CALCULATIVE IMAGINATIONS
Following the performative socio-technical
construction of Costa Rica’s carbon neutral
actor-network
Vorgelegt von
Yamil Hasbun Chavarría, M.Sc.
von der Fakultät VI - Planen Bauen Umwelt
der Technischen Universität Berlin
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Philosophie
- Dr.phil. genehmigte Dissertation
Promotionsausschuss:
Vorsitzender:
Prof. Dr. Misselwitz
Gutachter:
Prof. Jörg Stollmann
Gutachter:
Prof. Dr. Ignacio Farías (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 10. April 2019
Berlin 2019
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ................................................................. 4
DEDICATION ........................................................... 7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................... 8
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................... 9
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................... 9
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................... 10
INTRODUCTION. ................................................... 13
1.1 THEORETICAL APPROACH .............................................................. 30
1.2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH.................................................... 37
1.3. CHAPTER SCHEME. .......................................................................... 44
1.4. READING CODE ............................................................................... 49
–CHAPTER 1– ........................................................... 51
NEUTRALIZING CARBON IN COSTA RICA ...... 51
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 51
A. ‘CARBON NEUTRALITY’ GOAL FOR 2021. .................................. 55
1. National Climate Change Strategy (ENCC) .................................... 65
Punctual Observations 1 ................................................ 88
2. Carbon Accounting: National Inventory of Green House Gas Emissions
............................................................................................................. 99
Punctual Observations 2 .............................................. 115
B. ‘CARBON NEUTRALITY’ GOAL UPDATED. ............................... 151
3. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) ................. 158
Punctual Observations 3. ............................................. 164
–CHAPTER 2–......................................................... 172
RECOGNIZING ‘CARBON NEUTRALITY’ ....... 172
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 172
1. ‘Carbon Neutral Country Program’ (Agreement 36-012-MINAET)
........................................................................................................... 176
2
Punctual Observations 1. ............................................. 180
Normative for Demonstrating Carbon Neutrality (INTE B5:2016) and
the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program .................................................... 182
Punctual Observations 2. ............................................. 217
Costa Rica’s Domestic Carbon Markets .............................................. 236
Punctual Observations 3. ............................................. 256
–CHAPTER 3–......................................................... 279
CAPITALIZING ‘EARLY ACTIONS’ ................... 279
INTRODUCTION. ................................................................................... 279
1. Capitalizing avoided deforestation and forest conservation: REDD+284
Punctual Observation 1. .............................................. 293
–CONCLUSIONS–.................................................. 327
REFERENCES........................................................ 339
3
Abstract
This dissertation explores the current process of sociotechnical reconstruction, negotiating, ordering and
stabilization of ‘nature’ as it is performatively (re)assembled
as ‘carbon’ through a series of contingent calculations
performed by ‘green technocracies’. Particularly, the
research follows how Costa Rica’s community of technoscientific ‘experts’ enables the simultaneous emergence of
‘carbon’ and ‘carbon offsets’ as the ‘problem’ and the
‘solution’ –respectively– to the country’s effort in reaching
its self-imposed goal of becoming the world’s first ‘carbon
neutral’ nation by 2021.
Chiefly drawing on actor-network theory (ANT), this
dissertation will show how the very objects of ‘nature’ with
which the global campaign for facing ‘climate change’ (and
hence also the country’s ‘carbon neutral’ initiative) is
concerned with, are not self-evident objects that pre-exist
the different policies, devices and calculative practices
developed to render them orderable. Instead, the study will
show that ‘carbon emissions’ and ‘carbon offsets’ are
things that come into existence through the mediation of a
heterogeneous network of socio-technical devices,
numbers and ‘expert’ knowledge; and are not simply things
literally and figuratively floating ‘out there’ in the
atmosphere. Therefore, rather than focusing on the material
–i.e. chemical, physical or climatological– properties of
Greenhouse gases (GHG), this dissertation focuses on
how the abstract entity known as ‘carbon’ is ‘socially’
collected,
measured,
accounted,
displaced
and
(re)circulated by Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’; and how
these practices enable a process of neoliberalism (understood
4
as a socio-technical governmentality) which is performatively
assembled and black-boxed as the ‘logical solution’ to a
series of longstanding ‘development’ problems embedded
in the requirements of capitalist value. The study will also
show how the contingent, fragmentary and biased nature
of carbon calculations requires high degrees of
improvisation,
selective
blindsight,
deliberate
discrimination and guesswork from both ‘expert’
practitioners and their technological devices, and from
final political decision-makers. Furthermore, this
dissertation sheds new light on the socio-technical process
through which the inexistence of an invisible ‘gas’ is
transformed into a measurable, tradable, storable and
circulatable currency. Rather than a particular material
good (i.e. cubic tons of oxygen), or ‘rights to pollute’, the
commodities exchanged in carbon markets (carbon offsets)
are better understood as imagined void-like entities capable
of ‘erasing’ the materiality of another gas in an ‘equivalent
proportion’.
Finally, drawing on governmentality studies, it will be
discussed how the ‘voluntary’ character of Costa Rica’s
policies and programs aimed to order carbon and ‘climate
change’, heavily relies on the creation of a myriad of
technologies of accounting intended to extend action at a distance.
Hence, Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral’ actor-network
performatively depicts climate change as a problem that is
technically and technologically amenable through abstract
calculative spaces. Furthermore, it will be shown how in
moving from a ‘protectionist’, state-centered conservation
model to a more market-oriented ‘neoliberal’ one, the
Costa Rican state has found a viable mechanism to transfer
what is perhaps the largest share of responsibility of
5
reducing the country’s GHG emissions –and therefore of
reaching the self-imposed goal of carbon neutrality in
2021– to the private sector.
6
Dedication
To Christiane
7
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Professor Jörg Stollmann for giving
me the immense opportunity of pursuing these Doctoral
studies; and for having always helped me to find my way
through all those years. I am forever in debt!
Also, I would like to thank Professor Ignacio Farías for
having shared his invaluable insights which allowed me to
face the simplest and most complex challenges of this
research.
Photo credit: Hector Santos.
8
List of Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Dissertation’s chapter scheme
Axes of the ENCC
Motorized fleet evolution, according to
type of vehicle.
Distribution of GHG emissions for
2012 expressed in C02 equivalents
Relation between costs, benefits and
degree of confidence in each technic
for determining GHG emissions
45
68
96
115
129
List of Tables
Table A
Table B
Table C
Table D
Table E
Table F
Table G
Table H
Threshold values and criteria for
hydroelectric power pants with
reservoirs
Framework of tier structure
‘Value jumps’ for the AFOLU sector
for different INGEIs
Different ‘mitigation commitments’ of
Annex I, and non-Annex I countries
over time
Enlistment of ‘definitions’ in the INTE
B5:2016 normative
Compensation schemes accepted in the
INTE B5:2016 normative
GWP relative to each CO2 over a 100year time horizon
Benefits for carbon market participants
9
111
125
149
168
191
194
204
244
Table I
Table J
UNFCCC’s five REDD+ activities
Periods
of
REDD+
strategy
implementation in Costa Rica
290
291
List of Abbreviations
Actor-Network Theory
Clean Development Mechanisms (defined
by the UNFCCC under the Kyoto
Protocol)
CERs:
‘Certified Emission Reduction’ credits, also
CER
CGR:
General Comptroller of the Republic [State
entity]
CO2eq:
Equivalent Carbon Dioxide units
COP:
Conference of Parties
CTO:
Certifiable Tradable Offset
DCC:
Climate Change Directorate [State entity,
dependency of MINAE]
ENCC:
National Climate Change Strategy [State
policy]
FONAFIFO: National Forestry Financing Fund [State
entity]
GHG:
Greenhouse gas
GWP:
Global Warming Potentials [Established by
the IPCC]
ICE:
Costa Rican Institute of Electricity [State
entity]
IPCC:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
ANT:
CDM:
10
Change
IMN:
National Meteorological Institute [State
entity]
INDC:
Intended
Nationally
Determined
Contributions
INGEI:
National Inventory of Green House Gas
Emissions
INTECO:
Institute of Technical Standards of Costa
Rica
INTE-12-01-06:2011: See B5:2016
INTE B5:2016: National Voluntary Normative for
Demonstrating
Carbon
Neutrality
(formerly INTE-12-01-06:2011)
MDVCCR: Domestic Voluntary Carbon Market of
Costa Rica [Proposed state policy]
MINAE:
Ministry of Environment and Energies
(Formerly MINAET)
MINAET:
See MINAE
MIV:
Motorized individual transports
MRV:
Measuring Reporting Verification
MRP:
Costa Rican Market Readiness Proposal
[Document]
NAMA:
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
[Projects]
NDC:
Nationally Determined Contributions
ONF:
National Forestry Office
PES:
See PSA
PSA:
Payments for Environmental Services
[Program]
REDD+:
Reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation, and the role
of conservation, sustainable management
of forests, and enhancement of forest
11
STS:
UCC:
UNC:
UNFCCC:
VERs:
carbon stocks in developing countries
[Program initiative]
Science and Technology Studies. Also
known as science, technology and society
See UNC
[Costa Rican] National Compensation
Units (formerly UCC)
United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
‘Voluntary Emission Reduction’ credits,
also VER
Shortened concepts:
Carbon Market: Domestic Voluntary Carbon Market
‘C-Neutral’*: Carbon Neutral certification program
‘Country Program’: Carbon Neutral Country Program
(Agreement 36-MINAET 2012)
‘2021 goal’: Carbon Neutral goal for the year 2021
(*) Official name.
12
INTRODUCTION.
Living anywhere in the western hemisphere, it seems
impossible to not be familiar with slogans such as
‘sustainable
development’,
‘nature
preservation’,
‘biodiversity conservation’ or ‘climate change mitigation’,
at least in some degree. What is more, it may also be safe
to believe that a significantly large amount of those who
are at least vaguely familiar with these concepts, will tend
to deem them as ‘good things’. Things to which,
additionally, the mere idea of openly opposing to would
seem right out wrong in a ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ sense.
Those ideas and ideals have sank in so deeply in our
western ‘modern societies’ that even impoverished
peasants in an underdeveloped or developing country will
increasingly have a hard time defending themselves from
moral or even judicial judgment for cutting down a tree for
its wood, or shooting a wild animal for its meat, regardless
of whether their very survival depends on these material
goods. At the same time, those ideas and ideals have
greatly contributed to the eruption of a wide variety of
markets filled with ‘greener’ consumer goods, spaces and
experiences just waiting to be consumed by a ‘trending’
population of ‘environmentally aware’ consumers.
I myself, for example, have been living in Berlin for the last
four plus years while developing the present doctoral
research. I have witnessed first-hand the explosion of
‘green’ products and ‘greener’ lifestyles that the urban
middle and upper classes have adopted in order to keep
‘current’ with these trends. I have seen the proliferation of
13
‘bio’ and ‘vegan’ shops, restaurants and supermarkets
particularly in the ‘hip’ neighborhoods of Berlin like
Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Prenzlauer Berg where
gentrification is strongest. In these businesses it is
common, for instance, to see ‘airplane’ papayas flown all
the way from a South American or South East Asian
country straight to the shelfs of the ‘bio’ supermarkets
where they are neatly stacked inside plastic boxes bearing
stickers that state that they were produced in ‘bio’ farms.
Nevertheless, no information is provided about the carbon
emissions involved in flying these products from their
origin countries so that they can be consumed as fresh as
possible at the other side of the globe; or of the
environmental footprint of producing the disposable
plastic containers in which they are displayed.
Other numerous examples of the raise of ‘green’ products
and lifestyles can be traced back to my home country of
Costa Rica. In fact, I believe that nine out of ten times
when I am asked where I come from, people instantly
follow my answer by acknowledging the fact that it is well
known for being a ‘green’ country, and also commonly,
how they or a friend or relative of theirs flew all the way
there to do some ‘eco-tourism’. And I believe this is hardly
surprising for any Costa Rican anymore. In this context,
the country has historically been renowned as a world-class
champion in defending, implementing and boosting
nature’s conservation since at least the 1970s when the
country pioneered in establishing a series of state-centered
implementations directed to protect its impressive
biodiversity. These policy devices ultimately resulted in the
creation of Costa Rica’s now world-famous ‘National Park’
and ‘Conservation Area’ network system that today gathers
14
approximately one third of the country’s surface under
various forms of environmental protection. More recently,
the nation’s ‘green’ economic activities –such as ecotourism, renewable energies, and more recently carbon
exchange markets– not only positioned this small Central
American country on the world map but have played a
central role in the country’s economic and political life in
one way or another.
Costa Rica’s pioneering program of ‘Payment for
Environmental Services’, for example, was largely
acknowledged as a groundbreaking implementation for its
time that ultimately influenced many nations worldwide in
their own re-thinking and re-writing of conservation
policies and programs (Pagiola, 2008). Likewise, the
country was part of the world’s first international exchange
of ‘Certifiable Tradable Offset’ (CTO) in 1997 when it sold
200,000 tons of carbon equivalent offsets to Norway in
exchange for $2 million US dollars.
In spite of these few examples provided here, attention
towards understanding how the nation has built –and
continues to build– its remarkable ‘green’ status and,
perhaps more interestingly, how it actually performs its
‘greenness’ in day-to-day practices of its ‘green
technocracy’, has been rather superficial in international
media, and arguably scarce in critical academia. Hence, this
dissertation intends to precisely focus in understanding
these performative ‘expert’ practices and show how Costa
Rica’s environmental discourse has shifted from a statecentered and centralized conservation model to a marketoriented and de-centralized one where the state has
gradually transferred the burden of facing climate change
15
to the private sector. As I will argue throughout this
dissertation, this process could be understood as a
localized effect within a wider move towards a global
neoliberal environmental governance (Swyngedouw, 2005).
Here, neoliberalism is to be understood as a particular way
of thinking and being capable of aligning these emergent
‘green’ lifestyles and ‘common senses’ with specific
economic and political interests and rationalities without
the need of direct state control. In short, a governmentality.
Moreover, I argue that this tendency has coincided with a
larger paradigmatic shift that has progressively replaced
‘biodiversity conservation’ for ‘climate change’ as the
driving concept of global environmental discourses
(Fletcher 2010a).
At first sight, it would seem tempting to ‘match up’
‘biodiversity conservation’ with the state-centered
conservation model, and climate change with the marketbased one; however, a closer look to how this shift has
taken place in Costa Rica reveals that both of these
conservation models (discourses + practices) are anything
but clear cut. In fact, in this dissertation I will show how in
practice, neither one is being replaced by the other. For
instance, I will show how the Costa Rica’s carbon markets
heavily rely on state funding and are under direct state
control over the demand and supply sides of these
markets. However, I will also argue that the ‘impurity’ of
these markets should not be seen as evidence of ‘market
flaws’. Instead, I will show how this ‘hybridity’ allows these
particular networks to operate through, rather that in spite
of, heterogeneity and disorder; and to constantly adapt
themselves in order to work their way around whatever
obstacles they may encounter.
16
Despite the many differences one can easily find between
activities like selling ‘airplane’ papayas in a ‘bio’
supermarket in Berlin, flying to Costa Rica to do
Ecotourism, or buying ‘carbon offsets’ from Costa Rican
forests, I believe that these three examples share one key
similarity which I will explore in this dissertation: They all
emerge from the creative capacity of neoliberalism that is
characterized by a process of intense abstraction (Pellizzoni,
2011). Hence, what is being sold is neither just a ‘papaya’, a
walk in a national park or ‘clean air’ from the rainforest,
but the imaginary experience of buying something ‘clean’,
‘green’ and ‘pure’.
The emergence of the above-mentioned examples of green
actor networks –and other examples that could easily be
found– are only conceivable in light of the cognitive-moral
agency that is currently being assigned to ‘nature’, and that
has in turn allowed a “spur [of] new ‘green’ markets,
equipped with ‘eco-products’, ‘eco-managing’ firms and
‘eco-conscious’ consumers – all in keeping with the new
spirit of capitalism” (Blok, 2013, p. 500. My emphasis).
Hence, the search for ‘greener’ products, experiences and
lifestyles could arguably be understood as a replacement of
religion as the axis around which our fear of social
disintegration becomes articulated (Cook & Swyngedouw,
2012, p. 1973). Thus, I tend to believe that buying ‘green’
or ‘eco’ products and experiences has developed into a sort
of modernist ‘eco-indulgences’.
The present dissertation aims to contribute to the existing
body of studies which are addressing the key assumptions
that fundament global and local contemporary discourses
and practices of environmental governance. In particular,
17
the study at hand will try to shed new light on several
modernist ‘facts’ that we have learned –and learned to
learn– to take for granted in regards to the global campaign
against climate change in general, and to the mitigation of
carbon emissions, which has emerged as the champion of
such campaign. I will argue –based on the present
research– that the imagined modernist separation between
‘nature’ and ‘society’ is the origin of our contemporary
understanding of the multitude of issues which we call the
ecological crisis. Consequently, so is the equally imagined
separation between the knowledge realms of ‘science and
technology’ (capable of approaching and ordering ‘nature’)
and ‘politics’ (capable of partially and temporarily
controlling ‘human’ entities, and of imperfectly explaining
human behavior).
In order to discuss these myths of contemporary
environmental governance, this study closely analyzes the
performative practices of (re)constructing, negotiating,
ordering and stabilizing ‘nature’ in Costa Rica. More
precisely, the research focuses on the way ‘nature’ is
performatively reduced to ‘carbon’ through a series of
socio-technical practices performed by the country’s ‘green
technocracy’. Hence, the latter community of ‘experts’
simultaneously enables the emergence of both ‘carbon’ and
‘carbon offsets’ respectively understood as the ‘problem’
and the ‘solution’ to the country’s effort in reaching its
self-imposed goal of becoming the world’s first ‘carbon
neutral’ nation by 2021.
Therefore, the present dissertation seeks to answer the
question of:
18
How is ‘nature’ performatively (re)assembled as
‘carbon’ through the socio-technical calculations of
Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’?
By putting into question the very myth of the objective
pureness and the robustness of the scientific method while
chiefly drawing on actor-network theory (ANT), this
dissertation questions the very core assumptions over
which modern science has sought out to approach and
interpret an imagined singular ‘nature out there’, and
through which modern techno-sciences have sought out to
order (Law, 1992) nature for the sake of ‘human society’.
Following these observations, this dissertation will show
how the objects of ‘nature’ with which the campaign to
face ‘climate change’ is concerned with, are not self-evident
objects that pre-exist the different policies, devices and
calculative practices developed to render them orderable.
Therefore, instead of focusing on the material –i.e.
chemical, physical or climatological– properties of
Greenhouse gases (GHG), this dissertation focuses on
how the highly abstract entity simply known as ‘carbon’ is
‘socially’ collected, measured, accounted, displaced and
(re)circulated by Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’; and how
these practices enable a process of neoliberalism (understood
as a socio-technical governmentality) which is performatively
assembled and black-boxed as the ‘logical solution’ to a
series of longstanding ‘development’ problems embedded
in the requirements of capitalist value (Lansing, 2011).
This study will show how ‘experts’ actively purify their
calculations in order to reduce ‘unnecessary complications’
for political decision-making agents, as well as for the
community of specialized ‘experts’ itself. Therefore, for
19
emergent scientific statements to appear as indisputable
‘facts’, there is a need to actively produce trust in the
‘objectivity’ of numbers and the ‘unbendable’ character of
mathematic calculations. However, this dissertation will
show how the contingent, fragmentary and biased nature
of carbon calculations requires high degrees of
improvisation,
selective
blindsight,
deliberate
discrimination and guesswork from both ‘expert’
practitioners and their technological devices, and from
final political decision-makers, particularly when dealing
with highly abstract invisible entities such as carbon
emissions and carbon offsets.
I will also show how different calculations will result in the
emergence of different entities, and how both entities and
calculations are co-emergent effects of specific sociotechnical performances. Consequently, I will show how
there is no such thing as one universal method to
determine whenever a country is or is not ‘carbon neutral’,
just like the idea of a singular conceptual definition of
‘carbon neutrality’ is an impossible one. As I will show, the
determination of whether a country is or is not ‘carbon
neutral’ is not a matter of unveiling the ‘truth’ through
unquestionable scientific ‘proof’, but instead a matter of
methodological and conceptual choice. A choice very
much determined by subjective and political motivations.
Therefore, I argue that the calculations to determine
‘carbon neutrality’, and the latter’s exact conceptual
definition are best understood as fluid objects which are
performatively brought into existence as “something that
both changes and stays the same” (Law & Singleton, 2005, p.
338. Original emphasis). In the following, I will show that
in the process of assembling and calculating ‘carbon’, the
20
material properties of GHG emissions, carbon offsets, or
carbon markets ‘are not enough’. Instead, I will show that
what counts are, on the one hand, the inscriptions that
register, displace and tell the story about ‘carbon
neutrality’; and on the other hand, the contingent sociotechnical practices that enable carbon to emerge into
‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘political’ realities.
In spite of the name ‘carbon markets’, I will set forth that
it is not ‘carbon’ that is exchanged in these markets, but
rather the absence of ‘carbon’. Therefore, this dissertation
sheds new light on the socio-technical process through
which the inexistence of an invisible ‘gas’ is transformed into
a measurable, tradable, storable and circulatable currency.
As a result I contend that following the performative
processes in which ‘nature’ is reduced to ‘carbon’ will only
allow us to arrive to half of the understanding of how
carbon markets operate since the commodity exchanged in
carbon markets is not any particular material good (i.e.
cubic tons of oxygen), nor simply ‘rights to pollute’; but
instead the absence of another material entity (i.e. carbon).
Therefore, I propose understanding carbon offsets as
imagined void-like entities capable of ‘erasing’ the materiality
(Law, 2007) of another gas in an ‘equivalent proportion’.
In order for offset-as-a-void to exist, three key assumptions
must be stabilized and put to work. First, that different
gases can be ‘made the same’ (MacKenzie, 2009) through
socio-technical practices of calculations. Second, that
‘offsets’ can be brought into existence through carbonoffsetting actions (i.e. forestry projects); and third that
these void-like entities come into existence ‘at the expense’
of other material entities, particularly GHG emissions.
21
Therefore, I argue that an offset-as-a-void brings into being a
patterned order of interwoven absence and presence which
cannot conceivably exist if all of its (non)materiality is
brought together in a single space and time.
Similarly, in the first chapter of this dissertation will also
show how the carbon-equivalent emissions1 –more
commonly known only as ‘carbon emissions’– that the
imagined offsets-as-voids are supposed to ‘erase’ are
themselves politically assembled entities that equally rely
on performative heterogeneous processes of patterned
absence-and-presence (or inclusions-and-exclusions) –
processes that simultaneously lead to the establishment of
an empirically contingent categorical order of socially valuated
objects, which are themselves ontologically multiple,
precarious and fluid.
Materially speaking, I argue that both ‘carbon emissions’
and carbon ‘offsets’ or ‘credits’ are in fact nothing more
(or less) than numbers on computer screens or printed
spreadsheets in carbon accounting devices and reports. In
other words, neither ‘carbon emissions’ nor ‘carbon
offsets’ are things literally and figuratively floating ‘out
there’ in the atmosphere, nor things that occupy Euclidean
space; instead they are things that come into existence
through the mediation of a heterogeneous network of
It should be noted that in this dissertation I draw a difference
between carbon –equivalent– emissions and GHG. Briefly, while
GHG are physical entities that absorb and reflect radiant thermal
energy, ‘carbon (equivalent) emissions’ are the result of a series of
socio-technical calculations intended to ‘flatten’ the former entities into
an imagined, orderable and comparable normalized gas.
1
22
socio-technical devices, numbers and ‘expert’ knowledge.
In spite of that, these numbers and calculations indeed
have concrete impacts over the actual materiality of Costa
Rican forests (such as the incentive to limit forest
plantations to certain tree species capable of offsetting
larger quantities of GHG emissions, etc.). Impacts that are
arguably stronger than those that any of the material
attributes of GHG may have.
Considering all the above, I will show how Costa Rica’s
carbon calculations must irremediably be understood as
intrinsically political processes from which inherently
political material entities emerge. Since such calculations
start with the process of separating things or states of the
world into qualitative categories, and by imagining courses
of action associated with those newly classified things. As a
result, carbon calculations can no longer be assumed as
processes exclusively populated by ‘neatly’ arranged
numbers and/or by an unbendable techno-scientific ethos,
but instead, I argue that the emergent accounts of GHG
emissions themselves result and temporarily ‘hold together’
through performative process of qualculation2 and not
simply ‘calculations’.
The categories and classifications employed to separate
things into qualitative taxonomies are neither limited to
2 According Callon and Muniesa (2005), qualculations are intermediate
situations between judgements and calculations. They are material
practices that are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative.
23
simply recording a reality ‘out there’, nor are they
constructed in a political vacuum. Instead, I show how the
process of assembling systems of classifications involves a
series of politically biased negotiations where decisions
over the enactment of delineations take place. Namely,
deciding what will emerge as visible (and what will
submerge into invisibility), the overall level of ‘detail’ of the
newly emerged visible reality, and ‘what things go where’
are all subject to compromises, judgments and
deliberations.
Drawing on governmentality studies, I discuss how the
‘non-binding’ or ‘voluntary’ character that characterizes
Costa Rica’s policies and programs mobilized to order
carbon and ‘climate change’ heavily relies on the creation
or improvement of accounting practices and devices.
These technologies of accounting are intended to extend
action at a distance (Latour, 1987) and allow for new spaces
of control without the need for direct interventions from
any authoritarian entity. Hence, I argue that Costa Rica’s
‘carbon neutral’ actor-network performatively depicts
climate change as a problem that is on the one hand
technically and technologically amenable through abstract
calculative spaces; while on the other hand, a problem that
requires a change of behavior through technologies of
government (Miller & Rose, 1990) capable of translating the
subject’s ‘self-interests’ into a certain domain of reality
aligned with the political rationalities of the state in a way that
subjects become self-regulating individuals capable of
acting as agents of government. Moreover, the use of this
particular body of theory will also allow me to discuss how
several coexisting forms of environmental governmentality
are performed simultaneously as Costa Rica’s general
24
environmental governance, and as the nation’s attempt to
reach ‘carbon neutrality’ in particular. Here, I will argue
that the different forms of governmentality target different
socio-material actors, use different methods of translation
and serve different, and sometimes competing, purposes.
I will argue that in moving from a protectionist and ‘statecentered’ top-down conservation model to a more selfregulating market-oriented ‘neoliberal’ one, the Costa
Rican state has found a viable mechanism to transfer what
is perhaps the largest share of responsibility –and at least a
great share of the economic burden– of reducing the
country’s GHG emissions to the private sector.
Henceforth, I contend that these new institutional forms
of governance-beyond-the-state set in motion a process of
externalization of state functions rooted in a neoliberal
governmental rationality. This rationality, I argue, allows
the Costa Rican state to not only justify its own inaction
towards reducing its GHG emissions, but to also benefit
from the provision of the demand and the supply sides of
the national carbon market.
Moreover, in examining this transition from a ‘statecentered’ conservation model (focused on the conservation
of biodiversity) to a ‘neoliberal’ one (advocated to face
climate change), I will show how the preservation of flora
and fauna has been downgraded from a worthy
conservation goal on its own right, to a secondary one.
Here I will also show how the state has also contributed to
the current depiction of existing protected forests (mainly
under the state-centered ‘fortress conservation’ model) as
being ‘useless’ in the mitigation of global carbon emissions;
and how this transition is not limited to a simple ‘rhetoric’
25
shift, but instead means the performative reconstruction of
‘nature’ in a material sense.
In spite of the latter process of ‘downplaying’ nonanthropogenic forests, in the third chapter of this
dissertation I will discuss how Costa Rica is currently
investing a great deal of effort in supporting the
development of market-based mechanisms that would
allow it to ‘cash-in’ on its early environmental actions
assembled
precisely
as
command-and-control
implementations during the country’s earlier welfare-state
era. In light of the refusal of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to
accept non-anthropogenic forests as viable source of
carbon offsets, and considering that the vast majority of
the country’s carbon credits are currently produced in such
forests, this move is strategic for ensuring the future of
Costa Rica’s carbon neutral actor-network.
Furthermore, I will argue that the ‘anthropogenic’
introduced above is a fundamental component of the
ontological construction of the ‘problem’ of climate
change, and at the same time of its ‘solution’. Here I argue
that the latter widespread and largely black-boxed insistence
on the ‘man-made’ component to ‘climate change’ has
further accentuated the modernist belief that ‘human’
entities are ontologically other to ‘nature’. Moreover, I argue
that this ontological polarization has actively undermined
the agency of ‘non-human’ entities by performatively
reducing them to a passive, mute and ‘helpless’ community
of ‘natural recourses’ waiting to be ordered by the modern
science and technology of ‘human kind’.
26
This dissertation will explore the role of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a
‘global’ parliament of specialists capable of ordering the
performative assemblage of ‘local’ carbon calculations
through their taken-for-granted authority and their blackboxed calculative devices –which are in turn believed to be a
matter
of
‘pure’
techno-scientific
practices
‘uncontaminated’ from any political or economic
entanglements. In this discussion, I claim that the
emergence of the IPCC as allegedly autonomous expert
communities is part of a reorganization process of neoliberal
governance, where national states increasingly delegate or
up-scale their environmental governance tasks to such
transnational entities. However, I also discuss how upscaling environmental governance is not limited to
transnational organizations controlling the local action
performed by national states. Instead, I will show how the
mobilization of ‘standards’ and technologies of government like
the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program and the voluntary
GHG emission inventories allow governmental agencies to
exercise oversight over the private sector without the need
to deploy any direct regulatory control.
I contend that the different policies and devices intended
to govern Costa Rica’s carbon emissions enact climate
change as a reality that must be primarily ordered for the
sake of the nation’s ‘economic’ development. Depicting
climate change this way is consequent with the
overreaching paradigm of sustainable development in
which ‘nature’ is reduced to ‘natural resources’ (such as
timber, trees-as-carbon-sinks, etc.) so that the ‘economic
development’ –and not ‘society’ or ‘nature’– can be
sustained. Hence, I on the one hand maintain that the value
27
of the emergent ‘resources’ is not found in the things
themselves, but rather in a reductively understood notion
of their usefulness (Lansing, 2010); while on the other that
the value of things does not naturally pre-exist the
economic practices of calculations mobilized to render
them orderable.
In the second chapter of this dissertation I will take a look
into the two different embodiments of Costa Rica’s
‘carbon markets’ –a ongoing ‘pre-operative’ one, and an
expected ‘future’ one– and show how neoliberal marketbased
and
state-centered
command-and-control
implementations and mechanisms in environmental
governance are performatively morphed and hybridized in
practice. Hence, I contend that the fact that both
embodiments of the country’s carbon markets have
developed into ‘imperfect’ exemplars of neoliberal markets
should not be seen as a ‘market flaw’. Instead, I argue that
this ‘hybridity’ has in fact provided the ‘pre-operative’
market the ability to operate through apparently
impenetrable dissidence, and to constantly adapt and
transform itself however it may be fit; while the
accumulated experience in vivo (Callon, 2009) of the latter
market has provided the Costa Rican ‘green technocracy’
with an insight that embraces –rather than rejects–
heterogeneity and multiplicity via a mutable, adaptable and
permeable ‘hybrid’ configuration. In a more theoretical
sense, I argue that carbon markets can be understood as
messy objects (Law & Singleton, 2005) in that they refuse
neatly delineated categorizations, and in that they cannot
be ruled out by prior methodological commitments to
particular and limited versions of clarity. Instead, Costa
Rica’s messy carbon markets are interpretatively complex
28
objects that mean different things to different people, and
at the same time multiple objects enacted into reality in
numerous –and often conflicting– simultaneous ways.
This dissertation contributes to the growing field of studies
on carbon exchange markets by offering an additional
concept to this field that has not previously been coined.
More precisely, I offer the notion of Offset Leakages to
refer to the units of carbon offsets (or carbon) sold or
bought outside of the national boundaries of the country of
interest. Hence, I argue that there are two types of such
leakages: carbon offsets bought by local organizations to
providers located outside of the national territory and
carbon offsets sold by local organizations to buyers located
outside of the national territory. Both types of Offset
Leakages challenge national states in that they refuse to be
enrolled in the latter’s own GHG accounting systems. In
this discussion I will argue that the country’s intention to
contain the proliferation of both types of Offset Leakages is
directed to not only ensure the liquidity of the country’s
domestic carbon market –and consequently the survival of
the forestry sector which supplies the market–; but will
also avoid the outflow of offsets which could potentially
undermine Costa Rica’s chances of reaching its ‘2021 goal’,
and its post-COP21 commitments.
In the following two subsections of this introduction, I will
attempt to outline some general theoretical and
methodological considerations surrounding the analytical
framework of the present dissertation. Although I believe
that the following research chapters themselves can show
these aspects at hand more clearly, it is perhaps prudent to
29
expose the main conceptual and empirical sensitivities
conveyed in this study at the very outset of this document.
In the third and last subsection of this introduction a
chapter outline of the dissertation will be presented which
intends to explain the splitting of the empirical work into
three themes following the overall argumentative strategy.
It should be noted, however, that this division does not
attempt to distribute the content extension of the research
into neatly balanced compartments.
1.1 Theoretical approach
As was introduced above, the study immerses in the use of
ANT in order to introduce new analytical resources that
would allow the reconceptualization of the largely blackboxed interrelation between the social, political, economic
and material implications of the performative processes of
construction of ‘carbon’. This contribution involves
rethinking the ontological and epistemological grounds
over which climate change is believed to be a technically
and technologically orderable issue by an imagined
community of autonomous techno-scientific ‘experts’.
Hence, this implies placing the imagined relationship
between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, and consequently between
‘techno-sciences’ and ‘politics’ under scrutiny.
Even though I could certainly elaborate an argument of
why I have chosen to use ANT as the theoretical backbone
of the present dissertation, I doubt I could elaborate one as
‘spot on’ as Yvonne Rydin’s own argument about the
potential of using ANT in understanding planning for lowcarbon development. She contends:
30
ANT seems ideally suited to understand a
world in which technological systems and
environmental
change
are
major
preoccupations. With its emphasis on the
lack of any boundary between society and
technology or between the social and the
natural worlds, it has the potential to deliver
a theory appropriate for contemporary
planning practice for sustainability. It can
offer an analytic edge over existing planning
theories that only engage with the material
and natural world through the values and
communicative action of social actors.
(Rydin, 2012, p. 24).
Although the precise matter that concerns this dissertation
is different from the one Rydin engages with in this
particular paper, I believe that the above statement fully
applies to the potential of ANT in exploring the
performative socio-technical processes of construction,
negotiation and black-boxing of ‘nature’ derived from the
politically contingent practices of carbon ‘experts’.
Consequently, all distinctions between ontological
categories will not only be empirically ignored in this
dissertation but will be open to close scrutiny. In this
respect, John Law (2007) argued that ANT assumes that
nothing has reality or form outside of the relations enacted
in empirically grounded practices. Thus, this theorymethod “[l]ike other material-semiotic approaches, the
actor-network approach thus describes the enactment of
materially and discursively heterogeneous relations that
produce and reshuffle all kinds of actors including objects,
31
subjects, human beings, machines, animals, ‘nature’, ideas,
organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and
geographical arrangements” (p. 2).
On the other hand, what Bruno Latour identified as the
difficulty of grasping ANT, is in my opinion actually one
of its potentials. Latour (2017) argues that this approach
has been made by the fusion of three hitherto unrelated
strands of preoccupations: “a semiotic definition of entity
building; a methodological framework to record the
heterogeneity of such a building; [and] an ontological claim
on the “networky” character of actants themselves” (p.
1463). Additionally, Latour continues arguing that the
potential limits of these three previously unrelated features
can only be solved when they are fused together into an
integrated practice of study. This dissertation precisely
intends to respond to such challenge.
All things considered, this research departs from the
ontological conviction that there is no such thing as a
singular ‘natural’ world ‘out there’ that stands opposed to
another ‘social’ one. Instead, I depart from the belief that
multiple ‘eco-socio-technical’ hybrids are simultaneously
enacted into being and are literally confronted against one
another day in and out. Moreover, since these multiple
socio-natural
hybrids
are
biased,
performative
constructions that depend on the specific practices of
calculations enacted by any given actor-network, they are
always fluid and necessarily imagined; yet with very real
material effects on the ground.
Regardless of the many and diverse analytical opportunities
found in ANT, the conceptual stands of this
32
theory/methodology will be complimented with some key
conceptual and analytical devices of governmentality
studies as a means to provide a more heterogeneous and
thus richer landscape of critical perspectives towards the
complex issues here examined. More precisely, the
discussions developed throughout this dissertation will
draw on a selection of previous academic works that
understand ‘neoliberalism’ as Foucauldian governmentality.
One of the main differences between this perspective and
others instead embedded in structuralism –mainly based on
Marxism– lays in the understanding of ‘power’ and
‘knowledge’. To be more precise, Marxian structuralism is
based on the understanding of “power as a resource a ruling
class possesses and of knowledge as an ideological construct
that needs to be unveiled” (Farías, 2011, pg. 365. My
emphasis). These two understandings necessarily rely on
theories and plots about hidden structures, intentions,
repressions and oppressions. On the contrary, Foucauldian
governmentality –just like ANT–, does not presume the
existence of any overreaching structure capable of
determining the action of any given actor or the emergence
of any particular reality. On the contrary, this approach
understands power as a complex, yet precarious ensemble of
knowledge productions based on locally and performatively
produced discourses, materials, technologies, and
calculations. This ensemble then allows the enactment of a
particular mentality of rule that constantly (re)assembles
entities, socially constructed realities (or forms of knowledge)
through a certain taken-for-granted ‘commonsense’.
According to Ignacio Farías (2011) then, Foucauldian work
“proceeds by means of positive descriptions of the
enunciates and assemblages mobilized to sustain historical
power/ knowledge regimes” (p. 367); hence does not offer
33
‘ready-made’
controversies.
explanations
to
locally
emergent
The purpose behind using the selected critical perspectives
of this alternative theory is to provide but one possible
reading of the political agencies behind the environmental
discourses and practices that constitute Costa Rica’s
carbon-neutral actor-network. Put differently, the
researcher believes that using selected concepts of
governmentality studies would allow to discuss (at least) a
part of the findings derived from the more material-semiotic
analysis through different critical lenses which instead
focus on the distribution and stabilization of ‘power’
within the formation, association and active performances
of the studied actor-network; particularly by looking into
the technologies and rationalities that allow the de-centering of
government through the active role of self-regulated
individuals facilitating a government at a distance.
Moreover, the introduction of this second theoretical
apparatus provides a particular reading of the issues
introduced with ANT which is ultimately intended to
reduce the risk of producing an analysis that unidirectionally applies pre-established categories –from a
single theory– on empirical data. This theoretical and
methodological heterogeneity has been implemented to
counterbalance the particular ‘weaknesses’ found in each
analytical device, while adding overall depth to the analysis.
Likewise, it may ultimately lead to a rich discussion on not
only the specific topics and controversies examined, but
likewise on the overall theoretical and methodological
framework of the study itself.
34
This dissertation will be framed as a Multi Perspective
Triangulation research (Flick, 1992) as it will engage in the
active use of multiple theoretical devices –ANT,
governmentality
studies
and
others–;
multiple
methodologies –again ANT, (anthropological) document
analysis, and reconstructive methods (interviews)–; and
finally, multiple sorts of data –interviews, official policy
documents, existing academic research, available online
material, etc.–.
The purpose of using triangulation here is not to increase
the ‘validity’ of the research nor to ensure the project with
a sort of ‘uncontaminated objective purity’ that would
result from the use of different methodological devices as a
way to make up for each other’s ‘weaknesses’. Hence,
triangulation must not be understood here in its positivistic
sense as a method that “assumes a single fixed reality that
can be known objectively through the use of multiple
methods of social research” (Seale, 1999, p. 473). Instead,
the use of triangulation in this project is to enrich the
scope of perspectives in which the issues are to be
addressed in a theoretical sense and to add depth to the
analysis of those issues in a methodological sense. As Nigel
and Jane Fielding (1986) put it: “Theoretical triangulation
does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological
triangulation necessarily increase validity. Theories are
generally the product of quite different traditions so when
they are combined, one might get a fuller picture, but not a
more ‘objective’ one” (p. 33). Hence, these authors argue
that because different methods derive from different
theoretical traditions, combining them can add range and
depth to the research, and not the much pursued ‘accuracy’
of positivism. In sum, the purpose of triangulation in the
35
present dissertation is not to seek congruent research
results, but on the contrary to welcome the
complementarity of distinct perspectives.
It should be noted however that the use of triangulation
does not mean just throwing together any theoretical or
methodological devices for the sake of complementarity.
Instead, the power of triangulation lies on a more
‘strategic’ assemblage between two or more devices which
add their own ‘strengths’ to the analysis, and through
which each device complements in a way the
‘shortcomings’ or ‘limits’ of the other. Here, Field and
Field (1986) recommend choosing at least one method
specifically suited to explore the structural aspects of the
research problem, and at least one other method capable
of capturing the essential elements of meaning to those
involved (p. 34). Therefore, Uwe Flick (1992) suggests that
the ‘strengths’ mentioned above should ensure the research
with at least one method to provide for description and
interpretation of the contexts in which the interaction between
actors occur within and throughout networks, and at least
another to illuminate the process of interaction itself.
Thus, and in spite of not doing full justice to either of the
theoretical and methodological devices used in this
dissertation, I will use ANT as the analytical device to
illuminate the process of interaction between the heterogeneous
actors that assemble Costa Rica’s carbon-neutral actornetwork; and governmentality studies as the device to
describe and interpret the multiple contexts in which these
performative ‘socio-technical’ interactions take place.
36
1.2. Methodological approach
The present dissertation largely engages in the analysis of a
wide variety of documents ranging from official policy
documents, officially issued procedure manuals, legal
documents, official communications and reports, to
websites of state entities and other relevant actors.
However, and because this research primarily draws on the
analytical sensitivities of ANT, the particular approach to
document analysis followed in this dissertation differs
from the positivistic approach commonly associated with
such type of analysis. Henceforth, in this subsection I will
briefly introduce a more material-semiotic approach to
document analysis by drawing primarily on the works of
Chris Shore and Susan Wright (2011), and Mathew Hull
(2012) which concur in recognizing documents as active
agents in the construction of new emergent realities, and
not simply passive ‘representations’ of technocratic
discourses and practices.
Shore & Wright (2011) argue that the field of anthropology
opens up new perspectives on the study of policy. To
sustain this, these authors review how in its typical version,
anthropology has historically failed to study policies due to
several types of shortsightedness of the field itself, such as
being human centered; being eminently positivistic by
presuming the existence of a structural order to reality; and
by treating policy analysis as a quasi-scientific activity.
These authors argue that the interpretative paradigm to
anthropology may offer several advantages to the analysis
of policy documents such as the ability to observe policies
as actants with agency rather than simply manipulable tools
or objects. Hence, they argue that documents may instead
37
be seen as productive, performative and continuously
contested entities. The authors argue that policies are
productive, performative, precarious and incomplete
entities that create new (emergent) social realities and
entities. Moreover, they argue that “[a] policy finds
expression through sequences of events; it creates new
social and semantic spaces, new sets of relations, new
political subjects and new webs of meaning” (p. 1).
Similarly, Hull contends that documents are not simply
instruments of bureaucratic organizations, but rather are
constitutive of bureaucratic rules, knowledge, practices,
objects, outcomes, and even the very organizations that
mobilize them. What is more, Hull (2012) argues that the
“[a] methodological focus on documents (rather than
sociologically
defined
organizations)
helps
us
ethnographically address a classic problem in social theory,
how to characterize the boundaries of organizations” (p.
258). In other words, focusing on the policy documents
rather than on the bureaucracies that produce them may
help us see through and beyond formal institutional
boundaries.
Shore and Wright argue that focusing on policies may
allow us to understand how systems of governance come
into existence simultaneously with the construction of
subjects as objects of power (2011, p. 20). As this
dissertation will show, carbon emissions and carbon
offsets do not preexist the processes of calculation and
ordering prescribed in the various policy devices analyzed
in this study. Instead, these gases are part of the wide
variety of effects derived from a series of heterogeneous
socio-technical performances from which policies, ‘experts’
and ‘scientific facts’ also (co)emerge.
38
However, as this research will also show, the enacting of a
certain reality into being is only possible at the expense of
enacting ‘other’ alternative realities. In this respect, Shore
and Wright argue that the establishment of a policy “[…] is
one moment in a process of appropriation and
contestation when a political coalition succeeds in silencing
others, making their version authoritative and embedding it
in the precepts and procedures of the state” (2011, p. 13).
Hence, bureaucratic documents should no longer be
understood either as abstract ‘semiotic constructions’
detached from emergent material realities; nor simply as
‘texts’ abstracted or abstractable from their own material
vehicles (Hull, 2012, p. 253). What is more, this author
argues against what he considers a prevailing ‘invisibility’ of
documents that entails that researchers continue to look
through documents rather than at them. In this respect, the
present dissertation directs its attention towards the very
documents that actively participate in the process of
construction of new emergent realities in all their
intermingled material, semantic and pragmatic dimensions.
Scrutinizing the material qualities and the socio-technical
processes of production and circulation of documents
therefore allows researchers to explore the role and agency
of documents without misrecognizing them as inherently
powerful ‘fetishes’ or objects (Hull, 2012, p. 254).
Shore and Wright (2011) contend that the challenge for
researchers is to find a small site that opens a ‘window’
through which larger, and more complex processes of
political transformation can be observed. Doing so, they
argue, would allow the observer to follow the connections,
associations, and putative relationships between the
networking actants involved in a particular controversy (p.
39
12). This analytical vantage point is possible in light of the
role of policies as a fundamental ‘organizational principal’
of society which “provides a way of conceptualising and
symbolising social relations, and around which people live
their lives and structure their realities” (p. 2).
Hull (2012) identifies two broad capacities of documents
which he calls the ‘coordination and control’ and the
‘constructive’ capacities. The first capacity establishes that
bureaucratic administrations are capable of controlling
subjects through technocratic knowledge which is
materialized in bureaucratic documents which act as
instruments of control and coordination. Here “[w]riting
establishes the stable relation between words and things
necessary for bureaucracies effectively to implement
regimes of control” (p. 256). The second capacity of
documents is their ability to make things come into being;
or to construct subjects, objects and socialities. Here the
author argues that documents act as mediators between
schemes of classification and the emergent things being
controlled (p. 259). Much like uniforms, cars, official
buildings etc., documents are a form of ‘material culture’
which is central to how the state comes to be enacted by
the population (p. 260); thereby documents actively
determine how political power is imagined, negotiated,
stabilized and black-boxed.
Sebastian Ureta (2014) synthesized 5 conceptual and
methodological contributions that a policy assemblage
perspective could provide to the analysis of public policies
which I essentially paraphrase as follows:
40
-Policies as emergent: They are not fully formed
things ‘out there’; there are no guiding principles that
remain stable all the time.
-Policies as multiple: They exist in multiple versions at
the same time.
-Policies are highly distributed and nonlinear: They
move all the time, passing from government offices or
from focus groups to the streets of the city. Their
temporal development is not linear but constantly
looping. Meaning that as new issues appear, the whole
process of negotiation, construction and stabilization
starts all over again.
-Policies do not end with the ribbon-cutting: They
are continually reenacted, changing their outcome in
accordance with the presence/absence of certain
devices in the assemblage. Hence, they are never absent
from the controversies and overflows in which the
assemblage is continually reenacted with ever-changing
results, resulting in ever new loopings.
-A methodological focus on concrete practices: It is
in these very concrete practices, and not in the
discourses of powerful actors or the official guidelines
set by public offices, that the different configurations of
a policy assemblage emerge.
(Ureta, 2014, pp. 13-14)
Finally, Shore and Wright state that “[p]olicies are not
simply ‘transferred’, they are reinterpreted as they travel
41
across cultural boundaries. This is rarely a neatly rational or
coherent process and the effects are unpredictable, as
policies tend to have ‘social lives’ that outlive their
authors” (2011, p. 20). While this means that documents
cannot be understood as the immutable mobiles described in
classic ANT because they are constantly transformed as they
circulate and are interpreted time and again; I would add
that documents should be considered for their ontological
multiplicity which well transcends their epistemological
fluidity. More precisely, while documents can indeed be
seen as boundary objects –as they are interpreted differently
by say different technocrat ‘experts’ time and again–,
documents can be thought about as multiple objects
enacted into being in the practices of getting to know such
emergent new realities (Law & Singleton, 2005, p. 334).
Therefore, the present dissertation will combine the
analysis of documents with on-site interviews with the very
actors who, alongside the analyzed policy documents,
manuals, legal documents, etc., construct new sociotechnical realities into being.
During March through April 2016, and again in February
2017, a total of 24 in-depth semi-structured qualitative
interviews were carried out by myself with a mixed group
of strategic actors involved one way or another with what I
identified in that time to be Costa Rica’s two leading
‘green’ actor networks. These where what I called the
‘carbon-neutral’ –on which this dissertation focuses on–
and the ‘eco-tourism’ actor-network –which, after a long
and complex process of analytical contemplation was
‘dropped’ from further analysis for several reasons which
escape the interest of what turned out to become the
present research–.
42
These interviews with an average duration of one hour,
where all recorded on digital audio files and later
transcribed into digital text documents by myself. All the
interviews
–and
consequently
their
verbatim
transcriptions– where originally produced in Spanish; while
only the extracts shown in this dissertation where carefully
translated into English by myself and proofread by a
professional translator. Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning
that the interviews were carried out in a semi-structured
matter where the interviewer (myself) identified a series of
‘topics of interest’ rather than strict direct questions to
address in the interviews. These topics where allowed to
flow somewhat freely as the subject discussed and
interconnected ideas and topics at will. This does not mean
that direct questions were not posed, but rather that they
were only sporadically posed in order to guide the subjects
back to the topics of interest whenever necessary.
In sum, the empirical material on which I am drawing in
this dissertation consists of well over 20 different policy
documents (official reports, manuals, norms, legal
documents etc.), plus a set of 15 interviews conducted with
people involved with either Costa Rica’s ‘C-Neutral’
certification program, its carbon exchange markets or on
the country’s carbon accountability systems and
inventories. Finally, this material is supplemented by
analysis of dozens of relevant academic papers, chapters
and essays on the different issues mentioned above.
43
1.3. Chapter scheme.
In this introduction, I have linked all the different
arguments I have coined throughout this research which all
fall under a common problematic, and which combined
construct the hermeneutic argumentative thread of this
dissertation. As can be seen, I have used different
theoretical concepts to analyze the performative process of
re-construction of ‘nature’ as ‘carbon’ through a series of
contingent socio-technical practices of calculation as
performed by a wide range of heterogeneous materials and
entities including Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’, forests,
policies, imaginations etc.
In spite of having split the ‘argumentative thread’ of this
dissertation from the comments on the theoretical’ and
‘methodological’ approaches of the study that followed,
the remaining chapters of this dissertation iteratively
combine theory-data-method in order to avoid a disjoint
appreciation of not only the issues at hand, but of the very
analytical tools mobilized in this study. This is particularly
true for ANT which Law (2007) describes as a “disparate
family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities and methods of
analysis that treat everything in the social and natural worlds
as a continuously generated effect of the webs of relations
within which they are located” (p. 2. My emphasis). In
other words, ANT is not so much an ‘abstract theory’, but
an empirically grounded case-study method which facilitates
conceptual theoretical stands to simultaneously co-emerge
a posteriori.
This dissertation will close with a conclusion which,
rather than summarizing the findings of the study or
44
condensing a grand argumentative statement –which
instead can be found in the opening paragraphs of this
introduction–, intends to provide the study with a closing
speculative reflection where specific questions and
challenges are raised over three different aspects:
a) The dissertation’s contribution to the field of urban
design and planning
b) The study’s contribution to the development of
environmental governance policies
c) Some potential aspects worthwhile exploring
further in follow-up research, perhaps even at a
post-doctoral level.
Additional to this conclusion, this dissertation will be
organized around three main chapters as visualized in the
following figure:
Figure 1: Dissertation’s chapter scheme
45
As ‘Figure 1’ shows, each of these three chapters focuses
on analyzing different moments of Costa Rica’s carbon
neutral actor-network, which are each embodied in a series
of policy devices and documents –represented in
rectangles– which each specific chapter sets out to
analytically review.
Although in reality these three moments are inseparable,
intertwined, fluid and perhaps most importantly imagined
–by the researcher–, they have been separated by three
somewhat coinciding chronological/thematic borders that
have allowed me to define three reasonably recognizable
chapters:
Chapter 1. Starts by laying out the basic
foundations over which the entire ‘carbon neutral actornetwork’ has been assembled. This general framework
introduces the general vision behind Costa Rica’s initiative
to impose itself the target of becoming the world’s first
carbon-neutral country by 2021 as well as several other
closely related targets that largely emerged from the
COP21 conference in Paris 2015. Besides introducing that
framework, this chapter focuses on reviewing a series of
‘state-led’ actions directed to so to speak ‘set the house in
order’ in terms of establishing actions to both ‘account’
national GHG emissions, and to ‘reduce’ these emissions
in the different productive sectors of the country. Hence,
this first chapter analyzes a series of policy devices coined
in the first decade of the 2000s which favored direct state
control over the country’s population via a series of
technologies of government intended to align the latter’s ‘selfinterests’ with the political rationalities of the state.
Additionally, this first chapter introduces the process of
46
construction of ‘carbon’ through a series of calculation
practices performed by Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’
through which some gases emerge as ‘environmentally
hazardous’ –and hence become relevant issues to contain–,
while others emerge either as ‘harmless’ or ‘irreprehensible’
emissions which are eventually withdrawn from any further
techno-scientific
calculation
and
thus
political
consideration.
Chapter 2. Unlike the straighter forward, statecentered implementations reviewed in the opening chapter
of this dissertation, the second chapter focuses on a series
of market-centered implementations devised as the very
core of the country’s carbon neutral actor-network.
Likewise, while the first chapter introduces the different
actions directed to ‘reduce’ the country’s carbon emissions,
the second chapter concentrates on analyzing a series of
mechanisms devised to ‘compensate’ the surplus carbon
emissions that the former reduction actions could not
govern. The market-centered ‘compensation’ actions
analyzed in this second chapter where developed in the
second decade of the 2000s after the proclamation of
Costa Rica’s ‘Carbon Neutral Country Program’ that
defined the legal procedures by which private
organizations may be granted the ‘C-Neutral’ voluntary
certification after submitting to an emissions assessment
based a national standard stipulated for such purpose. The
second chapter will also review two different embodiments
of Costa Rica’s ‘carbon markets’ where the first –and
currently only operational one– has been supplying ‘carbon
credits’ to the organizations enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’
program since that certification was launched; while the
second has been envisioned as a ‘refined’ version of the
47
current market –incorporating market safeguards, new
specialized institutional frameworks, etc.– which is
expected to take its place in a nearby future.
This chapter will show how through the ‘C-Neutral’
certification program, and through the two embodiments
of the country’s carbon markets, the Costa Rican state has
found a viable mechanism to transfer what is perhaps the
largest share of responsibility of reaching its self-appointed
goal to become a ‘carbon neutral’ nation in 2021 to the
country’s private sector.
Finally, this chapter deepens further in the ontological
process of construction of ‘carbon’ introduced in the
previous chapter by focusing on how ‘carbon offsets’
emerge as imagined void-like entities capable of ‘erasing’ the
materiality of ‘carbon emissions’ in equivalent proportions
by bringing into being a patterned order of interwoven
absence and presence.
Chapter 3. The third, last and by far shortest
chapter of this dissertation will focus on discussing Costa
Rica’s interest in the further development and
formalization of the REDD+ initiative which would allow
‘forest preservation’ to qualify as a viable source of carbon
offsets under the UNFCCC authority, and hence as an
eligible activity for CDM project status.
This chapter will discuss how Costa Rica’s current marketbased environmental governance mechanisms in general,
and the REDD+ initiative in particular, are presently being
oriented towards ‘cashing-in’ on the country’s early
environmental actions assembled during the country’s
48
earlier interventionist-state era, and through commandand-control implementations. Additionally, it will be
discussed how the REDD+ initiative is seen as an
opportunity for the Costa Rican state to enroll the
country’s large extensions of ‘non-anthropogenic’ forests
in
formal
international
carbon-markets
while
simultaneously still supplying the domestic carbon-market
–reviewed in chapter 2– with non-Kyoto carbon offsets.
As the discussions will show however, this new
prospective market is not exempted from controversy.
Instead, in light of the country’s self-appointed goal to
become the world’s ‘carbon neutral’ nation by 2021, the
chapter identifies a dilemma that Costa Rica must soon
face in regard to whether to ‘keep’ its offsets and make that
deadline, or ‘sell’ its offsets internationally and make a
profit. This discussion will simultaneously provide a final
layer in the ongoing discussion pertaining the ontological
process of re-construction of ‘nature’ as ‘carbon’ –and
‘carbon offsets’– which will consequently allow me to
introduce a new ontological category that I have named
offset leakages, which have been enacted in Costa Rica’s
‘carbon-neutral’ actor-network in two different ways.
1.4. Reading code
In order to ensure a more fluid and comprehensible flow
in the following discussions and reviews, I will use ‘single
quotation marks’ to mark complex ideas that are often
taken-for-granted in our modernist understanding of the
world. Since attempting to leave out such modernist roots
would probably lead to having to use a different code of
communication altogether, the present paper will make use
49
of the mentioned resource simply in attempts to enrich the
discussion. Similarly, the use of italics is employed much in
the same way, yet this time to mark complex concepts
derived from the different theoretical and methodological
devices used in the present work such as those drawn from
ANT and governmentality studies.
Furthermore, the dissertation will implement a color code
intended to assist the reader’s ‘navigation’ through the
different sections of the study. Text in black fonts is used
to describe the data set –policy devices, references to
existing local research, empirical work, etc.– consulted in
each section in a more straightforward or glaring manner.
Text in blue fonts is used to discuss the data set from a
more theoretical-analytical position. These discussions are
in no way ‘detached’ from the more descriptive reviews
mentioned above. On the contrary, they are to be
understood as a continuous reflective dialog with the more
empirical and descriptive work. Text in green fonts and
inside dashed-lined boxes is used in a series of simplified
summaries at the end of each of the larger theoretical
discussions where the different theoretical arguments and
findings are described in the most simplified language and
fashion as possible. Finally, text inside solid-line boxes
contain selected extractions of particular on-site interviews
carried out during the empirical phases of the study.
The use of this overall reading system intends to break an
unwanted compartmentation of sections which would
typically split raw empirical descriptions and observations
from a rigid ‘theoretical’ or ‘conceptual framework’.
Instead, this three-color code intends to engage the reader
in a non-linear iterative exploration of this dissertation.
50
–Chapter 1–
Neutralizing Carbon in Costa Rica
Introduction
In 2007, Costa Rica announced its intention to become the
world’s first ‘carbon neutral’ country. This goal was to be
achieved by the year 2021, through reaching its own
reported emission levels for the year 2005 again in 2021. In
order to do so, the Costa Rican state decided that the
country should gradually reduce its emission levels through
a series of ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’ mechanisms
consolidated in a group of strategical policies for such end.
Briefly, the policies developed to meet the carbon neutral
goal for the year 2021 (which I will from here on forward
refer to simply as the ‘2021 goal’) pivoted around a central
one –the National Climate Change Strategy– which was
meant to coordinate all other specific efforts that would
together constitute the country’s grand action plan for
facing climate change and for becoming a ‘carbon neutral’
nation.
The first part of this opening chapter will focus on
reviewing that pivotal strategy in order to show how the
Costa Rican ‘carbon neutral actor-network’ depicts the
‘climate change’ it sets out to confront as a problem that is
technically and technologically remediable though ‘proper’
accountability systems that would enable the state to ‘see’
where environmental problems lay, and with that to locate
where and how to intervene (Lovell & MacKenzie, 2011).
51
At the same time, I will show how these accountability
systems provide a new space for citizens, entrepreneurs,
politicians and others to recognize how much they
themselves contribute to climate change; and that way
promoting the self-regulation of their –consumption,
productive, domestic, etc.– behavior without the need for
any form of direct top-down enforcement from the state.
As I will show, Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral’ goal, and its
strategy to reach it, largely relies on the development of
‘technologies of accountability’ intended to frame Green
House Gases (GHG) as ‘carbon equivalent emissions’ (or
simply ‘carbon’). It should be noted that in this dissertation
I will draw a difference between ‘carbon’ (or carbonequivalent) and GHG emissions in that while the latter are
physical entities that absorb and reflect radiant thermal
energy, ‘carbon (equivalent) emissions’ are the result of a
series of socio-technical calculations intended to ‘flatten’
the former entities into an imagined, orderable and
comparable normalized gas. Under this understanding,
‘carbon’ is then an emergent abstract entity rendered
governable through the mobilization of numbers and
techno-scientific calculations trusted to ‘technocrat
experts’. Therefore, the second policy reviewed in this
chapter is precisely the National Inventories of Green
House Emissions developed to quantify the emission
and absorption of ‘carbon’ emitted to the atmosphere in a
given period of time. In reviewing these systems of
accountability, I will show how the emergence of ‘scientific
facts’ is the production of trust in the ‘objectivity’ of
numbers and the ‘unbendable’ character of mathematic
calculations; and how numbers take an active role in
reducing the ‘unnecessary complications’ of carbon
52
calculations so that the decision-making process carried
out by politicians and by techno-scientific ‘experts’ alike
can be shortened.
The last two policies reviewed in this chapter pertain to a
group of policies developed by the Costa Rican
government to ‘update’ its ‘carbon neutrality’ goal in light
of the international compromises that emerged around the
time of the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties or –
COP21– held in Paris in December 2015. As I will show,
these compromises have led to a process of gradual resematization of the ‘2021 goal’ as an ‘early action’ that can
be grouped among a number of other goals to mitigate
climate change. Additionally, I argue that the policies
developed in the second decade of the 2000s clearly denote
Costa Rica’s interest in joining the ‘green’ inflection of the
new spirit of capitalism (Blok, 2013) which performatively
reshuffles the demand and supply side of a series of
emergent markets filled with ‘greener’ experiences and
‘greener’ goods.
In this opening chapter, I follow how Costa Rica’s current
environmental discourse is progressively replacing
‘biodiversity conservation’ for ‘climate change’ as its
driving concept. I show how this paradigmatic shift can be
seen in the way the country’s ‘National Park’ system (the
flagship of the former concept) is losing its overall appeal
and relevance to the ‘carbon neutrality’ effort (milestone of
the country’s ‘climate change’ concept); which is now
being enacted as the nation’s most urgent environmental
challenge. Moreover, by exploring this shift I also show
how the assigned economic and symbolic value of ‘nature’
depends on its conceived ‘usefulness’, which is currently
53
understood as its potential to face ‘climate change’ (i.e.
generate renewable energies, absorb carbon emissions) and
not –anymore– to preserve biodiversity.
Prompted by a wide variety of authors from STS an ANT
concerned with the active role that techno-scientific
‘experts’ and their calculations play in the emergence of
new material realities (Lippert, 2013; Asdal, 2008, 2011;
Lovell & MacKenzie, 2011; Kalthoff, 2005; Lansing, 2010;
and others), I argue that the materiality of ‘nature’ –enacted
as ‘carbon’– does not pre-exit the processes of calculations
intended to render it governable. Subsequently, I contend
that such calculative devices are not limited to simply
record a positively given natural reality. Hence, rather than
understanding ‘carbon’ emissions as positively given
natural objects that are literally and figuratively floating
around ‘out there’, I show how such abstract gases are
politically assembled entities whose material and discursive
presence necessarily relies on the absence of that of other
disrupted –alternative or hypothetical– entities. While
building the above argument, I examine how the
performative practices of Costa Rica’s green technocracy
are, on the one hand, embedded in a series of political
subjectivities; while on the other hand, how these practices
of qualculation really occur through a series of performative
negotiations between human –i.e. technocrat ‘experts’–
and non-human entities –i.e. numbers– holding equal
agency. Thus, while exploring the contingent and precarious
processes in which ‘scientific facts’ are assembled, I show
how the ‘natural’ entities that we assume as a given, and
the techno-scientific calculative practices that order them,
are far from being performed in a political vacuum.
54
This chapter will also discuss how the authority of the
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) relies on projecting itself
as a parliament of specialists (Callon, 2009) which operates on
‘pure’ techno-scientific knowledge and robust scientific
consensuses ‘free’ from any socio-political entanglements.
In practice however, scientific ‘facts’ really emerge from
socio-political negotiations between a limited circle of
‘experts’ who each try to impose their own scientific
‘arguments’ over the rest. Thus, these ‘experts’ eventually
end up bargaining their ‘arguments’ among each other
instead of ‘simply’ demonstrating an undisputable ‘proof’
of any given scientific ‘fact’. Once consensus is reached in
those ‘quasi-scientific’ processes of negotiation, the
resulting ‘scientific statements’ are depicted to the larger
public as a monolithic, timeless and unquestionable
‘natural reality’ which is nevertheless ‘measurable’ and
‘calculable’ through mathematical numbers. Finally, I argue
that the community of imagined ‘autonomous experts’ of
the IPCC extends an action at a distance that is capable of
ordering the performative assemblage of ‘local’ carbon
calculations via their taken-for-granted authority and their
black-boxed calculative devices.
A. ‘Carbon Neutrality’ goal for 2021.
Former president Oscar Arias –a hardline advocate of
economical neoliberalism– announced in 2007 Costa Rica’s
intention to become the world’s first ‘carbon neutral’
55
country by 20213; this way coinciding with the nation’s
200-year celebration of independence from the Spanish
empire. Since then, the three consecutive governments
have ratified the goal.4
The selection of the specific 2021 deadline for reaching
‘carbon neutrality’ in Costa Rica is perhaps the first
evidence of the actual heterogeneity (Law, 1992; 2007) behind
the constituencies of the ‘nature' constructed in the carbon
neutralization network; and of the agency (Callon, 2004) that
an ‘abstract’ entity can hold in a network regardless of how
‘technical’ it may appear. What appears to ‘only’ be an
abstract symbolic entity (a commemorative date), in reality
plays an unquestionable role within this network to the
point that it replaces any other techno-scientific entity in
the selection of ‘the’ deadline in which Costa Rica will
‘neutralize’ its carbon emissions. The following extract of
an interview made by the author with a high-ranking
representative of one of the two auditing agencies
authorized in the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program
(discussed later in the second chapter) illustrates this
tension:
Subject: The original idea hmmm in 2008 was…
“Let’s make Costa Rica carbon neutral”
Although other nations such as the Maldives and New Zealand had
also pledged to become carbon neutral nations, Costa Rica remains the
only one to still maintain its self-appointed goal (see Araya, 2015).
4 Including the 2014-2018 Luis Guillermo Solis administration, Costa
Rica’s first social democratic government since 1978.
3
56
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Ok… by when? ...:2021. Why? They
never asked themselves.
And why in such short time? They also never asked
themselves
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Additionally, the answer is very political…
“because we celebrate our bicentenary” [of the
independence from the Spanish empire]
Interviewer: Right.
Subject: There is nothing technical about it [giggles].
(Source: M. Gonzales, personal communication, April 7, 2016. My
translation.)
This extract shows how in spite of the common
assumption that ‘scientific controversies’ are the ‘stuff’ of
scientific control, non-scientific entities (such as a political
one in this case) can override any constituent technoscientific calculations and ‘expert’ knowledge of a network,
and establish themselves as an obligatory passage point
(Callon, 1986).
Additionally, it may be pertinent to briefly –but
significantly– point out at the beginning of this chapter
that the concept of ‘carbon neutrality’ itself is not free of
controversy. Stefan Gössling (2009) holds that not only
does the concept of ‘carbon neutral’ only comprise CO2
emissions (as opposed to, for example, climate change that
57
would include all Greenhouse gases) but that the ‘neutral’
part of the concept is an oxymoron because emissions are
not ‘neutralized’; instead they are really compensated for
(Gössling, 2009, p. 19).
Following the self-proclamation of the ‘2021 goal’, in 2010
the national government founded the Climate Change
Directorate (DCC, for its acronyms in Spanish)5 which has
been appointed the function of coordinating the action
plan of the National Climate Change Strategy (ENCC,
for its acronyms in Spanish), in which Costa Rica’s
compromise to become a carbon neutral country in 2021 is
acquired. However, the ENCC was officially issued in
2009, and the state created the DCC to provide MINAE
with a specific dependency with the task of overseeing the
implementation of the ENCC, which was finally provided
with an ‘action plan’ in 2012. Besides these mentioned
policies, the carbon neutral initiative was initially provided
with three additional, and closely linked, instruments
designed to reach the 2021 goal. These were the ‘Carbon
Neutral Country Program’ (Programa País Carbono
Neutralidad) articulated in Agreement 36-MINAET 2012;
the National Voluntary Normative for Demonstrating
Carbon Neutrality6 articulated as INTE-12-01-06:2011,
later updated as INTE B5:2016; and the creation of a
domestic carbon market (Dirección de Cambio
Climático [DCC], 2012a, p. 19). The ENCC will be
The DDC is a dependency of the MINAE, established by executive
decree MINAE No. 35669. Note here that the ENCC was issued
before the creation of the DCC.
6 Often referred to in relevant official documentation as ‘Norm to
Demonstrate Carbon Neutrality’, ‘National Norm for Carbon
Neutrality’, or simply as ‘National Voluntary Norm’.
5
58
discussed further in this first chapter, while the ‘Carbon
Neutral Country Program’, the INTE B5:2016 normative,
the domestic carbon market and other relevant initiatives
will be discussed in following chapters. However, it may be
relevant to stress that these policies are in fact difficult to
separate both in discourse and in practice. In fact, a review
of the existing literature on the subject, as well as the
policy documents themselves reveals that elements of one
policy instrument are constantly inserted into the next in a
rather straightforward and uncomplicated way; making it at
times rather difficult to trace back the original sources
from which a certain statement or device first appeared on.
The general idea behind the ‘2021 goal’ is that the nation’s
GHG total net emissions should be systematically reduced
until that year in order to match the emission levels of
2005. The latter levels have been determined and registered
in the fourth National Inventory of Green House Gas
Emissions7 elaborated in that year –published in 2009– by
the National Meteorological Institute (IMN, for its
acronyms in Spanish).
Furthermore, the DCC (2012a) argues that Costa Rica’s
strategy to reach carbon neutrality in 2021 is based on the
application of the same calculation that the Institute of
Technical Standards of Costa Rica (INTECO, for its
acronyms in Spanish) formulated for private businesses to
According to the MINAE (2015, p. 6), six of such inventories have
been elaborated to date since 1990.
7
59
voluntarily aspire to become certified ‘C-Neutral’8:
E(i-1)−R(i)−C(i)=0
Where:
i: Stands for the reference year. In the case of the ‘2021
goal’ for Costa Rica, 2005 has been chosen as such
baseline.
E: Corresponds to the emissions of the entity being
measured* using internationally recognized standards (ISO
14064-1 or the GHG Protocol of the World Resources
Institute).
R: Corresponds to the emission reduction plans that the
entity being measured* should carry out to document its
emission reduction efforts for the period being measured.
According to MINAE “the reduction process is
instrumental to the carbon neutrality certification, such
that the organization’s main efforts in terms of reduction
of tons of CO2 equivalent should be reflected in R”
(Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía [MINAE], 2013, p. 29).
C: Corresponds to the accepted options of compensation
of GHG emissions that the entity being measured* must
enroll.
(*) These are either a particular private organization (in the
case of the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program) or Costa Rica
as a whole (in the case of the ‘2021 goal’).
In short: In order for Costa Rica (and the private
organizations that seek the ‘C-Neutral’ certification) to
See Chapter 2 for a full analysis and discussion regarding this
particular formula or calculation, as well as the entire ‘C-Neutral’
certification program.
8
60
become ‘carbon neutral’, it must calculate its net emissions
for a specific period (E), minus their reductions or internal
emission removals (R), minus their compensated emissions
(C) and equal zero (0).
The reasons for establishing the emissions of 2005 as the
baseline of comparison for targeting future reductions in
GHG has not been officially stated neither in the ENCC,
nor in its action plan, nor in the ‘Carbon Neutral Country
Program’, nor in the INTE B5:2016 Normative. Kowollik
(2014) believes that this is because the 2005 national GHG
inventory is the earliest and most trustworthy inventory of
all available ones. However, Soto (2014) states that because
of important methodological changes made in the fifth
national inventory of 2010 −published in 2014− all
previous results to this particular GHG inventory are now
considered to be incomparable; and therefore,
comparisons to the 2005 inventory are now to be
understood as merely informal and referential.
Additionally, this press release refers to the subdirector of
the IMN who stated that all previous inventories to the
2010 version are currently pending to be recalculated using
the methodological criteria employed in the 2010 version,
which is now based on the guidelines of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Hence, regardless of the particular methodological changes
that the IMN implemented from the fifth national GHG
inventory onwards, which intended to correct an apparent
lack of methodological reliability found in all earlier GHG
inventories (including the 2005 version), the relegation of
the 2005 reference year to an ‘untrustworthy’, ‘unreliable’
and ‘incomparable’ baseline did not lead to the rethinking
or refining of the carbon neutrality venture in any degree.
61
Likewise, it can be argued that 2021 goal is based on what
the IMN itself now considers a lack of ‘scientific
robustness’ that is not properly aligned with the IPCC’s
methodological black box (Callon & Latour, 1981). This
issue then opens up several questions regarding what is
(and what is not) understood as ‘scientific robustness’, how
it is coined, how it travels, and the role that authorized
‘experts’ play in assembling, maintaining and circulating
scientific legitimacy.
According to Donald MacKenzie, the authority of the
IPCC rests on the black boxing of its own authority as a
decisive social factor (MacKenzie 2009, p. 447). This
authority, he adds, is rendered as a subpolitical matter in that
it “[preserves] the boundary between ‘science’ and
‘politics’, since the boundary is precisely what is needed to
facilitate political action, because it matters that action can
be based upon ‘sound science’” (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 453.
Original emphasis). Hence, the authority of the IPCC as a
parliament of specialists (Callon, 2009) is not only taken-forgranted in the endorsement of what can (and cannot) be
considered ‘scientific enough’; but its criteria, judgment,
devices and actions are also readily ‘trusted’ to be other to
socio-political biases and dodgy pseudo-science.
In his STS informed study on ‘soil pollution’ in former
mineral mining sites in Chile, Ureta (2018) coins the term
baselining to refer to a bundle of messy complex sociotechnical practices through which human and non-human
entities actively negotiate the emergence of both ‘baselines’
and ‘pollution’. Ureta shows that rather than being
‘objective’, a baseline functions as a norm that both
‘scientifically’ describes and ‘politically’ prescribes what a
pristine state of ‘naturalness’ is, and what it ought to be.
62
Thereby, he argues that “[e]ntities such as baselines do not
exist naturally in the form of pristine entities and/or
landscapes. They have to be produced through very sitespecific baselining processes, usually in parallel with the
(potentially) polluted entities” (p. 352). Additionally, he
points attention towards existing criticism on the use of
historical records to attempt to reconstruct a state of
‘naturalness’, which a baseline is supposed to enact (such as
Costa Rica’s 2005 baseline derived from the data that had
been previously gathered by the IMN). Particularly, how
the actors involved too often interact with the available
data uncritically, without cautiously examining the specific
contexts and approaches in which such accounts where
coined, circulated and recorded (Alagona, Sandlos, &
Wiersma, 2012). The latter authors believe that the
fragmentary, selective and ambiguous nature of historical
records, that necessarily requires high degrees of
‘guesswork’ and ‘extrapolation’ from ‘expert’ practitioners,
should challenge these to incorporate more sophisticated
analytical methods which are capable of coping better with
the complexity and variation of a world in continuous flux
(p. 65).
Regardless of all the imbued complexities mentioned
above, Maarten Hajer (1995) argues “[h]ard decisionmaking on global environmental problems requires an
almost unprecedented degree of trust in experts and in our
political élites at the same time as this trust is continually
undermined by scientific controversies and political
indecision” (p. 11. My emphasis). With that, he suggests
that however indispensable the authority of ‘scientific
experts’ may be considered, in practice, it is always
contested and frail.
63
Additionally, Reiner Keller (2012) argues that the agency of
practitioners is irremediably embedded in the particular
techno-scientific field in which they participate, and from
which particular ‘problems’ and their proposed ‘solutions’
emerge. This field represents a particular universe of
scientific contemplation that has been handed down to her
or him by the historical tradition of science. As a result, he
argues that the leeway for the discretion of the ‘expert’ in
stating problems and in exploring possible solutions is a
limited one (Keller 2012, p. 48). In other words, the agency
of techno-scientific practitioners is one constrained by a
network of black boxes and biases, which she or he draws
upon and re-circulates time and again. In the case of Costa
Rica’s 2005 baseline for the carbon neutral initiative, ‘trust’
placed in the original calculations9 performed by ‘experts’
was eventually questioned, yet not enough to challenge the
entire carbon neutral 2021 goal to be ‘overhauled’. Instead,
the IMN ‘corrected’ its inventories by employing a
renewed methodological criterion based on the black-boxed
guidelines provided by the IPCC.
All these issues raise questions regarding what is
considered scientific robustness and objectivity, expert
authority and agency, and the legitimacy of techno-scientific
black boxes, just to mention a few.
In the present dissertation, I borrow the particular definition of this
term as was coined by Ingmar Lippert in his 2013 Doctoral
dissertation which refers to calculation as the practical and material
activity performed by humans; and not the calculation as a
disembodied mathematical logic (Lippert, 2013, p. 88).
9
64
Briefly: The Carbon Neutral initiative was built over a
known lack of scientific robustness and of any actual
consensus between technocrat experts. Consequently, the
reliability of the 2005 INGEI (over which the ‘2021 goal’ is
based on) was eventually put into question. In spite of this,
the ‘2021 goal’ was never modified or adjusted accordingly.
Additionally, current INGEIs employ a methodology that
is based on the largely unchallenged and taken-for-granted
authority of IPCC which is still widely assumed to be
purely scientific knowledge, hence free from any sociopolitical entanglements.
A general description of the latest available National
Inventory of Green House Gas Emissions will follow after
the next review of the ENCC in the following subsection.
1. National Climate Change Strategy (ENCC)
The main objective of the ENCC is “to reduce the social,
environmental and economic impacts of climate change
and promote sustainable development through economic
growth, social welfare and environmental protection using
mitigation initiatives and adaptation actions so that Costa Rica
improves the quality of life for its people and eco-systems
by moving toward a carbon-neutral competitive economy
by 2021” (MINAE, 2013, p. 22. My Emphasis). Hence, the
ENCC’s defines ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’ interventions
as the two types of actions that will lead the country to a
series of transformations that will reduce the impacts of
climate change while simultaneously paving its way
towards an ideal ‘sustainable development’. As will be
discussed throughout this dissertation, the latter concept of
65
‘sustainability’ has been so successfully black-boxed in
contemporary environmental governance discourses, and
so systematically mobilized, that in rare occasions one is
able to find voices resisting or disagreeing with it – not
only amongst circles of technocratic ‘experts’ and policy
makers, but even amongst mobilized environmental
activists (Escobar, 1996). Moreover, it has become such an
unchallenged and taken-for-granted notion that it is now
morally ‘difficult to resist’ (Blok, 2013; Fletcher, 2010a).
All of the different analysis and strategic implementations
provided in the ENCC are based on the data gathered in
the above-mentioned National GHG Inventories
elaborated by the IMN. However, the sectors recognized
in both documents are not identical. The IMN merges
Agriculture and Forestry (and other land uses) as a single
sector, while the ENCC categorizes them as two separate
ones. Briefly, this non-correspondence of categories what
is at stake in calculatory processes, from an epistemic point
of view, is not (only) whether the operations of
calculations work or not, but where categories have to be
separated (Kalthoff, 2005, p. 77). In other words,
categories do not pre-exist calculations, just like neither of
the former are limited to simply record a reality ‘out there’.
Instead, in the political practice of separating entities into
categories, new realities emerge as things that were once
‘invisible’ are made ‘visible’ in very specific and ways
(Murdoch and Ward, 1997, p. 308).
DCC (2012a) defined the ENCC action plan as:
A Road map that contributes to the process of
mainstreaming the climate change agenda in the
prioritized sectors (transport, energy, agriculture,
66
water resources) from a human development
perspective. It is intended to become a catalyzing
instrument for guiding public and private budget
allocations in a more strategic and articulated
way, so the country advances towards its
transformation to a development model low on
carbon emissions (including the landmark of
carbon neutrality in 2021), and resilient to the
effects of climate change. (DCC, 2012a, p. 39.
My translation and emphasis)
With this definition, the DCC intends to make
considerations related to climate change a common priority
in all of the nation’s highlighted sectors. It does so by
providing them with a series of recommendations and
voluntary guidelines instead of binding ‘top-down’
directives ordered through ‘command-and-control’
regulations.
It is designed around six ‘axes’, which link four general
actions or implementations to the two general target goals
of the plan. These can be better illustrated in the following
‘Figure 2’ –based on ‘Figura 3: Ejes ENCC’ presented in
the mentioned document (p. 16)–. Here, the lower 4 axes
are to be understood as the instrumental axes to reach the
defined goals in ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’, which are in
turn represented as the higher axes of the strategy.
67
Figure 2: Axes of the ENCC
As stated earlier, the ENCC action plan defines ‘mitigation’
and ‘adaptation’ as the two main axes or types of actions
that will lead the country to reduce its vulnerability to
climate change while simultaneously paving the country’s
way towards a ‘sustainable development’. The action plan
provides each of these axes with their own general and
specific objectives linked to each of the key sectors
identified as crucial to be intervened in each type of action.
Hence, in the ‘mitigation’ axis, the prioritized sectors are
energies, transports and agriculture; while in the
‘adaptation’ axis, the water resources and, once again, the
agriculture sectors are highlighted. As will be discussed in
greater depth later on, through these axes, climate change
is mainly enacted as a problem that is technically and
technologically amenable, and as a problem that requires a
change of behavior through technologies of government
68
capable of translating the subject’s ‘self-interests’ into a
certain domain of reality aligned with the state’s political
rationalities (Miller & Rose, 1990).
In the next pages, I will briefly review each of the strategy
axes, while mainly concentrating on the ‘mitigation’ and
the ‘adaptation’ axes from which the entire ENCC is
framed.
‘Mitigation’
The ENCC defines mitigation actions as those that will
“make the country avoid carbon net emissions, while
adopting a vision that combines environmental, sanitation,
economic, human, social, ethic, moral, cultural, education
and political actions with the nation’s competitive
strategy.” (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y
Telecomunicaciones [MINAET], 2009, p. 48. Author’s
translation). The ENCC stipulates that the country’s
overall ‘mitigation’ strategy will implement three strategic
sub-axes, from which the ENCC action plan will focuses
only on the first (highlighted):
-Reduction of gas emissions by source
-Capture and storage of carbon dioxide
-Development of an effective national carbon
market with an active participation in international
markets.
Hence, the ENCC’s ‘mitigation’ axis exclusively focuses on
promoting efforts for the reduction of GHG emissions in
the different highlighted sectors, whereas the remaining
two ‘mitigation’ actions will be implemented under the
69
scope of other ‘mitigation’ policies and programs.
Moreover, since the DCC (2012a) contends that Costa
Rica’s strategy to reach carbon neutrality in 2021 is based
on the application of the same calculation that the
INTECO formulated for private businesses seeking the ‘CNeutral’ certification: E-R-C=0 (see page 194); the ENCC
can then be understood as a policy that exclusively focuses
on the ‘R’ (reductions) variable; while the latter two
remaining sub-axes of the country’s ‘mitigation’ strategy –
enlisted above–focus on the ‘C’ (Compensations) instead.
All in all, the ENCC prioritizes 5 different sectors in Costa
Rica over which its different analysis and strategic
implementations are to be applied to: energies, agriculture,
change of land use [forestry sector], industrial processes,
and waste management. From these sectors, the energy
and the agriculture sectors –in that order– are identified as
being the greatest producers of GHG emissions in the
country. Furthermore, the plan highlights the importance
of the ‘transport’ sub-sector10 –belonging to the energy
sector– as responsible for 64% of the latter’s total
emissions. Therefore, the plan urges the need for
mitigation interventions in ‘transports’ separately from
those in ‘energies’ (DCC, 2012a, p. 15).
The ‘mitigation’ axis of the ENCC action plan is defined
by three specific objectives, each one respectively linked to
one of the highlighted sectors:
However, I will continue to refer to transports simply as a ‘sector’ in
order to avoid what I find to be unnecessary confusion in the
discussions.
10
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1) Reduce the GHG emissions from the land
transportation sector by implementing a series of
complementary measures focused on the
improvement of accessibility, mobility and the use
of low carbon-emission technologies.
2) Support the consolidation of a low carbonemission energetic model.
3) Reduce GHG emissions while maintaining or
incrementing the productivity of the agricultural
sector in key products: Coffee, banana, sugar,
cattle, pineapple and flooded rice parcels.
(DCC, 2012a, p. 39. Author’s translation)
Mitigation: Transport Sector
The ENCC action plan recognizes the transport sector as
the principal focus of GHG emissions in Costa Rica, and
hence the reduction of this sector’s emission levels should
represent the foremost effort of the ENCC. More
precisely, the ultimate challenge for this sector is to reduce
the circulation of private vehicles in the country, which are
responsible for 52% of the sector’s GHG emissions. The
ENCC states that the current (2012) amount of private
automobiles in circulation in Costa Rica surpassed 600 000
vehicles –with a ratio of 1 vehicle for every 7.5
inhabitants– and with a tendency to steadily increase at a
yearly rate of 3.8%. This vehicle fleet, which is mainly in
circulation within the GAM, is said to have an intermediate
level of fuel ‘efficiency’ and an average age of 12.3 years
(DDC 2012, p. 12).
The action plan proposes the establishment of several
specific ‘products’ for the transport sector, some of these
are:
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-An ‘Integrated Public Transport System’: a plan for the
integration and coordination of the various types of
transport systems in the GAM. This initiative is based on
the assumption that the transfer of users from private
vehicles to public transports will ‘immediately’ produce an
effect in lowering emissions (DCC, 2012a, p. 41).
-A series of ‘Congestion Control Measures’: Expand the
amount of dissuasive measures intended to render private
vehicles unpractical while simultaneously promoting
alternative and public transport systems. The DCC targets
to reduce the private vehicle fleet by 20% (p. 42).
-The ‘Technological Renovation and Modernization of the
National Vehicle Fleet’ through a series of financial and
non-financial incentives. The program targets the
conversion of the entire taxi and bus fleet to liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) by 2021; and to amount up to 15%
of privately owned hybrid vehicles (p. 42).
The ‘Capacity building and technology’ axis for the
transport sector focuses on two issues. Firstly, the legal
strengthening of the Public Transport Council (a branch of
MOPT) so that it adapts its management and development
model to one that mainstreams ‘climate change’ as a key
subject in all future policies and practices. Secondly, the
integration of transport planning with local planning
practices and policies with the overall aspiration of
planning ‘denser’ human settlements with lower
dependence on commuting (p. 45).
72
Mitigation: Energy Sector
The DDC contends that in spite of Costa Rica’s installed
capacity for producing electricity, from which 77% are said
to be based on ‘clean sources’ such as hydropower and
wind power (DCC, 2012a, p. 29), the country still has a
strong dependency on the use of fossil fuels. This is partly
related to the fact that 9% of nation’s electricity comes
from thermal plants that run on fossil fuels such as bunker
and diesel, which are an important source of the nation’s
total GHG emissions. Finally, the DDC holds that legal
constraints make the development of potential sources of
‘renewable’ electricity difficult in areas which are under
some type of protection (namely National Parks and
indigenous reserves). The action plan proposes the
establishment of specific actions for the energy sector:
-The creation of a cluster of renewable and transition
energies in Costa Rica. The ENCC considers that the
country already has the conditions to become a center of
production of technologies that produce renewable and
transition energies for Latin America –such as solar panels,
wind turbines, etc. This is to be pursued by attracting firms
of such technologies to establish manufacturing facilities in
the country; by financially supporting local entrepreneurs
in this area; and by training future professionals and
technicians in this field (DCC, 2012a, p. 49).
-The ‘efficient use of energy in strategic sectors’: This
action focuses on the user/consumer side of the energy
market by introducing more energetically efficient
technologies in different sectors identified as strategic such as better refrigeration equipment in households,
73
better
air
conditioning
systems
in
tourism
accommodations, etc.- (DCC, 2012b, p. 6). Additionally,
this action promotes the creation of ‘Environmental
Management Programs’ to be implemented by Ministries,
Municipalities and quasi-state institutions so that these
improve their energetic efficiency and reduce their carbon
footprints (DCC, 2012a, p. 49).
-The substitution of bunker and diesel in the generation of
electricity (thermal plants) and vapor (boilers) with the
gradual introduction of less pollutant ‘transition fuels’ like
natural gas, LPG and biofuels; and in a more distant
future, replace these with hydrogen or plasma (p. 48).
-The consolidation of the ‘distributed generation program’
which is intended to stimulate the generation and storage
of electricity by a variety of ‘small’ technological devices
directly connected to a grid available nearby consumption
focuses. These devices are to generate electricity from
renewable sources including solar, wind and hydropower
(p. 47). ‘Adjustments’ in the country’s legal framework are
said to be needed to allow the implementation of this
program. However, some suspect that the incorporation of
solar power in particular has historically been downplayed
due to political concerns that home-generated power
would cut into state electricity’s profits (Fendt, 2017).
-The ‘Improvement and expansion of the electricity offer
based on renewables’: This action focuses in the “[…]
adjustment of the necessary legal framework that would
guarantee the offer of energy from clean sources [including]
the elimination of barriers to the production of renewable
energy […] within spaces that currently have some type of
74
restriction” (DCC, 2012a, p. 46. My translation and
emphasis). In other words, lift existing bans that forbid the
exploitation of ‘natural recourses’ –mainly hydro and
geothermal power generation– in National Parks, natural
conservation areas and indigenous reserves.
This last ‘mitigation action’ for the energy sector provides
a valuable space to introduce a discussion on a key aspect
related to the construction of nature in Costa Rica, as it
mirrors a process identified by Robert Fletcher (2010a) in
which ‘nature’ is being performatively reconstructed in the
country’s current environmental discourse where the
previous driving concept of ‘biodiversity conservation’ is
progressively being replaced to ‘climate change’. An extraction
of an interview conducted by the author with an engineer
from the department of research and development of
renewable energies of the Costa Rican Institute of
Electricity (ICE, for its acronyms in Spanish) echoes this
process:
Subject: So what other type of energy can be
characterized as basic? Geothermic energy.
But the problem, at a national level, is that all
volcanoes are National Parks [Giggles ironically]
Interviewer: Right.
Subject: So someone had the genius idea that… well,
it is a very good idea, ‘let’s turn all volcanoes into
parks’ …lets protect them.
Subject: Hmm… I am very environmentalist, hence
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I have always said ‘no, National Parks must be
National Parks’. But what if there is an area that is
very eroded inside a park? You know, that there are
emissions from this park because there is no flora nor
fauna; it’s almost as if it was a desert.
So you might say ‘No, here I will put some
geothermal’. So you substitute this [eroded] part for
geothermal while you buy these other thousands of
hectares at the other side of the park where there is
[still] biodiversity, where you could make a biological
corridor. So ‘park is park’, while ‘[power] plant is
[power] plant'; that way resource are simply taken
advantage of.
Interviewer: So let’s say it’s a simple relocation of
limits?
Subject: The limits could be relocated so that Costa
Rica has a ‘win-win [situation]’.
(Source: C. Hernandez Chanto, personal communication, April 13,
2016. My translation.)
As the extract shows, the subject starts up by
characterizing the fact that National Parks where erected
around all of the country’s active volcanoes as ‘a problem’,
and in a slightly sarcastic tone saying it was not a very
smart one. This is because Costa Rican law bans any sort
form of extractive exploitation, including the production
of geothermal energy. Immediately after this
characterization, the subject changes her statement by
succumbing to the unquestionable ideological and moral
goodness –or black boxes– over which National Parks
emerged since the mid-1950s –precisely around two active
76
volcanoes– and explicitly reassures her conviction that
parks should remain parks.
However, the subject explores the possibility of a ‘third
way’. One in which the materiality of nature, depicted as a
standing reserve of material objects waiting to be ordered
(Lansing, 2010) can be ‘traded’ for others elsewhere. The
key for this exchange would heavily relay on the socioperformative practice of gauging and rating things, and to
assign value to those things (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013).
Hence, values are not a thing that is naturally impregnated
on objects and materials, but instead the emergent result of
a performative and heterogeneous process of negotiations
that is closely tied to conditions of desire and desirability
(Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013, p. 7). The subject holds that
exchanging a ‘desert like’ area for another that has a stock
of flora and fauna elsewhere would represent a win-win
situation for the country as a whole. In this plot,
desirability is enacted in two ways:
Firstly, it is through the desire for ‘renewable energy’ –and
not for preserving biodiversity– that the idea of the
exchange, the designation of values and the conditions of
the deal are conceived. The value of ‘nature’ is constructed
first in terms of its potential to produce geothermic energy
(and therefore to face ‘climate change’), and second in
terms of its potential to cluster a relevant stock flora and
fauna (or preserve biodiversity). On this issue, Helgesson
and Muniesa (2013) argue that “what things are worth can
be manifold and change—and these values can be
conflicting or not, overlapping or not, combine with each
other, contradict each other. All, or almost all, depends on
the situation of valuation, its purpose, its means” (p. 7).
77
Hence, the multiple value(s) of a thing are empirically
manifold, performative, fluid, and variable.
And secondly, by depicting Costa Rica as a monolithic
entity that wants such an exchange which is depicted as
nothing less than a ‘win-win’ deal in which things can only
go right. This second enactment can only work if things –
in this case hectares of land– are gauged in terms of their
‘goodness’, and then rated from ‘good’ to ‘bad’. The
definition of which nature is ‘good’ vs. which one is ‘bad’
is not based on scientific facts; instead it is a culturally
specific valuation resulted from a heterogeneous process
of negotiation (Rice, 2014). In this particular evaluation,
the hectares of land that have potential to accommodate
geothermal power plants are deemed as ‘good’ nature;
while those that do not, are portrayed as ‘bad’ nature.
Likewise, their potential to gather a relevant stock of
wildlife, or to house complex ecosystems is, in this
particular valuation, irrelevant.
Briefly: Costa Rica’s current environmental discourse is
progressively replacing ‘biodiversity conservation’ for
‘climate change’ as its driving concept. This can be seen in
the way the country’s ‘National Park’ system (the flag ship
of the former concept) is losing its overall appeal and
relevance to the ‘carbon neutrality’ effort (milestone of the
country’s ‘climate change’ concept); which is seen as
today’s most urgent environmental challenge. The
discussion also shows how ‘nature’ is still conceived as a
commodity which can be easily traded and disposed of.
Moreover, the assigned economic and symbolic value of
‘nature’ depends on its conceived ‘usefulness’, which is
currently understood as its potential to face ‘climate
78
change’ (i.e. generate renewable energies, absorb carbon
emissions) and not –anymore– to preserve biodiversity.
Mitigation: Agriculture Sector
According to the DCC, the agriculture sector is responsible
for 35% of all GHG emissions in Costa Rica. 90% of the
sector’s emissions is Methane (CH4) which is mainly
produced in the digestive processes of livestock, while
other GHG such as Nitrous Oxide (N2O) and Carbon
Dioxide are commonly related to the use of synthetic
fertilizers and deforestation respectively (DCC, 2012a, p.
33). These figures make the agricultural sector the second
largest source of emissions after the transport sector.
However, the DCC states that unlike the latter, this sector
already shows a positive tendency in that it presents an
increase of productivity and a reduction of GHG per unit
of the Agricultural Internal Gross Product (DCC, 2012b,
p. 11).
The DCC argues that this sector’s productivity is
particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate
change in that drastic variations of temperature and
precipitations often lead to droughts and excessive rains
which commonly mean losses in production (DCC, 2012a,
p. 35). For these reasons, the action plan of the ENCC
proposes to face two general challenges for this sector, that
coincide with the two main interventions coined in the
strategy: one in ‘mitigation’ –incorporate the use of
‘climatically smart technologies’ for the consolidation of an
‘eco-competitive’ [productive] model (p. 35) –; and the
other in ‘adaptation’ –reduce the sector’s vulnerability to
the effects of climate change by improving the capacity of
producers to adapt to these (DCC, 2012b, p. 12).
79
Continuing in the ‘mitigation’ axis of the ENCC, the
strategy aims to reduce GHG emissions in the sector while
maintaining or incrementing its productivity. The DCC
argues that this can be accomplished by means of
developing, spreading and adopting the use of ‘win-win
technologies’ (or ‘climatically smart technologies’) in the
sector (DCC, 2012a, p. 51). The ‘Capacity building and
technology’ axis for the agriculture sector proposes to link
academic research with the new market demands for these
technologies; and to adjust the necessary legal and
institutional framework to financially promote their use (p.
52).
‘Metrics’ axis for all ‘mitigation’ actions and sectors
The action plan of the ENCC proposes to establish ‘base
lines’ –intended to set a comparative ground for the
estimation of GHG emissions within each sector– and
‘Monitoring, Report and Verification’ systems (MRV)11 for
all three prioritizes sectors. These instruments should at
the same time be functional for both the development of
NAMA12 projects and the development of national carbonmarket (p. 55).
The notion of ‘Measure, Report, Verify’ and accounting of data on
emissions was introduced in the ‘Bali Action Plan’ that followed the
2007 COP13. Its overall purpose was to create transparency and
enhance confidence among the different parties of the UNFCCC
(Boos et al. 2015, p. 8).
12 NAMAs: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. These will be
discussed at length in page 159.
11
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‘Adaptation’
The ENCC adopts the IPPC definition of ‘adaptation
actions’ as “the adjustment in natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities.” (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, Van der
Linden, and Hanson, 2007, p. 869). The ENCC’s action
plan highlights water resources and the agriculture ‘sectors’
as priority sectors to be intervened with adaptation
implementations because of three reasons. Firstly, because
the former resources are said to be particularly vulnerable
to the effects of climate change which can generate chain
reactions that may result in intense droughts and floods
which affects ecosystems, populations and the generation
of hydroelectric power which provides over 70% of the
country’s electricity (DCC, 2012a, P. 15). Secondly,
because, the agriculture sector is said to be particularly
sensible to variations in temperature and precipitation
patterns that could negatively affect the country’s
productivity, competitiveness and eventually even its future
food safety. And thirdly, because it considers these two
sectors as ‘cornerstones’ of the country’s competitiveness
(DCC, 2012b, p. 2). Hence, the ENCC action plan urges
for the establishment of strategic interventions to reduce
the vulnerability of water resources and the agriculture
sector to climate change, while improving their ‘resilience’
capacities (DCC, 2012a, p. 15).
Just like the DCC did for the ‘mitigation’ axis (see page
70), two specific objectives define the ‘adaptation’ axis;
each one linked to a particular highlighted sector
respectively:
81
1) Increase the adaptation capacity of the populations
and ecosystems most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change on water resources.
2) Decrease the vulnerability of agricultural producers
to the impacts of climate change.
(DCC, 2012a, p. 39. Author’s translation)
Adaptation: Agriculture Sector
As was mentioned earlier, the agriculture sector is targeted
both by the ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’ axes of the ENCC
as the sector was defined as being particularly susceptible
to the impacts of climate change (DCC, 2012b, p. 11).
While the objective of the ‘mitigation’ axis is to consolidate
a more efficient agricultural production through the
‘generation, diffusion and adoption’ of ‘climatically smart
technologies’; the objective of the ‘adaptation’ axis is to
reduce this sector’s vulnerability to climate change, which
the DCC portrays as being diminishable by means of using
‘technologies with tolerance’, and appropriate production
and crop management techniques for dealing with these
effects (p. 12).
Additionally, the above ‘adaptation’ objective is to be
pursued by incrementing the ‘capital stocks’ (physical,
human, financial, and social) available for the most
vulnerable producers by providing these with larger access
to information regarding the consequences and the ways to
face climate change, and to financial credits (DCC, 2012a,
p. 62); which is precisely what the ENCC proposes doing
in the ‘Public awareness, education and cultural
change’ axis for this sector. Moreover, the ENCC states
that the effects of climate change will be felt more
82
intensively by the poorest segment of the nation’s rural
population, which is generally found in the most
vulnerable areas of the country, and that tend to have less
access to physical and financial ‘capitals’. Therefore, the
general attention of the adaptation policies of this sector is
directed to supporting ‘smaller’ agricultural producers in
ensuring a greater degree of ‘adaptability’ to their
productive systems which will in turn result in the
reduction of eventual productive losses (DCC, 2012a, p.
63).
The ‘Capacity building and technology’ axis for the
agriculture sector recommends to improve the capacity of
‘data’ producing entities (relevant state ministers, the IMN,
etc.) to provide public decision makers and private
producers with ‘better’ information. For this reason, the
action plan proposes the creation of an information system
for the adaptation and the management of risk for the
agriculture sector.
Although brief and apparently straightforward, the above
axis provides a clear example of how the ENCC’s action
plan depicts the solutions to climate changed as technically
and technologically attainable through the development of
technologies of government (Miller & Rose, 1990) mediated by
an imagined community of technical ‘experts’ and in the
performativity of numbers (Asdal, 2011) capable of
providing decision makers with scientifically legitimized
information. This in return could be seen as a process in
which political decision makers effectively become
subordinated to expert rule through the displacement of
political decisions to knowledge realms that are still largely
celebrated as non-political (Hajer, 1995, p. 39).
83
Adaptation: Water Resources Sector
The DCC starts off the description of the proposed
‘adaptation’ actions for water resources by stressing the
sector’s importance from an economic perspective. The
report states that the impacts of extreme
hydrometeorological phenomenon in Costa Rica “oscillate
between 0.5% and 1.5% of the annual GDP” (DCC,
2012a, p. 60); and that variations in precipitation levels
condition and potentially impact all economic activities
related to, or dependent on, the generation of electricity
because of the country’s heavy reliance on hydroelectricity
(DCC, 2012b, p. 2). Therefore, the DCC literally highlights
that “the integrated management of water resources is the
main adaptation measure [of the ENCC’s action plan]”
(DCC, 2012a, p. 60. Author’s translation).
This paragraph shows that already at the introduction of
the ‘adaptation’ strategy for this sector, ‘climate change’ is
once again enacted as a reality that must be ordered for the
sake of the nation’s ‘economic’ development. Here, the
impacts of climate change are measured not in terms of
their effects over the materiality of ‘nature’, but in terms of
how ‘environmental’ issues –such as extreme
hydrometeorological phenomena– can affect Costa Rica’s
annual Gross Domestic Product by distressing the nation’s
capacity to generate hydroelectricity. This assertion is
consequent with the overreaching paradigm of sustainable
development in which “[…] nature is reinvented as
environment so that capital, not nature and culture, may be
sustained” (Escobar, 1996, p. 328). Hence, the value of
things –water recourses, and more generally ‘nature’– is
not found in the things themselves, but rather in a
reductively understood notion of their usefulness (Lansing,
84
2010). Kristin Asdal (2008) further argues that making
‘nature’ real is not for the sake of ‘nature’, but for the
protection of specific material assets linked to economic
productivity.
The ‘Capacity building and technology’ axis for this
sector recommends to implement –and strengthen
existent– public policies and legal frameworks for the
governance of water resources in the country. The plan
suggests the creation of a ‘water agenda’ for such purpose;
and the inclusion of climate change ‘axes’ in the ongoing
revision and update of the nation’s ‘National Plan for
Water Resources’. Moreover, the action plan suggests
promoting the use of water-efficient technologies for
industrial, agricultural, and residential applications.
‘Metrics’ axis for all ‘Adaptation’ actions and sectors
The ENCC action plan recommends the creation of a
‘National Information System for Water Resources
Integrated Management’ and a ‘National Information
System for Disasters’ both intended to produce the
necessary information for decision makers to increase local
and national resilience of the agriculture and water
resources sectors in the face of climate change (DCC,
2012a, p. 65).
‘Financing’ axis for all actions (Mitigation and
Adaptation)
The DCC recognizes that the country’s currently available
budget to finance climate change is well below the
estimated requirements of the ENCC; and that these could
85
jointly represent a cost between 1.5% and 2.5% of the
GDP (p. 65). Hence, the DCC argues that the ENCC
action plan provides a series of “enabling and/or catalyzing
actions for the implementation of sectorial emblematic
actions” (DCC, 2012a, p. 65. My translation and emphasis).
To finance all those emblematic actions, the DCC
considers fundamental a list of activities for such end.
From that list I consider relevant to highlight:
-To conclude the design of ongoing proposals for
NAMA projects in the agriculture, transports and
energy sectors.
-To continue the process of consolidation of the
national carbon market and the ‘C-Neutral’
program, which could potentially enroll a wider
range of actors from the private sector and private
funds.
(DCC, 2012a, p.69)
Hence, the ENCC makes explicit the reliance on the
implementation of NAMA projects, so that when these are
eventually up and running, they can provide a needed
financial support for the rest of the programs suggested
throughout this policy. A similar thing can be said about
the ENCCs reliance on the strengthening of the existent
‘C-Neutral certification program’ (discussed on page 184)
through its further promotion among private sector
entrepreneurs.
Finally, the ‘Public awareness, education and cultural
change’ axis for all actions (Mitigation and
Adaptation): Throughout the ENCC action plan, this axis
concentrates on different actions aimed at changing
specific behavioral aspects of the targeted groups of
human actors enrolled one way or another with each
86
specific highlighted sector. The different aims of this axis
are either to improve the perception of people towards
something (like public transportation systems); to change
of consumer choices (like ‘carbon-friendly’ agriculture
products); to change consumer habits (such as the
adoption of more ‘carbon-friendly’ habits by energy
consumers, or more ‘efficient’ use of water by industrial or
agricultural producers). In general, the proposed method
for such change of habits relies on the development of
public ‘awareness rising campaigns’ and ‘education plans’
including the curricular adequacy of primary and secondary
formal education, as well as in engineering, agronomy and
education study programs. Another relevant aspect worth
mentioning here is the intention to design these campaigns
in a ‘friendly’ way towards the specific target groups which
in many cases are housekeepers in urban and rural areas
alike (DCC, 2012a, p. 50), and women in particular, which
the ENCC action plan systematically refer to as ‘agents of
change’ because of their traditional role of administrating
households, their role in the education of children, and
their huge participation in micro-businesses (p. 54). Hence,
in light of the Costa Rican state’s inability to coerce
behavior through mechanisms of direct authoritative order;
the ENCC relies on self-regulating individuals who,
through the use of Technologies of government (such as charts,
indicators, study programs, systems of accountability,
standards and certifications) are directly empowered in
participatory processes in which notions of ‘sustainability’
are objectified, measured and standardized and thus
rendered governable (Holden, 2011). In this respect,
Bulkeley and Schroeder (2011) suggest that “in order to
understand the processes and outcomes of governing
climate change, analysis should focus on the hegemonic
87
projects or programmes through which the objects and subjects
of governing are constituted and contested, and through
which the form and nature of the state and authority are
accomplished” (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2011, p. 751. My
emphasis) Furthermore they argue that attention should
also be placed in the understanding of the ways in which
projects selectively assemble –or better, translate (Callon,
1986)– relevant entities into achieving their own aims
either through direct order or through self-government
(Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).
Punctual Observations 1
Before continuing reviewing the next constitutive policy of
Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’, I consider
relevant to point the reader’s attention towards certain
criticisms made from different sources concerning the
applicability, viability and reliability of the ENCC and its
action plan.
First, Monica Araya13 argues that despite the international
compromises that the country has assumed in regards to
climate change, and in relation to its self-proclaimed
‘carbon neutral’ goal in particular, it continues to fail to
provide MINAE or the DCC with a formal mechanism to
publicly inform about either the steps taken –and the ones
still to be taken– in order to comply with that objective, or
about the available funds that the country has received
from international cooperations in order to implement
projects for addressing climate change. (Araya, 2015, p.
Araya is an author and advisor that has specialized in politics of
climate change in Costa Rica, among other Latin American countries.
13
88
18). Araya’s critique has been made in line with an audit
elaborated by the General Comptroller of the Republic
(CGR)14 in 2014 that addressed the state of advance in the
implementation of the ENCC that concluded that “the
[DCC] utilizes a rather inefficient mechanism to oversee
the execution of the action plan of the [ENCC], and that it
lacks the instruments that allow the measurement of its
results which limits the quality of the control [the DCC
may have] over its development” (Contraloría General de
la Republica [CGR], 2014, paragraph 5. My translation).
The CGR determined that this lack of efficiency originated
from the DCC’s application of an implementation model
that is incapable of reasonably estimating the degree of
compliance and development –reflected for example in the
fulfillment of deadlines, percentages of advance, etc. – of
the specific goals for each of the prioritized sectors of the
ENCC. This situation suggested by the CGR, prevents the
DCC from having traceability over the different products
and actions proposed in the ENCC, and to alert the
respective actors about possible deviations during their
implementation (CGR, 2014, paragraph 5. My translation).
Secondly, the CGR found that the ENCC was never
officially issued through an administrative act that would
provide its content with a legally binding character, and
hence legally bind all the state institutions it is set to be
involved with. The report states that this failure is
The CGR is a constitutionally appointed state organism charged
with auditing and reporting on the government's operations in order to
improve its accountability.
14
89
particularly problematic because of the complex, intersectorial and long-term character that the strategy
proposes, which is moreover based on the fulfillment of a
series of objectives, actions, goals and specific products
assigned to not only several autonomous public
institutions, but several strategic private partners (for
instance, agriculture producers, public transportation
companies, etc.).
The CGR states that the President of the Republic in
conjunction with the relevant Ministries are entitled to
order guidelines of mandatory compliance to all state
institutions that each consist of the targeted sectors of the
ENCC; and to order these to comply with all policies,
goals and objectives assigned to each of their respective
sectors (CGR, 2014, paragraph 4) short, the CGR’s audit
concluded that providing the ENCC with a legally
compulsory character is essential for its effective
implementation.
Finally, Kowollik (2014) whom coincided with the former
critique, added that neither the ENCC nor its action plan
can be considered as ‘roadmaps’ exclusively advocated to
the country’s climatic effort as they are both conceived
around the notion of ‘fighting against climate change’ as a
‘global concept’. With that the author refers to how these
interrelated policies fail to point out which are the general
recommendations for actions, and the urgent measures
required to attain the ‘2021 goal’ (Kowollik, 2014, p. 2).
What all these criticisms have in common is that they all
render the ENCC and its action plan as policies that are
somewhat ‘vague’ and based on mere ‘suggestions’ rather
than ‘concrete’ implementations with a binding character. I
believe that both of these criticisms can be discussed both
90
epistemologically and ontologically with some of the analytical
sensibilities provided in governmentality studies, and
Science and Technology Studies (STS) –respectively–.
First, the suggestive and ‘non-binding’ character of the
ENCC, which can be seen throughout the various ‘axes’ of
its action plan, depict the solutions to climate changed as
technically (and technologically) attainable. As has been
shown, the strategy suggests that the key to enhanced
governance over climate change issues heavily lays on the
creation or improvement of accounting practices and
devices. These technologies of accounting are intended to extend
action at a distance (Latour, 1987; Miller & Rose 1990) and
allow for new spaces of control without the need for direct
interventions from any authoritarian entity. Moreover, the
ENCC suggests that the development of neat systems of
accounting itself relies on a great deal of ‘trust’ on technoscientific ‘experts’ and technological devices. In this
perspective, it is only through such sociotechnical
mediators that we may finally be able to ‘see’
environmental problems unfold (Hajer, 1995; Murdoch &
Ward, 1997). To this Asdal (2011) adds that abstract
calculative spaces –such as systems of accounting– not
only require ‘trust’ in the mediation of an imagined community
of technical ‘experts’, and in the performativity of
numbers, but in fact (re)produce ‘trust’ in return. In this
process, accountants ‘experts’ not only situate themselves
as the managers of carbon but position themselves as pivotal
in delivering solutions to the problem of climate change
(Lovell & MacKenzie, 2011, p. 717). Lastly, it is precisely
through the role of ‘autonomous expert communities’ that
government priorities are provided with a legitimacy that is
apparently exempted from political entanglements, which
91
at the same time allows these priorities to be translated into
a wide variety of locales (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010,
p. 80).
In short, the DCC depicts climate change as a problem
that is on the one hand technically amenable through
abstract calculative spaces both ‘narrowed down’ and
mediated by –assumedly– autonomous and scientifically
objective ‘expert’ knowledge and action; while on the other
hand, a problem that requires a change of behavior
through technologies of government capable of translating the
subject’s ‘self-interests’ into a certain domain of reality
aligned with the state’s political rationalities in a way that
subjects become a type of self-regulating individuals
capable of acting as agents of government (Rutland &
Aylett, 2008).
Secondly, criticisms on the vague or ‘non-concrete’
character of the ENCC can be theoretically discussed in a
more ontological sense by following how STS scholars have
focused on exploring the fluidity and multiplicity (Law &
Singleton, 2005) of not only ‘nature’, but of the
environmental policies intended to render ‘nature’
governable. Under this perspective, the material form of
any given entity will always inadequately enact the
symbolically charged construction it is supposed to
embody, and vice versa. This intrinsic incompatibility also
means that there will continuously exist an irremediable
gap between the materiality (Law, 2007) and the inscription
(Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012) of any object since these
assemblages are always held together precariously through
the constant negotiation between of ‘concrete’ and
‘abstract’ entities. Furthermore, and as will be discussed
92
throughout this dissertation, the objects of ‘nature’ with
which environmental issues –like facing climate change–
are concerned with are not self-evident objects that
somehow pre-exist the different policies that where
developed to order them. Instead, both the materiality and
the inscriptions of the objects of ‘nature’ come into
existence within particular sociotechnical processes of
policy development (Rutland & Aylett, 2008).
Fletcher (2013) argues that the country’s self-proclaimed
intent to reach carbon-neutrality in 2021 consists of little
more than a branding mechanism to boost the Costa Rica’s
‘green’ credentials while at the same time ensuring itself
with a competitive edge by supplying ‘C-Neutral’ products
in specific markets of interest. Both he and Kowollik
(2014) suggest that the carbon neutral campaign is almost
exclusively assembled by non-material ‘rhetoric’ or ‘abstract
discourses’ with hardly any actual on-the-ground material
‘practices’, or ‘concrete implementation’. This also means
that the enduring abilities of the network are put at risked
precisely because of its own failure to enroll a wider range
of durable (Callon & Latour, 1981) heterogeneous materials
embodied as concrete implementation practices and
strategical actions.
Briefly: Costa Rica’s ‘climate change’ strategy depicts the
solutions to climate change as being technically amenable
though sound accountability systems. These systems rely
on the mediation of ‘experts’ who are trusted to act on
allegedly pure scientific grounds, free of any political
interests and biases. The point of these accountability
systems is to allow us to ‘see’ where environmental
problems lay, and with that to locate where and how to
93
intervene. However, these accountability systems also
provide a new space for citizens, entrepreneurs, politicians,
etc. to recognize how much they themselves contribute to
climate change; and that way promoting the self-regulation
of their –consumption, productive, domestic, etc.–
behavior without the need for any form of direct top-down
enforcement from the state.
Additionally, the discussion addresses how the materiality
of ‘nature’ does not pre-exist the policies that seek to
render it governable. On the contrary, both the materiality
and the discursive depiction of ‘nature’ emerge from those
policies. However, both of these dimensions of ‘nature’ are
necessarily flawed and mismatched.
Similarly, some voiced criticisms have held that Costa
Rica’s strategy to face ‘climate change’ suffers from a noncorrespondence between its constitutive –rhetoric–
‘discourses’ and its –on the ground– ‘practices’.
Following up on the above issue, and in spite of the
ENCC’s particular emphasis on the urgency to engage in
‘mitigation’ actions for the transport sector (identified as
being by far the largest producer of GHG emissions in the
country); the last inform published by the Program State of
the Nation (PEN, for its acronyms in Spanish) 15 revealed
that while the national population has grown only 23.4%
during the course of the last 15 years, the nation’s fleet of
motor vehicles has duplicated (PEN, 2015, p. 173)16. Now,
PEN is a research program that belongs to the National Rectors
Council (or CONARE), which itself includes the country’s four state
universities.
The program is advocated to addresses ‘sustainable
human development’ in Costa Rica.
16 This same source shows that this tendency shows signs of further
increasing as the nation’s MIV fleet grew an additional 5% between
15
94
although the growth of that fleet is not synonymous with
the growth in GHG emissions by itself, it surely seems to
be the case in Costa Rica where 66% of the nation’s total
gross emissions are produced by transportation motored
vehicles (p. 178). The same report reveals that by far the
largest amount of the vehicles responsible for those
emissions (62.7%) are MIV –automobiles, vans, SUVs,
motorcycles, etc.–, followed by freight line trucks (21.1%),
and lastly –and very revealingly–, public transport (15.2%)
–which is precisely the mode of transportation that the
ENCC intended to favor instead of MIVs. Additionally, in
spite of the ENCC’s ‘Technological renovation and
modernization of the national vehicle fleet’, MINAE holds
that the vehicles in the country continue to be 15 years old
on average. MINAE states that this is the result of –still–
inexistent state controls regarding the importation of new
and used vehicles, and the prevalence of weak policies to
incentive the incorporation of new –and thus more
‘environmentally efficient’– technologies for both private
and public transport sectors (Ministerio de Ambiente y
Energía [MINAE], 2015b, p. 99).
In sum, not only does the Costa Rican state continue to
fail to mobilize the different regulatory frameworks and
programs proposed in the ENCC –which intended to
reduce the amount and antiquity of MIV–; but on the
contrary has permitted that the amount of such polluting
agents not only grew, but duplicated precisely during the
years following the nation’s self-imposed challenge to
reach carbon neutral nation in 2021. Moreover, despite the
comparatively low amount of emissions produced by
2013 and 2014 alone (PEN, 2015, p. 171).
95
public transportation systems in Costa Rica, the sharp
growth of private vehicles in combination with a
significantly slower growing population appear to indicate
that the tendency is to favor the use MIV instead of public
transportation. To add evidence to this claim, the PEN
report condensed the following chart showing how the
public transportation subsector has not shown any signs of
growth within the last 3 decades, while on the contrary
privately owned motorized individual transports (MIV)
have swiftly grown.
Figure 3: Motorized fleet evolution, according to type of vehicle.
Retrieved from PEN (2015, pg. 306)
Finally, the 2015 PEN report also concludes “the intensive
use of hydrocarbons is associated with a scarce use of
renewable sources based on technologies and investments
that would allow resolving, above all, consumption in the
transport sector” (PEN, 2015, p. 177. Author’s
translation). This means that in spite of the country’s
significant installed capacity to generate power from socalled ‘renewable sources’17, and albeit the ENCC’s explicit
17
See Fletcher (2013) for a critical discussion on how hydropower in
96
intention to further “improve and expand the offer of
electricity based on renewable sources” (DCC, 2012a, p.
46), 72.1% of all energies consumed in the country are
imported hydrocarbons (PEN, 2015, p. 177), and 66% of
those fossil fuels are consumed in the transport sector
(MINAE, 2015b, p. 93).
As part of this study’s interviews I asked my informants
“What would you identify as the most urgent environmental issue to
solve in Costa Rica?” To this question all –but one– of my
informants identified different issues related to the nation’s
urban transport sector as the most urgent to address.
While some of the subjects focused on the lack of
comprehensive infrastructural planning, others focused on
the lack of regulations to control the growth of MIV and
its consequent GHG emissions, or on the lack of
environmentally
efficient
transport
technologies,
particularly for public transport alternatives. All of them
coincided that the national government had simply not
taken the goal of reaching carbon neutrality in 2021
seriously. Below is an extraction of an interview with a
board member of the National Chamber of Eco-Tourism
when asked the above-mentioned question:
The following extract shows a particular response to the
above question by a board member of the National
Chamber of Eco-Tourism:
particular has been ‘greenwashed’ and black-boxed as a flagship example
of ‘clean’ and ‘renewable’ energies in Costa Rica –and globally– despite
being associated with several ‘social’ and even ‘environmental’ tradeoffs. Moreover, see Graef (2013) for a recount of how this process
took place in a specific historical controversy in Costa Rica.
97
Subject: Hmm... but… I mean [urban transport
planning] is a real challenge, and one that I believe the
government has not taken seriously. If we had a more
efficient public transport, one of better quality, then
people would maybe dare to leave their cars at home
and use public transport, and obviously more so if
these would hopefully be [ironic giggle] electric
transport systems and more efficient and so forth.
But no, they have not taken it… I mean, they have
not given the issue the urgency that it deserves in spite
of the challenge that we have with the goal [of reaching
carbon neutrality] and that its [ironic giggle] on
2021.
(Source: N. Carballo, personal communication, March 18, 2016. My
translation.)
As the extract shows, the subject explicitly contends that
the Costa Rican state has not been ‘serious’ about
addressing issues related to the transport sector.
Additionally, the subject suggests a disbelief in the state’s
intention to promote the incorporation of environmentally
‘efficient’ technologies of public transportation.
Finally, the subject argues that the state’s reluctance to
provide the issue with a sense of urgency does not reflect
the country’s resolve to become carbon neutral by 2021; a
goal which the subject also dismisses with a clear tone of
irony.
In the last few pages, I have showed that Costa Rica’s
ENCC may very well provide a traceable example of how
98
many of the constituent discourses and practices that
constitute the country’s ‘carbon neutrality’ actor-network are
so incompatible with one another that the gap between its
conflicting materialities and inscriptions threatens to cause a
network breakdown; and that this gap in return may be the
result of a failure to conceive the latter entities as integral
actants of the same actor-network.
Nonetheless, the point here is not to say that ‘discourses’
and ‘practices’ are irremediably confronted within and/or
among every actor-network; and nor is it to assert that
‘discourses’ always equal no more than non-material, abstract
or even empty rhetoric. On the contrary, the boundaries
between ‘discourses’ and ‘practices’ are always permeable,
mutable and in constant process of transformation and coconstruction (Haraway, 1991). And even if the boundaries
between the two could be drawn, Deleuzian and
Foucauldian post-structuralist perspectives often content
that materialist analysis can simply not be separated from
discursive analysis in the first place, because language is in
fact a constitutive actor in the construction of reality, and
not just a reflection of it (see Escobar, 1996).
2. Carbon Accounting: National Inventory of Green
House Gas Emissions
According to the IMN, the ‘National Inventory of Green
House Gas Emissions’ (INGEI, for its acronyms in
Spanish) is a document intended to “quantify the emission
and absorption of GHG emitted to the atmosphere in a
given period of time” (“Inventario nacional de gases,” n.d.
99
My translation and emphasis). Hence, this document is
understood as one delimited by a constrained temporality
that is itself determined by a periodical revision and reevaluation of its contents in a ‘strictly’ quantitative –hence
not qualitative– sense. However, these are not limited to
the expected variations in the numeric data values of each
newer version of the inventory; but extend to the
employed methodologies, mobilized descriptions and
analysis. According to the IMN, the sixth and most current
version of the INGEI for 2012 (Published in 2015) was
elaborated according to articles 4 and 12 of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), and the guidelines provided from the latter
for National Communications of Non-Annex I parties, as
adopted in decision 17/CP.8 (Chacón, Jiménez,
Montenegro, Sasa & Blanco, 2015a, p. 11). The
methodology mobilized in these INGEI focuses on
inventorying all anthropogenic Green House Gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and their respective
sources. Additionally, the INGEI also intends to inventory
all sources of ‘absorption’ of such gases in anthropogenic
carbon sinks. More specifically, the methodology employed
in the latest two versions of the INGEI is based on the
IPCC’s 2006 guidelines for GHG inventories, and on the
1996 version of such guidelines for inventorying GHG
precursors –also known as Ozone precursors–. According
to these guidelines, the INGEI is divided in four particular
sectors:
-Energy
-Industrial processes and product use
-Agriculture, forestry and other uses of land (AFOLU)
-Waste management
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Likewise, the evaluated gases are:
-Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
-Methane (CH4)
-Nitrous Oxide (N2O)
-Halocarbons (HFCs)
-Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
-Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)
-Carbon Monoxide (CO)*
-Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)*
-Volatile hydrocarbons different from Methane (NMVOC)*
-Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)*
(*GHG Precursors)
Emissions are accounted for each specific gas, and at the
same time as equivalent Carbon Dioxide units (CO2eq)
with the purpose of being able to draw comparisons
between them, and to measure the contribution of each
‘key source’ to the nation’s total emissions (Chacón,
Jiménez, Montenegro, Sasa & Blanco, 2014, p. 15). The
latest two INGEI report have registered 95% of all GHG
found in Costa Rica as a result of an assessment of the
‘level’ and ‘trend’ of these gases (Chacón et al., 2015a, p.
11). These two evaluations, as well as the notion of ‘key
sources’ are based on the IPCC’s (2000) Good Practice
Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse
Gas Inventories (Chapter 7: Methodological choice and
recalculation) and on a ‘software’18 facilitated by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Chacón et al.,
2015a, p. 19).
Unfortunately no further reference to this software has been found
anywhere either in academic, official or news sources; nor was it ever
mentioned during the applied field interviews with the relevant
‘experts’ during 2016 and 2017.
18
101
As was introduced in the beginning of this chapter, since
the fifth INGEI, all of IMN’s inventories have been based
on the methodological and conceptual guidelines provided
by the IPCC which have been effectively black-boxed and
remain largely unchallenged. The latter process at the same
time relies on how the authority of the IPCC itself, enacted
as a parliament of specialists responsible for assembling,
maintaining and circulating the scientific legitimacy of
these seldom challenged calculatory devices remains
equally undisputed (MacKenzie, 2009). The overall agency
of the IPCC and its calculatory devices, as well as the
mechanism by which both their authorities remain largely
unchallenged, will be discussed in greater depth later on.
For now, the following pages will summarize the sixth
INGEI for 2012. This summary will review the
contribution ‘level’ of each analyzed sector to the totality
of GHG emissions in Costa Rica; as well as the identified
trends of the totality of all generated GHG emissions
throughout time (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 18).
Finally, and before further continuing this particular
review, I feel convenient to state that much in the same
line with Ingmar Lippert’s 2013 PhD dissertation, with
which the present study shares numerous of theoretical,
conceptual and paradigmatic similarities; I am taking all
numbers in the different inventory reports, documents and
interviews that sustain the present at face values. In other
words, in the present dissertation, I will not attempt to
engage with the formulas by which the derived values
recorded, displaced and mobilized in each source where
arrived at.
102
Energy Sector.
This category covers all GHG emissions generated in the
combustion and volatilization of gases. The main focus of
the analysis is placed on activities in which emissions are
generated in the use of fossil fuels in stationary and mobile
applications (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 21). Stationary
applications gather: energy generation industries,
manufacturing and construction industries, and others
(residential, commerce, agriculture and fishing industries).
Mobile applications on the other hand gather: ground
transportation, civil aviation, railways, maritime and river
navigation and other transports (all terrain).
Data regarding the consumption of fossil fuels was taken
from the annual energetic balance elaborated by the
Energy Sector Directorate (DSE) and the emission factors
from IPCC’s 2006 guidelines for elaborating GHG
emission inventories with the exception of the CO2
emission factor which was instead obtained through an
analysis of the carbon content of fuels used in Costa Rica
(although there is no mention of the entity that carried out
this particular analysis, or where it is available).
Energy Production Industry:
According to the IMN, Costa Rica has an energetic
network largely based on ‘clean’ energies distributed in
71.8% of hydroelectricity; 13.9% geothermic; 5.2% wind;
0.8 Biomass; 0.003% solar and 8.2% thermic. The latter
source is the only one considered a non-renewable and
non-clean source of energy as it is powered by two fossil
fuels: diesel and bunker (though to a lesser degree).
Consequently, the majority of GHG emissions accounted
103
in the energy production sub-sector belong to thermic
power generation.
The IMN excludes the emissions generated in the
hydropower production in this section of the inventory,
and instead includes them under the ‘Humedales’ category
of the AFOLU sector which literally translates to
‘wetlands’, but which for the sake of accuracy, I will
continue translating as ‘flooded lands’19.
This, they argue, is because they correspond to emissions
generated in reservoirs (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 22). In so
doing, the IMN favors an understanding of these
emissions as other to the generation of electricity.
Although I will discuss this with greater depth on page
146, the present can be seen as an example that shows how
classifications do not pre-exist ‘natural’ entities; just like
neither are the calculations that order these simply limited
to record a positively given reality ‘out there’. Instead the
development of classifications is a critical step in the
enactment of new emergent realities in which entities are
locked into specific roles assigned for them by other actors
in a process of translation (Callon, 1986). In this particular
case, gases liberated in reservoirs through the diffusion of
the water-air interface are locked into position (or
classified) as GHG emissions belonging to the AFOLU
sector by the IMN. In other words, the IMN imposed its
‘flooded lands’ category over certain entities (gases) which
As I will argue later on page 146, the inaccuracy of the translation of
this term is neither innocent nor the result of sloppiness, but a
carefully orchestrated socio-technical arrangement.
19
104
in turn came to be define as ‘GHG emissions’. These then
emerged as a new ‘natural’ reality made visible and
calculable (Murdoch and Ward, 1997) not by themselves,
but as entry numbers strictly recorded under the ‘flooded
lands’ –and not the ‘energy production industry’– category
of the INGEIs.
The IMN renders the emissions from geothermic power as
‘fugitive’, and calculates them by using an ‘emission factor’
taken from a local study of CO2 emissions directly from
the geothermic plants. This was done so in light of the
inexistence of any methodology to account for these
emissions in the IPCC guidelines (Chacón et al., 2015a, p.
25). Solar and wind power are considered to not have any
directly related emissions.
Manufacturing and construction industry:
Includes the emissions produced in all equipment used in
different industrial processes to produce vapor, heating,
cooling, illumination and movement (driving force).
Emissions produced in the transportation of raw materials
and products are excluded in this section, and are instead
included in the ‘transport’ sub-sector (the same is true for
all other subsectors analyzed in the INGEI’s that require
any kind of transportation of goods or raw materials).
Food industry is the primary consumer of energy in this
sub-sector using up to 37% of the energy, followed by the
chemical industry with 15%, and all other industries (such
as construction and the production of leather, paper, wood
products, etc.) with a combined total of 38%.
105
Transports:
This sub-sector includes emissions produced in terrestrial,
aerial and maritime transportation vehicles. A national CO2
emission factor was used in the analysis of this subsector
alongside IPCC’s emission factors for all other GHG
emissions.
According to IMN, the vehicle fleet in Costa Rica
consisted of approximately 1.400.000 vehicles in 2012;
while both the proportion of vehicles with diesel and
gasoline powered engines, and the amount of CO2
emissions these respectively produce were very similar.
Although emissions produced in international air transport
and in international maritime transport are accounted in
this sub-sector, these are only accounted in order to
“guarantee worldwide completeness; but they are
[ultimately] not added to the country’s emissions” (Chacón
et al., 2015a, p. 23. My translation). The IMN states that
these emissions20 are presented for ‘informative’ purposes
only, but that they ‘belong’ to an ‘international deposit’
(Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 25).
As will be further discussed later on, the growing GHG
emissions produced by the equally growing international
air travel and air fright industries remain on a virtual ‘no
man’s land’ as these emissions have so far escaped all
international regulations intended to allocate them. These
Which according to the 2012 INGEI, adds up to 609.89 Gg of net
CO2e (Chacón, et al., 2015a, p. 25) whereas the same inventory
estimates the emissions of the entire energy production to a total of
590.44 Gg of net CO2e (p. 22).
20
106
failed international attempts have included the Davos
Declaration (2007) by the United Nations World Tourism
Organization, the first period of the Kyoto Protocol
(2008–2012), the Copenhagen Climate Conference (2009),
and more recently the International Civil Aviation
Organization Conference (2016); none of which has, for
instance, conclusively held any actor or part21 responsible
for these emissions, nor secured an international tax on
aviation fuel.
Other [sub]sectors:
Under this category, the INGEI includes the ‘public,
service and commercial [sub]sector’, the ‘residential
[sub]sector’ and the ‘agriculture [sub]sector’. These gather
the emissions produced in refrigeration, illumination,
cooking, heat generation, office equipment and other nonmobile machinery.
Before reviewing the next sector of the INGEI, it may be
relevant to mention that Costa Rica is an importer of
petroleum (not a producer). Hence the ‘fugitive’ emissions
found in this sector correspond only to the transportation,
refinement and storage of such imported oil, and the
distribution of its derivate products (Chacón et al., 2015a,
p. 25). Moreover, it is stated on the 2012 INGEI that the
country did not import raw oil in that year and hence no
emissions exist for this specific entry.
For instance, destination countries, countries of departure, airline
companies, aircraft manufacturers, travelers, etc.
21
107
Industrial processes and product use.
The emissions considered in this sector correspond to
those produced in the “transformation of raw materials
through physical and chemical means” (Chacón et al.,
2015a, p. 27). This includes the manufacturing of cement
(by far the largest source of GHG emissions of the subsector); the production of lime; the production of glass; the
use of hydrofluorocarbons –as a replacement to
Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) – in refrigeration, air
conditioning and other applications; the use of Sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6) as an insulating agent in the
transmission and distribution of electricity.
This sector does not include the respective emissions
produced in the country’s electronic industry as the IMN
states that there are no such emissions in the production of
semiconductors (the only electronic product manufactured
in Costa Rica). Additionally, the emissions produced in the
use of non-energetic combustion products –such as
lubricants and paraffin waxes– are not accounted in this
INGEI as the data concerning these is only currently being
produced for its inclusion in future inventories (Chacón et
al., 2015a, p. 28). Finally, there is no entry for the
emissions produced in steel or chemical industries because
these are inexistent in the country.
Agriculture, forestry and other uses of land (AFOLU).
According to the IMN, agriculture and forestry activities
either generate GHG emissions or absorb CO2 through
several processes that take place in the different ecosystems condensed under this sector. These processes
include photosynthesis, respiration, decomposition,
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nitrification, denitrification, energetic fermentation and
combustion (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 31). More precisely,
the INGEI reviews the following processes in relation to
their respective emissions:
-CH4 emissions produced in the energetic
fermentation of cattle.
-CH4 and N2O emissions produced in the processing
of manure.
-Emissions and absorptions of CO2 resulted from
changes in the existence of carbon in biomass, dead
organic matter and mineral soil*.
-CO2 and non- CO2 emissions produced in fires*.
-N20 emissions*.
-CO2 emissions related to the application of lime and
urea*.
-CH4 emissions produced in rice cultivation.
-CH4 emissions in flooded lands (This includes all
reservoirs used in hydroelectric power generation).
*On all managed lands categorized as part of the AFOLU
sector.
In the summary of this chapter, I consider relevant to
briefly review two particular subsections of the AFOLU
sector because of their direct relation to the topic of this
study; and because I believe they both reveal interesting
information regarding the way GHG emissions are framed
in the latest two INGEI reports.
Forestry land.
The information sources used for this subsection mainly
derive from governmental forestry statistics and censuses;
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land coverage maps; and stored and fixed biomass data by
type of forest (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 33). The proportion
of carbon stores in tree biomass used in the latest two
INGEIs (used to estimate CO2 absorptions) equals 47%.
This factor corresponds to the one recommended in
IPCC’s 2006 methodology. However, there has been
voiced criticisms from Costa Rican academics in regard to
the extent the black-boxed notion that forests are in fact
capable of offsetting carbon emissions at all (Baltodano,
2008), and the precariousness behind local calculations to
estimate actual carbon absorptions in relation to biomass
expansion in forest stocks (Alice, Fonseca & Herrera,
2014, p. 28).
Flooded lands.
This sub-section of the INGEI includes the methane
(CH4) emissions produced in reservoirs used in
hydroelectric power generation. The methodology defined
by the IPCC in 2006 only considers methane emissions
liberated in reservoirs through the diffusion of the waterair interface22 in light of “existing discussions regarding the
amount of actual emissions from reservoirs, especially
those with low energy or power densities” (Chacón et al.
2014, p. 35). Therefore the guidelines designed by the
UNFCCC for Clean Development Mechanism projects
(CDMs) were used to determine the power/density ranges
(estimated in Watts/m2).
In absence of a ‘scientifically valid’ national emission factor
to determine the corresponding emissions of this sub-
22Although
three other mechanisms are recognized and enlisted in the
INGEIs.
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sector, the employed emission factor derives from the
IPCC (Chacón et al. 2015a, p. 36).
It is stated on the 2010 INGEI that Costa Rican reservoirs
are not expected to produce large emissions rates because
they belong to the higher power-density category (Chacón
et al. 2014, p. 36). Instead, the document states that these
emissions could be expected to become minimized in the
long term because the country’s reservoirs produce much
more energy-per-unit than those high-emission cases
typically used as reference in existing literature. Moreover,
on page 36 of the 2010 INGEI, table 4.9 titled ‘CO2
emission criteria in reservoirs’ is provided:
Power density
(W/m2)
Less than 4
4-10
More than 10
Recommendation
Not to consider standard
methodology for CDM projects.
90 ton CO2 eq/ GWh
Emissions can be neglected.
Table A: Threshold values and criteria for hydroelectric power pants
with reservoirs
‘Table A’ (which is at the same time based on UNFCCC’s
CDM EB23 Annex 5)23, designates the threshold values
and criteria for hydroelectric power pants with reservoirs
for CDM projects as accepted by the mentioned
multilateral entity. Thresholds are calculated in the result of
the division of the assigned value of installed power
generation capacity by the flooded surface area. In the
2010 INGEI it is argued that there is no reservoir in Costa
23
Available at: https://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/023/eb23_repan5.pdf
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Rica with a lower power density than 4 W/m2. Moreover,
that aside from a single reservoir that has a higher power
density than the previous figure, all other reservoirs in the
country have higher or much higher power densities than
10 W/m2 (Chacón et al. 2014, p. 36). Consequently, their
CO2e emissions may be neglected from GHG emission
inventories. Similarly, a member of the Costa Rican
Institute for Electricity (ICE) stated that methane
emissions form reservoirs have a generation curve that
dramatically decreases after 10 years because the
submerged organic matter should be completely
disintegrated by that time (C. Hernandez, personal
communication, April 13, 2016). These issues surrounding
the processes of calculation and accounting mobilized in
Costa Rica’s INGEIs for the ‘flooded lands’ subsector can
be seen in light of two specific theoretical arguments found
in STS work. First, the role that numbers have in making
things governable through a process of simplification (Law,
1992) with which decision-making processes are effectively
‘shortened’ by actively transforming the objects that
calculations and modern technologies together reveal into
uniformed, materialized things that afford being measured,
compared, displaced and circulated (Kalthoff, 2005, p. 73);
and second, that for an object –like methane emissions
from reservoirs, as calculated in the INGEIs– to be
sustained, stabilized and capable of moving between
locations, not all of its constituent ‘parts’ can be brought
into presence; hence any given thing made present will
always depend on another being made absent (Law &
Singleton, 2005).
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Waste management
The last sector of the INGEIs estimates the carbon,
methane and nitrogen oxides from the following sources:
-Solid waste disposal
-Biological treatment of solid wastes (Composting)
-Incineration and open incineration of waste
-Treatment and elimination of sewage water
A revealing issue addressed throughout the review of this
sector is the less than ideal situation of wastewater
treatment in Costa Rica. The INGEI states that despite the
fact that the country’s sanitation covers 99.4% of total
population; only 2.4% of the latter has access to a sanitary
sewer network connected to some sort of water treatment
system. Additionally, the INGEI reveals that despite the
fact that 70.54% of the total population makes use of
septic tanks, there are little to no controls regarding the
design, construction, operation and maintenance of these.
Moreover, the authors state that in the majority of cases,
these tanks are only connected to black water (from flush
toilets) and not greywater (sinks, showers, wash machines,
etc.). What is more, in the majority of cases, the latter are
directly connected to storm sewers and drains which
eventually unload untreated directly on rivers and creeks
(Chacón et al., 2014, p. 44).
It is stated on the last two INGEIs that the lack of
available information, and the lack of regulatory controls
on sewage infrastructure, is evident in the construction of
new residential condominiums; while on the contrary, “all
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productive activities24 that generate residual waters must
comply with the regulations on spill and re-use of residual
waters” (Chacón et al., 2014, p. 47. My emphasis and
translation). This means, in other words, that regulations
on this matter are enforced over the private sector, yet
with the exception of the housing industry.
Total results
The final chapter of the 2012 INGEI provides a short
summary of all sectors analyzed put together. This
summary contains several tables that simplify (and hence,
reduce) the information found in the previous chapter with
the intention of allowing a quick-and-easy comparison
between the emissions produced in each of the four
sectors (expressed both as specific GH gases, and as their
respectively assigned ‘carbon equivalence’ value), and
between the emissions accounted in latest three INGEIs
(2005, 2010 and 2012). Likewise, the 2012 INGEI presents
an 8-page annex where all tables are summarized with
more detail.
The following diagram is based on ‘Figura 6.1: Distribución
de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero expresadas como CO2
equivalentes para el 2012’ provided at the end of the 2012
INGEI25. It visually summarizes the distribution of GHG
emissions expressed in CO2 equivalent units.
The 2012 INGEI enlists the production of coffee, sugar, starch,
vegetable oil, meat, fruits and vegetables as such productive activities.
25 The shown ‘Figure 4’ is virtually identical to figure 6.1 except for the
translation of all wordings from Spanish to English.
24
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Figure 4: Distribution of GHG emissions for 2012 expressed in C02
equivalents
Punctual Observations 2
Several mentions are made throughout the different
sectors and sub-sections of the INGEIs indicating that
certain emissions (mainly CO2) are not ‘added’ to the
country’s total GHG emissions for one reason or another.
Although these reasons are specific to the source of each
particular emission, these emissions are generally
withdrawn from the overall calculations because they are
said to emerge either from organic matter –such as plant
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residues, biomass, timber, charcoal, etc.26; or biogenic
processes –such as CO2 emissions from landfills and the
treatment of wastewaters.
Following Michel Callon’s now classic ANT study on the
scallops and fishermen of Saint-Brieuc Bay in Brittany,
France; I argue that the IMN sought to become
indispensable to a wide range of gases by defining these as
‘GHG’ emissions. The ‘nature’ of some of these gases
where further defined as being ‘environmentally hazardous’
due to their contribution to the problem of ‘climate
change’, which itself emerged as the ‘new’ main
environmental threat to target through Costa Rica’s
‘carbon neutral’ actor-network. Later, this emergent network
–which includes the IMN as a key actor– suggested that
the problem of ‘climate change’ could be resolved if GHG
emissions where negotiated and accounted in the obligatory
passage point of the IMN; namely the National GHG
inventories. However, while some gases where defined by
the INGEIs as ‘evil’ GHG emissions, others (like the
emissions from organic matters introduced above) were
‘withdrawn’ from the overall calculations, discarded
because of their somewhat independent nature to human
activity (such as water vapor), or simply remain ‘invisible’
to modern science and technology.
All in all, earth’s global emissions are neither things simply
For instance, carbon emissions produced in cooking in the
residential sector are not included in the final inventory because the
most common types of fuels used for this purpose are timber or
charcoal (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 24).
26
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‘out there’ in the atmosphere, nor things that occupy
Euclidean space; instead they are things that come into
existence through socio-technical devices (such as
computer screens) and performances (such as conferences,
scientific articles) mediated by communities of ‘experts’
(Lippert, 2013, p. 21). “Researchers, irrespective of their
discipline, work on inscriptions produced by instruments,
which they have to decipher and put into statements. […]”
(Callon, 2006, p. 13). Callon further argues that the
scientist’s work is to ‘help nature to write’ hence making
‘experts’ the mediators between the inscriptions ‘written’ by
nature, and the interpretations put into words which will
eventually constitute the propositions and discourses about
the new emergent ‘natural’ reality. It takes further effort to
sustain and stabilize the networks of relations over which
those emergent statements were assembled upon;
otherwise things start to lose their shape and stop being
the objects they were (Callon & Singleton, 2005, p. 337). In
our case, accounting is key in making carbon emissions
visible –or invisible– (MacKenzie, 2009), particularly
because ‘non-visible theoretical entities’ like gases, are
simultaneously brought into existence and made calculable
by an operative writing which determines the correspondence
between those emergent ‘invisible’ entities and their formal
mathematical expression; and not the nexus between those
expressions and naturally given objects ‘out there’ waiting
to be measured, calculated and recorded (Kalthoff, 2005,
p. 82).
Just like emissions are not simply just ‘there’ waiting to be
ordered, the motivations and interests of the enrolling actors
to participate in the performative construction of
emissions should not simply be taken for granted either.
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Emissions only become relevant once they have been
constructed as an issue, an “unwanted consequence of an
action or omission that affects a certain group of human
beings” (Ureta, 2014b, p. 306). Moreover, carbon
emissions become a ‘public’ issue once certain human
actors feel affected by them in a certain way, and decide to
gather forces to ‘fix’ them, to do something about them.
But as we have seen, not all inscriptions become gases; not
all gases become ‘emissions’; and finally, not all ‘emissions’
become issues. It becomes apparent then that the two
relevant things to look at here are: Firstly, how it came to
be determined what things will be made visible (and
subsequently, what others invisible) within the emergent
networked reality; and secondly whose voice will determine
this outcome (Bowker and Star, 1996). These questions
loop back to Callon’s four moments of translation in that:
1) [Problematization] The IMN sought to become
indispensable in the fight against hazardous GHG
emissions which affect Costa Rica’s ‘economy’,
‘environment’ and ‘society’. For facing such challenge, the
IMN suggested that these emissions could be governed if
they were calculated and accounted for in its INGEIs (the
IMN’s Obligatory Passage Point);
2) [Interessement] The IMN locked a range of gases into
fulfilling the role of what became to be known as ‘GHG
emissions’;
3) [Enrolment] The IMN mobilized a set of strategies in
which the emergent ‘GHG emissions’ where defined and
calculated –through inscriptions, technological devices,
mathematic expressions and social interactions among
‘experts’–;
4) [Mobilization] Finally, the IMN mobilized a series of
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techno-scientific calculations, propositions and discourses
about the accounted GHG emissions in an effort to
provide robust ‘scientific proof’ that would allow to sustain
these inventories (and these emissions) as a stable network
of relations. The emergent propositions where assembled
not only as credible and indisputable ‘proof’ about carbon
emissions; but also, as mobile gases capable of circulating
through their displaced embodiment as numbers in
inventory reports.
However, did all GHG gases make it into these reports?
Whatever happened to those gases that despite being made
visible in instruments, inscriptions and statements; and
despite being defined as ‘GHG emissions’ either ended up
slipping through the INGEIs by avoiding their calculation,
or ended up being calculated but not added to Costa Rica’s
final grand emission total?
As was mentioned in the first paragraph of this subsection,
GHG gas emissions liberated from the combustion of
‘organic matter’ (such as timber or biomass) and from
‘biogenic processes’ (like organic decompositions in
landfills) are in fact withdrawn from the overall
calculations without the provision of any explanation or
reason
whatsoever27.
Similarly,
emissions
from
international aviation and maritime transportation, or
‘international bunker fuels’ are also expected to be
accounted but not summed to the country’s total emissions
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [UNFCCC], 2017). In this case, the IMN states
that these emissions are only accounted in order to
27
See pages 25 and 43 from the 2012 INGEI.
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guarantee ‘worldwide completeness’ (Chacón et al., 2015a,
p. 23) and presented only for ‘informative purposes’ but
that they ultimately ‘belong’ to an ‘international deposit’ (p.
25). Emissions from international flight industries in
particular are in fact a delicate issue to consider since these
increased proportionally to the growing demand for
international air travel and transports in general. On this
matter, Fletcher argued that “[t]he Kyoto Protocol, for
example, does not require any specific parties to assume
responsibility for emissions from international air
transport” (Fletcher, 2016, p. 144); while Gössling (2009)
discussed how the international aviation has been left ‘off
the hook’ from any reasonability on the matter, despite the
intricate symbiosis between air travel and global tourism
(particularly ‘eco-tourism’, where Costa Rica is renowned
to be hugely important). Gössling’s study showed how
the growing GHG emissions from the air travel industry
remain on a virtual ‘no man’s land’; as these emissions
have so far escaped international regulation (such as the
not-so-binding ‘Davos Declaration’ in 2007 by the United
Nations World Tourism Organization) which do not hold
any actor conclusively responsible for these emissions. In
short, while emissions from ‘biogenic processes’ and
‘organic matter’ simply ‘disappear’ from the final overall
calculation of the INGEIs, international flight and
maritime emissions are enacted as being ‘stored’ in an
abstract void-like space known simply as the ‘international
deposit’. Hence all these emissions have been effectively
disrupted (Galis and Lee, 2014); they have been rendered as
‘powerless’ in that their power to influence negotiations
within the INGEIs network has been downplayed as being
either ‘harmless’ (emissions from ‘biogenic processes’ and
‘organic matter’), or ‘irreprehensible’ (emissions from
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international air and maritime travel). Rather than
constructing chains of translation (like Callon’s moments of
translation suggest), the IMN has constructed chains of
differences that deconstruct the agency of those gases by
destabilizing their organization, and ultimately portraying
them as invisible others (Galis and Lee, 2014, p. 168) to those
other gases who succeed in mobilizing their own agencies,
and in making themselves dominant and representative –
hence effectively being added to the grand emission total
of the INGEIs.
Galis and Lee then speak of a process in which the presence
of some ‘successful’ actors necessarily depends on the
absence of other defeated and excluded ones. Although not
nearly the same claim, Law and Singleton (2005) argued
that the constant, juxtaposed and patterned interactions
between entities (bodies, numbers, discourses, etc.) included
and excluded from a network make it possible for an object
to be temporarily sustained over different and
discontinuous locations (Law & Singleton, 2005). In short,
they argued that an object made present necessarily depends
on another made absent. When these emergent objects are
further translated into policies, a process of problem closure
takes place which provides “socially acceptable solutions
for well-defined problems” (Hajer, 1995, p. 22). These
solutions are once again obtained by sorting out which
aspects of the emergent problem will be included, and
which will be excluded; giving way for a ‘proper target’ for
policy-making instead of the contradictory, fluid and
precarious mess (Law & Singleton, 2005) from which
objects actually emerge. Finally, Lippert (2013) argues that
since the calculation of carbon emissions are full of
judgements like the ones reviewed so far, it is apt to
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conceptualize the process of accounting carbon emissions
not simply as a calculation, but as qualculation (Callon &
Muniesa, 2005) that implies both qualitative and
quantitative manipulations over the mobilized data and its
relations, and over the materiality of the emergent reality.
The emergent numbers and ‘results’ from these qualculations
are signifiers of loss of accounts of –other– realities
(Lippert, 2013, p. 107). In other words, the presence of
emergent accounts of GHG emissions that result and
temporarily ‘hold together’ from a performative process of
qualculation rely on the absence of other alternative accounts
of such emissions and of other disrupted material entities. In
conclusion, GHG emissions are politically assembled
entities that rely on performative heterogeneous processes
of patterned absence-and-presence (or inclusions-andexclusions) that lead to the establishment of a categorical
order between socially valuated (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013)
objects that is nevertheless empirically contingent, and
ontologically multiple, precarious and fluid.
Briefly: Costa Rica’s GHG did not pre-exist policies.
Instead, they are politically assembled entities that were
defined within the policies intended to render them
governable –the INGEIs–. Yet not all gases ‘made it’ to
the inventories. Unlike GHG, not all gases emerged as
‘bad’. Some gases where rendered as ‘harmless’, others as
‘irreproachable’ to any particular actor, while others simply
remained ‘invisible’ to ‘modern’ science. Hence all of these
‘other’ gases where consequently either ignored or
withdrawn from the INGEIs.
Put differently, GHG emissions are not positively given
natural objects literally and figuratively floating around ‘out
there’; instead they are politically assembled entities whose
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material and discursive presence necessarily relies on the
absence of that of other –alternative or hypothetical–
entities.
Continuing with another observation on Costa Rica’s
INGEIs, numerous mentions are made to indicate the
origin of each ‘emission factor’ or specific ‘calculation’
used to determine the different values assigned to each
sub-sector analyzed throughout the INGEIs. As far as
emission factors go, the document essentially alternates
between the use of emission factors provided in the 2006
IPCC guidelines for elaborating GHG emission inventories
and locally produced emission factors derived from
specific studies elaborated in Costa Rica. Here, the authors
state that ongoing work is continuously being invested to
improve the quality of the data used in the inventories as
well as the emission factors (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 17).
This suggests then, that the ideal scenario is to consolidate
as much context specific-emission factors as possible,
leading to measuring systems with greater certainty than
those generic default emission factors provided in the
IPCC guidelines. In fact, Chacón acknowledged this
concerned in a personal interview and stated that the IMN
currently has all of its estimations of GHG and removals
for each source in at least ‘level 1’; yet that the goal is to
have them all in ‘level 3’ (A. Chacón, personal
communication, February 27, 2017). By this, Chacón
makes reference to the three ‘Tier levels’ coined by the
IPCC in its 2003 Manual for Good Practices for Land Use, Land
Use Change and Forestry. According to this manual, ‘Tier
levels’ are three progressive methodological ranks for
estimating GHG and their removals for each source that
go from the use of simple equations with default data to
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country-specific data to more complex national systems.
According to the IPCC, the progression from the ‘lowest’
to the ‘highest’ level correspond to an implicit progression
in the degree of ‘certainty’ of estimations because of the
increase of methodological complexity, regional specificity
and the extent of activity data (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [IPCC], 2003, p. 3.17). Likewise, the IPCC
states that moving from lower to higher tiers typically
requires an increase in institutional and technical capacity,
and in resource investment.
Put briefly and schematically, the following table
condenses how the IPCC defines these three ‘Tier levels’:
Tier
Level 1
Tier
Level 2
Tier
Level 3
Employs basic methodologies that commonly
uses spatially rough data, such as nationally or
globally available estimates of deforestation
rates, agricultural production statistics, and
global land cover maps.
This tier level can use the same methodological
approach as Tier 1 but applies country-defined
emission factors, emission coefficients for
specific regions and specialized land-use
categories per activity. The IPCC considers the
use of this set of country-defined data as a
more appropriate basis for estimating GHG
emissions and removals in each specific
reporting country. Additionally, Tier 2 level can
also apply stock change methodologies based
on country-specific data.
Employs models and inventory measurement
systems designed specifically for each national
circumstance, repeated over time and driven by
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high-resolution
activity
data
that
is
compartmented into a finer sub-national grid.
According to the IPCC, the more complex
methodologies employed in this tier level
provide estimates of greater certainty than
those of lower tiers and have a closer link
between biomass and soil dynamics.
Additionally, this level employs land-use data
that can track land changes over time. Finally,
the models coined in this level are to
periodically undergo quality checks, audits, and
validations to ensure their accuracy.
Table B: Framework of tier structure
(Based on IPCC, 2003, p. 3.17. Box 3.1.1).
Throughout the INGEI, quantitative values assigned to
specific gas emissions appear on the different tables of the
document. However, the ways in which these gases were
‘actually’ measured is often left unsaid. On those occasions
in which these mechanisms are made explicit, we find
references of measurements directly made on a selected
population of sources –such as emission measurements
made on automobiles without inbuilt emission control
systems (Chacón et al., 2014, p. 22). On other occasions,
measurements are ‘estimated’ on the basis of available
‘related’ information connecting a process or a product to
an emission calculation –such as the estimation of CO2
emissions from the cement industry based on available
knowledge on the carbon emissions produced in the
processing of clinker (a component of cement) instead of
cement itself (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 27). Finally, some
estimations are arrived at based on measurements of
arguably distant and indirect variables in space, time and
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matter –such as the assessment of N2O emission from
domestic residual waters based on estimates of the
consumed kilograms of protein per capita at a national
level. In this case, emissions are arrived to by calculating
the amount of nitrous oxide typically liberated in the
synthesis of urea linked to the degradation of protein by
the human body (p. 45).28
Despite the rather obvious differences between the
methods of calculation employed in the three examples
above; and despite the differences in the degree of local
accuracy and methodological complexity between the
different (tier) ‘levels’ of calculations enlisted earlier, the
IMN makes no explicit distinctions between the qualitative
differences of these calculations. Instead, the INGEI is
reported in a way in which it would appear as if all of its
different calculations and measurements share the same
degree of robustness, precision and accuracy.
Alice, Fonseca and Herrera (2014) however published a
critique on several issues behind Costa Rica’s GHG
inventories from a methodological point of view, which in
part relates to all the issues discussed above. The authors
argue that the absence of several technical specifications to
estimate emissions in Costa Rica’s INGEI reports generate
elevated risks that reduce the applicability, comparability
and reliability of their results (Alice et al., 2014, p. 28).
The three examples of measurements described in this paragraph
correspond to what Alice, Herrera and Fonseca (2014) term ‘source
sampling’, ‘material balance’ and ‘extrapolation’ measuring techniques
respectively.
28
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Now, before I continue reviewing the particular criticism
these authors make to Costa Rica’s INGEIs, I would like
to make a relevant philosophical statement related to why
–or more precisely how– I have included the particular
work of these authors in the first place. As I will continue
showing throughout this dissertation, I do not believe that
it is possible or even relevant to discuss whether the
different methodological procedures, devices and
calculations mobilized in the process of accounting GHG
emissions in Costa Rica –or in fact, in any other technoscientific controversy– can be considered technically or
scientifically ‘flawed’ or not. Or for that matter, to state
that there exist alternative devices that would allow technoscientific ‘experts’ to measure, calculate and record carbon
emissions more accurately. Such an endeavor would
precisely contradict the purpose of this entire dissertation
in that it would imply subscribing it into a positivistic
paradigm that understands that a positively given ‘nature’
out there can be approached by sound scientific methods
populated by strictly objective inquiry and properly
calibrated instruments. On the contrary, I believe that
GHG gases cannot ‘simply’ be measured to begin with,
precisely because such entities only come into existence
through particular and contingent sociotechnical practices.
Or as Lippert puts it: “Different apparatuses produce
different carbon. A reconfiguration of any carbon
measurement apparatus will not get closer to an
independently existing reality. Rather, the material reality of
carbon is configured by the means by which it is
produced” (Lippert, 2013, p. 471). Hence, a collage of
different –and often competing– practices will result in
multiple realities of carbon(s). What is more, I believe that
these simultaneous practices are not only embedded in –
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political– subjectivities, but also occur through a series of
performative negotiations between human and non-human
entities holding equal agency.
Returning to Alice and colleagues’ (2014) paper, the
authors identify several issues or challenges related to the
country’s methods and metrics mobilized to estimate its
GHG emissions. First, they argue that Costa Rica’s carbon
neutral model makes no distinction between ‘real’ and
‘potential’ emission measurements (p. 19). Here ‘real’
measurement of emissions are understood as the
calculation that better reflects the actual mass of gases
liberated in the atmosphere in a certain period of time;
while the ‘potential’ measurement is the estimation of the
maximum rate of liberated gases that a source can reach
during a certain time frame. These two types of
measurements are based on two assumptions: 1) that all
measuring equipment used to determine these emissions
work at their full capacity; and 2) that these instruments are
capable of measuring the full load of the measured gases.
The authors argue that the country’s ‘carbon neutral’ policy
not only makes no distinction between the nature of these
two approaches –which is commonly distinguished
explicitly in each country’s carbon regulation policies–; but
that this leads to the potential risk of mixing these two
methods which would lead to inconsistences that affect the
overall capacity to compare the obtained data.
Second, they argue that despite the fact that the
development of GHG inventories necessarily requires the
combination of approaches to estimate emissions, the
selection of these methods should on the one hand be
made explicit from the starting point of any inventory;
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while on the other hand consider the associated costs of
elaborating an inventory in relation to the quality and
degree of uncertainty that comes with each of the different
methods (p. 20). In that respect, the authors establish a
cost/benefit relation between the associated costs of six
different technics to determine GHG emissions, and their
degree of trustworthiness where the most costly method –
source sampling– is also the most reliable; and the most
inexpensive one –extrapolation– is at the same time the
most inaccurate. The following ‘Figure 5’ –based on ‘Figura
1: Relación entre el costo, el grado de confianza y las diversas técnicas
existentes para el cálculo de emisiones en los inventarios de GEI’29
(Alice et al., 2014, p. 20)– illustrates the relation between
costs and degree of confidence implicit in each of the
existing technics to determine GHG emissions:
Figure 5: Relation between costs, benefits and degree of confidence in
each technic for determining GHG emissions
The shown 'Figure 5’ is essentially the same as Alice and colleagues’
‘Figura 1.’ Found in page 20 of the reviewed article; except for the
translation of all wordings from Spanish to English.
29
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Although I will not attempt to review the six different
techniques that the authors identify, I would like to focus
on briefly reviewing the measuring technique that is based
on the use of ‘emission factors’, which was acknowledged
as the selected method in Costa Rica’s INGEIs. ‘Emission
factors’, which are placed somewhere in the middle of the
cost/benefit scale-chart, represent the relation between an
amount of GHG liberated in the atmosphere and a
corresponding ‘activity unit’ (activities are the sources of
emissions; for instance, generation of thermic electricity,
cattle ranching, etc.). Emission factors can be classified in
two types: those based on processes, and those based on
census; the former are considered to be more
accurate/expensive
while
the
latter
more
inaccurate/inexpensive (see figure 5). Additionally,
emission factors can either be nationally determined, or
derived from IPCC’s database and guidelines. Just like the
former types of emission factors, the freely available
emission factors derived from the IPCC are considered
more inaccurate because of their generic nature; while
nationally determined emission factors are considered to
be much more precise, yet (more) expensive to produce.
Costa Rica’s INGEIs combine all of these types of
emission factors, yet the IMN acknowledges the need to
improve INGEIs by “considering more accurate
methodologies, by elaborating emission factors specific to
the country and by collecting more detailed activity data”
(Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 19. My translation). However, the
IMN also admits that doing this will require additional
resources than those currently available; and that it is not
possible to make improvements to each and all categories
of emission source.
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On this subject, the following extract of an interview made
to a high-ranking member of FONAFIFO’s development
and marketing department addresses how in face of the
elevated costs and the complexity behind the elaboration
of nationally determined data, calculations are often
deliberately simplified to reduce such costs and
complications:
Subject: I believe that [the calculation of] carbon is
one of the easiest ones. Because what you quantify is the
growth of trees. There are other variables there that are
rather complicated right; that we have tried to ‘purify’
so that… so that the costs do not elevate right? For
example, those that have to do with nitrogensequestrating species.
If you get into that… you have to quantify how many
emissions of nitrous oxide are filling up the atmosphere;
so hmmm, you also have to quantify how many
[emissions] are staying [sequestered in the ground], and
you would also have to quantify how many [emissions]
are being generated in that exchange of nitrogen.
So in the end of the day, these are small things that we
are leaving out at the moment because we believe that
they are way too complicated right? Hmmm these would
mean being in the field with devices and instruments
that tell you how the flow of nitrogen from the ground to
the atmosphere really is. Right?
Interviewer: Sure.
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Subject: So, these are small things that… are more
complicated to quantify, but… let’s say you can obviate
these in the general quantification, by saying: “ok, I
will not consider these”… you can define certain limits.
So to say: “ok, I will quantify until ‘this’ limit, and
from there on, if it gets better or not, well… it could
end up improving but I better not quantify it because
it’s way too costly”.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Right? For example measuring the organic
carbon from the soil that ‘happens’ in an ecosystem.
One would have to constantly be doing soil analysis;
and although these are possible to quantify, they are
very costly. They imply having to be going over to all the
sites and taking soil samples every certain amount of
time so that you can assess the growth of the organic
carbon in a certain site, and in a certain ecosystem.
So these are things that make you say no; I will not
complicate my life. I know that organic carbon will
improve but I will not quantify it because it’s way too
complicated. So instead, one focuses only in [the
quantification of] the growth of trees.
(Source: R. Bedoya, personal communication, March 28, 2016.
My translation.)
In this extract, the subject holds that the FONAFIFO has
worked on ‘purifying’ the calculations necessary to
determine the amount of GHG offset by tree biomass. In
this process of methodological ‘purification’, certain
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variables that typically bring along several –simultaneous–
technical, monetary and practical ‘complications’, are the
excluded from further calculatory consideration.
The subject also suggests that a great deal of the inherent
complications from measuring certain variables in relation
to carbon accounting derives from the need for ‘experts’ to
be physically present at different sites –time and again–
taking samples directly from the sources. As an alternative
to such hassle, the subject readily assumes that ‘expert
knowledge’ can authorize the establishment of ‘limits’ as to
what is –and what is not– to be measured and calculated;
and that way cutting corners in terms of complexity and
costs. This belief consists just one of the two black boxes
sustained in this statement; where the second –and perhaps
more obvious one– is embedded in the assumption that
trees and forests are essentially and necessarily ‘good’ at
offsetting GHG. Hence measuring how much they offset
is enacted more as a matter of fact than of matter of concern
(Latour, 2004).
Before continuing with this discussion any further, I would
like to direct the reader’s attention to a central issue that
can be observed not only in the above extract, but that has
been mentioned several times throughout this chapter.
That is on how the last two versions of the INGEIs have
been based on the methodological and conceptual black
boxes of the IPCC. Particularly on the parameters derived
from IPCC’s 2006 and 1996 guidelines for GHG
inventories and for inventorying GHG precursors
(respectively); as well as on the generic ‘emission factors’
found in the later version. These guidelines, as was briefly
argued earlier, have been effectively black-boxed in a process
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that was made possible in light of how the authority of
IPCC itself has remained largely undisputed as a parliament
of specialists whose a-political ‘experts’ assemble, maintain
and circulate scientific legitimacy over ‘climate change’
issues. Moreover, MacKenzie (2009) holds that on those
occasions in which IPCC’s authority has been challenged,
it has been over the bases of the ‘reality’ of anthropogenic
climate change, and not on matters of ‘details’ over the
IPCC’s calculatory devices which tend to occur in more
limited circles. He argues “[t]he IPCC’s authority in such
detailed matters is thus an essential part of ‘making things
the same’ in carbon markets, by keeping the ‘exchange
rates’ between gases inside the black box and separate
from political and economic disputes” (p. 447. Original
emphasis). Two ideas can be deduced from this assertion:
Firstly, that an essential part of IPCCs task is to keep
rendering its own authority as a subpolitical matter so that
techno-scientific knowledge on which political decisionmaking about climate change issues is almost
unproblematically based on, continues to give the
appearance of being objective and indifferent to sociopolitical biases. And secondly, MacKenzie’s assertion
addresses how the IPCC actively seeks to clear out any
potential space for controversies to emerge from in regards
to its calculatory black boxes. As part of this effort, the
IPCC relies on continuously projecting itself as a network
assembled from strong techno-scientific consensuses,
which ultimately authorizes its devices as scientifically
pertinent. However, Callon (2009) holds that “in its
organization, with the constitution of a world parliament of
specialists (the IPCC) […], like any political assembly,
negotiate the content of their reports among themselves
and vote on scientific facts before making them public and
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passing them on to policy-makers” (p. 545). Hence,
scientific ‘facts’ emerge from performative negotiations
between ‘experts’ who mobilize competing constructions
of scientific ‘realities’ embodied in different calculations
and different numbers; and not simply through the
demonstration of undisputable ‘proof’ of an underlying
reality ‘out there’.
A parallelism may be drawn here with Kjaer and Muritsen’s
(2007) work on following the process of construction and
negotiations of numbers involved in budget-variances
controversies. Much like in the negotiation of competing
scientific reports on ‘climate change’, the authors argue
that there is a limit to the calculability of things and
therefore negotiations are preferred. They concluded in
their study that “[t]he goal of negotiation was to reach a
state where participants were satisfied that it was not too
far from their own calculation even if the result could not
be proven” (p. 13). Thus, calculative or numeric ‘facts’ are
not only the emergent effect of processes of negotiations,
but the result of ‘compromises’ which involve a certain
degree of ‘unprovable’ assumptions.
Once ‘scientific facts’ emerge from those processes of
negotiations among limited circles of ‘experts’ (MacKenzie,
2009), they are not enacted either as frail nor contingent
but instead as monolithic, timeless and unquestionable; or
even better, as ‘natural’. Here, a key condition for the
emergence of ‘reality’ is that negotiations over “which
numbers to feed into the calculating machine” are kept out
reach for the larger public (Asdal, 2008, p. 129).
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Another key condition for the emergence of ‘scientific
facts’ and ‘natural reality’ is the production of trust in the
performativity of numbers; and their role in establishing
the technical possibilities of cleansing GHG emissions
(Asdal, 2011, p. 3). Much like language is not limited to
being a mere reflection of reality (Escobar, 1996; Miller &
Rose, 1990), the production of trust relies on the agency of
numbers themselves as active agents in the bringing
‘natural facts’ and ‘realities’ into existence and not simply
in ‘inscribing’ scientific objects and facts into a supposedly
pre-existing reality. Simultaneously, numbers are active
agents in reducing complexity so that the decision-making
process can be shortened (Kalthoff, 2005). The latter
assertion can be identified in the extraction of the
interview above where the subject literally refers to the
processes in which calculations are purified in order to
reduce ‘unnecessary complications’, not only for final
decision-making agents, but for the community of
specialized ‘experts’ themselves.
According to Rose (1991), in this process of construction,
‘facts’ –such as GHG emissions, the ‘national economy’,
‘the population’, and so forth– are assembled as a visible
‘plane of reality’, marked out by a grid of norms which
render them governable. In his own words “the collection
and aggregation of numbers participates in the fabrication
of a ‘clearing’ within which thought and action can occur.
Numbers delineate ‘fictive spaces’” (Rose, 1991, p. 676.
Original emphasis). In our case after all, “what are
‘emissions’ if not the quantification of pollutants?” asked
Asdal (2011) who also argued that the pollution issue has
been framed through numbers and calculating practices
more than any other area of public administration (p. 2).
136
Hence, in the same process in which ‘facts’ are assembled,
the emergent circulating objects –such as GHG emissions–
are fixed into existence as uniformed, materialized things
that can be measured and compared through computing,
balancing and calculating (Kalthoff, 2005, p. 73).
Briefly: The authority of the IPCC relies on projecting
itself as a network assembled from ‘pure’ techno-scientific
knowledge and robust scientific consensuses which are all
free from any socio-political entanglements. In practice
however, scientific ‘facts’ really emerge from socio-political
negotiations between a limited circle of ‘experts’ who each
try to impose her or his own scientific ‘arguments’ over the
rest. Thus, these ‘experts’ eventually end up compromising
and conceding their ‘arguments’ among each other instead
of ‘simply’ demonstrating an undisputable ‘proof’ of any
given scientific ‘fact’. Once ‘scientific consensus’ is reached
in those processes of negotiations, the resulting ‘scientific
statements’ are depicted to the larger public as a
monolithic, timeless and unquestionable ‘natural reality’
which is nevertheless ‘measurable’ and ‘calculable’ through
mathematical numbers. Hence, another key condition for
the emergence of ‘scientific facts’ is the production of trust
in the ‘objectivity’ of numbers and the ‘unbendable’
character of mathematic calculations. Moreover, numbers
are seen as active agents in reducing complexity so that
decision-making process can be shortened by reducing
‘unnecessary complications’ for decision-making agents,
and for techno-scientific ‘experts’ alike.
Aside from all these issues discussed until now, Alice and
colleagues also argue that the existing legal framework for
reporting GHG in Costa Rica under the ‘Carbon Neutral
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Country Program’ (reviewed later in this chapter) does not
establish any guidelines oriented to determine the
maximum degree of ‘uncertainty’ accepted either for the
GHG inventories presented under that program, nor for
the INGEIs themselves. What is more, the authors argue
that nearly none of the inventories elaborated in the
country to this date have included a ‘calculation memory’
that supports the value of uncertainty they are required to
declare. This leads to a situation in which nearly any
technique for calculating emissions is currently being
admitted in Costa Rica, which in turn directly affects the
quality of the [resulting] data, and the inter-comparability
between inventories (Alice et al., 2014, p. 22).
Finally, Alice et al. (2014) state that ‘extrapolations’ –which
they grade as the least accurate method to calculate GHG
emissions– commonly take place in Costa Rica because of
the prevalent lack of local studies (in terms of specific
geographical areas, local tree species, ecosystems, etc.).
These extrapolations along with the lack of domestic
information ultimately contribute to further levels of
uncertainty in the estimation the nation’s emissions (p. 24).
Moreover, by referring to some examples of locally
produced estimates, these authors show how the use of the
IPCC’s 2006 ‘generic’ reference values to estimate carbon
absorption through the measurement of tree biomass
expansion will tend to either overestimate or underestimate
the actual valuations of carbon absorptions by local
tropical forests (p. 28). All these issues addressed by Alice
and colleagues carry a significance worth taking into
consideration in the extent that, as they argue, decisionmaking within Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral’ initiative
continues to be made over outdated, incomplete,
138
imprecise, and generic data. At the same time, this situation
puts into question the very purpose of the country’s
general ‘carbon neutral’ effort and all of its derivate
embodiments.
Another issue worthwhile highlighting is the way in which
categories are ‘arranged’ in the INGEIs. Particularly the
placement of GHG emissions produced in hydroelectric
power generation under the ‘energy production industry’
category in the ‘energy’ sector, while the emissions
produced in water reservoirs appear under the category
‘flooded lands’ in the ‘Agriculture, forestry and other uses
of land (AFOLU)’ sector. This is particularly relevant to
highlight because not only are the majority –if not the
totality– of all constructed dams and reservoirs in Costa
Rica directly related to the generation of hydropower, but
the INGEI explicitly links reservoirs to no other activity
than the former. Yet, no reason is given to justify the
separation of these two entities into two completely
separate sectors. After all “the practical performance of
enframing entities to be accounted for is everything but
innocent” (Lippert, 2013, p. 451), and this particular
separation is by no means the exception. On the contrary,
I believe it is carefully orchestrated to result in a significant
reduction on the total accounted methane emissions for
the energy sector. By separating them as the INGEI does,
the ‘energy production industry’ sub-sector comes out
‘cleaner’ in terms of accounted GHG emissions, which is
very much in line with the country’s discourse on being
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powered by what is essentially a sustainable power matrix
based on ‘clean energies’30.
But what is at stake? Kalthoff (2005) argues that calculative
devices, such as the INGEIs “are not conceived of as
neutral devices but as theory-loaded instruments of
(scientific or economic) representations” (p. 71). Hence,
neither the technical nor the human entities that assemble
the socio-technical network of carbon calculations perform
their task on a neutral basis, but instead on the basis of
standardized forms of knowledge. The same thing then
goes for the political practice of separating the calculated
entities into categories or classifications. Bowker and Star
recommend that “we should always understand
classification systems according to the work that they are
doing –the network within which they are embedded”
(Bowker & Star, 1996, p. 7. My emphasis). In the case of
Costa Rica’s INGEIs, this work is certainly not limited to
simply calculating the amount of gases being liberated to
the atmosphere for the sake of the gases themselves; but
for assuring the ‘economic development’ and ‘growth’ of
Costa Rica, as was promised so insistently in the reviewed
ENCC. But how exactly could cleaning up Costa Rica’s
‘energy production industry’ benefit its economic growth?
I can think of two reasons:
First, and based on the observations of two of my key
30For
an example of this narrative in a recent press release, see:
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/costa-ricaelectricity-renewable-energy-300-days-2017-record-wind-hydro-solarwater-a8069111.html
140
informants, the original idea behind the carbon neutral
initiative was to attract international firms to ‘move in’ to
Costa Rica which offered them, amongst other things,
“practically the worlds cleanest energy network” (M.
Gonzales, personal communication, April 7, 2016. My
translation). According to these informants, this meant that
international firms placing their operations in Costa Rica
would ‘automatically’ transform them into low-emission
ones.
The following extraction of an interview made to another
of my key informants further illustrates this argument,
while also introducing the second way in which cleaning up
the country’s ‘energy production industry’ may benefit its
economic growth:
Subject: What should be promoted in tourism, and that
Costa Rica has not done so thoroughly is… if you come to
Costa Rica, how many tons of carbon dioxide do you emit?
Versus when you travel to Panama, or I don’t know…
Colombia. These [other] countries have high… emissions
of carbon dioxide in their energy production so to speak.
So, if you come to Costa Rica, and turn on a light bulb in
your room, or put on the air condition, how much carbon
dioxide do you generate?
Subject: In ‘so’ many days your generation of carbon
dioxide will be ‘so’ much; and if you go to ‘this’ other
country, you generate ‘so’ much.
Subject: These are tools that they could be using in
tourism, which I would say they are currently not taking
advantage of. […] this could be a decision-making point
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for travelers.
Interviewer: Sure.
Subject: If I go to Costa Rica I don’t pollute so much,
and I will see all this biodiversity; if I go to Panama, I will
see the same biodiversity but I will pollute ‘this much’
[more].
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: What is my impact in [terms of] ‘carbon
footprint’? The only thing that we have different from the
rest of the world is the generation of clean energy.
Subject: Let’s say Amazon [for example]…
Amazon, come and install your business and your offices
here. If you install them in India or even in Panama, your
tons [of CO2] will be ‘so’ much; but just by coming to
Costa Rica instead, you will have an emission reduction of
‘so’ much per year.
Subject: But they are not exploiting this; this is not
being divulged […] And this is right now like the big
‘boom’ everywhere
Subject: […] What is Costa Rica’s market plan? It’s a
‘green country’.
Ok perfect, but everyone wants to be ‘green’ […] But none
of them can, or at least it’s going to be tough for them to
reach us.
(Source: C. Hernandez Chanto, personal communication, April 13, 2016.
My translation.)
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At the end of this extract, the subject also refers to how
offering a network of ‘clean energies’ may potentially be
mobilized as a device of interessement (Callon, 1986) for
attracting international firms to invest in the country by
‘moving in’ part of their operations into Costa Rica. The
subject argues that the benefit for these foreign firms
would be the ‘certain’ and/or ‘automatic’ reduction of their
corporate emissions; as opposed to moving into countries
‘like’ India or Panama. These latter countries instead are
distorted (Galis & Lee, 2014) by the subject by making their
offerings seem unsound and illogical for any international
firm seeking to boost their competitiveness under the new
‘boom’ of carbon neutral economies.
The second benefit from ‘cleaning up’ (or greenwashing)
Costa Rica’s ‘energy production industry’, introduced by
the subject in the first half of this extract, relates to the
potential benefits the country might obtain from
promoting itself as a ‘carbon neutral destination’ (Gössling,
2009). The overreaching intention of this move is the
development of the nation’s tourism industry by further
enhancing its ‘image’ as being ‘environmentally pristine’
and ‘sustainable’ through the reduction of its GHG
emissions (Gössling, 2009, p. 17). Just like the subject built
her argument on the potential of attracting international
firms to invest in Costa Rica, the subject’s statement
destabilizes ‘other’ countries (this time Panama and
Colombia as examples) by distorting them as places that may
offer the ‘same’ commodity –biodiversity–, but at a higher
‘ecological’ cost –emitted tons of carbon dioxide31.
Although it is not the intention of this discussion, or more generally
of this dissertation, several scholars have pointed their criticisms
31
143
It is important to notice the subject’s insistence on
stressing how Costa Rican authorities have failed to
thoroughly exploit the country’s ‘clean energy’ industry as a
key ‘branding’ agent. A strategy with the potential
opportunity of attracting both foreign investors and
international tourists interested in jumping on the
‘booming’ bandwagon of ‘low-emission’ economies,
products and experiences. An opportunity that according
to the subject, has nevertheless been ignored in spite of
Costa Rica’s head start over its potential competitors on
both tourism and ‘clean energies’.
So far, I have presented two perceived reasons why
‘cleaning up’ Costa Rica’s ‘energy production industry’ may
be mobilized as a strategy to potentially benefit the
country’s economic growth. But how exactly does ‘cleaning
up’ actually happen? I believe that by counting the GHG
emissions produced in all dammed reservoirs linked to
hydroelectric power plants under the category of ‘flooded
lands’ in the AFOLU sector –instead of the ‘energy
production industry’ category in the ‘energy’ sector–, not
only do these emissions suddenly become invisible, but so
do the man-made reservoirs that produce them.
I argue that any reader interested in knowing the total
carbon emissions of Costa Rica hydroelectric power
towards a certain paradox related to the flight lengths that generally
connect origin (demand side) and destination (supply side) countries
involved in global eco-tourism. These criticisms point towards the
inherent incompatibility between the use of fuel-intensive air travel
systems and the ‘ecological sentiments’ of the consumers of ecotourism (See Hunter & Shaw, 2007; and Gössling, 2009)
144
industry (which is said to represent over 70% of the
country’s electricity) will not only not find these emissions
‘directly’ in the different sums, estimations or charts
presented in ‘energy sector’ subchapter; but will likely also
dismiss these emissions all together for they have arguably
been displaced in a way that makes them appear as if they
are being caused by ‘naturally’ occurring phenomena. This,
I argue, is because the Spanish word that originally appears
in all available versions of the INGEIs, humedales –which I
have chosen so far to translate as ‘flooded lands’–, literally
translates to ‘wetlands’. The latter word is defined by the
online Merriam Webster dictionary as: “land or areas (such
as marshes or swamps) that are covered often
intermittently with shallow water or have soil saturated
with moisture” (Wetland, 2018). Hence classifying manmade dammed reservoirs as ‘wetlands’ is in fact highly
inaccurate and considerably misguiding.
It is also worthwhile noting here that all of Costa Rica’s
INGEI reports are written in Spanish language exclusively;
and that my decision to translate humedales as ‘flooded
lands’ instead of ‘wetlands’ was a deliberate choice to avoid
this precise confusion and misguiding32.
It should be noted here that the IPCC includes ‘flooded lands’ in the
‘wetland’ chapter of the 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories. However, in such guidelines the word ‘wetland’ is not
used in substitution or omission of the word ‘flood lands’ as is the case
of Costa Rica’s INGEIs. For more see: https://www.ipccnggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/4_Volume4/V4_07_Ch7_Wetlan
ds.pdf
32
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The process of ‘cleaning up’ Costa Rica’s energy
production industry through making the GHG emissions
produced in man-made dammed reservoirs invisible, shows
how categories and classifications are neither limited to
simply record a reality ‘out there’, nor are themselves
constructed in a political vacuum. This echoes the two key
aspects of what Bowker and Star’s (1996) called the
practical politics of classifying and standardizing: “arriving
at categories and standards, and, in the process, deciding
what will be visible within the system (and of course what
will thus then be invisible)” (p. 4). Moreover, the authors
hold that those visibility issues arise as the leading actor
who performatively constructs the final outcome of a
formal classification decides where to ‘make the cuts in the
system’. Hence the assembling of systems of classifications
(like the INGEIs) involve a series of performative
negotiations where decisions over the enactment of
delineations take place. Namely, deciding what will emerge
as visible; what will submerge into invisibility; and the
overall level of ‘detail’ or ‘depth’ of the newly emerged
visible reality.
Finally, Lippert argues that “the credibility of the concepts
and categories are inextricably linked with trust in the
reliability of measurements” (Lippert, 2013, p. 174. My
emphasis). He adds that these measurement approaches
can only become black-boxed once they have been assumed
to work on the basis of clearly defined and standardized
techno-scientific measures and methods. All of the so far
reviewed invisible work necessary to assemble and maintain
systems of classification precisely relies on being blackboxed, and on being taken-for-granted as a thing of strict
science and technology. Hence, classifications “can best be
understood as doing the ever-local, ever-partial work of
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making it appear that science describes nature (and nature
alone) and that politics is about social power (and social
power alone)” (Bowker & Star, 1996, p. 8).
In summary, there is nothing innocent about accountability
nor about the regimes of making things (in)visible or the
process of construction of categories it requires and loops
back.
Briefly: This discussion addresses how the Costa Rican
‘clean energy’ network can potentially be used as a
‘branding’ asset to attract international firms to invest in
the country, and in the eco-tourism industry. The former
by offering international firms to ‘clean up’ their corporate
emissions by ‘simply’ moving their operations in the
country; while the latter by promoting the country as a
‘carbon neutral destination’. In order for any of these
things to happen, the country has to start by ‘cleaning up’
its energy production sector so that it can become a ‘low
carbon’ destination. Hence the discussion addresses how
exactly this ‘cleaning up’ happens. This process entails
making certain emissions ‘invisible’ by re-arranging,
mistranslating and ‘resemantizing’ them. Thus, the
processes of making ‘scientific’ categories and
classifications as well as ‘natural’ entities calculable are not
performed in a political vacuum.
It may also be relevant to highlight the way that the
information from the 2012 INGEI was synthesized,
mobilized and reconfigured in comparison to the previous
2010 version. Despite a large proportion of text and
information from the earlier version reutilized and directly
reinserted in the later, much of the crucial information
147
regarding employed methodologies, sources and analytical
processes was stripped away from the later version leaving
the reader with what I believe to be ‘information gaps’ and
black-boxes. As an example of this we find, that while the
2010 INGEI explains to a moderate degree of detail some
key considerations that were taken into account when
methane emissions where measured on reservoirs; makes
reference to international scientific debates on the matter;
enlists some reasons to justify why some sources of
emissions where not taken into consideration while other
were; and provides a short description of some relevant
characteristics of Costa Rica’s hydroelectric power industry
network –related to its capacity to produce GHG
emissions– these where all removed from the 2012
INGEI.33
Furthermore, this omission of information makes it
impossible for the reader to understand how some
emissions values reported on one INGEI suddenly change
drastically on the next. For instance, and without moving
away from the example of emissions from reservoirs,
methane emissions were reported to be 5.54 Gg in 2010
(Chacón et al., 2014, p. 36), yet these dropped to 2.19 Gg
in 2012 (Chacón et al., 2015a, p. 36). This sudden drop to
less than half of the original value –which if one considers
how values shift from one inventory to the next is quite
drastic– is not in the least either explained or
acknowledged in the more recent document. Another
example of these value ‘jumps’ can be seen in the way in
which the accounted emissions of the AFOLU sector have
For instance, table 4.9 ‘CO2 emission criteria in reservoirs’ referred
to on page 113 was removed from the 2012 INGEI.
33
148
not only drastically changed from one inventory to the
next, but how the IMN re-calculated the emissions of the
2010 inventory in the following inventory without
providing any insight on the reasons or the methods
behind such recalculations, other than that these were ‘recalculated’ using the IPCC guidelines of 2006 (Chacón et
al., 2015a, p. 51) –which, needless to say, where precisely
the supposed methodological guidelines followed in the
2010 INGEI in the first place34. More specifically, the 2010
INGEI reported that the total of CO2 equivalent emissions
of the AFOLU sector equaled -473.29 Gg (Chacón et al.,
2014, p. 51); yet, the 2012 re-estimated these to a total of
224.7 Gg –which is approximately four times higher than
the former figure. Furthermore, the same INGEI
estimated that the AFOLU sector then produced 1,119.36
Gg of CO2e in 2012, which is almost five times higher than
the value re-calculated for 2010. The following ‘Table C’ is
based on the information provided in both INGEIs
illustrates these particular ‘value jumps’ for the AFOLU
sector:
AFOLU’s total
CO2e emissions
for the year 2010
as
originally
calculated in the
2010 inventory
-473.29 Gg
AFOLU’s
total
CO2e emissions
for the year 2010
as re-calculated
in
the
2012
inventory
224.7 Gg
AFOLU’s total
CO2e emissions
for the year 2012
as calculated in
the
2012
inventory
1,199.36 Gg
Table C: ‘Value jumps’ for the AFOLU sector for different INGEIs
34
See page 13 of the 2010 INGEI.
149
Related to these omissions of information and lack of
methodological transparency, Araya (2015) argues that the
available information on the country’s net GHG emission
“[…] does not reflect Costa Rica’s actual gross CO2e (nor
per-capita) emissions since the [employed] system of
accounting subtracts the total amount of carbon absorbed
by forests from the gross amount. And although this is
methodologically allowed, […] little disclosure exists in the
country regarding the real data of national emissions”
(Araya, 2015, p. 30. My translation; my emphasis). In other
words, total carbon emissions appear with the total
emissions considered to have been offset already reduced
from the sum; hence the ‘real’ total remains hidden.
Moreover, the author argues that despite Costa Rica being
up-to-date in its compromises with the UNFCCC, it is
internally characterized by suffering a ‘chronic’ lack of
information regarding its ‘real emissions’. Regardless of
what the author understands as ‘real data’ and ‘real
emissions’, this critique highlights the existence of a series
of methodological black boxes that may play a role in some
of the information ‘jumps’ found throughout the INGEIs
as mentioned above.
Additionally, Araya holds that the country has done a poor
job in keeping GHG accounting and inventory reports –as
well as their public communication– up to date (a
conclusion also shared by Alice et al., 2014). She reminds
the reader that as of June 2015 –when her referenced
paper was published–, the available information on the
country’s GHG emissions was outdated by 5 years.
Although the IMN published the 6th INGEI inventory
after the mentioned paper was published later that year, the
emissions reported in that last inventory corresponded to
150
those of 2012. Moreover, at the moment of writing this
dissertation, the IMN has not published any INGEI since
the latter, which means the latest available information
regarding the country’s GHG emissions is outdated by
nearly 6 years.
Besides the reviewed National GHG inventories, the IMN
has also been assigned by the government of the Republic
to produce the ‘National Communications to the
UNFCCC (CN)’ and the ‘Biennial Update Reports (BUR)’
as the required instruments to keep all other member
countries of the UNFCCC informed about the nation’s
advance on the subject. These communications represent a
compromise that all member countries of this convention
assumed.
Since I believe those communication informs overlap the
reviewed INGEIs and the ENCC –and its action plan–, I
will not go into detail about the punctual information
provided in these. However, these documents will be used
to help sustain and inform the following analyses and
reviews found on the following sections and chapters of
this study.
B. ‘Carbon Neutrality’ goal updated.
The DCC (2013a) had already stated in the action plan of
the ENCC that in light of the international compromises
that emerged around the time of its publication, a point of
departure must be drawn from the original plans conceived
in the 2009 ENCC, and those that faced its action plan
because, while the ENCC originally focused only on
reaching the ‘2021 goal’, its action plan pursued several
151
other goals for 2020, 2030 and 2050. Hence, a clear
distinction must be made between the ‘pre-2020 voluntary
actions’ and the ‘post-2020 climate policies’ that have a
more ‘binding’ character (DDC, 2013a, p. 10).
More precisely, while the ‘pre-2020’ instruments and
policies reviewed above were being designed, the
UNFCCC requested all signing countries to publish their
own ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs)’ in the lead-up to the Conference of the Parties
or COP21 held in Paris, in December 2015. Once the
conference’s resulted agreement is ratified, the INDCs
pledged during the COP21 will serve as the initial
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that
represent the first GHG targets for both ‘developed and
developing’ countries under the UNFCCC. The Paris
agreement promises a turning point from ongoing
negotiations on global climate change policies in that
developing countries will assume legally binding
compromises on the matter for the first time in history
(Araya, 2015, p. 28).
In this context, the government of Costa Rica now holds
that “the date of 2021 will become the turning point [of]
Costa Rica’s emissions, as a continuation of its voluntary
action and a landmark in the path towards de-carbonizing
the economy” (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía
[MINAE], 2015a, p. 3). Hence the 2021 goal to reach
carbon neutrality has now been resemantized as an ‘early
action’ that essentially focused on compensating the
country’s GHG emissions through the removal or
offsetting of these through its forest sector (p. 2). This
retelling of the story finally admits what some voiced
152
criticisms had suspected already shortly after the 2007
announcement was made: That Costa Rica was attempting
to “plant its way out of the carbon-emissions problem […]
rather than attack[ing] emissions more aggressively at its
industrial and automotive sources” (Rogers, 2010).
MINAE argues that since 2007, mitigation goals have
‘evolved’ leading to a point in which the COP21 agreement
states that international mitigation efforts must together
aspire to maintain a 2°C limit on mean global temperature
or global warming above pre-industrial levels35 (MINAE,
2015a, p. 3). In this new context, MINAE argues, Costa
Rica is now committed to a maximum of 9,374,000 tons of
CO2 eq. net emissions by 2030, with proposed emissions
per capita of 1.73 net tons by 2030, 1.19 net tons per capita
by 2050 and 0 net tons per capita by 2085 (p. 11).
Although, as the following short extract shows, some
believe these goals are absurdly ambitious and over the
top:
Subject: Costa Rica has an annual per capita rate of
2 tons of emission per person; this is one of the world’s
lowest emissions. And according to the last [INGEI]
report it’s even lower, we are below the 2 tons now.
We pretend to get to 2050 with half of that, and to
2100 with zero… Hmmm net emissions, which and
that is a huge challenge.
35
See: “Summary of the Paris Agreement” (n.d.)
153
I don’t know how we will be living in 2100…
probably in super modern domes on tree canopies so
that we can accomplish that [goal]; I still cannot
imagine it.
(Source: M. Gonzales, personal communication, April 7, 2016. My
translation.)
Despite that the exact dates and goals expressed by my
informant do not exactly match those established in
MINAE’s 2015 document here being reviewed, a clear
tone of mockery denotes a rooted skepticism surrounding
the country’s current ‘carbon neutral’ discourse as devised
in the nation’s INDC even among key members of this
actor-network.
Methodologically speaking nevertheless, MINAE sustains
that Costa Rica’s INDC targets are based on two
complementary methodological approaches: a deductive
one, based on future emissions scenarios modeling
(forecasting); and an inductive one, which based on the
emission goal for 2050, which sets out to determine a lineal
reduction of GHG emissions necessary to accomplish it
(backcasting) (MINAE, 2015a, p. 4). Moreover, MINAE
states that Costa Rica’s GHG reduction goals will be
driven by national scientific consensus and validated by the
criteria of the IPCC. And that the country’s reduction
goals may be modified as needed as new ‘scientific
information’ becomes available.
Here MINAE once again reaffirms the authority of the
IPCC as a parliament of specialists capable of providing
trustworthy scientific criteria and guidelines rendered as
subpolitical. Nevertheless, the ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’
154
methodological approaches over which Costa Rica’s INDC
has been based on have in fact been assembled following
both quantitative and qualitative considerations which are,
in practice, inseparable and indistinguishable. Insisting on
viewing these practices as pure calculations in the sense of
being all about number manipulations would fail to
recognize the different qualifications or judgements
necessary for those numbers to be sustained and to make
sense on the one hand, and for new entities to emerge on
the other. Hence, what actually takes place in the
assemblage of Costa Rica’s INDC targets –as well as on its
carbon accounting practices in general– is a process of
qualculation. More generally, “Quantitative methods,
qualitative procedures, professional judgements, or the
tinkering of daily practice – all of these are qualculative”
(Callon & Law, 2003, p. 13). Henceforth, the emergence of
numbers from these processes of qualculations cannot be
seen as mere reflections of an objectively given world ‘out
there’; instead “numbers represent the relations and
materials which have been arranged to fit together and
perform a result” (Lippert, 2013, p. 106). Hence, when we
find numbers and ‘results’ that make sense to us Lippert
argues, it is because they relate to some forms of qualifiers
which we often take for granted in that particular context.
Furthermore, both the ‘deductive’ and the ‘inductive’
methodological approaches mobilized by MINAE to
assemble Costa Rica’s INDC involve a great deal of guesswork. They both perform realities, betray and disrupt actants
and can only be imagined, not controlled. “Any knowledge
of carbon emissions is an effect of the particular
distinctions enacted within the apparatus” (Lippert, 2013,
p. 451). Thus, regardless of the chosen method, Costa
155
Rica’s carbon qualculations must irremediably be
understood as intrinsically political processes from which
inherently political material entities emerge.
Costa Rica’s INDC report reveals two further issues
related to the particular discourses and strategies being
mobilized within the country’s current climate change
policy worthwhile accentuating. First, MINAE states that
the different sectors in the country “[…] all agree that
climate change, more than just an environmental problem,
is a development matter which requires effective climate
actions through activities in the transportation, energy,
forestry, agricultural, livestock and waste management
sectors” (MINAE, 2015a, p. 8). With that statement,
MINAE explicitly manifests its understanding of
mitigation and adaptation to climate change as not ‘just’
issues that exclusively affect ecosystems, animals, trees, or
even carbon; but instead that these consist of greater
problems that affect the country’s ability to economically
grow or ‘develop’. Or as Asdal (2008) argues the notion of
‘cost-efficiency’, which is pivotal in economics has been so
effectively black-boxed in the governance of nature that it
has become widely accepted that “[n]ot using nature’s
capacity to use resources efficiently equals waste of
resources” (p. 129). Hence, the nation’s discourse of
‘climate change’ is rooted in questions of ‘economy’ and
not (just) ‘nature’.
Second, it is stated three times in the country’s INDC
report36 that “Costa Rica reserves its sovereign right to use
Find the three non-literal reproductions of the same statement in
pages 5, 6 and 8.
36
156
international compensation units to accomplish its goals
within the National Contribution or, as well, within its
Domestic Compensation Market. Any compensation units
traded abroad will be registered in the National Emissions
Inventory to avoid double accounting.” (MINAE, 2015a,
p. 5). This means that Costa Rica is emphatically insisting
that, in spite of carbon offset credits being sold to national
or international –private– clients, those sold offsets are still
going to be included as part of the country’s own carbon
reductions in its national GHG inventory. By doing so, the
Domestic Carbon Market will act as an instrument to
accomplish the nation’s mitigation goals regardless of who
actually pays for those offsets, and where.
In a review of Costa Rica’s international agenda on climate
change, Monica Araya (2015) voiced several important and
closely related criticisms on the country’s performance in
the process of designing its INDC and its GHG
inventories. Among these, the author holds that despite of
the agreement to submit the INDCs to the IPCC by
September 30th, 2015, Costa Rica still did not have either a
draft of its INDC nor a ‘road map’ of how to elaborate it
by June that same year. Hence, Araya argues that “the
tendency appears to be that the government will approach
donor agencies to finance technical workshops (which should
not be confused with public consultation) which does not
guarantee any feedback processes from business,
productive or academic sectors nor from the general
public” (Araya, 2015, p. 31. My translation and emphasis).
In sum, just months before the above mentioned deadline,
Araya argued that Costa Rica’s INDC was likely to be
designed, drafted and reviewed in a rush. And that by
doing so, the participatory mechanisms that the Paris
157
agreement favored where essentially cut out in the process;
instead, the document was negotiated among a closed
circle of ‘experts’, ‘delegates’ and their superiors (p. 32)
behind ‘close doors’. Contrary to this criticism however,
MINAE stated that a number of sector-wide dialogues
were organized during 2015 by Costa Rica’s government to
bring together key stakeholders in pursuit of defining
sectorial plans and programs needed to accomplish the
country’s GHG reduction goals, within the INDCs context
(MINAE, 2015a, p. 8).
3. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
(NAMAs)
In 2011, Costa Rica submitted the world’s first –of the still
few– ‘Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA)’
in the agriculture sector, which targeted its coffee
production network. A ‘NAMA’ is a set of policies and
actions that the signing countries of the COP13 in Bali
(December, 2007) undertook as part of a commitment to
reduce GHG emissions. NAMAs are framed under the
recognition that different countries may take different
nationally appropriate actions in accordance with their own
differentiated capabilities, but nevertheless within a
common global responsibility. This notion –which had
been formalized by the UNFCCC as early as 1992 during
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro– became known as the
principle of ‘Common but differentiated responsibility’.
The underlying aim of the Bali Conference was to increase
‘mitigation activities’ in developing (non-Annex I)
countries through the implementation of NAMAs. Hence,
158
it was agreed that “NAMAs in developing countries should
have an impact that can be measured, reported and verified
(MRV), to ensure that the implemented measures make a
genuine and effective contribution to the global climate
response and that industrialized nations support the
developing countries’ mitigation efforts” (NAMA Café de
Costa Rica, n.d). In order for an activity to be
acknowledged as a NAMA, it must be capable of
demonstrating its contribution to reduce GHG emissions
‘relative to business-as-usual emissions in 2020’ while being
in line with the host country’s development priorities.
Here, the notion of ‘Common but differentiated
responsibility’ which justified the emergence of NAMAs is
an example of how specific political rationalities found in
global environmental governance are mobilized to render
reality ‘thinkable’ in very specific ways, through translation
processes mediated by technologies of government capable of
shaping thought, action and behavior regardless of any
‘economic’, ‘political’ or ‘environmental’ barriers. To this
McCarthy
and
Prudham
(2004)
add
that
‘environmentalists’ have often invoked scarcity, or in this
case mitigation of climate change, without regard to equity.
The resulting ‘universalist pretensions’ of these
constructions they argue “are problematic if they fail to
address the fact that exposure to even pervasive scarcities
and environmental risks in fact varies widely across social
strata, while responses are mobilized in ways that
reproduce spatially uneven social geographies” (McCarthy
& Prudham, 2004, p. 279). Hence, policies such as NAMAs
insinuate specific ways of agency tied to a globally
widespread –and black-boxed– ‘common sense’ that, at least
in terms of climate change, knows no distinction between
what is often referred to as the ‘developed’ and the
159
‘developing’ economies. These technologies of government are
therefore only effective “to the extent that they tie various
actors together and furnish them with common goals,
forms of calculation, representation and so on” (Murdoch
and Ward, 1997, p. 311).
Costa Rica’s ‘Low Carbon Coffee NAMA’, which entered
its implementation phase in 2015, is a sector-specific
approach that aims “for a climate-friendly transformation
of the entire value chain of one of the most important
economic sectors in the country […] which is the source of
nine percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions”
(Nama Facility (n.d.)). This project –which was
implemented in conjunction with public, private and
international partners37– intends to support the capacity of
coffee farmers and millers to develop more ‘efficient’
production practices. Concretely, this means that the
project is meant to guarantee coffee producers with the
provision of technical and policy advice through grants,
loans and guarantees to support them in acquiring more
GHG-efficient fertilizer and milling technologies (Araya,
2015, p. 13). Moreover, the project promotes the adoption
of techniques for reducing methane emissions from
residual waters and coffee-pulp waste (Chacón, Jiménez,
Rojas & Ramírez, 2015b, p. 89). An important goal of
Costa Rica’s Coffee NAMA is the creation the world’s first
certified ‘low emission coffee’ that would open new
These include the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the NAMA
Facility, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), and
Coopedota R.L.
37
160
markets for the country and its coffee producers (p. 88).
This could be seen as a vivid illustration of how Costa Rica
is interested in joining what Anders Blok calls the ’green’
inflection of the new spirit of capitalism. An inflection
which performatively reshuffles the demand and supply
side of a renovated green market filled with goods and
experiences assembled as “green attractors”. These
emergent ‘green’ commodities actively usurp the surplus of
authenticity of ‘nature’ by casting it in the attractive
grammar of projective green worth (Blok, 2013, p. 503).
According to Costa Rica’s 2015 ‘Biennial Update Report
(BUR)’, this NAMA’s ‘quantitative goal’ is to reduce the
aggregate emission potential to 1.850.000 tons of CO2e by
2024 (Chacón et al., 2015b). This would mean that the
total emissions of the entire agriculture sector would be
reduced by up to 15% solely by the implementation of
GHG mitigation technologies in the production and
processing of coffee (“NAMAs in Costa Rican coffee,”
2016).
Additionally, Araya argues that this project was presented
as a ‘NAMA Laboratory’ from which other Latin
American coffee producers could learn from (Araya, 2015,
p. 13). Likewise, its promoters hold that once it has been
‘successfully implemented’, “the initiative also seeks to lay
the foundations for extending NAMAs to other agriculture
systems” (“Costa Rican Coffee NAMA,” n.d.). Therefore,
the government of the republic through its Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) in conjunction with the
DCC and the United Nations Development Program
(PNUD) followed the former project with the proposal of
an ‘Eco-competitive livestock NAMA’ in 2013. Much in
161
the same line with the coffee NAMA, the Livestock
NAMA intends to guide this specific productive sector
towards more ‘eco-competitive’ and ‘efficient’ productive
systems through reducing GHG emissions and
transforming production practices of the beef, milk and
double purpose subsectors of livestock (Chacón et al.,
2015b, p. 89).
This NAMA is visualized to include several stages of
implementation. The first one –the pilot phase– has been
drawn in line with the carbon neutrality goal for Costa Rica
and seeks to cover 10% of all cattle farms in the country by
2021; while the second stage targets to enroll 80% of all
farms by 2028 (Chacón et al., 2015b, p. 89), and to
promote the adoption of Measuring Reporting Verification
(MRV) systems (“Eco-competitive Livestock,” 2015) The
projects targets to improve fertilization plans; to promote
rotational grazing (rotation of livestock between pastures)
and live fences; to improve pastures (by introducing
improved pasture species capable of capturing more
carbon emissions, while providing a food source to
livestock that produces less energetic fermentation); and to
introduce silvopastoral systems (such as planting of trees
within the pasture areas to provide shadow for the herds
while at the same time capturing carbon emissions)
(Chacón et al., 2015b, p. 91). According to the 2015 BUR,
this NAMA’s ‘quantitative goal’ is to reduce 833.966 tons
of CO2e by 2021; and 12.923.718 tons of CO2e by the time
this NAMA has been completely implemented in 2028 (p.
90), although the estimates of the UNFCCC are much
more modest placing the grand total of expected emission
reductions to 6.000.000 tons of CO2e (United Nations
162
Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC],
2015).
Aside from these two NAMAs, MINAE mentions three
other projects at an ‘implementation’ stage, that will
possibly be submitted as three additional NAMA projects
all related to a single overreaching ‘low emission
development strategy’ for the urban sector (MINAE,
2015a, p. 15). These are: a ‘Low Carbon Urban and
Housing NAMA’; an ‘Ordinary Solid Waste NAMA’; and a
‘Public Transport NAMA’ (NAMA Database, 2012).
However, by March 2018, none of these three have been
submitted to the UNFCCC registry, and all three present
varying degrees of development in terms of content and
definition.38
According to Araya (2015), with the two submitted
NAMAs, Costa Rica has shown to have successfully
transitioned from Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)
to NAMAs; however that a second transition from
NAMAs to INDCs has not been as effective due to an
‘impasse’ reached in the country’s urban transport sector
(Araya, 2015, p. 28). As will be discussed below, these
transitions coincide with the instrumental changes between
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (CDM), to the COP13 Bali in
2007 (NAMA) and finally to the COP21 Paris in 2015
(INDC).
For more information on the current state of these three NAMAs
see: http://www.nama-database.org/index.php/Costa_Rica
38
163
Punctual Observations 3.
As will be further discussed later, the Costa Rican
government has carefully and emphatically insisted in
seeing to that all the carbon offset credits ‘produced’
within the country are to be ‘reserved’ for their inclusion in
its own GHG accountings (including INDCs and
INGEIs), regardless of whether these credits are sold to
nationally or internationally located buyers. This effort
denotes Costa Rica’s clear determination to use all means
necessary to accomplish the several ‘carbon reduction’
goals it has assumed; and its understanding of ‘carbon’
(and the ‘nature’ involved in its offsetting process) as a
thing that can be reduced to a tradable commodity that can
ultimately be ‘owned’.
Furthermore, this stand may also hint a certain confidence
from the Costa Rican government in rendering the
interests of its ‘carbon-offset’ clients as strictly corporate
and private. With that I mean that clients are seen as
private entities primarily interested in ‘greening up’ their
businesses by compensating their corporate GHG
emissions through the purchase of UNCs (Before UCCs);
and not as particular –national or international– entities
interested in such corporate compensations on the one
hand, and on the reduction of their origin country’s GHG
emission accounting on the other hand. If the latter was
not the case, then perhaps international offset buyers
would instead favor either domestic options to compensate
their GHG, or mechanisms that would ensure that
whatever carbon offsets they purchase would be added to
the GHG accountings of the buyer’s own origin country.
164
Considering this, Costa Rica then seems to be pursuing its
different carbon-reduction goals through at least two
mechanisms that act inversely, but both on its own favor.
On the one hand, it reserves itself the right to ‘include’ all
carbon-offsets sold to international clients in its own
national GHG accounting; and on the other hand, –as will
later be discussed in Chapter 3– it discourages national
clients from buying carbon-offsets in foreign markets so
that ‘offset-leaks’ are avoided. Likewise, it is possible to
conclude that despite the ‘free-market’ discourse that
surrounds both of these mechanisms, Costa Rica’s carbonmarket clients are understood as neither ‘full owners’ of
their offsets; nor entirely ‘free’ to buy such offsets
wherever or to whomever they want.
Aside from the former discussion, I consider worthwhile
highlighting an issue related to the country’s current
‘carbon neutral’ discourses and policies coined in the
second decade of the century, which respond to current
shifts in global climate change discourses that conceptually
fundament these international networks. Particularly, I
would like to briefly concentrate on the ‘shifts’ between
global ‘climate change’ policies (such as INDCs, NAMAs,
CDMs); and the interrelations between the various
mechanisms, policies and programs (such as MRVs,
NAMAs, REDD+39, etc.) that result from –and
simultaneously constitute– the former.
REDD+ or ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation’ is a voluntary climate change mitigation approach that
has been developed by Costa Rica, and other parties to the UNFCCC
for the acknowledgment of the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests in the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries.
39
165
On her assessment on Costa Rica’s international climate
change agenda, Araya (2015) spoke of such a shift that was
still taking place in Costa Rica since 2010 between the
design of Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) to the
design of NAMAs; while the author also referred to a
second shift taking place at the moment of the article’s
publication between NAMAs to INDCs (Araya, 2015, p.
28). In order to engage in this discussion, I will refer to a
discussion paper on the transitions and links between
INDCs, NAMAs, REDD+, and other policies and
programs published by Boos, Broecker, Dorr, and Sharma
(2015) through the German Corporation for International
Cooperation GmbH (GIZ) with UNEP DTU Partnership.
Boos and colleagues argue that prior to the Bali Action
Plan (BAP) that resulted from the COP13, “developing
countries were only encouraged to submit measures to
mitigate GHG emissions in order to receive support from
the convention’s financial mechanism” (Boos et al., 2015,
p. 3). Perhaps the most important of such mechanisms was
the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) in which
developing countries voluntarily sold GHG offsets to first
world buyers, and that way simultaneously fulfilling their
own mitigation targets. However, according to a key
informant enrolled in the IMN “[CDMs] where made to
‘clean up’ countries; not to [economically] compensate
those that were doing things right already” (A. Chacón,
personal communication, February 27, 2017). Hence, it is a
commonly shared belief that countries –such as Costa
Rica– that had already engaged in ‘early efforts’ of
conservation before the emergence of CDMs, were not
able to fully benefit from these mechanisms, as could other
developing countries that had until then relied on
166
environmentally ‘unhealthy’ practices and development
models.
The Kyoto Protocol (and its derived CDM) henceforth did
not ‘obligate’ developing countries to mitigate their
emissions prior to BAP; but this would change with the
agreements resulted from the COP13 and the subsequent
conventions (particularly the COP17 in Durban). Boos and
colleagues (2015) argue that unlike the Kyoto Protocol
which required ‘Annex I’ (or developed) countries to take
on economy-wide emission reduction targets with
reference to a base year (p. 3); the Ad hoc Durban
Platform that resulted from the COP17 determined that
mitigation actions are now expected from all countries
regardless of their development status. Likewise, it could
be argued that CDMs where gradually replaced by NAMAs
which emerged from the BAP in 2007.
However, these same authors argue that NAMAs where
not completely defined in the BAP, but instead that in the
pre-2020 context, NAMAs ‘evolved’ from national
mitigation ‘pledges’ towards nationally and voluntarily
determined policies, programs and actions. This ‘evolution’
responds to the fact that NAMAs were originally
conceived as instruments with a broad definition that is to
be defined more by experience and practice rather than by
rules and definitions set up by the UNFCCC (Boos et al.,
20015, p. 5).
The following ‘Table D’ –based on ‘Table 1: Development of
mitigation action per group of UNFCCC member state over time’
(Boos et al. 2015, p. 4)– outlines the different ‘mitigation
commitments’ of Annex I, and non-Annex I countries
over time, and throughout the different UN Conferences
167
and summits, as well as several different historically
relevant agreements on climate change.
Timeline
UN
Conferences,
summits and
protocols
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
1992-1997
19972010
COP 13
(Bali)
2010-2020
Post 2020
Rio
COP17
COP21
Conference
(Durban)
(Paris)
Kyoto
Protocol
Limit GHG Economy wide GHG INDC/
Emissions.
reduction targets
NDC
Take voluntary
NAMAs
INDC/
measures to mitigate
/REDD+
NDC
emissions through
CDMs.
Table D: Different ‘mitigation commitments’ of Annex I, and nonAnnex I countries over time.
According to the authors, a more recent shift took place
after the Durban convention, and especially after the
COP21 in Paris, this time from NAMAs to INDCs to be
implemented post-2020. INDCs consist of comprehensive
devices that include and align together the different
mitigation actions, plans and strategies to reach the
medium- to long-term country-specific pledges that each
of the signing nations of the UNFCCC will submit as their
traceable commitments to “achieving a collective and
progressive ambition level sufficient to limit global
warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels”
(Boos et al., 2015, p. 8). Hence, according to Boos and
colleagues INDCs form an ‘umbrella’ for NAMAs –and
other efforts such as REDD+, LEDs40 and market
LEDs or ‘Low-Emission Development Strategies’. According to
Boos and colleagues these can be defined as “forward- looking
40
168
mechanisms– when they are used as policy instruments
and implementation tools to achieve the mitigation targets
that each country will take to address climate change
domestically (p. 11). Put differently, “INDCs provide the
opportunity to follow a more integrated approach by
aligning past commitments and actions through LEDS,
NAMAs and REDD+ activities” (p. 12). Hence, unlike the
aforementioned shift from CDMs to NAMAs, INDCs do
not replace NAMAs, REDD+, LEDs, etc. Instead, the
shift consists more of a way in which the later sets off
efforts that are no longer conceived as separated sectorial
sets of programs and activities with a potential for GHG
mitigation; but are aggregated together and leveraged
towards each country’s post-2020 mitigation targets (p. 13).
Although it is not the purpose of this dissertation to either
try to ‘unmask’ who is ‘behind’ the design, promotion and
enforcement of the different global policies and programs
on climate change reviewed in this study; nor to ‘unveil’
the reasons why these policies and programs shift from
one to the next; what this section has so far revealed is that
the transitions between global climate change policies and
mechanisms have certainly had a role in shaping Costa
Rica’s national and international discourses and policies in
the matter. In fact, Costa Rica has actively participated in
the design of some of these global initiatives (such as
REDD+, as will be discussed later in Chapter 3).
Moreover, according to Araya (2015), the country has
never opposed to the ‘universalization’ of responsibilities
national development plans that encompass low- emission and/or
climate-resilient economic growth” (Boos et al., 2015, p. 8)
169
and compromises for all nations to assume concrete
mitigation efforts in order to reach the post-2020 set
targets to reduce global GHG emissions (Araya, 2015,
p.28). In short, Costa Rica has not only historically been
‘onboard’ with the different global policies on climate
change and their shifting; but has been an active party in
the design, promotion and advocacy of these. As this
dissertation has shown so far, and will perhaps more
obviously continue to show in the following two chapters
of this thesis, Costa Rica has proven to be an advocate of
the implementation of market-based mechanism to face
challenges imposed by climate change, and to reach its selfappointed goal of achieve carbon neutrality by 2021.
Whereas this first chapter has focused on reviewing a
series of state programs and accountability devices directed
to ‘politically’ put Costa Rica’s ‘house in order’ as a step
towards reaching ‘carbon neutrality’ by 2021; the following
chapter will instead review a series of market tools and
devices directed to ‘economically’ activate and sustain the
country’s ‘carbon neutrality’ actor-network. Unlike the
policies and programs reviewed in this chapter, which had
a more heterogeneous mix of ‘target groups’ –like
economic sectors, state and quasi-state institutions, policy
makers, and general citizenship among others–; this second
set of tools and devices is exclusively aimed at the
country’s private sector. Particularly at a segment of this
sector that may potentially show an interest in joining the
‘carbon neutral’ bandwagon which this assemblage of
policies and devices has set out to consolidate. On this
matter, several scholars have pointed out that ‘market’
mechanisms, like the ones I seek to review on the
following second chapter, reflect a spur of new ‘green’
170
markets where the demand, the supply, and the
management sides of these markets are together nurturing
what Blok (2013) calls a renewed spirit of capitalism (Blok,
2013). Additionally, Erik Swyngedouw (2005) argues that
in today’s market economy, the ‘political’ does not operate
independently from the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ spheres.
This is especially true for governance over economic
processes and modes of environmental use, where any
operation of the political sphere is, de facto, a politicaleconomic intervention. He argues that “political-economic
intervention as governance inevitably impinges on
decisions over economic processes and modes of
environmental use and transformation [where] key
decisions over resource allocation, use and transformation,
are taken by private actors who operate within the
constraining or enabling regulatory framework of systems
of government” (p. 2002). Hence, under the ‘market
economy’, the taken-for-granted divisions between the
‘political’, the ‘social’, the ‘economic’ and the
‘environmental’ on the one hand; and the divisions
between ‘state’ and ‘private’ on the other –all to which I
allude to above– are in fact imagined; and in practice
necessarily permeable, contingent and negotiated. Again, these
and many other related issues will be developed as
followed in the next chapter.
171
–Chapter 2–
Recognizing ‘Carbon Neutrality’
Introduction
In January 2010, Costa Rica delivered a ‘verbal note’ to the
UNFCCC requesting the formal inscription of the ‘CNeutral’ certification program into its NAMA initiatives
(Araya, 2015, p. 11). Later in 2012, Costa Rica made the
‘Carbon Neutral Country Program’ (hereinafter
‘Country Program’) official, which establishes the legal
procedures for private organizations to elaborate GHG
inventories, while it also legally fundaments the application
of the National Normative for Demonstrating Carbon
Neutrality. In other words, the Country Program
establishes the parameters by which private organizations
may be granted the ‘C-Neutral’ Certification after
submitting to an emissions assessment based on the agreed
standards stipulated in INTE B5:2016, and after
undergoing a process of reduction and compensation of
their GHG emissions.
The latter process implies the any given organization
applying for the ‘C-Neutral’ Certification may purchase the
necessary ‘carbon credits’ needed to ‘offset’ the residual
emissions they were not able to reduce for the established
timeframe of the certification process. Therefore, this
second chapter will first review Costa Rica’s
‘preoperative’ carbon market which has been supplying
‘carbon credits’ to the organizations enrolled in the ‘CNeutral’ program
ever since this certification was
172
launched; and secondly, I will be review a ‘projected’
domestic carbon market prototype that is expected to
replace the former market in the nearby future.
The review of these two embodiments of Costa Rica’s
domestic carbon markets will show how they have both
have developed into ‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ exemplars
of neoliberal markets because they deliberately and
fundamentally
intertwine
command-and-control
mechanisms with market-oriented incentives. However, I
argue that in light of practical inexistence of a ‘pure’ or
‘perfect’ neoliberal market, this heterogeneity should not
be seen as a ‘market flaw’ or a fundamental weakness.
Instead, I show how this ‘hybridity’ has in fact provided
Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’ market with the ability to
operate through an apparently impenetrable dissidence,
and to constantly adapt and transform itself however it
may be fit. What is more, I argue that the experience
accumulated on the ground with the country’s
‘preoperative’ carbon market, has prompted Costa Rica’s
‘green technocracy’ to design its ‘future’ carbon market
with a fundamental hybridity which is intended to be tested
‘on the ground’ rather than followed ‘by the book’. The
discussions derived in these reviews will show how rather
than ‘naturally’ emergent things, the country’s carbonoffset markets must deliberately, pragmatically and
continuously be enacted into being. Both of these resulting
markets offer ‘laboratory-like’ spaces to test the
organization and functioning of actual carbon markets
which are still largely rendered as highly experimental
things.
173
In this chapter I will show how in spite of the country’s
‘carbon-neutral actor network’ being apparently assembled
over a fundamental principle of ‘free market’ that would, in
principle, stand in a sharp contrast to anything that would
resemble any sort of ‘monopoly’; the Costa Rican
government single-handedly controls both the demand and
supply sides of the market, as well as the legal framework
that regulates its functioning. In light of this, I show how
the Costa Rican ‘carbon neutral actor-network’ actively
restricts the sales of ‘foreign’ carbon credits –for the ‘CNeutral’ certification program– as a means to ensure the
liquidity of the country’s own domestic carbon markets,
while also ensuring the survival of the forestry sector that
supplies these markets with nationally ‘produced’ carbon
offsets.
Following the works of several academics, all following
Foucault’s ideas about governmentality (Miller & Rose, 1990;
McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002;
Fletcher, 2010b; Springer 2012), I explore the several
coexisting –and often competing– ways in which
environmental governance is being enacted in Costa Rica.
These different socio-technical enactments –or
governmentalities– differ from one another in the way they
each reproduce a particular ‘will to govern’ as well as in the
means they each use to accomplish their particular
objectives and in the specific human and non-human
entities they each target. For instance, I show that while
the ‘C-Neutral’ program intends to seduce private
businesses into adopting ‘greener’ practices by offering
them promises of increased economic revenues, Costa
Rica’s ‘national park’ system enforces environmental
conservation through top-down ‘policing’ and command-
174
and-control regulations. Correspondingly, I follow the
ongoing process in which concerns about the protection of
biodiversity –historically portrayed in the ‘national park’
system– have been gradually downplayed in favor of
concerns about ‘climate change’ –currently being enacted
as Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’–. This move
coincides with the country’s shift from a ‘protectionist’
state-centered conservation model to a more marketoriented ‘neoliberal’ one in which the responsibility of
environmental conservation –understood now as
mitigating ‘climate change’ and reaching ‘carbon
neutrality’– are gradually being transferred from the state to
the private sector. Moreover, I argue that the latter process
of socio-political reorganization can be understood as a
gradual progression towards the decentralization and
externalization of state functions. A process that is
congruent with a broader turn towards an environmental
governance imbedded in a neoliberalism which ultimately
intendeds to extend action at a distance (Latour, 1987) by
translating ‘private self-interests’ into a certain domain of
reality aligned with the state’s political rationalities (Miller &
Rose, 1990).
Hence, whereas the first chapter of this dissertation
focused on reviewing a series of state programs and
accountability devices directed to ‘politically’ put Costa
Rica’s ‘house in order’ as a step towards reaching ‘carbon
neutrality’ by 2021; this second chapter will instead review
a series of market tools and devices directed to activate the
country’s ‘private sector’ and that way to ‘economically’
sustain the country’s ‘carbon neutrality actor-network’. Put
differently, while the policies and programs reviewed in the
first chapter had a more heterogeneous mix of ‘target
175
groups’ –i.e. productive sectors, state and quasi-state
institutions, and general citizenship among others–; the
policy devices reviewed in this second chapter exclusively
aim at a particular segment of the country’s private sector
that has –or is expected to have– an interest in joining the
‘carbon neutral’ bandwagon.
Besides these discussions, and once again drawing on ANT
and STS literature, this second chapter will engage in a
series of more ontological discussions pertaining some key
aspects surrounding the country’s ‘carbon neutral’ strategy
in general and its carbon markets in particular. For
instance, in these discussions I will show how in spite of
the idea that carbon markets essentially embody the
privatization of carbon emissions; what is sold in these
spaces of exchange is not ‘carbon’ but –on the contrary–
its absence. Furthermore, I will show how ‘nature’ is reduced
to ‘carbon offsets’ (which in turn are framed as the
circulating currency of carbon markets) through
performative socio-technical calculations embedded in
neoliberalism.
1. ‘Carbon Neutral Country Program’ (Agreement 36012-MINAET)
The Country Program is a governmental legal agreement
that establishes the voluntary procedures by which a
productive process may become ‘carbon neutral’
(Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía [MINAE], 2013, p. 28).
The program did not only make the ‘National Norm for
Carbon Neutrality’ official, but also laid the legal
foundations for its application.
176
This agreement establishes the legal procedures for both
the granting of the ‘C-Neutral’ brand (discussed later from
page 184), and for reporting particular carbon footprints
from private organizations. Furthermore, the program
officially creates the ‘Costa Rican Compensation Unit
(UCCs)’ –re-conceptualized as National Compensation
Units (UNCs) in 2016– as a new tradable carbon offset
unit or a credit alternative to other existing compensation
options such as the ‘Certified Emission Reduction (CER)’
and the ‘Voluntary Emission Reduction (VER)’ credits. In
spite of the document stating that CERs, VERs and UCCs
(or UNCs) are all acceptable ‘compensation options’, the
document states that “[any given] organization that has
realized actions for the reduction of its greenhouse gases,
can compensate the emissions that they have not been able
to reduce [by] acquiring UCC[s].” (Ministerio de Ambiente,
Energía y Telecomunicaciones [MINAET], 2012, Article 5.
My emphasis and translation). Hence, by not explicitly
mentioning either of the other two options in the
description of the mechanisms for compensating corporate
GHG emissions, the program implicitly favors the
exclusive commercialization of UNCs (before UCCs). As
will be seen throughout this study, this is not an isolated
statement found in the Country Program alone, but is one
repeated in other crucial documents that fundament Costa
Rica’s carbon neutrality efforts –such as the ENCC’s
action plan, which was reviewed in Chapter 1– and echoed
in statements of several of the interviewed experts of this
actor-network.
The Country Program establishes two voluntary report
levels available for participant organizations:
177
1) GHG emission inventory report
2) Carbon Neutrality declaration.
‘Level 2’ requires the interested organization to first
elaborate a GHG emission inventory report –also referred
to as ‘carbon footprint’– whereas ‘level 1’ can be pursued
without necessarily opting for the former.
GHG emission inventory reports must comply with the
following standards –organized by priority level as
stipulated in Article 2 of the Country Program:
-Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHGP): Corporate
Accounting and Reporting Standard from the World
Resource Institute (WRI).
-ISO 14064-1:2006: Greenhouse gases -- Part 1:
Specification with guidance at the organization level
for quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions and removals.
Additionally, INTECO instructs that all GHG emission
inventory reports must be made with a focus on the
organization’s operational control.
Article 2 establishes that the period of validity of a carbon
footprint declaratory is ‘one calendar year’; and that the
specific gases to be reported are:
-Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
-Methane (CH4)
-Nitrous Oxide (N2O)
-Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
-Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
-Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)
178
The document states that only credited verification
organisms are authorized to verify GHG emission
inventory reports; and that it is the task of the Costa Rican
Accreditation Entity (ECA) to credit these verification
organisms. As of October 2018, the only two credited
‘verification organisms’ authorized to verify GHG
emission inventories are the INTECO and the Carbon
Neutral Unit of the EARTH University.
As mentioned earlier, the document establishes the legal
procedures for organizations to participate in the Country
Program at ‘Level 2’ by effectively declaring themselves
‘carbon neutral’ entities, and by doing so allowing them to
apply for the ‘C-Neutral’ brand. In order to obtain this
brand, applicant organizations must:
-Elaborate a GHG emission inventory report
-Obtain the verification of this GHG emission
inventory report
-Obtain a declaration of ‘carbon neutrality’ under the
National Normative for Demonstrating Carbon
Neutrality INTE-12-01-06:2011 (later updated to
INTE B5:2016)
-Compensate its residual GHG emissions
-Register
its
emissions,
reductions
and
compensations.
The organizations that comply with these requirements
may aspire to obtain the ‘C-Neutral’ brand once one of the
two existing credited verification organisms verifies that
they possess a management plan in line with the INTE
B5:2016 norm, and once a maintenance audit is realized by
those verification organisms once a year.
179
Punctual Observations 1.
In spite of the Country Program being apparently
assembled over a fundamental principle of ‘free market’
that would, in principle, stand in a sharp contrast to
anything that would resemble any sort of ‘monopoly’
(which limits the buyer’s freedom to freely consume), one
of my key informants argued that the Costa Rican
government not only controls the market’s entire legal
framework –through the Country Program–, but also both
the demand and the supply side of the market. The
following extract of another interview made to a highranking representative of one of the two ‘verification
organisms’ authorized in the ‘C-Neutral’ certification
program shows this contrasting argument:
Subject: I would say that the country has to develop a
structure of incentives; It [also] has to thoroughly
analyze how FONAFIFO is handling the carbon
market.
I would say that to me, that is not a market; that is a
monopoly in disguise.
And that [the Costa Rican state] has not given the
opportunity for others to get in.
Interviewer: Excuse me, are you referring to the
National Carbon Units? If yes, how so?
Subject: Yes, because the Ministry of Environment,
the Climate Change Directorate and FONAFIFO
they… they are the same thing. Hmmm so there is
[…] a terrible management of impartiality, right?
180
When instead that could be pushed forward with
private alternatives.
(E. Castro, personal communication, February 10, 2017. My
translation.)
Aside from the subject’s explicit argument that Costa
Rica’s Carbon market is really a state-controlled monopoly,
this informant introduces two further, and interrelated,
concerns. The first pertains to what he believes is a serious
degree of bias surrounding the demand (DCC), supply
(FONAFIFO) and regulation (MINAE) of the market
which are all under the control of the Costa Rican state.
The second concern regards a perceived refusal of the state
to allow non-state actors to participate in either side of the
market. Here, the subject shows his explicit disbelief in
what he depicts as a state-centered model; and instead
suggests that the market would ‘push forward’ if actors
from the private sector would take over at least some of
the roles of the carbon market. Swyngedouw (2005)
identifies this process of decentralization as the
externalization of state functions and considers it as part of a
wider three-fold process of reorganization between state,
civil society and market under neoliberal governmental
rationality. He argues that in this process new institutional
forms of governance-beyond-the-state are set in motion
and take part in organizing the conduct of conduct. In
other words, such reorganization processes of governance
in which “non-state, civil society or market-based
configurations become increasingly involved in regulating,
governing and organizing a series of social, economic and
cultural activities” (p. 1998) are ultimately intended to
extend action at a distance (Latour, 1987) by translating
181
‘private self-interests’ into a certain domain of reality
aligned with the state’s political rationalities (Miller & Rose,
1990). By ‘private’ I am referring to anything from
individual subjects to private organizations and businesses.
Although these issues will be further developed in the
remainder of this and the next chapter, I believe that it is
already possible to conclude that the Costa Rican
government is hardly indifferent to the choice of ‘carbon
credits’ that the clients of the Country Program purchase
in order to compensate their residual GHG emissions as
part of the process of pursuing the ‘C-Neutral’
certification.
Normative for Demonstrating Carbon Neutrality
(INTE B5:2016) and the ‘C-Neutral’ certification
program
In 2011, MINAE requested INTECO to elaborate a
voluntary normative that would allow private organizations
to officially report their GHG emissions and that way
aspire to obtain the newly designed ‘C-Neutral’
certification brand. The original Normative for
Demonstrating Carbon Neutrality, which was originally
articulated as INTE-12-01-06:2011, established the
principles and requirements for private organizations to
declare their GHG emissions; and provided the accredited
verification organisms with the general criteria to evaluate
these inventories. Later in 2016, the original normative
INTE-12-01-06:2011, was updated and replaced by a
182
revised version (normative INTE B5:201641) by
INTECO’s Normalizing National Commission. In spite of
this however, to this date the vast majority of official and
non-official documents that address the normative refer to
its older version. While this dissertation will focus on the
newer version of the normative, it may however be
appropriate to point the reader towards this consideration.
Right from the start of the introduction of the INTE B5:
2016 document, INTECO states that this normative is in
line with UNFCCC’s philosophy of ensuring that the fight
against ‘climate change’ must ensure a sustained and
sustainable development at the same time. Hence, Costa
Rica’s Normative for Demonstrating Carbon Neutrality
(from now on referred to simply as ‘the normative’) is
considered an effort to increment the country’s
competitiveness in the different markets, while
simultaneously reducing its GHG emissions (Instituto de
Normas Técnicas de Costa Rica [INTECO], 2016b, p. 4).
Thus, once again, Costa Rica prioritizes a market-oriented
concern such as boosting ‘competitiveness’ as a driving
interest for the development of this key environmental
governance policy device.
INTECO holds that to be ‘carbon neutral’ commonly
means that the net emissions associated with the
organization’s activities equal zero. Hence for an
organization to become ‘carbon neutral’, the following
actions –in order of relevance– are accepted as ‘best
In between both versions of this normative, version INTE-12-0106-2016 was briefly issued by INTECO sometime between 2012 and
2017.
41
183
practices’:
a) Measure the net carbon equivalent emissions and
removals (GHG inventory)
b) Reduce emissions; and
c) Compensate any residual emissions.
These ‘best practices’, INTECO continues, require that the
applicant organizations follow transparent MRV
mechanisms so that these practices can be nationally and
internationally recognized. However, INTECO states that
due to the lack of a common definition, and of a lack of a
recognized verification method, inconsistencies exist in
regard to how to recognize the term ‘carbon neutrality’
(INTECO 2016b, p. 4). Therefore, the development of an
instrument such as this national normative constitutes an
effort dedicated to ‘correct’ this limitation. In this case,
INTECO refers to how the concept of ‘carbon neutrality’
is fuzzy in a more ‘methodological’ sense which goes
beyond Gössling’s criticism introduced in the first chapter
that argued that the concept of ‘carbon neutral’ is in itself
imprecise, misleading and oxymoron.
The following extract of an interview with a member of
INTECO explains this rather methodological fuzziness:
Subject: Costa Rica, depending on which definition
of ‘carbon neutrality’ you use, is already ‘carbon
neutral’.
Interviewer: Ok?
Subject: Let’s see… I will explain two definitions to
184
you.
The national norm defines that ‘carbon neutrality’ is
the totality of emissions from the year of the report,
minus the reductions, minus the compensations right?
They should sum up to zero.
Interviewer: Hmmm that’s right.
Subject: The British in their PAS 2050 define
‘carbon neutrality’ as the inexistence of an increment in
net emissions respective to a base-line.
So what does that mean? Costa Rica in the last
national inventory had emissions in the order of 9
million tons [of CO2e]. In comparison with the 2010
inventory… Costa Rica has practically no significant
increase. Aside from the fact that it increased its forest
cover to 52%.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: If I want to declare myself [Costa Rica]
‘carbon neutral’ using the British definition, then I am
already am ‘carbon neutral’.
(M. Gonzales, personal communication, April 7, 2016. My translation.)
As this extract shows, there is no such thing as a universal
method to determine whenever a country is or is not
‘carbon neutral’. Consequently, neither is it possible to
image that a singular monolithic conceptual definition of
‘carbon neutrality’ can ever exist. Likewise, the extract
suggests that determining whether a country can declare
185
itself ‘carbon neutral’ is pretty much a matter of choosing
the most appropriate definition for each particular case;
and not a matter of submitting to a ubiquitous scientific
method capable of determining ‘truths’ based on
unquestionable ‘proof’ and judged by some objective laws
of a ‘nature out there’. As Andrew Barry (2001) argued,
differences between methods or practices exist less in
relation to well-defined regions and borders (in this case
say Costa Rica and England) then in terms of continuous –
epistemological and ontological– variations and in terms of
their fluidity. Hence he argues, techno-scientific
standardization, methods and ‘precision’ are not universal,
but culturally and historically specific values (p. 57). In
other words, the ‘calculations’ to determine whenever or
not a country is ‘carbon neutral’, and the conceptual
definition of what is exactly meant by ‘carbon neutrality’
are best to be understood as mutable mobiles (Law, 2007) or
fluid objects (Law & Singleton, 2005) which are
performatively brought into existence as “something that
both changes and stays the same” (Law & Singleton, 2005, p.
338. Original emphasis).
According to INTECO, the following can be considered
the ‘changes’ and overall ‘benefits’ that can be obtained
through the adoption of the INTE B5: 2016 normative:
1) Greater opportunity for the ‘general public’,
consumers, current and potential buyers to take
[consumption] decisions based on the best
information available.
2) Increase of opportunities for competitiveness in
the market of goods and environmentally friendly
products.
186
3) Greater consumer protection.
4) Increase of actions to reduce or mitigate the effects
of climate change in the different sectors of
society.
5) [Emergence
of]
Verifiable
‘C-Neutrality’
declarations that guarantee transparency.
6) Increase in the probability for corporate entities to
make improvements in their production
management practices and in their derivative
products, as a response to consumers or to market
pressure.
7) Reduction of erroneous interpretations among the
different actors at national, regional and
international levels.
(INTECO 2016b, p. 5. My translation).
Although voluntary, the normative is based on a series of
‘International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’
norms that submit it to a nationally recognized level of
rigor which is also transparent and traceable (Chacón et al.,
2015b, p. 77). Moreover, INTECO states that all these
ISO norms contain dispositions that, by being cited within
the INTE B5:2016 norm document, constitute the basic
requirements for that norm. The referenced ISO norms
are:
INTE/ISO 14064-1: Greenhouse gases. Part 1.
Specification with guidance at the organization
level for quantification and reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions and removals.
187
INTE/ISO 14064-2: Greenhouse gases. Part 2:
Specification with guidance at the project level for
quantification, monitoring and reporting of
greenhouse gas emission reductions or removal
enhancements.
INTE/ISO 14064-3: Greenhouse gases. Part 3:
Specification with guidance for the validation and
verification of greenhouse gas assertions.
Greenhouse
gases.
INTE/ISO
14065:
Requirements for greenhouse gas validation and
verification bodies for use in accreditation or other
forms of recognition.
INTE/ISO/TR 14069: Greenhouse gases.
Quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions for organizations - Guidance for the
application of ISO 14064-1.
(Source: www.iso.org)
-Principles and Definitions
Aside from the INTE/ISO 14064 international norms,
INTE B5:2016 is also based on the ‘principles’ stated on
the Greenhouse Gas Protocol of the World Resources Institute
(WRI). These principles constitute a series of concepts
intended to guide the application of the normative
(INTECO 2016b, p. 12). These are:
*Relevance: Select the GHG sources, GHG
sinks, GHG reservoirs, data and methodologies
appropriate to the needs of the intended user.
188
*Completeness: Include all relevant GHG
emissions and removals. Include all relevant
information to support criteria and procedures.
*Consistency: Enable meaningful comparisons
in GHG-related information.
*Accuracy: Reduce bias and uncertainties as far
as is practical.
*Transparency: Disclose
sufficient
and
appropriate GHG-related information to allow
intended users to make decisions with
reasonable confidence.
**Respect for the principle of legality: Meet the
respective legal requirements related to the
elaboration of GHG emission/removal
inventories; and whenever preventive, corrective
and improvement actions are implemented.
**Efficiency:
Demonstrate
improvements
through the establishment of management plans
to demonstrate carbon neutrality.
(*Taken directly from ISO 14064-2:2006; ** taken and
translated from INTE B5:2016)
Besides these ‘principles’, the normative includes a six page
long conceptual and technical ‘definitions’ glossary that
enlists each of the concepts used in the INTE B5:2016.
Many of the concepts enlisted in this section correspond to
189
direct quotes from the ISO 14064-1 (indicated in ‘Table E’
in Italics followed by the original reference source in
parenthesis). Finally, it may be relevant to point out that
this section constitutes the largest chapter of the INTE
B5:2016 due to the relevance that I believe it possesses
within the normative. Consequently, this section will also
constitute the most extensive section of this particular
review.
The concepts enlisted in the ‘Definition’ section –and their
original list numbers– are presented as follows:
3.1. Directed Action.
3.2. Accreditation
3.3. Additionality
3.21. GHG Source (ISO 14064-1.
Section: 2.2)
3.4. Base-year (ISO 14064-1.
Section: 2.20)
(ISO 14064-1. Section: 2.1)
3.23. GHG Report.
3.24. Installation
3.25. GHG inventory (ISO 140641. Section 2.14)
3.26. Organization
3.27. Other Indirect GHG
emissions (ISO 14064-1.
……….Section 2.10)
3.28. Permanence
3.29. Reductions Management
Plan for Carbon Neutrality
3.22. Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
3.5. Carbon Neutrality
3.6. Productivity/Efficiency Ratios
3.7. Emission Compensation
3.8. GHG Declaration (ISO 14064-1.
Section: 2.12)
3.9. Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
(ISO 14064-1. Section: 2.19)
3.10. Double Accounting
3.11. GHG Emissions
3.12. Direct GHG Emissions (ISO
14064-1. Section: ………2.8)
3.13. Indirect GHG Emissions
3.14. Energy Indirect GHG Emissions
(ISO 14064-1. ………Section: 2.9)
3.15. Corresponding Participation
Approach (ISO ………TS14069.
Section 5.1.2.2.)
3.16. Operational Control Approach
(ISO TS14069)
3.17. Financial Control Approach (ISO
190
3.30. Global Warming
Potential (ISO 14064-1.
Section 2.18)
3.31. GHG Project
3.32. Emission Reduction
3.33. GHG Removal (ISO
14064-1. Section 2.6)
3.34. GHG Reservoir (ISO
14064-1. Section 2.4)
3.35. GHG sinks (ISO 14064-1.
TS14069)
3.18. Competent Entity
Section 2.3)
3.36. National Compensation
3.19. GHG Emission or Removal Unit (UNC)
Factor (ISO 14064- 1. Section:
3.37. Provided User
2.7)
3.38. Project and/or
3.20. Leaks
Methodology Validation
3.39. Project and/or
Methodology Validator
3.40. Verification
3.41. Verification organism
Table E: Enlistment of ‘definitions’ in the INTE B5:2016 normative
Although it is not the intention of this dissertation to go
through each and every single one of these 41 ‘definitions’,
I consider relevant visiting at least 11 of these (indicated
with bold fonts in the above ‘Table E’) because of their
straight-forward relation to the general issue of this
dissertation; namely the current performative process of
construction of ‘nature’ in Costa Rica through the ‘carbonneutral’ actor-network. Since INTECO explicitly prohibits
the publication or partial reproduction of any segment of
the actual INTE B5:2016 document (which the researcher
acquired privately though a direct purchase to INTECO),
all direct quotations made in this dissertation will be
extracted from PN INTE 12-01-06:2016 CP, an earlier
draft version of the actual normative available for public
consultation42.
Available for download at:
http://www.ciqpacr.org/sites/default/files/PN%20INTE%2012-0106%20NORMA%20PARA%20DEMOSTRAR%20LA%20CARBON
O%20NEUTRALIDAD%20CP(1).pdf
42
191
Carbon Neutrality:
“Is what is achieved through a transparent process of
measurement, where the result of the net calculation of
emissions and/or removals (E), minus reductions (R),
minus compensations (C) equals zero” (INTECO 2016b,
p. 6. My translation). This is expressed through the
formula:
Definitions:
E: “Measurement or verifiable estimation of the total
emissions and/or removals for a year, or the period to
which the inventory corresponds, within the operative
limit established by the [applicant] organization”
(INTECO 2016b, p. 6. My translation). Here INTECO
recommends the applicants to consult the INTE/ISO
14064-1 norm as a guide to develop a GHG inventory and
thus for determining ‘E’ (see ‘Base Year’ on page 201 for a
relevant consideration regarding the definition of ‘E’).
R: “Achieved decrease of GHG emissions by the
[applicant] organization through the implementation of
actions throughout time, within the reporting period” (p. 6.
My translation).
C: “Leveling mechanisms for an entire or partial GHG
inventory, or for an organization. These can occur directly
by preventing the liberation [of], by reducing, or by
removing a part of the GHG [emitted in] a process outside
of the operative limits of an organization; and indirectly
192
through the acquisition of gas reductions (in the form of
carbon credits) generated by a third party” (p. 7. My
translation and emphasis).
Furthermore, INTECO explains that a ‘carbon credit’ is “a
generic term that designates any certification or negotiable
permit that represents the right to emit a ton of carbon
dioxide, or the mass of any other GHG as a carbon
dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) which equals a ton of carbon
dioxide” (p. 7. My translation and emphasis). Put
differently, according to the normative, a ‘carbon credit’
constitutes a tradable permit that allows its buyer to gain
the right to pollute the atmosphere within a predetermined range (measured in tons) of emissions of
carbon dioxide, or its also pre-established equivalence.
Additionally, both versions of the reviewed normative43
include a note that clarifies the differences between ‘E’ vs.
‘R’ and ‘C’. It reads: “While ‘E’ represents the net
inventory of GHG emissions of the [applicant]
organization for an annual period, ‘R-C’ represent the
additional planned effort of the organization to
reduce/remove and/or compensate what is required to
achieve the C-neutrality condition” (INTECO 2016b, p. 7.
My translation and emphasis). In other words, Costa Rica’s
‘Carbon-Neutral’ calculation is based on a zero-sum
formula where an organization can only become certified
as ‘C-Neutral’ if its ‘R’ and ‘C’ values together equal ‘E’.
By that I am referring –and I will continue to refer to– the PN
INTE 12-01-06:2016 CP and the INTE B5:2016 versions of the
normative.
43
193
Emission Compensation:
Following the definition of the ‘Compensation’ variable as
found in the formula above, the normative further defines
‘compensation of emissions’ as a procedure through which
the removal of CO2 emissions –or the prevention of these
emissions– can be “voluntarily acquired through the
recognized compensation mechanism of carbon credits
intended to counteract those GHG emissions that have
not been reduced” (p. 8. My translation and emphasis).
Both versions of the reviewed normative indicate that “the
mechanisms of compensation recognized by this norm are
the CER, VER and UNC” (INTECO 2016b, p. 7). Related
to this, the normative includes ‘Tabla 1: Esquemas aceptados
para la compensación’ which details the three recognized
carbon compensation schemes that meet the requirements
of the normative. Except for the translation of all words
from Spanish to English, the following ‘Table F’ is
essentially the same as INTECO’s ‘Tabla 1’ found on both
of the referred versions of the norm under analysis:
Compensation Schemes
Third Party verification
organism
National International
1. CERs, Certified Emission Reduction
Clean Development
X
Mechanisms (CDMs)
2. VERs, Voluntary Emission Reduction
2.1. Gold Standard1
X
2.2. Verified Carbon Standard
2.3. Other2
3. UNCs, National
X
Compensation Units3
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1
Gold Standard is a foundation that registers projects that
reduce GHG emissions, and certifies [actions that attain]
effective reductions.
2
Other compensation schemes may eventually be
recognized by the competent authority.
3
UNC refers to a ton of [sequestrated, offset or avoided]
CO2e in a project developed with the criteria of the
INTE/ISO 14064-2 norm.
Table F: Compensation schemes accepted in the INTE B5:2016
normative
Although at this point of the dissertation, this ‘Table F’
may appear to only show information that has been already
introduced in previous sections of the present study, two
particular issues can be deducted from it. First, footnote ‘2’
suggests that the normative is not ‘fixed’ on exclusively
including these two types of VERs; but instead is opened
to other compensation options as long as the ‘competent
authority’ approves their inclusion. Despite there being an
entry intended to define such figure (entry 3.18 in both
versions of the reviewed normative; see ‘Table E’)
INTECO defines ‘competent authority’ only as: “the
organization defined in the corresponding legal
framework” (INTECO 2016b, p. 9. My translation).
Hence, it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the normative
who or what exactly constitutes this authority, and even
less which criteria and mechanisms will such party employ
to determine its decision. Although this question may seem
superfluous, the users of (or in our case, those studying)
the INTE B5: 2016 normative are left with no information
to establish who makes this decision, and where, when,
and how it is reached.
195
Second and perhaps more interestingly, ‘Table F’ reveals
that CERs are in fact the only compensation mechanism of
the three recognized that is issued under the CDM
framework. In other words, CERs are the only of the three
compensation units recognized in Costa Rica’s ‘carbon
neutral’ actor-network that are covered under the rules
defined in the Kyoto Protocol. The difference between
Kyoto and non-Kyoto recognized ‘carbon-credits’ will be
explained in greater detail on page 256.
National Compensation Unit (UNC):
INTECO defines UNCs as “CO2e units from avoided,
reduced, removed, and/or stored emissions that can be
monitored, verified and reported” (INTECO 2016b, p. 11.
My translation). The definition includes two further
footnote entries worth mentioning here. The first one
states “this unit should be verified by an accredited body,
and nationally recognized by the ‘competent authority’”
(p.11. Original emphasis. My translation).
The second entry note argues that “UNC[s] are national
units registered before the competent authority, with
which the [applicant] organizations can compensate those
emissions that, after a sustained effort, where not possible
to be reduced; and that could eventually be used in any
country in which this normative is applied and recognized”
(p. 11. My translation).
From this definition several important issues can be
pointed out. First, in the very definition of UNCs,
INTECO holds that one of the methods to ‘produce’ these
units is by ‘avoiding’ emissions. In other words, a certain
196
mass of GHG emissions that is avoided from ever existing,
is transformed or translated into its ‘equivalent’ mass of
compensation, and hence it’s equivalent tradable right to
pollute. Although the ontological implications of such
assemblage of absence/presence will be discussed later,
what I wish to emphasize here is the mere possibility of
including ‘avoided’ emissions as a recognized modality for
UNCs, considering the negativity of the Kyoto Protocol to
accept offsets from ‘avoided deforestation’ as a valid and
feasible option in the first place. An option that is
nevertheless, as I will discuss later, the largest source of
CO2e compensation in Costa Rica.
Second, the provided definition of UNCs concludes
making a direct reference to the MRV system derived from
the Bali Action Plan (COP 13), which is a concept, coined
for accounting data on GHG emissions, and which is
intended to “create transparency and enhance confidence
among UNFCCC’s parties (Boos et al. 2015, p. 8).
INTECO’s reference to UNFCCC’s MRV system is
revealing in at least two respects. On the one hand, it
speaks of the way in which global environmental devices
can be found even within locally produced policies that are
nevertheless ‘out’ of the cover of global policies such as, in
this case, the Kyoto protocol. Hence, one could argue that
UNCs are simultaneously ‘in-and-out’ of authorized global
environmental actor-networks. On the other hand, the
reference to UNFCCC’s MRV system is also based on the
clearly modernistic belief that there is a ‘nature’ out there that
can be scientifically measured, reduced, ordered and
displaced through scientific calculations and protocols.
Both of these issues are furthermore consolidated over the
assumption that the MRV system (or any other global
197
environmental device such as NAMA, INDC, etc.) are
rendered as stable and scientifically robust devices capable
of ordering ‘nature’ in a ‘precise’, ‘standardized’ and
‘objective’ way.
Reductions, Removals and Base Year:
The normative defines the concepts of ‘Emission
Reduction’ and ‘GHG Removal’ which both appear on
very definition of the normative of ‘Carbon Neutrality’ and
on the ‘formula’ over which the INTE B5:2016 is based
on. However, defining these two concepts together may be
prudent as the similarity between ‘reduction’ and ‘removal’
may cause some confusion and might somewhat obscure
the overall comprehension of the normative.
According to the normative, Emission Reductions
represent the “decrease in an organization’s GHG
emissions through the implementation of actions during
the period of the report” (INTECO 2016b, p. 11. My
translation). The definition also includes two footnote
entries. The first enlists examples of ‘reduction
mechanisms’ including technological changes in productive
processes, forestry projects and sustainable agricultural
production projects. The second footnote states the
INTE/ISO 14064-2 norm can be consulted as the guide to
develop reduction and removal projects offering UNCs
(p.11).
Likewise, the normative forwards the definition of GHG
Removal from the ISO 14064-1 norm (Section 2.6) which
defines these as the “total mass of a GHG removed from
the atmosphere over a specified period of time”
198
(International Organization for Standardization [ISO],
2006).
As was introduced earlier in page 194, in the ‘carbon
neutrality’ formula (E – R – C = 0), emission ‘removals’
are included in the variable (E); while emission
‘reductions’ in variable (R). This means that while the
INTECO’s ‘carbon neutrality’ formula considers
‘reductions’ (R) as a subtraction made to the total of
emissions (E) within the exact year in which the formula is
being applied by the applicant organization, ‘removals’ are
subtractions that where already made to the total of
emissions (E) in a period prior to the application of the
formula; or in other words, to the ‘base year’.
Once again, the normative forwards the definition of ‘base
year’ from the ISO 14064-1 norm (Section 2.20) as the
“historical period specified for the purpose of comparing
GHG emissions or removals or other GHG-related
information over time” (ISO, 2006). Moreover, this
definition includes a footnote entry that states that “[b]aseyear emissions or removals may be quantified based on a
specific period (e.g. a year) or averaged from several
periods (e.g. several years)” (ISO, 2006. My emphasis).
Additionally, the INTE B5:2016 normative in fact states
that the calculation of GHG ‘reductions’ must be realized
with respect to the ‘base year’ established by the applicant
organization (Instituto de Normas Técnicas de Costa
Rica [INTECO] 2016a, p. 19). Hence, ‘Base Year’ really
equals the (E) variable of the carbon neutral formula;
whereas ‘emissions’ is only one of the two constituents of
the former variable. The reduction of ‘removals’ inside the
variable for emissions, and the equivalence of emissions to
199
‘Base Year’ could be said to mirror the same sort of lack of
transparency found in Costa Rica’s INGEIs (reviewed in
Chapter 1) as was pointed out by Araya (2015) who argued
that the ‘automatic’ reduction of offsets to the total sum of
emissions in the INGEIs prevents the reader from
knowing the actual value of carbon emissions at hand.
Verification and Verification Organism:
Finally, the normative defines verification as a
“systematic, independent and documented process for the
evaluation [GHG inventories, or for the demonstration of
carbon-neutrality] within the agreed criteria for such
verification” (INTE 2016b, p. 12. My translation).
Accordingly, INTECO (2016b) defines verification
organism as “the competent and independent
organization with the responsibility of carrying out the
‘verification’ and of informing about the ‘verification’
process” (p.12). According to the normative, ‘verification
organisms’, must comply with the accreditation
requirements established in the INTE/ISO 14065
standard.
Besides this disposition, the Country Program establishes
in article 3 that the Costa Rican Accreditation Entity
(ECA) is the authority in charge of accrediting these
verification organisms. For this process of endorsement,
the ECA determined the standards for accreditation of
organizations for validation and verification (ECA-MCP09- F13), for the verification procedure (ECA-MC-P13F13), for the criteria to evaluate (ECA-MC-C10) and for
the witnessing procedure (ECA-MC-P25) (MINAE, 2013,
200
p. 10). Moreover, MINAE holds that besides the ECA’s
commitment to grant the accreditation for domestic
organizations, it will eventually recognize international
accredited organizations, once Costa Rica has agreed to
multilateral arrangements established for the purpose of
consolidating an international carbon market (p. 10). As of
2018, the Carbon Neutral Unit of the EARTH University,
and INTECO itself are the only two credited ‘verification
organism’ authorized to carry out the verification processes
established in the INTE B5: 2016 normative. As will be
discussed later, the lack of available options for verification
organisms, and the costs involved in hiring these
organisms, have been identified as a source of concern by
several of the key informants of the present study.
Other relevant conceptual premises:
The normative uses the definition of Carbon Dioxide
Equivalent (CO2e) as provided in the ISO 1464-1: 2006
standard, section 2.19 where it is defined as a “unit for
comparing the radiative forcing of a GHG to carbon
dioxide” (ISO, 2006). Both the original source and the
INTE B5:2016 normative add a footnote that states that
the CO2e is calculated using the mass of a given GHG
multiplied by its Global Warming Potential (GWP),
which at the same time is defined as a factor that describes
the “radiative forcing impact of one mass-based unit of a
given GHG relative to an equivalent unit of carbon
dioxide over a given period of time” (ISO, 2006).
Additionally, INTECO further defines GWP as “an indexbased on the radiative properties of well-mixed GHG, [and
that it is] determined by measuring the radiative force of
one mass-unit of a GHG well-mixed in the current
201
atmosphere over a given period of time, relative to carbon
dioxide” (INTECO 2016b, p. 23. My emphasis. My
translation)44. The normative later establishes that all GHG
emission and removals may only be reported in terms of
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) –which
INTECO also calls tons of ‘normalized gas’–; and that
these are to be calculated by using the GWP values
produced by the IPCC (INTECO 2016b, p. 16).
I would like to briefly mention two key aspects introduced
in the above paragraph. First, by referring to tCO2e as
‘normalized gas’, the normative is reinforcing the legal
limits imposed by the IPCC which established that the
GWPs –which were inscribed in the Kyoto protocol– are
to be used to translate emissions of other greenhouse gases
into their equivalents in CO2 (MacKenzie, 2009 p. 446).
Borrowing Pierre Belanger’s (2015) call for an ecological
turn towards understanding landscape as infrastructure, the
implementation of this type of legal limits, and categories
of accountability –institutionalized through standardization
and systematization– remove more and more agency from
regional resources and dynamic biophysical processes
(Bélanger, 2015, p. 199). What is more, Bélanger holds that
such ‘normalization’ processes are heightened by the
security found in quantitative logic and numerical
precision.
The second key aspect that takes place in the process of
‘normalizing’ gases as prescribed in the ‘carbon neutral’
normative is the ‘bracketing out’ of carbon-market politics
Despite the explanatory purpose and tone of this description, the
exact meaning of a ‘well-mixed’ GHG’ and of ‘current atmosphere’ are
not provided in the normative.
44
202
from IPCC’s GWP estimations in the socio-technical
process of ‘making gases the same’ (MacKenzie, 2009). In
other words, keeping the ‘normalization’ of gases as a subpolitical matter.
INTECO’s normative advances the definition of two key
concepts that conceptually fundament INTE B5: 2016, and
that are once again subtracted from the ISO 1464-1: 2006
standard. These are the definition of Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) and of GHG Emission or Removal Factor. The
first is defined as a “gaseous constituent of the
atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorbs
and emits radiation at specific wavelengths within the
spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earth's
surface, the atmosphere, and clouds” (ISO, 2006. Section
2.1). This definition of GHG as well as the formerly
introduced definitions of CO2e and GWP all explicitly
refer to a table produced by the IPCC in which the ‘global
warming potentials’ of each GHG are defined. Although
such table is not provided either in freely available version
of the standard online nor on the INTE B5: 2006
normative, INTECO does provide a table based on it.
More precisely, INTECO’s table defines the GWP relative
to each CO2 over a 100-year time horizon. Although I will
not provide neither an in-depth description of this table,
nor a reference to the full version of this table –which
covers three pages of the INTE B5: 2016 document– the
following ‘Table G’ shows a short extract of such table:
203
Industrial
denomination or
common name
Chemical
Formula
GWP over a 100year time horizon
(to the date of
publication)
Carbon Dioxide
CO2
1
Methane
CH4
25
Nitrous Oxide
N20
298
Substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol
CFC-11
CCI3F
4 750
CFC-12
CCI2F2
10 900
…
…
…
Table G: GWP relative to each CO2 over a 100-year time horizon.
Based on Tabla A.1 Potenciales de Calentamiento Global (PCG) relativos a
CO2 por el horizonte temporal de 100 años (INTECO, 2016b, p. 23).
Finally, the normative incorporates the definition of GHG
Emission or Removal Factor “as the factor relating
‘activity data’ to GHG emissions or removals” (ISO, 2006,
section 2.7). At the same time, the ISO 14064-1:2006
defines GHG activity data as the “quantitative measure of
activity that results in a GHG emission or removal” (ISO,
2006, section 2.11). The ISO standard enlists the amount
of energy, fuels or electricity consumed; the amount of
materials produced; the services provided; and the area of
land affected by any given activity as examples of ‘GHG
activity data’.
What is interesting about these concepts, which I have
chosen to group as ‘relevant conceptual premises’, is
perhaps not so much each of their individual definitions,
but how they have been taken-for-granted both within
(and beyond) the ‘Carbon Neutrality’ normative, and
within the particular enactments of the normative in
discourses and practices. Another interesting issue that can
be derived from this section of the normative, is the
204
‘influence’ that ‘global’ environmental actors and their black
boxes –such as the IPCC, the ISO and their respective
standards, concepts and calculations– play in the
performative assemblage of ‘local’ environmental
enactments.
-Requirements for GHG emission and removal
inventories.
After the conceptual and technical ‘definitions’ glossary
reviewed above, the second largest section of the INTE
B5:2016 normative corresponds to the ‘Requirements for
GHG emission and removal inventories’. This section
includes the three further subsections:
A. Scope to demonstrate Carbon Neutrality
B. Resources, functions, responsibility and authority
C. Requirements for the evaluation of the GHG
inventory
Subsection (A), or the ‘Scope to demonstrate Carbon
Neutrality’ establishes that applicant organizations are
required to determine and document their performance in
relation to the normative. This determination must include:
-The ‘limits of the organization’: An analysis of the
objective that the applicant organizations have for
pursuing ‘carbon neutrality’; as well as of their operations
and facilities to determine their particular GHG sources
and sinks.
-And the ‘limits of its operation’: A report on the
organization’s GHG emissions and removals related to its
205
productive processes. This report must also include all
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ emissions related to their use of
energy.
Subsection (B), or the ‘Resources, functions, responsibility
and authority’, establishes that the applicant organization
must have enough (economic, human, technological,
infrastructural, etc.) resources to implement and follow
through the process of ‘carbon neutrality’.
Finally, this section concludes with subsection (C), or the
‘Requirements for the evaluation of the GHG inventory’,
which includes –but is not limited to– the following three
subsections45:
C.1. Selection of quantification methodology:
The normative establishes that the methodology used for
applicant parties to quantify their GHG emissions and
removals should be selected either from the available
international
norms,
or
from
–nationally
or
internationally– recognized methodologies capable of
reasonably reducing uncertainty. Additionally, the chosen
I have chosen to limit the review of the ‘Requirements for the
evaluation of the GHG inventory’ section of the normative to these
three selected entries because of two main considerations: First, for the
sake of overall readability, and second, and perhaps more importantly,
because of their relevance to the interest of the dissertation, namely
the process of construction of the Costa Rican ‘carbon-neutrality’ actornetwork through the enactment of particular calculations. Please note
that the enumerations assigned to each of this three subsection have
been assigned by myself, and hence do not correspond to the original
normative.
45
206
methodologies should be able to produce exact, coherent
and reproducible results that at the same time allow the
compatibility of data and information (INTECO, 2016b, p.
15). Moreover, the normative suggests the INTE/ISO
14064-1, INTE/ISO 14064-2 standards, and the
WBSD/WRI GHG Protocol as recommended references
of methods to quantify and reduce GHG emissions. This
sub-section of the normative enlists three possible
methods for the calculation of GHG emissions and
removals:
Method-1. “Calculations based on GHG activity
data multiplied by the available GHG emission or
removal factors which are made official by the competent
authority, or [based on the] use of scientifically supported
models” (INTECO 2016b, p. 15. My translation and
emphasis).
Method-2: Direct measurement using continuous or
periodic GHG monitoring.
Method-3: Calculations based on mass –or material–
balances.
These three methodologies match those described in the
discussions surrounding the INGEIs in the Punctual
Observations 2 in Chapter 1, where Method-1 matches the
favored method in the INGEIs in which the estimations
are derived with the use of (nationally or internationally
determined) ‘emission or removal factors’. Method-2
consists of the more costly-yet-more-accurate ‘end of the
pipe’ measurements known as ‘source sampling’ (Alice et
al., 2014); while Method-3 corresponds to the ‘less
207
accurate’ technique of calculations based on ‘material
balance’. Once again, it may be relevant to consider the
role that the ‘generic’ emission factors provided in the
IPCC guidelines often play a role in the process of
calculation of GHG emissions and removals (see Chapter
1); put plainly: the role of a ‘global’ parliament of specialists is
that of an imagined community of ‘autonomous experts’
which order the performative assemblage of ‘local’ carbon
calculations through their taken-for-granted authority and
their black-boxed calculative devices. This particular
interrelation of power is key to understanding Costa Rica’s
current market-centered environmental governance as a
model rooted in a neoliberalism that largely depends on
“autonomous expert communities that translate
government priorities into a wide variety of locales and
that provide legitimacy” (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010,
p. 80). Although I will discuss the particular features and
pragmatic implication of such neoliberal turn in Costa
Rica’s environmental governance later on, I would like to
state here that I use the term ‘neoliberalism’ as a particular
way of thinking and being, in other words as a Foucauldian
governmentality. Such an understanding –which emphasizes
on the proliferation and diffusion of state power through
multiple institutional forms– offers an appealing capacity
to overcome false dichotomies between state and market
that too often have been accepted even by critics of
neoliberalism; while apprehending neoliberalism as a
discourse-productive assemblage of a particular kind of
society and particular kinds of political subjects (McCarthy
& Prudham, 2004, p. 280).
208
C.2. Calculation of GHG emissions and removals:
This subsection is directly related to the above mentioned
one in that it establishes several considerations that the
applicant organizations must comply with depending on
the specific method for the calculation of GHG emissions
and removals it selects. This subsection concludes by
stating that the applicant organization is authorized to
exclude the quantification of sinks, or direct or indirect
GHG sources that when summed either do not exceed 3%
of the inventory’s total, or the specific value established on
the program assigned for the applicant organization.
However, the applicant organization is required to explain
the reasons behind the prospective exclusion of any GHG
source or sink from the quantification. Moreover, the
normative states that those GHG emissions or removals
that are neither technically nor financially feasible must be
included as an estimation, which at the same time shall
consider its degree of ‘uncertainty’ (INTECO, 2016b, p.
16). In short, Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral’ normative
allows the exclusion of certain GHG emissions and
removals, depending on the estimated qualitative values of
certain of its material qualities, as well as on certain
technical and financial considerations relative to the
estimation of the former values.
This section of the normative shows how, under certain
socio-political conditions and through particular sociotechnical arrangements, gases can be ‘omitted’ from the
overall quantifications of an organization’s GHG
inventory. This particular process of qualculation resembles
the one discussed in the Punctual Observations 2 in
Chapter 1 in which GHG emissions from international air
209
and maritime travel, and from ‘organic matter’ and
‘biogenic processes’ are withdrawn from the overall
calculations of the INGEIs. However, unlike the former,
this particular calculation appears to focus more on
‘quantitative’ considerations –such as allowing the
omission of gases representing less than 3% of the total of
the inventory– than on ‘qualitative’ ones –like the ‘nature’
of the emission source–. However, as Callon and Law
(2003) argued, “[calculation] has nothing to do with
quantification” (p. 13). Instead, what we commonly
understand as ‘calculations’ are better understood as
processes in which entities are detached from other
contexts –like inscriptions in a measuring device–,
manipulated –through numbers, judgments, compromises,
computer algorithms, etc.–, transformed, and summed in a
single space –like a spreadsheet in an GHG emission
inventory– (Callon & Law, 2003, p. 13). Hence, carbon is
really qualculated, and not simply calculated (Lippert, 2013,
p. 104) since qualculations are intermediate performative
situations between judgements and calculations (Callon &
Muniesa, 2005, p. 1232). Additionally, drawing some
entities into a single judgement-calculative space also
implies excluding other entities from being recognized in the
process. A process that ultimately leads to the emergence
of a new material called result (Lippert, 2013, p. 103). Put
briefly, since calculations start with the process of
separating things or states of the world into qualitative
categories, and by imagining courses of action associated
with those newly classified things, then calculations in
general –and certainly carbon calculations in particular–
can no longer be understood as processes exclusively
populated by ‘neatly’ arranged numbers and/or by an
unbendable techno-scientific ethos.
210
C.3. The ‘Evaluation of uncertainty’.
The second section of the ‘Requirements for the
evaluation of the GHG inventory’ focuses on the
assessment of uncertainty for GHG emissions and
removals, which considers the ‘uncertainty’ of both the
GHG activity data, and the GHG Emission or Removal
Factor used (INTECO, 2016b, p. 17).
The normative provides the following formula to
determine the ‘uncertainty’ of each of the sources and
sinks identified by the applicant organization:
Definitions:
Ui: Represents the ‘aggregated uncertainty’ or the
uncertainty associated to the source of emission or
removal (i)
EFu: Corresponds to the uncertainty of the ‘GHG
emission or removal factor’; while
ADu: Is the uncertainty of the ‘GHG activity data’.
Besides the former formula, the INTE B5:2016 provides
an additional equation46 to calculate the ‘combined
uncertainty’ which is the resulting percentage of
uncertainty from the sum of amounts (that correspond to
half of the 95% confidence interval, divided by the total).
Due to copyright reasons I am unable to include this second formula
in the present dissertation.
46
211
This calculation is intended to determine the ‘total’ value
of uncertainty from an entire GHG inventory.
The normative recommends that the applicant
organizations consult the principles and methods to
estimate ‘uncertainty’ provided in the IPCC’s 2006
guidelines for National GHG inventories47 (Volume 1;
chapter 3), on the Climate registry website
(http://www.theclimateregistry.org/), and on the WRI’s
‘Quantitative Inventory Uncertainty’ guidelines available
on
the
GHG
Protocol
website
(https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/Quantitative
%20Uncertainty%20Guidance.pdf).
-Requirements for the reduction of emissions.
This chapter of the normative enlists the requirements that
must be met by any applicant organization in order to
fulfill two further steps necessary for the declaration of
‘carbon neutrality’:
a) Elaboration of a ‘reduction management plan’
b) Elaboration of ‘documentation for the reduction of
GHG emissions’
The ‘Reductions management plan’ is a document
intended to gather all the reductions that the applicant
organization must implement to demonstrate ‘carbon
neutrality’. This plan must include several declarations of
The same reference over which Costa Rica’s National GHG
inventories is largely based on.
47
212
commitment, timetables, inventories of available resources,
and estimations of specific targets.
The ‘Documentation for the reduction of GHG emissions’
on the other hand consists of a series of documents that
justify and back up the reduction of GHG emissions that
the applicant organization has set out to do. Once again,
these documents include several specific declarations that
justify the specific methodological choices of the applicant
organization, as well as several other timetables and target
estimations.
Three additional chapters follow this ‘Requirements for the
reduction of emissions’ chapter, which enlist several formal
requirements necessary for the declaration of carbon
neutrality:
-Requirements that an organization must meet when
‘compensating’ its residual emissions with the
purchase of ‘carbon credits’.
-Requirements and steps that the applicant
organization must fulfill in order to maintain and
renew its GHG inventories, and its ‘carbon neutral’
status.
-Guidelines on how to elaborate a report that
effectively communicates an organization’s ‘carbon
neutral’ performance and results.
Due the more formal or ‘administrative’ character of these
chapters, their repetitive content and their somewhat
distant relation to the specific aim and topics of this
213
dissertation, I have decided to abstain from reviewing
these three chapters in the same depth like was done with
the others. However, I would like to point out three key
issues that can be derived from these three final chapters
of the normative.
First, INTECO states that the “acquired compensations
must occur in a process outside of the operative limits of
[the applicant] organization, and indirectly through the
acquisition of GHG reductions (in the form of carbon
credits) generated by a third party” (INTECO 2016b, p.
19). In other words, the Costa Rican normative to
demonstrate ‘carbon neutrality’ only recognizes a
‘compensation’ of those ‘carbon credits’ that have been
purchased by the applicant organization from an external
supplier or producer of ‘carbon offsets’. In other words,
the normative dismisses any other form of compensation
which could be produced by the applicant organization on
its own; or any other form of exchange between the
‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ part that is not based on a
monetary transaction. The later can be deduced because
neither of the recognized ‘carbon credits’ (CER, VER or
UNC) is legally available outside of the limits of national or
international ‘carbon markets’. This shows how in spite of
neoliberalism insistence on the “pervasive naturalization of
market logics, [justified] on the grounds of efficiency and
even ‘fairness’ [of] their installation as the dominant
metrics of policy evaluation” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.
394. Original emphasis); there is nothing ‘natural’ about a
marketplace or about the agents of rational economic
calculations that are expected to inhabit one. Instead the
latter actors alongside their instruments, sites and
techniques with which economic calculations are made
214
possible have to be made (Barry, 2001, p. 82). In other
words, and just like any other market, Costa Rica’s carbonoffset market is not a ‘naturally’ emergent thing; it has to
be deliberately, pragmatically and continuously enacted as
such. The opportunity to follow the performative
emergence of Costa Rica’s carbon market represents a
laboratory type of space to test the organization and the
actual functioning of an experimental market in vivo
(Callon, 2009). Moreover, studying carbon markets offers
an excellent field of inquiry in that they are “built up from
scratch based on economic theories, but in an
experimental way through the ‘constitution of collectives
comprising large numbers of different actors from diverse
temporal and spatial horizons’” (Pellizzoni, 2011, p. 800).
Hence, and following Ureta (2014a), Costa Rica’s carbon
offset market, as will be discussed in greater depth on page
239, performs at least three kinds of work as an emission
trading scheme: it performs a textbook market –in which
‘goods’, ‘buyers/sellers’ and multiple ‘market spaces’ are
performatively assembled and framed ‘by the book’–, as a
civilized enactment of market –in which competing
differences in the way the market is framed are recognized
and welcomed, and eventually negotiated– and it performs
an exemplar of the validity of certain economic
knowledge/practice mobilized to strengthen the general
work of economics.
Second, the applicant organization must maintain
management procedures to ensure that the information on
its GHG results and performance are available for routine
revisions. The normative states that this information must
be coherent and precise, and at the same time reflect the
total coverage of the inventory (INTECO, 2016b, p. 20).
To this end, INTECO suggests that the organization must
215
ensure that its data collection systems are robust; that its
measurement equipment is kept well maintained and
calibrated; and that its data remains current and precise for
its use in periodical internal audits and technical revisions.
This assertion goes well in hand with Hajer’s description of
how ‘modern’ environmental problems lacking a material
reality (such as the greenhouse effect, or the ozone
depletion) require what he calls an almost unprecedented
degree of ‘trust’ in ‘experts’ and in high-tech devices to
help us understand these global threats. He argues:
[U]nderstanding has ceased to be a matter of
direct experience, but is a matter of complex
scientific extrapolations, of mathematical
calculations that require extremely expensive
supercomputers, and, consequently, it is a
limited group of experts who define the key
problems, who asses the urgency of one
problem vis-á-vis other possible problems,
and who implicitly often conceptualize the
solution to the problems that they put
forward (Hajer, 1995, p. 10).
By emphasizing on the importance that ‘properly
calibrated’ equipment, and on the robustness of data
collection systems, INTECO enacts ‘climate change’ as a
problem that is technically and technologically amenable
through such technologies of government, and through the
mediation of autonomous techno-scientific ‘experts’ who
allow political rationalities and political action to be
prescribed at a distance. However, Callon and Law argue
that qualculations do not sit well with ‘trust’. On the
contrary, qualculative effects, they argue, replace ‘trust’ as to
216
talk about the latter is already to render it discussable,
accountable and thus once again, qualculable (Callon &
Law, 2003, p. 8).
Finally, INTECO argues that the normative does not
correspond to any existing international norm because at
the time of its development, no reference was available
(INTECO 2016b, p. 22). In other words, INTECO argues
that Costa Rica’s INTE B5: 2016 normative is the world’s
first standard to demonstrate ‘carbon neutrality’.
Briefly: Costa Rica’s carbon-offset market did not
‘naturally’ emerge into being; instead it is the result of
careful planning, and of particular political agendas. The
resulting market offers a ‘laboratory-like’ space to test the
organization and functioning of actual carbon markets
which are still rendered as highly experimental.
Finally, the discussion addresses the process in which
‘trust’ in technological devices, accountability systems,
calculations and ‘expert’ knowledge are constructed in
Costa Rica as necessary way to maintain ‘nature’ governed.
In short, how ‘climate change’ is constructed as a problem
that is technically and technologically controllable.
Punctual Observations 2.
In the introductory section of the of the normative,
INTECO states:
This instrument is intended to support the
efforts being individually or collectively carried
out from the private, or the public sector to
217
achieve Carbon Neutrality, and to advance
towards a low Greenhouse gas emission model.
This implies a strong transformation in the
productive systems, the financial mechanisms
and the country’s structure (INTECO 2016b, p.
5. My emphasis and translation).
However, in spite of the suggestion that this normative is
intended to be an instrument for the use of both ‘private’
and ‘public’ sectors; a closer look at the normative shows
that such instrument is exclusively based on –voluntary–
market mechanisms, and not on any kind of ‘commandand-control’ implementation. This assertion is perhaps
already made evident when considering that the normative
is built on the ISO 14000 family of standards related to
environmental management; which is based on a voluntary
approach to environmental regulations intended to
minimize the environmental impacts of the operations and
processes of private companies and organizations48. The
voluntary character of the ‘C-Neutral’ program is intended
to break away from Costa Rica’s earlier state-centered
command-and-control conservation model which was
largely based on the ‘National Park’ system. A system that
relied on the formal designation of strictly defined borders
to ‘fortress-like’ protected areas, and imposed sanctions to
anyone who violated these (Fletcher, 2016). According to
Fletcher, this protectionist ‘fortress conservation’ approach
could be considered a sovereign environmentality which
facilitates “governance through top-down creation and
enforcement of regulations” (Fletcher 2010b, p. 178). In
See more on the nature of the ISO 14000 family of standards in
https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html
48
218
contrast, a voluntary market mechanism can instead be
considered a neoliberal environmentality in that it seeks to
“create external incentive structures within which
individuals, understood as self-interested rational actors,
can be motivated to exhibit appropriate behaviors through
manipulation of incentives” (p. 173). Hence, this type of
environmentality constitutes an alternative type of
intervention to both the direct subjugation of individuals,
and to the internalization of norms and values of what he
calls the disciplinary environmentality49.
So, if mechanisms of environmental governance such as
the ‘C-Neutral’ certification –and for that matter, the ISO
norms over which it is based on– are just voluntary, then
why do private organizations and businesses bother?
Timmermans and Epstein (2010) argue that in practice
voluntary standards become ‘de jure’ mandatory producing
a neoliberal government-industry hybrid of governance (p.
80). Additionally, the ‘voluntary’ nature of emission trading
schemes –such as the ‘C-Neutral’ and the country’s
‘voluntary carbon market’ that supports it– in practice
work very similar to a ‘carbon tax’50, yet that they are less
prone to negative lobbying and political opposition
(MacKenzie 2009, p. 453).
Right at the beginning of the same normative, INTECO
states that “[t]his normative applies to any type of
Which, as was suggested on page 88, could be argued to correspond
more to the ENCC through its ‘Public awareness, education and
cultural change’ axis.
50 That would typically require polluters to pay either by having to buy
permits, as a liability, or as penalty fees for exceeding agreed upon
pollution limits.
49
219
organization, regardless of its size, geographical location or
activity, that seeks to improve its competitiveness through its
compromise with [its] environmental performance,
reducing its GHG emissions” (INTECO 2016b, p. 6). My
translation and emphasis). Hence, INTECO assures that a
key objective of this normative is to ensure a greater level
of ‘competitiveness’ to those organizations that fulfill its
requirements. Similarly, INTECO enlists the seven
different benefits that an applicant organization is able to
obtain through the application of the normative (see Table
H from page 246) where four of them make direct allusion
to either the consumption, production or supply of
products or services within increasingly competitive
markets; two focus on improving the transparency or
comprehensiveness of the normative, and only one
(number 4) on the collective need for reducing the effects
of climate change regardless of the ‘sector of society’
(INTECO 2016b, p. 6). Finally, according to Fletcher,
following the nation’s former Minister of Environment,
“the national carbon neutrality initiative is intended as a
branding mechanism to leverage C-Neutral products and
services through ‘the sustained creation of value for target
customers in the market or segment of interests, which
proves to be superior to the value offered by the
competition’” (Dobles in Fletcher 2017, p. 143. Original
emphasis).
To further sustain this argument, I include the following
extract of an interview made to one of my informants
enrolled in FONAFIFO (the organization in charge of the
supply side of the national carbon market through the sales
of UNCs) who explains a common reason why the private
sector has shown interest in the certification:
220
Interviewer: The CST* is clearly for eco-tourism;
yet ‘Carbon Neutrality’, you could say, is much
broader. Or is [C-Neutrality] meant to be more
industrial?
Subject: It’s mainly for industry. However, even
financial businesses have enrolled themselves in this
[C-Neutral program]. It’s something that has
caught their attention that has allowed them to also
join the country’s reduction efforts.
[Businesses] that have nothing to do with tourism and
all of that; those that previously had no access to any
other certification. So [the C-Neutral] has already
meant something attractive for many.
They have seen this as an opportunity because it allows
them to brand themselves.
*CST: Certification for Sustainable Tourism51
(R. Bedoya, personal communication, March 28, 2016. My translation.)
In this extract, the subject considers the fact that the ‘CNeutral’ certification is not limited to one specific
productive sector (as opposed to the CST certification that
focuses exclusively in sustainable tourism) is an element
that has by itself attracted businesses from a wide range of
Up until a relatively late stage of the study that lead to the present
doctoral dissertation, the idea to establish an analytical comparison
between ‘C-Neutral’ and the ‘CST’ certifications as embodiments of
political socio-technical constructions of ‘nature’ was explored. Hence
many of the gathered data and interviews also collected information
regarding the Costa Rican Tourism Board’s CST certification program.
51
221
markets. The subject additionally adds that the ‘C-Neutral’
represents the only source of recognized environmental
branding (or certification) available for any business
organization outside of tourism sector.
Similarly, another of my informants, this time one enrolled
in the DDC (the state institution in charge of the CNeutral program) referred to the ‘benefits’ of the program
as follows:
Interviewer: Do you believe that the Carbon
Neutral certification, or the reduction of carbon in
general, is important for our country? And if so, why?
Subject: Well, I believe that there is already like…
like a lot of all the effects of climate change. Not only
droughts, floodings … but also at the level of costs that
it represents.
Subject: So I think that if you speak to people
about the benefits that are obtainable through the
Country Program which range from… energetic
efficiency, improvement in accounting, reduction of
costs, access to state bids and that sort of incentives
mainly for private sector businesses well… that’s why
these have looked into obtaining the ‘C-Neutral’
brand.
(K. Aguilar, personal communication, March 29, 2016. My translation.)
This extract shows how when asked about the ‘benefits’
from the reduction of carbon emissions in general, and
222
from the ‘C-Neutral’ program in particular, the subject
began acknowledging what she believes is a widespread
awareness
about
the
(strictly)
‘environmental’
consequences of climate change. Immediately after that,
however, the subject focused on enlisting the more
‘business-like’ benefits from obtaining the brand.
Hence, according to the two extracts above, the ‘CNeutral’ offers its participants three main benefits from
participating in the program:
-A marketing tool through environmental
branding
-Cost savings in their operations through
improved efficiency
-Access to business incentives reserved for
organizations certified ‘C-Neutral’.
However, several other of my informants (some even
directly involved in the process of certifying applicant
organizations in the program) have expressed serious
doubts about those three general benefits of the program
enlisted above. The following extract of an interview made
to a client enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’ certification speaks
of a certain skepticism felt towards the brand:
Subject: There are no incentive plans. There is no
commercialization part, there is no focus part; there is
no vision so that [the C-Neutral brand] gains
followers, and the way to gain them is making them see
the positive part that this has, what you gain, all the
benefit.
223
Despite of all the costs and all there is, we also have to
talk about the benefits that achieved.
Right? This is not being done, so it’s really difficult. If
you ask me, if the investment put down on this has
generated something to my business? I am going to
have to answer no(!).
(J. Lopez, personal communication, April 15, 2016. My translation.)
The subject continued the interview mentioning examples
of what she would consider plausible incentives that could
ideally be gained by those organizations that obtain the ‘CNeutral’ certification. She mentions for instance the
option to be included as a ‘service provider’ for the
government, and to have the option of having certain
taxes reduced or cut out. All of these being hypothetical
incentives that are currently unavailable for ‘C-Neutral’
businesses.
Continuing with the competitive advantages that the ‘CNeutral’ program is supposed to provide, all of the
interviewed subjects of the study –who had in fact
obtained the ‘C-Neutral’ brand– reported not having
perceived any particular boost in sales, or in the demand
for their products or services since obtaining the
certification. Moreover, several of my informants
coincided that as of today, the ‘C-Neutral’ is not a product
differentiator because the Costa Rican market, and the
clients of this market, know nothing –or simply care too
little– about ‘carbon neutrality’. In fact, several of my
informants –one of them being a high-ranking member of
224
INTECO itself– concurred that the ‘C-Neutral’ has
become more a matter of ‘image’, or prestige among
business entrepreneurs rather than an actual competitive
edge. On this particular matter, Timmerman and Epstein
(2010) warn “that voluntary nature of many standards
makes it difficult to develop momentum unless built-in
incentives promote compliance” (p. 80). Hence all of these
concerns could be pointing towards a particular issue that
is widely believed to deserve more attention than it
currently does.
Back again to the extract above, the subject also referred to
the costs that applicant organizations must cover to opt for
the ‘C-Neutral’ certification. This leads to another criticism
that was constantly made throughout the study’s different
interviews. Particularly, how the elevated expenses required
to cover the costs of inscription, verification and finally for
the compensation of residual emissions –not to mention
the particular investment that the applicant must dedicate
to improving its emission performance, either through
technological, architectural, organizational, or other
means– are unaffordable for many small- to medium-sized
businesses. For instance, one of the study’s informants
stated that their organization (a financial entity seated in a
rather large office building in San Jose) invests over $4,000
US Dollars per year only in compensating its
approximately 500 tons of residual CO2e emissions. That
figure however does not reflect the initial investment of
improving the organization’s emission or energetic
‘efficiencies’, which commonly surpasses $15,000 US
Dollars for any ISO certification in Costa Rica (Quirós,
2013); nor does it cover the costs of the verification part,
which represents an additional cost of around $7,000 US
225
Dollars52 per year. On the later issue, one of my key
informants enrolled in one of the credited verification
entities for the ‘C-Neutral’ program argued that the
elevated costs required for hiring an auditing party are
themselves a consequence of the large amount of
requirements that these are expected to fulfill in a
verification process (E. Castro, Personal communication,
February 10, 2017). Interestingly enough, a somewhat
similar asymmetry is said to be taking place in the ‘supply’
side of Costa Rica’s ‘carbon market’, specifically in the
forestry sector. This sector supplies the only source of
Kyoto-recognized carbon credits to the national market,
and has been ‘decentralized’ and ‘privatized’ under the
country’s current market-centered conservation model.
This has gradually led to a system of competitive
contracting among professional forestry engineers whose
goal it is to offer the lowest possible rates for their
services. Matulis (2013) argues that this competitive
contracting has disproportionately benefited the wealthier,
bigger landowners as the potential for savings are
correlated with the contract size. Thus, the liberalization of
the forestry sector may very well be harming the most
vulnerable participants of the supply side of the market.
Another complaint found throughout the interviews with
clients enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’ program suggests a
second asymmetry between the potential clients of the
program based on the economic viability for these to
pursue the certification; only this time related to the
‘nature’ of their operations, and not necessarily to their
52Estimate
provided by personal communications with both J. Lopez,
Mapache rent-a-car; and V. Espinoza, ICT in May and April 2016.
226
‘scale’. The following extract of an interview with an actor
enrolled in an organization certified ‘C-Neutral’ can better
illustrate this point:
Subject: Certifying yourself is not cheap. Its more or
less, in theory, $2,500.00 Dollars; $7.5 Dollars per
ton [of offset CO2e].
For an organization like this*; but for a PYME**,
or a [automotive/ manufacturing/ etc.]
workshop, or a company dedicated to public transports
that generates more than 1,000 tons; by $7.5
Dollars? Getting certified will be no [good] deal. Plus
the measures that they would have to take to reduce
their footprint? Otherwise they would generate more
and more [emissions]… and for what?
*A financial entity seated in an office block
building designed to current emission and
energetic efficiency standards.
**PYME: Small and medium size companies.
(M. Alvez, personal communication, April 5, 2016. My translation.)
Another of my informants –enrolled in FONAFIFO’s
marketing department– for instance, explained how some
cement-producing firms showed particular interest in the
certification; but that eventually dismissed the possibility of
participating in light of the huge investment it would mean
for them in terms of technological improvements, and in
terms of compensating their residual emissions.
227
Considering all the above mentioned issues, it now
becomes clear that from the start, the target group of the
‘C-Neutral’ has been the private sector and particularly
those organizations and businesses that are ‘large’ or
‘profitable’ enough to afford all the different expenses
required to apply for, obtain, and maintain the certification.
Nevertheless, the target group of the certification are
organizations that are additionally not enrolled in certain
types of economic activities based on particular productive
processes that yield large amounts of emissions. These two
reasons practically rule out any realistic possibility for
public entities to take part in the program all together.
This, as follows, was pointed out by one of my informants
whose organization is certified ‘C-neutral’:
Subject: What is going to happen now that the
country has that [2021] goal; now that everything that
comprises the government, and its public companies,
has to become a part of these programs and be its
guarantors? When [Government and state
entities] have that amount of human recourses; when
they have to apply the normative to all of them; that’s
going to mean an additional cost for them.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Precisely today I heard about MINAE
considering the costs of verification entities… because if
they try to enter [the C-Neutral program] they
already know they will not be able [to afford it].
(J. Lopez, personal communication, April 15, 2016. My translation.)
228
According to the subject, because of the government’s
large amount of human recourses –yet I would also add
because of its material recourses in general, and its
intensive energetic needs–, in relation to its limited budget;
and in combination with the elevated costs of the
certification process, it is unlikely to consider the ‘CNeutral’ certification as a feasible alternative for the state
itself. That is, for reducing its GHG emissions in light of
the country’s ‘carbon neutral’ goal. What is more, this
assertion does not even question whether the ‘benefits’
promised from obtaining the ‘C-Neutral’ brand (such as
market positioning and business benchmarking) are
attractive for public institutions at all.
All things considered, I argue that the ‘C-Neutral’
certification program represents a space in which the Costa
Rican state transfers a great deal of the burden to reach its
self-appointed goal to become a ‘carbon neutral’ nation in
2021 to the country’s private sector. By doing so, not only
is the state justifying itself in its arguable inaction towards
reducing its GHG emissions but is also benefiting through
the provision of the demand and the supply sides of the
national carbon market.
However, the interviews made for this study show that, in
spite of some informants claiming that ‘the government
does not show by its own example’; many appear to accept
quite easily the ‘leading role’ of the private sector in Costa
Rica’s path towards ‘carbon neutrality’. Moreover, many of
them consider the private sector to be “the entity of
229
change in achieving the carbon neutral goal”53. Still, this
does not mean that those subjects that placed their hopes
on the private sector consider that public entities should be
left ‘off the hook’. On the contrary, several of them
alluded to the need to literally ‘force’ state institutions into
taking measures in order to reduce their carbon emissions;
hence reserving any ‘voluntary’ mechanisms, such as the
discussed certification program, to private entities.
Consequently, I believe that several coexisting forms of
environmental governmentality are performed simultaneously
as Costa Rica’s general environmental governance, and as
the nation’s attempt to reach ‘carbon neutrality’ in
particular. These different forms of governmentality target
different socio-material actors, use different methods of
translation and serve different, and sometimes competing
purposes.
I would argue that the ‘C-Neutral’ program represents a
technology of government inscribed in what Fletcher (2010b)
calls a neoliberal environmentality54. More precisely, and
K. Aguilar, personal communication, March 29, 2016. My
translation.
54 Although Fletcher (2010b), like Agrawal (2005) and Luke (1999)
mobilize the concept of environmentality as an extension of Foucault’s
original concept of governmentality; I will refrain from using the former
extended concept in my own formulations as I believe it is mainly
focused on the process by which socially situated subjects acquire an
environmental consciousness and reassemble their identity as
environmental subjects (Agrawal, 2005); whereas the original concept of –
environmental– governmentality works in a broader sense to explain the
socio-technical processes by which certain political rationalities emerge
53
230
following this author’s definition of the latter concept, the
‘C-Neutral’ is assembled as an effort to ‘combat climate’
through the promise of an incentive structure intended to
influence the enrolled organization’s use of natural
resources while reducing their ‘carbon footprint’. This
reduction is intended to be accomplished by altering the
cost-benefit ratio of resource extraction, and energy
expenditures respectively so as to encourage in situ
preservation (p. 176). Furthermore, the ‘C-Neutral’
program is intended to motivate the enrolled organizations
to align their ‘self-interests’, and to exhibit a ‘more
appropriate’ environmental behavior in line with the state’s
political rationality (Miller & Rose, 1990). This is possible,
once again, through the prescription of technologies of
government
–such
as
eco-certifications,
emission
accountability systems and the tradable ‘carbon-credits’–
assembled over the promise of delivering greater ‘ecoefficiency’ and ‘eco-competitiveness’55, and greater access
to a renovated ‘green’ market filled with goods and
experiences assembled as “green attractors” (Block, 2013).
At the same time, I believe that the ENCC (reviewed in
Chapter 1), particularly in its ‘Public awareness, education
and cultural change’ axis, constitutes what Fletcher calls a
disciplinary environmentality in that is intended to persuade
individuals –through formal education, ‘awareness rising’
campaigns, social media, etc.– to internalize the social
as the ‘logical solution’ to situated narratives of particular ecological
‘crisis’ or ‘threats’ (in our case, ‘climate change’).
As defined, and as promised by Costa Rica’s former Minister of
Environment and Energy Rene Castro (2015).
55
231
values and norms by means of which they will self-regulate
their behavior in ways consistent with the state’s goals visà-vis reaching carbon neutrality in 2021. An explicit
example of how this second form of environmentality is
being mobilized in Costa Rican environmental governance
discourses can be found in the country’s ‘Third National
Communication’ for the UNFCC that states: “the need to
build a national education and communication strategy on
the matter of climate change is imperative […this strategy
should] generate a reflexive and transformative social cycle
that requires changes in people’s daily practices, and in
their interpretation of reality” (Ministerio de Ambiente y
Energía [MINAE] & Instituto Meteorológico Nacional
[IMN] 2014, p. 98. My translation and emphasis). As this
shows, this form of environmentality then operates “through
the internalization of social norms and ethical standards to
which individuals conform due to fears of deviance and
immorality, and which they thus exercise both over
themselves and one another” (Fletcher 2010b, p. 173).
Unlike Fletcher’s neoliberal environmentality, or the disciplinary
environmentality, Costa Rica’s oldest, and arguably most
consolidated form environmental governance corresponds
to a third type of environmental governmentality which this
author names sovereign environmentality. This third type of
environmentality is bound to state-centered protectionism,
and just as Foucault’s concept of biopolitics or biopower, it is
justified as the defense of non-human life (Fletcher 2010b,
p. 177). In practice, sovereign –environmental– governmentality
is enacted as the direct exercise of sovereign power
through the construction and enforcement of codified
rules determined to protect biodiversity, and typically
materialized in the state-centered command-and-control
232
practice of erecting ‘national parks’ and patrolling their
borders. Costa Rica’s ‘national park’ system is arguably a
quintessential example of the protectionist ‘fortress
conservation’ model of the welfare state. In fact, and in
spite of the rather common claim that Costa Rica’s
‘Payment for Environmental Services Program’ (PSA)56 –
arguably the country’s strongest, and most consolidated
market-based environmental policy– has been instrumental
in reducing the country’s deforestation rates since the mid1990s, Sanchez-Azofeifa, Pfaff, Robalino and Boomhower
(2007) show how in fact “[a]ll of the prior policies [to the
PSA], including the creation of national parks and
biological reserves and the 1997 [forestry reform] law, have
very effectively lowered deforestation […] The success of
these previous programs subsequently left the PSA
program with little forest clearing to prevent” (p. 1172).
This conclusion is not an isolated one, but is on the
contrary shared by several scholars engaged in studying the
PSA program and its impacts.57
However, Fletcher argues that Costa Rica has shifted its
environmental governance discourses and practices from
enacting the sovereign environmentality determined on
‘preserving biodiversity’ in national parks and through
banning deforestation for example, towards a neoliberal
environmentality focused on conducting a campaign against
‘climate change’ –and hence in reaching ‘carbon
neutrality’–. As a result of this shift of paradigm, or ‘master
Which constituted the country’s first effort to link the country’s
forests to the emerging carbon markets.
57 See Blackman & Woodward (2010); Daniels et al. (2010); Fletcher &
Breitling (2012) and Rosendal & Shei (2014) for some of such
examples.
56
233
concept’ as he calls it, “Biodiversity preservation has thus
shifted from a worthy conservation goal in its own right to
an instrument, in many cases, in the campaign against
climate change” (Fletcher 2016, p. 139).
As a conclusion to this brief discussion, I contend that
each enactment of environmental governmentality targets a
different set of socio-material actors, uses different
methods of translation and serves different, and sometimes
competing purposes. Accordingly, while ‘national parks’
are enforced and policed directly by the state through a
series of top-down directives, restrictions and taxes on
Costa Ricans intended to preserve the country’s flora and
fauna, the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program and its the
INTE B5: 2016 normative are primarily intended to enroll
private businesses and organizations, carbon emissions,
preserved forests and forest plantations. Instead of direct
impositions, these technologies of government seduce the
targeted entities by promising them access to business
incentives, a renewed competitive edge in their respective
markets, the chance to be offset in forests, an improved
cost-efficiency in their operations, and the chance to be
accounted for in GHG inventories.
Additionally, I argue here that through the enactment of
the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program, the Costa Rican state
has found a viable mechanism to transfer what is perhaps
the largest share of responsibility of reducing the country’s
GHG emissions to the private sector. This however does
not mean that the entire burden of the ‘carbon neutral’
project falls on the shoulders of the private sector. As was
mentioned before, I believe that the ENCC was conceived
as a policy that at least partially seeks to render the
234
country’s entire citizenship as responsible for mitigating
climate change through the provision of technologies of
government –education programs, awareness rising
campaigns, circulation of statistics, online carbon footprint
calculators, etc.– and through the infusion of power
through increasingly participatory process intended to
objectify, standardize and render carbon emissions, climate
change and more generally ‘sustainability’ governable
(Holden, 2011).
Finally, I contend that with such market-based
mechanisms, the Costa Rican state has found a viable
option to decentralize, privatize and deregulate the
country’s environmental governance which had historically
been overseen and financed exclusively by the central
government. A burden that meant a massive –and still
unpaid– debt from expropriating lands to establish the
country’s national park since the late 1960s; a debt that
according to one of my informants was approximately
1,727.00 million US Dollars by 2015, and which the
country is currently paying at a rate of one million US
Dollars per year (P. Abarca, personal communication,
February 13, 2017). Ironically, the process of role-back
neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002) or externalization of state
functions (Swyngedouw, 2005) embedded in Costa Rica’s
current market-based environmental governance practices
are presently being oriented towards ‘cashing-in’ on the
country’s early environmental actions assembled precisely
as command-and-control implementations during the
country’s earlier welfare-state era.
235
Briefly: There are several coexisting –and often
competing– ways in which environmental governance is
carried out in Costa Rica. Each approach differs from the
next in the way that they each reproduce a particular ‘will
to govern’; in the means they each use to accomplish their
particular objectives; and in the specific human and nonhuman entities they each target. For example, while the ‘CNeutral’ program intends to seduce private business into
adopting ‘greener’ practices by offering them promises of
increased economic revenues, Costa Rica’s ‘national park’
enforces environmental conservation through top-down
‘policing’ and command-and-control regulations.
Correspondingly, concerns about the protection of
biodiversity –protected in ‘national parks’– have been
gradually downplayed in favor of concerns about ‘climate
change’ –as portrayed in Costa Rica’s ‘Carbon Neutral’
actor-network–. This move coincides with the country’s
shift from a protectionist and ‘state-centered’ conservation
model to a more market-oriented ‘neoliberal’ one in which
the responsibility of environmental conservation –
understood now as mitigating ‘climate change’ and
reaching ‘carbon neutrality’– are gradually being
transferred from the state to the private sector.
Costa Rica’s Domestic Carbon Markets
I would like to call into the reader’s consideration that the
review of this third section of the present chapter differs
from all previous reviews of this dissertation in two ways.
First, this subsection is not based on a single policy
document but instead on several heterogeneous sources
such as policy documents and manuals, academic articles,
236
and personal interviews. This means that unlike the
previous reviews I have done up to this point, in which I
have analytically dissected particular policy documents by
summarizing what I considered to be their most relevant
contents –that is, in relation to the topic of this
dissertation–, and by discussing them ‘in order’; I will
instead review the country’s carbon market more ‘freely’.
The reason for taking such liberty relates to the second
consideration. Namely, unlike all the previously reviewed
policies, the country’s carbon market is not yet officially
running. However, a ‘preoperative’ version of the market
has been supplying ‘carbon credits’ to the organizations
enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’ program since as long as that
certification was launched. This ‘preoperative’ carbon
market was legally bound to the ‘C-Neutral’ program
through the proclamation of the Country Program decree
which stated that “all compensation processes through
[UNCs] before the formalisation of the domestic carbon
market should be carried out by the [FONAFIFO].”
(MINAET, 2012, Article 5, Transitory 3. My translation).
Henceforth, the third section of the present chapter will
not provide an in-depth analysis of all the minutiae of any
given policy document or device but will instead offer a
review of how MINAE is expecting to assemble a ‘future’
domestic carbon market in a broader sense, while
simultaneously discussing several relevant issues related to
how the market is currently being enacted in a more
performative sense.
Therefore, the review of Costa Rica’s carbon market will
be split into two parts. The fist will review the design of
the future carbon market. This review will be largely based
237
on the ‘Domestic Voluntary Carbon Market of Costa Rica’
(MDVCCR, for its acronyms in Spanish) and on the ‘Costa
Rican Market Readiness Proposal’ (MRP), both published
by MINAE in 2013.
The second part will review the country’s ‘preoperative’
carbon market which is in fact the country’s wellestablished ‘Payment for Environmental Service Program’
(PSA, for its acronyms in Spanish), and which has been
steadily running since the second half of the 1990s.
Having said that, both analyses are expected to differ from
each other since one embodiment of the carbon market is
little more than a future projection, whereas the second has
accumulated over 20 years of experience and has
consequently been reviewed numerous of times by
scholars around the world.
2.1. Costa Rica’s ‘future’ Domestic Carbon Market
MINAE introduces the domestic voluntary carbon market
(hereinafter ‘carbon market’) in both the MDVCCR and
the MRP documents by acknowledging that the need to
develop such market was considered in the light of the
existence of the ENCC, the Country Program and the
INTE B5:2016 normative, and hence it was required to put
those three long term policies into motion. More precisely,
MINAE argues that it considered the design of the
domestic carbon market as a means to make the generation
of Costa Rica’s indigenous carbon credits or UNCs viable,
while rendering these as feasible alternatives to the CER
and VER credits recognized as available compensation
options by the INTE B5:2016 normative.
238
MINAE describes the carbon market as a mechanism of
voluntary participation that will help Costa Rica reach the
‘2021 goal’ through the provision of guidelines to generate
and commercialize carbon credits as established in the
INTE B5:2016 normative and the Country Program; and
from projects or activities located in the territory defined
by the legislation (Salgado, Dumas, Feoli, and Cedeño,
2013 p. 18). Moreover, MINAE argues that the Costa
Rican government “intends to establish a Domestic
Carbon Market as the primary policy tool to achieve its
Carbon Neutrality target. [And that such market] is
intended to assist Costa Rica to meet its target in the most
flexible and cost-effective way” (MINAE, 2013, p. 8. My
Emphasis). Hence, not only does MINAE render the
‘carbon market’ as nothing less than the primary tool to
reach the ‘2021 goal’, but it also insistently argues
throughout the available documentation that the market is
the most cost-effective mechanism available domestically
to meet such challenge.
In both the MDVCCR and the MRP it is insisted time and
time again that the primary objective of the country’s
future carbon market is to contribute to national carbon
neutrality in general, and to the ‘2021 goal’ in particular.
MINAE also argues that all though the domestic market
may eventually be extended to enable international
participation through the establishment of multilateral
agreements, the priority of the market must never conflict
with the nation’s self-appointed carbon neutrality pledge
(MINAE, 2013, p. 57). In other words, the future carbon
market is primarily concerned with figuratively ‘cleaning up
the house’ –in terms of offsetting domestic GHG gas
emissions–, rather than accommodating a new
239
international business niche, or as MINAE puts it “a
system that generates businesses, or a market per se”
(Salgado et al. 2013, p. 104. My translation). Moreover,
MINAE holds that the future carbon market must assure a
degree of environmental integrity that would allow it to be
recognized globally as a source of reliable carbon credits,
and not as a ‘branding’ instrument to sell the image of
carbon neutrality without concrete actions (p. 70).
Nevertheless, MDVCCR stipulates that through the
promotion of a ‘low emission’ development model, the
future carbon market will have the capacity to ‘improve’
the country’s overall image (p. 85). MINAE adds that a key
consideration in this matter is the nation’s international
recognition for its environmental policies which implies
that the transparency, robustness and above all, the
environmental integrity of the future carbon market system
should not be questionable (p. 104).
Once again, despite the market being strictly a ‘domestic’
one, MINAE does not dismiss the possibility that UNCs
can be acquired by international buyers, and that the
market can eventually ‘interact’ with other domestic or
regional markets in the future (Salgado et al., 2013, p. 18).
The supply side on the other hand is expected to include
project developers and wholesalers of offsets generated by
verified GHG emission reductions or CO2 removal by
sinks. Moreover, the market is expected to eventually
include intermediaries such as retailers and brokers
(MINAE, 2013, p. 8).
240
-Regulatory and institutional framework.
According to MINAE, this framework has been designed
to closely resemble two of the world’s most recognizable
standards: The Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)58
–as a reference for regulated markets– and the Verified
Carbon Standard (VCS)59 –as a reference for voluntary
markets–.
Four key institutions are to be created as part of the
market’s regulatory and institutional infrastructure. Some
of these institutional bodies have already been ‘approved’
in particular official decrees and legislations, however at
the time of writing this dissertation, none of these have
been officially appointed.
Therefore, only a short description of each of these, and
their primary function will be provided as follows:
a) Carbon Board: The highest governing body of the
domestic carbon market and the basis of the general
market structure. Its task is to ensure the fulfillment of
the different criteria and procedures related to the
market, and to systematically and continuously reviseand-improve the overall implementation of the market
(Salgado et al., 2013, p. 55).
Two permanent committees will provide operational
support to the Carbon Board: the ‘Methodologies and
Protocols Committee’, and the ‘Control and
Transparency Committee’ (see points ‘c’ and ‘d’ of the
Covered under the Kyoto Protocol.
A particular modality of the Voluntary Emission Reduction (VER)
standards.
58
59
241
present list). This board is expected to be constituted
by a variety of representatives from the public and
private sectors, as well as from academia and civil
society.
b) Secretariat: The main role of the Secretariat is to
provide technical and operational support to the
Carbon Board in the development of projects related
to project developers, activities and protocols. The
Secretariat is to be led by the DCC.
c) Control and Transparency Committee: Its role will be
to support to the Carbon Board in promoting the
optimum functionality of the market and overall
transparency. This committee is expected to be
comprised of members “linked to the market, but with
no interest in participating in it” (MINAE, 2013, p.
34), such as the IMN, union chambers, etc.
d) Methodology and Protocols Committee: MINAE
states that this committee is intended to be a ‘purely
technical’ one with the main objective of proposing
methodologies adopted by other standards or systems
to the Carbon Board, or to supervise the development
of context specific or indigenous methodologies. This
committee is to be populated by ‘experts’ from the
ECA, FONAFIFO, ICE and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock.
-The future carbon market is expected to accept two types
of projects:
242
a) Independent projects: Projects developed in sectors
where there are no registered protocols, or from
developers that prefer not to participate in any given
protocol.
b) Protocol projects: These are projects developed in
prioritized sectors designated as being of national
interest. These projects are defined as a voluntary
action to either reduce or offset GHG emissions.
Unlike the above these projects are under the direct
coordination of the Carbon Board.
-Carbon ‘reserves’.
The DCC proposed the creation of a ‘reserve account’
intended to act as a mitigation mechanism and to promote
market confidence. This ‘reserve account’, to be managed
by the Carbon Board and its Secretariat, “may be used as a
last resort to make up [UNCs] when a major event results
in non-permanence” (MINAE, 2013, p. 38). The idea of
these reserves is that buyers of UNCs will be issued with
replacement credits from this reserve account in case of
any unforeseen environmental or performative incident
that could eventually affect the supply side of the market.
These ‘replacement credits’ are to be readily available since
the Carbon Board is expected to withhold a predetermined percentage of the UNCs from each project
producing such credits, indistinctly if they are produced by
private and public parties (Salgado et al., 2013, p. 73).
-Benefits and incentives of the future carbon market.
MINAE enlists 11 benefits for participants of the market
including those that are attainable through the ‘C-Neutral’
243
certification program. Although I will not go through each
one them, I consider it to be relevant to briefly describe
the incentives that MINAE expects to offer participants
from both the demand and the supply side of this future
market.
Cost-efficient
system
Flexibility
Specificity
National
exposure
International
exposure
The market is to operate in a simple and
low-cost way so that all the enrolled
actors obtain overall better conditions
than they would typically obtain in any
international market.
The market may use simple protocols
based on the standardized conditions for
either each particular sector of Costa
Rica, or for carbon markets regulated
under the UNFCCC.
The market conditions will be based on
the national context; and not on generic
international standards –which are
understood as the ‘norm’ under CDMs–
and which do not target countries that
developed ‘early measures’, or that have
limited levels of emissions such as Costa
Rica.
The organizations that compensate their
residual emissions with UNCs ‘could’ be
included in a list of recommended
products and companies elaborated by
MINAE for the national market.
The organizations that compensate their
residual emissions with UNCs ‘could’ be
mentioned in the audiovisual material
[PowerPoint
presentations,
videos,
244
infomercials, etc.] used by PROCOMER
(the Costa Rican Foreign Trade
Promotor).
Savings
The incorporation of emission saving
activities and technologies will lead
enrolled organizations to operative
savings.
Long
term The nation’s compromise to reach the
market
‘2021 goal’ indicates the permanence of
the political compromise of the state
which assures the stability of the market.
Best
price The country’s future carbon market will
control on a provide competitive prices to those
national scale
selling UNCs which are projected to be
higher than those being currently offered
by FONAFIFO in the existing
‘preoperative’ market.
Additionally, the Carbon Board will
retain the authority to control the supply
of UNCs, and the market prices.
MINAE promises that “the price of
compensations will not constitute an
impediment to reach [carbon neutrality]”
(Salgado et al., 2013, p. 96. My
translation.)
Table H: Benefits for carbon market participants
(Source: Salgado et al., 2013, pages 95-97. My translation.)
-Benefits and incentives of the UNCs
MINAE on the other hand enlists the benefits that the
production and consumption of UNCs will have over the
alternative CERs and VERs credits which will also be
245
accepted in the ‘future’ domestic carbon market. It is
however stated in the MRP that entities wishing to be
certified as ‘C-Neutral’ may only submit CER and VER
credits if the Carbon Board authorizes them to do so.
MINAE argues that the purpose of this additional
administrative step is to incentivize entities to surrender
UNCs instead and, that way, lend support to domestic
GHG mitigation projects (MINAE, 2013, p. 40).
Moreover, the MRP dedicates one subsection of the report
to literally compare the UNCs to the CER credits, and
hence the CDM compensation mechanisms. MINAE
enlists the following as advantages of the UNCs over their
international alternatives:
-The UNCs standard allows offsets to be generated in
new sectors not sufficiently covered by the CDM (e.g.
transport) where the marginal cost of GHG abatement
may be relatively low. This is particularly relevant to
Costa Rica where the highest amounts of GHG
emissions are found in the transport sector, as opposed
to CDMs that typically focus on energy production
industries.
-UNCs have ‘a more programmatic approach’ than
CDMs which in practice follow a more project-byproject based approach. Hence, UNCs are produced
following a broader approach than their competition.
-The approval and issuance of UNCs is designed to be
flexible and less complex than the CDM, reducing costs
and entry barriers, particularly for small-scale projects.
246
-Costa Rica’s voluntary scheme is expected to impose
fewer transaction costs than CDM, especially through
the participation of national experts in the validation
and verification process. Hence, the administrative costs
offered at a national level will be lower than their
equivalent counterparts typically found in the
international level of the CDM.
-Besides the reduced administrative cost offered by the
UNC system at a national level, delays in the approval
of projects are also expected to be lower than those of
CDMs.
-Since UNCs are tied to Costa Rica’s long-term Carbon
Neutrality goal, it is grounded in a long-term policy
framework that offers a long-term price signal for
investors and decision-making. This situation stands in
high contrast with the CDM market that, according to
MINAE, is currently facing uncertainties regarding
market demand and price which have in turn already
affected the continuation of efforts to develop CDM
projects.
-Voluntary market mechanisms + Command-and-control
regulations.
The carbon market will only issue UNCs, and not rights to
emit GHG, which are typically linked to markets based on
‘Cap and Trade’ systems. However, in spite of the market
being initially based exclusively on voluntary mechanism,
mandatory regulations may be assessed in the future if the
scheme’s objectives are not met on a voluntary basis.
These voluntary mechanisms are by the way based on the
247
motivation of private organizations enrolled in the ‘CNeutral’ certification who seek greater competitiveness,
product differentiation and access to markets with
environmental standards (MINAE, 2013, p. 8).
MINAE also argues that there does not exit a
‘quantification’ capable of predicting the contribution that
the market will have on the country’s ‘2021 goal’ since
such program is essentially voluntary. However, MINAE
insists on the importance of linking that voluntary scheme
with other possible binding mechanisms for the
compulsory reduction and compensation of GHG
emissions. Thus, on the MRP document MINAE holds
that:
[The commitment to the country’s] low emissions
development strategy has been reinforced by the
government’s eco-competitiveness policy, in which
the environment and development agendas
converge to guide the design of command-and-control
instruments that range from legislation and
regulation on one side, to voluntary approaches and
market-based instruments on the other side,
including voluntary mechanisms like adoption of
standards and schemes of self-regulation” (MINAE, 2013,
p. 9. My emphasis).
More precisely, MINAE argues that “Costa Rica intends to
pay close attention to the strengthening of demand with the
study of a range of policy options to determine if the Cneutrality goal requires going beyond voluntary
participation into mandatory measures” (MINAE, 2013, p.
14. Original emphasis). This concern is at least partly
grounded on MINAE’s own projection that the supply of
248
UNCs will exceed the demand side of the market which is
currently based on the exclusive demand of carbon credits
linked to the ‘C-Neutral’ program. Therefore, the MRP
suggests that the government will evaluate additional
policies to encourage further voluntary participation
through mechanisms such as the demonstration of
convenience of C-neutrality programs to increase the ‘ecocompetitiveness’ by companies, and industry/sector
benchmarks as context specific references. Additionally,
MINAE suggests that the application of mandatory
policies like the obligatory declaration of emissions by large
emitters, and emission regulation and caps for industries or
sectors with high carbon footprint are to be explored
(MINAE, 2013, p. 31). In short, MINAE proposes that the
country’s ‘low emission’ development strategy, and
consequently also the ‘2021 goal’ are likely to be
unreachable goals if the nation’s voluntary mechanisms
(such as the ‘carbon market’ and the ‘C-Neutral’
certification program) are not accompanied with more
binding or compulsory measures which respond more to a
model of environmental governance tied to more
‘command-and-control’ measures rather than ‘free market’
mechanisms. Similarly, MINAE insists on the need for the
future ‘carbon board’ to retain the authority to control the
supply of UNCs, and that way to closely control market
prices. Hence, right from the outset of the ‘future’ carbonmarket design, MINAE calls for a more ‘hybrid’ approach
to its environmental governance model rather than a
purely ‘market led’ or neoliberal one. In other words, Costa
Rica’s future carbon market is projected to work more as a
civilized market that stimulates the redistribution of
economics and politics while recognizing and maintaining
‘internal’ differences and multiplicity; rather than a textbook
249
market in which ‘perfect’ neoliberal environmental
economics are enacted ‘by the book’ (Ureta, 2013). I will
return to this discussion later in the Punctual Observations
3.
2.2. Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’ Domestic Carbon
Market
Growing international pressure from international
financing parties in the first half of the 1990s, combined
with the appointment of a hardline neoliberal government
administration (1994-1998) led Costa Rica to downscale its
protectionist conservation model of the previous two
decades. This process ultimately led to the establishment of
the Forestry Reform Law (No.7575) in 1996; which also
created the National Forestry Financing Fund
(FONAFIFO), a semi-autonomous division of MINAE
assigned to manage and distribute the Payments for
Environmental Services Program (PSA, for its acronyms
in Spanish).
In May 1997 Costa Rica received $2 million US Dollars
from Norway as an initial payment in exchange for 200,000
tons of carbon equivalent offsets on 4,000 hectares of
Costa Rican tropical forest. This exchange in fact became
the world’s first international exchange of ‘Certifiable
Tradable Offset’ (CTO). This transaction, heavily based on
the PSA framework, already reflected the country’s interest
in selling carbon credits on an international market that
was expected to develop from the Kyoto protocol that was
250
proclaimed later that same year60, but that took an
unexpected turn that will be discussed later in Chapter 3.
Later that same year, FONAFIFO began providing
payments to land owners either for maintaining existing
forest, or for planting new trees on their privately held
lands. Hence, the PSA program represented a
groundbreaking implementation for its time that partly
targeted to influence landowners on land-use choices for
conservation or forestry purposes. The PSA program
recognizes 4 environmental services:
Mitigation of greenhouse effect gas emissions (fixation,
reduction, sequestration, storage, and absorption).
Protection of water for urban and rural use, and for
hydroelectric plants.
Protection of biodiversity for conservation and
sustainable use for scientific purposes, for the
pharmaceutical industry, for research, and for genetic
improvement, as well as for the protection of various
ecosystems and forms of life.
Protection of the beauty of natural landscapes, to the
benefit of both the tourist industry and scientific
purposes.
(Source: http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/home/psa_eng/)
60However,
Costa Rica officially approved the Kyoto Protocol later in
March 2002 with Law No. 8219.
251
These four distinct services are bundled together into a
single payment, which varies according to the specific PSA
modality in which a given parcel is enrolled (Fletcher,
2013, p. 157).
Despite this, and as can be deduced, our interest lays on
the first service of the above enlisted. In practice, the
‘Mitigation of GHG emissions’ service is provided through
contracts for either planned reforestation, sustainable
forest management, forest conservation, forest natural
regeneration, or agroforestry.
However, Blackman and Woodward (2010) found that the
difference in demand between these contracts is
remarkably asymmetric since payments for ‘forest
conservation’ are by far the most popular of PSA
contracts. More precisely, these authors show that 85% of
all land enrolled under FONAFIFO’s service payments are
enrolled under contracts for ‘forest conservation’. By
contrast, contracts for ‘planned reforestation’ and
‘sustainable forest management’ have respectively
accounted for 9% and 3% of all hectares receiving
payments (p. 1629). Lansing (2013) suggests that a possible
reason for this may be that despite consisting of smaller
payments than those earned in reforestation contract61,
At the time of Lansing’s study (2013), ‘forest conservation’ payments
consisted of $64 USD per hectare, per year; while ‘reforestation’
payments consisted of $980 USD per hectare in total. Today payments
for ‘forest conservation’ consist of approximately $289.75 USD per
hectare, while payments for ‘reforestation’ contracts amount to a total
of approximately $1,288.96 USD per hectare –in both cases distributed
in payments throughout a 5-year span– (“Pago por Servicios
Ambientales,” n.d.).
61
252
forest conservation requires less labor input and a smaller
initial investment from the landowner who simply has to
ensure that her or his land remains out of any sort of
production during 5 consecutive years (versus the 16 years
required in reforestation contracts). As I will discuss in
greater depth later in Chapter 3, keeping this asymmetry in
mind is relevant considering that the Kyoto Protocol
(alongside its CDM mechanisms) and consequently the
UNFCCC does not recognize GHG offsets from ‘avoided
deforestation’ –hence from PSA’s ‘forest conservation’
contracts– as a valid source of carbon credits.
Regardless of this, in making payments for the ‘mitigation
of greenhouse effect gas emissions’, what FONAFIFO
actually does is to purchase the rights to a landowner’s
carbon storage, which allows the agency to later re-sell
these rights to a third party in the form of ‘non-Kyoto’
UNC carbon credits. Finally, these ‘third party’ entities are
essentially those organizations enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’
program, who are required to purchase UNC credits in
order to compensate their residual GHG emissions, and
that way obtain the ‘C-Neutral’ certification.
At a discursive level, Stefano Pagiola (2008) argues that the
1996 forestry reform law that frames the PSA program
changed the justification for the payment of subsidies at a
discursive level from ‘support for the timber industry’, to
the ‘provision of environmental services’ (p. 713). In
practice however, the PSA program does not survive on
the environmental services it is set out to provide by a long
shot. In fact, only 0.5% of the program’s income can be
regarded as purely market-generated (Matulis, 2013, p.
256). Instead, in 2001 the state proclaimed the ‘Ley de
253
Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria’ which provides a
3.5% tax revenue over all fossil fuels sold nationally
directly to the PSA program through FONAFIFO. This
tax is presently the greatest source of income for the
program (www.fonafifo.go.cr/psa/).
Until recently however, the fossil fuel tax represented
approximately 40% of the program’s total funding,
whereas an even greater source of its funding (approx.
45%) was provided by international and multilateral
financial institutions, including loans and grants from the
World Bank, the German Federal Government through
the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (FfW), and the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF). These sources of funding –
which have recently been due– where intended to merely
‘kick start’ the market by providing a temporary support to
FONAFIFO while at the same time encouraging the
consolidation of future self-regulating markets (see
Fletcher and Breitling, 2012). Thus, despite the obvious
market-orientation of the program at a discursive level, in
practice the PSA continues to be unable to survive on selfregulating market mechanisms and has instead heavily
relied on international aid and direct state involvement
while employing the very mechanisms that it was intended
to replace. This means that despite FONAFIFO’s own
claims introduced above, the PSA continues to survive on
‘subsidies’ provided by both multilateral financing agencies,
and the national government through the creation of a
PSA quasi-market (Sierra and Russman, 2006).
What is more, Blackman and Woodward (2010) showed
how of all the funding that FONAFIFO categorizes as
254
user-financed62, 73% has come from sources that are not
purely private in nature. To be more precise, the authors
show how 71% of these payments came from the
government-owned electric companies CNFL and ICE,
while only 27% came from private firms, organizations and
individuals. Not only that, but Blackman and Woodward
also show how 93% of all funds of the entire PSA program
–and 78% of funds from purely private sources– targeted
hydrological services, while carbon sequestration was the
only other environmental service of the remaining three
modalities of the program targeted by more than 1% of the
program’s funds (p. 1631).
Barquero (2017) revealed that FONAFIFO is only capable
of paying between 20% and 30% of the solicitudes it
receives from landowners interested in enrolling their lands
in the program. The overflow of interested parties in the
program derives from the landowner’s impossibility to
enroll their lands in anything other than ‘forest
conservation’ since the 1996 forestry reform law legally
forbids any change of use over these lands. In other words,
a property that was not previously enrolled in agriculture,
ranching or even forestry plantation cannot, by law, be
enrolled in anything other than ‘forest conservation’. In
this scenario, landowners can only generate income from
their privately held forest covered lands either through the
PSA program, or through ecotourism –that is, if their land
happens to have any ‘touristic’ potential at all–.
Despite these difficulties that the program continues to
Which FONAFIFO itself calculates to merely have represented
0.5% of the PSA’s total income in 2011 (Matulis 2013, p. 256).
62
255
face; and besides the fact that the program is not entirely
focused on carbon sequestration but instead encompasses
several other services embedded in different environmental
concerns; the PSA program embodied the country’s first
rigorous effort to participate in the growing global effort to
address anthropogenic climate change through forestry
policy (Fletcher, 2013) and to link the country’s forests to
future carbon markets.
Punctual Observations 3.
I would like to start this section by continuing the
discussion surrounding the uneasy relationship between
the ‘market-oriented’ rhetoric that embeds both
embodiments of the Costa Rican domestic carbon market
–that is, the ‘future’ and the ‘preoperative’ versions of it–
and the more ‘command-and-control’ implementations
that the future domestic carbon market is expected to
have, and that have in fact ensured the financial survival of
the PSA program.
In contrast with the commonly accepted idea that both
‘Payment for Environmental Service’ programs and
‘carbon markets’ are representative of a global trend to
neoliberalization within environmental governance which
promotes the externalization of state functions (deregulation,
decentralization, devolution of governance to non-state
stakeholders), and creates markets for trading a
commodified ‘natural capital’; Costa Rica’s PSA and its
future carbon market provide examples of how neoliberal
tendencies in environmental governance are performatively
morphed and hybridized in practice. Again, neoliberalism is
not used here as a mere tag to describe a particular
256
economic or a political program, but as a way of thinking,
being, and acting; as a governmentality.
The process of creating a hybrid monster (Callon & Latour,
1981) of environmental governance speaks of the
commonly overlooked gap between rhetoric and practice
that nevertheless was identified by some scholars in regard
to the PSA case. More precisely, Fletcher and Breitling
(2012) argued that in spite of the program being originally
designed with a strong neoliberal vision which explicitly
promoted it as a neoliberal market-based mechanism
controlled by non-state actors; the PSA has in practice
deviated substantially from that original vision.
These authors show how the program does not only
survive on revenues from fossil fuel tax, and more recently
by a 25% share of the national water-use tariff imposed on
consumers of public water supply, but how there exists a
gap between vision and execution in the program’s
administration in three additional aspects: its governance,
its motivation and its outcomes (Fletcher and Breitling,
2012, p. 408). However, Matulis (2013) argues that in spite
of the apparent ‘failure’ of the Costa Rican state to deliver
the PSA as a pure neoliberal governance mechanism –
identified by the above authors–, the negative effects of
‘pure’ neoliberalism have in fact been ‘socially’ and
‘ecological’ detrimental. Moreover, he argues that “it is
possible that the shift in ideology embodied by the PSA
can represent the onset of the neoliberalization process,
despite the many overtly non-neoliberal practices that have
endured” (p. 256). Nevertheless, discarding carbon markets
for simply being another ‘neoliberal excess’ (Ureta, 2014a),
and therefore being inherently flawed, may lead to having
257
no serious instruments for climate change abatement left at
a national and an international scale (MacKenzie, 2009, p.
451).
I believe that Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative carbon market’ –
embodied as the state controlled PSA program– is a clear
example of a neoliberal + state centered hybrid that
prescribes market-based transactions between ‘private’
consumers of ‘carbon credits’ and private holders of forest
covered land. At the same time, however, it also requires at
least two direct state interventions:
-The purchase of over 71% of the total of
environmental services sold in the PSA program by the
government-owned electric companies CNFL and
ICE63.
-The imposition of a tax revenue over fossil fuels, and a
water-usage directed towards sustaining a quasi-market
that has handsomely failed to survive on its own during
its 20 years of existence.64
In fact, the present dissertation further contributes to this
perspective by arguing that the future carbon market of
Costa Rica not only does not distance itself from
reproducing this hybrid further, but instead it has been
designed from its very conception to further combine
elements from neoliberal market-mechanisms and statecentered
command-and-control
regulations.
A
combination that MINAE itself describes simply as the
63
64
See Blackman and Woodward (2010).
See Fletcher and Breitling (2012), and Matulis (2013).
258
country’s ‘eco-competitiveness’ policy (MINAE, 2013, p.
9).
More precisely, it has been insistently stressed in both the
MDVCCR and the MRP policy documents that the
‘Carbon Board’ will maintain control over the pricing of
domestic carbon credits in the country’s future carbon
market either by controlling the ‘price floor’ of UNCs, or
by controlling the supply side of the market by either
restricting market access to actors that could potentially
‘flood’ the market with overly cheap prices or by
introducing government owned UNCs in order to increase
the systems overall liquidity (Salgado et al. 2013, p. 105).
Finally, I find that that the explicit favoring of sales of
UNCs over other alternative ‘carbon credits’ represents
another evidence of this hybrid monster. As was discussed
earlier in this chapter, both the Country Program, the ‘CNeutral’ program –based on the INTE B5:2016
normative–; and now the MDVCCR and the MRP
documents –which sustain the design of the country’s
future carbon market– all recognize –at least rhetorically–
VERs and CERs as available alternative compensation
options for domestic buyers of carbon offsets. However,
as was shown until now, each of these policy documents
have at the same time explicitly recognized UNCs as the
favored –if not the only– recognized carbon credits in
Costa Rica in one way or another. MINAE states that
conditioning the submission of CERs and VERs for
applicants of the ‘C-Neutral’ certification represents a
mechanism to incentivize these entities to surrender UNCs
instead on the one hand, and to lend support to the
nations own domestic GHG mitigation on the other
259
(MINAE, 2013, p. 40). In other words, restricting the
purchase of international carbon credits will not only
ensure the liquidity of the country’s domestic carbon
market –and consequently the survival of the forestry
sector which supplies the market–; but will also avoid the
‘leakage’ of offsets which could potentially undermine
Costa Rica’s chances of reaching its ‘2021 goal’, and its
post-COP21 commitments65.
These hybrids of command-and-control and marketmechanisms are evidence of the heterogeneous nature of
‘neoliberalism’ understood as a process that is not only
heterogeneous, but a necessarily incomplete one under
continuous transformation (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Once
again, I make use of the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ not as
an end-state, but as a process of ever unfolding failures and
successes of articulations between heterogeneous sociotechnical entities and materialities as they are all
performatively
(re)imagined,
(re)interpreted,
and
(re)assembled to influence forms of knowledge through the
conduct of conduct (Springer 2012, p. 137), and temporarily
succeed –or fail– in becoming a commonsense of the times
(Peck and Tickell, 2002).
Another key argument that can be subtracted from
governmentality studies here, and which applies to the
hybrids discussed in this section, is that there is no such
thing as a ‘pure’ or ‘paradigmatic’ version of neoliberalism,
but rather a series of performatively enacted hybrids that
are geopolitically distinct and institutionally effected that
I will return to this particular issue in the Punctual Observation of
Chapter 3.
65
260
nevertheless rely on the fluctuating interchange between
local and extra-local forces at work within global political
economy (Springer, 2012); and in our case, within global
environmental governance networks. After all, Collier
(2009) contends that a more faithful reading of Foucault’s
own understanding of neoliberalism would entail a more
topological analysis fit to show “how styles of analysis,
techniques or forms of reasoning associated with
‘advanced liberal’ government are being recombined with
other forms, and to diagnose the governmental ensembles
that emerge from these recombinations” (pg. 99. original
emphasis).
Hence, when understanding Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’
and ‘future’ carbon markets, applying one or another
definition of environmentality as was coined by Fletcher
(2010b) –introduced in the Punctual Observation 2 of this
chapter– fails to recognize that both these enactments
combine elements of what he calls sovereign and a neoliberal
environmentalities. In other words, both enactments of Costa
Rica’s carbon market refuse these neatly delineated
categorizations because they in fact behave more as messy
objects (Law & Singleton, 2005) that cannot be ruled out by
prior methodological commitments to particular and
limited versions of clarity. Instead, Costa Rica’s messy
carbon markets are interpretatively complex objects that
mean different things to different people, and at the same
time multiple objects enacted into reality in numerous –and
often conflicting– simultaneous ways.
In other words, instead of trying to categorize Costa Rica’s
carbon offset markets as one or another environmentality, I
believe these particular enactments are best described
261
under the particular kinds of ‘work’ identified by Ureta
(2014) for emission trading schemes. More precisely, I
believe that Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’ carbon market can
best be described as the enactment of a civilized market in
that as it developed, it strived away from the initial textbook
pure-vision over which it was conceived –which according
to Matulis (2013) envisioned much more radical and
‘idealistic’ marketization and state withdrawal processes–
and morphed into a hybridized program assembled over a
much more heterogeneous set of practices, concepts,
policies, technical devices and (extra)local entities which
have together performed the overall common objective of
keeping the PSA up and running.
Considering that direct user financing for all four services
provided in the PSA program has funded less than 3% of
the area enrolled in the PSA program (Blackman and
Woodward 2010, p. 1627), and that 71% of those
purchases were made by government-owned companies; it
can be argued that Costa Rica’s PSA program (as a whole)
has performed poorly as a pure textbook market. Let alone
considering the ‘carbon-market’ modality of the PSA
program on its own. This modality is the only
environmental service besides hydrological services to
receive payments by more than 1% of the program's funds
(p. 1631). On the contrary, as a civilized market, the PSA
has developed into a complex network that not only
recognizes heterogeneity, but stimulates the maintenance
internal distinctions, and loops back a redistribution of
economics and politics under much more mutable,
adaptable and permeable configurations.
262
I believe that the lessons learned during the first 15 years
of the PSA allowed the Costa Rican state to re-evaluate its
overall approach towards designing its domestic voluntary
carbon market during the first decade of the 2000’s, and
the subsequent readjustments and trials undergone until
this date. This learning curve was always intended to be a
key element of the PSA since this program was always
expected to function as a ‘quasi-market’ that marked an
“intermediary stage in the formation of true markets for
environmental services” (Sierra and Russman 2006, p.
133).
Henceforth, I believe that Costa Rica’s ‘future’ carbon
market represents an exemplar of validity in which a much
more civilized market is projected to be tested in vivo
(Callon, 2009) soon. More precisely, MINAE already
acknowledges the need to combine command-and-control
regulations with voluntary mechanisms not only in the
eventuality that schemes objectives are not met on a
voluntary basis (MINAE, 2013, p. 8); but as means to
directly favor the sales of UNCs –over the alternative VER
and CER credits–; and to guarantee the permanence of
competitive market prices through exercising direct control
over the supply of UNCs, and through the establishment
of the market’s ‘price floor’.
Now, despite this market being designed –to a certain
extent– in both the MDVCCR and the MRP documents in
vitro (Callon, 2009) –as was reviewed in this chapters–, a
closer look at these policies reveals that they act more as a
263
‘roadmap’66 intended to guide the development of the
market in vivo rather than providing a rigid textbook of how
this market should precisely operate. This assertion is in
fact made explicit by MINAE itself by stating that “based
on the experience of different carbon markets systems,
[the MDVCCR] inform proposes the basic institutional,
technical and legal elements to establish a carbon market in
Costa Rica […], and provides suggestions on how the
domestic voluntary carbon market of Costa Rica could
operate” (Salgado et al. 2013, p. 14. My translation and
emphasis).
Although Costa Rica’s ‘future’ domestic voluntary carbon
market has been developed as its own program, with its
own sets of goals, visions and its own legal, administrative
and economic arrangements; it could be argued that it
represents a third phase of experimentation derived from a
predeceasing ‘preoperative’ carbon market that was tested
in vivo during the last two decades, and which culminated in
the in vitro re-design of the market’s socio-technical
arrangements, only this time separated from the PSA
framework.
Briefly: Both the ‘preoperative’ and the ‘future’ versions of
Costa Rica’s carbon markets have developed into
‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ exemplars of neoliberal markets
because they are deliberately and fundamentally
intertwined
with
several
command-and-control
The concept ‘hoja de ruta’, which translates to ‘roadmap’, is
explicitly used to describe the function of the MDVCCR manual at
least six different times throughout the document (see Salgado et al.
2013).
66
264
mechanisms in their very core. However, this should not
be seen as a ‘market flaw’ because there is no such thing as
a ‘pure’ or ‘perfect’ neoliberal market in practical reality.
Hence instead of a weakness, this ‘hybridity’ has in fact
provided Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’ market –or PSA– the
ability to operate through apparently impenetrable
dissidence, and to constantly adapt and transform itself
however it may be fit. Finally, from the experience
accumulated on the ground with the PSA market, the
country’s future carbon market has incorporated a
fundamental ‘hybridity’ that is intended to be tested ‘on the
ground’ rather than ‘by the book’.
Now I would like to turn the focus of the discussions
towards the particular way in which both embodiments of
Costa Rica’s ‘carbon market’ construct, mobilize, calculate
and manipulate ‘nature’, and how it is reduced to, and reassembled as, tradable ‘carbon offset credits’. This
discussion will focus on three different transformative
processes –which in practice are inseparable and at times
indistinguishable from one another– that determine the
performative ontological re-assemblage of ‘nature’ as
emergent ‘carbon credits’.
Firstly, and as was introduced on page 245, Costa Rica’s
future carbon market intends to establish a ‘carbon reserve’
account intended to act as a mitigation mechanism and to
promote market confidence. The establishment of this
fund perhaps partly responds to some voiced criticism
regarding the inexistence of a penalties associated with
potential failures to deliver carbon rights in the PSA,
anytime that forest holders break their long-term
commitments to reduce deforestation and enhancing forest
265
carbon stocks (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro and
Pacheco, 2011). Additionally, this ‘reserve’ is intended to
back up the carbon market in the eventuality that ‘nature’
itself threatens the permanence and proper functioning of
the forests-as-carbon-sinks (Lansing, 2009) enrolled in
production of UNC credits. Hence, this ‘carbon reserve’ is
intended to keep the market running uninterruptedly
whenever human and/or non-human entities fail to hold
their own liabilities associated with producing, holding and
exercising carbon rights.
The crucial thing to understand this ‘carbon reserve’ at a
greater depth is to consider what exactly it is that is being
held, replaced and eventually redistributed in and through
it. I find no better way to describe this but to quote
MINAE itself which states that “[t]he Costa Rican
Compensation Unit [UNC] is to be the currency of Costa
Rica’s voluntary carbon market” (MINAE, 2013, p. 44).
So the most basic question to ask here is ‘How is (the
inexistence of) an invisible ‘gas’ transformed into a
measurable, tradable, storable and circulatable currency?’.
For the sake of order, I will discuss the issue of
‘inexistence’ –as found in the above question– in the last
segment of this particular discussion.
I find the work of David Lansing particularly useful in this
discussion since it not only focuses on the analysis of
Costa Rica’s particular carbon markets, but it does so by
concentrating on how the materiality of ‘carbon credits’ are
performatively assembled through contingent practices of
calculation, and through the precarious assemblage of
heterogeneous socio-technical entities, materials and
devices. In short, the present dissertation not only shares
266
the same general ‘object’ of study of Lansing’s work, but it
also shares its material-semiotic sensitivity and analytical
approach.
A great deal of Lansing’s work elaborates on the
ontological conditions that allow ‘carbon offsets’ (the
object of exchange) and carbon exchange markets and
schemes (the field of exchange, also known as ‘the
economy’) to emerge through performative practices of
calculation,
measurement,
representation
and
displacements. Additionally, his work pays attention to
how ‘carbon offsets’ and ‘the economy’ –which in turn
defines the agencies of the ‘consumers’, ‘producers’ and
‘sellers’ of carbon– are mutually emergent and coconstituted effects of those contingent and situated
practices. It is here that, following the work of Heidegger,
Lansing elaborates on how under the purview of carbon
trading, all materials, bodies and beings that constitute ‘the
world’ are performatively reduced, calculated, displaced
and revealed as a standing reserve of objects subject to further
ordering (Lansing 2009, p. 57). Hence, understanding
Costa Rica’s intention to establish a ‘carbon reserve’ –as a
sort of ‘trust fund’ for its future carbon market– through
Lansing’s overreaching argument is pretty straightforward.
However, Lansing’s thesis is linked to this particular issue
far beyond the obvious etymological similarity (that is, the
similarity between Lansing’s concept of standing reserve
and the market’s proposed ‘carbon reserve’). In fact, I find
that the present dissertation closely relates to Lansing’s
research in at least the three different ways, which will be
elaborated below. Consequently, I have chosen to discuss
three key issues related to Costa Rica’s carbon markets
departing from Lansing’s own theoretical stands. At the
267
same time, I have linked this author’s positions to other
key scholars that have equally influenced the present
research.
First, Lansing discusses how the value of ‘nature’, objects,
beings and literally everything are not found in the things
themselves, but rather, the value of things lays in the
reductively understood notion of their designated
‘usefulness’ (Lansing, 2009, p. 55; 2010, p. 719). For
instance, the author shows how the value of trees is neither
an inherent or impregnated characteristic of these, nor
simply a ‘culturally assigned’ thing; but instead an emergent
effect of socio-technical practices that allow these entities
to be understood in terms of their ability to contribute to a
worldwide ordering of carbon. This understanding, he
argues, “is an approach that is predicated on a conceptual
understanding of the entire world as a singular, orderable
space” (p. 56). And precisely that planetary ‘singularity’ is
what ultimately renders the exchange of ‘carbon credits’ in
carbon markets as a feasible solution to global climate
change.
I find that this argument can be complemented with
Asdal’s (2008) assertion that ‘nature’ is made real through
practices of calculation in support of specific ‘economic’
arguments. Additionally, the purpose of protecting nature,
she argues, is not grounded on ‘nature’, but for the sake of
particular productive industries and markets (in Asdal’s
case fish-stocks in Norway, in our case carbon-stocks in
Costa Rica).
Lansing’s work, just like that of Asdal –and other authors
influenced by Michel Callon’s work on the socio-technical
268
emergence, performance and effects of markets– point
towards the need to study ‘nature’ and ‘natural sciences’
“in relation to another whole and another science: The
economy and practices of accounting” (Asdal, 2008, p.
130). Needless to say, the present dissertation attempts to
contribute to this particular call, and to this general
analytical sensibility.
Second, Lansing’s work sets out to establish links between
the socio-technical arrangements through which carbon
offsets emerge and the field of exchange in which these
emergent socio-material entities are performatively framed.
In doing so, Lansing engages in a material-semiotic analysis
of ‘neoliberalism’ that enriches the analysis carried out in
the present dissertation which has so far framed
neoliberalism as an active process of governmentality. To be
more precise, the author understands neoliberalism as a
socio-technical performance, and not ‘just’ a way of thinking,
being, and acting as has been augmented until now. A
position that is congruent with Collier’s call for precaution
in misreading Foucault’s own depiction of neoliberalism as
an imagined outreaching master category only definable by
certain technical elements. A misinterpretation that
furthermore does not allow empirical observation as it is
misused to both understand and explain all manners of
political programs across a wide variety of local settings
(2009, p. 97).
Lansing' (2009) depicts neoliberalism as a “[performative]
process that acts on the world in a way that is productive
of natural, cultural, and social hybrids: socio-natures,
cyborgs or quasi-objects (p. 89).” Hence, instead of
foregrounding it as an Marxian ‘hegemonic ideology’
269
(Springer, 2012); Lansing reads neoliberalism from the
‘bottom-up’ by focusing on the agency that ‘nature’ and
‘forests’ themselves possess in the performative assembling
of not only ‘carbon offsets’ but ‘the economy’ itself. He
places particular interest in how the process of
commodification embodies the transformation of
environmental processes into tradable commodities that
can be bought, sold and reserved for a price (Lansing 2014,
p. 1313). These tradable commodities I would add, emerge
either as objectified goods like timber, fish stocks, etc.; or
as providers of specific ‘environmental services’ such as
offsetting carbon emissions or hosting ecotourists. Lansing
recognizes the agency of ‘non-human’ entities in the
particular neoliberal process of world-making embodied in
the assembling both carbon-offsets and ‘the economy’
itself. He suggests that instead of thinking of
commodification as a process that acts upon ‘this forest’ or
‘those trees’ “[…] the commodification of carbon should
be thought of as a performance where both the forest and
the circuits of exchange through which it circulates as a
commodity are co-emergent as temporarily stabilized,
mutually imbricated, moments of being” (Lansing, 2009, p.
90).
Third, Lansing (2009) argues that in the neoliberal process
of assembling carbon offsets and markets, the materiality
of forests themselves ‘are not good enough’, instead what
counts are credible reports that register, displace and tell
the story ‘about’ the forests-as-carbon-sinks (p. 88). In the
author’s own words, “[…] under the overdetermined
framework of carbon offset trading, an offset’s
materialization
becomes
inseparable
from
its
representations, and the calculations themselves become
270
the useful thing.” (Lansing, 2011, p. 748). Hence, what
determines the value of ‘carbon offsets’ is not the carbonon-the-ground, but “the relational ordering between the
spaces of carbon storage, the carbon dioxide emitter, and
the atmosphere itself” (p. 747. My emphasis). ‘Value’ is
here again understood reductively and instrumentally as
degree of ‘usefulness’.
I believe that a further link can be drawn between
Lansing’s focus on the performative socio-technical
calculations of carbon and Lippert’s attention to the
“practices which bring corporate impacts on ‘the
environment’ into social, economic and political reality
[which] are now framed in terms of carbon” (Lippert,
2013, p. 1). The focus of both of these authors –and of the
present dissertation– is not on the chemical, physical or
climatological discussion of carbon (p. 20); but instead on
how carbon is being enacted by carbon technocrats and on
the contingent ways in which it is collected, measured,
accounted, displaced and (re)circulated. Or as Lippert puts
it, on the ‘social form of carbon’ (p. 20). The potential
value of approaching these issues from this perspective
lays in the possibilities it opens for analytically dissecting
how the socio-technical process of neoliberalism (understood
as the particular process of world-making from where
‘carbon offsets’ and ‘carbon markets’ simultaneously
emerge) is performatively assembled and black-boxed. In
Lansing’s (2011) own words “[…] natures, and bodies
come to be represented in ways that allow for neoliberal
projects to emerge as the logical solution to
longstanding development problems, with their final form
ultimately conditioned by the requirements of capitalist
value” (p. 734. My emphasis).
271
Briefly: ‘Nature’ is reduced to ‘carbon offsets’ (which in
turn are framed as the circulating currency of carbon
markets) through performative socio-technical calculations
embedded in neoliberalism. Hence, the materiality of
carbon does not pre-exist its economic manipulations.
However, nor does the field of exchange in which ‘carbonas-a-commodity’ is circulated (commonly known as ‘the
economy’ or ‘the market’). Instead, both ‘carbon’ and
‘markets’ are the co-emergent effects of socio-technical
practices of ‘neoliberalism’ (understood here as a
productive process of new realities).
Finally, in the socio-technical construction of ‘offsets’, the
physical, chemical and climatological properties of carbon
stored ‘on the ground’ are not enough. Instead, what really
matters are precisely the different practices of carboncalculations performed by ‘experts’ who socially determine
the emergent ‘form’ of carbon.
Having discussed these three initial ontological conditions
about carbon markets, carbon offsets, and the
performative process of neoliberalization, I would like to
turn the attention towards an additional issue that has, to
my knowledge, not been addressed by contemporary
scholars. This issue pertains the material emptiness of the
‘carbon offset credits’ exchanged in ‘carbon markets’.
As Lippert explains, under climate change, ‘Green House
Gases’ –commonly abbreviated simply as ‘carbon’– have
become the enemy to mankind. Here, “capitalist
economics organised to assumably allow the optimal
allocation and reduction of carbon” (Lippert, 2013, p. 5),
also known simply as ‘the market’, has emerged as the
primary mechanism. This instrument, Lippert adds, has
272
presupposed the privatization and commodification of
carbon emissions. MacKenzie (2008) adds that the goal of
these markets is to convey emissions within the frame of
economic calculations by giving carbon a price. He claims
“[a] carbon market is thus an attempt to change the
construction of capitalism’s central economic metric: profit
and loss, the ‘bottom line’” (p. 441. Original emphasis).
Lippert (2013) here again very sharply explains how
emission trading means that “an entity [B] can buy reduced
(saved) emissions from another entity [so that] entity B can
declare having zero emissions, being carbon neutral” (p. 6).
An assertion that is reaffirmed by MINAE who stated that
Costa Rica’s ‘preoperative’ carbon market (PSA) is based –
literally– on the principle of quien contamina paga or
‘whoever pollutes, pays’ (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía
[MINAE], 2011, p. 10). Hence, Lippert (2013) explains
how what is being sold in emission trading markets and
schemes are really negative emissions (p. 7). This means that
in Costa Rica, the objectified goods that emerge as the
tradable commodities of exchange in carbon markets are in
fact numbers in a computer screen or on a printed spread
sheet. These numbers intend to numerically represent the
results of certain sociotechnical calculations that estimate
the absence of the material presence of certain quantities of
GHG emissions in ‘Costa Rica’s atmosphere’.
In other words, when an organization purchases a certain
amount of UNCs, they are not really buying the presence
of ‘X’ amount of material goods (i.e. oxygen or any other
gas); instead they are buying the absence of another material
entity (Carbon, Methane or any other GHG). In order for
this exchange to work, different gases have to be
‘equalized’, or as MacKenzie (2009) argues ‘made the same’
273
so that they can be “allocated to market participants, made
transferable and tradable, and so on” (p. 443). Thus, the
performative process of ‘making things the same’ is also
instrumental –and indispensable– in the re-construction of
GHG as ‘carbon –equivalent– emissions’, and in the
construction of gases as tradable ‘emission rights’.
Moreover, MacKenzie (2009) discusses how this process is
both highly heterogeneous and politically contingent by
arguing that “[gases are] made the same by a combination
of measurement devices, complex natural science, and the
capacity (at least so far) of the [IPCC] to keep the
estimation of global warming potentials bracketed off from
carbon-market politics” (p. 447). Hence, the capacity of the
IPCC to project itself as an indisputable and unbendable
scientific authority on climate change is instrumental for
GWPs to remain black-boxed as “a matter for technical
specialists” (p. 446), that way keeping the ‘exchange rates’
between gases as a subpolitical matter based on sound
scientific practices separated from political and economic
disputes.
So once again, I argue that what is sold in carbon markets
in general are neither simply ‘rights to pollute’, nor cubic
tons of whatever gas –or gases– consist the imagined entity
colloquially called ‘clean air’; but instead an imagined voidlike entity capable of ‘erasing’ the materiality of another
polluting gas in an ‘equivalent proportion’. Here I use the
term void precisely to allude to the capacity of these
imagined entities to exist as sort of abstract hollows
inhabited with nothing. Furthermore, two key taken-forgranted assumptions must be put to work in order for
these void-entities to exist: First, that these entities can be
brought into existence through carbon-offsetting actions –
274
particularly through forest protection or plantation projects
in the case of Costa Rica–; and second that these entities
come into existence ‘at the expense’ of other material
entities, particularly –and I would say conveniently no
other than– GHG emissions. Therefore, an offset-as-a-void
brings into being a patterned order of interwoven absence
and presence which cannot conceivably exist if all of its
(non)materiality is brought together in a single space and
time.
Hereafter carbon offsets are made in disjunction as fire
objects (Law & Singleton, 2005). They are transformative
objects that emerge from “sets of present dynamics
generated in, and generative of, realities that are necessarily
absent” (p. 343). The transformations they embody are
nothing like the gentle and adaptable flows seen in fluid
objects (also known as mutable mobiles) like say carbon
calculations themselves67; but instead they take their
provisional form from jumps and discontinuities. In other
words, carbon offsets are fire objects in that they depend on
the abrupt enactment of difference between absent carbon
emissions, and the present forest biomass (trees, soil, etc.).
Lansing (2012) argues that “[f]or this equivalence to hold,
however, carbon must be stored in a specific place with a
degree of permanence. Otherwise, the consumer's
contribution to mitigating global climate change, and the
ultimate point of purchasing this commodity, will be in
doubt” (p. 212. My emphasis). Therefore, neither the rarely
disputed assumption that forests ipso facto sequester carbon;
67
See page 187.
275
nor the tables, charts and graphs that ‘demonstrate’ the
amount of carbon being offset are ‘enough’ to determine
offsets as a ‘fixed’ commodity because the variable of
permanence renders offsets as a necessarily unstable
commodity.
Aside from the introduction of this additional ontological
modality, Lansing (2012) suggests that the statement “‘this
forest sequesters [X amount of] carbon, so long as the
forest remains intact'” (p. 209) presupposes the black-boxed
assumption that forests in fact sequester carbon. In other
words, while the modality of permanence remains a matter of
concern, the assumption that ‘forests sequester carbon’ has
been stabilized as a matter of fact.
Although it is not the intention of this dissertation to
discuss the ‘veracity’ or even the ‘appropriateness’ of
relaying on forest biomass to offset GHG emissions, it is
relevant to mention how Baltodano (2008) elaborates a
small but wide-ranging review of literature discussing the
different ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘environmental’ impacts
behind the deployment of forestry plantations and
monocrops in the offsetting of GHG emissions. For
instance, he enlists the degradation of water, the drainage
of wetlands, and the displacement of communities among
other negative consequences (p. 10).
Additionally, to the issue of permanence introduced above,
the Baltodano argues that Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral’
initiative has failed to include an analysis of how much of
the country’s territory is necessary to enroll as carbon-sinks
in order to mitigate its own emissions –let alone the idea of
establishing an international carbon market–. This issue, he
argues, may well lead to an eventual competition for
276
available land between carbon-forestry, urban development
and agriculture. All in all, the author concludes that “the
possibility of offsetting carbon produced by anthropogenic
processes from the atmosphere through the establishment
of natural sinks is very slim” (Baltodano 2008, p. 11. My
translation). Moreover, Falkowski and colleagues (2000)
add that several different evidences seem to predict that
negative feedbacks between different climatological
processes and GHG are almost certainly signaling the
weakening of natural sink strengths in the foreseeable
future. They state “although natural processes can
potentially slow the rate of increase in atmospheric CO2,
there is no natural ‘savior’ waiting to assimilate all the
anthropogenically produced CO2 in the coming century”
(p. 291). Instead they suggest that these sinks may buy
some time, but they do not have the capacity to mitigate
the CO2 emissions projected in current emission scenarios.
The concept of ‘anthropogenic’ introduced in the last
assertions of this discussion, constitutes yet another key
ontological modality over which ‘carbon offsets’, ‘carbon
markets’ and ‘climate change’ itself are all constructed on. I
will return to discuss this condition in the next –and final–
chapter of this dissertation where I will explore its
fundamental role in the ontological construction of both
‘the problem’ of, and ‘the solution’ to, climate change.
Briefly: Carbon Markets embody the privatization of
carbon emissions. However, what is sold is not ‘carbon’
but –on the contrary– its absence. More precisely, what is
being sold are numbers derived from calculations that
estimate a balance between the material absence of a
certain GHG in one part of the globe, and a certain
amount of forest biomass intended to offset it in another.
277
The production of carbon credits therefore requires a
process in which gases are made the same. A process that
despite being politically contingent, is purposely projected
as being purely ‘scientific’ (objective).
Two assumptions make the emergent tradable entity –the
‘carbon offsets’– possible. First, a belief that carbons are
‘producible’ (in forest plantations); and second that by
coming into being, they are capable of ‘erasing’ equivalent
amounts of hazardous gases elsewhere.
The idea that forests can in fact offsets has been largely
assumed to be factual. However, the problem of
‘permanence’ of a certain forest-as-a-carbon-sink is
necessarily unstable. Finally, the mitigation of GHG
emissions through forest sinks may prove not to be
‘enough’ to cope with the ever-growing rate of global
carbon emissions.
278
–Chapter 3–
Capitalizing ‘early actions’
Introduction.
To this date, the UNFCCC refused to recognize ‘avoided’
deforestation as a valid source for generating carbon
credits. As I will show in this chapter, this negativity
responds to the belief that ‘primary’ or ‘old growth’ forests
lack a necessary ‘anthropogenic’ component which would
enable them to be conceived as a ‘man-made solution’ to a
‘man-made problem’. Therefore, the CDM mechanisms
defined in the Kyoto protocol accept carbon offsets from
reforestation and afforestation projects, but not from
forest ‘conservation’ projects.
The impossibility to generate authorized carbon offsets
from already standing forests has presented a particular
challenge to all those nations that established a series of
environmental governance devices at some ‘early’ stage and
managed to maintain significant parts of their forests
unspoiled. Therefore, several of such nations –led precisely
by Costa Rica– developed a proposal for a global
environmental governance device intended to persuade the
UNFCCC to recognize ‘forest conservation’ as a feasible
way to mitigate to ‘anthrophonic’ climate change. This
proposal, which would eventually be known as ‘Reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and
the role of conservation, sustainable management of
forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries’, or REDD+, is expected to allow
rain forest preservation to qualify for CDM project status,
279
and thus to deliver economic incentives to all those nations
that had ‘already’ stopped or diminished their deforestation
rates. In other words, based on a ‘results-based’ payment
system, REDD+ presents these ‘already green’ nations the
opportunity to ‘cash in’ on all previous actions, policies
and efforts to stop or revert the destruction of their
‘natural’ forests. Hence, the driving logic behind REDD+
challenges the UNFCCC’s separation between ‘natural’ and
‘man-made’ problems and solutions to ‘anthropogenic’
climate change.
This chapter describes Costa Rica’s proposal for its own
REDD+ strategy as an eminently market-based
mechanism based on the same framework as the country’s
‘preoperative’ carbon market reviewed in the previous
chapter, the PSA program. It then ventures deeper into
exploring the key ontological modality of ‘anthropogenic’
and follows how this imagined concept is being mobilized
in the construction of carbon ‘emissions’, ‘offsets’, ‘market
mechanisms’ and even ‘climate change’ itself. Here, I will
show how the ‘anthropogenic’ factor is a fundamental
component of the ontological construction of the
‘problem’ of climate change, and at the same time of its
‘solution’. Moreover, I will discuss how the imagined
separation between ‘man-made’ and ‘natural’ conditions,
that this ontological modality presupposes, further
accentuates the largely taken-for-granted belief in a
separate ‘social’ world ordered by politics on the one hand,
and on the other hand a ‘natural’ world populated by nonhuman resources waiting to be disposed of through ‘pure’
techno-science. Additionally, I will show how this
imagined separation in fact has concrete, material impacts
‘on the ground’.
280
In the following, I show how Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral
actor-network’ enacts a second ontological division that
this time determines the circulation, not the ‘nature’, of
carbon offsets ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the country. More precisely,
I show how an imaginary border separating an ‘internal’
and an ‘external’ distribution of offsets has led to the
emergence of the potential outflow of offsets ‘outside’ of
national boundaries. This is a form of market overflow I
have named offset leakages. In spite of the potential threat
that the leakage of offsets poses to Costa Rica’s ambitious
carbon neutral targets, I argue that the country still firmly
advocates the international recognition of REDD+ as a
means to capitalize its ‘early efforts’ in reverting its
deforestation rates. Simultaneously however, I hold that
Costa Rica implements specific procedural safeguards to
prevent the leakage of offsets in the ‘pre-operative’ carbon
market that supplies the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program
because. The reason for this is, I argue, that while the latter
certification program enables a tool for extending action at a
distance, REDD+ is seen merely as a tool to cash-in on the
country’s large extensions of protected forests. An
intention that is nevertheless presented with several
challenges that remain to be met by Costa Rica’s ‘carbon
neutral actor-network’.
Finally, drawing on the work of recent literature focused
on the economic practices that shape the emergence and
performances of markets –understood as socio-technical
assemblages (Callon, 1998; Çalişkan and Callon, 2010;
Pellizzoni, 2011; Ureta 2013) – the chapter discusses the
ontological conditions that determine –and that feedback
from– the emergence and leakage of offsets as they are
brought into existence through the myriad of practices of
281
qualculations mobilized in all embodiments of Costa Rica’s
carbon markets. I argue here that the country’s
‘preoperative’ carbon market as well as REDD+ operate
under the ontological belief that overflows –such as leakages–
are accidents that must be put to right by a properly framed
market. By contrast, I argue that Costa Rica’s ‘future’
domestic carbon market departs from an understanding
that market failures –rather than properly executed textbook
markets– are the rule. An assertion that is consequent with
neoliberalism’s tendency to operate “through, rather than
in spite of, disorder” (Pellizzoni, 2011, p. 795).
As a result of this analysis, I arrive to the identification of
three key aspects pertaining the material inferences of carbon
emissions, offsets and leakages as they are enacted in both
of the contrasting attitudes towards the framing of markets I
identified above: First, I discuss how ‘offsets’ are imagined
void-like entities believed to be able to ‘erase’ the materiality
of polluting gases liberated elsewhere in equivalent
proportions; second, I explain how entangled beings –such
as biosphere– are transformed into a passive and ownable
‘commodity’–such as a carbon credit– through a process of
objectification. When the emergent commodities are invisible
abstract entities –such as offsets– state intervention is
required in order to establish formal ‘property rights’; and
last, I argue how the creative capacity of neoliberalism is
characterized by a process of intense abstraction meant to
increase the manipulability and controllability of all the
emergent commodities and all the possible worlds they
populate.
Before continuing with what will be the last policy review
of this research, I would like to remind the reader once
282
again that this third and last chapter of the dissertation will
by far be the shortest segment of this three-part study due
of the following reasons:
First, much like Costa Rica’s ‘future’ or ‘projected’
voluntary domestic carbon market reviewed in chapter 2,
to the date of writing this dissertation, the REDD+
program is neither yet officially running nor has it been
conclusively admitted or dismissed by the UNFCCC in
light of many technical, financial, legal and socio-economic
issues still remain unsettled. In spite of this, several
REDD-based projects and start-up initiatives have already
been developed, or underway in a number of countries –
including Costa Rica–.
Second, and as a consequence of the above reason, this last
chapter will not provide an in-depth analysis of the
minutiae of any of the currently available policy documents
created to plan Costa Rica’s strategical immersion in the
expected international REDD+ initiative. Instead, this last
chapter will offer a modest insight to Costa Rica’s
REDD+ initiative by drawing on some of those
documents –which largely focus on particular technical
aspects such as the establishment of emission and
absorption ‘baselines’, addressing issues concerning land
tenure ship, etc.; and organizational aspects such as
planning for participatory consultation processes and
future institutional arrangements –but will instead offer an
interpretative depiction of how Costa Rica sees in REDD+
a valuable opportunity to further expand its ‘carbon
neutral’ actor-network by means of establishing new market
spaces capable of reaching beyond the current limits
established by the UNFCCC via the Kyoto protocol.
283
Hence, instead of going into detail describing the
performative practices through which the country intends
to establish a referential ‘baseline’ for REDD+, for
example, I will focus the discussion on an analyses of how
such initiative is performatively being assembled as a
potential international carbon-market capable of
capitalizing the nation’s ‘early environmental efforts’.
1. Capitalizing avoided deforestation and forest
conservation: REDD+
In 2005, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)
which was led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea at
that time, drafted a proposal titled Reducing emission from
deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action
for the COP11 convention celebrated that year in
Montreal. The idea behind this proposal was the
recognition of ‘forest conservation’ as a way to mitigate
climate change under the UNFCCC authority. This
proposal, which underwent two years of negotiations and
re-designs, culminated it what came to be known as the
‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD)’ policy by
the time of the Bali Action Plan of December 2007. This
new policy proposal, which essentially focused on the role
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and
enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing
countries, finally became consolidated as REDD+ once
the initiative came to include ‘the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests, enhancement of forest
carbon stocks and reforestation’ (hence the added ‘plus’).
284
The purpose of REDD+ is to develop a series of climate
change mitigation policies and programs intended to
reduce GHG emissions by essentially paying developing
countries to stop cutting down their forests. For this
reason, the program is expected to allow rain forest
preservation to qualify for CDM project status which
would in turn deliver economic incentives to nations that
have ‘already’ stopped or diminished deforestation –like
Costa Rica–, and not just for countries that still have large
and unresolved deforestation problems (Araya, 2015, p.
27). Unlike what currently takes place in ‘carbon markets’,
where a landowner is paid in exchange for allowing certain
amount of gases to be emitted, REDD+ is intended to pay
for the conservation and sustainable management of
forests in order to decrease global GHG emissions
(MINAET, 2011, p. 29). In other words, while ‘carbon
markets’ consist of spaces in which carbon offsets are sold
‘at retail’ to private entities seeking to ‘compensate’ their
residual GHG emissions, REDD+ intends to establish
itself as an international exchange framework in which –
developing– countries that still conserve their forests are
economically compensated by those other –developed–
countries who constitute the world’s most contaminating
nations.
Despite that since its first inception, the UNFCCC has
been less than clear regarding the positive incentives that
developing countries would obtain from reducing GHG
emissions through the implementation of REDD+
strategies, the present discussion will depart from the
understanding of REDD+ as an eminently market-based
mechanism. This particular approach seems to best
describe the path that Costa Rica has taken in the design of
285
its own strategy as can be seen in seen in the country’s
Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP)68 from 2011,
the Costa Rican National REDD+ Strategy: An
initiative of the Program of Forests and Rural
Development69 from 2015; as well as in a wide variety of
other related documents, some of which have been already
been referred to in the present study. Under this marketbased approach, REDD+ is to be understood as an
‘emission trading scheme’ based on the exchange of
‘carbon credits’ in a verified result-based system. An
overall scheme that resembles the Certified Emission
Reduction (CER) system recognized under the Kyoto
Protocol through its CDMs.
According to Saenz et al. (who were commissioned by the
Costa Rican government to elaborate the country’s R-PP
document), “Costa Rica has successfully implemented a
series of positive incentives directed to avoid deforestation
and improve the country’s carbon reserves during the last
15 years; yet has not obtained fair reparations for its
mitigation actions” (2011, p. 40. My translation). Hence,
the R-PP acts on the assumption that REDD+ will
increase the ‘value’ of Costa Rican forests through the
economical recognition of the ‘environmental services’.
This includes services such as offsetting of GHG
emissions, the production of ‘sustainable goods’ –like
‘sustainable’ timber– and the possibilities for tourism they
Saenz, et al. (2011) Propuesta para la Preparación de Readiness R-PP Costa
Rica.
69 Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (2015c) Estrategia Nacional
REDD+ Costa Rica: Una iniciativa del Programa de Bosques y Desarrollo
Rural.
68
286
provide.
Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy is largely based on the PSA
program reviewed in the second chapter of this
dissertation. The R-PP document contends that the
country’s REDD+ will develop a series of programs and
policies aimed at reducing the deforestation and
degradation through forest ‘conservation’, ‘sustainable
forest management’ and what the proposal calls ‘increase
in carbon stocks’, all of which will draw from the
experience accumulated in the PSA program (Ministerio de
Ambiente y Energía [MINAE], 2015c, p. 8). Furthermore,
the R-PP states that perhaps the most important lesson
learned from the PSA program is the need to be ‘flexible’
and to adapt to any circumstantial challenges (Saenz et al.,
2011, p. 42). Thus, the REDD+ largely echoes the way in
which the PSA program provided a basic model for the
development of the country’s ‘future carbon market’
(reviewed in chapter 2) which is also intended to be
embodied as a civilized carbon market.
However, Costa Rica’s large reliance on previous policies
such as the PSA program and others mentioned in the
nation’s different REDD+ documents are not be
understood as an exception to the rule. Instead, the
UNFCCC established that national REDD+ strategies
should adapt to the particular national circumstances, and
to the particular efforts that each of the participating
countries had previously assumed. Moreover, REDD+
strategies should also adapt to each country’s existing
institutions and mechanisms that address the various
aspects that REDD+ intends to tackle. The idea behind
this is to maximize the efficiency of each particular
287
strategy, and to respect the sovereignty and particularity of
each nation while avoiding the duplication of particular
efforts or actions (MINAE, 2015c, p. 30). In other words,
each country is expected to design their own national
REDD+ strategies in direct relation with their existing
environmental governance frameworks.
Therefore, Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy is based on 10
‘strategical options’ directed to either avoiding
deforestation and enhancing carbon stocks or
strengthening national technical capacities and forest
governance. From these 10 ‘options’, the first addresses
the need to ‘integrate carbon sequestration in national
parks and biological reserves’. Another five of the 10
options intend to further consolidate and expand the
existing PSA program, three propose the strengthening of
key state entities in charge of monitoring and enforcing
control over illegal deforestation, and the remaining one
intends to “Promote the substitution of products with high
carbon footprints for sustainable wood from primary,
secondary and reforestation natural forests” (Saenz et al.,
2011, p. 43. My translation). MINAE identified the lack of
an efficient and successful forestry sector capable of
producing, industrializing and commercializing timber and
other forest-derived products as one of the main triggers
for deforestation in Costa Rica, and as one of the most
important obstacles for REDD+. According to MINAE,
the reason for this is the currently lower profitability of
forest management in comparison to the profitability of
agricultural production. Considering that under Costa
Rican forestry law (law No. 7575) ‘forest management’ is
the only admissible productive alternative for forest
property owners, the latter will likely tend to keep their
288
lands currently enrolled in agriculture production as such,
rather than ‘switching’ these to the much less profitable
‘forest management’ alternative.
What is more, Saenz et al. (2011) argue that the PSA has
fomented an imbalance towards forest ‘protection’ of oldgrowth forests over ‘reforestation’ and ‘afforestation’
which has directly resulted in a deficit of timber in the
national market and consequently in the felling of
plantations at a faster rate than the technical availability of
timber. Additionally, this deficit has stimulated the
reemergence of illegal gross deforestation (p. 41). Hence,
REDD+ will discourage illegal logging by promoting the
production and consumption of ‘sustainable wood’ from
primary and secondary forests, and from forestry
plantations (Saenz et al., 2011, p. 47). I will return to some
of issues surrounding this specific topic later in the
Punctual Observation 1 on page 296.
According to MINAE (2015), REDD+ has been
implemented through a series of phases since 2011, which
are expected to culminate in a final ‘implementation phase’
based on a system of ‘result-based payments’, that will
generate economic incentives based on the country’s
performance in meeting its reduction targets expressed in
tons of CO2eq per year. In order to do so, the UNFCCC
defined five REDD+ activities which will shape its specific
projects or actions70.
However, Pedroni, Espejo and Villegas (2015, p.27) argue that the
UNFCCC has not explicitly defined these activities yet.
70
289
1
2
3
4
5
Reducing
emissions Reduce
agricultural
from deforestation
incursion in an area of
natural forest through
creation of alternative
livelihoods
Reducing
emissions Provide woodlots close to
from degradation
villages to reduce the need
for firewood collection
Conservation of forest Designate new national
carbon stocks
parks
Sustainable
Introduce a policy that
management of forests logging concessions create
reduced-impact
logging
management plans
Enhancement of forest Restore a degraded forest
carbon stocks
through the planting of
native species
Table I: UNFCCC’s five REDD+ activities
Based on Goodman (2015)
Costa Rica’s REDD+ implementation strategy comprises
the following three periods:
Economic
recognition for the
countries
‘early
efforts’
Result: Costa
Rica reduced
gross
deforestation
rates.
290
Period: 1997-2010
–Starts: creation of
the PSA program.
Finishes: Official
initiation
or
Economic
recognition for the
implementation of
the
country’s
REDD+ strategy
Mid-term
implementation of
the
country’s
REDD+ strategy
Result:
Pending
Result:
Pending
REDD+
program–71.
Period: 2010-2020
–Starts:
official
initiation
or
REDD+
program–.
Period: 2020-2030
Table J: Periods of REDD+ strategy implementation in Costa Rica
(Based on MINAE, 2015c, p. 34).
As ‘Table I’ shows, Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy has been
envisioned as a ‘result-based’ payment system in which
economic returns are retrieved retrospectively and thus not
in advance like in the case of Costa Rica’s ‘pre-operative’
and ‘future’ carbon markets where payments are issued
either at the start of a contract, or during its duration. This
condition, as will be discussed further in the next
subsection, represents a key opportunity for Costa Rica to
‘cash-in’ on some of its key environmental policies
implemented already over two decades ago.
According to MINAE (2015c), Costa Rica’s REDD+
strategy is not only consequent, but an integral part of the
efforts that the country has set in motion in order to reach
the carbon neutral goal for 2021 and INDC targets
Please bear in mind here that REDD+ intends to capitalize the
results from this period ‘retrospectively’. Hence the first stage of the
strategy concludes with the official ‘start’ of REDD+.
71
291
–reviewed in the first chapter of this dissertation– (p. 30).
In fact, a 2010 estimation of the Central American Institute
of Business Administration business school (INCAE)72
determined that the PSA program (the ‘backbone’ of Costa
Rica’s REDD+ strategy)73 would be responsible for 58%
of the total emission reductions necessary for the country
to reach the 2021 goal (Saenz et al. 2011, p. 48).
I would like to close this review of what is projected to
become the country’s REDD+ strategy which pertains the
role that the Costa Rican state is a expecting to fulfill; how
it intends to retrieve and administer profits from REDD+,
and finally the closely interrelated topic of ownership of
both forest lands and ‘carbon rights’.
Throughout the different documents intended to define
Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy, there is a latent insistence
in the need to set in order the issue of legal ownership over
forest covered lands. The reason for this is the fact that the
PSA program can only recognize payments for any given
environmental service to the legal owners of the forest that
provide these services. According to MINAE, the
existence of forest lands without formal property
registration in Costa Rica does not only generate a
disadvantage to land holders, but prevents them from
participating in the PSA program which in turn
undermines the further development of the program, and
consequently the country’s REDD+ strategy. MINAE
adds that that ‘non-expropriations’, and the still unpaid
Acronyms in Spanish for Instituto Centroamericano de Administración
de Empresas.
73 Kuper & Fernandez Vega (2014).
72
292
expropriations of land converted to national parks since
the 1970s have further undermined PSA since confiscated
land owners could be allured into committing criminal acts
in the surrounding areas, and on the edges of protected
lands that were once seized from them (MINAE, 2015c, p.
29).
Saenz et al. (2011) explain that in Costa Rica, “the owner
of the land is also the owner of the carbon” (p. 57. My
translation). Hence, since FONAFIFO can only buy
carbon reductions rights to formal land owners, carbon
rights cannot be transferable if land ownership is not
legally settled first. In other words, FONAFIFO cannot
buy and later –at a higher price– re-sell carbon rights
through either the current ‘preoperative’ carbon market
(PSA) or REDD+ unless legal ownership is first
demonstrated by the participating landowners. Having said
that, one of the main roles that the Costa Rican
government (through FONAFIFO) intends to fulfill in the
REDD+ is to become the strategy’s exclusive broker in
the commercialization of carbon rights. According to
Saenz et al., the expected profits generated by FONAFIFO
in REDD+ will be re-invested in programs to reduce
deforestation (2011, p. 59).
Punctual Observation 1.
As is mentioned in literally every single official document
with references to Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy reviewed
in this dissertation, this strategy can quite essentially be
understood as a further phase of ‘expansion’ of PSA
program.
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Kuper and Fernández (2014) argue that the Costa Rican
state decided to follow this approach in light of the current
deaccelerating of forest recovery rates in the country with
which under a business as usual scenario, the effects of
PSA would level off at 55% forest cover. Hence, to
counter that imminent stalling of the system, Costa Rica
plans to expand the PSA by another 342,000 Ha. Hence,
one of the country’s ‘strategical options’ for REDD+ –
mentioned before on page 290– is precisely to ensure that
FONAFIFO is capable of expanding PSA’s coverage to
include ‘natural forests under sustainable forest
management’ so that the current imbalance towards ‘forest
protection’ –as opposed to ‘reforestation’ and
‘afforestation’– on PSA contracts is corrected; and so that
the nation’s timber market does not continue to worsen
(Saenz et al., 2011, p. 42). On this latter subject, MINAE
adds that lack of a consolidated timber industry represents
one of the strongest barriers for REDD+ in Costa Rica
(2015c, p. 28).
Saenz et al. (2011) argue that an important reason for the
underdevelopment of the country’s timber industry derives
from the influence of “certain groups of environmental
activists who have satanized the consumption of wood as a
cause for deforestation and environmental degradation” (p.
44. My translation and emphasis). The argument continues
with the notion that the country’s REDD+ strategy should
finance an ‘awareness’ program directed by the
National Forestry Office (ONF, for its acronyms in
Spanish) directed to eliminate cultural, legal, technological
and educational barriers the currently disregard the use of
wood.
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An extraction of an interview conducted by the author
with a forestry engineer precisely enrolled in the ONF
echoes this position:
Subject: There are two axes at a national level: what
the general public sees, and what those of us that work in
the sector see. Those of us that are inside the sector agree
with conservation […]
As far as the general public, for them utilization is
satanized. [However] utilization, or a correct use of
timber, does not necessarily imply that there is no
conservation.
Interviewer: Sure.
Subject: So understanding conservation in Costa Rica
very much depends on which side you stand on. In other
words, if you stand on the side that satanizes, or you stand
on the side that should be the one of rational and correct
use.
Interviewer: Ok.
Subject: But people, when they hear felling… there is
still that culture of [making gestures of people being in
panic] “They are cutting down a tree, this is serious!”
So that’s what I was saying, people get like scared, they
sort of satanize it. But really, we should look at a forest
like a dynamic system which will, by nature, have trees
die.
(M. Villegas, personal communication, March 16, 2016. My
translation.)
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As can be seen in this extract, the subject argues that
positions towards the issue of conservation are relative.
Either you stand on the side of those who, because of their
ignorance, panic at the mere idea of any kind of use of
‘natural resources’ (such as timber); or you stand on the
‘right’ side of the balance, that is with those who support
the ‘rational’ (or ‘sustainable’) use of those resources.
Hence this balance is not merely a problem of interpreting
‘conservation’ as a flexible, multi-interpretable boundary
object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) capable of moving across a
same network while different communities of practice
relate to it in different-yet-simultaneous ways. Instead,
‘conservation’ is here depicted as an object capable of
defining the cultural, intellectual and even moral grounds
of any given standpoint. Besides, as the subject reasons,
trees will naturally die in a forest, hence felling a tree is not
morally wrong per se.
Once again, and to add to this position, Costa Rica’s
‘carbon neutral’ actor-network enacts the reluctance to
‘rationally utilize’ forests as a trigger of environmental
degradation in its own right. As Kuper and Fernández
(2014) argue: “If anything, the pendulum has now swung
too far the other way. The strict protection of natural
forests and the high barriers to sustainable forest
management have led to over extraction from less- well
protected agricultural lands and plantations” (Kuper &
Fernández, 2014, Forest management, para 4). To counter
this then, “REDD+ strategy seeks to finance a program to
eliminate cultural, legal, technological, and training barriers
that discourage the massive use of timber” (MINAE, 2013,
p. 27. My emphasis).
296
Now, I would like to turn the reader’s attention towards a
key ontological modality over which carbon ‘emissions’,
‘offsets’, ‘market mechanisms’ and even ‘climate change’
itself are constructed on. I am referring to the concept of
‘anthropogenic’. The relevance of discussing this issue here
relates to the reluctance of the UNFCCC and the IPCC (in
their role of global authorities in climate change) to
formally admit ‘naturally’ existing forests as a legitimate
mechanism to mitigate ‘man-made’ GHG emissions under
the CDMs derived from the Kyoto protocol. Hence, I will
discuss how the ‘anthropogenic’ condition is instrumental
in the process of semantic reconstruction of ‘forests’ under
the current global environmental regime, which today is
largely understood as a ‘man-made’ climate change. I will
show here how the ‘anthropogenic’ factor is a fundamental
component of the ontological construction of the
‘problem’ of climate change, and at the same time of its
‘solution’.
More precisely, the IPCC argues that “global assessment of
data since 1970 has shown it is likely that anthropogenic
warming has had a discernible influence on many physical
and biological systems” (Parry et al. 2007, p. 9). They argue
that the gathered evidence suggests that changes in many
physical and biological systems are directly linked to
human activity. Although the IPCC recognizes that
‘limitations and gaps’ prevent contemporary science to
articulate a more complete attribution of the causes leading
to the responses of the observed system to anthropogenic
warming, they contend that “the consistency between
observed and modelled changes in several studies and the
spatial agreement between significant regional warming
and consistent impacts at the global scale is sufficient to
297
conclude with high confidence that anthropogenic
warming over the last three decades has had a discernible
influence on many physical and biological systems” (Parry
et al. 2007, p. 9).
Therefore, the IPCC establishes an explicit separation
between ‘natural’ and ‘anthropogenic’ forcing factors by
using ‘climate models’ and ‘spatial analysis’ in order to
compare the observable responses of physical and
biological systems to changes in global temperatures.
Changes that the IPCC separates into ‘natural’ and
‘anthropogenic’ warming (Parry et al. 2007, p. 29) which
finally sustain other related notions such as ‘anthropogenic
carbon’ and ‘anthropogenic climate change’.
This separation, which has been successfully black-boxed in
global environmental discourse and in scientific
communities alike, is based on the modernist binary
ontological polarization that separates human from nonhuman entities. This modernist dualism can be explicitly
found in the definition of the notion of ‘anthropogenic’
itself. For instance, while the online Merriam-Webster
defines the concept as “of, relating to, or resulting from
the influence of human beings on nature” (Anthropogenic
2018a. My emphasis), the online Oxford Dictionary
defines it as “(chiefly of environmental pollution and
pollutants) originating in human activity” (Anthropogenic
2018b. My emphasis). Hence the notion is already
etymologically linked to the problem of ‘pollution’ on the
one hand, and to the modernist ontological distinction
between ‘humans’ and ‘nature’ –or between the
corresponding imagined realms of ‘socio-politics’ and
‘science’– on the other.
298
Needless to say, that public controversy surrounding global
warming by climate change ‘deniers’ has mainly focused
precisely on the reality, extent of and evidence for
supporting the thesis of man-made influence on climate
change (MacKenzie, 2008, p. 447). Falkowski et al. argue
that “[a]s we rapidly enter a new Earth system domain, the
‘Anthropocene’ Era, the debate about distinguishing
human effects from natural variability will inevitably abate
in the face of increased understanding of climate and
biogeochemical cycles” (Falkowski et al. 2000, p. 295.
Original emphasis). However, they also suggest that “[t]his
uncertainty should not be confused with lack of knowledge
nor should it be used as an excuse to postpone prudent
policy decisions based on the best information available at
the time” (p. 295).
This leads us to the second use of the notion of
‘anthropogenic’, only this time in the ontological
construction of the ‘solution’ to climate change. In order
to provide some context over the essential ‘anthropogenic’
ontological modality in the construction of the ‘solution’
and again, the ‘problem’ of climate change, I introduce the
following extract of an interview made to a forestry
engineer member of FONAFIFO:
Subject: One of the arguments at an international
level is that emissions are produced by mankind. There
has to be an anthropogenic effect to revert this process
as well.
So they [UNFCCC] also argued that forests where
299
entities ‘created by a divinity’. That they already
existed, and therefore could not be included in the
compliance mechanism.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Forests are supposed to be in balance […]
So there is no reason to include [conservation of
existing] forests, but instead new activities like
reforestation.
Interviewer: Sure.
Subject: They said that forests were not provided
with any anthropogenic contribution because mankind
did not do anything. A tree falls naturally, new ones
are born in its place and then there is a condition of
balance.
(M. E. Herrera, personal communication, April 1st 2016. My
translation.)
As the subject explains in this extract, the ‘problem’ of
global emissions and consequently the ‘solution’ to these
are both determined by an anthropogenic mediation. Since
human entities actively produce GHG emissions, they
must also directly and explicitly participate in the
production of the forests that will offset those gases. The
subject elucidates on how only reforestation –and
afforestation– projects are considered eligible options
under the Kyoto Protocol –and consequently the CDM–.
In other words, how the UNFCCC only recognizes carbon
offset from ‘man-intervened’ forests as the only authorized
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suppliers of ‘valid’ carbon credits. The subject also
describes why such global authority does not recognize the
protection of forests as a valid source of production of
carbon offsets by attributing the UNFCCC with a belief in
an ontological distinction between ‘man-made’ and ‘godmade’ forests.
Another of my informants provides a further description
of the necessary role played by human entities in the
construction and legitimization of forests-as-carbon-sinks in
Costa Rica:
Subject: One of our forests is primary. When a
forest is primary it is basically in balance, so it doesn’t
offset carbon anymore.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: But… that’s where the question of
defending our biodiversity comes in. Because many
times, [forestry] developers say “Well, it’s better, for
removing carbon, to cut down all of that [forest], level
it and start planting [trees] again; and that way we
are offsetting carbon constantly.”
(K. Aguilar, personal communication, March 29 2016. My translation.
Original emphasis.)
301
As this second extract shows, there is certain feeling of
‘contempt’ towards primary74, or generally ‘nonanthropogenic’ forests by certain actors participating
somewhere along the ‘production line’ of carbon offsets.
This extract provides further evidence of Lansing’s
argument that the ‘value’ of forests is understood
reductively and instrumentally in terms of their ‘usefulness’
in contributing to the worldwide ordering of carbon. A
‘usefulness’ that is nothing other than emergent effect of
socio-technical practices of calculation (Lansing 2009,
2011). At the same time the extract shows how, at least for
some, the preservation of biodiversity has been demoted
to a secondary concern within the global campaign against
climate change (Fletcher, 2016).
Accordingly, I would argue that under the current process
of performative reconstruction of the leading global
environmental discourse –in which the focus of
‘conserving’ the planet’s biodiversity has shifted to
‘mitigating’ climate change–, Costa Rica’s forests have
undergone a gradual process of both semantic and material
reconstruction. On the one hand, those ‘primary forests’
protected under the ‘fortress conservation’ model of the
welfare state, celebrated as the pinnacle of human
intervention for the preservation of the planet’s flora and
fauna, are currently being reconstructed as ‘useless’, or in
the best case as ‘inappropriate’ for the mitigation of global
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, primary forests are “Forest/Other wooded land of native
species, where there are no clearly visible indications of human
activities and the ecological processes are not significantly disturbed”
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2004).
74
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carbon emissions. Whereas on the other hand the
materiality of forests themselves are simultaneously being
reconstructed within the economic frames through which
carbon offsets circulates at a planetary scale. This can be
seen for example in the way in which the FONAFIFO is
explicitly incentivizing the plantation of a reduced list of
tree species capable of offsetting greater amounts of GHG
emissions or in the way in which the FONAFIFO is
directly limiting the tree species authorized to generate
UNCs in the PSA market, while explicitly incentivizing the
use of ‘genetically improved’ materials (seeds)75.
Hence, Costa Rica and several other nations with extensive
areas of protected forest have mobilized towards
establishing REDD+ as the embodiment of a muchexpected formal international recognition of ‘primary’ and
other types of existing forests as authorized producers of
carbon offsets. They do so partially by claiming that there
is indeed an active anthropogenic component to forest
conservation anytime that human entities are necessary to
prevent the destruction and degradation of these forests,
and to ensure their long-term permanence. In short, they
argue that in practice even primary forests are assembled
with an inescapable anthropogenic factor any time that
human entities intervene by ‘not doing’ anything to them,
and by ‘fencing them off’ so that they remain unspoiled.
For now nevertheless, the UNFCCC’s resolve in
exclusively recognizing ‘man-made’ forests (plantations) as
the single form of ‘anthropogenic solution’ to climate
change, presents a particular challenge for Costa Rica’s
75
For more details see Oficina Nacional Forestal (n.d.)
303
carbon neutral actor-network. As was introduced in
Section 2.1. of Chapter 2, the vast majority of PSA
contracts (85%) are enrolled in the ‘forest conservation’
modality; whereas ‘planned reforestation’ and ‘sustainable
forest management’ have instead received a comparatively
marginal attention76. As was also discussed, this asymmetry
is likely to takes place because unlike forest plantations,
forest conservation requires scarcer labor and a smaller
initial investment from the landowner. The problem, as
Pagiola (2008) explains, is that “[a]s most of Costa Rica's
emission reductions are generated by avoided deforestation
rather than reforestation, no additional sales of CTOs [are
being] made” (p. 716). Hence the country has failed to
enroll its forests in the grand international market of
carbon offsets –standardized as CDM projects–, defined in
the Kyoto protocol and authorized by the UNFCCC.
I believe that through such formal standardization of the
carbon exchange framework, the UNFCCC has
consolidated a mechanism of exercising action at a distance
capable of dispersing its authority across national borders.
Additionally, this standardization of the carbon market has
allowed it to emerge as black-boxed matter best left to
techno-scientific specialists, while simultaneously best left
alone by politicians and lay people (Barry 2001). Preserving
the imaginary boundary between ‘science’ and ‘politics’ is
central in facilitating a political action at a distance that is
capable of working ‘outside’ and ‘beyond’ the institutional
apparatuses of national-states precisely because it is
enacted as a local of sub-politics (MacKenzie, 2008, p. 453).
In other words, because it claims to be based on ‘pure’ or
76
See Blackman and Woodward (2010).
304
‘uncontaminated’’ technical expertise without any political
entanglements (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010, p. 80).
What is more, Barry argues that the emergence of
transnational political and scientific organizations such as
the IPCC itself precisely respond to the need to manage,
contain and control the overflows or externalities of technological
zones77 –such as carbon exchange markets– or in between
them. Similarly, Swyngedouw (2005) argues that the
emergence of these transnational entities is part of a
reorganization process of neoliberal governance, where
national states increasingly up-scale governance to such entities
by “increasingly [delegating] regulatory and other tasks to
other and higher scales or levels of governance” (p. 1998).
This, however, does not mean that the construction and
circulation of standards is exclusively performed by
transnational organizations to control local action. Instead,
as Lippert (2013) argues, “standards allow governmental
agencies to exercise oversight over companies.
Governmental standards ‘dictate’, in their view, which
corporate materials and wastes a firm has to control, how
and how much (p. 13)”. Hence, in Costa Rica both
‘national’ (i.e. UNC credits) and ‘transnational’ (i.e. CER
credits) standards are simultaneously mobilized as
technologies of government that seek to translate political realities
into the domain of action (Miller & Rose, 1990).
According to Barry, “a technological zone can be understood as a
space within which differences between technical practices, procedures
and forms have been reduced, or common standards have been
established” (Barry 2006, p. 239)
77
305
Having reviewed the country’s carbon markets in the
previous chapter, and the expected REDD+ marketstrategy in the present, I believe two key conclusions
pertaining the ontological constitution and enactment of
carbon exchange schemes and markets can already be
drawn. Firstly, I have shown that the widespread and
largely black-boxed insistence on emphasizing the need for
an ‘anthropogenic’ factor in the definition of both the
‘problem’ and the ‘solutions’ to climate change has further
accentuated the modernist belief that ‘human’ entities are
ontologically other to ‘nature’. I believe that insisting in this
imagined separation contributes to the further reassurance
of the –also imagined– division between ‘knowledge
realms’ which has insisted in the differentiation between
politics (where ‘human’ entities subjectively construct
social reality) and ‘science’ (where ‘nature’ can be
approached through ‘objective’ science and technology).
This ontological polarization, I argue, has actively and
determinedly undermined the agency of ‘non-human’
entities by performatively reducing them to a passive, mute
and ‘helpless’ community of ‘natural recourses’ waiting to
be ordered by the modern science and technology of ‘human
kind’.
Secondly, and once again following the works of Lansing
and Lippert, I have shown that the materiality of ‘carbon’
does not pre-exist the calculative practices –embedded in
‘economics’– with which it is articulated. Instead, I have
shown that it is from the performative enactment and framing
of carbon-markets that both the materiality of ‘forests-ascarbon-sinks’, and ‘the market’ –as an emergent space for
the articulation of ‘neoliberal’ and ‘command-and-control’
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actions–, are simultaneously co-constructed and blackboxed.
Briefly: The ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ to climate change
have been defined by an imagined division between
‘anthropogenic’ and ‘natural’ conditions. This imagined
separation has been the base over which global
environmental authorities –the IPCC and consequently the
UNFCCC– reject the enrolment of ‘naturally’ existing
forests as a legitimate mechanism to mitigate ‘man-made’
GHG emissions.
This imagined division has further accentuated the
widespread believe in a separate ‘social’ world of human
beings and politics on the one hand; and a ‘natural’ world
of non-human resources waiting to be disposed of –by
humans– via allegedly ‘objective’ techno-science. This
modern dualist partition is not ‘simply’ limited to an
ontological debate, but instead has concrete material
impacts ‘on the ground’ such as the promotion of certain
tree species and genetically ‘improved materials’ in Costa
Rican forest plantations; and the decrease of ‘value’ of
existing ‘natural’ forests in light of their prescribed
‘uselessness’ in the mitigation of carbon emissions. In
short, neither the materiality of ‘forests’, ‘carbon offsets’,
nor ‘markets’ pre-exist the practices of calculations
performed by technocrats enrolled in politically biased
settings.
In spite of that, widespread trust in the alleged ‘objectivity’
of such ‘experts’ is indispensable in assuring the successful
‘standardization’ of national and international carbon
trading schemes. It is through the emergence of ‘standards’
that both global environmental authorities and national
governments are able to exercise control ‘at a distance’
307
without the need to directly enforce order over national
states, or private companies and individuals respectively.
As I briefly introduced in the second chapter of this
dissertation, Costa Rica’s has actively –yet not explicitly–
restricted the sale of international carbon credits –such as
CERs and VERs– in both embodiments of its domestic
carbon markets as a means to ensure the liquidity and the
flow of supply of these markets. Simultaneously, this
performative restriction has also been mobilized as a
mechanism to avoid the ‘leakage’ of offsets which could
potentially undermine Costa Rica’s chances of reaching its
‘2021 goal’, and its post-COP21 commitments.
The ‘leakages’ I refer to above should not be confused
with what the IPCC defines as ‘carbon leakages’ which
describe “the increase in CO2 emissions outside the
countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the
reduction in the emissions of these countries” (Baker et al.,
2007, p. 665). Instead, several of my informants referred
simply as ‘leakages’ to the potential problem that may arise
from the outflow of units of ‘carbon offset’ sold or bought
outside of national boundaries. To better explain this
concept, which I will name Offset leakages for the lack of
an existing term –at least to my knowledge–, I present an
extract of an interview made to a high-ranking member of
the DCC’s technical team of engineers:
Subject: Agreement 36-2012, which is the Carbon
Neutral Country Program, accepts three
compensation mechanisms: the pioneer which was the
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CDM that certifies emission reductions through the
voluntary options that can either be the ‘Gold
Standard’ or the ‘Voluntary Carbon Standard’. The
Country Program also(!) accepts the UCCs.
Interviewer: Ok, so you mean to say that national
markets are a practical response to somehow solidify
the sale of national carbon, let’s say, independently of
whatever processes are taking place internationally?
Subject: The thing is that, well, anyone… has the
right to go to any market they prefer. I mean it’s a
matter of ‘free market’ […] you cannot constrain
[buyers] by saying “you can only buy from me”
because then it turns into a ‘monopoly’.
Interviewer: Hmm.
Subject: So, what I make is a recommendation…
because if we want to reach carbon neutrality, the
ideal is that our removed tons of CO2 equivalent stay
here in the country. Because if we start having
leakages, well, we probably cannot account these for.
(K. Aguilar, personal communication, March 29, 2016. My translation.)
In this extract, my informant addresses at least two
interrelated issues that concern this type of leakage. Firstly,
the subject argues that while the Costa Rican carbon
market is based on an alleged overall principle of ‘free
market’ that ensures consumers freedom to buy their
‘carbon credits’ wherever and from whomever they desire,
the Country Program does take the liberty to ‘recommend’
Costa Rican businesses to buy carbon-offsets units (UNCs)
309
to national producers instead of their international
competitors. Second, the subject suggests that what
motivates the Costa Rican state to promote the purchase
national carbon credits relates to the country’s
impossibility to account for (in its national carbon
inventories) any carbon offsets bought by local private
companies outside of the national borders. Hence, the
purchase of national UNCs on the contrary, allows Costa
Rica to get closer to its goal to reach the ‘2021 goal’; and to
account for these tons of compensated carbon in its
INGEIs, and in its INDC (reviewed in Chapter 2 and 1
respectively).
A different interview with an informant enrolled in the
specific department of FONAFIFO in charge of
developing and designing the country’s REDD+ strategy78
further confirmed the potential problem of offset leakages
while adding, among other things, a key difference
between Costa Rica’s pre-operative carbon market –which
supplies the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program with carbon
offsets– and REDD+:
Subject: [Since] the country presented its ‘[Intended]
Nationally Determined Contributions’; the country
will have to make a decision. That is:
“[those offsets] I generate with REDD+, those I
generated internally, do I sell them ‘outside’ or not?”
This particular informant is also credited as a member of the
technical team that designed Costa Rica’s Readiness Preparation
Proposal (R-PP) for REDD+.
78
310
Because if I sell them ‘outside’, I cannot account them
anymore. Or should I keep them inside?
REDD is made to sell [offsets] internationally.
Interviewer: Unlike [the] Carbon Neutrality
[certification]?
Subject: Unlike Carbon Neutrality which is focused
on the national [market].
In other words, [the] Carbon Neutrality [certification]
was developed to support the ‘2021 neutrality’
internally(!); REDD is an international(!) initiative.
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: Now we are in the process of opting for the
‘Carbon Fond’. The World Bank, the ‘Carbon
Fond’, will study our [REDD+] proposal and say if
it agrees or not.
Then the Minister [of environment and energy] will
have to say “what is the price you are offering me [for
REDD+ offsets]?”. “5 Dollars?... No, it doesn’t
work for me… 15 Dollars?... Ok, but let’s
negotiate… 25 Dollars?... Ok sold.”
Interviewer: Aha.
Subject: But why? Because he will have to decide
whether it suits me to sell at 5 Dollars, or whether I
should keep them so that the country fulfills the
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commitments that it will have to assume.
Interviewer: Got it.
Subject: That is the political decision that
politicians must make. But the Minister needs the
technical input we are generating for him, so he can
make that decision.
(M.E. Herrera, personal communication, April 1, 2016. My
translation.)
As the extract shows, the subject explains how the choice
the country must make of whether to sell ‘outside’ or keep
‘inside’ the offsets expected to be generated by Costa
Rican forests, essentially boils down to a ‘purely political’
one. A decision that nevertheless relies on the availability
of ‘purely technical’ data generated by the country’s
carbon-neutral technocracy. Furthermore, the subject
explains how the final political decision will likely come
down to a matter of establishing the ‘best convenience’
scenario for Costa Rica, which would largely be
determined by the amount of potential monetary profits to
be made with REDD+. Put plainly, a marginal amount of
profit made from the sale of offsets in an international
REDD+ market will almost certainly lead to dismissing
such exchange; while large gains may lead to the sale of
those offsets at the expense of being able to account these
in the nation’s grand carbon inventories and reduction
targets.
In the subject’s appraisal of the situation, the ‘C-Neutral’
certification program is intimately connected to a ‘inward’
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carbon markets in which offsets may be sold, but
nevertheless remain ‘inside’ Costa Rica; whereas REDD+
represents a ‘outward’ market in which profits may
eventually be made, but the offsets sold outflow ‘outside’
of the nation’s own carbon inventory. The distinction here
made between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is of course, an
imaginary and semi-permeable one, considering that both
embodiments of Costa Rica’s carbon markets –the
preoperative and the projected one– allow for buyers
based outside of the national territory to voluntarily
purchase Costa Rican offsets if they so choose to; but
those offsets sold are still going to be included as part of
the country’s own carbon reductions in its national GHG
inventory. Consequently, Costa Rica has emphatically
insisted on stating that “[it] reserves its sovereign right to
use international compensation units to accomplish its
goals within the National Contribution [and that any]
compensation units traded abroad will be registered in the
National Emissions Inventory to avoid double
accounting.” (MINAE, 2015a, p. 5). Rather than a ‘hard’ or
a ‘soft’ border, I describe this imaginary border between
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as a semi-permeable one with an unidirectional tendency (Lippert, 2013, p. 455) in light of the
asymmetrical flow of circulating entities – ‘carbon offsets’–
that it allows.
To recap, by now I have identified not one but two
different scenarios from which offset leakages may emerge
from:
The first scenario includes locally based clients of the
‘C-Neutral’ certification program purchasing VER or
CER credits in foreign markets –instead of nationally
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‘produced’ carbon offsets in either of the two
embodiments of the country’s domestic carbon market–
in order to compensate their residual carbon emissions.
The second scenario includes internationally located
clients purchasing carbon offsets ‘produced’ in Costa
Rican forests sold in the potential international
exchange market of REDD+.
The main two differences between these scenarios are,
first, that while Costa Rica would still make a profit in the
second scenario (from the sale of ‘offsets’ in REDD+), it
would not do so in the first. Hence, as an attempt to avoid
this scenario, the country’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’
has in practice constrained the sale of VERs and CERs,
while nominally still offering them as an acceptable
alternative to UNCs. And second, that while offsets
‘produced’ by Costa Rican forests cannot be accounted in
the country’s National Emissions Inventory if they are sold
in REDD+, they can still be accounted in such inventory
regardless of whether or not they are purchased in the
domestic carbon markets.
The similarities between these two forms of offset leakages
are perhaps less apparent, and somewhat more complex.
The more obvious are first, that to this day, neither the
offsets circulated in the country’s ‘preoperative’ carbon
market, nor those expected to be commercialized through
REDD+, are fully recognized by the UNFCCC (and the
IPCC for that matter) since the vast majority of these
offsets are produced –or are expected to be produced– by
‘primary’ forests, instead of forest plantations. And second,
that both of these leakages are rendered as a threat to the
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country’s ‘carbon neutrality actor-network’ since these
offsets are overflows (Callon, 1998) that resist being framed by
the local technologies of accountability intended to aid the
country in reaching its 2021 goal, as well as all other
reduction targets included in the INDC.
However, I believe that this opens up a question
worthwhile considering: If Costa Rica wants to suppress
the emergence of these offset leakages in order to reach its
‘carbon neutral’ goals, why does it still push forward for
the formal recognition of REDD+ (which will inevitably
mean the outflow of tons of carbon offsets), while at the
same time deliberately limiting the local purchase of
foreign ‘carbon credits’ as a means to avoid the leakage of
offsets? I believe that a possible explanation for this could
be that while the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program –and
with it the domestic carbon markets that supply that
program with purchasable carbon credits– extends an action
at a distance capable of translating the ‘self-interests’ of
private organizations and individuals into a certain domain
of reality aligned with the state’s political rationalities,
REDD+ is seen mainly in terms of its potential to literally
capitalize the country’s ‘early efforts’. However, the
following extract shows how the explicit use of the notion
of ‘capitalization’ does not sit well with at least some
‘experts’ enrolled in Costa Rica’s ‘green technocracy’; at
least not at a strictly rhetoric level:
Interviewer: Is there an intention to capitalize
existing forest ‘stocks’ through REDD; like the
reforestation activity does with carbon offsets?
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Subject: Capitalize?
Interviewer: In other words, what does the country
gain from REDD?
Subject: Well, we are betting on getting a financial
recognition. I mean, financial [recognition for] those
actions made. But maybe when… when using the word
‘capitalization’ it seems more like ‘mercantilist’, right?
Interviewer: Hmm, aha.
Subject: I am not sure if I am understanding you
wrong?
Interviewer: No, no no.
Subject: Well, but… but let’s say that what the
country wants is: “I have invested ‘so much’. My
institutions, my policies have generated ‘this’”, right?
Interviewer: Hmmm.
Subject: ‘This’ is my base-line in reference to ‘this’, I
mean, I want to be recognized ‘this’ small part; and I
am going to continue with ‘these’ actions to be able to
charge in the future for ‘this’ [much].
(M.E. Herrera, personal communication, April 1, 2016. My
translation.)
Although this particular extract is rather self-explanatory, I
believe that a key assertion can be extracted from the
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subject’s depiction of this core purpose of REDD+. The
subject argues that receiving ‘financial recognition’ from
the country’s ‘early efforts’ is somehow other than
‘capitalizing’ them. This allegation is made over a latent
fear of sounding too ‘mercantilist’ which in turn is based
on a depiction of ‘capitalism’ as a suspicious and greedy
evil foe. However, the expected recompense for the
country’s ‘early efforts’ should be, as the subject contends,
unmistakably monetary.
As was introduced in the previous chapter, several
authors79 have concluded that, in practice, “[PSA has] had
virtually no additional impact on lowering deforestation
because forest[s] would have been conserved on PES sites
even without payments” (Daniels et al., 2010, p. 2124)
because, as Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) explain, all prior
policies to such program –such as the creation of the
national park system, and the ban on deforestation
formalized in the 1997 forestry reform– arguably left the
PSA program with little forest clearing to prevent (p.
1172). Fletcher (2013) argues here that “[i]f such
assessments are correct, future expansion of the
programme in relation to REDD+ funding may be less
impactful than anticipated” (p. 169). Rosendal and Schei
(2014) go further to argue that even if REDD+ is adopted
by the UNFCCC and funds become available at a global
scale, Costa Rica may find it difficult to attract such
funding because the country’s deforestation rate has simply
been too low lately; or as they boldly put it, because Costa
79See
Blackman & Woodward (2010); Daniels et al. (2010); Fletcher &
Breitling (2012) and Rosendal & Schei (2014) for some of such
examples.
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Rica “is not ‘bad’ enough” (p.80). This has become to be
known as the ‘baseline problem’ in which the additionality
that can be claimed by REDD+ can likely be called into
question. Furthermore, Rosendal and Schei believe that the
latter problem could be a sign of REDD+’s bias towards
reforestation and plantations instead of forest protection
(2014, p. 80).
Besides the ‘baseline problem’, Fletcher and Breitling
(2011) believe that because of the country’s small size and
total forest relative to other attention-grabbing nations
such as like Indonesia and Brazil, its chances of accessing
REDD+ markets may be further undermined (p. 408).
Briefly: The outflow of units of carbon offsets sold or
bought ‘outside’ of national boundaries –which I have
named offset leakages– relies on the assumption that an
imaginary and uni-directional border exists between and
‘outside’ (where international sales of offsets occur) and an
‘inside’ (where domestic offsets are sold to local or extralocal buyers indistinctively). In spite of the potential threat
that the leakage of offsets poses to Costa Rica’s ambitious
carbon neutral targets, the country still firmly advocates
the international recognition of REDD+ as a means to
capitalize its ‘early efforts’ in reverting its deforestation
rates. An intent that is nevertheless commonly met with
certain discursive precaution. Finally, in light of Costa
Rica’s comparatively small size and excellent track record
in reverting its deforestation rates, the country might
‘ironically’ find it difficult to attract further international
funding for its REDD+ ambition.
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I would like to close this discussion by examining the
ontological conditions that determine –and that feedback
from– the emergence and leakage of offsets as they are
brought into existence through the performative processes
of qualculations mobilized in all embodiments of Costa
Rica’s carbon markets.
Form a modernistic perspective, calculations allow the
radically indeterminate chaos of ‘nature’ to be reduced to
the manageable order of ‘technoscience’. However,
Pellizzoni (2011) argues that since neoliberalism does not
rely on prediction –as did its earlier cousin liberalism– but
rather in speculation, it understands disorder as a positive,
enabling system condition capable of carving out
provisional room for purposeful maneuver (p. 797). Hence
Ureta’s (2013) depiction of the civilization of neoliberal
carbon markets is resonant with Pellizzoni’s hypothesis in
that, according to the former author, these markets tend to
embrace irreconcilable differences, constant mutations and
hybridity instead of textbook prescriptions of normality. In
short, the more heterogeneous, unstable, fluid and mutable
the world, the more manageable. Moreover, Pellizzoni
(2011) suggests that the construction of possible worlds
under –or rather, as– neoliberalism, is based on
uncertainty, creativity and imagination, rather than the
properly executed calculations of risk and formal
descriptive forces allocated to such textbook markets. The
latter type of markets, according to Çalişkan and Callon
(2010), can be defined as socio-technical assemblages that
“organize the conception, production and circulation of
goods, as well as the voluntary transfer of some sorts of
property rights attached to them” (p.3). Hence, unlike
civilized markets, textbook markets are expected to perform a
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series of complex practices that neatly frame (Callon, 1998)
the identities of the ‘goods’ being circulated, the ‘buyers’
and ‘sellers’ who calculate the values of those ‘goods’ and
the multiple locations or ‘markets’ in which trading takes
place (Ureta, 2013, p.3).
According to Callon’s definition of the opposing attitudes
towards framing and overflows of economic externalities, Costa
Rica enacts REDD+ and its ‘pre-operative’ carbon market
on the belief that “framing [or the textbook market] is the
norm –in the double sense of something that is desirable
and also statistically predominant– and that overflows [in our
case, the offset leakages] are exceptions which must be
contained and channeled with the help of appropriate
investments” (1998, p. 250. My emphasis). In short, under
Callon’s pure view, market externalities –like the outflow of
carbon offsets to foreign buyers– are simply the result of
imperfections or failures in the framing process of the
market, which in turn place the effectiveness of the market
in jeopardy (p. 251). Hence, offset leakages are still seen by
the country’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’ as a kind of
accident which must be put right while ‘the market’ is
something that happens by itself.
I believe that in contrast to REDD+ and the ‘preoperative’
carbon market –which are not coincidentally both based
on the same PSA program–, Costa Rica is attempting to
approach the design of its ‘future’ carbon market following
the opposite attitude towards market failures –or
externalities– identified by Callon (1998). This attitude has
that “overflows are the rule and framing is a fragile,
artificial result based upon substantial investments” (P.
252). Costa Rica’s more civilized ‘future’ carbon markets is
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projected to emerge in vivo from a fluid, heterogeneous,
mutable and incomplete process of framing based on
“reasoned bets over unpredictable futures” (Pellizzoni,
2011, p. 797) rather than predictive calculations and in vitro
‘tried-and-tested frames’ (Callon, 1998., 251).
There is at least three key points to be made in relation to
the material inferences of carbon leakages and more generally
carbon offsets in both of these contrasting attitudes towards
the framing of markets. First, and as was discussed in the
second chapter, the ‘carbon offsets’ sold in emission
trading markets are imagined void-like entities capable of
‘erasing’ the materiality of another polluting gas in an
‘equivalent proportion’. To do so, they bring into being a
patterned order of interwoven absence and presence which
cannot conceivably exist if all of their (non)materiality is
brought together in a single space and time. However, this
does not mean that offset-as-voids are entirely stripped away
from all materiality, nor that they are entirely abstract entities.
Instead ‘offsets’ materially exist as numbers –displayed in
computer screens or printed on spread sheets– and intend
to numerically represent the results of certain
sociotechnical qualculations that estimate the absence of the
material presence of certain quantities of GHG emissions
in ‘Costa Rica’s atmosphere’.
Second, the instance of the Costa Rican state on the need
to formalize the legal ownership of all forest covered lands
participating in the PSA market (hence also those willing to
participate in REDD+) has very concrete material
implications. As was discussed earlier in this chapter,
‘carbon rights' can become transferable to landowners only
if ownerships are legally recognized first. Hence, the Costa
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Rican state (through FONAFIFO) cannot profit from the
re-sale of ‘carbon offsets’ if such ownerships are not legally
demonstrated. This exchange is built on the notion that
“the environmental services generated by a forest or a
plantation can be considered an ‘active’ or ‘good’ that
belongs to the owner of the service provider” (Saenz et al.,
2011, p. 57. Original emphasis. My translation). Put plainly,
whoever owns the forest land also owns the ‘carbon
credits’ it ‘produces’. Hence, Callon’s appreciation on the
role played by national states in framing formal ownerships
is spot on, particularly in light of the non-material qualities
of carbon emissions and carbon offsets: “Only in cases
where ‘property rights’ are difficult to establish (so in the
presence of indivisible entities, for example: it is quite
impossible to establish a property right to the atmosphere
with a view to resolving pollution-related issues) is state
intervention required” (Callon, 1998, p. 264).
Costa Rica’s interest in settling forest/carbon ownerships
represents one of the five processes of marketization –or
market framing– recognized by Çalişkan and Callon (2010)
which they termed the process of pacifying goods. According
to the authors, this process implies that objectification work
must be set in motion in order to disentangle things from
their networks of connections. I believe that in our case
this work takes place in several moments. For instance,
when a forest covered area is set aside from its immediate
context and defined as a ‘ownable property’; when
particular sets of trees are highlighted from their
surrounding ‘eco-system’ as entities capable of sequestering
carbon; when the imagined ‘offsets’ produced by a
particular rainforest in Costa Rica are re-circulated as a
certain number of carbon ‘credits’ which end up being
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bought by private clients in Norway; etc. All these
examples of Objectification work transform entities from
entangled beings into passive things waiting to be ordered. The
‘goods’ that emerge from this process of disentanglement
can finally be transferred as ‘property’.
Among the several forms of commodification of
objectified things identified by Çalişkan and Callon (2010),
two are particularly relevant to REDD+ and carbon
markets in general: the emergence of ‘property rights’ –
which I have already introduced above– and the
emergence of ‘service provisions’. The latter form reflects a
transition from an economy of ‘material goods’, typical of
classic liberalism, to a ‘service economy’ as found under
neoliberalism. As has been discussed throughout this
dissertation, Costa Rica’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’
has clearly intended to demonstrate the economic value of
in situ natural resources. Hence, rather than ‘extracting’
them, it has developed the notion that ‘nature’ provides the
‘environmental service’ of offsetting carbon emissions in
forests. In this market-based mechanism, which has been
quite literally been embodied in the PSA program,
“[s]ervices are framed with a view to objectifying and
transforming them into packages, ‘things’ which can be
valued. Like other goods, they must be made describable
and predictable, with built-in safeguards to warn of
unexpected overflows” (Çalişkan & Callon, 2010, p. 7.
Original emphasis). The latter assertion can be seen in the
way the Costa Rican state has designed its ‘carbon reserves’
as an attempt to safeguard its ‘future’ carbon market from
unforeseen environmental or performative incidents that
could affect the supply of ‘carbon credits’; and in the
mobilization of procedural obstacles to contain the leakage
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of offsets in the country’s ‘pre-operative’ domestic carbon
market.
However, selling an environmental service such as the
‘offsetting’ of carbon emissions is not exactly the same as
selling papayas or even ‘ecotourism’ packages80. In spite of
the fact that the latter commodity can be understood as a
‘service’ rather than a particular stock of objects –like the
former–, it is a service that requires a wide range of
material entities –such as sand, palm trees, hotel rooms,
quetzal birds, airplanes, smoothies, etc.– to hold together.
‘Carbon offsets’ on the contrary are really imagined –and
fully abstract– void-like entities without any material
constituency whatsoever. Unlike a walking tour in the
rainforest, when an offset is sold, what is really being
purchased is the imagined material absence of a gas elsewhere.
This observation then brings us to the third aspect to
consider in relation to the material inferences of carbon
offsets, emissions and leakages.
According to Pellizzoni (2011), the key to the creative
capacity embraced by neoliberalism, is precisely abstraction.
Similar to Çalişkan and Callon (2010), he asserts that free
market capitalism objectifies ‘nature’ into fictitious commodities –
such as water, trees, or offsets– disentangled from their
socio-cultural and biophysical networks and are reassembled as increasingly dematerialized commodities. This
process of abstraction, he argues. “translates differences
into exchangeable equivalences, which means giving
Although it may appear that I suggested the exact opposite in the
introduction of this dissertation, in that earlier formulation I meant to
imply that what is being sold in each respective market was neither just
a ‘papaya’, a walk in a national park or ‘clean air’ from the rainforest,
but the abstract imaginary experience of buying something ‘clean’,
‘green’ and ‘pure’.
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disorder or contingency an ordered, manageable form”
(Pellizzoni, 2011, p. 797). Hence, the author argues that the
neoliberal era has been characterized by processes of
intensive abstraction which operates at an ontological level,
rather than at the epistemic level in which the capitalist
performance of classic liberalism operated. More precisely,
Pellizzoni argues that the ontological reconfiguration of
the biophysical world which gives way to the emergence of
a new plastic ‘nature’ –characterized by an ontological
fluidity– “[…] entails an increase in its manipulability and
controllability, since the limits of the world as
manufactured represent also its limits of meaning and
salience” (2011, p. 800).
The
performative
socio-technical
process
of
dematerialization and ontological reconstruction of ‘nature’
as ‘carbon’ –emissions, offsets and leakages– which this
dissertation has set out to follow, entails that the
resurfacing construction of ‘nature’ “is no longer
conceived as an objectively given, though cognitively
mediated, reality, but as a constitutively fluid entity, a
contingency purposefully produced and controlled for
instrumental ends” (Pellizzoni, 2011, p. 802).
Briefly: Discussion on the ontological conditions that
determine –and that feedback from– the emergence and
leakage of offsets as they are brought into existence through
the myriad of practices of qualculations mobilized in all
embodiments of Costa Rica’s carbon markets. I argue here
that the country’s ‘preoperative’ carbon market as well as
REDD+ (both in reality being different embodiments of
the same PSA program) operate under the ontological
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belief that overflows –such as leakages– are accidents that
must be put to right by a properly framed market. By
contrast, I argue that Costa Rica’s ‘future’ domestic carbon
market departs from an understanding that market failures –
rather than properly executed textbook markets– are the
rule. This assertion, I argue, is consequent with
neoliberalism’s reliance on uncertainty, imagination and
disorder in the construction of possible worlds.
Three key observations are made in regards to the material
inferences of carbon (emissions, offsets and leakages) in
both of these contrasting attitudes towards the framing of
markets: (1) ‘Offsets’ are imagined void-like entities believed
to be able to ‘erase’ the materiality of polluting gases
liberated elsewhere in equivalent proportions; (2)
Entangled beings –such as biosphere– are transformed
into a passive and ownable ‘commodity’–such as a carbon
credit– through a process of objectification. When the
emergent commodities are invisible abstract entities –such
as offsets– state intervention is required in order to
establish formal ‘property rights’; (3) The creative capacity
of neoliberalism is characterized by a process of intense
abstraction meant to increase the manipulability and
controllability of all the emergent commodities and all the
possible worlds they populate.
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–Conclusions–
The present conclusions intend to close this dissertation
with a series of speculative reflections on some key aspects
that arose during the development of this dissertation and
that I find worthwhile commenting on. Finally, I will raise
a series of specific questions, and some future challenges
coined throughout this study.
I would like to start these conclusions by addressing what
is perhaps the most speculative conclusion I will draw
here. One that loops back to the examples of ‘green actor
networks’ provided in the opening two pages of this
dissertation’s introduction which depicted a general metanarrative around the eruption of ‘green’ consumer goods,
spaces and experiences on the one hand; and a ‘trending’
population of ‘environmentally aware’ consumers on the
other. Only this time I would like to comment on what in
my opinion is a difference in the motivation between
buyers of ‘bio’ or ‘eco’ products in retail stores, and
booking an ecotourism vacation package in Costa Rica, for
example; and those organizations looking to ‘offset’ their
corporate footprints by buying CTOs in carbon markets. I
believe it is possible to conjure that while the first type of
buyer frames what is commonly assumed to be a global
ecologic crisis such as ‘climate change’ in a ‘moral’ sense,
the second type instead does so in an ‘economic’ one.
More provocatively, while buyers of ‘bio’ and ‘eco’ goods
and services are motivated to consume these products as a
way to mitigate their environmental ‘guilt’ –which may
often respond to very real concerns about ecological
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degradation, or personal wellbeing–, organizations buying
carbon credits ‘produced’ in forestry projects do so either
to access particular business incentives, to ‘greenwash’
themselves or in order to faithfully contribute to mitigate
the negative ecological consequences of an environmental
cataclysm that could potentially endanger their business.
The Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, for example, is the
largest consumer of PSA contracts directed to protect the
river streams that drive their hydroelectric power plants.
A second key issue I would like to revisit in these
conclusions is the troublesome definition of Costa Rica’s
carbon markets as precisely that: a market. According to
Çalişkan and Callon (2010), markets are socio-technical
assemblages that among other things “favour the creation
of values by organizing competition between autonomous
and independent agents” (pg. 3). Hence, they are
assemblages that delimit and construct a space of
confrontation and power struggles between independent
companies selling similar products and services. These
struggles, commonly known as ‘market competition’,
motivate companies to increase sales volume by offering
the best price, best product or best conditions –among
other strategies– to their potential buyers so that these
choose their product, rather than the product of the
competitors. However, I have shown that the Costa Rican
state has actively mobilized a series of practical –yet not
explicit– mechanisms to discourage or outright prevent the
market’s consumers from buying offsets from private, and
extra local alternatives (i.e. VER and CER credits) while
simultaneously offering its own carbon credits as the only
feasible option to consume. Furthermore, I have shown
how by controlling the only recognized ‘Carbon Neutral’
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certification option in the country –in fact, the only ecocertification available for any productive sector outside of
the tourism industry81–, the state also directly controls the
market’s demand for carbon credits. In short, I believe it is
possible to conclude that in spite of being generally
regarded as an archetypical market-based mechanism
prescribed under an eminently neoliberal framework of
environmental governance, both versions of Costa Rica’s
carbon markets in practice embody a state centered
monopoly that controls the demand and the supply side of
the market. A monopoly that by bypassing any sort of
external competition, aims at capturing all revenues and
market shares from all sides of the market at once.
A third conclusion worthwhile drawing here pertains to the
agency of imagination in the construction of ‘carbon’. I
believe that this dissertation has shown how –in spite of
the modernist believe that the problems of ‘climate change’
and other embodiments of what could be defined as global
ecological crisis are challenges to be met with objective
scientific methods, instruments and knowledge– the
problems and solutions to these challenges only really
emerge through an intense use of imagination. For
instance, I showed how the UNFCCC has established that
emissions from international aviation and maritime
transportation “should be calculated as part of the national
GHG inventories of parties, but should be excluded from
national totals and reported separately” (UNFCCC, 2017)
The ‘Certification for Sustainable Tourism’ or CST program exists as
a viable option for private organizations of that productive sector.
Nevertheless, the CST program is also controlled by the state through
the Costa Rica Tourism Board (ICT).
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because they are instead contained in an imaginary
‘international deposit’ specifically assigned for these
emissions. But in terms of materiality, it is not difficult to
realize that such ‘deposit’ is nothing more than a metaphor
presumably reflected in numbers on a spreadsheet which
nevertheless I could not find neither online nor elsewhere,
despite my persistent attempt to do so. As I have shown in
this dissertation, a very similar thing can be said about the
way carbon ‘offsets’ are brought, or better, imagined into
being as transferable void-like-entities capable of erasing
GHG emissions produced elsewhere, and in equal
proportions.
Consequently, under this perspective it could be concluded
that carbon markets are spaces of exchange that rely on the
‘trust’ placed in the assemblage of ‘expert’ knowledge,
calculations and technical devices rather than on the
chemical, physical or climatological attributes of any given
gas. Hence, I would suggest that the carbon technocrats
followed in this research at times arguably resemble the
weavers in Hans Christian Andersen’s short tail of ‘The
Emperor’s New Clothes’. Like the vain emperor who
parades before his subjects naked while believing to be
wearing a ‘magic’ new suit that is invisible to anyone who
is unfit for their position, offset buyers must rely on
nothing more than on a deep sense of trust in the practices
of calculations performed by technocrat ‘experts’. Of
course, I am not trying to suggest that ‘carbon technocrats’
are con-men or charlatans; nor that the calculations that
the former agents perform are a thing of ‘magic’ or
improvisation. On the contrary, I believe that these
particular techno-scientific practices require high degrees
of skill and rigor especially in light of the overall
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uncertainty and ontological fluidity that characterizes this
actor-network. However, I am suggesting that imagination,
belief and guesswork play a crucial part in the making,
accounting and trading carbon emissions and offsets.
In the remaining pages of this conclusion I will address a
series of the questions and challenges that rather than
focusing on the particular case of Costa Rica will address
more general concerns for the consideration of potential
researchers regardless of the particular case and context
they wish to tackle. These conclusions relate to three key
analytical dimensions of the study which I will attend in
the following order:
a) The dissertation’s contribution to the fields of
architecture, urban design and planning
b) The study’s contribution to the development of
environmental governance policies
c) Some potential aspects worthwhile exploring
further in a potential follow-up research at a postdoctoral level.
As was centrally argued throughout this dissertation, sociotechnical calculations are not limited to rhetorics or to a
series of things performed among ‘experts’ at closed doors.
Instead, the material form and attributes of any given entity
or object are emergent results of such interactions. In this
dissertation, I have traced how the calculative practices of
carbon calculations transcend spreadsheets and computer
screens and largely determine the materiality of ‘forests’
through the prescription of incentives supporting
monocrop plantations intended to offset carbon emissions
on the one hand, and to produce ‘sustainable timber’ for
the industry that is expected to emerge in close relation to
REDD+ and PSA.
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I believe that the present dissertation could be follow up
by a study on the socio-technical practices in play in the
current process of rediscovery and resemantizing of ‘wood’
as a ‘‘low footprint’ and ‘sustainable’ constructive material
for an architecture attuned with the global campaign
against ‘climate change’. A material semiotic study of this
issue would, in my opinion, allow to trace how the agency
of global environmental governance assemblages –such as
multinational carbon exchange markets and the global
parliaments of techno-scientific ‘experts’ that mediate
them– actively contribute to shape the material and
discursive outcomes of contemporary architecture. Such a
study could also follow the symbolic trajectory of wood
through different historical periods determined not only by
architectural tendencies, but shifting social-environmentaleconomical regimes. Likewise, this exploration could reveal
some of the key conditions behind the historical
fluctuations of socio-economic ‘value’ of wood and for
example reveal why this particular was considered ‘cheap’
or ‘ordinary’ in one period, and ‘sustainable’ and ‘elegant’
in the next.
In this same line, I believe that the field of architecture
remains a wide-open field to engage in studies focused on
exploring how theoretical and empirical ‘expert’ knowledge
remains largely unchallenged and black-boxed; and how it is
broadly mobilized and reproduced at a global scale at
particular points in times. An ANT-informed study on
architecture’s own black boxes could promote a critical selfreflection on the role we designers and architects play in
our practices both out ‘in the field’; and inside classrooms
and workshops. I believe that such a study could
potentially help designers and architects become aware of
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their networked practices, and to potentially avoid
reproducing existing power constellations unknowingly as
we mobilize taken-for-granted concepts (which we often
don’t fully understand) while playing the role of ‘experts’ in
our highly politicized fields.
Additionally, I believe that the fields of architecture and
design certainly represent a fertile ground for future
research engaged in theoretical and methodological
approaches which, like ANT and STS in general, are
sensitive to the agencies that non-human entities play not
only in design and planning practices –like those played by
digital and analog representation tools–, but in urban
environments –like trees, bridges and rail lines–. Needless
to say, I believe that such a study could reveal a certain
parallelism between the way the techno-scientific ‘experts’
mentioned in this dissertation purified their calculations as
a means to ‘simplify’ unnecessary complexity for decision
makers; and architects and designers –in their role of
technical experts– engaging in equivalent ‘simplifications’
to shorten decision making processes. What is more, the
same study could reveal how architecture’s own
technocratic discourses and representational devices are
often mobilized to deliberately silence-off any
uncooperative or unaligned actors and entities avoiding
that way the proliferation of controversies for the sake of a
so-called ‘common good’.
The last concluding consideration I would like to address
in regard to the dissertation’s contribution to the
architecture, design and planning fields arises from a
particular concern discussed in the end of the third
chapter. As I argued, the creative capacity of neoliberalism,
333
has meant an overall process towards intense abstraction
which, instead of reducing ‘nature’ to stocks of material
recourses like timber, beef or coal like classic liberal
capitalism, neoliberalism has shown a tendency to reduce
‘nature’ into more abstract and non-material entities like
‘carbon emissions’ and ‘carbon offset credits’ through
performative processes that operate through disorder and
imagination rather than through order and predictive
calculations. Consequently, I believe that future research
could address how this ontological reconfiguration of the
biophysical world has influenced, and will continue to
influence, the development of architecture and design’s
ever emergent tendencies and paradigms embedded in
neoliberalism. I believe this challenge is particularly
relevant in these particular fields which not only are
believed to essentially produce concrete objects and spaces;
but that also rely on very visible and tactile material qualities
in their creative processes and expressions. Perhaps such a
study could reveal some insights towards why current
architecture and urban design tendencies embedded in
neoliberalism like ‘smart’, ‘resilient’ and ‘sustainable’ cities
are so hard to grasp and to thoroughly define.
I believe that research engaged in evaluating the
performance of the global campaign for mitigating the
negative effects of what has become defined as climate
change, is as relevant as ever in light of the current rise and
spread of rightwing populism. This widespread political
turn has largely shown a marked tendency towards climate
change skepticism which either denies the ‘reality’ or the
evidence for ‘anthropogenic climate change’ and may in
time distance the development of global environmental
governance policies and devices away from those
334
embedded in neoliberalism into something that still
remains to be seen. Hence, I believe it may be relevant to
ask ourselves if we are in the process of forgetting about
‘climate change’? And if so, what will the next embodiment
of ‘ecological crises’ look like?
Similarly, I believe that future research could seek out to
understand what I consider to be key questions that have
risen from this research in regard to the development of
future environmental policies such as: what ‘good’ is it
doing to insist in differentiating between ‘anthropogenic’
and ‘non-anthropogenic’ climate change, and between
‘man-made’ and ‘natural’ solutions to mitigate it? And, how
would ‘climate change’ policies and devices look like if they
were not embedded in market mechanisms and generally in
neoliberal world views? In the particular case of Costa
Rica, I believe it may be interesting to determine if the
country will lose or is already losing its ‘carbon neutral’
competitive edge in light of the recent commitments
assumed by all signing nations of the UNFCCC’s Paris
agreement (2015) to set up their own emission reduction
targets for the next decades. And if so, what will Costa
Rica –in its already historical role of a leading ‘green
nation’– do next?
In these last pages of the conclusions, I would like focus
on some issues that I believe are worthwhile exploring
further in a possible follow-up research, perhaps even at a
post-doctoral level. While some of these issues derive from
my personal interest to understand better the particular
case of Costa Rica’s leading ‘green’ actor-networks; others
are concerned with more general aspects of the contingent
335
practices of qualculations at play in the performative sociotechnical construction of ‘nature(s)’.
I believe that an interesting controversy to explore in the
particular case of Costa Rica would be to follow the
ongoing process of socio technical assemblage of what
several of the informants interviewed in this dissertation
called the ‘environmental label’ for Costa Rican products
for exportation. This new ‘eco-certification’ is expected to
guarantee the entry of the country’s agricultural and
industrial products to the European market, and other
strategic ones at a time when the latter are expected to start
demanding some form of certified ‘technical’ proof about
the ‘footprints’ of each imported product. As my
informants explained, these footprints are not limited to
‘carbon emissions’, but will apparently include other
relevant aspects involved in the manufacturing processes
of the goods being circulated –i.e. an ‘energetic’ footprint,
a water footprint, etc.–. I believe that the ‘environmental
label’ that members of INTECO and the DCC said to be
developing at the time of the interviews, represents a
continuation of the ‘C-Neutral’ certification program, only
instead of certifying the manufacturing organizations
themselves, what is to be certified are the specific ‘goods’
they produce for exportation purposes only. This
introduces several other –and not so obvious– differences
with the ‘C-Neutral’ certification. For one, manufacturing
organizations may produce ‘certified’ and ‘non-certified’
products at the same time; the difference lays on
determining to which market those products will be
directed to. Second, non-compliance with this ‘voluntary’
certification may very well mean the exclusion of exporting
producers from entire markets. Hence, this new
336
certification standard could be seen as a new technology of
government capable of extending action-at-a-distance from
‘first world’ markets to ‘third world’ national states; and
again, from national sates to private sectors.
Additionally, I believe that this follow-up research could
also benefit from engaging in an in-depth analysis about
the inclusion or exclusion of the environmental footprints
derived from the means of transportation required to
physically position these certified products in international
markets. This may be particularly interesting in light of the
current exclusion of the emissions produced in
international air and maritime travel and transportation as
was discussed in this dissertation.
Another interesting approach for a follow-up project to
the present study could be to invert the focus of the
inquiry and focus on the ‘demand side’, rather than the
‘supply side’ of national and international carbon markets.
This study could trace the different socio-technical
calculations that ‘offset buyers’ engage in, in order to
estimate the cost-effectiveness of aligning their
organizations in ‘green’ actor-networks –i.e. ecocertifications programs and standards, Kyoto and nonKyoto carbon markets, etc.–. Put plainly, what are the
economic and socio-political incentives that attract these
organizations to undergo processes of ‘green auditing’, and
how do they calculate the balance between the perceived
benefits versus the necessary investments? Such a study
could follow the practices of calculations performed by
local organizations enrolled in the ‘C-Neutral’ program
reviewed in this dissertation as well as other national ecocertifications and standards such as the ‘Sustainable
337
Tourism Certification’ provided by the Costa Rican board
of Tourism or the future ‘environmental label’ introduced
above.
Finally, I believe that another potential follow-up project
to this dissertation could engage in a more ethnographical
on-site exploration of how ‘expert knowledge’ is
assembled, transported and black-boxed within and beyond
the country’s ‘carbon neutral actor-network’. This study
could on the one hand follow the particular ways in which
techno-scientific ‘experts’ purify their calculations as a
means to shorten the decision-making processes of
political and technocrat actors by reducing ‘unnecessary
complexities’. And on the other hand, follow how those
same ‘experts’ simultaneously mobilize calculative devices,
numbers, language and discourses impregnated in thick
techno-scientific complexity in order to constrain the
participation of ‘non-expert’ actors in debates over climate
change mitigation, and that way avoid the proliferation of
further ecological controversies for the sake of a so-called
‘common good’.
338
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