
to obtain representation, they finally managed to get some
seats in the Andalusian regional elections in December 2018
and later in the April 2019 General Elections. As opposed to
other radical right-wing parties that normally owe their popularity to a discourse rallying citizens’ anti-immigration mindset, to a large extent VOX was driven at a grassroots level by
THE PROFITEERS OF FEAR? RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN EUROPE – SPAIN
its discourse on the territorial unity of Spain and particularly
the context of the secessionist challenge in Catalonia (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019 and Vampa 2020).5
THE CONFLICT IN CATALONIA AND THE
ELECTORAL THRUST FOR VOX
After a very significant rise in support for independence in
Catalonia, the Catalan nationalist parties that controlled the
regional government, along with several organisations from
civil society produced a road map for unilateral independence6. This process began when the, conservative and traditionally moderate, coalition, Convergencia i Unió that ran
the regional government, entrenched in corruption scandals
and in the midst of a severe economic crisis, decided to embrace the independence movement and blame the central
government in Madrid for Catalonia’s problems (Barrio &
Field 2018: 713–715 and Olivas Osuna et al. 2020). These
plans included setting up state structures and generating a
conflict to force “disconnection” with Spain (Hernández 2017).
In 2017, after organising an illegal referendum, Catalonia’s
independence became a great concern for the Spanish people, second only to unemployment (CIS 2017).
In this context of generalised concern, VOX carved out a
remarkable public role as a private prosecutor in the widely
reported trial against the pro-independence leaders who
were accused and later sentenced for a variety of illegal acts
(STS 459/2019). By adopting a populist discourse confronting the also populist rhetoric and claims by the Catalan
pro-independence parties and Unidas Podemos, VOX capitalised on the concern among many citizens who perceived
that the major Spanish parties, PP and PSOE, had lacked
conviction and allowed the unity of Spain to be endangered
(Barrio et al. 2019 and Olivas Osuna 2019). VOX also managed to capture media attention that helped to boost
Abascal’s party, and to shape the topics and framing of the
public debate.
Consequently, the regional elections held in Andalusia in
December 2018 went down in history as putting an end to
Iberian exceptionalism7 against the wave of radical rightwing parties, experienced by its European neighbours over
the last few years (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2018 and
Norris & Inglehart 2019 and). At this point, it seemed that
5
It is noteworthy that the presidents of VOX to date have been a Catalan (Alejo Vidal Cuadras) and a Basque (Santiago Abascal).
6
The largest nationalist political parties in Catalonia; Convergència
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), joined forces with Demòcrates de Catalunya and Moviment d‘Esquerres, and civil organisations such as Òmnium Cultural,
la Associació de Municipis per la Independència (AMI), Assemblea
Nacional Catalana (ANC), among others, to create a coalition and
stand at the Catalonia regional elections in 2015 in an attempt to get
independence for this region. See Junts pel Sí (2015) Manifesto.
7
Spain, alongside its neighbour Portugal, that also forms part of the
Iberian Peninsula, were countries that had not experienced the electoral emergence or rise of radical right-wing populist formations until
2018 in Spain (regional elections in Andalusia) and 2019 in Portugal
(legislative elections).
3
finally VOX had achieved sufficient critical mass to cross the
implicit threshold in the Spanish electoral system and present itself to voters as a viable political force (Márquez &
Ramírez 1998: 45–59) 8. At this point, many former PP voters, although also from other parties, decided to support
Abascal’s party that now seemed to have a chance of
achieving representation.9 This wind of change reappeared
in the April 2019 general elections in the form of 10.26 of
the vote, and only a few months later, after Pedro Sánchez
failed to form a government, in the November election the
same year, where VOX, now the third most voted party,
won more than 15% of the vote. Table 2 sums up the recent
electoral to-ing and fro-ing in Spanish politics on a national
level: from a system with two large parties and a set of
smaller ones in 2011, to a multi-party system with five medium-sized national parties and several regional formations
from 2019.
In this respect, as opposed to how radical right-wing parties
have been treated in other countries, a complete cordon
sanitaire has not been implemented around VOX in Spain.
This party has managed to get political compensation in exchange for support for PP and Ciudadanos coalition governments. However, despite the fact that VOX, as summarised
in Table 1, has managed to get good results in general, regional, European and local elections over the last few years
his influence should be contextualise. VOX only rules in five
local authorities out 8,131 in Spain (all under 115 inhabitants), it has only played a relevant role in the investiture
agreements in the Region of Madrid, Murcia and Andalusia
and in the city council of Madrid, Zaragoza, Córdoba,
Santander and Badajoz, and it has been excluded from most
of the coalition governments that it has supported (EFE
2019).10
So, returning to an idea that was mentioned previously, it is
important to highlight the disproportionate media visibility
of VOX whose leaders, and often controversial political proposals and interventions in the public sphere, became the
central theme of political discussion, opinion articles and even
comedy and entertainment programmes (Serrano 2019).
The fascination demonstrated by both conservative and progressive media has made it easier for VOX’s message to
reach citizens. Studies such as by Olalla Ubierna, Chueca and
Padilla demonstrate that the main Spanish newspapers,
such as El País and El Mundo, gave VOX disproportionate
coverage which, at the time, brought it electoral support at
the regional elections in Andalusia in 2018 (Olalla Ubierna et
al. 2019).
8
The Spanish electoral system is detrimental to relatively small political
forces that like VOX, do not have a territorially concentrated vote.
9
In December 2018, 67.2% of people who said they intended to vote
for VOX had voted for the PP, 17.4% for Ciudadanos and the rest
abstained or voted for other parties, including 4.7% of UP voters
(Varela 2018).
10 VOX has only formed part of the governing coalition in the city of
Badajoz and with just one councillor who oversees waste collection
coordination.
4
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
Table 2
Electoral results in general elections, Spain 2011– 2019
Percentage of the vote and number of seats for national parties
2011
IU
7,02 (11)
Podemos/UP
PSOE
29,16 (110)
45,25 (186)
VOX
2016
2019
2019
21,31 (71)
14,3 (42)
12,8 (35)
3,7 (2)
20,83 (69)
Cs
PP
2015
22,16 (90)
22,8 (85)
28,7 (123)
28 (120)
14,05 (40)
13,16 (32)
15,9 (57)
6,8 (10)
28,92 (123)
33,26 (137)
16,7 (66)
20,8 (88)
0,23 (0)
0,20 (0)
10,3 (24)
15,1 (52)
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Electoral Results (www.infoelectoral.mir.es) and Central Electoral Commission
MAIN IDEOLOGICAL TRAITS
VOX is a party that ideologically might be classified as radical right-wing populist (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020 and
Mudde 2010: 1167–1186). Regarding the social component, VOX defends a traditionalist Christian conception of
Spanish society with frequent references to the threat of
Islam. For example, VOX proposes to “close fundamentalist
mosques and expel imams that spread fundamentalism,
scorn for women, or the jihad”, “exclusion of teaching
about Islam in public schools” and “setting up an Agency
to help threatened Christian minorities, imitating a similar
initiative in Hungary” (VOX 2018: 17&23). VOX also directly
opposes marriage between people of the same sex, demanding protection for the “natural family” and proposes
to reform abortion laws to make the process more difficult
(VOX 2018: 14&17–18). One important line in its discourse
opposes what they call “gender ideology” and feminism
(VOX2020). For example, they demand that laws to protect
against gender violence are repealed (instead calling to restore former family violence laws) and that “subsidised radical feminist organisations” should be suppressed (VOX
2018: 17). In line with other radical right-wing parties, VOX
has taken a position that undeniably opposes immigration,
calling for “deportation of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin”, new requirements and barriers for nationality and establishing quotas based on linguistic and cultural
criteria (VOX 2018: 5–6 and VOX 2019).
However, this party also presents some peculiarities in its
manifesto that are worth highlighting. In economic terms,
as opposed to other radical right-wing parties that identify
more with so-called welfare chauvinism, such as the French
Rassemblement National, the Hungarian Jobbik or the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), VOX maintains a clearly liberal discourse in favour of the free market (Greve 2019). Consequently, this party maintains a discursive balance between
right-wing identitarian logic and economic neoliberalism
(González Cuevas 2019: 175–182). In addition, VOX is characterised by defending a unitary and centralised government, proposing to suppress the pro-independence parties
(González Cuevas 2019: 176–177). Despite this proposal to
radically transform the configuration of the state, and as
opposed to other populist parties, VOX defines itself as the
defender of Spanish institutions such as the Constitution
and the Constitutional Monarchy against attacks from the
left and separatist parties. This defence contrasts with the
attitude of the far right in Spain during the transition to
democracy.
The profile of a VOX voter is a man in the youngest or
oldest age bracket, with intermediate studies, high income levels, a practising Catholic, ideologically aligned
with the right, with a strong feeling of identification with
Spain but discontent with how its political system works
(Santana & Rama 2019). This feeling of a rift with the institutions is clearly seen, not only in levels of satisfaction
with democracy expressed by VOX voters but in their support for the former Francoist regime. This leads to the
situation where, according to the post-electoral study by
the Sociological Research Centre (CIS) for the November
2019 elections, a far from negligible 21.65 percent of
VOX voters expressed that, in some circumstances, an authoritarian regime is preferable to a democratic one (CIS
2019).
MUTATION OF THE DISCOURSE AND
STYLE
Influenced by other parties and ideologies from the radical
right such as Steve Bannon, Abascal’s party has moved from
a fundamentally ultra-conservative and nationalist discourse
towards a much more populist style, adopting anti-globalist
ideas, criticising supra-national institutions and embracing
conspiracy arguments, including attacks on George Soros
and accusations to the PSOE and UP governments of attempting to set up a communist regime (Sommerlad 2019,
Parto 2019, El Español 2020, Mayor Ortega 2019 and Congress Sessions Record 2020).VOX has also developed quite
an effective social media strategy, becoming for instance the
Spanish party with the most followers on Instagram (Viejo &
Alonso 2018).
THE PROFITEERS OF FEAR? RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN EUROPE – SPAIN
Their populist discourse divides Spain into two different
parts: “la España viva” (Living Spain) that VOX represents, as
opposed to “España muerta” (Dead Spain), featuring progressive media, partisan elite, gender ideology, among others (Casals 2019 and Casals 2020: 27–35). The leaders of
VOX have also embraced a coarse and aggressive rhetoric
style, intentionally distanced from what is politically correct
emulating Donald Trump and other international populist
figures. For example, during VOX’s vote of no confidence
against the government, their deputy spokesperson, Ignacio
Garriga, referred to “electoral fraud”, accused ruling coalition of “participating in a coup”, of totalitarian ideology, of
“starting up a machine of violence against VOX”, of “criminal management” and condemning many Spanish people to
death, He also accused “illegal immigrants” of attacking,
intimidating and stealing (Garriga 2020). The use of bad
manners, a clearly hyperbolic tone and dramatizing political
crisis, fits with a populist strategy that aims to side with “Joe
public” as opposed to the political, economic and intellectual elites (Moffitt 2016 and Ostiguy 2017).
VOX’S DISCOURSE DURING THE STATE
OF ALARM
The COVID19 pandemic has been also instrumentalised in
this polarisation strategy. Confirming arguments regarding
populism’s performative nature, this party organised people’s rallies to protest against the government’s management during the pandemic, both in May and in October,
encouraging citizens to use their vehicles and thereby circumvent the lockdown rules (La República 2020 and Europa
Press2020). Furthermore, the health and economic crisis
seems to have had an impact on confidence in governments
and institutions, satisfaction with democracy and electoral
participation (Bol et al. 2020 and Flanders et al. 2020). Some
studies highlight that it has increased the demand for
stronger leaders, citizens’ willingness to renounce their individual freedom and, in general, a growing preference for
technocratic governments even if they display some authoritarian traits (Amat et al. 2020).11 Aware of this situation,
VOX has adapted and reinforced its confrontation discourse
and when the majority of parties attempted to show unity in
the fight against the pandemic, they voted against successive extensions for the state of alarm and called a vote of no
confidence against the government.
On the one hand, VOX has used conspiracy theories, accusing the Spanish government of using euthanasia on thousands of elderly people and China of having created a virus
to damage other countries (Carvajal 2020). Abascal suggests
demanding that China should pay compensation and congratulated Trump for leaving the WHO, insinuating that it is
11 We should remember that elections in Spain were postponed during
the pandemic, anyone testing positive for Coronavirus was forbidden to vote (elections in Galicia and the Basque Country), there was
a proposal to control information to control fake news, application
of the transparency laws was suspended and individual freedom was
limited during the state of alarm.
5
controlled by China (Europa Press 2020). In this context, furthermore, VOX has intensified its European anti-immigration
and anti-integration discourse, which seems to bring them
even closer, if possible, to their populist European contemporaries (McDonnell & Werner 2019). For example, in Madrid City Hall, VOX has promoted measures to slow down
immigration arguing, against all scientific evidence, that immigrants are more likely to carry coronavirus (La Vanguardia
2020). On the other hand, VOX has intensified its anti-European discourse. During the recent vote of no confidence,
Abascal referred to the European project as “progressive
and globalist tyranny” and affirmed that “the Spanish people are not going to allow their nation to disappear, turned
into a region of a replica of the People’s Republic of China”
and that “Brussels won’t save us” from the crisis.12
Getting a better understanding of the scope of this apparent change in VOX discourse in recent times requires systematically analysing their parliamentary speeches on the
state of alarm in Spain caused by the COVID19 pandemic. In
this respect, as a recap, the declaration of the state of alarm
took place on 25 March 2020, transferring most powers to
the central government and decreeing a general stay-athome order. At first, it was called for a period of two weeks.
However, it was successively extended, the last time on the
3 June of the same year. VOX only voted in favour of the
state of alarm the first time and clearly opposed each of the
successive votes.13
It is particularly interesting to see to what extent the discourse from the new political force in the Congress, VOX,
had been able to change parliamentary dynamics and influence the other political parties. We analysed the content of
parliamentary speeches, dissecting them according to the
five main dimensions of populism (Laclau 2005; Canovan
1981 and Mudde 2004: 542–563):
1. Antagonism: simplistic and antagonistic representation
of political and social players (“us” against “them”) and
calls for radical changes in the system.
2. Morality: establishing a moral hierarchy among players,
disqualifications and ad hominem attacks to undermine
the political opponent.
3. Idealisation of society: ahistorical and anti-pluralist
description of the people, emphasis on homogeneity
within the group and marked difference from the other.
12 In this respect, Abascal used this criticism of the integration
process to, in turn, defend the nation state and emphasise the
nativistic component in his discourse: “People are waking up in
Europe to defend their sovereignty and defend their western identity, they are demanding the nation-state as an irreplaceable unit
and supreme space for democracy, and they reject a federal
mega-state that looks like the People’s Republic of China or,
even, the Europe that Hitler dreamed of” (Congress Sessions
Record 2020).
13 Out of all seven extensions to the state of alarm that the Government had to put to a vote in the Congress, VOX only voted in favour
the first time, voting against it the other six times (just like most of
the regionalist / independent parties such as ERC, JxCat or Bildu)
(Alfonso 2020).
6
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
Figure 1
Populist references in VOX’s manifesto (November 2019), investiture session (4 January 2020) and interventions in sessions
on the state of alarm (March-June 2020)
Investiture
Electoral programme
Covid-19
15
15
15
10
10
10
5
5
5
0
0
0
Sovereignty-Populism
Leadership-Populism
Society-Populism
Antagonism-Populism
Morality-Populism
Source: own work
4. Popular sovereignty: lack of boundaries for the
“will of the people” and preference for direct
democracy tools such as referendums or massive
rallies.
5. Personalist leadership: the leader gives the people a
voice and brings their interests to life. Their relationship
with this population does not have to be measured
by parties, parliaments or other institutions.
The lines, both moralist and antagonist, tend to move upward and the last debate during the state of alarm saw the
greatest doses of populism deployed. Use of antagonistic
allusions over the six points in time being analysed stands,
on average, at 6.4 while the average of moralist allusions is
11.12. So then, on 3 June, these figures rose to 10.68 and
14.25 respectively. A clearly hyperbolic and belligerent tone
could be perceived in the interventions in the final session:
Figure 1 shows how VOX’s discourse is modulated from
the populist point of view and evolves according to circumstance. The morality and antagonism components become
much more salient in Abascal’s parliamentary speeches
while the references to an idealised conception of traditional society become less prominent (Olivas-Osuna & Rama 2020).
“Mr Sánchez, you can’t disguise this: tens of thousands of
dead Spaniards due to sectarianism and criminal negligence by this Government and millions of Spaniards ruined
by sectarianism and a hidden state of exception” (Abascal,
3 June 2020)
In the same way, Figure 2 shows that there is an evolution in
populist (left-hand graph) and anti-populist (right-hand
graph) discourse for the case of VOX during the pandemic.14
14 The figures show the density of the allusions. To calculate this figure,
the number of phrases that we consider belonging to each category
(Sovereignty, Leadership, Morality, etc.) is divided by the total number of words in the speech and multiplied by one thousand, to provide figures that are easier to interpret.
“…We know where your Government stands,[…], forging
new agreements with all of Spain’s enemies who are not in
the Council of Ministers, of course: with ETA, with the Partido Nacionalista Vasco and with Esquerra Republicana de
Cataluña, with everyone who has only ever been concerned, are and will be concerned by Spain going down in
flames…” (Abascal, 3 June 2020).15
15 Congress Sessions Report, http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/
L14/CONG/DS/PL/DSCD-14-PL-25-C1.PDF
7
THE PROFITEERS OF FEAR? RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN EUROPE – SPAIN
Figure 2
Evolution of populist and anti-populist references in VOX’s discourse, March 2020 to June 2020
VOX
VOX
15
10
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sovereignty-Populism
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sovereignty-Anti Populism
Leadership-Populism
Leadership-Anti Populism
Morality-Populism
Morality-Anti Populism
Society-Populism
Society-Anti Populism
Antagonism-Populism
Antagonism-Anti Populism
Source: own work
So, this discourse from VOX could have had a contagion
effect on other formations. In moralist terms, although far
from VOX numbers, Unidos Podemos has demonstrated
figures of around 7.5 (a long way off figures for parties
such as Cuidadanos or the PSOE, always under 2.5). On the
left, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) has moved
from 2.72 and 1.94 for moralist and antagonist allusions,
respectively, on 25 March 2020, to 8.59 and 7.47 on 3
June 2020. This doubtlessly shows a clear increase in populist rhetoric. Even more so given that the populist allusions of these parties were partly allusions to VOX (Congress Sessions Report, 2020).
For the case of the PP, this populist contagion has been
even more relevant: the figures speak for themselves and
Figure 3 demonstrates this well. Pablo Casado, leader of
the PP, changed from a barely populist intervention at the
start of the crisis to a much more populist style where he
accused the government of hiding deaths, lying and damaging institutions to stay in power (Congress Sessions Report, 2020). In terms of morality, his populist references
tripled from 4.74 to 14.14. In fact, along with the VOX
levels on 3 June (14.25), they show the highest values of all
the Spanish parties being analysed. The evolution of their
antagonistic rhetoric is also remarkable: from 1.25 to 5.44.
It seems that the PP, seeing how VOX was presenting itself
as the only party that was providing aggressive opposition
to the government, decided to raise the tone so as not to
lose voters in favour of this party. However, Casado’s coded populist references, although plentiful, do not reach the
level of intensity and emotional charge of Abascal’s speech.
Furthermore, it should be noted that during the vote of no
confidence in October, the PP hit a turning point and
leaned towards the centre, apparently abandoning its populist tone from previous speeches.
THE FUTURE OF VOX
It is difficult to predict whether VOX’s increasingly populist
strategy will will continue to be successful in the future. Regarding the elections in November, VOX seems to show a
slight upwards evolution in some polls, as in the latest survey
taken by the Sociological Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS) (Electocracia.com and Santaeulalia 2020). Having positioned themselves as the radical opposition to Pedro Sánchez’s government, even in the midst
of a health crisis such as this, where a certain collaboration
of all parties is assumed, does not seem to have harmed
them yet. (see Figure 4). VOX seems to have interpreted the
coronavirus pandemic as a window of opportunity to differentiate its political offer from that of the rest of Spanish parties, intensifying the use of a confrontational discursive style
with many rhetoric elements wherever possible. The initial
8
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
Figure 3
Comparison of populist references in the PP and VOX discourse, March 2020 and June 2020
PP
VOX
15
10
5
ne
ch
Ju
ar
3.
M
25
.
25
.
3.
M
Ju
ar
ne
ch
0
Sovereignty-Populism
Leadership-Populism
Society-Populism
Antagonism-Populism
Morality-Populism
Source: own work
reaction of the PP during the first wave, adopting also a
somewhat populist discourse vis-à-vis the COVID-19 crisis
may indicate a certain degree of success in VOX approach.
However, during the vote of no confidence in October, in
the midst of the second wave, the leader of the PP, Pablo
Casado, decided to make a clean break from VOX and vote
“no” at the vote of no confidence, with a speech that highlighted the danger of this party’s radicalism and that asked
citizens to take the threat of populism seriously (El País
2020). The speech, applauded by many, took Abascal’s formation by surprise (Santaeulalia 2020). VOX not only seemed
confused during the rest of censure motion session but also
chose to confront the PP days later in Andalusia by leaving
the approval of the regional budget up in tha air (Morillo
2020). Abascal and other leaders from his party not only feel
betrayed, but have reason to fear that a rupture with the PP
will once again pigeonhole them as an extremist party alien
to government pacts.
Thus, the radicalisation of VOX’s discourse along with the
recent shift of the PP towards the centre of the political
chessboard, a space that it seemed to have abandoned after
Mariano Rajoy’s departure, could give way to at least two
different scenarios: on the one hand, PP’s and Ciudadanos’
centrist turn in the last few months could catapult VOX into
the limelight as the “real” opposition to the current government. Especially, if the political climate continues to remain
tense revolving around the territorial conflict and topics of
identity, VOX can continue attracting citizens who feel alienated by the left-wing government and not sufficiently defended by the centre-right opposition.16 In the alternative
scenario, the PP could capitalise on the defeat of the vote of
no confidence and Casado’s well-received speech and recover voters who left the PP to join VOX or Ciudadanos in the
last elections.17 This could mean that VOX would be isolated
and gradually becomes a party with less capacity to shape
Spanish politics and therefore less attractive electorally-speaking. Thus, if Spanish politics returns to “relative normality”, VOX’s deliberately exaggerated and aggressive discourse could end up costing it a significant percentage of
votes that the Spanish electoral system may translate into a
significant loss of seats in future elections.
One remarkable element of the Spanish radical right-wing
formation to bear in mind when understanding its possible
long-term future is that, opposed to most of its European
counterparts, VOX does not seem to depend entirely on its
leader Santiago Abascal. Thus, compared to the personalism
16 There is evidence that, Radical Right-wing parties get better electoral
support in climates of electoral polarisation (Castanho Silva 2018 and
Bischof & Wagner 2019).
17 Out of all VOX voters in 2019, 58.9 percent had previously voted for
the PP.
9
THE PROFITEERS OF FEAR? RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN EUROPE – SPAIN
Figure 4
Predicted vote for the five most relevant national parties in Spain during the COVID19 pandemic, April 2020 – November 2020
35
30
25
20
15
13,0
12,5
12,3
Jun 20
Jul 20
11,3
12,5
11,7
13,2
10
5
0
Apr 20
Mai 20
PSOE
PP
Aug 20
Cs
Sep 20
UP
Okt 20
Nov 20
VOX
Source: CIS surveys April 2020 – November 2020
of parties such as UKIP in the United Kingdom, that without
Nigel Farage, or the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, that
also depends greatly on Geert Wilders, several of the leaders
accompanying Abascal: Espinosa de los Monteros, Macarena Olona, Jorge Buxadé, Rocío Monasterio, among others,
seem just as capable as Abascal of taking the party reigns if
necessary.
Finally,in order to estimate VOX’s possible future VOX, it is
important to know the strategy of the left, particularly of
PSOE as well as the postitions of the media. If the PSOE opts
to build bridges with Ciudadanos and the PP, now that the
conservative party has demonstrated its intention to stick to
the centre, it is possible that the polarisation might crumble
and that VOX, and probably Unidas Podemos, become less
important in the public sphere. If, however, PSOE discourse
continues to associate Ciudadanos and PP with VOX, the far
right and Francoism, the dynamics of confrontation could
continue or even get stronger. Similarly, the media can play
an important role in the future of this party. If major newspapers and TV channels continue to give VOX as much airtime as they have done so far, this party will capitalise on
both the praise and the criticism and may maintain or even
increase its electoral base.
According to the American film-maker Cecil B. DeMille a
film shouls always start withan earthquake and work up to
a climax. If we apply this idea to Spanish politics, it seems
that extreme Spanish right now is coming to the end of the
earthquake part (i.e VOX’s vote of no confidence) but this
might be just the start: there could be even more earth-shattering episodes to come.
10
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
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http://www.poderjudicial.es/stfls/TRIBUNAL%20SUPREMO/
DOCUMENTOS%20DE%20INTER%C3%89S/Sentencia%20459_2019.pdf
Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. (2019): Explaining the end of Spanish
exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox, in: Research & Politics, 6(2);
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Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J.; Rama, José & Santana Andrés (2020):
The Baskerville’s dog suddenly started barking: voting for VOX in the
2019 Spanish general elections, in: Political Research Exchange, 2(1);
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Vampa, Davide (2020): Competing forms of populism and territorial
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12
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – POLITICS FOR EUROPE
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany with
a rich tradition dating back to its foundation in 1925. Today, it remains loyal to the
legacy of its namesake and campaigns for the core ideas and values of social democracy: freedom, justice and solidarity. It has a close connection to social democracy and free trade unions.
FES promotes the advancement of social democracy, in particular by:
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political educational work to strengthen civil society;
think tanks;
international cooperation with our international network of offices
in more than 100 countries;
support for talented young people;
maintaining the collective memory of social democracy with archives,
libraries and more.
IMPRINT
© 2020
FES Madrid
The statements and conclusions are the sole responsibility of
the author and do not represent an official opinion of the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-EbertStiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of
the FES.
Front cover: ©Noé
Design concept: www.bergsee-blau.de
Layout: www.zumweissenroessl.de
In many countries the COVID-19 crisis had initially led to increased trust in
government. The restrictions to personal freedoms, curfews, restrictions on social
contacts, the closure of large segments of the economy as well as the widening
of executive powers in many countries was largely accepted and supported by the
public. However, frustration and distrust of government have been increasing the
longer the restrictions have been in place. Some countries, such as Germany,
witnessed large demonstrations against the counter measures. Moreover, the
wide dissemination of fake news and conspiracy theories are influencing the
public debate on how to handle the pandemic.
Reports from Sweden, Finland, Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Germany – all
countries with large or growing right-wing populist movements and parties
explore the question, if right-wing populism in Europe has been able to benefit
from the Corona-crisis. A synopsis interprets and classifies the developments in
the individual countries in a comparative perspective.
Further information on the project can be found here:
fes.de/c19rex