SOMALIA: ILLICIT ECONOMIES, CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND THE
DOWNFALL OF THE SOMALI STATE
A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies
By
Spencer Hugh Brooks, B.A.
Washington, DC
November 19, 2010
Copyright 2010 by Spencer Hugh Brooks
All Rights Reserved
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page ........................................................................................................................................ i
Copyright ....................................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents........................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
Map of Somalia ………………………………………………………………………………...... 2
Background and Contextual History .............................................................................................. 3
Somali Socio-Political History and Attitudes................................................................................. 4
The Importance of Clan Structure .................................................................................................. 8
State Collapse and the Rise of Violence, Why Illicit Economies? .............................................. 10
Legal Economic Opportunities in Somalia .................................................................................. 13
Illicit and Informal Economies .................................................................................................... 14
Piracy .......................................................................................................................................... 19
Drug Trafficking .......................................................................................................................... 26
Entrepreneurs? ............................................................................................................................. 27
Policy Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 29
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 32
Appendix A: South-Central Somali Clan Structure...................................................................... 33
Appendix B: Map of Somali Clans............................................................................................... 34
NOTES:......................................................................................................................................... 35
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 39
iii
Introduction
Somalia has existed for nearly twenty years without a stable government. Attempts by
external powers to intervene internally to provide security or build a state have failed. An
approach to establish a state which uses the functioning informal markets and institutions that
have survived is needed, as opposed to an external development model based on misconceptions
of Somali statehood. The failure of Somalia as a traditional state based on modern
interpretations of statehood has resulted in a breakdown of most formal structures of commerce
and government. In this environment, Somalia may appear to the external observer as a modern
interpretation of a Hobbesian state of nature, where there exists only chaos and anarchy.
However, a type of order does reign in Somalia, it revolves around the informal and illicit
economies that have existed and supported people since before the fall of the Barre government.
These various economies included illegal weapons transfers, parallel currency exchanges,
informal commodity exchange markets, the illegal sale of food and medical aid, human
trafficking and the drug trade. The Somali case provides an opportunity to evaluate the role that
illicit economies played in the breakdown of the Somali state; ongoing illegal sales and transfers
of weapons and goods continue to fuel conflict and enable illicit economies functioning in and
around the Horn of Africa. This paper will examine how illicit and parallel economies,
encouraged through aid and development intervention played a role in the downfall of the Somali
state, and failed to bring peace, security and progress to Somalia.
1
Map of Somalia 1
Source: University of Texas Austin. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/somalia.html
2
Background and Contextual History
Due to its position at the tip of the Horn of Africa, Somalia has long played a role in the
trade along the East coast of Africa, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and beyond. The scramble for
Africa at the end of the 19th century divided Somalia among the British, French, Italians and
Ethiopians.1 Each colonizer desired prime access to ports to bring goods from the African
interior to markets in their colonial homelands. Almost immediately after colonization began the
indigenous Somali people opposed occupation and a bloody resistance began, led by the ‗Mad
Mullah.‘ His death due to malaria soon thereafter, however, ended large scale resistance to initial
British occupation. Somali opposition continued through the wartime Italian occupation as well
as the post WWII British protectorate. Only the 1969 coup that brought the Siyaad Barre
government to power provided a brief respite from ongoing violence.2 The armed Somali
opposition to foreign occupation ended in a 1969 coup that installed the Barre government to
power. Barre‘s government produced Somalia‘s alignment with the Soviet Union and other
Warsaw-Pact Socialist allies against the West. However, the Somali-Soviet relationship
deteriorated in 1977-78 when the alliance failed to deter Somalia from invading Western
Ethiopia in hopes of capturing the Ogaden region. The Soviet Union decided not to back
Somalia, and provided aid to the communist regime in Ethiopia, the Derg, instead.3 Never
willing to let an opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union slip away, the United States briefly
backed a repentant Somalia before turning away altogether as the dictatorship of Barre worsened.
In the mid 1980‘s, Somalia‘s Barre-led government in Mogadishu began to deteriorate as
internal resistance movements emerged to fight the Barre dictatorship. Total state collapse
occurred in 1991 with the final ousting of Barre and the ensuing civil war. Since the initial
outbreak of civil war, Somalia has existed as a collapsed or failed state as defined by modern
3
criteria.4 Somalia as a ―state‖ is largely an artifact of 19th century imperialism. This is readily
observable in the unsuccessful attempts to install externally backed governments to remake
Somalia in the image of a Western state. Additionally, efforts to provide aid based on this model
have yielded only ongoing suffering.5 The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia
(as it now stands in October of 2010) is seen by many Somalis as a puppet of external powers,
and controls only a small portion of Mogadishu and little else.6 The Somali people, although
desperate for peace and security themselves, have no interest in any external force meddling in
their internal affairs.7 Without an external occupying force however, and despite having one of
the most homogenous populations in Sub-Saharan Africa with regards to language and culture,
additional challenges to effective governance arise from the deep rivalries that exist among the
various Somali clans. These competing clans make up the basic social structure of Somalia and
persist despite imperialist experiments in the region.
Somali Socio-Political History and Attitudes
As a nomadic people, with a wealth system and economy based primarily on livestock,
the Somalis travel in familial units in a set pattern of herd rotation along the coast, following the
green fields along the main rivers and up into the now Ethiopian highlands and then back down
to the Indian Ocean coast. Some small scale subsistence farming or planting of crops to be
harvested for the next migration seems evident, but most of the land is arid with little if any
significant sustainability8. The Somali system of migration, rather than fostering centralization,
nurtured the development of an intricate network of clan relationships based around the family
and herd.
4
A nomadic way of life, Islam, and close ties to the Arabian Peninsula, Islam, and led to
period conflict with Christian Ethiopia during much of Somalia's past. This environment
precipitated the first major recorded incident of Somali jihad against Christian Ethiopia during
the 16th century, led by Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi or ‗the left handed.‘9 The Somali remained
stateless until the Colonial era, when, after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British
established the Somaliland Protectorate on July 20, 1887. Eventually Somalia was divided in
1889 with France in modern-day Djibouti, and Italy officially taking up the Northeast and South
in 1905. The aforementioned resistance from the ‗Left-Handed‘ (and that from the Darwish and
Mohammed Abdullah Hassan or ‗the Mad Mullah‘ from 1898 until 1920) occurred after this
partitioning. Some scholars consider this one of the bloodiest anti-colonial resistance campaigns
on the continent.10 In World War II, North-Western Somalia (Somaliland) shifted to Italian
control, and then in the post-WWII years the entire area of Somalia came under British
administration. In 1950, the United Nations put Somalia back under Italian oversight. Finally, in
1960 Somaliland and later the rest of the country obtained independence. Peace however, was
not forthcoming. Ongoing border disputes between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya kept the elected
government in constant conflict with clan and regional leaders. Tensions and rivalries reached an
apex when in 1969 Army Major General Siyaad Barre assassinated the President of Somalia,
Abdi Rashid Ali Shemarke and took power in a relatively bloodless coup.11
After assuming power, the Barre dictatorship quickly implemented a policy of 'Scientific
Socialism' and did not restrict most Islamic religious practices. The lack of restriction on Islamic
practices was initially popular, despite ongoing debates about specifics of those policies.12 To
further create national unity, Barre created and enforced an intentional homogenization of
Somali culture. In the 1970‘s, ‗modernization‘ began. To this end, Barre enacted a series of
5
reforms permitting that only the Somali language be taught in schools. Additionally, in 1972
after lengthy debate, the government decreed that the national language, Somali, would be
represented with the Latin alphabet rather than Arabic script. In 1975, Barre also enacted a
‗progressive‘ family-code angering hard-line Islamists in the country. As these reforms were not
always popular, Barre‘s government had the dissenters executed.13 Furthermore, many of the
economic activities were centralized (as far as possible in a nomadic community), leading to the
beginning of the parallel economies that eventually brought down the Barre government.
The strains on the Barre government emerging from his social policies were further
exacerbated in 1977-78 when Ethiopia, with backing from Cuba and the Soviet Union, defeated
Somalia in a war over the Somali border areas (the Ogaden region). Whereas violence
characterized the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 1970‘s, relative peace
between the two countries existed during the 1980's, culminating in an official peace accord in
1988. Additionally, the long term drought that plagued the country since the mid-1970's pushed
many Somalis to informal and non-traditional economic activities, undermining the state-driven
socialist economy which eventually weakened the Barre government, forcing it out of power in
January 1991. The dictatorship‘s collapse sparked a bloody power struggle among the different
clan leaders and regions. Somaliland in the North declared its own independence. International
aid organizations withdrew from the South due to the blood-letting, leading to extreme starvation
for the Somali people who no longer had access to external food aid.14 Since 1991, the anarchy
reigning since the fall of the Barre dictatorship has caused more human suffering in Somalia than
most aid-workers have witnessed anywhere else in Africa.15
This desperate situation caused the UN to intervene in 1992 in its first ‗militaristic‘
attempt at distributing aid to a collapsed state (UNOSOM I), an attempt which was backed by the
6
United States military and the will of the US government trying to prevent widespread famine.
This backing constantly encountered violent conflict, culminating in the downing of U.S.
military Blackhawk helicopters and the deaths of 17 US Army Rangers, some of whose bodies
were desecrated and paraded around the streets of Mogadishu for the international media.16 This
event eventually caused the US to leave Somalia altogether, and almost completely ended US
engagement in Africa. The hesitancy to intervene during the Rwandan Genocide became a
bloody testament of the US policy of African non-intervention during the late 1990's.17
In the wake of the African embassy bombings as well as 9/11, US policy towards failed
states, such as Somalia, the Sudan, and Afghanistan shifted. Somalia had already come under
scrutiny as a problematic failed state due to its provision of safe haven status for the perpetrators
of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and other individuals supposedly
linked to al-Qa`ida. Subsequent attempts by the UN and international efforts to establish a stable
government failed, as most Somalis viewed these governments as Ethiopian or US puppets, run
by local mafia bosses. At the beginning of this decade, more "homegrown" violent movements
were created by Islamists, the most important being the Ittijad al-Mahakim al-Islamiyya (Islamic
Courts Union or Council i.e. ICC or ICU). In 2006, the ICU briefly claimed legitimacy as the
government of Somalia and began to provide services and relief to Somalis. As with the current
TFG, these governments usually only controlled small portions of Mogadishu and the path to
Ethiopia, as well as some other parts of the South.18 These attempts by the ICU to establish
control in Somalia reached their culmination when Ethiopia invaded 2006 to take out the ICU,
and install a ‗friendly‘ government, the TFG, whose leader finally quit in December 2008.19
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, or al-Shabaab, the current competitor for power with the
TFG, split from the ICU and together with the co-opted Islamic Youth Movement, made its own
7
bid for power in January 2007, taking over parts of Mogadishu as well as Kismayo in the South.
By 2008, al-Shabaab wass thought to be more closely aligned with Islamic fundamentalist
terrorist organizations such as al-Qa`ida, to whom they officially swore allegiance in early 2010.
The Importance of Clan Structure
The clan system in Somalia co-opted the Islamic pattern of tracing lineage back to the
Prophet Muhammed. The Somalis, who are ethnically and culturally homogenous, trace the
Qurayshitic lineage of the Prophet into four "Noble Clans." These noble clans are an offshoot of
the Samaale branch of Muhammedian lineage of Somali (See Appendix: A). They are the
Darood, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq. The other two main clans stem from of the Sab branch; Digil
and Rahanweyn. From this base structure of the main clan groups, the clans then break down into
smaller units, often called sub-clans, then further to their primary lineage or reer (which means
herd in Somali). Below the sub-clans, smaller units exist called diya paying groups (which means
collective payment and compensation), usually at the village level.20 Clan identity was
traditionally very fluid in Somalia, with members not prescribed to one certain clan or sub-clan
at birth, as this could change due to alliances, marriages, protection rackets, or food security.21
This identity was extremely important in financial dealings, both licit and illicit, as it formed a
base for transaction-trust (which in modern economies is regulated by codified law and a
functioning judiciary, an impossibility in Somalia), on which many market flows and contracts
rely.
The diya paying group is the level at which most conflicts were resolved in traditional
Somali society.22 At the village level there was a further breakdown of the diya groups among
the different households within the village. Conflict resolution within the clans was traditionally
8
mediated through the payment of a diya fee as assigned by the traditional Somali mediator in
tribal conflict, the Wadad. These conflict resolution bonds and mediation techniques were
dismantled by Barre due to his anti-clan policies and favoritism of his Marrehaan clan over the
Isaaq or Mijerteyn clans in the government, which resulted in total collapse of the conflict
mediation system after 1991. This collapse was worsened when the remaining "old bonds" not
destroyed by Barre, finally broke in the wake over the struggle for the seat of government in
Mogadishu and food scarcity.23
Clan-alliances and inter-clan trust still take precedence over every other organization or
social structure in Somalia. In the early 1990‘s, as food aid was distributed, some clans were
favored over others, giving them more resources and power. The marginalized clans not directly
associated with the food distribution process retaliated with violence. The aid organizations and
the UN, who were there to help the people at large, fell into the trap of helping one group at the
cost of another, and were targeted for revenge. This sentiment from the Somalis transferred into
an anti-Western attitude, then general xenophobia, which in turn sparked the killing of journalists
and aid workers in the medical and other fields. The reluctance of the US and UN to intervene
militarily to protect aid and media led the African Union to think it could possibly alleviate some
of the xenophobia by sending in African troops for the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) in 2007. The AMISOM mission, which is still present in Somalia, continues to take
heavy casualties and is considered ineffective.24 In addition to the challenges faced in providing
aid to the Somali people, the aid organizations that do operate in Somalia from more ‗palatable‘
sources such as the Middle East or African-Muslim countries are themselves co-opted by the
clan system as they grow in size and power. In turn this co-opting makes these organizations
biased towards other clans and other clans biased towards working with them.25 As a result of
9
this system, any attempt to provide aid that is not viewed as equitable to all clans is impossible
and fosters more violence.
State Collapse and the Rise of Violence, Why Illicit Economies?
Beyond the clan structure rivalries, which are one key factor in Somali state failure, the
dissolution of the Somali state was due to the poor financial policies of the Barre government
and the resulting widespread illicit economic activity and trade. These black markets became so
dominant that they led to a parallel economy in Somalia over which the government lost all
control. This loss of control over the formerly black market contributed to the government‘s
downfall.26 It is necessary to first look at the Somali economy in the language of the ―Greed vs.
Grievance debate‖ as discussed by Paul Collier in his work on the causes of civil war and state
collapse. Collier claims the risk of civil war or rebellion is related to three significant economic
conditions: dependence upon primary commodity exports; slow economic growth; and low
average incomes. The last two reasons appear to play a larger role in Somali state collapse as
opposed to the first, and coincide with the rise of illegal economic activity.27
Somalia has nearly no primary commodity exports. A rinder-pest scare eliminated the
once thriving cattle trade industry, and no other replacement exists.28 Collier proposes that
countries with high dependence on primary commodities exports are susceptible to internal
conflict because of their vulnerability to looting and predation by both the government and the
rebels and a competition for the control of these commodities.29 Somalia‘s functioning legal
economy is primarily based on subsistence pastoral nomadic practices and minimal agriculture.30
Collier views low per capita income as a cause of civil-war due to the low cost of recruiting
militants.31 The effectiveness of this recruitment practice is evidenced in the UN Monitoring
10
Group report showing that the group al-Shabaab, offers wages and recruiting ‗bonuses‘ to
recruits in extremely at-risk populations.32 Somalia has an extensive informal economy that
consists of: livestock sales, telecommunications, air transport services, agricultural exports,
remittances, and sale of household items and food locally. The extensive international Somali
diaspora also contributes considerable funds through remittances to the daily sustenance of the
Somali population within Somalia, much of which is unrecorded due to the nature of hawala
transactions. In the Somali case economic impoverishment and basic survival would appear to
contribute more to the grievance side of the argument than outright greed.33
Collier also claims that a large youth population bulge is a contributing factor for conflict
because it provides jobs and opportunities for survival beyond raising livestock or subsistence
farming.34 Al-Shabaab, as discussed earlier, is thought to be primarily made up of younger
recruits, and stems from the ICU‘s Mujahedeen Youth Movement (MYM). Additionally,
shabaab means ―youth‖ in Somali. The emergence of these groups would seem to provide
evidence for Collier‘s argument regarding the youth bulge as factor in rebellion, but the size and
scope of the youth population actually involved in the two groups is unknown, but some figures
place group size at approximately 14,000.35 That said, involvement represents a minimal portion
of the youth population.
Collier additionally proposes that contrary to the conventional argument of ethnic
diversity as a driver of conflict, ethnically diverse societies have resilience to civil wars whereas
societies with homogeneous ethnicity are more susceptible to rebellions.36 Collier further posits
that if an ethnic group has between 45 and 90 percent of the population, then there is an
increased risk of civil war.37 Collier cites Somalia as an example for his claims of diversity
11
reducing violence by stating that Somalia, despite ethnic homogeneity, has essentially engaged in
civil war for protracted periods since independence.38 However, in Somalia clan membership
assumes a proxy role for ethnicity, and even Collier himself states that clan or tribal divisions
create an equivalent of inter-ethnic hatred in an ethnically homogenous society.39
Collier argues that the grievance-theory as the cause of conflict is unsupported by reliable
empirical evidence.40 But as a factor in the outbreak of war in Somalia, it is important to note the
long standing grievances that the Somali population has concerning foreign occupation; first by
the Italians, then the British, then an oppressive Soviet-backed (until Soviets withdrew support
for Barre during the Ethiopian war of 1977-8) dictator until 1989. When the Barre regime finally
fell, conflict focused on the struggle for power and resources for survival. The grievance
discourse is needed by the rebel groups even if it appears false, but resource competition is very
real. Violence is the outcome of groups expressing their grievance, and furthermore greed, and is
driven by opportunities to profit from instability. These profit making opportunities are abundant
in a failing or failed state. External observation may not reveal what honestly motivates rebellion
based on grievance, but as the rebels or militant groups begin to prosper at war and see the
benefits (such as siphoning aid for private profit) they have an incentive to continue the violence
and are well poised to do so in Somalia. The proliferation of arms in Somalia, from years of
protracted conflict since the outbreak of war in 1977, has made obtaining a monopoly over
violence close to impossible.
According to the economic scholar Jamil Mubarak, five policy choices initiated the weak
state which in turn led to the Somali grievance discourse.41 First, the continuing conflict over
―absent Somali territories,‖ i.e. the continued disagreements with Ethiopia and Kenya over the
12
well-populated Southern and Eastern border areas of Somalia caused continual conflict that
strained government resources. Second, the socialist experiment, and the creation of a large and
inefficient public sector began the process of economic deterioration and waste that created a
large black market economy. Third, there was poor commitment to policy reforms involving the
currency exchange to head off the growing economic crisis. After the socialist experiment began
to fail there was a great hesitancy to follow-through with the policy reforms. Wasteful
institutions remained. Fourth, elite ―capture‖ of state and market institutions, neopatrimonialism, and clan dynamics led to a narrow distribution of resources and coercive power
that excluded most Somalis. Finally, the oppression of individuals and groups not of the ruling
elite pushed many people to retaliate as soon as opportunities presented themselves.
Legal Economic Opportunities in Somalia
Several areas exist where the Somali economy has continued to function in spite of state
collapse. These areas provide a source of income and revenue for many Somalis, even if
relatively unregulated or controlled internally. Most of the formal and non-―illegal‖ Somali
economic activities surround agriculture and livestock, telecommunications, money transfers
such as remittances, and a small amount of transport and security services. Each of these
economic areas has problems of their own and many overlap with illicit economic activities in
and around Somalia. For instance, the livestock trade (which consists of both on the hoof sales as
well as hides and meat) which was a booming business during the periods after colonialism was
severely set back by the fall of the Barre government. The livestock market recovered with a
huge surge in exports in the post-Barre years, only to collapse due to rumors of the rinder-pest
disease that led to an import ban in key export markets for beef such as Saudi Arabia.42 These
13
bans were lifted, then re-imposed, then lifted again in 2007.43 Although Somalia in informal
terms has one of the most thriving economies with a growth rate better than other countries in
Africa, it still remains largely on the periphery of regular international trade.44 That said, the
international linkages and connections of the illicit and informal economies in Somalia are strong
and varied, and most economic activity could not function without them.
Illicit and Informal Economies
Some illicit activities in Somalia are integrated with its history and culture; others are
more modern interventions. Some of the major illegal activities include: currency exchange;
money laundering, remittance transfers; theft and re-sale of humanitarian aid resources, such as
food, medicine; maritime piracy; kidnappings; arms transfers, of both small arms and light
weapons (SALW), as well as larger combat units called ‗technicals‘; drug trafficking, including
qat, marijuana, etc; human trafficking, such as refugees but also including slaves and sexworkers; charcoal sales; and illegal sale or selling usage of government provided resources such
as bore-holes and watering holes. This list contains most of the major illicit activities in Somalia
(or at least considered illicit by international norms), but is by no means all-inclusive.
Currency Exchange
The illegal currency exchange is one of the most interesting of the illicit economic
activities in Somalia because it was a key factor in the Barre government‘s economic problems.
The currency traders continue to (oddly enough), use the Somali Shilling (SoSh) as the standard
currency in daily exchanges and it remains in widespread circulation.45 Although the SoSh has
retained only a fraction of its value, it responds to supply and demand forces like any currency;
Somali currency exchangers follow rates via modern telecommunications.46 The Barre regime
14
after 1971 tied the official exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, where it remained until 1982 when
the system became more responsive to market conditions at the behest of the International
Monetary Fund. The fixed exchange rate allowed for an extensive black market trade in the
appreciating Somali currency without government intervention -likely due to bribery- and huge
profits were made in illegal exchanges that undercut official exchange rates. 47 Shortly after the
SoSh began to react to market conditions, internal factors in the government such as corruption
and mismanagement led to an excessive printing of paper money, and subsequent devaluation
from inflation and trade losses. From the period of 1980-83 until the year 2000 the SoSh
exchange rate went from 19 SoSh per USD to 9,925 SoSh per USD.48 The SoSh has since
experienced relative stability; as of 15 September 2009 the exchange rate was 3,190 SoSh per
USD.49 Most large transactions are carried out in US Dollars or Euros, but in order to obtain
cash, one must visit a money-changer who has illegal ties within and outside the country. These
money-changers operate completely independent of the shaky TFG backed Central Bank of
Somalia, even if they do keep tabs on the current exchange rates, and it is these individuals who
often have ties to other illegal networks and criminal organizations. Additionally, because of
their independence from the state and volume of transactions they also maintain a de facto
monopoly on the currency exchange enterprise and inadvertent control over the business beyond
the reach of the central authority.
Hawala
Beyond the unofficial money changing and transfers of wealth at the local level, many of
the same individuals and organizations involved in local Somali money exchange and barter are
also involved in the international money laundering and exchange business, which also involves
remittances from the extensive Somali diaspora. The Somali diaspora and business community
15
primarily uses the informal banking system known in Somalia as Hawala, or the hawalidaad
system, which is based on trust. The Hawala system allows for transfers of large sums of money
across the globe without extensive official regulation or control. This lack of regulation or
taxation is why the Hawala system receives a high volume of transactions from the illicit
economic system, as much of that money is untraceable.
Hawala appeals to the illicit actor because it is cost effective, i.e. has low overhead and
offers good rates; is efficient; has an established customer base; reliable, uncomplicated
transactions that require little knowledge of a formal banking system; lacking in bureaucracy,
based on trust and clanship; lacking in a paper trail, many transactions are not recorded in any
official manner; evades taxes, exchange restrictions and fees.50
Additionally, as it is more appropriately called an ―informal value transfer system,‖
Hawala resembles other types of money laundering. Money is often not transferred at all, but
rather the value of the money is transferred through other goods, from something as benign as
livestock skins or rugs, to illegal goods such as drugs and weapons. Shortly after the events of
September 11, 2001 the United States froze funds and restricted one of the most prominent
Somali Hawala banking houses, al-Barakaat because of its potential links to al-Qa`ida
terrorists.51 These money transfer companies (MTC) have resurged in recent years after adjusting
to the restrictive environment post-9/11 and Dahabshiil, the largest current MTC claims
expansive services that include postal services, construction, and telecommunications. Recently
al-Barakaat was reviewed for delisting from US and UN blacklists and its assets partially
unfrozen.52
16
These MTCs usually transfer the money that is being remitted through traditional legal
banks in a number of countries, where it is stored and legitimately used for business costs, and
then paid out at the other end through a variety of services. Many of these transactions go
through a third party in Dubai or another Arab state who then export goods and other services to
Somalia. A third party state and bank acting as the ―legitimate‖ destination point is extremely
important for MTCs due to the restrictive nature of trade with Somalia, which has restrictions
from the US, UN and other international actors on many types of trade. Since a formal system is
predicted to alienate 95 percent of potential Somali remittances, legal and illegal, because of
documentation and identification systems, an informal system that uses the trust-based
relationships which Somali religion, kinship culture and clanship provides is one of the only
ways in which value could transfer in and out of the country. 53 Since identification is scarce in
Somalia, and easily forged anyway, it is confirmed through questions involving family and clan.
Only after these questions are answered correctly can an individual pick up his money.54 In 2009
there were an estimated 14 percent of Somalia‘s 7.4 million population strewn about the world,
remitting an approximate 750 million to 1 billion US$ each year. With such a high volume of
transactions from disparate corners of the globe, using such personal informal connections for
banking transactions represents no small feat.55
MTCs must still cooperate with an array of regulatory restrictions in order to operate in
many countries across the globe. However, the small scale of most transactions and lack of
traceable bank accounts makes these restrictions only a minor nuisance for most MTCs operating
in Somalia. These restrictions were mostly enacted to catch terrorist finance, but as the 9/11
Commission Report shows,56 the 9/11 hijackers eluded tracking from financial institutions even
without extensive knowledge by using just such low-value transfer systems from ―legitimate‖
17
sources, rather than an MTC or money-laundering operation.57 Money laundering, especially in
cases involving Islamic charities are increasingly scrutinized internationally, but lack of
oversight in Somalia makes it a prime destination for such activity. Al-Haramein for example, is
a charity that has come under the most scrutiny for such actions. Al-Haramein was more
associated with supporting terrorist activity than directly linked to involvement with illicit trade
or finance networks. However, with the extensive network of criminal organizations operating in
Somalia it is unlikely that Al-Haramein or other Islamic charities remain totally free of their
influence.
Humanitarian Aid
The aid sector is another area where illicit activity thrives in Somalia. As modern aid first
began to flow in the wake of the 1973-4 drought and subsequent humanitarian crisis, the Somali
government responded with what little resources they could, and even then corruption was
present.58 The Barre government worked to reduce clan allegiance, but, in fact, was still largely
biased towards providing aid to the four main clans with which Barre was associated, the
Darood, Ogaden, Majirteyn and Marrehaan. The government officials unfairly distributed aid to
some regions and not to others, and other clans not in the distribution ring quickly moved to
acquire resources through unofficial channels. The demand for aid quickly outstripped supply,
and the officials involved in distribution saw an opportunity to profit, and did so.59 As these
individuals were also the officials with whom the external aid organizations worked and
continued to do business, an illicit economy quickly sprung up parallel to the aid distribution
networks. The aid organizations that operate in Somalia originating from more ―acceptable‖
sources like the Middle East or African-Muslim countries are co-opted by the clan system as
they grow in size and power, which in turn makes them clan biased in their operations as well.60
18
The later attempts by the UN to intervene and provide humanitarian aid were also
interrupted in this manner, and food labeled for distribution was seen for sale as far south as
Tanzania, and may have supported the Somali pirate industry.61 Further investigation into aidsales revealed that industrious criminals were creating refugee ―camps‖ that didn‘t exist, taking
advantage of ignorance and the fear of violence against foreigners in Somalia. Criminals were
providing fake camp names to officials in charge of distribution and receiving aid that was later
sold elsewhere. The UN monitoring group report estimated that nearly half of all aid was
diverted by criminal actors. Most of the aid was being sold illegally in markets and not reaching
its intended recipients.62 Some aid was also revealed as supporting the terrorist group alShabaab, and other insurgent groups and warlords in the country.63 Consequently the United
States ceased providing aid to the country for fear of it being diverted to questionable actors. 64
The World Bank Report discussed the problem, and did not wish to cease supplying aid for fear
that the humanitarian crisis would expand. Any aid getting into Somalia, even if the majority was
stolen, was a good thing.65
Piracy
The issue of maritime piracy has received increased international media attention in the
past few years. The success and frequency of pirate attacks and the scale of the criminal
networks surrounding maritime pirates has risen along with their profile. In response to the
piracy threat the international community has increased vigilance in maritime security, and many
countries have contributed resources to more actively patrol and police threatened areas. New
approaches are needed to address these issues, and some of the lesser known but more risky
aspects of the problem need consideration for long term stability of Somalia and ability to
19
combat illicit networks in the region. Attempts to thwart pirates and prosecute those captured are
so far largely ineffective. The pirate problem remains strong for several reasons. First,
international laws regarding maritime piracy are outdated, and countries are hesitant or unwilling
to try pirates due to issues concerning evidence and the possibility of failing to convict. Second,
the current patrolling and enforcement method for combating maritime pirate networks usually
involves considerable amounts of violence and risk. Up until now, only a Naval-Military strategy
has been applied, with some successes but no overall reduction in attacks. As there is no Somali
police force capable of combating the criminal network on the mainland, an external naval
solution remains one of the few options open. In 2009, of the 22,000 registered ships that passed
through the Gulf of Aden a total of 217 ships were attacked, up from 111 attacks in 2008.66
Third, links to piracy and terrorism, both present and future, are real and increasing. Fourth, the
attacks originating from Somalia are increasing in range and boldness, reaching as far south as
810 nm, and as far east as 1100 nm.67 Finally, the scale of the pirate criminal organization has
increased and poses a real threat of becoming a vast criminal organization. Even if piracy is
reduced or stopped, such an organization could pose a threat for legitimate business for years
into the future. The rise of the pirates as unique criminal organization has a number of driving
forces. These forces go beyond the usual Somali political, clan, or Islamist group dynamic.
States such as Somalia where perpetual war, anarchy and economic chaos provide few
opportunities for individuals to establish a formal stable livelihood or express themselves
politically, have often fallen into a "Piracy-Cycle."68 This cycle emerges from the analysis of
piracy in the past, and shows strong evidence that, "piracy is likely to exist while there are littoral
communities that are sunk in poverty or vulnerable to economic fluctuations and in which local
traditional practice is more respected than the law of a remote central authority."69 This lack of,
20
or disregard for (in their eyes illegitimate), remote authority is key to the political nature of
piracy, and many cases from the past show how pirates in such states portrayed themselves as
levying taxes and protecting coastlines.70 Modern Somali pirates sometimes claim their actions
are similarly motivated.71 Although pirates are not necessarily attempting to influence a specific
political entity directly through their actions, and some claim they are not at all politically
motivated, the lack of a controlling political force that maintains a monopoly on violence is key
to the emergence of piracy and the illicit economic activity that stems from it. An additional
problem that needs consideration for anti-criminal activity including piracy and stability is the
fact that prolonged drought and conflict as described earlier have not allowed food to be planted,
grown or stored for years in many regions, resulting in an increased humanitarian crisis. This
humanitarian and economic crisis only perpetuates the criminality and Pirate-Cycle. To break
from these cycles requires an approach that takes into account the failed state and dilapidated
market factors.72
The pirates themselves are roughly organized into two primary groups, one focused
around Puntland (north-eastern Somalia associated with the Majirteyn Clan), and one based in
central Somalia (primarily the Habar Gidir clan).73 These networks have fluid relationships, and
territory, personnel, resources and profits are shared and mutually controlled. The main leaders
of the pirate groups are Garaad Mohamud Mohamed and Mohamed Abdi Hassan ―Afweyne‖
(central Somalia network based in Harardheere) as well as, Farah Hirsi Kulan ―Boyah.‖74 These
leaders appear to have a strong business sense, and their pirate organizations are ―guided more
by the principles of private enterprise than military strategy.‖75 Their business model is
extremely complicated, and the organization includes the main financier, his ground team (who
provide the logistical support for the maritime militia), negotiators with foreign language skills,
21
local officials, elders, senior government officials, money launderers, and smugglers. Each of
these individuals receives a salary, and in the case of the actual pirates themselves, the first man
on the ship is often given a ―bonus‖ as incentive, which could consist of a small monetary bonus,
or depending on the final ransom, an SUV.76 Ransom is paid via air-drop, in either Euros or
US$.77 These flows of European or American cash further facilitate the illicit currency
exchange.
Counter-pirate measures at sea have involved Yemen and Kenya, who have basic
maritime patrol capabilities. Three further large naval coalitions conduct counter-piracy patrols
in the area: Combined Maritime Forces of NATO (Operation Ocean Shield); EU‘s NAVFOR
Somalia (Operation Atalanta); Naval Forces US Central Command in Bahrain Combined Task
Forces 151; plus a myriad of other patrol ships from China, Russia, and other interested parties.
Many of these independent actors do not cooperate or coordinate with the other coalitions in the
area, and no combined oversight exists that is managing and coordinating efforts.78 As stated
above, attempts to address the humanitarian issues by the international community have largely
failed, and the continual failure has implications for the illicit activity, as well as regional and
global security for a few key reasons. The Somalis have reacted to lawlessness, lack of economic
security and insecurity on land by pushing out into the ocean and capturing ships for ransom in
one of the most heavily transited areas of the world threatening global trade. 79 The proximity of
Somalia to Yemen and linkages between the two has drawn more terrorists and criminal activity
to the region, both seeking safe haven and transit opportunities in Somalia for drugs, arms, and
people, including radicalized US citizens.80
Current attempts to combat piracy have generally focused around countries sending ships
to patrol set corridors and provide a show of force81 and measures taken by individual ships that
22
are generally non-lethal such as turning fire-hoses on their own ship's hull to prevent pirates from
getting too close to climb the hull in dangerous areas, and putting up razor-wire around the deck
to dissuade boarding. Any other methods, such as boarding of ships by military personnel,
entering territorial waters with military vessels,82 or the carrying of weapons by non-military
maritime personnel are legally questionable.83Although after 2001 the UN and other countries
tried to expand the capabilities and legal protection for countries undertaking counter-piracy
measures, there remains a great deal of ambiguity and many gray areas.84 These difficulties are
inherent in the international system where consensus and cooperation are typically complicated
and complex given the differing sets of priorities regarding maritime law. In the case of Somalia
and Somali piracy, other mainland economic policies and de-stabilizing factors have led to the
failed state that enables piracy, and any future attempts to combat it must understand and address
these issues as well as those at sea.
Furthermore, the links between maritime piracy, criminal networks and terrorism,
although perhaps not apparent upon initial evaluation, and denied by some, when examined more
closely show the close conflation between the three illegal activities. Pirates are often seen as
simple privateers, criminals who share more in common with highway robbers, kidnappers,
extortionists and other criminals than the more fearsome and dangerous terrorist. In this
paradigm, the criminal or pirate‘s motives are often considered as nothing more than
opportunism, survival, and of course the proverbial ―booty‖ i.e. money or goods.85 Indeed, most
of the Somali pirates are involved primarily for personal gain. However, although pirates are not
necessarily attempting to influence a specific political entity directly through their actions, they
are certainly making a clear statement that they see themselves as at least partially politically
motivated. Even if these statements are just to gloss over criminal acts. This political motivation
23
may not fall into the same category as ideologically driven terrorism such as that of al-Qa`ida,
but it is very similar to other profit seeking, violent organizations such as the various world
Mafias.
Several key factors are worth considering in the case of Somalia and its criminal networks
that have expanded out to sea. First, maritime terrorist attacks were carried out by al-Qa`ida
operatives such as the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and 2002 attack on supertanker M/V Limburg
at Yemeni ports. Second, al-Qa`ida has links to other groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia who,
although officially condemning piracy, certainly have the potential to co-opt the revenues taken
in from ransom and pass these along to other terrorist groups, even if no apparent links between
al-Shabaab and pirate organizations exist. Other international extremist and criminal
organizations including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemmah Islamiyya, and Kumpulan
Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) all include piracy and maritime acts in their portfolios of illicit
activities.86 ASG in particular uses piracy as a funding source and tactic in their overall terrorist
strategy.87 Third, this acquisition of revenue sources has become important not just for the
individual pirate and the traditional criminal networks but for terrorist networks as well, who
have in recent years lost support from states and had their other assets frozen in ongoing
counterterrorism campaigns.88 Fourth, terrorist groups, like any illicit operator, militant, criminal
or even legitimate organization requires training, training grounds, and an area of operations
(large or small), often called a "safe haven."
This training and its value are very important to increasing the capability of both criminals
and terrorists and the risks and costs taken on by individuals to go to training camps are
considerable. The Afghan Mujahideen that emerged out of the safe haven and long protracted
war, poverty and conflict in Afghanistan (which also has extensive criminal networks) provided
24
a leadership base for al-Qa`ida that persists until today.89 Some of these Afghan veterans were
Somali and have since returned to the Horn.90 Although there may exist no direct or immediately
apparent training camps or safe-haven in Somalia or around the Straits of Malacca, the two
places where piracy is currently most prevalent, the pirates are increasing in ability and boldness
as a result of their "on-the-job training" through repeated acts of piracy. Most of the actual
―doers‖ of piracy are expendable and at extremely high risk, however simply the sheer volume of
participants (upwards of 1000-1500)91 makes the potential for defectors to extremist groups
(even if only a small number) extremely high. Capable pirates have the potential to become like
the Afghan Mujahideen, but in a marine environment, i.e. a highly trained, experienced and
capable force that has specialized in maritime operations involving the boarding, navigation and
tactics for the takeover of maritime vessels.92 The media attention received by high-profile
hijackings like the Faina and Maersk-Alabama shows that maritime acts, though not as
glamorous, high speed and intense as airplane hijackings, have the potential to draw the media
attention that terrorists crave.
Arms
Furthermore, the SALW that both the criminals, warlords, pirates and terrorists are using
in Somalia are all transferred illegally. Since 1992 a UN Security Council arms embargo
(UNSC-Resolution 733) has existed on Somalia, and member states are therefore in theory
prohibited from sending arms to the nation. This ban is de-facto un-enforceable, and arms
continue to flow into the country, especially from Yemen and Ethiopia.93 The main financing for
arms that flow to insurgents and Islamists comes from state actors such as Eritrea (est.
US$200,000 -500,000 per month), and at least two other states from the Islamic world. All of
these transactions are in violation of the UN embargo.94 Much of the fundraising for arms is done
25
via the illicit money transfer systems and web donations. The criminal networks appear to be
largely self-financing, and as Brigitte Unger states in Black Finance: “…arms smuggling is also
a source of illegal proceeds in itself, which are subsequently subject to laundering. Combined
with the proceeds of drug trafficking, organized crime and the funds derived from arms
smuggling have been identified as one of the main sources of illegal proceeds for laundering
especially in parts of Eastern Africa.‖95
Drug Trafficking
Somalia, along with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a surge in drug trafficking in
the past decade, and has become a key transit point for drugs that flow all over the world. This
transit is in spite of the fact that other than qat or marijuana, no high volume of drugs is grown
on the continent, and practically none grown in Somalia itself.96 This drug transit point now
includes a key route from drugs from Asia into the US via the Indian Mafia, usually with
couriers from a variety of countries such as Somalia who transit through Kenya. The US$
100,000 payoff is a huge incentive for the Somali diaspora population, or any individual in
search of quick money. Beyond transit, in the greater Horn, especially Ethiopia, qat and
marijuana are cultivated for sale in Djibouti, Yemen and of course Somalia.97 The drug trade is a
thriving illegal business in Somalia and the Horn, especially for warlords, who operate the routes
for heroin trafficking and use it as a main source of their self-sustained income to finance their
criminal activities within Somalia, including purchasing arms. Although the external drug trade
does include heroine and a high volume of cocaine, more frequently the chewed drug, qat, or
marijuana, are consumed locally.98
26
Qat consumption is generally confined as an institutionalized consumption practice to
Somalia (and the Somali realm), Ethiopia and Yemen, where it is transferred on a daily basis due
to its high volatility and freshness requirements.99 Throughout the Horn and East Africa, where
qat is consumed, it also finds transfer points to the US and Great Britain where there are large
Somali diaspora communities.100 In spite of its status as a stimulant drug, qat remains legal under
Islamic practice under the belief that it enhanced the religious experience, not unlike cannabis
usage in the Ethiopian diaspora movement Rastafarianism, which also came from the area.101
This is not to say that qat usage was always acceptable. In the 1980‘s qat was outlawed under the
Barre regime (and again under al-Shabaab presently) which contributed to a major drop in
income for many individuals who legally sold it previously, and pushed the sale and transit of qat
underground.102 In 1999-2000 it is estimated that an approximately 22.6 billion kg of qat, valued
at 68.3 million US$, were imported into Somalia, then much of it exported elsewhere in the
world, making an extra 4,968 million US$ for the illicit exporters air-lifting it internationally.103
The qat producers, sellers, and traffickers are normally, all local individuals and criminal
organizations based in the Horn, especially Somalia, where they can live and operate their
business away from the scrutiny of the ―stable‖ Horn governments: Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
and Eritrea. The qat import-export business is a key player in the connections between criminal
organizations such as those involved in arms smuggling, piracy (which needs an extensive
support and business network), money laundering and illegal sale of humanitarian aid.
Entrepreneurs?
Violent entrepreneurs are the main actors in the criminal networks in Somalia, with
warlords, ‗money-lords,‘104 and the Mogadishu Mafia105 taking the foreground. Although some
27
criminal activity like piracy is denounced by Islamist groups, it is likely that they profit from the
activity, and may include some of their main financing from the gray areas such as moneylaundering. Both criminal and Islamic groups are using illicit (also informal) economies to
finance operations, some are justifying this by providing services to local populations, and most
of the locals are happy to look the other way if some modicum of peace and human security are
provided, no matter where the source. The initial lack of, and conflict, over resources pushed
entrepreneurs to use what materials were readily available (i.e. dugout boats, people in need, plus
guns), to make their business focus on activities like piracy and other illicit economies. This
business shift creates a greater demand for more guns and pirates, fuelling the illegal cycle. An
upside to these activities exist however, as although the economy in Somalia is largely informal,
a legal cottage industry grew from financing pirate activities (e.g. to build and maintain a force
of patrol ships with a base on land, food and water for pirates and captives to name a few). Also,
a market has developed around providing better tech for pirates, e.g. Global Positioning Systems
(GPS), and sturdier long range mother-ships to extend the range of pirate attacks.106
These factors are hindering a real legal economy however, as they are seen as illegal by
the international community who might otherwise potentially invest in Somalia. Additionally,
the extensive pervasiveness of arms and an unstable political situation create high transaction
costs for mediation and business. Therefore, the regular flow and taxation of commercial goods
is hindered, and illicit goods such as arms, qat, and illegal currency exchange take the foreground
in economic activity, placing livestock, agricultural trade, telecommunications and
food/household goods in the background. That said, the recent UN report107 on Somalia states
that the Somali economy is actually doing better in the free market (albeit illicit and informal)
atmosphere than some other African economies.
28
Policy Recommendations
An approach that might have a chance at circumventing clan, warlord, money-lord, and
Mogadishu mafia rivalries fueling the illicit economies is one that recognizes the diffuse and decentralized clan based system of government and provision of goods and public works within
that structure. The pirate groups and their position as a conglomerate of members of different
clans or businessmen instead of just clan-leaders are in a unique position to transcend clan issues
and provide an actor (or actors) that can actually become a model for Somali cooperation, i.e. the
violent entrepreneurs might become the politicians needed to unify the country. The idea of
organized crime as a tool in state-building is not new; Charles Tilly proposed the idea as early as
1985.108 As described by William Reno, Tilly draws connections between violence, protection
rackets and generation of revenue by war leaders in Europe to pay for military campaigns,
eventually resulting in the establishment of a formal state apparatus.109 Reno further elaborates
on these concepts, describing how these predatory individuals develop state structures and
legitimate businesses as they shift from violent criminal activity to the realm of peaceful
economic competition. This shift to legitimate business and cooperation by the money-lords and
warlords can bring about significant social change. In Somalia, where external influence and
other state-building activity have failed, promoting incentives for the moneylords and warlords
to participate in legitimate economic activity may provide the boost needed to establish security
and peaceful co-existence between clans. Policies towards illicit activity that confuse people with
policies, especially those involved in illicit activity simply for survival such as piracy or
acquiring humanitarian aid should focus on not criminalizing people who are acting out of
necessity and lacking other distinct, viable opportunities. Instead, these policies should focus on
providing better incentives for Somalis to go legitimate.
29
Additionally, the international community should also withdraw its bid for power in Somalia,
and cease assassinating and targeting Somalis engaged in illicit activity as they do typical
terrorists. This activity amounts to extrajudicial killings, and is done without due process in any
court. As long as Islamist groups within Somalia are viewed as fighting foreign, international or
US backed troops or rival clans, and their fellow Somalis are shot by overzealous international
actors, Islamist groups will continue to gain in strength and support among the general mainland
population and other trans-national criminal and terrorist groups.
The UN and other International actors should recognize that supporting a puppet Transitional
Federal Government that remains ―Transitional‖ and is not wanted or legitimized by the Somali
people is simply futile. The international community should cease recognizing any actor or body
who claims power or authority in Somalia (or Mogadishu) that is not approved by the
conglomerate clan heads and the people that reside within Somalia itself.110 Some suggestions
include moving the capitol to Hargeisa in the stable Somaliland section of the country until peace
is established in the south. Somaliland and Puntland could receive ―interim special status‖
similar to that given southern Sudan. This status would allow Somaliland and Puntland to enter
into international agreements, contracts and other foreign activity requiring state recognition
such as a SWIFT banking code. Also concerning banking, more of the restrictions on al-Barakaat
and other Hawala systems need to be lifted and revised in a manner that reflects the unique
situation in Africa. The flow of goods through formal markets and legitimate entrepreneurs needs
encouragement through preferential trade negotiations and permitting easier flows of money
through other money-transfer organizations such as Dahabshiil.
Instead of hunting, angering and encouraging violent entrepreneurs, the international
community should encourage contact, partnerships and trade with them. Criminal entrepreneurs,
30
especially in Somalia, have the potential to become the trade/market liaison between the
international markets and donor community. If the root of the criminal problem lies in
desperation and financial gain as well as a feeling of disenfranchisement and lack of voice in the
international community, linking with illicit actors and providing them with incentives beyond
big money has the potential to address most of their issues driving them to their current state.
Captured pirates, for example, should be interviewed beyond simple security and intelligence
questions about their socio-economic needs and potential new approaches taken to discover
avenues to re-establish legitimate trade and market opportunities with the mainland.111
Finally, making the shipping and aid systems transparent is necessary, on the international
side as well as the Somali side. On the Somali side of the equation, this transparency can be
achieved by establishing many diffuse business contacts and utilizing a competitive system of
development. This system could then be mediated not only through the observers running the
program, but through the clans, money-lords and pirates themselves. Through this, all actors,
illicit and licit will see what projects and goods the other clans and areas have available through
the formal markets and trader networks, and wish to improve their own access. Making the
operation function on a smaller scale and using local money-lords or businessmen and trade
groups will reduce the top-tier corruption and make the local leaders more visible to their people.
For larger projects that would involve a greater population or geographic dynamic, an element of
cooperation would then fall automatically in place, further reducing the fissures between regions
and clans.
31
Conclusions
This leveling of the playing field would do much to alleviate tensions between clans and
other groups competing for resources. Building the system to be based on economic competition,
socio-economic incentives, market rewards and personal success will initially see some failures,
but the invisible hand mechanism is such that niches are filled quickly given the right incentives.
These incentives drive the people to recognize that the functionality of such a system is in their
overall interest. This base is necessary because it will encourage not only economic
entrepreneurs, but political ones as well, which is also necessary for the growth and stability of
Somalia. Political entrepreneurship requires the same skillset as market entrepreneurship. The
skills required to work with others to facilitate successful economic projects are similar to those
used to gain widespread political support. This market-to-political entrepreneur evolution in
Somalia may happen through existing clan, money-lord or pirate connections. However, the
geographic fluidity of the clans is ever changing. Entrepreneurs therefore are encouraged to bring
other actors into the fold so as not to undermine their own hard work and that of others, in a way
that would challenge future progress. Since the existence of warlords, pirates, money-lords,
Mogadishu mafia and Islamic groups has created actors that are not necessarily associated with
clans only, representatives of their specific interests that are focused around more diverse
populations beyond clanship might emerge. Excluding any of these groups is fatal to the process,
since as stated earlier, such groups when alone are individually quickly co-opted by the clan
system and thereby reduced in effectiveness. Illicit economies in Somalia currently have no end
in sight and continue to grow, but they also possibly provide a path to growth for the Somali
people given the proper incentives and international attention. Before that happens, informal and
illicit activity represents a valuable asset for individual livelihoods in the poverty stricken nation.
32
Appendices:
Appendix A: South-Central Somali Clan Structure
Source: World Bank, ―Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.‖ January 2005, p. 56;
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf
33
Appendix B: Map of Somali Clans
Source: University of Texas Austin. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/somalia.html
34
NOTES:
1
Tripodi, Paolo. The Colonial Legacy in Somalia. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Ibid., p. 99.
3
Abbink, J. "Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath." African Affairs
105, no. 419 (2006): 173-199.
4
Diamond, Larry. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21-35.
5
Ruthorford, Kenneth R. Humanitarianism Under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia. Sterling, VA:
Kumarian Press, 2008.
6
Menkhaus, Ken. "Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and US Policy." Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, June 17,
2010.
7
Menkhaus, Ken. "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of
Coping." International Security 31, no. 3 (2006/7): 74-106.
Hanley, Gerald. Warriors: Life and Death Among the Somalis. London: Eland Books, 2004.
8
Lewis, I.M. A Pastoral Democracy. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.
9
Iliffe, John. Africans: The History of a Continent. 2nd. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007;
p. 61.
10
Ibid.
11
Hofmeier, R. and Mehler, A. Kleines Afrika-Lexikon. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004.
12
Marchal, Roland. "Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already Confusing Crisis? The Case of
Somalia." International Affairs (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) 83, no. 6 (2007): 1091-1106.
13
Marchal, Roland. "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11." Chap. 4
in Islam and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, edited by Alex De Waal, 114-145. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2004.
14
Ruthorford, 2008.
15
Ruthorford, 2008.
16
Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999.
17
Hofmeier, 2004.
18
Ruthorford, 2008.
19
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Opportunities and Risks After Somali Leader Quits." The New York Times, December 30,
2008.
20
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "The Most Dangerous Place in the World." Foriegn Policy, March/April 2009.
21
Lewis, 2008.
22
Lewis, Ioan M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: A Guide to Cultural History and Social Institutions. New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008.
23
Marchal, 2004, p. 67.
24
Ibrahim, Mohammed. "Suicide Attacker Kills 15 Near a Peacekeeprs' Base in Somalia." The New York Times,
January 25, 2009.
Menkhaus, 2010.
25
Marchal, 2004.
26
Little, Peter. Somalia: Economy Without a State. Indianapolis, IA: Indiana University Press, 2003.
27
Collier, 2000; p. 9-11.
28
Little, 2003; p.85.
29
Ibid., p. 9-10.
30
Menkhaus, 2008; p.1999-2000.
31
Collier, 2000; p. 9.
32
―Monitoring Group sources report that Shabaab in Kismayo has invested considerably in new military hardware,
and has embarked on a recruiting campaign bolstered by the promise of a $150-$200 per month stipends for new
recruits.‖
UN Monitoring Group. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811
(2008). Report of the UN Monitoring Group, UN Security Council , 2008. Pg. 46.
33
UN, 2008; p. 46-48.
34
Collier, 1999; p.3.
2
35
Alasow, Dahir. ―Somalia: Report on Al-Shabaab Military Force.‖ SUNA-Times.net, Accessed: 03 November
2010: http://www.sunatimes.com/view.php?id=564
36
Collier, 2000; p. 13.
37
Ibid., p.7.
38
Ibid., p. 12.
39
Ibid., p. 12-13.
40
Collier, 2000; p.3.
41
Mubarak., Jamil. An Economic Policy Agenda for Post-Civil War Somalia: How to Build a New Economy, Sustain
Growth, and Reduce Poverty. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2006, p.52-3
42
Mubarak, 2006; p. 119.
43
Lewis, 2007; p.95.
44
UN News Somalia economy stronger than others in Africa, UN-backed meeting says. 29 Jan, 2008
45
Little, 2003; p. 138.
46
Ibid.
47
Mubarak, 1996; p. 135.
48
Little, 2003; p. 141.
49
United Nations, Operating Currency Exchange, December, 2009.
5050
Lilley, 2006; p. 146-7.
51
Mubarak, 2006; p. 96-7.
52
United Nations Security Council. "SC/9998." Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee
Approves Deletion of Five Entities. New York, NY, July 29, 2010.
53
Mubarack, 2006; p. 98-9.
54
Little, 2003; p. 143.
55
UNDP, 2009.
56
U.S. Congress. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Washington, DC: U.S.
Congress, 2004.
57
Lilley, 2006; p. 130.
58
Menkhaus, Ken. "Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: The Somali Case." Disasters 34,
no. S3 (2010): S320-S341.
59
Mubarak, 2006; p. 185.
60
Marchal, Roland. "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11." Chap. 4
in Islam and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, edited by Alex De Waal, 114-145. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2004.
61
BBC, 16 June 2009 ―Inquiry into Somali food aid sale‖ Accessed On-line:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8102415.stm
62
UN, 2008; p. 60.
63
Gettleman, Jeffrey. ―Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. Study Says.‖ The New York Times, 9 March 2010.
64
UN, 2008.
65
Ibid.
66
Rothberg, Robert. Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action. World Peace
Foundation, January 26, 2010, no 11.
67
IMB Reports, Online: http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&c=form&view=details&Itemid=261&fabrik=45&rowid=377&tableid=55&f
abrik_cursor=375&fabrik_total=0, http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&c=form&view=details&Itemid=261&fabrik=45&rowid=362&tableid=55&f
abrik_cursor=360&fabrik_total=0,
68
Anderson, J. L. "Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation." Journal of World
History (University of Hawaii Press) 6, no. 2 (1995): 175-199.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money." The New York Times, September
30, 2008: A6. (The Title of this is slightly misleading, the money referred to is for Faina, a ship containing arms, the
pirates were stating that they didn't want the arms aboard the ship but the ransom only, later expressing " We don‘t
35
36
consider ourselves sea bandits... We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our
seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard.‖)
72
This is also where the West needs to appreciate its lessons from emerging capitalist markets and encourage
legitimate markets and entrepreneurs again in Somalia.
73
Ibid.
74
UN, 2008.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Gardner, Frank. "The Long Road to the Chandlers' Release." BBC On-Line, November 14, 2010.
78
Snodden, Robert. "Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the
Global Seaborne Economy." In Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, edited by Peter Lehr, 225240. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.
79
Rotberg, 2010.
80
Temple-Raston, Dina. "Missing Somali Teens May Be Terrorist Recruits." National Public Radio, January 28,
2009.
81
Snodden, Robert. "Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the
Global Seaborne Economy." In Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, edited by Peter Lehr, 225240. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.
82
Especially territorial waters of failed states where permission cannot be granted by a central government.
83
Murphy, Martin. "High Resolution - Trying to tame Somalia's Piracy Problem." Jane's Intelligence Review. Jane's
Information Group, July 17, 2008.
84
Chalk, Peter, 2008.
85
In the case of Somali pirates, more often it is simply money and nothing else which they desire, as their lack of
interest in hijacked cargo, no matter the value, seems to imply. Other ―flavors‖ of pirates, such as those off the West
Coast of Africa or in and around the Straits of Malacca have a greater interest in goods beyond money, to include
the ships themselves.
86
Herbert-Burns, Rupert and Lauren Zucker. "Drawing the line between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism." Jane's
Intelligence Review, September 01, 2004.
87
Ibid.
88
Murphy, Martin N. Small boats, weak states, dirty money : the Challenge of Piracy. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2009. p. 5.
89
Bruce Hoffman, ―The Myth of Grassroots Terrorism,‖ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.
90
―In the late 1990, half a dozen Somali Veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan returned to Mogadishu,
bringing with them an eagerness for armed jihad.‖
International Crisis Group. Somalia's Islamists. Africa Report No 100, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2005; p 4.
91
Lehr, Peter and Hendrick Lehmann. Somalia -Pirates' New Paradise. in Lehr, Peter, ed. Violence at Sea. New
York, NY: Routledge, 2007. p.16.
UN Monitoring Group. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811
(2008). Report of the UN Monitoring Group, UN Security Council , 2008; p.28.
92
These abilities may not seem threatening at first, but one need look no further than the leaders and other
perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks for example, who all spent considerable time training for their operation by
learning many aspects of aviation. Potentiality does not necessarily mean that an imminent threat exists, but as the
resilience of piracy in the past years has shown international maritime security has serious flaws that are being
exploited.
93
UN, 2008.
94
UN, 2008; p. 6.
95
Unger, 2007; p. 146.
96
Arnold, Guy. The International Drugs Trade. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005, p. 182-3.
97
Arnold, 2005; p. 191.
98
Anderson, David et. al. The Khat Controversy: Stimulating the Debate on Drugs. New York, NY: Berg-Oxford,
2007, p. 147-189.
99
Anderson, 2007.
100
Weir, Shelagh. Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change. British Museum
37
Publications, Ltd.: Britain. 1985; p.71.
101
Weir, 1985; p. 75.
102
Bariagaber, Assefaw, Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa.
2006 Ashgate, Burlington, VT. p. 63.
103
Anderson, 2007; p. 63.
104
Gettleman, 2009.
105
Le Sage, 2002.
106
UN, 2008.
107
UN, 2010.
108
Tilly, C. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. In P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, &
T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the state back in (pp. 169–191). New York: Cambridge University Press
109
Reno, William. ―Illicit Markets, Violence, Warlords, and Governance: West African Cases,‖ Crime Law and
Social Change, Vol 53 March 2009, p. 313-322.
110
This 'strategic retreat' to intervention in Somalia will be the first and hardest pill to swallow, and is politically the
most volatile, but is necessary to allow the Somali people the first step towards a plan that takes into account the
political grievances of the Somali pirates and people.
111
Exact details of how such a program might work are of course extremely difficult, it is important here only to
assess possibilities for different approaches and not specifics.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. December 30, 2008.
38
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