A Sociology of Counter Revolution in Egypt

Received: 19 April 2020 Revised: 7 February 2021 Accepted: 9 July 2021 DOI: 10.1111/soc4.12916 ARTICLE A sociology of counter-revolution in Egypt Atef Said Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, USA Abstract In this article I interrogate three misapprehensions around Correspondence Atef Said, Department of Sociology, 1007 West Harrison Street (MC 312). Behavioral Sciences Building (BSB), Chicago, Illinois 60607-7140, USA. Email: atefsaid@uic.edu the concept of counter-revolution: (1) defining the old regime, (2) defining counter-revolution's temporal boundary, and (3) different meanings of the countering actions. Using Egypt as a case study, I develop and apply a disaggregated and temporally sensitive framework to analyze the counter-revolution. I argue that counter-revolution was instigated during the revolutionary crisis (25 January–11 February 2011), accrued momentum during the extended transitional period (12 February 2011–30 June 2013) and achieved a decisive victory after the military coup of 3 July 2013. I interrogate the varieties of counter-revolutionary actions in these periods: repression and propaganda, adopting a project of containment during the transitional period, then launching unlimited repression campaigns against revolutionaries, and expanding military rule. This framework helps make sense of how different forces change their positions over time, and of the contradictions and the dynamism of counter-revolutionary actions. KEYWORDS counter-revolution, Egyptian Revolution, temporality, the military, the Muslim Brotherhood 1 | INTRODUCTION A simplistic representation of the Egyptian Revolution would go as follows: a popular uprising took place in 2011, and Egypt's longtime dictator was ousted after 18 days of protest. All seemed to go relatively well for a two-year period, until a military coup on 3 July 2013, which removed the democratically elected president from office. Things started to deteriorate after that, as the coup embodied the ultimate victory of the counter-revolution. Sociology Compass. 2021;e12916. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12916 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/soc4 © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1 of 13 2 of 13 SAID This overview is overly simplistic and reductive. Yet many analyses of the Egyptian Revolution, especially analyses based on the so-called transition (to democracy) paradigm, have adopted this storyline. Within this framework, the main mechanism that initiated the change, the revolutionary mobilization, disappears to make room for the transition, once this transition begins (see Bou Nassif, 2017; Brown, 2013; Mietzner, 2014). This framework obscures conditions and contradictions in the transition, assuming it to be a straightforward process. It also fails to take into account the role of counter-revolution. If the counter-revolution's ultimate victory was crystalized by the military coup in 2013, when did it start? And if the counter-revolutionary forces come from the old regime, which of these counts as old regime: Mubarak, Mubarak's ruling party, the military, the security apparatus, or the Egyptian bourgeoise? If we ask Egyptian activists today to date the beginning of the counter-revolution, or to name the counter-revolutionary forces, we would get different answers. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would suggest that the military was the leading force of the counter-revolution. Supporters of the state and the military, on the other hand, would suggest it was the MB. Leftist revolutionaries would suggest that the counter-revolution included both the military and the MB, with security agencies and the Egyptian bourgeoise playing important roles in it. Even if we accept one of these claims, have these groups and forces been equally counter-revolutionary? And was each of these forces consistent in its position after the revolution? Not only is such nuanced analysis lacking in the transition paradigm literature, it also seems virtually inexistent in some of the most important accounts of the Egyptian Revolution (Holmes, 2019; Ketchley, 2017). For example, Ketchley (2017) accurately suggests that the so-called 18 days of the revolution constitute a case of revolutionary situation (p. 5). But it is unclear from his analysis how the series of mobilization and counter-mobilization leading to the coup fit in within the categories of revolution and counter-revolution. Meanwhile, Holmes suggests that the Egyptian revolution is best understood as three waves, or three uprisings: against Mubarak in 2011, against the leadership of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in 2012, and against Morsi in 2013. Holmes is rightly suggesting that we should understand the three waves on their own terms, with the three governments against which these uprisings took place being uniquely formed (Holmes, 2019, p. 236). But while presenting what she describes as a micro-periodization of the revolutionary process, in which she interrogates the regime pillars and conditions of their collapse, Holmes seems to focus on some events in the aftermath of the coup as critical junctures or waves of the military counter-revolution, understood here as processes to expand the grip of President Sisi's military rule in Egypt (Holmes, 2019, pp. 139 and 193). While I totally agree with this characterization, it seems to me that Holmes reduces the existence of counter-revolution to its decisive triumph after the coup as well. Counter-revolution appears to be missing in the historicizing of events from the revolution until the coup. This is especially ironic since, as Hazem Kandil rightly observes, “the fact that no revolt triumphs as long as the old regime's coercive organizations are willing and capable of suppressing it is one of the few truisms in the field of revolution theory” (Kandil, 2014, p. 2). The goal of this article is not to interrogate the limitations of the transition paradigm, as some leading scholars have already done so (Carothers, 2002; Diamond et al., 2014). Nor do I intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of the literature on the Egyptian Revolution and highlight how and why the concept was mostly lacking. I contend that we cannot understand what went wrong in a given revolution without a proper understanding of the different phases and dynamics of its counter-revolution. I argue that not only is a disaggregated account of counter-revolution needed, but that such analysis should take into account temporal shifts in the components and the actions of this countering movement. Only through such an account can we understand the contradictions and shifting positions of actors, as well as grasp what went wrong in a revolution. This article has two objectives. Empirically, I present a disaggregated and temporally sensitive analysis of the counter-revolution in Egypt. I highlight how the role of different groups, specifically the Mubarakists, the military, the MB and the security apparatuses, shifted from time to time in leading counter-revolutionary actions. I also demonstrate how counter-revolutionary actions shifted from defense to offense, depending on different political circumstances. Theoretically, I synthesize different threads from the sociology of revolution and scholarship on the Egyptian SAID 3 of 13 Revolution, and present a disaggregated and temporally sensitive approach to counter-revolutions. In doing so, I differentiate between moments of instigation (during the revolutionary crisis), of activation (during the revolutionary trajectory or transition), and ultimate victory or defeat (the revolution's outcome). The article proceeds in three parts. First, I present a short review of the sociological literature on the concept of counter-revolution, and how this is studied within the scholarship on the Egyptian Revolution. I demonstrate the need for a disaggregated and temporally sensitive analysis of counter-revolution and offer such a framework. I argue that counter-revolution is instigated by the revolutionary situation and may reach its victory or defeat when power is consolidated by one camp or another to provide a settled outcome for the revolution, going through a period of skirmishes between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary actors during the revolutionary trajectory. I then apply my proposed framework and show how counter-revolutionary actors changed in Egypt in the three periods: the revolutionary crisis (the famous 18 days of the revolution), the extended transitional period (12 February 2011–30 June 2013) and the military coup and beyond (3 July 2013–present). In the third part, I show how counter-revolutionary actions changed in Egypt throughout the three periods. The article is based on extensive historical and ethnographic work I conducted over the course of three research trips (4 February–16 April 2011; 16 July 2012–5 January 2013; and July 2015), with ongoing documentary work. 2 | COUNTER-REVOLUTION: MISAPPREHENSIONS AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK The study of revolution has grown immensely over the past decades, yet revolution's main other, counter-revolution, still gets inadequate attention. “Counter-revolution” is used broadly to describe counter-movements or reactionary policies, and narrowly to refer to specific efforts of restoration that occur after a social or democratic revolution. Examples of the first approach are Seymour Martin Lipset's analysis of politics in Canada and the U.S., and his argument that a specific country's composition of elite and social structure can make it more or less progressive than another (Lipset, 1988), Karl Polanyi's notion of counter-movement to refer to the social efforts and policies counter marketization (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 79–80), and economic sociology scholarship which suggests that the Chicago school of economics works as a counter-revolution to Keynesianism (Leeson, 2000). Examples of the second approach are Karl Marx's classic work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2008), Alexis De Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution (2010), and Charles Tilly's important analysis on the Vendee (1976). This also includes analyses of counter-movement and counter-mobilization in social movement literature and revolution literature (Dillard, 2013; Ignazi, 1992; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In political theory, some scholars suggest that counter-revolution is an umbrella term that includes all anti-revolutionary actions and attempts to prevent institutionalizing revolution (Weber, 1974, pp. 10–13). Other theorists analyze counter-revolution as applied to specific moments, such as anti-communist campaigns and policies globally (Marcuse, 2010). My focus is on this latter approach, as I argue that the concept invokes three misapprehensions. The first relates to how we define the old regime, given the assumption that counter-revolutionary actors are mostly from the old regime. The most notable motto raised in the Arab Spring was “The People Want the Fall of the Regime.” But what is that regime? In his classic analysis, Tocqueville defines the old regime broadly, to refer to the entire social and political order and the state itself, not just the royal regime or royalists. Tocqueville's analysis refers to a unique case, when the regime and the state (Napoleon Bonaparte, and then Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte) saw themselves as the state. More conventionally, most political scientists and political sociologists differentiate between the state, the government and the regime. The latter is often understood as sets of rules for deciding on how political offices are filled, or the ruling networks. Should we then think of the old regime broadly, a la Tocqueville, or more narrowly, following most political scientists and political sociologists today? During the Egyptian Revolution, many revolutionaries saw the old regime only as Mubarak and the Mubarakists. This was understandable, as the regime indeed seemed to revolve around Mubarak and his circles. Nor should we blame revolutionaries for a confusion that exists among scholars themselves. In the Egyptian case, many 4 of 13 SAID revolutionaries learned the hard way that their understanding of the old regime should have included the military, the security apparatus, and Egyptian business's class, in addition to Mubarak and the Mubarakists generally. Among the most important analyses of the Egyptian Revolution is the work of Hazem Kandil, who provides a thorough historical interrogation of the role of a power triangle (the political apparatus, the military apparatus, and the security apparatus) since the events of the military coup/revolution of 1952 through the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, and the short period thereafter (Kandil, 2014). While Kandil does not elaborate on counter-revolution, his work is useful in demonstrating how the tensions within the triangle of power played out in Egypt's recent history, as well as during the revolution and its aftermath. Yet even though the triangle of power can be seen as a critical component of Egypt's counter-revolution, one cannot overlook how this triangle operated always in relation with the business class.1 The position of a group such as the MB has been very contradictory in Egypt's revolution. While they (reluctantly) participated in the uprising, they played a critical role in the counter-revolution during the transitional period in Egypt. Gilbert Achcar suggests that counter-revolution refers to “all reactionary alternative to social order,” which would include a group such the MB (Achcar, 2016, p. 8; see also Selim, 2015). In Egypt's case, sometimes some forces of the old regime, such as the military, are only one anchor of counter-revolution, but counter-revolutionary forces are an incoherent assembly of actors whose positions are never fixed. The second misapprehension is around the timing of the counter-revolution: when it begins and ends. Specifically, analyses of counter-revolution assume that it awaits to launch its attack after a given uprising. Yet conservative and counter-revolutionary forces do not come out of nowhere. They predate, and coexist alongside, the revolution. Asef Bayat suggests, “We should bear in mind that every revolution carries within itself the germ of counter-revolution” (emphasis mine) (Gökmen 2016). In the broader social movement literature, counter-revolution sometimes is used in conflation with extreme and rightwing movements (Dillard, 2013; Ignazi, 1992; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Regardless of this conflation, the assumption is that counter-movements come after the rise of progressive movements, and in reaction to these. Yet analyzing these movements only as reaction does not provide us with a clear sequence of this counter-movement. In short, we need to differentiate between moments of instigation of this movement, and moments of gaining (or losing) power, and then defeat or victory. The third misapprehension relates to the nature and types of the countering actions. Do the countering actions seek to restore the state prior to revolution, undo the revolution, make adjustments to keep the status quo, or do they seek to create a new status quo? These are not synonymous. As I demonstrate here, the counter-revolution, led by the military, was not invested in bringing back the Mubarak regime, but in expanding military rule and enacting revenge against revolutionary actors. No static analysis can resolve these misapprehensions. A better approach is to develop a disaggregated sociological analysis that takes into account how actors and actions of counter-revolution change over time, during the course of a revolution. I propose this alternate framework and argue for the need to distinguish between three periods in the course of counter-revolution: (1) during the time of revolutionary crisis, (2) during the revolutionary process/trajectory and (3) during the period of resolutions or revolutionary outcome. In doing so, I synthesize different threads from the literature on revolution and counter-revolution. A primary inspiration for my framework is Karl Marx's analysis of counter-revolution in France, which accounts for how leading counter-revolutionary actors contradict or act in a similar way to other actors at different moments in time (Marx, 2008). Another notable inspiration is Tilly's analysis of the Vendee. Tilly provides us with a rigorous analysis of the intersection of class as well as mode of production in a given region. Most notably, Tilly (1976) reminds us about key differences between cases when revolution or counter-revolution are on the offense or defense. Jack Goldstone (2009) differentiates between revolutionary origins, processes/ trajectory and outcome, while George Lawson (2015) analyzes how international geopolitical factors shift from the time of revolutionary situation, to revolutionary outcome, through revolutionary trajectory. Without losing sight of the class component of counter-revolution, I use this disaggregated and temporally sensitive approach to counter-revolutionary actions and actors in Egypt. SAID 3 5 of 13 | SHIFTING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTORS IN THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION Guided by the framework above, I demonstrate why it is critical to interrogate the constant shifts in the composition and leadership of counter-revolution. While the military and the deep state have been critical components of the counter-revolutions all along, these institutions were not in the front seat during the uprising. The Mubarak regime was. The military became the anchor of counter-revolution in the transitional period and beyond. The military would not have been able to succeed in its counter-revolutionary activities without the support of different political groups, the Egyptian bourgeoisie, and large segments of the middle class. In short, the composition of counter-revolution varied from the time of revolutionary crisis in early 2011, through the extended transitional period, until the military coup in July 2013 and beyond. 3.1 | Revolutionary crisis: The Mubarakists and the security apparatus Notions of special operations or command room in military affairs or crisis management teams are useful here. Several testimonies by politicians and actors close to the Mubarak regime agree on one thing: key decisions during the time of the revolutionary crisis, at least in the first week, revolved around Mubarak and the Mubarakists. While highlighting some disagreement within the crisis management team, these testimonies suggest that the team involved three circles: the media, the security, and the ruling party. Some of the key actors in these circles included, for example, Mubarak Sr., Mubarak Jr. (Gamal), Gamal's close aides within the ruling National Democratic Party, Anas el-Fiqqi, the minister of information, as well as the security apparatus, especially the ministry of interior headed by Habib El-Adly and General Hassan Abdel Rahman, the head of the SSID. Examples of these are testimonies by Abdel Latif El-Menawy (head of the news department at the government TV during the uprising), Mustapha Bakri (a pro-government journalist, known to be close to security and intelligence apparatuses in Egypt) and Moustafa Elfeki, a former advisor to Mubarak. In a book about the last days of Mubarak, El-Menawy details disagreement between the party and media circles about the coverage of protests and the inclusion of the voices of revolutionary youth in this coverage. El-Menawy also highlights the role of Mubarak Sr. himself, and how he had lost touch with reality, and the fact that daily reports to him misrepresented the mass mobilization in Egypt's streets (“Al-Masry Al-Youm,” 2012). In his testimony about the revolution, Elfeki noted for example how what he described as the reformist camp in the ruling party were marginalized, first by the old guard within the party, then by Mubarak Jr and the new leadership in the party. Both circles were hostile to the uprising during the crisis management time (Elfeki, 2012). There were at least four reasons for the crisis management team revolving around the close circles of Mubarak, his son and the ruling party, assisted by the security apparatus. One was the fact that over the five years prior to the uprising, Gamal Mubarak had become increasingly involved in politics. The ruling party and its relation to “business” had changed, as a an ever-smaller group from Gamal Mubarak's inner circle grew to dominate business (see Soliman, 2012, p. 58). These changes alienated businessmen who felt threatened by Mubarak Jr. and his circles. The second reason involved marginalizing the military in politics. Mubarak's grooming of his son for succession angered the generals, as it disrupted the long-standing tradition of presidents coming from the military. There was also evidence that Gamal Mubarak and his circle sought to encroach on military lands and business in Egypt (“Tantawi Was at Odds,” 2011). Fourth, the security apparatus led by Habib El-Adly was invested in Gamal Mubarak's succession plan, and the period before the uprising witnessed an expansion of this apparatus. With the failure of the security apparatus to control the protest, Mubarak commanded the military to intervene on the evening of 28 January 2011. The 2 February 2011, “Camel Battle” attack on protestors was orchestrated by the leaders of the ruling party, with the assistance of security and police networks. But while the military leaders were communicating with Mubarak during the crisis, the military formally distanced itself from Mubarak on 10 February 2011, one day before the ouster of the president. SAID 6 of 13 3.2 | Transitional period: SCAF, the MB and Egyptian bourgeoise With Mubarak's ouster, Egypt came under the rule of the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF), whose formal task was to lead Egypt until democratic institutions were elected and formed. Thus, while the military was in the back seat during the uprising, the military institution came to the fore during the transitional period. While it is accurate to suggest that the military was the main counter-revolutionary during this period, it must be noted that it was able to do so in partnership with the Egyptian bourgeoisie and political forces, especially the MB. Three key factors contributed to the military's control over the political process during this period. The first is that SCAF restructured the security apparatus while expanding the role of the military intelligence agencies. After the uprising, the military police's role expanded, as this branch became partially responsible for policing Egypt, especially during contentious episodes and protests. For example, on 3 March 2011, when activists stormed the SSID headquarters, they noticed that the SSID had shredded many documents. When activists rescued the remaining documents, they handed them over to the military police, clearly unaware that the military's goal was to expand control over the security agencies and the transition process (el-Raggal, 2019). Additionally, during the 19 November 2011, “Mohamed Mahmoud” clashes between protestors and security, several informants who participated in the clashes told me that security was administered by military agencies. During my ethnographic research in Egypt in February and March 2011, I saw military units such as Unit 777 (the military's special operation unit for counter-terrorism) present in Tahrir, to scare protestors. During many clashes with protestors throughout the extended transitional period, the military was involved, while the central security forces, the main anti-riot police, only played a secondary role. The military's leadership of counter-revolution would not have been possible without the collaboration of the MB. The MB and Islamists contributed to the counter-revolution by using sectarianism for electoral gains, and were in constant coordination with SCAF. According to a WikiLeaks document (which includes an email from former US Secretary of the State Hillary Clinton to one of her aides, Jake Sullivan, on 23 November 2011), during the Mohamed Mahmoud battles, Clinton confirmed that SCAF worked closely with the MB leaders. MB “provides intelligence to the SCAF regarding developments in the smaller and more radical political parties. At the same time, the MB, in coordination with the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate and Military Police forces, is working to reduce the level of violence in demonstrations protesting extended military rule.” SCAF continued to provide a degree of funding and information to the MB, giving it an advantage over competing secular and religious-based political movements in the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for the fall of 2011. According to Clinton and the document, both SCAF and the MB “represent the only two truly established political organizations in the country, and they must work together to gain full advantage from the newly developing political structure in Egypt.” SCAF's top priority was to stop the protests and ensure their participation, if not control of, political arrangements in Egypt. The MB's goal was to maximize their electoral gains and share in power (“Hillary Clinton Email Archive,” 2016). Many observers emphasized that sectarian tensions and clashes were a central dynamic in the transitional period in Egypt (Brooke, 2017; Guirguis, 2016), while others highlighted that these tensions were always politicized, and were a counter-revolutionary strategy par excellence. Even competing camps did not mind the military controlling events and the political process, with the main difference between Islamists and liberals being that Islamists actually shared power with the military. As several analysts suggest, while the MB and the military shared animosity to Gamal Mubarak's crony capitalist faction, both endorsed free market policies, and favored upper class interests during the transition (Allinson, 2015, p. 304; Gamal, 2019). Many businessmen who had supported the revolution during the uprising itself later distanced themselves from it during the transitional period, as they made concessions to the military and the intelligence apparatus. The Egyptian bourgeoisie agreed with the military and MB's hostility to workers and their social demands, and welcomed the military's plans to lift subsidies in basic commodities and follow IMF and World Bank policies, even as they realized that a free market in Egypt meant the expansion of the economic empire of the military. SAID 3.3 7 of 13 | Military coup and beyond: The military and deep state A key factor leading to the military coup in 2013 was mobilization against Mohamed Morsi, who had been elected president in June 2012. This mobilization took place partially due to the infiltration of military intelligence and the deep state. The four processes below demonstrate how the military and the deep state expanded their power grip after the coup in 2013. First is the expansion of the power of the military and intelligence apparatuses over the executive and legislative bodies. During the transitional period, SCAF shared power with the parliament, dominated by Islamists, then with the elected president. After the coup, the military and intelligence apparatuses entirely controlled key governing posts and bodies. For example, the military sponsored the drafting of a new constitution on 18 January 2014, which retained the military's privileges in Egypt. These were later safeguarded in the MB constitution. Nine days later, SCAF threw its might behind the key agent in the coup, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who consequently secured 96.91 percent of the votes in the 26–28 May presidential election. The parliamentary election was subsequently delayed several times, because Sisi insisted on a unified list to represent the nation. Finally, well over two years after the coup, a new parliament was elected at the end of 2015. Technically, the electoral law was structured to minimize party candidates and maximize individual seats (one-third for the former, two-thirds for the latter). But in practice, the majority of seats were taken by a pro-Sisi list called “For the Love of Egypt.” Most of the candidates on that list were former military and police generals. Out of the seven coalitions running for the parliament, six were formed by and in coordination with Egypt's General Intelligence and Military Intelligence. Activists and critics in Egypt described the new parliament as “the generals' parliament” and “the intelligence parliament.” Some politicians revealed details about the intervention and the planning process of the intelligence apparatuses and security forces in the election process (Bahgat, 2016). This new parliament held its first session in January 2016. The second process is the centralization of power in Sisi's hands. At the peak of Sisi's popularity in 2013 and 2014, critical scholarship invoked the notions of Bonapartism and Caesarism (Achcar, 2016; De Smet, 2016; Younis, 2015). Some even pointed to Sisi's resemblance to Nasser, the military leader who was president from 1954 until 1970 (Achcar, 2016, pp. 65–66; Younis, 2015, p. 19). Sisi's consolidation of power can be attributed to the military's endorsement of his candidacy for the presential post, the weakness and exhaustion of the revolutionaries after two years of violence and polarization without revolutionary gains, and the state propaganda projecting him as the savior of the state during the post-revolutionary turmoil. The third process that contributed to the military and deep state expanding their power grip was the systemic elimination of all political forces from the political scene, including all who had supported Sisi and the military during the coup. The MB became a target of persecution, along with liberals, nationalists, and key members of the “June 30th Coalition,” which had paved the way to the coup. Many leaders in this coalition were detained and prosecuted, as were some liberal figures who had participated in Sisi's presidential campaign in 2014, when they revealed details about the military intelligence and public intelligence agencies' control of the election. The fourth process is the Egyptian bourgeoisie's endorsement of Sisi and the military, despite the constant tensions between the military and this class over the military's massive expansion into the economy. One scholar suggests that the business class in Egypt shifted its position constantly, from supporting the uprising, to wooing Morsi briefly when he was in power, to endorsing the military coup (Holmes, 2019, p. 254). Observers also suggest that many upper-class liberals supported the military coup because they saw Islamic rule as a threat to their lifestyle (Kirkpatrick, 2013). Because Sisi appeared in a moment of weakness, both social and political, the bourgeoisie accepted his rule and the military's expansion. They also accepted the military and security apparatuses having a free hand to do what they must to achieve state stability, in hopes that this would help them in their businesses. SAID 8 of 13 4 | SHIFTING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS I analyzed above how the composition of counter-revolutionary actors in Egypt varied from the time of revolutionary crisis in early 2011, through the extended transitional period, until the military coup in July 2013 and beyond. In the same vein, I analyze below how the counter-revolutionary actions also evolved throughout the same three periods. The key characteristic of counter-revolutionary actions during the revolutionary crisis was that they were defensive. During the transitional period, the counter-revolution was not on the defensive, its actions revolved around containment of the revolution and its implications, and reducing it to a project of election without democratization, in the context of escalated repression and defaming of revolution and revolutionaries. In the aftermath of the military coup in July 2013, the military and deep state gained greater control, and the period witnessed a decisive victory of the counter-revolution. Counter-revolutionary actions during this period revolved around expanding military control, and the complete restoration and expansion of the repressive apparatus. 4.1 | Propaganda, defamation, and unsuccessful repression As discussed above, counter-revolution was instigated by the revolutionary mobilization and the revolutionary crisis. The military was not at the fore as a counter-revolutionary actor, even if it later took advantage of the political process. Rather, the main counter-revolutionary actors during the revolutionary crisis were the Mubarak regime, as well as the police apparatus with an influential role of the SSID. In this context, one can understand the counter-revolutionary actions taken in the short period of the revolutionary crisis. An overall feature of these actions is that these were defensive actions, due to the immense revolutionary mobilization. Notable actions taken by the Mubarak regime and the SSID included launching a massive repression campaign, that targeted the mass protest, and launching propaganda campaigns against the uprising. As close observers of the Egyptian revolution know, there was no significant repression on the first day of protest, 25 January 2011, until the very end of that day, when police used live ammunition to evacuate the protestors from Tahrir at midnight. The police apparatus was better prepared on 28 January 2011, a day that saw the launch of unprecedented repression, but also, a surprise mass mobilization, and the victory of the protestors over Mubarak's police apparatus. The protestors' victory meant the security apparatus was no longer capable of controlling Egypt and indicated the peak of a revolutionary crisis. It also showed the failure of the counter-revolution's attempt at repression. On 2 February 2011, leading figures of the ruling party, helped by the remainder of functioning security apparatus, organized another attack on Tahrir and other protest sites across Egypt. The “Camel Battle,” in which pro-Mubarak militia and Mubarak supporters tried to evacuate Tahrir by attacking the protestors with camels, horses and Molotov cocktails, lasted for almost 20 h. The outcome was important, as the protestors succeeded in remaining in Tahrir Square, while the army was forced to appear neutral. As the protestors' victory proved that direct repression was no longer an option, the government media launched propaganda campaigns against the uprising. Official media targeted Tahrir, labeling the protestors as infiltrators or troublemakers, and disseminated images purportedly showing violent instigators and groups of destructive kids. Many conservative celebrities, politicians, and state intellectuals were interviewed extensively on state TV to praise Mubarak's proposed reform, his promise not to run in future elections, and to enact constitutional amendments to guarantee free elections. At the core of the propaganda campaigns defaming the uprising were conspiracy theories claiming that foreign elements, including Hamas and Hezbollah, had participated in the uprising. A state security intelligence report released after the revolution stated that at least 29 foreign nationalities were present in Tahrir Square in those days (Mohi, 2015). The discourse of conspiracy continued and intensified after the 2013 military coup. SAID 4.2 9 of 13 | Revolution's containment and escalated repression Mubarak transferred power to SCAF on 11 February 2011. While many actors saw Mubarak's ousting as a success for the revolution, the military leadership started a cascade of events and shaped the trajectory of the revolution. Throughout the extended transitional period, the military was no longer strictly on the defensive, and instead led counter-revolutionary actions to minimize reform, escalate repression, and continue to defame the revolution. On 13 February 2011, SCAF issued a decree delineating a roadmap, declaring itself the supreme administrative authority over Egyptian affairs, and announcing its intention to remain in power for six months, “or until completing the election of a new parliament and Shura Council as well as a new president.” In short, the military would retain control of the entire constitutional and electoral processes, until such election could take place. Accordingly, SCAF authorized a committee to draft amendments to the 1971 constitution. Many developments ensured, including a constitutional referendum in March 2011, parliamentary election in November 2011, and the presidential election in June 2012. The new parliament, the first parliament after the revolution, lasted nearly five months before it was dissolved by a verdict from the Supreme Constitutional Court on grounds of irregularities in the election law. Mohamed Morsi was elected and was in power for only one year when he was ousted by the military coup on 3 July 2013. I am listing these developments to demonstrate that during the extended transitional period (11 February 2011– 30 June 2013), SCAF and the military regime used legalistic and reformist methods against the revolution to counter and contain calls for substantive forms of democracy. First, all elections and all amendments during this period took place under the supervision and control of SCAF. All electoral laws were designed by military and state legal experts. SCAF and its legal experts created multiple loopholes to obstruct elections and their outcomes. For example, SCAF was aware that the law governing the parliamentary election may be unconstitutional, but went ahead with it anyway. Second, SCAF resisted announcing a timeline for presidential election, only finally doing so prior to the parliamentary election and after the Mohamed Mahmoud protests and battles, the main grievance of which was ending SCAF rule in Egypt. Third, SCAF used its constitutional and legal power to issue constitutional decrees and laws, most of which aimed at criminalizing protest and revolutionary mobilization, in addition to reducing reform to the most superficial, proceduralist components possible. In short, due to the short terms of the various elected bodies between 2011 and 2013, SCAF was effectively ruling Egypt throughout that period. From 2011 to 2013, Egypt had only two elected representative bodies (parliament and Shura council) each of which had lasted for only six months. Egypt also had a democratically elected president for one year, from June 2012 to July 2013. Repression was relentless throughout the extended transitional period. For example, from 11 February 2011 to 1 July 2012, when Egypt was under SCAF rule exclusively, SCAF killed about 438 protestors, and injured about 16,806 protestors, according to WikiThawra (a non-profit initiative to document events related to the revolution). All attempts to re-occupy Tahrir were evacuated by force. During the clashes on 19 November 2011, military and the police used rubber bullets, tear gas, and live ammunition against protestors. The military expanded the use of military trials for civilians, and many revolutionary youth and ordinary citizens were detained and subjected to these trials. Rights groups estimated that by April 2011, just three months after Mubarak's ouster, no fewer than 7000 civilians had been tried in military tribunals. The MB also endorsed the use of legalistic methods to end or deflate the revolutionary mood in the streets. With its exclusionary and sectarian policies, the MB contributed to fueling the public hatred of the MB and Islamists. Throughout this time, protest was ongoing, as revolutionary youth resisted SCAF's control over the process of political transition. During this extended period, the main counter-revolutionary project was to contain the revolution in the shallowest democratic proceduralist reform possible, while constantly attacking protests and expanding control over media and limiting freedom of expression. To put this escalated repression in context, it is useful to note that after ousting Mubarak, a major reorganization of the security apparatus took place under the leadership of the military, which included expanding the role of military intelligence and military police. Consequently, SSID no longer had control over national and domestic politics, which came under the supervision of military intelligence. Under pressure from the revolutionary street, SCAF agreed to SAID 10 of 13 reforming the SSID. But the reform remained extremely superficial, and was limited to changing the name of the organization to National Security Apparatus. The juxtaposition of reducing the entire reform to a project of procedural democracy and the escalated attacks on protest and all forms of expression demonstrate that the goal of the military was containing the revolution. 4.3 | Revenge, restoration and expanding military rule The 2013 military coup launched an enormous expansion of the military's bailiwick, politically, economically, and in terms of security. As scholar Shana Marshall suggests, the military both consolidated and expanded after Morsi (Marshall, 2015). To cite but one example, Sisi reportedly contracted the Armed Forces Engineering Authority to work on 1737 civilian projects from the moment he came to power in mid-2014 until early May of 2016 (Ali, 2016). The military regime in post-coup Egypt used excessive and disproportionate use of violence against activists and all forms of dissent. According to a July 2019 report by the Arab Organization for Human Rights, some 3185 civilians were killed extrajudicially by Egyptian security forces in the six years following the coup (“Rights Group,” 2019). Yehia Mostafa Kamel (2019) suggests that the inflated security and intelligence apparatuses are a response to their earlier loss of control: “the only acceptable solution for Sisi and the supporting class involves revenge over January. Their main goal is the untiring work to prevent its repetition, through disproportionate and unlimited violence” (emphasis added). Since the military coup, revolutionary youth have been persistently targeted. Ahmed Maher, Alaa Adel Fatah, Mahienour El-Masry, Mohamed Al-Qasas, Israa Abdel Fatah, Ahmed Douma, Haitham Mohamadain, Mohamed Adel, and Shady al-Ghazaly Harb, for example, have been repeatedly detained. Some of them participated in the mobilization against the exclusionary politics of the MB that paved the way to the coup, and were targeted after the coup with arbitrary detention—often marked by solitary confinement—and repeated lawsuits alleging plotting against the state or criticizing the leadership of the nation, in what human rights groups describe as “recycled lawsuits” or “revolv[ing] door charges” (Sorour, 2019). Targeting dissidents, silencing criticism, and spreading fear are all characteristic of the military leadership's discourse. For example, in a speech launching the gas line project, Sisi declared: “I have spent fifty years of my life learning the meaning of the state. I swear to God. I swear to God [sic] I have spent fifty years getting education [perhaps referring to military education] and teaching myself about the meaning of the state. Now I hear illiterate people and they want to have a say about the state. This is not acceptable.” (“Sisi: Not a Politician,” 2018). 5 | CONCLUSION The literature on the sociology of revolution is still dominated by a positivistic approach that focuses on revolutionary causes and outcomes and ignores understanding revolutions as processes and trajectories. If we agree that we need more analyses of revolutionary processes, then we should be attentive to how counter-revolutions fit within these processes. One cannot understand what went wrong in a given revolution without a proper understanding of its counter-revolution in its different phases and dynamics. In this spirit, I proposed a disaggregated and temporally considerate account of counter-revolution in Egypt, analyzing how counter-revolutionary actors and actions shifted between three periods or moments: revolutionary crisis, transitional period, and the military coup and its aftermath. Theoretically, this analysis sheds light on how we should understand counter-revolution as a dynamic process, based on an ongoing dialectical tension with the forces of a revolution. Counter-revolution is never static, it does not operate in a vacuum, and it relates to and aims to combat the revolutionary momentum (see Said, 2020). Empirically, I hope that my SAID TA B L E 1 11 of 13 Shifting counter-revolutionary actors and actions in Egypt (2011–present) Counter-revolution's key actors Counter-revolution's main actions Type of actions Counter-revolution instigated Mubarak regime (Mubarak, ruling party, security apparatus) Propaganda, unsuccessful repression Defensive Transitional period (12 Feb 2011–30 June 2013) Counter-revolution gaining power The military and its intelligence apparatus in collaboration with the MB and other political forces Containment of revolution and escalated repression Manipulation and attrition warfare Military coup and aftermath (3 July 2013–present) Counter-revolution's victory The military and its intelligence and other security apparatuses Unlimited repression, revenge and expanding military rule Offensive Period Temporally Revolutionary crisis (25 Jan–11 Feb 2011) Abbreviation: MB, Muslim Brotherhood. analysis helps scholars of the Egyptian Revolution, many of whom seem to be fixated on the events of the coup in 2013, or the role of the military, and see them as the only critical moments and critical forces in Egypt's counter-revolutions. The following table summarizes my analysis of the counter-revolution in Egypt (Table 1). Overall, this analysis demonstrates that counter-revolution is never consistent in relation to a given revolution. It invites us to rethink the limitations and confusion relating to the notion of old regime, especially as some forces from the old regime can seem neutral during revolution, and later proceed with counter-revolutionary action, as the military did in Egypt. This analysis also calls for investigating different modes of counter-revolution, such as moments of instigation, moments of gaining power, and moments of victory, or defeat. In these different modes, counter-revolution acts differently when operating in defensive actions and failed repression, or in offensive actions and expanded repression and revenge, with a goal of restoration. One limitation of this article is the lack of spatial aspects of counter-revolution. As many scholars suggested, one key feature in the Arab Spring uprisings is the strong presence of regional and international involvements in the uprising; in many cases this involvement was counter-revolutionary (Al-Rasheed, 2011; Dannreuther, 2015; Kamrava, 2012). Even though this article focused exclusively on Egypt, while highlighting temporal shifts in its counter-revolution, the analysis presented would apply to regional and international counter-revolutionary involvement in the Arab spring uprisings. The temporal framework presented here is especially useful in demonstrating the temporal shifts and contradictions in counter-revolutionary involvement, whether national or international, through phases of revolutionary situation, revolutionary trajectory and revolutionary outcome. ACKNOWL EDGEMEN T S I would like to thank Professor Paul-Brian McInerney and two anonymous reviewers for their guidance and constructive criticism, respectively. I am thankful for Nada Elia and Boyd Bellinger for their editorial assistance. ORCID Atef Said https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6150-5147 12 of 13 SAID ENDNOTES 1 I see the work of Holmes and Kandil as complementing one another, even though their focus is not the counter-revolution. While Holmes emphasizes the significance of the relation between the business class and the military apparatus in Egypt's revolution (while missing the security apparatus), Kandil interrogates the role of the power triangle (the military, the political, and the security apparatus), while missing the business class. REFERENCES Achcar, G. (2016). Morbid symptoms: Relapse in the Arab uprising. Stanford University Press. Ahram Online. (2011, May 7). Tantawi was at odds with Gamal Mubarak: Wikileaks. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/11559/Egypt/Politics-/Tantawi-was-at-odds-with-Gamal-Mubarak-Wikileaks.aspx Ali, M. M. (2016, May 12). 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Hillary Clinton email archive: Email 12228. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://wikileaks.org/ clinton-emails/emailid/12228 Younis, S. (2015). The mandate legitimacy: Roots and where abouts? (p. 15). Egyptian Files Magazine. [special issue: Egyptian state between two revolutions]. AU T H OR BIOGR APH Y Atef Said is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Said studies and teaches on the following topics: sociological theory, political sociology, historical sociology, and social movements and revolutions. Said published in Social Problems, Social Research, International Sociology and Contemporary Sociology. He finished his manuscript titled “Revolution Squared: Tahrir, Political Possibilities and Counter-Revolution in Egypt.” The manuscript is under contract (forthcoming Duke University Press). This article is based on an ongoing project about the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and its aftermath. The project started in 2011. How to cite this article: Said, A. (2021). A sociology of counter-revolution in Egypt. Sociology Compass, e12916. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12916