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Living as Zainichi in the Twenty-First Century:
Identity and Citizenship in Japan’s Ethnic
Korean Community
Matthew Heidenreich
University of British Columbia
While much of the existing academic scholarship on Japan-Korea
relations has focused on the ongoing political and historical disputes
related to World War II, this paper analyzes the experience of ethnic
Koreans living in Japan on a microeconomic and sociological level.
Zainichi Koreans and the ongoing structural societal and economic
challenges they face in Japanese society are analyzed from a
historical perspective throughout this paper. Through a comparativehistorical analysis of the experience of Koreans from the point when
Japan annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910 until liberalizing
reforms of the twenty-first century, this paper shows that the social
rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities of Zainichi Koreans
have remained fluid throughout much of the twentieth century. While
the challenges faced by Japan’s Korean population have marginally
improved since liberalizing reforms in the 1990s, this paper
demonstrates that ongoing scapegoating on the part of politicians
and negative public perceptions of Zainichi Koreans continue to
pose challenges to Japan’s sizeable Korean minority population.
Introduction
Common perceptions of Japan in Western media often characterize Japan
as a country of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. While there is some truth to
this preconception, the reality is more complex. Even though ethnic diversity
is not a term usually applied in the Japanese context, there are several nonJapanese ethnic groups living in Japan, many of which can be examined
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
59
and understood as scars of Japan’s imperial project during World War II.1
Ethnic Koreans make up one of the largest minority populations in Japan, with
about 850,000 permanent residents identifying as ethnically Korean in 2014,
according to Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.2 In the
Japanese context, these people are referred to in academic scholarship and
media as “Zainichi” Koreans (Zainichi Kankokujin).3 The term Zainichi, literally
meaning “foreign citizen in Japan”, carries the significant connotation that these
individuals are temporary residents rather than permanent members of society.
Korea and Japan have a long and complicated political history with
longstanding and unresolved animosities mainly stemming from Japan’s
colonial rule and cultural assimilation policies on the Korean Peninsula. The
most notable of these ongoing hostilities is Japanese compensation to Korean
victims of forced labor during the years preceding and during World War II,
which the Japanese government has argued have been resolved by existing
treaties. Nevertheless, compensation disputes remain highly politized and a
source of ongoing tension between both Koreas and Japan. These unresolved
hostilities and resulting tensions continue to complicate the situation of
ethnic Koreans living in Japan. Most ethnic Koreans permanently residing in
Japan today are descendants of Koreans that arrived in the country before
or during World War II, usually as physical laborers and often against their
will.4 These individuals remain largely marginalized in society, face workplace
discrimination, lack employment opportunities, and are often prevented from
holding passports due to their complicated citizenship status. The lack of
opportunities for Koreans in Japan is not a new phenomenon. It is a fluid
situation that has gradually shifted in both positive and negative ways since
World War II. Ethnic Koreans were brought to Japan to work in many manual
labor industries preceding World War II. However, many opportunities dried up
in the decades following the war, as the Japanese economy shifted towards
a growth-oriented nativist economic system in the mid-twentieth century.
As the Japanese economy slowed down in the 1990s, following a series of
1 “Japan,” CIA The World Factbook, accessed January 27, 2019, https://www.cia.
gov/the-world-factbook/countries/japan/.
2 “Foreigners by nationality and by visas (occupation),” Statistics Bureau, Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications, accessed on March 30, 2019.
3
All translations are author’s own unless otherwise stated.
4 Sonia Ryang, “Space and Time: The Experience Of The ‘Zainichi’, The Ethnic
Korean Population of Japan,” Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems
and World Economic Development 43, no. 4 (2014), 520.
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YONSEI JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
liberalizing reforms, many institutional barriers were eliminated, allowing ethnic
Koreans to participate in a much more market-oriented economy more freely.
While the plight of Japan’s Korean population has been studied
extensively in English-language literature, many scholars have focused on the
experience of these people during Japan’s occupation of Korea and the war
years.5 In contrast, few critical studies have been conducted on the continued
challenges facing the Korean diaspora in Japan in the twenty-first century.
While the situation for Japan’s Korean residents has greatly improved in many
ways as Japan has blossomed into a vibrant liberal democracy and developed
economy, these residents still face several daily challenges. Such challenges
include racial job discrimination, housing discrimination and ghettoization, and
limited access to public services compared with ethnically Japanese citizens.6
This situation has been further complicated by the political division of the Korean
Peninsula since the 1950s, which has resulted in Japan’s refusal to recognize
the existence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Japan, therefore,
does not recognize North Korean citizenship as a legitimate nationality.
This paper will conduct a comparative study of the political, social,
and economic challenges faced by Japan’s ethnic Koreans. It will compare
the period of colonial rule from 1910-1945 with the contemporary challenges
faced by these individuals since the turn of the twenty-first century when Japan
engaged in liberalizing economic reforms that removed many of the institutional
barriers to Korean participation in society. As this paper will demonstrate,
overt economic discrimination and systemic poverty among Koreans in Japan
have drastically reduced as Japan has developed, resulting in a higher quality
of life for both ethnic Japanese and Koreans. However, these economic
improvements have not been uniform, as Korean communities have yet to see
the same economic uplifting that the rest of the country has experienced. Ethnic
Koreans continue to face systemic barriers preventing them from participating
fully in Japanese society. In addition, this paper will highlight the social and
political nuances faced by Japan’s ethnic Koreans. It will demonstrate how
a contested sense of ethnic identity has become a barrier to full integration
into Japanese society and Japanese nationality. The tensions between ethnic
5 . Japanese colonial rule of Korea lasted from the annexation of the peninsula in
1910 until Japan’s surrender at the end of the Second World War in 1945.
6 Philip Brasor, “Japan’s Resident Koreans Endure a Climate of Hate,” The Japan
Times, May 7, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/07/national/medianational/japans-resident-koreans-endure-climate-hate/.
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
61
Koreans and their Japanese counterparts have continued to foster a sense
of hostility. The situation is further inflamed by the political activism of North
Korea-aligned political advocacy groups such as Chongryon, which continues
to operate as a middleman between the North Korean government and North
Korean-aligned Zainichi Koreans.7 This paper will demonstrate that while
Japan’s economic and social situation has stabilized since the end of World
War II, Korean residents’ social rights, civil rights, and economic opportunities
are still hindered by societal marginalization and racial discrimination. This
issue can be attributed to continued hostility between Korean and Japanese
residents and the unresolved political situation on the Korean Peninsula,
which has left many Korean residents with precarious citizenship status.
This paper conducts a comparative-historical analysis of the
challenges Zainichi Koreans face in Japan, beginning with the annexation
of Korea in 1910 and concluding with contemporary trends since
liberalizing reforms in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. This
historical comparison demonstrates how the institutional barriers to Korean
participation in Japanese society have changed over time, both negatively
and positively, throughout the twentieth century. Social rights, civil rights, and
economic opportunities are dependent variables in this analysis. Political
and economic policies are demonstrated to significantly impact these rights
and opportunities for the Zainichi Korean population. While institutional
barriers should be considered a key obstacle to full participation in Japanese
society, more nuanced societal barriers and anti-Korean discourses remain
the greatest obstacles for Zainichi Koreans to enjoy equal social rights, civil
rights, and economic opportunities as their ethnically Japanese counterparts.
Historical Background
The premise of this paper depends on how one defines “Korean” or “Japanese”,
which themselves are contested concepts. Korea and Japan have experienced
a long history of cultural and linguistic exchange. Historians generally accept
that ancient Koreans were some of the first settlers of Japan.8 In addition to this,
both Hirohito and Akihito, the most recent two Japanese Emperors, explicitly
7
.
Ibid.
8 . Hyung Il Pai, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology,
Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 234.
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acknowledged that the Imperial Family has Korean origins.9 Despite sharing a
close ethnic and political history, Japan and Korea continue to see themselves
as fundamentally distinct from one another. In the years leading up to World
War II, the line between Koreans and Japanese was further muddled due
to Japan’s imperial expansion. As Toshiyuki Tamura explains, “people in the
colonial territories were deprived of their native nationalities and incorporated
into the Japanese nation.”10 Consequently, there were legally no Koreans in
the Japanese Empire, even though the whole of the Korean Peninsula was
under Japanese rule. Due to the complex history of Korean nationality, this
paper will use the term “Korean” to refer to any individual who came to Japan
after the Japanese Empire was established in 1868 and their descendants.
Following the Japanese Empire’s annexation of Korea in 1910, the
Japanese government began to bring as many as 2.2 million Koreans from the
Peninsula into the Japanese home islands by 1945, usually to work as forced
laborers for the war effort.11 While these Korean laborers were technically
Japanese subjects, their rights were severely limited. These workers were
often employed in the most dangerous jobs, such as factories or mines, and
were paid significantly less than their Japanese counterparts.12 By some
accounts, the situation faced by wartime Korean laborers amounted to slave
labor.13 In addition to the poor working conditions faced by Korean residents
of Japan, there was a history of racial segregation and discrimination.
As far back as the Taishō Period (1912-1926), there are recorded events
of lynching and public violence against Koreans. Immediately following
the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake in Tokyo, mob violence immediately
broke out, as rumors had spread that Koreans were plotting a coup. As a
result, up to 10,000 ethnic Koreans were murdered by mobs in the weeks
following the disaster.14 While this level of violence was by no means the
9 . Toshiyuki Tamura, “The Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in the Japanese
Economy,” in The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy, ed. C. Fred Bergsten
(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2003), 79.
10
.
Ibid.
11
.
Ibid., 81.
12
.
Ibid., 82.
13 Hyonhee Shin, “Thousand Koreans sue government over wartime labor at
Japan firms,” Reuters, December 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japanforcedlabour-southkorea-idUSKCN1OJ0F7.
.
14 . Joshua Hammer, Yokohama Burning: The Deadly 1923 Earthquake and Fire
That Helped Forge the Path to World War II (New York: Free Press, 2006), 167.
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
63
norm, it is important to consider the animosity and suspicion felt towards
Koreans by many Japanese citizens at this time. While Japan and Korea
had historically held strong diplomatic and trading ties, the early 1900s were
a time of suspicion towards Koreans in Japan – especially as the budding
Korean independence movement gained steam on the Korean Peninsula.
Korean nationalists had engaged in civil disobedience and assassination
attempts on Japanese officials on multiple occasions, contributing to
Japanese suspicions of Korean citizens domestically.15 Even though Korean
residents of Japan were considered Japanese subjects and were politically
equal, the reality was that they remained a significantly marginalized group.
With Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation at the end of World
War II, the vast majority of Koreans were permitted to return to the Korean
peninsula, which had only just been liberated from Japanese colonial rule.16
The population of ethnic Koreans in Japan immediately dropped significantly,
as between 1.1 million and 1.4 million Koreans were repatriated immediately
following the war.17 The political situation on the Korean Peninsula became
more complicated with the division between the Soviet-backed North and
American-backed South, and the nationality status of many remaining
Koreans was brought into question. As part of the post-war reforms,
Japan’s Alien Registration Law of 1952 stripped Japanese citizenship
from all ex-colonial descendants that remained in the country, including
around 500,000 ethnic Koreans.18 This caused that many ethnic Koreans
were left effectively stateless unless they chose to pursue repatriation.
The partitioning of the peninsula into North and South meant that
many Koreans in Japan had no real homeland to which they could return.19
With anti-communist hysteria growing more prevalent in South Korea,
many Koreans intending to repatriate to South Korea were barred from
entry under suspicion of being Communist sympathizers, especially if they
had engaged in left-wing politics or expressed leftist sentiments in Japan.20
15 Sharon Minichiello, Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and
Democracy, 1900-1930 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2018), 60.
16
.
Tamura, Role of Ethnic Koreans, 83.
17
.
Ibid.
18
.
Ibid.
.
19 Sonia Ryang and John Lie, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in
Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 31.
20
.
Ibid., 31.
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YONSEI JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
As a result, the post-war period saw many ethnic Koreans placed in a
stateless and marginalized position; they could not return to either Korean
state on the newly divided peninsula and were largely unwelcome in Japan.
With the conclusion of World War II and the continued political
instability on the Korean Peninsula, a large population of Zainichi Koreans
remained in Japan. In line with its history of oppression and marginalization
in Japanese society, this population continued facing significant barriers to
full participation in society. Japan embarked on a rapid reconstruction and
economic boom during the 1950s and 1960s; the mainstream of Japanese
society was lifted out of poverty, and homeownership became the norm.
The same was not true, however, for the ethnic Korean population. Just as
before the war, Koreans were generally forced to live in ethnically segregated
communities along riverbanks. These sites were often superstitiously
believed to be “roads to the afterlife” and were undesirable locations to live.21
Zainichi Koreans were largely exempted from vast increases in
wealth that Japan saw throughout the post-war period, as many institutional
barriers to employment and movement remained. While racism was not
institutionalized as part of policies, the relative statelessness of Zainichi
Koreans prevented them from attaining the same social and economic
rights as their Japanese counterparts, which served to institutionalize
a sort of passive racial discrimination.22 Just as the post-war reforms had
stripped Koreans of their Japanese nationality, the Nationality Act banned
Japanese employers from hiring noncitizens as permanent employees. The
Act thus effectively barred Koreans from seeking stable employment. 23 To
survive, many Korean families were forced to operate small businesses,
such as Korean food restaurants, within their segregated communities.
Therefore, the Nationality Act created a situation in which the economy
largely marginalized Korean-owned businesses and the families that
depended on them. By cutting off access to mainstream commerce and
the more mainstream Japanese economy, this system stilted the success
of Korean businesses and left Korean families institutionally disadvantaged
as a result. Zainichi Koreans were some of the last members of society to
see improvements in their living conditions during the post-war period. This
21
.
Ryang, “Space and Time,” 544-545.
22
.
Tamura, Role of Ethnic Koreans, 83.
23
.
Ibid., 84.
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
65
had much to do with their inability to participate in the workforce fully.24
Ethnic and National Identities
An important question that arises from this discussion is the issue of citizenship.
Despite being stripped of their Japanese nationality after the war, Zainichi
Koreans were not technically barred from pursuing Japanese nationality in
the same way that any other immigrant arrivals in the country could. Although
Japan’s naturalization process has always been notoriously complicated and
strict, the pursuit of Japanese nationality was not impossible, even in the
years following the war. Despite this, the number of Zainichi Koreans that
pursued Japanese nationality following the war remained surprisingly low,
especially given the economic opportunities it would bring. The reality is
difficult to explain fully, as all individual cases are different. However, some
critical trends in the conceptualizations of national identity among Koreans
and Japanese may differ from the typical Western conceptualization of
national belonging. Japan’s post-war order was primarily rooted in the idea
that the country would only succeed as an economic and political power
if it relied on its “ethnically and culturally homogenous nature”, which was
deeply entrenched in its social and political discourses.25 This idea was
also a guiding principle of the new governments in North and South Korea,
especially to contrast these societies with their former colonizer. “Koreanness”
and “Japaneseness” became mutually exclusive ideas, and social room for
an identity in-between these two “essences” did not exist.26 The Japanese
government often expressed their belief in a “monoethnic ideology” through
the bureaucratic system, which operated in a way that underscored the
importance of “blood purity” when applying for citizenship.27 For many
Koreans, the pursuit of Japanese citizenship meant the abandonment of their
Korean identity, and the vast majority of these individuals were categorically
against naturalization.28 For many Zainichi Koreans, the prospect of losing
their identity as a people was too grave a risk to take, even if it meant
passing up on the potential economic and social benefits of doing so.
24
.
Ibid.
.
25 John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial
Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 84.
26
.
27
.
Ibid., 85.
28
.
Ibid.
Ibid., 84-85.
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YONSEI JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Zainichi in a Globalizing Japan
Japan, like much of the world, has been transformed in the age of
globalization. In 2000, Japan was recovering from one of the most prolonged
recessions in its history. When the Bubble Economy popped in the 1990s, it
left Japan’s economy in tatters, with low economic growth and uncertainty
about its future. The first decade of the twenty-first century brought Americanstyle economic and political reforms to Japan with the election of Junichiro
Koizumi’s conservative, reformist-minded government.29 Reforms to the
sprawling bureaucracy became the centerpiece of government, bringing new
conceptualizations of citizenship and nationality as Japan sought to reinvent
itself as a “normal” participant in the world order. These reforms, including the
deregulation of the financial markets and liberalization of currency practices
on American-style market lines, primarily began with the slowing of the
Japanese economy in the 1990s. This new political age brought sweeping
changes, especially to the Zainichi Korean population. As the government
deemphasized the “monoethnic nation-state” narrative and expanded the
employment rights of noncitizens, Japan’s population of Koreans saw
expanded opportunities to participate in the workforce without the need to
give up their identity. As Japan’s economy liberalized, foreign investment and
an influx of foreign workers diversified the face of the labor force, creating
an atmosphere in which non-Japanese, in this case, Koreans, became
more common through increased exposure to the markets. As institutional
barriers to participation fell, however, the existential threat to the continued
existence of the Zainichi identity was even further clarified. In addition, these
reforms have encouraged more Zainichi Koreans to pursue naturalization.
While the government does not publish official statistics, estimates
place the number of Zainichi Koreans that pursued naturalization after
2000 to be in the tens of thousands.30 This number sharply contrasts similar
research performed in the 1950s, which saw about 232 ethnic Koreans
naturalize in Japan. This increase in the willingness of Koreans to naturalize
is fundamentally challenging to explain simply. However, the decline in the
monoethnic public discourse is most certainly a critical component in driving
this trend. If the pursuit of Japanese nationality does not demand that Koreans
completely give up their identity, they may be more willing to naturalize.
29 . Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, “The Koizumi Revolution,” PS: Political Science
& Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 79.
30
.
Tamura, Role of Ethnic Koreans, 84.
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
67
Despite this evidence, it is still important to consider that Zainichi Koreans
are not guaranteed citizenship should they choose to pursue naturalization.
Japan remains one of the most difficult states to naturalize in, as explained by
Anna Boucher in her analysis of Japanese immigration policy: “naturalization
is regarded as arduous, arbitrary, and unfacilitated; while 30,000 permanent
resident visas are issued each year, the country processes only 1,000
annual naturalizations.”31 The barriers to citizenship still exist across all
minority groups, especially since Japan does not guarantee birthright
citizenship. While many Zainichi Koreans are third or even fourth-generation
Japan-born Koreans, many still struggle to obtain Japanese nationality.
While ethnic Koreans no longer faced institutional barriers to economic
well-being, threats to their linguistic and cultural identity intensified. Racialized
discourses became more extreme, with several large-scale demonstrations
by Japanese citizens against what many viewed as “preferential treatment” of
Zainichi Koreans by the government.32 The improving livelihoods of Zainichi
Koreans effectively brought many of these individuals into mainstream
society, which potentially catalyzed public backlash. This backlash has
been expressed in the establishment of several anti-Korean organizations
such as Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, or the Association of
Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi. They often organize
large street protests calling for an end to state welfare and alleged “privileges”
afforded to Zainichi Koreans.33 As this paper discussed previously, antiKorean sentiment has a long history in Japan. Nonetheless, it is important
to note that a corresponding increase in anti-Zainichi sentiment has
accompanied the increase in economic opportunity for Zainichi Koreans.
Korean Politics and Zainichi Identity
As this paper has already discussed, the complex political situation on the
Korean Peninsula has repeatedly complicated the Zainichi identity and quest
31 . Anna K Boucher and Justin Gest, “Naturalization,” in Crossroads: Comparative
Immigration Regimes in a World of Demographic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2018), 118.
32 . Apichai W. Shipper, “Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan,”
Asian Politics & Policy 2, no. 1 (January 2010): 55.
33 . Justin McCurry, “Police in Japan place anti-Korean extremist group Zaitokukai
on watchlist,” The Guardian, December 4, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/dec/04/police-japan-rightwing-anti-korean-extremist-group-zaitokukaiwatchlist.
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for nationality, as the majority of Zainichi Koreans arrived in Japan before
the partition of the peninsula. While many Zainichi Koreans self-identify with
liberal-democratic South Korea, there is a sizable minority that has chosen
to identify themselves with totalitarian North Korea. This has historically been
a significant roadblock to repatriation; the Japanese government has never
recognized the North Korean government as legitimate and therefore does
not allow Zainichi Koreans to claim North Korean nationality.34 In addition,
the fierce political divide between the North and South in Korea is mirrored
by Zainichi Koreans aligning themselves with different sides of the conflict.
This divide has led to the establishment and rise of two separate political
organizations: Mindan, which operates on behalf of South Korea-aligned
Zainichi Koreans in Japan, and Chongryon, which operates on behalf of those
who align themselves with North Korea. Notably, Chongryon also serves as a
de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan, as the two countries do not have
official diplomatic ties.35 Both Mindan and Chongryon operate as middlemen
between Zainichi Koreans and their respective Korean governments. They
provide financial support and lobbying, especially in the case of Chongryon.
These organizations have also established a vast network of “Korean
Schools” throughout Japan, which have become a point of serious controversy,
especially with the renewed anti-Korean sentiment since the early 2000s.
These schools operate similarly to private schools but offer education in
Korean and provide students with a curriculum comparable to those of North
or South Korea. Thus, North Korea-aligned schools have allowed Zainichi
Korean students as young as preschoolers to be exposed to the propaganda
and indoctrination promoted by the regime in North Korea.36 Accompanied by
an increasingly belligerent and nuclear-capable North Korea under Kim Jong
Un, this has encouraged a fierce backlash by anti-Korean activists, who see
the activities of Chongryon and North Korean schools as a threat to national
security.37 Directly following North Korea’s missile tests over Hokkaido in 2017,
members of anti-Korean groups engaged in coordinated protests at Korean
schools and Korean institutions around the country, further fueling the anti-
34 . Erik Ropers, Voices of the Korean Minority in Postwar Japan, 1st ed. (London:
Routledge, 2018), 97.
35
.
Tamura, Role of Ethnic Koreans, 99.
36 Misa Ryu, “Issues Concerning Immersion Education in Korean Schools in
Japan,” Japan Social Innovation Journal 3, no. 1 (2013), 62.
.
37
.
McCurry, “Zaitokukai on watchlist.”
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
69
Korean sentiment and pushing many Zainichi Koreans to fear for their lives.38
Continued Challenges
The activities discussed above have continued to serve as a barrier for
complete Zainichi integration into society, as these individuals continue to face
discrimination. In addition to protests and threats made by fringe organizations
and right-wing groups, significant social barriers to integration remain. While
the laws have been generally reformed since the post-war years, Zainichi
Koreans still experience workplace discrimination and lower salaries than
their Japanese counterparts.39 These individuals have also been subject to
what Bumsoo Kim calls “practices of everyday exclusion.”40 These practices
include the inability of Zainichi Koreans holding permanent residency to return
to Japan from abroad without attaining a re-entry permit, as well a public ban
on employed Zainichi Koreans in managerial posts that have the potential to
“shape the public will.”41 While not overtly discriminatory compared to past
policies, these policies reflect a deep-seated distrust of Zainichi Koreans by
the Japanese political elite and members of society. Antidiscrimination has
been enshrined in liberal democracies around the world, including in Japan
through its adherence to the International Covenants on Human Rights.
Despite this, Zainichi Koreans are still subjected to policies and practices
that place them in a permanent sub-citizen status. Even outside the realm
of official policies, Koreans in Japan experience widespread harassment,
especially when the threat of North Korea is in the media. Following the
most recent missile tests over Hokkaido, police received several reports
from Korean residents who had experienced physical or verbal abuse, such
as having their bags sliced open and other types of physical assaults.42
While it should be noted that these types of violence are the exception
rather than the norm, it cannot be doubted that Zainichi Koreans continue
to suffer discrimination and abuse in contemporary Japanese society.
38 . The Japan Times, “Former Zaitokukai member pressed with libel charges
for hate speech against Korean school in Kyoto,” The Japan Times, April 24,
2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/24/national/crime-legal/formerzaitokukai-member-pressed-libel-charges-hate-speech-korean-school-kyoto/
39
.
Brasor, “Climate of Hate.”
40 Bumsoo Kim, “Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But…: The Politics of
Everyday Exclusion in Contemporary Japan,” Asian Perspective 35, no. 2 (2011),
288.
.
41
.
Kim, “Blatant Discrimination,” 294.
42
.
Ibid., 297.
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However, what is likely to be more damaging to the lives of Zainichi
Koreans is the blatantly inflammatory language utilized by some public
figures in Japanese politics. There have been several examples since the
2000s of right-wing, even centrist, politicians joining in on the anti-Korean
public discourse. One significant example of this was in April 2000, when
Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara stated that, “atrocious crimes have been
committed again and again by sangokujin.”43 in a televised speech. The term
sangokujin means “third country” and is commonly used in a derogatory
manner to refer to Koreans. This language not only serves to intimidate and
exclude Zainichi Koreans from feeling accepted in Japanese society but also
further inflames the already problematic anti-Korean sentiment. While this
type of discourse is not unique to the twenty-first century, such discourses
are important to consider in reference to the liberalizing reforms that have
eliminated many institutional barriers to Korean participation in the labor force.
Conclusion
Although Korea and Japan share more than two thousand years of
political and cultural history, animosity between these two countries still
exists. Japan’s imperial ambitions during World War II, in which Korea
was absorbed into the Japanese Empire, have inflicted lasting scars on
both Japanese and Korean societies. In Japan, the continued presence of
Zainichi Koreans, who exist in a semi-stateless position, has complicated
both countries’ efforts to move forward with reconciliation. Despite the
narrow lens through which Japan is depicted in Western media, it is not
an ethnically homogenous nation. The rights of minorities like Zainichi
Koreans have routinely been threatened, and their challenges understudied.
While the number of Koreans in Japan today is far less than
during the war years, the Zainichi population still represents a formidable
cultural community. The rights of these ethnic Koreans living in Japan have
been disrespected and oppressed since the early years of the Japanese
Empire. However, they have improved marginally due to globalization and
democratization. Rather than being forced to live in slums, Zainichi Koreans
have been able to climb out of poverty and engage more meaningfully with
Japanese society since the Koizumi era beginning in 2000. Despite this
progress, however, Japanese ethnic Koreans continue to face systemic,
often subtle, discrimination and exploitation in Japanese society. While,
43
.
Ibid., 298.
LIVING AS ZAINICHI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
71
economically speaking, Zainichi Koreans have progressed significantly, the
continued challenges of these individuals in their daily interactions cannot
be ignored. From outright abuse to subtle discrimination and inequality,
Japan’s Korean minority continues to suffer from social prejudice and
institutional barriers to sufficient equity and equality in Japanese society.
This paper has demonstrated that the plight facing Zainichi Koreans
has improved, but there is much work to be done in pursuit of equality. While
economic development showed that progress could be made in bringing
these individuals into mainstream society, public discourses have signaled a
backslide. Zainichi Koreans living and working in Japan do not have access
to the same opportunities as ethnic Japanese and are therefore excluded
from full participation in society. While discrimination against these Koreans
is not as overt as it once was, this paper has demonstrated that issues of
prejudice and harassment are very much alive in contemporary Japanese
society. As the political situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to worsen,
Zainichi Koreans will require recognition as an at-risk group if they are to be
adequately protected from further institutionalized discrimination. The first step
to resolving these issues of identity is recognition. If Japan is to participate
fully in the liberal-democratic order, it must acknowledge the continued
social challenges facing its largest minority population, Zainichi Koreans.