ETHICS
A Thematic Compilation
Avi Sion, Ph. D.
AVI SION, 1995-2008.
PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED IN ANY MANNER
WHATSOEVER, OR STORED IN A RETRIEVAL SYSTEM OR TRANSMITTED,
WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR-PUBLISHER, EXCEPT IN
CASE OF BRIEF QUOTATIONS WITH DUE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
First Published 2008.
By Avi Sion. Geneva, Switzerland.
Library Cataloguing Information:
Sion, Avi.
Ethics. A Thematic Compilation.
Abstract
Ethics is a collection of thoughts on the method, form and
content of Ethics.
This book is a thematic compilation drawn from past works
by the author, over a period of thirteen years. The essays are
placed in chronological order.
Contents
1.
Chapter One ........................................................ 7
Basic Properties ......................................................... 7
Complementary Factors ........................................... 16
How to Count Mitzvot ............................................. 27
Commanded vs. Personal Morality .......................... 41
2. Chapter Two...................................................... 50
1. Karmic Law Denied ................................................. 50
2. Empirical Observations ............................................ 51
3. Inductive Conclusions .............................................. 52
3. Chapter Three.................................................... 55
1. Harmonizing Justice and Mercy .............................. 55
2. Feelings of Emptiness .............................................. 61
4. Chapter Four ..................................................... 65
1. Knowledge of Volition ............................................ 65
2. Freedom of the Will ................................................. 70
3. Decision and Choice ................................................ 75
4. Goals and Means ...................................................... 79
5. Chapter Five ...................................................... 84
1. The Consciousness in Volition ................................ 84
2. The Factors of Responsibility .................................. 91
3. Judging, and Misjudging, People ............................. 96
6. Chapter Six...................................................... 107
1. Influence Occurs via Consciousness ...................... 107
2. Knowledge of Effort, Influence and Freedom ....... 112
3. Formal Analysis of Influence................................. 115
4. Incitement .............................................................. 121
1.
2.
3.
4.
7.
Chapter Seven ................................................. 127
1. Some Features of Influence .................................... 127
2. Processes of Influence ............................................ 134
3. Instincts in Relation to Freewill ............................. 139
4. Liberation from Unwanted Influences ................... 142
5. Propositions about the Future................................. 144
8. Chapter Eight .................................................. 148
1. Volition and Biology .............................................. 148
2. Therapeutic Psychology ......................................... 155
9. Chapter Nine ................................................... 162
1. Cognition, Volition and Valuation ......................... 162
2. Velleity ................................................................... 171
3. Whim ...................................................................... 175
4. Inner Divisions ....................................................... 178
10. Chapter Ten ..................................................... 181
1. Valuation ................................................................ 181
2. The Main Valuations .............................................. 185
3. Ethology ................................................................. 194
11. Chapter Eleven ................................................ 203
1. Habits ..................................................................... 203
2. Obsessions and Compulsions ................................. 206
3. The Ego Abhors a Vacuum .................................... 217
12. Chapter Twelve ............................................... 224
1. Physical Urges and Impulses ................................. 224
2. Mental Urges and Impulses .................................... 236
3. Formal Analysis of Physical and Mental Urges..... 241
4. Are There Drives Within the Soul? ........................ 246
5. Formal Analysis of Spiritual Urges........................ 249
13. Chapter Thirteen.............................................. 256
1. Purposiveness ......................................................... 256
2. Organic Functions .................................................. 258
3. The Continuity of Life ........................................... 265
14. Chapter Fourteen ............................................. 271
1. Social Darwinism ................................................... 271
2. Spiritual Darwinism ............................................... 278
15. Chapter Fifteen................................................ 283
1. Founding Ethics ..................................................... 283
2. Ethics Concerns the Living, Thinking, Willing ..... 291
3. Conscience and Conformism ................................. 295
4. Tai Chi, Karma Yoga and Faith ............................. 299
16. Chapter Sixteen ............................................... 305
1. Inducing Ethics ...................................................... 305
2. Ethical Formulas .................................................... 312
3. Philosophy of Law ................................................. 318
17. Chapter Seventeen .......................................... 325
1. Against Kant on Freewill ....................................... 325
2. Alleged Influences ................................................. 329
18. Chapter Eighteen ............................................. 333
1. The Goals of Meditation ........................................ 333
2. The Individual Self in Monism .............................. 339
19. Chapter Nineteen ............................................ 347
1. Distinguishing the Ego ........................................... 347
2. Dismissing the Ego ................................................ 351
3. Relief from Suffering ............................................. 356
20. Chapter Twenty ............................................... 363
1. Taking Up the Challenge ....................................... 363
2. Face Facts with Equanimity ................................... 366
21. Chapter Twenty One ....................................... 369
1. Stop Substance Addictions .................................... 369
2. Don’t Stuff Yourself Silly ...................................... 372
3. Limit Input from the Media ................................... 374
22. Chapter Twenty Two....................................... 377
1. Forget Your Face.................................................... 377
2. Give Up Sensuality ................................................ 379
3. On “Sexual Liberation” .......................................... 382
23. Chapter Twenty Three..................................... 387
1. Attachment ............................................................. 387
2. Non-attachment ...................................................... 389
3. Wise Moderation .................................................... 391
24. Chapter Twenty Four ...................................... 394
1. Freewill .................................................................. 394
2. The Is-Ought Dichotomy ....................................... 398
3. The Standards of Ethics ......................................... 404
25. Chapter Twenty Five ....................................... 407
1. The Laws of Thought in Meditation ...................... 407
2. Reason and Spirituality .......................................... 413
26. Chapter Twenty Six......................................... 419
1. Mental Health ......................................................... 419
2. Transcending Suffering and Karma ....................... 423
27. Chapter Twenty Seven .................................... 428
1. Enlightenment Without Idolatry ............................ 428
2. Good People ........................................................... 434
3. A World of Mercy .................................................. 438
28. Chapter Twenty Eight ..................................... 441
1. Understanding Injustice ......................................... 441
2. Forgiveness ............................................................ 447
3. Actions and Reactions ............................................ 452
References
459
CHAPTER 1
7
1. CHAPTER ONE
Drawn from Judaic Logic (1995),
Chapter 13.
ON THE CONCEPT OF MITZVAH
Jewish tradition assigns various technical
characteristics to the concept of mitzvah. In this chapter, we
will try to clarify some of them, and analyze their formal
implications, making comparisons to natural ethical logic.1
1.
Basic Properties
The term mitzvah (pl. mitzvot) is usually translated as
commandment(s). Mitzvot asseh (do’s) are positive
commands or imperatives; mitzvot lo-taasseh (do-not’s) are
negative commands or prohibitions. Strictly-speaking, this is
not quite correct. Some of the ‘mitzvot’ are indeed
imperatives or prohibitions, but some, whether directly or by
1
Kahan's Taryag Mitzvos is worth reading in this context, as
an illustration of how mitzvot are currently taught to laypersons.
Many of the examples proposed here were drawn from that work,
though their analysis is my own.
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implication, are rather only permissions (i.e. negations of
prohibitions) and/or exemptions (i.e. negations of
imperatives).
For examples: Deut. 23:25, “when you come into your
neighbour’s vineyard, you may eat grapes” (which refers to a
laborer at work), is a case of direct permission; or Exod.
13:13, “and if you will not redeem it, you must behead it”
(which refers to a firstborn donkey), is a conditional
imperative, which by implication implies a permission. In
some cases, the imperative and permission do not have the
same logical subject; thus, in Lev. 19:10, the crop-owner’s
obligation to leave gleanings for the poor, implies the right of
the poor to go into the field and take them.
But note that, in some cases, a statement which has the form
of a permission, is received rather with emphasis on an
implicit imperative (for instance, Deut. 14:11, which reads
“every clean bird, you may eat” is taken to mean that one
must examine a bird and make sure that it is kosher before
eating it; similarly with Lev. 11:2, 9, 21). Some passages
which might more naturally be understood as merely
permissive, are seemingly interpreted more extremely as
imperatives (for instances, Deut. 15:3 or 23:21, which read
“from a gentile, go ahead“ - “exact repayment of loan,
even in Shemitah year“ or “take interest”, are interpreted by
some as meaning ‘you must do so’, rather than as merely
‘you may do so’; similarly, Deut. 17:14-15 is understood to
mean that Israel not just may but must (eventually) have a
king.
So we have to interpret the term mitzvah/command, here, as
including ‘command to allow’ and ‘command to exempt’, as
well as ‘command to obligate’ and ‘command to forbid’. This
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9
sort of nested reiteration might raise formal problems, if
taken too literally. Rather, I think, the best thing is to
understand the term ‘command’, for lack of another, as
having as well as its narrow sense of imperative, a broader
sense which includes prohibitions, permissions and
exemptions, as well.
One might argue that reiteration does reflect an aspect of the
concept of mitzvah, namely that even contingent ethical
propositions, if true, are products of God’s will and therefore
imply a command. But then, a command to whom? Some
might answer, to the religious authorities, telling them to tell
the lay people what they must, must not, may, may not do.
However, I do not think that Judaism wishes to be so
extremely authoritarian; it acknowledges a more direct
relation between layperson and God.
Also, I do not think that we are logically forced to regard
contingent ethical propositions as expressions of God’s will;
it is not inconceivable that God is simply open to either
course implied by such propositions. In other words, the
totalitarian thesis, that “everything is regulated” within a
religious ethics, is not logically inevitable; it is quite
conceivable (though some people, with fanatical inclinations,
would doubt it) that God allows for (perhaps even rejoices at)
some human spontaneity, so that humans have some
(however much or little) freedom of choice, not only in the
sense of natural capacity, but also in the sense of ethical
liberty.
In more formal terms, the issue may be expressed as follows:
in natural modality, a proposition of the form “X is capable
of doing Y” is usually associated with a proposition of the
form “When X is in such and such a situation, he is forced to
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ETHICS
do Y”, which expresses the conditions under which the
potentiality is necessarily actualized. One hypothesis (known
as determinism) is that such association is not only usual but
universal; the opposite hypotheses (positing spontaneity or
freewill) are that there exist cases where a potentiality does
not imply a conditional necessary actualization.
Similarly, the issue totalitarianism versus partial liberty arises
as follows in ethical modality: a proposition of the form “X is
permitted to do Y” may or may not presuppose a proposition
of the form “When X is in such and such a situation, he is
obligated to do Y” - the issue is not formally resolvable;
either position, ethical determinism and ethical
indeterminism, is a hypothesis. Note in passing that the
English language, by using passive verbs like ‘is permitted’,
already implies that liberty is endowed; but a more impartial
terminology would reflect more the inherent independence of
liberty, its conceptual primacy.2
The following are some of the terms found in Talmudic
discussions referring to mitzvot:
2
The simplest explanation of permissive and/or exemptive
ethical propositions in the Torah, is to suppose that God wanted to
preempt us (or the Rabbis) from drawing a prohibitive or imperative
conclusion.
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There are many other equivalent terms, needless to say; in
Hebrew, such as tsarikh, zakai, in English, such as
prescribed, prohibited, allowed, and so forth (check out your
thesaurus for more). These concepts are normally understood
by logicians as ethical modalities - attributes of relations,
conceptually similar to (indeed subsets of) necessity,
impossibility, possibility and unnecessity, but in the ethical
field, implying some prior standard(s) of value, ultimate
norms - and having (among others) the following logical
characteristics:
(a) They are in principle obvertible, so that if, for subject X,
the doing (in the widest sense) of Y is an obligation, then notY is forbidden, and if Y is forbidden, then not-Y is an
obligation; and likewise, if Y is permitted, then not-Y is an
exemption , and if Y is an exemption, then not-Y is
permitted.
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ETHICS
(b) They form a normal ‘square of oppositions’, so that
obligation implies (but is not implied by) permission, is
contrary to prohibition, and contradictory to exemption; and
likewise, prohibition implies (but is not implied by)
exemption, is contrary to obligation, and contradictory to
permission.
However (as already discussed in an earlier chapter of Judaic
Logic) Talmudists would be likely, more often than not, to
interpret these concepts somewhat differently. For them, at
least ab initio, permission and exemption would be
understood as davqa positions, and therefore as implying
each other, and being together contrary to both obligation and
prohibition. In that case, one may educe “X may not-Y” (as
well as “X may not not-Y”) from “X may Y”; and similarly
“X may Y” (as well as “X may not Y”) from “X may not-Y”.
In certain cases, the preceding lav davqa interpretations
might be preferred, if the davqa ones turned out to be
untenable for some reason.
Going further, a question arises as to whether the Hebrew
expressions ‘asseh’ and ‘lo-taasseh’ (‘do’ and ‘do not do’)
are intended as general words, signifying any verbs, or
whether they signify more specifically volitional ‘action’ and
‘restraint from action’, respectively.
In the general sense, verbs are fully obvertible: ‘does X’
implies ‘does-not do not-X’, and ‘does-not do X’ implies
‘does not-X’; this is the sense preferred by formal logic,
because of its simplicity. Whereas, in the more special sense,
concerning human will, with its psychological, physiological,
environmental, social, political and spiritual concomitants,
which is the domain of interest of ethics, various nuances
have to be taken into consideration.
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An ‘action’ may refer to a thought (a purely mental event); to
an emotion (a psychosomatic expression of pleasure, pain or
indifference, love, hatred, or non-commitment, in various
configurations and degrees); or to a physically-manifest
event, with all its implications within the individual(s)
concerned and all its consequences in the surrounding natural
and social context. In this sense, then, ‘action’ refers to an act
of the human will, which may range from fully voluntary and
conscious to very-nearly involuntary and/or unconscious, but
must in any case have some degree of freedom to be subject
to ethical legislation, under any system.
Note that, contrary to what one might expect, thoughts are
often subject to legislation: for though cognition is ultimately
an objective event, the observer can often choose the
direction of his/her attention, the course of his/her research,
and the price (i.e. conditions) of his/her belief-attitudes.
Similarly, emotions are in a sense ‘passions’, but the valuejudgments originally underlying them are often a relatively
free choice, and a person may often choose to suppress
emotions, more or less control them or give them free rein,
and actions (of varying value) may then follow. Certainly, we
find within Judaism laws relating to belief (to believe in the
Lord/God’s existence, oneness, sovereignty, not to believe in
other gods) and to love (to love the Lord/God, to love one’s
neighbor as oneself, not to hate one’s brother in one’s heart).
Lastly, while it might be that an individual can have
influence on his/her natural and social surrounds directly
through his/her thoughts and emotions (I mean, by telepathy),
in most cases, certainly, such influence can only take shape
through the medium of physical acts (be they words or
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ETHICS
sounds spoken or unspoken, facial expressions and gestures,
or pushing, pulling and other movements) of the individual.
Also to note: as far as religion is concerned, ethics concerns
not only the impact of individuals on their own body and
mind (including soul), and on their physical and social
surrounds, but also their (alleged) effect on “upper and lower
spiritual worlds” of mystical significance. While some rituals
are more or less explicable in immanent terms, many are
reputed or presumed to have transcendental purposes. But I
will not make further remarks on such relatively
metaphysical topics.
My only interest being here to point out the differing senses
of ‘doing’, and to briefly demonstrate that once one goes
beyond the simple, general sense, the issues become rather
complicated. For these reasons, formal logic usually
concentrates on the broadest sense of the verb ‘to do’, with
which no essential distinction other than polarity exists
between positive and negative commands.
Where the more specific sense of human action is intended,
we have to keep in mind at least the following categories:
‘doing’ and ‘avoiding doing’ (both of which signify some
degree of volition and awareness), and ‘absence of doing’
and ‘absence of avoiding doing’ (which merely negate the
preceding two categories, without implying volition and
awareness and without excluding them). All this is obvious
enough, and was (it seems to me) clearly known to the
Talmudists.
The following is a more technical presentation of the
concepts under discussion:
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15
For the most abstract forms, where ‘do’ refers to any verb,
positive or negative, active or passive, whatsoever, (a) all
imperatives with a zero or even number of negations are
equivalent, and (b) all those with an odd number of negations
are equivalent, and these two sets of forms are contrary to
each other. This refers to the following forms (I use the
formulas “that’s good,” “that’s bad,” to express the black and
white value-judgments involved):
a) X must do Y = X mustn’t do not-Y = X must not-do notY = X mustn’t not-do Y = if X does Y, that’s good; if X
does not do Y, that’s bad.
b) X mustn’t do Y = X must do not-Y = X mustn’t not-do
not-Y = X must not-do Y = if X does not do Y, that’s
good; if X does Y, that’s bad.
However, in contrast, if we interpret ‘doing’ as meaning
specifically ‘willing’, obversions are not always feasible, and
we obtain four variously opposed sets of two forms (c
through f, below), instead of two contrary sets of four forms
(a, b, above).
c) X must will Y = X mustn’t not-will Y = if X wills Y,
that’s good; if X does not will Y, that’s bad.
d) X mustn’t will Y = X must not-will Y = if X does not will
Y, that’s good; if X wills Y, that’s bad.
e) X must will not-Y = X mustn’t not-will not-Y = if X wills
not-Y, that’s good; if X does not will not-Y, that’s bad.
f) X mustn’t will not-Y = X must not-will not-Y = if X does
not will not-Y, that’s good; if X wills not-Y, that’s bad.
About the oppositions between these forms. Note that, given
“X wills Y” and “X wills not-Y” are incompatible, whereas
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ETHICS
“X does not will Y” and “X does not will not-Y” are
compatible, it follows that “X wills Y” implies (but is not
implied by) “X does not will not-Y”, and that “X wills notY” implies (but is not implied by) “X does not will Y”.
Now, the forms (c) and (d) are contrary, since they disagree
regarding whether “X wills Y” is good (c) or bad (d), and
likewise whether “X does not will Y” is good (d) or bad (c).
Similarly, for the forms (e) and (f). However, since “X wills
Y” (good) found in (c) implies “X does not will not-Y”
(good) found in (f), and “X does not will Y” (bad) found in
(c) is implied by “X wills not-Y” (bad) found in (f), the forms
(c) and (f) are compatible, but neither implies the other.
Similarly, for the forms (e) and (d).
2.
Complementary Factors
When God tells us to do or not-do something, is He just
concerned with that one thing He has mentioned, or with a
much larger, unstated context?
Perhaps just doing what one is told by God to do, is all that
counts. Or perhaps this bottom line is duly rewarded; but
also, as one enriches the deed with better kavanah (pl.
kavanot), as defined below, the reward increases
proportionately. Similarly, on the negative side: there may be
gradations in seriousness, ranging from a minimum for “sin
through error” (implying that one has a certain responsibility
for ignorance or neglect), to a maximum for intentional or
willful sin (implying a certain rebellion). Or perhaps, more
extremely, the performance of a positive mitzvah or nonperformance of a negative mitzvah require an adequate
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kavanah (or, rather, a certain collection of kavanot), and does
not otherwise count at all.
Kavanah includes various factors:
(a) A certain degree of awareness of one’s activity or
inactivity; so that it is a product of will, and not merely an
automatic reaction (a reflex or habit or chance occurrence).
For example, while praying, being aware of the meaning (at
least the plain meaning, if not the deeper meanings) of the
words one utters, would fall under this heading.
(b) The proper motives: this concerns the causal background
influencing the deed. Included here are (i) more or less
conscious goals, like gaining a place in the world-to-come, or
earning earthly rewards, such as a wife and children, long
life, health, knowledge, success, riches, and so forth; and (ii)
undeclared/unadmitted, subconscious or unconscious goals,
which constitute the relatively hidden psychological context,
such as power-lust for instance. Apparent motives are not
necessarily true motives; here, complex needs for
introspection are implied.3
3
Note that in some cases, as I recall (though I cannot
appose an example offhand), Scripture itself mentions a motive; if
so, it would seem obvious that the specified motive must play a
role. As a rule, the Rabbis disapprove of explanations for mitzvot,
for fear that the mitzvot might be erroneously limited thereby. For
instances: to say that shaving is forbidden because heathen
priests engaged in it, might lead people to regard shaving as
permissible so long as not performed with idolatrous motives; or
again, to say that pork was forbidden because it went bad quickly
in hot countries, might lead people to regard it as permissible in
cold countries or in the days of refrigerators. But a corollary of that
view would be that if Scripture ever explicitly mentions a motive for
a mitzvah, then the performance of it without that motive would
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ETHICS
(c) The intention to thereby fulfill the mitzvah, as such, i.e. as
a command from God given through Moshe at Sinai. One
may view this, though the ideal motive, as just a necessary
motive, a sine qua non, without having to be the only motive,
exclusive of any other. Or, more extremely, one may insist on
obedience without selfish motive whatever, purely lishma,
“for its own sake,” or leshem Shamaim, “for the sake of
Heaven.”
(d) We might additionally mention, though it does not strictly
qualify as kavanah, the emotional context. Treatises on the
performance of mitzvot always stress the significance of
mood or attitude: goodwill, doing the job at hand with joy
(beratson), adds to the value and virtue of one’s good deed,
and conversely resentment and such depreciate it. This is
quite understandable, at least from the point of view of the
order-giver, who does not want the annoyance and
interference of negative vibes (stiff-neck); from the
viewpoint of the order-receiver, however, there may be a felt
need to express dissatisfaction or disagreement, of
involuntary compliance.
According to some Rabbis (including, as I recall, the
Rambam and the Chafets Chaim), without the required
kavanah the action done or not-done is considered mere
happenstance, and does not constitute fulfillment of the
corresponding mitzvah.
seem, logically, to be equivalent to non-performance (i.e. to
constitute, for a positive mitzvah, a useless act; and for a negative
mitzvah, a legitimate loop-hole). A davqa reading, akin to a klal
uphrat inference, would in such case seem justified; but I do not
know if this position is accepted traditionally, or whether the Rabbis
nevertheless generalize the mitzvah.
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Now, the above is a very heavy doctrine, whose logical
implications are manifold. For what it means, in formal
terms, is that the Divine commandments given in the Torah,
although expressed in simple forms like “do this” or “don’t
do that”, are really meant as more complex forms, which
include a multiplicity of tacit qualifications. Clearly, this
changes their logical properties. For instance, the two ethical
propositions below have very different logical properties:
“X must do Y” (simple).
“X must do Y and be aware (to degree k) of doing Y and
have motives l, n, m while doing Y and do Y in order to
fulfill the command to do Y” (complex).
When I say that two such propositions have different logical
properties, I mean that they have different contradictories,
different implications, and so forth - just as any elementary
proposition ‘P’ has different logical properties, compared to
any compound proposition ‘P+Q+R’. All the more so, since
the additional elements include mention of the same subject
and/or predicate in a complicated variety of ways.
It follows that, if the doctrine described above is to be
accepted literally and in full, so that there are effectively no
simple ethical propositions in Judaism, then the logical
system applicable to it is not (as often presumed) the system
which applies to simple ethical propositions, but a much
more elaborate system appropriate to the more complex
forms, with strings of qualifications of the simple relations. It
is very important to realize the full weight of this implication
of the doctrine.
There are yet other complementary factors which might need
to be taken into consideration:
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ETHICS
a) In a natural ethics, the reward/punishment factor is builtin, because the things one should or shouldn’t do have a
natural causal relation, constructive or destructive, to one’s
standard of value - normally, human welfare. The doing or
not-doing of so and so causes an improvement or a damage
in the goal(s) which constitute our norm; and the seriousness
of the measure depends on whether this causation is
necessary or merely helpful, sufficient or partial, categorical
or conditional, etc.
Here, “X should do Y”, because if X does-not do Y, the
ultimate goal(s) Z will be disfavored; or “X should not-do
Y”, because if X does do Y, the ultimate goal(s) Z will be
disfavored; or again, “X may or may not do Y”, because
whether X does or does-not do Y, the ultimate goal(s) Z will
not be disfavored, though one way may be more favorable
than the other, or unfavorable consequences may arise, one
way and/or the other, only under certain conditions instead of
unconditionally.
But in a religious ethics, that is: one based on Divine
Revelation, such causal relations are not always apparent,
especially in that the ultimate goal(s) involved may not be
altogether explicitly known to us (though commentators may
variously presume this or that to be God’s intentions).
Moreover, the personal or collective reward/punishment may
not in all cases be in a naturally-apparent manner causallyconnected to the deeds, but may rather be connected by
Divine fiat, as it were, in hidden pathways. I mean, granted
that Nature is also a product of Divine fiat, religion still
presumes that some relations are intrinsic to it (immanent,
natural), while others use more extrinsic pathways
(transcendent, miraculous).
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Thus, in religion, the reward or punishment, which we will
symbolize by Z1 and Z2, respectively, has the following
formal relation to the command: “X should do Y, and if X
does Y then Z1 is promised, and if X does not do Y then Z2
is threatened”; and similarly, in the case of “X should not do
Y”, mutadis mutandis. The imperatives are associated with
promises and threats, but one may not formally infer from
these imperatives negative natural-conditional propositions.
Here, the reward/punishment complex is a Divinely-instituted
appendage, which may not (though it also may) have any
natural causal connection to the (positive or negative)
imperative. The result is not automatically consequent, under
Natural Law, but mediated by ad hoc acts of will by God on a
case-by-case basis. Even if God’s choices are consistently
uniform, they always retain a more voluntary character. This
hypothesis would explain the irregularity of results (which
might alternatively be due to the complexities of the natural
causalities involved, of course), and fits neatly with the
doctrine that God wishes to reserve for Himself the option of
mercy and forgiveness.
In this context, the issue of redemption arises. In nature,
some mistakes can be corrected, and others cannot. In
Judaism, by special Divine dispensation, as it were, we are
more often than not offered further possibilities of
redemption, the undoing and forgiveness of fait accompli,
beyond the natural, through repentance and personal change
(teshuvah), through charity (tsedakah) and sacrifice in the
Temple (korbanot). All this has logical significance.
b) Another issue with possible relevance is whether
reward/punishment are related to effort. Is God’s only
interest in tachlit, the bottom line, getting the job done, or is
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ETHICS
the effort expended in fulfilling a mitzvah significant to Him?
Effort means work against resistance, the resistance of one’s
own faculties or weaknesses or diverse external factors; or, in
other words, in a terminology dear to the Rabbis, the counterpressure of the yetzer haraa, the “evil inclination” allegedly
possessed by mankind in particular and this-world in general.
With regard to reward, if two people fulfill the same mitzvah,
and for one it was an easy thing and for another a difficult
thing, are they at the same moral/spiritual level? The one for
whom it was easy is in a sense proved the higher, in view of
the facility experienced; but the one for whom it was more
difficult is in another sense proved the higher, in view of the
extra effort dedicated.
More specifically, for instance, if a person never kills or
never steals or never commits adultery (and many people fall
in those categories), is such a person always credited with
virtue? Or does the merit depend on having been tempted and
resisted temptation, as some Rabbis claim, and does the merit
grow as a function of the difficulty encountered? In other
words, to use a technological image, is only heat-production
respected in Jewish law, and superconductivity looked down
upon?
More formally, does “X must do Y” imply, in the Torah, “if
it takes X an effort to do Y, he is rewarded; else, not”; and
does “X mustn’t do Y” imply, in the Torah, “If X is tempted
yet resists to do Y, he is rewarded; else, not”? It may not be
possible to answer such questions on formal grounds; any
doctrine which is internally consistent, which presents no
inherent difficulty, is on equal footing from that point of
view.
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With regard to the negative mitzvot just mentioned, I would
like to comment that people are in fact constantly tempted:
any cause for anger, real or imagined, is effectively a
temptation for violence and (eventually) murder, every object
one can pick up (which belongs to someone else) is a
temptation for theft, every woman that passes by is a
temptation for rape and (if she is married) adultery. So, even
if such temptations were regarded as so small as to be nearly
zero, for most people, or the overcoming of them was viewed
as generating a virtually negligible credit, for most people,
we could still not truly claim in such cases that no temptation
at all was involved and therefore that no resistance to
temptation took place.
The idea of the more extreme Rabbis may be expressed more
fully by saying that each mitzvah refers to four outcomes
(leaving aside more complex issues of kavanah mentioned
earlier) as follows: for example, that “X must do Y” in the
Torah is intended to mean “X must will Y” (see form (c), in
the previous section), so that:
if X wills Y (= active performance), the mitzvah is
fulfilled and rewarded;
if X does Y, but does not will Y (= passive performance),
the mitzvah is not truly fulfilled and no reward follows;
if X does not will Y, yet as it happens does not do Y (=
sin of omission), the mitzvah is breached though perhaps
relatively less punishably;
if X wills not-Y (= sin of commission), the mitzvah is
breached in a more punishable manner.
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ETHICS
Similarly, that “X mustn’t do Y” in the Torah is intended to
mean “X mustn’t will Y” (see form (d)), and this entails four
outcomes as above, mutadis mutandis; and likewise,
supposedly, for “X must do/will not-Y” (see form (e)) and “X
mustn’t do/will not-Y” (see form (f)). All that in itself seems
consistent.
With regard to punishment, is a person who has tried his/her
utmost to perform a positive mitzvah or resist a temptation to
sin, but failed, treated less severely than one who has tried
less or not tried at all? This question can also, like the
preceding one, be expressed in formal terms; it proposes
further gradations. Our human sensibilities concerning
Justice would answer yes to it; Judaism tends to agree in
principle, though some stories seem to suggest that
sometimes this is irrelevant.
Still further distinctions and gradations are called forth when
we consider the issues of kavanah. For instance, a person
who did not know the law, having say been kidnapped far
from the community, and who consciously eats pork, is not
comparable to someone who knew the law and wished to
break it to express rejection of it. Such fine subdivisions are
beyond the scope of the present study; I only mention them to
remind the reader that we have far from exhausted the issues.
c) While on the topic of reward/punishment, we should
mention an interesting concept of deontology (general ethical
logic) found in the Bible and Talmud, that of remedy. For
example, it is forbidden to steal (a negative mitzvah), but if
one did steal, returning the stolen object to its owner (a
positive mitzvah), in some cases with an extra amount of the
same object, frees the thief from the penalty incurred (such as
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lashes). Similar examples can be found in man-made law and
‘natural’ ethics.
Such corrective processes can be expressed in formal terms,
as follows. In some situations, X causes Y and NotX causes
NotY; whereas in other cases, though X causes Y, NotX does
not cause NotY - so that the damage done (Y) by the
violation (X) cannot be undone (NotY) by a remedy (NotX).
This is an insight, primarily, of causal logic, namely that
some causal relations are reversible, whereas with others
“what’s done is done” - they are ‘entropic’, we might say.
In a broader sense, all reward or punishment, whether in this
world or in the afterlife, is considered as remedy. This is the
concept of tiqun (repair), so dear to and widely used by
Jewish mystics. Life is either degeneration (through sin) or
putting things right (through good deeds or through
reward/punishment by society or by God). Note that reward
is ultimately as much a tiqun as punishment, in that a neverrewarded good deed is comparable to work without wages,
there is an injustice involved, something which should have
been completed has not been.
It should be stressed that the Rabbis nowhere (so far
as I know) explain just how they know that mitzvot
were intended by God to have the various special
features they ascribe to them. Certainly, the Written
Torah is not as explicit as they are on such matters.
Nor are any of the inferences - emerging from by the
special features discussed in this chapter - included in
the main lists of hermeneutic principles; nor is it
anywhere shown precisely how such forms of
argument might be read into the Torah text by means
of the listed hermeneutic principles. The special
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ETHICS
features of Rabbinic ethical logic are merely taken for
granted, as part and parcel of the oral tradition; and
perhaps viewed as implicit to some extent in the
behavior of exemplary characters found in stories in
the Torah, Talmud and later inspirational literature.
There are, as we have pointed out, discussions among
Rabbis as to their ultimate force of law. I would
suggest that such special features developed gradually
in rabbinic lore, generated by the idealism, and
sometimes the one-upmanship, of successive Rabbis.
d) Note, finally, that mitzvot may have still other features
(unrelated to the above). For instance, mitzvot are quite often
temporally related, in forms like “you the person(s)
concerned must perform Mitzvah A before Mitzvah B”.
These constitute complementary commands, say C, whose
subject is the same as A and B, and whose predicate contains
two commands in a specified sequence. Such statements may
have any polarity or modality4; and may be - as well as
categorical - conditional, in diverse and eventually complex
hierarchies. Needless to say, the formal logic of such
propositions can get rather complicated. This feature is not
peculiar to Jewish deontology, but may be found in natural
ethics, where complementary means to an end are often
similarly ordered.
An example from Judaism is the sequence
recommended for the mitzvot of tallit (prayer shawl)
4
Other forms include "A may precede B", "A must notprecede B", "A may not-precede B", and so forth. Intermediate
modalities like "should preferably" or "should preferably not" can
also be used (these correspond to degrees of probability in natural
modality).
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27
and tefillin (phylacteries; leather boxes containing
extracts from Scripture, with straps); within the latter,
in turn, the rosh (head) tefillin is to be put on before
the yad (arm) tefillin. Strictly-speaking, these are
independent mitzvot, but the order in which they are
here listed is the ideal. We are also told precisely at
what stages the appropriate blessings should be
recited.5 How all this is proved (if at all) from
Scripture is another matter, to do with hermeneutics;
our concern here is with formalities.
3.
How to Count Mitzvot
One of the interesting, peculiar properties of Biblical or
Talmudic/Rabbinic commands is the non-equivalence
between an ethical proposition and its obverse. That is, “X
must Y” and “X mustn’t not-Y” (or similarly, “X mustn’t Y”
and “X must not-Y”), although they logically imply each
other, formally, in all cases, may nevertheless in some cases
be counted as two Mitzvot! For example, Deut. 22:19, which
refers to cases of libel of wife by husband, says both “she
shall remain his wife” and “he may not send her away all his
days”; having to remain married and being forbidden to
divorce are identical, yet are here both specified. Another
5
There are many additional prescriptions, such as that if
one has taken up the yad tefillin before the rosh tefillin, one should
out of respect continue to put it on, or again, if one speaks in the
middle of the process, another blessing must be recited; and so on.
From the formal point of view, such details constitute a host of
conditional (if-then) mitzvot.
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ETHICS
example is Deut. 25:17 and 19, the commandments to
remember and not-forget Amalek’s misdeeds towards Israel.
It would at first sight seem like a redundancy, to repeat the
same commandment in positive and negative form; or one
may suspect that the two wordings were counted as two laws
to satisfy some preconceived notion of the ‘number of
Mitzvot’. But the explanation given by the Rabbis is quite
plausible, namely that this emphasis serves not only to
doubly encourage obedience of the command, but also to
signify the extra possibilities of reward or punishment
inherent in its performance or in failure to do so. (Note that
the positive and negative mitzvot in question need not be
close to each other in the Biblical text: for instance Lev.
19:13 and Deut. 24:15, concerning paying a worker his
wages without delay and on time, are far apart yet
complementary.)
Thus it is that there is a general (or nearly general) rule, to the
effect that: the disobedience of a positive command cannot be
punished by Rabbinical courts, though it may have negative
social or Divinely-produced consequences, the latter in this
life or in the afterlife; whereas, disobedience of a negative
command can indeed be punished by Rabbinical courts,
though again it may have consequences of one kind or
another. With regard to obedience of positive or negative
commands, the reward of such obedience is not usually
within the competence of Rabbinical courts (though they may
in some cases decree a person be honored, for instance), but
may be programmed in nature (by God, of course) or occur as
a social phenomenon (most probably due to the ambient
culture produced by the Torah) or be effected Providentially
(i.e. by Divine intervention) in this world or the next.
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29
Effectively, we have here a specialized linguistic convention
that: when a command is worded only positively, the courts
are not competent to punish transgression, whereas when it is
expressed also or only negatively, they are so. It is a signal, a
code, not found in general language, and therefore not a rule
of formal ethical logic, but peculiar (we are taught) to the
domain of Torah.
Note that, in some cases, the pair of positive and negative
commands are not, strictly-speaking, in a purely formal
sense, obverts of each other. This may occur when the
positive command refers to a finite act of will, and the
negative command refers not merely to the absence of that
will, but to another finite act of will in the opposite direction.
For examples. Deut. 22:29, concerning cases of rape,
obligates marriage and forbids divorce; these two mitzvot are
not like the above mentioned case of Deut. 22:19 identical,
for one might well be forced to marry someone, yet not
absolutely forbidden to turn around and divorce her soon
after.
Similarly, in Deut. 21:23 the prohibition to allow a man to
remain hanging overnight and the obligation to bury him on
the same day as he was executed, are not exact obverts of
each other. In Deut. 22:1,3, the mitzvah to return lost
property one finds, and the warning not to pass-by and ignore
it (so as to avoid the hassle of returning it), are not implied by
each other; similarly, with Deut. 22:4, concerning helping
one’s fellow’s fallen animal. Again, the commandments in
Deut. 22:6-7 concerning the mother-bird are not inferable
from each other (as it might have been required that we take
neither mother nor young, or mother but not young).
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ETHICS
We also find in the Torah another form of apparent
redundancy, the repetition of certain laws in both generic
and specific form. For example, if incest is forbidden
between a man and various specified near of kin (Lev. 18:718), one might ask what is the point of forbidding it
additionally with any near of kin (Lev. 18:6). Here again, the
explanation given by commentators is that such repetition
signals the severity of the mitzvah, and forewarns of the
double jeopardy its disobedience implies, in the case of
negative mitzvot; or, in the case of positive mitzvot, their
importance and double recompense. A calculus is suggested.
With regard to the example taken here, one might say that
whereas incest in general generates a moral debit of x, such
practice with a specified near of kin generates a greater debit,
x + y.6
This issue incidentally raises another, of even broader interest
to the formal logic of ethical propositions. What are the
logical relations between imperatives, permissions,
prohibitions and exemptions? This question has to do with
modal logic, and as we shall see it may be answered entirely
with reference to alethic (non-ethical) logic.
6
The example here taken is perhaps not the best, being too
complex. The text may naturally be interpreted as klal uphrat,
meaning that the initial generality is limited to the specifics listed
next [fourth hermeneutic rule of R. Ishmael]; or the generality may
be viewed as referring to non-copulative erotic acts, while the
specifics may refer to copulation, though the wording is the same
[lo tikrav legalut ervah, don't approach to uncover nakedness].
Also, the subject of these prohibitions is generally masculine [ish, a
man], without clarification concerning the status of the feminine
partners. And so forth - but let us ignore such complications in this
context.
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We know that, in the logic of non-ethical propositions, while
predication of any species syllogistically implies predication
of all of its genera, predication of a genus does not suffice to
imply predication of any one (randomly selected) of its
species, though it does imply that at least one (without
prejudice as to which one(s)) of its species must be
predicable. By contraposition it follows that: while denial of
a generic predicate implies denial of all relatively specific
predicates, denial of any one (or even more than one,
provided less than all) of its species is not formally sufficient
to deny a given genus, but it takes denial of all of its species
to ensure denial of a given genus.
As we shall now show, certain rules may be inferred from the
above, with respect to ethical logic. The formal relation of
ethical to neutral propositions is to be found in teleology (a
derivative of causal logic). Normative statements refer to
means and ends, they tell us whether such and such is needed
for, harmful to, or neither needed for nor harmful to, some
accepted standard of value. This norm may have its source in
revelation, or in rational deliberations or in irrational choices,
it may be more or less explicit, and it may be unitary or
manifold (provided that it is internally consistent, or at least
that its parts are clearly hierarchized).
In Judaism, the norm is God’s Will, whose precise content
we know only partly and speculatively, insofar as it is
implicitly expressed in the Torah through the laws and stories
(and similarly, mutadis mutandis, in certain other religions).
In Natural Ethics, the norm is general human welfare, which
may be broadened to include the ecological concerns, and
this is largely explicit and consistent, to the extent that it is
knowable through biology and kindred sciences. More
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ETHICS
subjective ethical systems refer to personal emotions or the
welfare of special groups (e.g. a race) as their standard, and
are largely unverbalized and often inconsistent. In any case,
whatever the standard of value (which we shall label C), the
following formal relations are set by logical science, for any
given action (call it B) performed by someone (A):
A must do B (B is imperative for A), means that if A does
not do B, C cannot occur.
A musn’t do B (B is forbidden to A), means that if A does
do B, C cannot occur.
A neither must nor mustn’t do B (call this ‘license’, for
lack of a better word), means that whether A does or
doesn’t do B, C can still occur.
Additionally:
A may do B (B is permitted to A), means that B is either
imperative or licensed to A.
A may not-do B (B is exempt to A), means that B is
either forbidden or licensed to A.
These, then, are the alethic interpretations of categorical
ethical necessity, impossibility, contingency, possibility and
unnecessity, respectively. Our palette of ethical modalities
may be extended further with reference to conditional
teleologies. Thus, for instances, A doing B is conducive to C,
if it causes C in certain circumstances; and A doing B is
dangerous to C, if it inhibits C (causes not-C) in certain
circumstances. Now, our goal here is to find the
relationships between species and genera of action.
Knowing that a given genus (say G) is imperative or
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33
forbidden or whatever, what can we infer concerning its
species (say S1, S2, S3,...); and vice versa?
a.
If a genus G is imperative, no given one of its
species is logically implied to be imperative, or anything else,
though it is implied that at least one of its species has to be
performed, otherwise G cannot occur, and therefore C
cannot occur. Note well that S1, S2, S3... are disjunctively,
but not individually or distributively, and still less
collectively, implied imperative by G’s imperativeness; it is
only the disjunction of the series of S which is affected, each
and every S may just as well, in itself, be licensed, or
imperative or even forbidden. It follows, by contraposition,
that it does not suffice to know that each and every one of its
species, S1, S2, S3, ..., are exempt, to infer that a genus G is
exempt, but we must establish that the species are not
disjunctively imperative, as just defined; note this well! Thus,
if any species, say S1, is exempt, no inference concerning its
genera, such as G, is logically possible.
b.
If a genus G is forbidden, all (each and every) of its
species are logically implied to be forbidden, because if any
(one or more) of the species occurred, G would occur, and
thereby C couldn’t occur. Here, the prohibition of G is
transmitted to S1, S2, S3, ..., distributively and collectively;
the link is much stronger than in the previous case, note well.
It follows, by ad absurdum, that if any species, say S1, is
permitted, then all its genera, such as G, are permitted
(either imperative or licensed).
c.
If any species, say S1, is imperative, then all of its
genera, such as G, are imperative, because the absence of G
(which is implied by S1) would imply the absence of S1,
under which condition C cannot occur. Note that G’s other
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ETHICS
species, S2, S3, ..., need not for all that be imperative; G’s
imperativeness, here, is rather incidental to S1’s, more in the
way of an inevitability, due to the fact that you cannot
generate S1 without G; only if all of its species were equally
imperative, would G be imperative per se. It follows, by ad
absurdum, that if a genus G is exempt, then all its species,
S1, S2, S3, ..., are exempt (either forbidden or licensed).
d.
If any species, say S1, is forbidden, no inference is
possible concerning its genus G, because given that S1
implies not-C and S1 implies G, we can only conclude that G
does not imply C (since if G implied C, then S1 would imply
both not-C and C, whence S1 would be impossible, contrary
to the premise that it is forbidden, which implies potential). G
may equally be imperative (not-G implies not-C, in which
case the remaining species S2, S3, ..., are at least
disjunctively imperative), or forbidden (G implies not-C, in
which case S1’s prohibition is simply a consequence of G’s),
or neither imperative nor forbidden (‘G does not imply C’
only excludes the possibility that G be imperative to not-C,
which does not concern us, since it is C that is our standard of
value). It follows from all the above, that if a genus G is
permitted, no inference is logically possible concerning its
species S1, S2, S3, ...; each of them could equally be
imperative (in which case, G would be imperative, and
therefore permitted) or licensed (implying only that G is
permitted) or forbidden (nothing implied for G).
Note well, finally, that knowing a genus G to be licensed
(i.e. neither imperative nor forbidden), we can only infer for
its species that they are exempt (i.e. either forbidden or
licensed); and knowing any species, say S1, to be licensed,
we can only infer for its genera, such as G, that they are
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permitted. These relations follow from the above. We need
not pursue the matter further, here, with reference to
conditional situations.
It should however be noted that the above principles,
describing how ethical modality is transmitted or relayed up
or down conceptual hierarchies, can also be expressed in the
form of modal syllogisms. The most obvious valid moods
being (see b, c, above, which yield categorical conclusions):
G is a genus of S1
S1 is a species of G
and A mustn’t do G
and A may do S1
therefore, A mustn’t do therefore, A may do G
S1
G is a genus of S1
S1 is a species of G
and A may not-do G
and A must do S1
therefore, A may not-do therefore, A must do G
S1
In everyday discourse by religious Jews, we find the term
mitzvah used in a loose, broad sense covering any good deed
or proper restraint, which will get you brownie points.
However, in the context of the doctrine that there are 613
Mitzvot for the Jews, or of the doctrine of 7 Mitzvot for the
Bnei Noach (non-Jews), the term acquires more restricted
senses, which are also not quite the same in each system.
This phenomenon will now be explained, because it is rather
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ETHICS
interesting from the logicians’ point of view and rather
special to Jewish (or Jewish-style) law.
Formal logic deals in meaningful grammatical sentences,
each of which symbolizes some phenomenal appearance, be
it concrete or abstract, material or mental, empirical or
hypothetical, real or illusory. Viewed in this broad-minded
way, even the subjective is objective, and logic is at all times
open to all candidates to membership in the body of
knowledge it seeks to gradually construct. Every event has a
great many facets and a great many levels, which are
interconnected in a great many ways. Each of these
innumerable phenomena, each phenomenon within or next to
every other, may be represented for conceptual purposes
through verbal propositions; but many objects of perceptual
experience or of insight are never verbalized.
In this flexible perspective, it would be absurd and arbitrary
to try and dogmatically enumerate ‘laws’ of any kind, and
say “there are N laws of nature in such and such a field” (e.g.
Three Laws of Thermodynamics) or “there are M moral laws
to follow in such and such a situation” (e.g. Seven Cardinal
Sins). The enumeration would have to capture all the
propositions, at a certain same level, which are true and from
which all others relating to the topic concerned can be
inferred; and it would claim a certain finality.
Such an ultra-rationalistic logistic programme, which is still
found among modern logicians with Cartesian inclinations,
takes no account of the moment-by-moment import of
empirical data which occurs in practice. Such gradual input is
bound to affect, not only the applications of laws, but their
very bases and contents.
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One may, in any science or body of knowledge, identify
certain larger principles, however arrived at, as dominating
the remaining data, in a way resembling the deductive
relationship between axioms and theorems; but every wise
thinker keeps in mind the inductive sources of the whole, and
remains pragmatic in his approach. All this to say: rigidly
counting ‘laws’ would be a very artificial procedure,
particularly if one insisted on adhering to a given number.
Yet this is found in Jewish law, and predictably affects not
only its content, but its form.
Thus it is that different Rabbis will agree that there are 613
Mitzvot for Jews, or 7 Mitzvot for non-Jews, in accordance
with Talmudic traditions, but will disagree somewhat
regarding which commandments precisely are to be included
in or excluded from the list concerned! So long as they arrive
at the correct total, even superficially, they retain a certain
legitimacy; whereas a system which refused to recognize the
magic number, insisting on an irreducibly larger or smaller
number, would from the outset be eliminated. An additional
given is that there be 248 positive Mitzvot and 365 negative
Mitzvot7. My purpose here is not to criticize such an
approach, but to emphasize the logical specificities it
generates.
Still, it is interesting to note that the number 613
TaRYaG, in Hebrew is only based, so far as I know,
on one passing mention in Maccot 23b, quoting Rabbi
7
Said to correspond to the 248 bones of our bodies and 365
days of the year, and implying the necessity to involve all one's
faculties all the time to service of God. (I do not know if our bodies
really have precisely 248 bones; as for 365 days, that is a round
number, corrected in leap years.)
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ETHICS
Simlai, and the Talmud has no one-by-one
enumeration of these Mitzvot. One explanation of the
number that I have read somewhere is that it consists
of the sum of: 2 for the first two of the Ten
Commandments, which the Children of Israel heard at
Sinai directly from God; plus 611, which is the
gematria of the word TORaH (T=400, O=6, R=200,
H=5), which were received by them indirectly
through Moshe. Whether this explanation was
constructed ex post facto, or was the original reason
for the number, I do not know.
One cannot, in such a context, count just any mitzvah (ethical
sentence) as a Mitzvah (note my use of a capital M). Only
certain mitzvot qualify for the honor, and their ability to do
so is mainly traditional (for instance, they are in the list
proposed by the Rambam in the Sefer HaMitzvot, or that in
the Sefer HaChinukh). One cannot strictly say that these
laws, known as av (father) mitzvot, are all at the same
conceptual level; nor that they taken together will allow the
strictly deductive inference of all other laws, though many
are indeed inferable (in which case they are called toledot
descendants). Thus, the enumeration has no natural basis; it
is an imposed structure.
To some extent, then, the Mitzvot are a grab-bag; which
perhaps reflects the complexities of the world to which they
are intended to apply. Whereas from the point of view of
formal logic (and indeed for codes of law like the Shulchan
Arukh, as mentioned below), any individual injunction, be it
categorical or conditional, imperative or otherwise, would
count as an ethical sentence (mitzvah), a traditional Mitzvah
(av mitzvah) may consist of a cluster of such sentences, in
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conjunction or in disjunction, explicit or implicit. Perhaps
most mitzvot are implied in the Mitzvot; but in all honesty,
strictly-speaking, one cannot claim that all are: many details
are contributed by tradition or later Rabbinic decisions, and
many vary from community to community.
To give an example at random. In Exod. 20:12, “honor your
father and your mother”, two distinct items are listed (rather
than just “parents”), and yet they count as one law.
Sometimes, the composition is more complicated: for
instance, Deut. 25:3, “Forty strikes may he give him, not
more”, prescribes the giving of strikes, permits up to 40 of
them, and forbids more than forty, all in one and the same
sentence. It is not always easy to predict and understand how
and why the Rabbis split some sentences into two or more
separate Mitzvot, while they kept others, or fused some, as
single Mitzvot.
More broadly, let us remark that in some cases,
sentences which intuitively might have been
considered as laws, end-up rejected by Rabbinic
decision; whereas, sentences which might at first sight
have seemed incidental story-telling end-up as laws.
All this has to be explained on a case-by-case basis,
with reference to the relevant Talmudic and postTalmudic discussions; there is no sweeping
justification. The oral tradition also stretches and
delimits laws, stating how far they are applicable and
detailing their exceptions.
If now we turn our attention from such numerical systems to
the developed law-system of the Shulchan Arukh, we see that
the latter is concerned with listing all the mitzvot (small m),
without attempting to count them, which are generally
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ETHICS
accepted as Halakhah, and even many subcultural traditions
(minhagim). While the Code of 613 Mitzvot is by definition
exclusive, the Shulchan Arukh is rather an attempt at
exhaustiveness (and a degree of order, for currently relevant
laws at least). It is clear that one cannot expect to
mechanically derive the thousands of nuances in casuistry of
the Shulchan Arukh from the 613 Mitzvot. Rather, the 613
could be regarded as heads of chapters, which signify certain
collections of mitzvot of varying importance and consensus.
Furthermore, as Aaron Lichtenstein has ably shown in his
The Seven Laws of Noah, the term Mitzvah does not have
quite the same denotation or connotations in the legal code of
613 Mitzvot and in that of 7 Mitzvot. There are parallels and
genetic relations between these systems, but there are also
some radical differences and differences of detail. Here
again, then, the term ‘mitzvah’ has a varying meaning (even
after the elucidation of about 66 equivalences between the
two systems proposed by Lichtenstein, as he himself argues).
The concept of ‘chapter-heads’, rather than ‘top principles
from which all others are inferred’, is also made evident in
this work: in the list of Noachic laws, the titles tend to
describe an extreme negative behavior pattern (for instance,
eating a limb off a live animal), without apparently limiting
itself to it, i.e. without precluding other proscribed behaviors
and even prescribed positive behavior patterns (in the case at
hand, against other forms of cruelty to animals and for
kindness to them).
We see from the foregoing discussion that the counting of
mitzvot is no simple matter.
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4.
41
Commanded vs. Personal Morality
According to Judaism, a person has greater merit for doing a
good deed if he was commanded by God to do it, than if he
merely voluntarily took it upon himself to do it. Indeed, in
some instances (for instance, shaking the lulav when it is not
the festival of Succoth), doing the deed without having been
commanded to is useless and gains one no credit; in some
instances (as in the case of presumptive keeping of the
Sabbath by a non-Jew), it is even counterproductive and
punishable.
Ethics, in this perspective, is not ‘universal’ in the sense of
uniform for all - but may vary from group to group or even
among individuals. Thus, Jews may have one set of rules,
non-Jews another; Israelites, Levites and Kohens may be
subject to different rules, as may relatively volunteer classes
of individuals, like ‘nazirites’, judges (within a Beit-Din, or
religious court) or kings; men, women, and children need not
have the same obligations, restrictions and liberties; prophets
or kings may receive very personal orders; and so forth. Not
only may rules vary from population to population, but
reward and punishment may likewise vary, accordingly.
I see no logical difficulty in this viewpoint, in the sense that I
have never agreed with the Kantian idea that the moral is
necessarily reciprocal and universal. Deontology, the general
logic of ethical forms, cannot be presumed to consist
simplistically of exclusively categorical ethical-mode
statements, but must consider a complex intertwining of
conditional statements. Just as the non-ethical aspect of
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ETHICS
nature displays diversity and conditionality, as well as some
uniformity and categoricality - so may the ethical aspect of
nature (to the extent that it exists), and all the more so Godgiven ethics, display these various modalities.
Furthermore, in both natural and religious ethics,
conditioning may be of any category and type of modality: it
may be extensional (schematically: ‘in the case of this class
of people, thusly; in all other cases, otherwise’),
natural/temporal (e.g. ‘when a nazir eats a certain quantity of
grapes, then he is subject to certain penalties’), or even
epistemic (i.e. ‘if a person was aware of so and so, he is
responsible for such and such; alternatively, not’). The search
for absolutes (for an ethic which can be proved with
certainty) must not be confused with a pursuit of categoricals.
Of course, where no truly convincing cause for
discrimination is available, one is logically bound to revert to
the idea of reciprocity and universality (known to
philosophers as the Principle of Uniformity of
Indistinguishables). Such positivism or minimalism is often
justified and inevitable, at least within a natural knowledge
framework; and indeed it is applied in the religious context,
where the text of reference has not specified any distinctions
to be made. For in such cases, legal differentiation between
people and lack of equity (equality before the law) would be
arbitrary and unjustifiable.
But, where religious ethics is concerned, our attitude is that if
God, the Creator of all fact, including ethical fact, chooses to
subdivide responsibilities and structure reward and
punishment in uneven ways, and communicates His will in
this respect to us, that is His prerogative, and we are bound to
comply. The reason for this attitude is not necessarily that
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there exists a cause for discrimination invisible to us though
visible to God (though in some cases, this may be true), but
that God is free to assign different functions and wages to His
various workers, however indistinguishable they be in their
natural or spiritual characteristics. He is the Boss.
However, the said viewpoint is difficult to accept, at
another level, for someone in modern democratic
western society, at a time in history and in places
where the experience of the totalitarian oriental or
medieval monarch has thankfully virtually
disappeared. Our society is very permissive and
liberal (and nevertheless, thank God, it is not totally
and extremely amoral or immoral, and is even in
many respects more moral than ever before). This
stance is the product of a development, which has
even been noticeable within the space of my own
lifetime, but has its roots far in the Enlightenment
(including, to some extent, Immanuel Kant, but many
others too) and subsequent philosophical and political
events.
It is hard for us to accept, as the paradigm of morality,
the behavior-pattern of a frightened slave, doing his
assigned duties with nothing in it for his or her self,
simply because the master commanded it
threateningly, thinking only as far as necessary to
fulfill the command, and so forth. We want to
understand things more, we expect fairness more.
Selfless submission and pure obedience seem to us to
be remote theoretical constructs, inventions of austere
and insensitive moralists; they no longer seem so
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ETHICS
beautiful and ideal. Such attitudes must be taken into
consideration.
What I want to discuss here is whether an externally imposed
course of action, Divinely commanded, to be sure, but done
in the way of a duty, is morally higher, as norm-setting
Judaism seems to suggest - or whether a person is more
credibly moral who acts from a deep internal intuition of
right and wrong, spontaneously, without being forced to, out
of genuine love for the world, for fellow creatures, and for
God. More simply put, the question is really: who is the nicer
guy, the one who gives you charity or who doesn’t kill you,
just because he has been so commanded - or the one who
gives you charity or who doesn’t kill you, because he himself
loves you?
Bound with this issue is that of the actual psychology of
religious study and observance, which suggests that the
answer to our question varies from case to case. For there is
surely a difference, for the most part, between the
motivations religion ideally demands of its adherents in
theory, and those which actually move them in practice. And
while religion views this gap hopefully as a passing phase,
which it is precisely the job of study and observance to close
- we must linger on it more attentively. We must ask, what in
fact makes most religious people act as they do, i.e. in
apparent accordance with the precepts of the religion.
And the reply cannot be that such people have at the outset
the same value-judgments as the religion. It may be that they
do, if they happen to have been culturally prepared since
youth to that effect, though this does not prove that under
other influences they would not have acquired other values
and convictions. But in any case, new arrivals to the religion,
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whether Jews doing teshuvah (return) or gerim (converts),
while they may have out of personal life-experience acquired
some values and convictions in common with those proposed
by the religion - enough to draw them to it - new arrivals, I
say, are systematically acculturated and made to acquire
desires and beliefs they previously lacked.
Thus, while the initial motives drawing a new arrival may
have been the desire to escape painful experiences, like
loneliness and confusion, or more positively the desire to
gain an edge in a competitive world by receiving the favor of
the Ruler of the world, or perhaps even simply getting
material help from the Jewish community - the religion
induces new, additional desires in the newcomer, as its
condition for belonging to the group, which may include
various material, psychological, familial, national, political
and spiritual desires. For example, the newcomer may have
no initial interest in the world to come or the messiah, but the
religion gradually makes him believe these are his own most
fervent wishes, and even that they always have been.
Objectively speaking, at any given time in a person’s spiritual
development, some aspects of his indoctrination have become
internalized, and others are still essentially at an artificial
level of pretense or mimicry, while yet other aspects are still
being rejected. Whereas in the case of role-play a distinction
is possible between the subject and his response or behavior
pattern, in the case of an internalized doctrine such an
objective distinction is rather difficult to make. The
difference between traits and habits acquired, on the one hand
through the natural process we call “experience”, and on the
other hand through the social process we call
“indoctrination”, becomes at some point academic - except
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ETHICS
insofar as or to the extent that the method of influence used
involved violence or conscious lies, so that the subject was
forced or tricked rather than a voluntary participant.
Similar doubts exist even with regard to the person motivated
to virtue by non-religious forces. While good deeds (or
restraints), like acts of charity (or non-violence), may have
external resemblances, their internal roots vary widely, from
mean and ugly ulterior motives to beautiful, uplifting
examples of sincere human love and siblinghood. It would be
unfair to assume only negative subtexts, and naive to suppose
only positive ones.
For these reasons, it is not clear to me why some Rabbis
insist that good deeds (or restraints) based on purely secular
motives are automatically suspect. I find it hard to believe
that human nature is intrinsically evil and lowly, when
without explicit Divine guidance. Rather, I think that humans
have an innate minimum of morality, expressed in various
ways and different in degree from person to person, which it
is difficult for them to fall below. Often, to be sure, an
individual’s ‘minimum of morality’, the limits he/she will not
pass no matter what the stress or temptation, has cultural
roots (which may indeed be ultimately religious), but it is
there all the same.
A conformity, however superficial, with the law (whether the
7 Mitzvot for non-Jews or the 613 Mitzvot for Jews), is still
respectable, even though deeper accord with the spirit of the
law is always more admirable. The Rabbis argue that when a
law exists (or, rather, is known or thought to exist) the ‘evil
impulse’ to resist it is greater, and therefore the obedience of
the law is all the more commendable; whereas, actions (or
inactions) performed against no such resistance are almost
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worthless. This may explain why one should rather do right
in obedience of a law (applicable to one) than for personal
motives, or why a person to whom the law was applicable is
more creditable than a person to whom it was not, though
both obey it. But in my opinion such argument has only
comparative force, it cannot be taken to the extreme.
In brief, even though we can formulate a typology of the
more desirable and the less desirable motivations, differences
between motivations are in practice often blurred and moot,
and it is difficult to judge without prejudicial type-casting
just where each person stands.
A person who is well-practiced in the art of self-knowledge
may in the limit have a good idea of his/her own motivations;
but understanding other people is much more difficult and
mostly a guessing game. For our judgment is highly colored
by our level of tolerance and love, for ourselves and others.
People who habitually judge themselves too harshly will tend
to judge others just as or even more harshly; those who are
overly complacent with themselves may either be equally so
with others (to excuse themselves) or nevertheless
judgmental towards others (using double standards).
The true conclusion is that human beings are not like material
objects, definitely this or definitely that, their character traits
are indefinite - a ‘was somewhat’, a ‘seeming to become’, a
‘tending to be’, rather than a being. It is not always clear just
what they are - not merely to us, the subjective or objective
observers, but in reality, in fact.
While on the subject of harsh judgment, I would like
to comment on an indecent mode of thought some
religious people engage in. I refer to the tacit
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ETHICS
suspicion of every victim, if not every sufferer. They
think: ‘if God is just, then every victim/sufferer must
have committed some crime/sin in the past for which
he/she is thus punished’8. In this view, there are no
innocent victims/sufferers, and all pity is misplaced,
all compassion gratuitous; misfortune becomes proof
of hidden fault!
It does not seem credible that God would use a
criminal’s misdeed as His instrument for the
punishment of the victim: that would imply that, even
while condemning such crime, He is in a way an
instigator or accomplice of it, and the criminal is in
the service of justice! No: crime must be viewed as a
person’s initiative, entirely disapproved of by God.
God may ex post facto balance the victim’s ledger a
bit, but He had no need of the crime for that. We
might more credibly regard natural misfortunes as
God’s doings for purposes of justice; but even that is,
I think, simplistic. Just as God lets crimes take place,
so (or all the more so) He lets natural misfortunes
occur.
Sufferings suggest a distance taken by God, letting
the human drama unfold within certain parameters,
usually without interference. (Why such negligence
and how to reconcile it with justice, I do not know.)
There are some evident causal connections between
8
There are hints of this view in the Talmud. In
Hindu/Buddhist philosophy, the argument refers to 'karma', and
presumes a victim to have committed a similar crime in a past life,
if not the present one. But this presupposes an infinite regression;
crime must have started somewhere, sometime.
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sufferings and previous misdeeds, but very often (as
e.g. with the Shoah) credible explanations are lacking.
Balancing of accounts must be a later matter, after life
(if at all). That seems to be the only empirical and
reasonable viewpoint.
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ETHICS
2. CHAPTER TWO
Drawn from Buddhist Illogic 2002),
Chapter 9.
KARMIC LAW
1.
Karmic Law Denied
Finally, let us consider Nagarjuna’s comments on the moral
principle of ‘karma’ (as we commonly call it). He denies
karmic law – for him, “necessary connections between
good deeds and rewards, and bad deeds and
punishments” are, as Cheng describes9, “not objective
laws in nature and society, but subjective projections of
the mind”. This is of course not an argument, but a
statement, so his reasoning cannot be evaluated. The
statement is notable, considering the context of Indian and
Buddhist belief. And again, Nagarjuna makes this statement,
not out of a desire to oppose normative Buddhism, but in an
attempt to be consistent with his own overall philosophical
9
See p. 88. Cheng there refers to MT XVII:1-33, XXIV:18,
and Hui-cheng-lun, 72, as well as to TGT II.
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51
programme of consciousness beyond reason, the ‘middle
way’.
2.
Empirical Observations
I will take this opportunity to make a few comments of my
own regarding karma. The claim that there is moral order in
the world is partly, but only partly, based on empirical
grounds. Without prejudice as to what constitutes morality,
we can agree that certain actions have certain consequences,
and that some of those actions and consequences happen to
be morally orderly by our standards. The ‘actions’ referred to
are actions of a person; the so-called ‘consequences’ referred
to are things happening to that person beyond his control.
It so happens that sometimes a person who has acted in a way
he (or an observer) considers ‘good’ (e.g. being kind to
others, or whatever) is soon after or much later a recipient of
something he (or the observer) considers ‘positive’ for
himself (e.g. health or children or wealth, whatever).
Similarly, a ‘bad’ action may be followed by ‘negative’
events. In some of those cases, a causal relation may be
empirically established between the ‘action’ and
‘consequence’, without appeal to a moral principle. For
instance, the man works hard and prospers. Such cases can be
considered evidence in favor of a karmic law. In other cases,
however, the causal relation is merely assumed to occur
subterraneously, because it is not empirically evident that
such ‘action’ produces such ‘consequence’. For instance, the
man gives charity and prospers. It would be begging the
question to use cases of the latter sort as evidence in favor of
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ETHICS
karmic law, since it is only by assuming karmic law that we
interpret the events as causally connected.
Furthermore, it so happens that sometimes, despite good
actions, no positive consequences are forthcoming or only
negative ones follow; or despite bad actions, no negative
consequences are forthcoming or only positive ones follow.
The saint suffers and the evil man enjoys. These cases are all
empirical evidence against karmic law, granting the value
judgments involved, since we are not assuming karmic law to
establish the causal relations between such actions and socalled consequences (be they happenstance or evidently
produced by the actions). Of course, one might mitigate this
conclusion somewhat, by stating that one has to know all the
life of a person because no one only suffers and no one only
enjoys, and that anyway it is difficult to estimate the merits of
a good deed or demerits of a bad deed.
3.
Inductive Conclusions
Thus, whereas karmic law might be viewed as a
generalization from the cases where actions are empirically
causally connected to consequences, it cannot be inferred
from the cases where such connection is not established
without presuming karmic law, and it is belied by the cases
where the order of things predicted by karmic law is not
matched in experience. In order to nevertheless justify karmic
law, religions may introduce the concept of rebirth, on earth
as a human or other creature, or elsewhere, in heaven or in
hell, suggesting that if the accounts do not balance within the
current lifetime, they do in the long run balance. But again,
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since we have no empirical evidence of such transmigration
and the process is anyway very vaguely described, such
argument begs the question, making the assumption of
karmic law superficially more palatable, but not providing
clear concept or inductive proof of it.
Some might hang on to karmic law all the same, by arguing
that what we have been calling good or bad, or positive or
negative, was wrongly so called. These postulate that a set of
moral standards, of virtue and value, might be found, that
exactly coincide with empirically evident causal processes, or
at least which are not belied by such processes. Good luck.
But what bothers me most about the assumption of
karmic law is this: it logically implies that whoever
suffers must have previously done evil. For instance,
the millions of Jews (including children) murdered by
the Nazis during the Holocaust. This seems to me an
unforgivable injustice – it is an assertion that there
are no innocent victims of crime and that criminals
are effectively agents of justice! Thus, in the name of
morality, in the name of moral order – merely to
satisfy a ‘rationalist’ impulse to uphold a ‘law of
karma’ – justice is turned upside-down and made to
accuse the innocent and exonerate the guilty. Clearly,
the idea of karmic law is inherently illogical. We have
to conclude that the world functions differently than
such a principle implies.
We seem to have reached, with regard to karma, the same
negative conclusion as Nagarjuna, though perhaps through a
different argument. If there is no karmic law, is there then no
need for liberation, no utility to virtue and meditation? It does
not follow. Even if souls come and go, like bubbles in water,
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ETHICS
it may be good for them to realize their true nature while they
are around. ‘Virtue is its own reward’ and the benefits of
meditation are obvious to anyone engaged in it.
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3. CHAPTER THREE
Drawn from Phenomenology (2003),
Chapter 9.4 and Appendix 2.
1.
Harmonizing Justice and Mercy
Just as God’s existence cannot be proved (or disproved), so
also His attributes cannot definitively be proved (or
disproved). If an attribute could be proved, that to which it is
attributed would of necessity also be proved. (If all attributes
could be disproved, there would be no subject left.) We may
however admit as conceivable attributes that have been found
internally coherent and consistent with all known facts and
postulates to date. (Conversely, we may reject an attribute as
being incoherently conceived or as incompatible with
another, more significant principle, or again as empirically
doubtful.)
Among the many theological concepts that need sorting out
are those of justice and mercy10. Justice and Mercy: what is
their border and what is their relationship?
10
This essay was written in 1997, save for some minor
editing today. Reading it now, a few years later, I find it
unnecessarily aggressive in tone. I was obviously angry for
personal reasons at the time of its writing. Nevertheless, I see no
point in toning it down today.
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ETHICS
Mercy is by definition injustice – an acceptable form of
injustice, said to temper justice, render it more humane and
limit its excesses. But many of the things we call mercy are
in fact justice. Often when we ask (or pray) for mercy, we are
merely asking not to be subjected to injustice, i.e. to
undeserved suffering or deprivation of well-being.
Justice is giving a person his due, either rewarding his virtues
or punishing his vices. Asking (or praying) for either of these
things is strictly-speaking not a request for mercy, but a
demand for justice.
So, what is mercy? A greater reward than that due (i.e. a gift)
or a lesser punishment than that due (i.e. partly or wholly
forgiving or healing after punishing). In the positive case, no
real harm done – provided the due rewards of others are not
diminished thereby. In the negative case, no real harm done –
provided there were no victims to the crime.
An excess of mercy would be injustice. Insufficient
punishment of a criminal is an injustice to victim(s) of the
crime. Dishing out gifts without regard to who deserves what
implies an unjust system.
But in any case, this initial view of moral law is incomplete.
Retribution of crime is a very imperfect form of justice. True
justice is not mere punishment of criminals after the vile deed
is done, but prevention of the crime. Our indignation toward
God or a social/political/judicial system stems not merely
from the fact that criminals often remain unpunished and
their victims unavenged, but from the fact that the crime was
at all allowed to be perpetrated when it could have been
inhibited. In the case of the fallible and ignorant human
protectors of justice, this is sometimes (though not always)
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inevitable, so they can be excused. But in the case of God,
who is all-knowing and all-powerful, this is a source of great
distress and doubt to those who love justice.
There are, we usually say, two kinds of crime: those with
victims and those without. The latter include crimes whose
victim is the criminal himself (they are his own problem), or
eventually crimes against God (who, being essentially
immune to harm, and in any case quite capable of defending
His own interests, need not deeply concern us here). With
regard to crimes with victims, our concern is with humans or
animals wrongfully hurt in some way. The harm may be
direct/personal (physical and/or mental – or in relation to
relatives or property, which ultimately signify mental and/or
physical harm to self) or indirect/impersonal (on the
environment or on society – but these too ultimately signify
an impact on people or animals).
A truly just world system would require God’s prevention of
all crime with innocent victims, at least – which He does not
in fact do, judging by all empirical evidence, which is why
many people honestly doubt His justice or His existence. To
say (as some people do) that the failure to prevent undeserved
harm of innocents is mercy towards the criminals, giving
them a chance to repent, is a very unsatisfying response. It
doesn’t sound so nice when you consider that it was
‘unmerciful’ (i.e. unjust) to the victims: they were given no
chance. Perhaps, then, if not in a context of prevention, the
concept of mercy has some place in the context of ex post
facto non-retribution.
Avenging the victims of crime seems like a rather useless,
emotional response – too late, if the victim is irreversibly
harmed (maimed, killed, etc.). If the victim were not
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ETHICS
irreversibly harmed, his restoration and compensation would
seem the most important thing, preferably at the expense of
the criminal. But we know that vengeance also to some
degree serves preventive purpose: discouraging similar acts
by other potential criminals (raising the eventual price of
crime for them) or educating actual criminals (so they
hopefully do not repeat their misdeeds). To be ‘merciful’ to
actual criminals with victims is therefore not merely to
abstain from a useless emotional response, but to participate
in eventual repetitions, of similar crimes by the same criminal
or others like him.
It must be stressed that taking into account extenuating
circumstances is not an act of mercy, but definitely an act of
justice. Not to take into account the full context in
formulating a judgment is stupidity and injustice. Perhaps the
concept of mercy was constructed only to combat imperfectly
constructed judicial systems, incapable of distinguishing
between nuances of motive and forces. The law says so and
so without making distinctions and is to be applied blindly
without variation – therefore, ‘mercy’, an apparently
‘irrational’ exception to the law, is necessary! It would not be
necessary if the law were more precisely and realistically
formulated. Thusly, as well for allegedly Divine law systems
as for admittedly human law systems. If the system and those
who apply it are narrow-minded and inhumane, of course you
need ‘mercy’ – but otherwise, not.
Another way the concept of mercy is used is in wish or
prayer. We hope that the ‘powers that be’ (Divine or human)
will indeed give us our due, rewarding our good efforts or
preventing or punishing our enemies’ evil deeds, even though
this is not always the case in this imperfect world. Such calls
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to mercy are a form of realpolitik – they are not really calls
for injustice, but calls for justice clothed in humble words
designed to avoid a more fundamental and explicit criticism
the failure of true justice of the powers-that-be. Again, if
absolute justice were instituted, there would be no need for
such appeals to ‘mercy’; the right would be automatically
done. Well, human justice is inevitably deficient: even with
the best of intention and will, people are neither omniscient
nor infallible, so uncertainty and even error are inevitable,
and in such context ‘mercy’ is perhaps a useful concept.
But in the case of God, what excuses can we give? How can
we justify for Him the imperfection of the world? We try to
do so with reference to freewill – justice presupposes
responsibility, which presupposes freedom of choice. But this
argument is not fully convincing, for we can dig deeper and
say: if the world couldn’t be made just, why was it made at
all? Or if it had to be made, why not a world of universal and
unvarying bliss – who ever said that freewill was required?
For this question there seems to be no answer, and it is the
ultimate basis of the complaint of theodicy. The counterclaims of ultimate justice – causes of seemingly unjust
reward or punishment invisible to humans, balancing of
accounts later or in a reincarnation or in an afterlife – seem
lame too. If justice is invisible it is also unjust, and justice
later is too late since for the intervening time injustice is
allowed to exist. So we are left perplex.
Even when we see two equally good men unequally treated,
one rewarded as he deserves and the other given better than
he deserves, or two equally bad men unequally mistreated,
our sense of justice is piqued. All the more so when the one
with more free gifts is less deserving than the one with less
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free gifts. And all the more so still when the bad is not only
not punished but given gifts and the good not only not
rewarded but mistreated. For then all effort toward the good
and away from the bad is devaluated and rendered vain. If
there is no logic in the system of payment, then what
incentives have we? Certainly, the resultant effect is not to
marvel at the love and mercy of the payer, but rather at the
injustice and lack of love that such chaotic distribution
implies.
Perhaps then we should ask – what is good and what is bad?
Perhaps it is our misconception of these things that gives us a
false sense that injustice roams the world. The way to answer
that is to turn the question around, and ask: should we
construct our concepts of good and bad empirically, by
simply judging as good all actions which seem to result in
rewards and bad all actions which seem to result in
punishment (the ‘market’ value of good or bad.)? Such a
pragmatic approach (which some people find convenient,
until they bear the brunt of it themselves) is surely contrary to
humanity’s intuitions. For in such case, criminals become
defenders of justice (justiciers) and victimization should
always be a source of rejoicing for us. This is the antithesis of
morality, which is based on human compassion towards those
who suffer indignities and indignation towards those who
commit indecencies. These intuitions must be respected and
supported, against all claims of religion or ideology or special
interests.
Some say there are no innocent victims – implying (for
example) that even those who perished in the Holocaust must
have been guilty of some commensurate crime, in a previous
lifetime if not in the current one. Some say there are no
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culprits – for instance, many Buddhists apparently hold this
view, with reference to karmic law. These propositions are
two sides of the same coin. As soon as you have a doctrine of
perfect justice, divine or natural, you stumble into this pitfall.
Only by admitting the imperfection of justice in the world
can we become sensitive to the undeserved sufferings of
people (others’ or one’s own).
2.
Feelings of Emptiness
There is another sense of the term “emptiness” to consider,
one not unrelated to the senses previously discussed. We all
have some experience of emotional emptiness.
One of the most interesting and impressive contributions to
psychology by Buddhism, in my view, is its emphasis on the
vague enervations we commonly feel, such as discomfort,
restlessness or doubt, as important motives of human action.
Something seems to be wanting, missing, urging us to do
something about it.
These negative emotions, which I label feelings of
emptiness, are a cause or expression of samsaric
states of mind. This pejorative sense of “emptiness” is
not to be confused with the contrary “emptiness”
identified with nirvana. However, they may be
related, in that the emotions in question may be
essentially a sort of vertigo upon glimpsing the void.11
11
These emotions are classified as forms of “suffering”
(dukkha) and “delusion” (moha). According to Buddhist
commentators, instead of floating with natural confidence on the
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Most people often feel this “hole” inside themselves, an
unpleasant inner vacuity or hunger, and pass much of their
time desperately trying to shake it off, frantically looking for
palliatives. At worst, they may feel like “a non-entity”,
devoid of personal identity. Different people (or a person at
different times) may respond to this lack of identity, or
moments of boredom, impatience, dissatisfaction or
uncertainty, in different ways. (Other factors come into play,
which determine just which way.)
Many look for useless distractions, calling it “killing
time”; others indulge in self-destructive activities.
Some get the munchies; others smoke cigarettes,
drink liquor or take drugs. Some watch TV; others
talk a lot and say nothing; others still, prefer shopping
or shoplifting. Some get angry, and pick a quarrel
with their spouse or neighbors, just to have something
to do, something to rant and rave about; others get
into political violence or start a war. Some get
melancholic, and complain of loneliness or
unhappiness; others speak of failure, depression or
anxiety. Some masturbate; others have sex with
everyone; others rape someone. Some start worrying
about their physical health; others go to a psychiatrist.
Some become sports fanatics; others get entangled in
consuming psychological, philosophical, spiritual or
religious pursuits. Some become workaholics; others
“original ground” of consciousness as it appears, a sort panic
occurs giving rise to efforts to establish more concrete foundations.
To achieve this end, we resort to sensory, sensual, sentimental or
even sensational pursuits.
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sleep all day or try to sink into oblivion somehow.
And so on.
As this partial and disorderly catalogue shows, everything we
consider stupidity or sin, all the ills of our psyche and
society, or most or many, could be attributed to this vague,
often “subconsciously” experienced, negative emotion of
emptiness and our urge to “cure” it however we can. We stir
up desires, antipathies or anxieties, compulsions, obsessions
or depression, in a bid to comprehend and smother this
suffering of felt emptiness. We furnish our time with
thoughts like: “I think I am falling in love” or “this guy really
bugs me” or “what am I going to do about this or that?” or “I
have to do (or not to do) so and so”. It is all indeed “much
ado about nothing”.
If we generalize from many such momentary feelings, we
may come to the conclusion that “life has no meaning”. That,
to quote William Shakespeare:
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
Macbeth (act V, scene 5).
Of course, we can and often do also react more positively,
and give our life more constructive meaning. I believe this
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becomes possible once we are able to recognize this internal
vacuum when we feel it, and make sure we do not react to it
in any of the negative ways we unconsciously tend to react.
Once we understand that this feeling of emptiness cannot be
overcome by such foolish means, we can begin to look for
ways to enjoy life, through personal growth, healthy
activities, helping others, learning, creativity, productiveness,
and so forth.
Regular meditation is a good remedy. Sitting quietly for long
periods daily makes it easier to become and remain aware of
emotional emptiness when it appears. Putting such recurring
bad feelings into perspective gradually frees us from them.
They just seem fleeting, weak and irrelevant. Life then
becomes a celebration of time: we profit from the little time
we have in it to make something nice out of it.
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4. CHAPTER FOUR
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 3.
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF VOLITION
1.
Knowledge of Volition
There is little mystery left as to how to theoretically define
causation and how we get to establish it in practice. A
mixture of epistemological and ontological issues is involved,
which are resolved with relative ease. Causation in general
may be expressed in terms of conditional propositions, or
more profoundly with reference to matricial analysis. And
particular causative relations can be established inductively,
by observation of conjunctions and separations of events and
their negations, and appropriate generalizations and
particularizations.
Not so easy for volition. Many philosophers and
psychologists are discouraged by the difficulties surrounding
the concept of volition (or will). How is it known? How can
it be defined in general? How are particular acts of will
apprehended? How can we prove they belong to the agent,
are his responsibility? How to conceive freedom of the will,
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let alone prove it? And so forth. But a thinker should not
despair too early. We can gradually build up our reflection on
the subject, and hope to clarify issues.
As earlier suggested, volition – unlike causation –
cannot entirely be defined by means of hypothetical
(if–then) propositions. However, we can partially
delimit volition that way, as follows.
First, we focus on volition as the presumed ‘causal’
relation between an agent (soul) and certain events in
or around him (called events of will), whatever be the
exact form of that relation. That relation may
intuitively be assumed to be other than causation,
though some causation may be involved in it. A
general causative statement “without an agent, there
would be no volition” can be invoked to show partial
involvement of causation.
Second, we point out that without that particular
agent, those particular events would not – indeed
could not – occur; they are reserved for that soul, it is
irreplaceable in their genesis. This may be expressed
as a conditional proposition: “if not this particular
soul, then not those particular events”. The latter
just means that the agent concerned (as an individual,
and not just as an instance of a kind) is a sine qua non
of the particular events (presumed ‘of will’) under
scrutiny.
However, while the soul is thus a necessary causative
of the events, it does not causatively necessitate them,
i.e. it is not a complete causative of them. For it is
clear that, in what we call volition, the soul is not
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invariably followed by those events (the presumed
events of will), but remains at all times – till they do
occur – also compatible with their negations. That is
to say, with regard to causation, the compound
conditional proposition “if this soul, not-then these
events and not-then their negations” is true12.
However – and therein lies the mystery of volition –
we intuit that the agent alone does somehow ‘make
necessary’ or ‘completely cause’ the events concerned
when they do occur. At that time, the proposition “if
this soul, then these events” becomes effectively true,
although such a change of ‘natural law’ is not
possible under the relation called causation.
Therefore, some other category of causality must be
involved in such cases, which we call volition.
That is about as far as we can get into a definition by
means of ordinary conditional propositions. We can
delimit the concept of volition to a large extent, and
clearly distinguish it from causation, but that is still
not enough to fully specify its formal structure. We
can, however, go further by other means, step by step,
as we shall see by and by.
Certain epistemological questions can be answered readily.
To begin with, as I have argued in Phenomenology, the raw
data for the concept of volition has to be personal ‘intuitions’
– in the sense of direct experience, self-knowledge – of one’s
own particular acts of will.
12
The “if–not-then” form of hypothetical, I remind the reader,
is the exact contradictory of the “if–then” form. It simply means that
the consequent “does not follow” the antecedent.
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Will has no phenomenal qualities: it should not be confused
with its phenomenal products in the mental or material
domains; volition cannot therefore be an abstraction from
material or mental experiences. We evidently know
introspectively – at least in some cases, when we make the
effort of honest introspection – when we have willed, and
what we have willed, and even the effort involved, i.e. to
what degree we have willed. Such particular intuitions of
will in the present tense give rise to the abstraction of will,
i.e. the concept of volition.
Thus, the conception of volition is an ordinary inductive
process, except that its experienced instances are not
phenomenal percepts but intuitions. This of course does not
tell us the definition of volition as a causal relation. But it
does tell us that there is something to discuss and define, as
in the above initial attempt.
But of course, we do not only assign volition to ourselves,
but we assume it in other people (some of us assume it
further in other animals13, and also in God). Here, the thought
13
As I write, it is mid-February, and almost every day, as I
drink my morning coffee, I watch a pair of magpies not ten meters
away, enacting a ritual. Each in turn tears a twig off the tree they
are perched on, and places it precariously on the same branch for
a moment, letting it eventually fall. They are, evidently, not yet
trying to build a nest; rather, they seem to be making common
plans, coming to an agreement as to where they intend to do it
when the time is ripe. I even once saw them rehearsing feeding,
with one bird pretending to put a small nut into the other’s beak.
They, supposedly the same birds, actually started building their
nest in late March. What I thought was rehearsal of feeding may
have been that of cementing, because I saw that they bring each
other what seems to be mud pellets that are stuffed between twigs.
Anyone observing animals cannot but suppose they are able to
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involved is more intricate. A person knows from his own
experience which externally visible actions of his are due to
will (and which are not) – for example, moving one’s arm (as
distinct from having it moved by someone or something).
Having recorded the descriptions and conditions of willed
(and unwilled) externally visible actions, we can by
generalization assume that, when we see the same external
behavior in others, we can infer a similar internal behavior in
them.
In other words, whereas with regard to ourselves, we know
the cause first and thereafter observe its effects, with regard
to other agents, we infer the cause from the observed effect,
by analogy.
Of course, none of this implies omniscience, either of our
own acts, and much less of others’ acts. Sometimes, we have
difficulties discerning our will – for instance, what we really
wanted, or whether we acted voluntarily or involuntarily.
Introspection is not always successful, especially if one has
the habit of keeping one’s inner life murky and inaccessible
to scrutiny. Sometimes, even if one is sincere and transparent,
contradictory subliminal forces are at play, causing confusion
in us. All the more so, with respect to other people: we may
not have all the evidence at hand allowing us to draw a
conclusion. What we observe of their behavior may be only a
partial picture, leaving us uncertain as to their intentions. And
so forth; no need to go into detail at this stage.
imagine goals and to pursue them, as well as communicate (at
least by such physical demonstrations) and cooperate (effectively
sharing duties).
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Thus, it should be understood that in this field of knowledge,
as in all others, our conclusions are ultimately inductive
rather than deductive. We have a certain database –
consisting of our own self-observations and all other
information – and we use it, and our powers of imagination,
to formulate and test hypotheses. The logic involved is
similar to that in the natural sciences. The only difference is
the nature and source of some of the data used: it is nonphenomenal and personally intuited. This is of course a
significant ontological and epistemological difference, but
once realized the issues are much simplified.
2.
Freedom of the Will
With regard to the concept of freedom of the will, the
following can be said at the outset.
We can roughly define freedom of the will by saying
that “agent A is ‘free’ to will or not will something
(say, W) in a given set of circumstances, if neither
W nor notW is inevitable in those circumstances”.
This of course does not define ‘will’ for us; but
granting the term willing (or doing, in the sense of
volition) understood, its freedom is relatively
definable. Note that strictly speaking it is the agent
who is free, not his will.
This definition is rough, in that it does not tell us how we are
to know that under the exact same conditions, either event W
or notW is potential – since conditions are in fact never
identical again. However, this is an epistemological issue
regarding the degree of empiricism of our knowledge of
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freedom. We can suggest that we have intimate knowledge
(intuition) of our freedom as well as of our volition; or we
may propose that freedom is known more hypothetically, by
way of extrapolation from approximately similar conditions,
i.e. by adduction. The former would be direct, particular
knowledge; the latter, indirect, general knowledge.
A way to distinguish causation and volition is with reference
to identity. In causation, the cause is viewed as being ‘caused
to cause’ the effects it causes, by virtue of the underlying
natural characteristics or essences of the entities involved;
whereas in volition, the cause is ‘free’ – its nature or identity
does not allow a hundred percent prediction of all its actions.
In comparison to a deterministic entity, what distinguishes a
volitional agent is such lack of definite identity.
Even the agent of volition cannot till he acts definitely predict
his own acts, for he may at the last moment ‘change his
mind’ for some reason (or even, perhaps, for no ‘reason’ – in
which case we characterize the will as pure whim or caprice).
The agent of volition is distinguished by creating (some of)
his own identity as he proceeds. His ‘identity’ at any given
moment is the sum of previous such creations, but they do
not fully determine his next creations, his later identity. The
agent of volition has a distinctively ‘open-ended’ nature.
A way to express the freedom of (direct) volition is by
reference to autonomy – that is, own (auto) lawmaking
(nomy)14. Whereas natural objects are effectively subject to
14
The free agent is ‘autonomous’ – this term is of course not
to be confused with ‘autonomic’ motor system, which means the
opposite, referring to the functioning of certain organs without
recourse to will. Descartes’ term for autonomy is ‘selfdetermination’.
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law, the agent of volition (to some extent, within certain
natural boundaries) makes up his own laws for himself as he
proceeds. These ‘laws’ may be ad hoc or they may have some
regularity, of course. For the agent may choose to will on a
singular basis, or may act by instituting personal rules, i.e.
intended longer term patterns – predictable or repetitive
behavior, plans, habits, etc.
We may, in the latter case, fashionably speak of selfprogramming. Such temporally stretched intentions may
require a discipline of will to fulfill; often, however, by
presetting personal conduct, we achieve an economy of
effort, as comparatively less attention may be needed to
perform. Many of the rules people adopt are of course
collective, interpersonal promises. Some are imposed on
them; still, most are ultimately self-imposed. Even when one
fails to keep such personal or social promises, they may have
considerable influence on action.
Perseverance of will (in the face of difficulty of some sort,
over time) may be due to a series of punctual wills, or have
some real continuity. Whether punctual or persistent, acts of
will vary in the intensity of awareness and reflection they
invest – some are the fruit of long and careful consideration
(emotional or rational), others are seemingly impetuous
(though often in fact merely the end product of a long
gestation of more or less conscious thought).
The distinction of the freedom inherent in volition from that
of chance must be stressed. Though there is an element of
spontaneity in volition, it is not the blind spontaneity of
chance. On the contrary, volition is in a way even more
‘deterministic’ than natural law, in the sense that the causal
entity (agent) does not merely react into producing some
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effect (whatever is willed), but specifically chooses it out of
two or more possibilities. Some awareness and intention is
involved in all choice. At its most focused, choice is very
conscious, with a clear goal in mind; the volitional act is
normally purposive, it has an ‘end’ or, in Aristotelian
language, a ‘final cause’. Notwithstanding, we should not at
the outset exclude the possibility of truly purposeless acts of
volition, with a strict minimum of awareness.
Volition may be influenced in some direction rather than
another by the agent’s right or wrong view of the world in
which he acts. But that influence is not determining: this is
what we mean by freedom. You may coerce a man into doing
what you want by threatening him with violence or other
punishments, but even so, as experience shows, he can still
disregard such threats, and even act in a suicidal manner. You
may dangle great rewards under his nose, but he may still act
seemingly against his own interests. Acts of will may equally
well be rational or irrational, intelligent or stupid; they may
be explicable by self-interest or altruism, or be quite
whimsical. Their ‘logic’ may be sound or faulty; i.e. logic
does not definitely determine them.
Another important concept is that of degrees of freedom.
Freedom of the will is not absolute, except perhaps for God.
And even in that case, He is supposedly limited by the laws
of logic, and cannot create things without identity, or that
both are and are-not, or that neither are nor are-not. In the
case of humans, freedom of the will varies; from time to time
in any individual, and from one individual to another,
according to the health and structure of his or her many
faculties.
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Likewise, the freedom of our will is broader than the freedom
of will of other animal species in some respects, and
admittedly narrower in other respects. To affirm that animals
have some volition does not imply that one has to regard
them as having powers of choice equal to those of humans.
Each animal species has specific volitional powers, some of
which may be found in other species and some not. Similarly,
we suppose by extrapolation, God’s will is the broadest
possible of all.
But furthermore, one may have the freedom to do or not do
something, and yet not have the freedom to do or not to do
some other thing. One may have the freedom to do
something conditionally, lacking it if certain conditions are
not met. Some people (laymen or philosophers) are confused
by the term ‘freedom’, thinking that freedom can only be
total and unconditional! Freedom need not be viewed as
limitless. We are quite able to develop a logical discourse
about freewill, such that each specific freedom is predicated
specifically to a given individual subject, at a given time or in
given circumstances. We can then inductively generalize, and
describe ranges of freedom applicable to classes of
individuals, as the case may be.
Some people tend to deny volition to animals, because they
confuse the issues and think volition has only one measure.
Indeed, some deny volition even to humans, thinking that the
concept requires absolute freedom. Not so. Each agent,
according to his natural constitution, has or lacks freedom in
relation to each kind of action. A duck can apparently choose
to fly off or not, as you approach it; some do, some don’t. But
a duck cannot apparently choose to add five and six together,
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nor can an elephant flap its ears and fly. Likewise, humans
are favored in some respects and deficient in others.
Many, or perhaps all, freedoms are also conditional. One may
be free to run or stay, except in cases of extreme fear, or
under hypnosis, which might exceptionally ‘force’ one to
behave mechanically (like a zombie). Emotions normally
play a role in volition as influences, but in some more
extreme circumstances, they might become determining
factors that paralyze freedom of the will altogether or
generate automatic reactions. Likewise, one may temporarily
lose certain freedoms, as when one cannot move because one
is physically tied up or sick; or more permanently, as when
one is deprived of a limb. In such cases, volition is
temporarily or permanently lost and causation takes over.
To construct a realistic logic of volitional causality one must
take all such variations into consideration; i.e. consider its
intertwining with causation. Each agent has specific powers
and limits, which may vary in time and according to
surrounding conditions for any given individual, and which
may vary from individual to individual of a species and from
species to species.
3.
Decision and Choice
The precise relationship between consciousness and volition,
or between the status of being a Subject and that of being an
Agent, needs elucidation. Empirically, the two seem tied
together, though it is not clear just why. Conceptually, at first
sight at least, one can imagine a Subject, floating in the
universe as a pure observer, unable to do anything; and
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likewise, perhaps, an Agent that simply wills certain things
without awareness. Maybe such entities exist somewhere, but
we have not encountered any.
In any case, we must keep in mind that consciousness varies
in intensity or scope. An insect’s consciousness (which we
infer from its sense-organs and its responses to stimuli) is
seemingly weak and limited; that of a bird is somewhat more
elaborate; and so forth. The powers of volition of different
organisms seem proportionate to their powers of
consciousness.
However, some intelligent people seem weak-willed (perhaps
through indecision) and some stupid people seem strongwilled (perhaps through inability to conceive alternatives). It
may not be merely an issue of character flaws; there may be
an issue of uneven biological development of faculties.
In humans, at least (and perhaps, though to a much lesser
extent, in higher animals), acts of will are usually preceded
by some thought (in the largest sense, not necessarily
meaning verbal deliberation; possibly merely an imaging).
There is usually a decision (which may be wordless, to
repeat), followed by a choice of one course rather than
another (or than no choice). But it should be stressed that
some acts of will seem virtually devoid of decision-making
(this is one more sense of the concept of spontaneity);
however, a minimal level of consciousness may be involved
even in such cases (‘without conscious decision’ may simply
mean without very-conscious decision).
Also, decisions do not necessarily result in corresponding
acts of will. The issue, here, is not whether an effort of will is
successful in producing some intended result, but what we
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call will-power, arousing one’s faculty of will. Sometimes, of
course, hesitation or paralysis is due to indecision, when the
pros and cons of a course of action seem balanced or too full
of uncertainties.
A decision may be punctual or large, specific or general. A
punctual decision relates to a single act of will; but a decision
may be large, in the sense of an indefinite general resolve to
pursue some goal over time, through numerous acts of will
yet to be intellectually determined as events unfold. For this
reason, the concept of decision is distinct from that of will.
An example of such general policy is what we call ‘good
will’, the resolve to do whatever happens to seem like the
right thing at any time, and avoid doing what seems wrong;
good will implies a certain openness or eagerness, which
facilitates many actions. The contrary attitude is that of ‘bad
will’, a tendency to resist doing what one is supposed to, if
not to perversely prefer doing what one is not supposed to;
this often makes things more difficult.15
What we call choice is the logical aspect of a decision – two
or more alternative courses of action are open to the agent,
though possibly to different degrees, i.e. requiring different
expenditures of effort, and one of them is ‘taken’ or ‘opted
15
Note how the attitude tends to influence results. Good will
gives us moral credit for trying, even if we do not succeed; and bad
will tends to discredit us, even if we do succeed. Of course, often
we role-play good will, to give ourselves a good conscience, or to
look good in other people’s eyes. Also, of course, as the saying
goes: “hell is paved with good intentions”, and good will cannot be
taken as the sole basis of moral judgments – contrary to Kant’s
doctrine that the intention (to act as duty dictates) is the overriding
consideration.
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for’. The alternatives may simply, of course, be to do or notdo one thing; or there may literally be several contrary or
combinable alternatives.
Another important aspect of decision is intention – the
pursuit by the agent of some goal or purpose. Without
intention, the agent has no ‘reason’ to do anything. This is
why Aristotle regarded ‘final causes’ (intentions) as causes of
motion. Intention, note, implies memory and anticipation,
both of which imply consciousness. We project an image of
the kind of thing we wish to attain.
In volition, purposeless motion seems virtually impossible.
The purpose may just be to keep moving, or to exercise one’s
faculties, or to discover or demonstrate one’s abilities, or to
prove one can will without motive, but there seems to be
need of some purpose. ‘Art for art’s sake’ or ‘spontaneous
art’ also have a goal of sorts, be it self-expression, beauty or
humor, money or sex. Of course, the result of one’s action
may not be what one intended.
Non-willing entities remain essentially passive objects, even
when they are causes (within the domain of causation), or the
result or theater of spontaneous events (in an apparently
causeless domain, one governed by chance). Whereas willing
entities are truly active: they are more than objects, they are
subjects and agents.
Influence is the interface between these two kinds of entity:
objects impinging on subjects; or in some cases, subjects
producing objects that impinge on subjects. The impact may
be to stimulate, inhibit, or direct hither rather than thither,
some event of will.
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Goals and Means
What we have just said about volition requiring intention
shows the interdependence between meta-psychology and
ethical and legal studies. In formal logic, aetiology leads to
teleology: “To obtain Y, X is required” is based on “If not
X, then not Y”. Philosophically, consideration of intention
naturally raises the question: what ought we intend – what
goals or ends shall we pursue? Thereafter, the question
arises: by what means may such goals be reached, i.e. what is
needed or required to attain them?
Goals may be broad and long-term, or narrow and immediate.
They may be consciously ordered in a consistent hierarchy,
or may be a confused mix of unrelated or even contradictory
directions. They may in either case, for any individual,
change over time, or be doggedly adhered to. Some may be
very consciously developed, others very instinctive. Our
goals may be reduced to a limited number of basic goals, or
standards or norms.
Means also vary greatly. They may be appropriate or
inappropriate to one’s goals. They must be timely, to be
effective. There may be many possible means to the same
goal, of which some are known and some not (or not yet).
Some may be easier, some harder. Means may take time to
identify, and the identification, as said, may be correct or
incorrect. All these details will emerge in the course of
formal analysis.
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It is a common error to think that logic has nothing to say in
the setting of standards for ethics or politics. The anarchist
premise that ‘anything goes’ in these fields is logically
untenable. The anarchist cannot plead against legalism, since
by virtue of his advocacy of general unlimited freedom he
allows for legalism; but the legalist can in all fairness frown
on the anarchist without inconsistency. Thus, whereas
anarchism paradoxically allows for its logical opposite,
legalism – the latter logically excludes the former. It follows
that anarchism is a self-inconsistent and so false thesis, while
legalism is a coherent and true thesis. That is, we can in
principle aspire to justifying some ‘objective’ norms of
behavior.
Note well the form of norm-setting argument; it is
essentially dilemmatic: “If X, then Y, and if not X,
then Y; therefore, in any case, Y”.
In this way, we can argue, for instance, that the use of
logic (meaning: any epistemological ways and means
that are demonstrably effective in increasing or
improving knowledge of reality) is an absolute
imperative. No matter what our norms or standards of
value be, whatever the goals we pursue – to find out
the means that indeed result in these desired results,
we need to know reality; it follows that all aspects of
scientific methodology are imperative, since they are
the way the truth gets to be known, i.e. the way any
intellectual issues encountered are resolved. Thus,
science (in this broad, open sense) is a means
common to all goals, a fundamental and general
imperative.
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From a biological point of view, of course, the ultimate
(minimal) goal of all volitional action is or should be survival
of the individual living organism, or at least of its
descendents, or its other family or larger group members, or
the species it belongs to, or life itself on earth and perhaps
beyond. That is because survival is the necessary
precondition, the sine qua non of all other pursuits.16
It is a minimum need; but of course, maximum health and
wellbeing is preferable; and this implies realizing one’s full
potential, psychologically and spiritually as well as
physically. In other words, our cognitive and volitional nature
must be taken into account in our understanding of what we
mean by ‘life’.
For ethics in general, then: life, cognition and volition are
three natural norms, insofar as nothing that a particular ethics
might recommend can be done without these three basic
values. Being relative to no norm in particular, these values
are absolute for all in general.
Intention presupposes imagination: one imagines something
not yet there and proceeds to bring it about. Such imagination
of a goal presupposes an informational context, which may
be realistic or unrealistic, i.e. based on knowledge or mere
belief. Even if the subject’s ideas on what it is possible for
him to have and how it is possible for him to get it are
illusory, they are influential; and they may even be
efficacious! Realistic ideas are, of course, likewise
influential; and in principle, and statistically, no doubt more
16
In more artificial perspectives (viz. certain religious,
political or behavioral doctrines, like sadomasochism), survival is
not essential; however, the founding arguments of such doctrines
are logically very debatable.
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efficacious, but they do not always or necessarily lead to
success.
The motive of an action is the thought of its goal, or perhaps
more precisely, the pressure or attraction one feels towards
that goal. This is stated to clarify that it is not really or
directly ‘the goal’ that influences one’s action; logically, the
goal cannot do anything since it lies in the future! So rather
we must refer to the present thought of that intended end; and
even that mental image has little power, except insofar as it
stirs a desire within the agent. Thus, the relation of the goal to
our striving activity must be specified with reference to a
motive (analogous to a force, a motor), a present influence by
a mental image and the stirring it produces in us to get into
action.
Note in passing that having a certain motive, and being aware
of having it, and publicly admitting to having it – are three
different things. Often, we conceal our real motive from
ourselves or from others, and replace it with a more
acceptable pretext. Such rationalization is made possible by
the fact that our actions often have incidental or even
accidental consequences, in addition to the goals they
intended to pursue. We pretend these side effects are our
‘motive’, to divert attention from our effective motive, and
give ourselves a good conscience or a virtuous facade.17
The most fundamental faculties of the soul are, in that order,
cognition, volition and valuation. Cognition refers to
consciousness, volition to actions, and valuation to affections
17
The problem with such distortions of reality is that they
eventually boomerang psychologically and socially. Deceiving
ourselves, we lose track of the truth; deceiving others, we lose their
trust.
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and appetites. The soul has three corresponding and
interdependent roles, as subject, agent and evaluator. Volition
implies, and is impossible without, cognition. Valuation
implies, and is impossible without, cognition and volition.
With regard to goals and means: the goal is the value sought
(seeking implies consciousness anticipating, note) by act(s)
of will; the means is identified (rightly or wrongly) by
consciousness, and is executed by the act(s) of will.
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5. CHAPTER FIVE
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 4.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY
1.
The Consciousness in Volition
Volition as an inner effort of the soul requires some degree of
consciousness – else it would not be volition but mechanical
movement. But the question arises: ‘consciousness’ of what?
There are several answers.
Firstly, every act of will requires some minimum amount of
awareness to be at all performed. To produce a volitional act,
some attention to one’s inner faculties of volition has to be
invested.
If all we invest is only just enough attention to perform the
act in the most perfunctory manner, we call the act
effectively unconscious or inattentive or mindless or
involuntary, because as volitions go it is almost so. Note well
that the negative terms used in this context are not meant as
full negations, but as hyperbolic. Such conduct may be
reproved as essentially lazy; for example, one may wash the
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dishes barely aware of what one is doing, while thinking of
one hundred other things. Often, such actions are gauche and
fail, because one was ‘absent minded’, one’s ‘heart was not
in it’.
As we deliver more and more consciousness to our volitional
faculty, the act becomes increasingly mindful or conscious,
attentive or voluntary, till a peak of awareness is attained. In
this case, contrary to the preceding, we are fully focused and
concentrated on what we are doing; our mind is empty of
extraneous thoughts, our action is pure and uncluttered.
Everything we think or do is relevant to the job at hand; there
is little hesitation, decisions are efficiently made, timely
action proceeds. For example, a good fighter has this
consciousness; whoso has experienced it knows its magic.
Note that the terms here used are sometimes mixed up in
practice – so that mindful action may be called
‘unconscious’, meaning unconscious of irrelevant matters;
we are not attaching to words but to their intended meanings.
Also note, the expression ‘self-conscious’ is sometimes used
to mean ‘mindful’, whereas at other times it is meant
pejoratively, with reference to an interference of ego. In the
latter case, we are conscious of other people looking at us,
and careful to appear at our best so as to impress them; this
implies a lack of self-sufficiency or self-confidence, and
more important, turns our attention from the job at hand, so
that we in fact lose our ‘presence of mind’.
Between unconsciousness and mindfulness, as above defined,
there are many degrees of awareness. Just as cognition may
involve different intensities of awareness, so does volition.
This distinction explains why movements requiring will may
nevertheless seem almost automatic or ‘involuntary’ to us: it
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is because they have no more than the minimum awareness in
them, the agent being distracted by many other things, almost
absent. In the case of ‘voluntary’ will, the agent is by virtue
of his greater presence more of a volunteer, who will
therefore more readily acknowledge the action as his own.
The possibility of minimal awareness helps explain selfprogramming: once a choice of freewill is launched, its
continuation has a momentum of its own, hard to stop
without special dedication; this means that more effort of
consciousness and will is needed to stop it than to continue it.
A component of what we have called mindfulness is
awareness of the influential context. This refers to
consciousness to some degree of all the influences impinging,
or seeming to impinge or possibly impinging on one’s current
volitional act – including attitudes, concerns, motives, goals,
feelings, moods, emotions, mental images, memories,
imaginations, anticipations, thoughts, arguments, bodily
aches and pains, physical sights and sounds perceived, that
disturb or please, distractions, obstacles, and so forth. One
should also mention awareness of one’s level of awareness.
To the extent that one is conscious of all eventually
influential factors, one’s volition is lucid and efficient.
Such consciousness is of course momentary and peripheral to
the volition. It serves to minimize or even dissolve negative
influences, and maximize or empower influences in the
direction of our will. It makes the will as free as possible, or
at least freer than when unconscious. It is a preparatory act,
making ready for volition, aligning its resources, helping to
focus and concentrate it. But if we exaggerate it and linger on
it too long, we miss the point: instead of facilitating our
volition, it confuses and interferes with our action. So, one
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has to know the right balance. Awareness of influences does
not consist in weighing volition down with irrelevant
thoughts, but on the contrary in emptying the mind of
extraneous material.
In yoga meditation, by the way, this is known as
pratyahara. We just calmly observe internal or
external disturbances. As we do so, they either cease
to exist or to appear, or they at least cease to disturb
us. In this way, our consciousness can settle and
become more intense.
A second important aspect of consciousness in volition is its
intentionality, the direction of its aim. If agent A specifically
wills W, then W is what A ‘has in mind’ as his aim as he stirs
his volition into action, i.e. W is indeed what A ‘wanted to
do’. In such case, we say that A intentionally or purposely
willed W; and W is called the object or purpose of his will. If
however A wills something else, of which W is a mere side
effect, then we say that W was unintended. In the latter case,
W is not the object or purpose of A’s act of volition, although
it is a de facto product of will; we label this an incidental
consequence of will.
Note that the ‘intention’ of the will resides primarily in the
agent, as the intelligence of his act; thereafter only, is the
term applicable to the act of will or to its object. The agent is
conscious of the object-to-be, and exercises will towards it.
A third way consciousness is involved in volition is through
deliberation, which serves to aim will in some appropriate
direction. This may be a quick, almost instantaneous thought
and decision, or it may require a long process of thought,
involving complex research and difficult choices, gradually
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‘making up one’s mind’. A deliberate act is thus filled with
intelligence, in contrast to an inadvertent or haphazard act.
Deliberation also implies adjusting action as one proceeds, to
make sure one gets it right on target.
Volition may consist of a simple act of will or a series of
such acts. The degree of attention, effort and appropriateness
involved in either case is a measure of the endeavor in
willing, how hard we try. That A intends W does not
guarantee that his endeavor is bound to result in W; he may
succeed or fail to achieve his purpose. W may be an
necessary consequence of A’s act of will, in which case
success is inevitable; or W may be a contingent consequence
of A’s act of will, in which case failure is possible.
If A’s intention to achieve W is strong enough, A will do all
in his power to increase the chances of success and reduce
those of failure. If A’s endeavor is half-hearted, as we say,
the chances are proportionately small. Agent A may also
make no attempt to will for W, but merely wish for it to occur
somehow; a wish may be a nice thought, but it is not will. If
agent A pursues some goal W, and does not take the
necessary and sufficient precautions to ensure success, then
when failure occurs he may be said to have been negligent.
Note that, in the case of more complex goals, success or
failure may be partial; i.e. they both may result, and more or
less of the one than the other.
In some cases, although A intends W, but (whether due to
insufficient endeavor or circumstances beyond his control)
fails to achieve it, W happens anyway through other causes
(as an incident of some other will by A, or due to another
agent’s volition, or through natural causes). From the
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perspective of A’s said intention of W, the latter cannot be
regarded as success, but at best as ‘lucking out’.
A fourth measure of consciousness in volition relates to
knowledge of conditions and consequences.
Agent A may intend W by his will, and yet fail to foresee
whether W will inevitably follow upon his act of will or
merely follow ‘if all goes well’. For example, he may aim an
arrow in the general direction of a target, yet not be in full
control of the resultant trajectory; his imperfect skill, or the
bow breaking, or a sudden wind, or some unexpected
obstacle, may yet impede a bull’s eye hit. Thus, intention
does not exclude unforeseen circumstances, nor therefore by
itself guarantee success. All the more so, if W is an incidental
consequence of A’s will, it may be foreseen or unforeseen. In
the former case, it occurs knowingly; in the latter case, it is
called an accident.
The concepts of incidental (or unintended) and accidental (or
unforeseen) consequence can further be clarified with
reference to causative chains, as follows. Suppose P is a
complete causative of Q (i.e. “if P, then Q” is true), either in
all circumstances or in some given circumstances. Then,
when A wills P (i.e. when A wills away with P as his
intention, and indeed achieves P), Q will necessarily also
follow. So, A will have effectively willed Q. However, if A
had no interest in willing Q or even preferred to avoid Q,
then Q is only an incidental consequence of A’s will, not an
intention of his. A may have known Q to be a necessary
consequent of P; or he may not have known it, or even may
have thought notQ to be a necessary consequent of P; or he
may not have thought about the issue at all. In the latter cases
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of ignorance, Q is just an accidental consequence of A’s
will.18
We should also distinguish between foreseeable and
unforeseeable consequences (be they intentional or not). In
the former case, agent A could have foreseen the
consequence if he had made appropriate preliminary
investigations; in the latter, not. Foreseeable consequences
may be inevitable or avoidable (if avoidance should be
needed). If some undesired consequence of will was
foreseeable and avoidable, then its not having been foreseen
and avoided is indicative of some failure or weakness of will,
i.e. not enough effort was expended to achieve the intended
result or to prevent some unintended result.
There are, of course, many degrees of expectation, depending
on the factual probability or improbability of the anticipated
event in the circumstances considered. An unexpected event
has either been unforeseen or foreseen not to happen.
Whether factual expectation is great or small, or nil, it is
based on belief. That is, it may be demonstrable knowledge,
or it may just be more or less justifiable opinion. The latter
refers to the epistemological likelihood of the event, the
former to its ontological likelihood.
18
Often, in political discourse, people accuse their opponents
of bad intentions based on unintended consequences of their
opponents’ actions; or they credit themselves with good intentions
they never in fact had.
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2.
91
The Factors of Responsibility
Volition implies responsibility, which is estimated with
reference to various factors and their measurements. The
concept of responsibility is of course primarily aetiological.
The concepts of moral and legal responsibility are more
specific, since they refer to specific ethical norms or to
legislation.
The important distinctions we made above, concerning
consciousness, intention, deliberation, knowledge and
expectation in volition, allow us to specify the measure of
responsibility of the agent, the degree to which the action
may be attributed to its doer, whether for moral or legal
praise or blame, or (in the case of no responsibility at all)
exoneration. In the case of crimes, with or without a victim,
note the terms guilty or innocent used for responsibility and
non-responsibility, respectively.
Agent A is fully responsible for event W, if W was his object
of conscious will, his purpose or goal, his intention in
willing, and a foreseeable and inevitable outcome of his
actions. A is only, in one sense or another, partly responsible
for W, in all other cases, to various degrees.
As we shall see in later chapters, influences on volition that
are considered psychological, such as desires and fears,
obsessions and compulsions, urges and impulses, whether
operative on a conscious or subconscious level, do not
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ultimately diminish or remove and agent’s freedom of will
and so remain his responsibility.19
We commonly also appeal to extenuating or aggravating
circumstances in estimating responsibility (whether for good
or bad acts), considering the former to somewhat diminish
responsibility and the latter to increase it. This concept may
be understood in two ways20:
(a) It may refer to terms and conditions, which objectively
affect21 the course of events, either before or after
volition, but not through cognition. For example, if a man
stole bread in a society refusing him both work and
charity, he would have an objective extenuating
circumstance, granting survival is a right. By way of
contrast, if a man stole bread to save money, the fact that
he did so although rich enough to buy bread, would be an
objective aggravating circumstance, since he had no need
to steal.
(b) Or it may refer to influences, which subjectively affect22
volition, through cognition. For example, if a man
witnessed a crime, but did not report it to the police
because his child was threatened with retaliation if he
did, he would also be able to appeal to ‘extenuating
19
This is said to stress opposition to certain psychological
theories, which seek to remove guilt by denying responsibility.
20
Note that the examples given concern blame for
wrongdoing; but we could of course equally cite cases of praise for
good deeds.
21
In the limit, if the terms and condition leave one no choice,
i.e. if no volition is possible, responsibility is eliminated.
22
Since influences, whether positive or negative, never
abolish freedom of the will, responsibility is certainly never annulled
by them.
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circumstances’. He had a difficult choice to make
between his duty to society and that to his family, and
since both are generally acknowledged values, the choice
he made (under the influence of the criminal’s threat of
violence) is understandable. On the other hand, if did not
report the crime but also actively concealed it so as to
avoid eventual blame for not reporting it, he would be
regarded as having ‘aggravating circumstances’. Here,
the man not only failed as a citizen, but (influenced by
some inexcusable laziness or antisocial feelings) he
committed the additional crime of making the witnessed
crime more difficult to discover and punish.
All the preceding factors refer to direct responsibility, of an
agent for his own actions.
An agent may also have a share of direct responsibility in
some resultant of the actions undertaken by two or more
agents. If each of the individual agent’s action has an
identifiable portion of the resultant, it may be said to have a
proportional partial individual responsibility for the resultant.
But if the resultant is a collective outcome of all the
individual contributions, such that it cannot be arithmetically
divided among them, we may speak of collective
responsibility. The latter is more difficult to apportion,
though we can do so with reference to causative
considerations. In practice, the distinction is sometimes moot,
or both aspects may be involved. In any case, further
clarification is possible with reference to individual
intentions, common purposes, cooperation or confluence,
degree of coordination of actions, and the like.
For example: if we refer to shares in a financial venture, the
total capital is the sum of the parts, so each part-owner is
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responsible for that portion of the whole in the company’s
environmental damage, say. If capital reduction by
withdrawal without replacement of one of the partners would
result in proportionately less damage to the environment,
then that partner may be considered to have a ‘partial
individual’ share of responsibility. But of course, in practice,
the company is not just about money input, but involves the
effort, skills and intelligence of numerous people, who
collectively do the work. If this or that worker or manager is
removed, the others may not be able to do their job; or what
they do may not result in a finished product; or operations
may after a while come to a standstill. In the latter case, we
have to regard each shareholder, manager and employee as
having a greater or smaller part of the collective
responsibility in the joint project.23
An agent may also have indirect responsibility in another’s
actions, if the former knowing of the latter was possibly able
to prevent it, alone or with others, but did not try to do so, or
tried to but did not make a sufficient effort to. Such
responsibility is necessarily partial, implying passivity and
tacit acquiescence. In most cases, this is just ordinary noninterference or tolerance, ‘minding one’s own business’; but
23
How exactly to quantify the relative weights of the partial
causes making up a complete cause is a moot question. Certainly,
common sense supports the notion of such quantification. In
principle, we could proceed as in the physical sciences, postulating
an algebraic formula linking the variables and repeatedly testing it
empirically. In situations involving humans – which are less easy to
reproduce identically – such an approach is not always practical.
For this reason, our judgments in this issue are often tentative and
approximate.
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in some cases, this would be called criminal negligence24.
Note that if there is any show of dissent or disapproval, or
other incipient effort of protest or opposition, one’s indirect
responsibility is proportionately diminished; and one may
claim a share of direct responsibility in the opposite direction.
Inversely, if there is any show of consent or approval, and all
the more so in the case of explicit encouragement or other
active involvement, then one is not merely indirectly in part
responsible, but acquires a direct share.
Thus, for example, during the Holocaust, history’s greatest
crime, the responsibility of the German population varied
greatly. A very few heroically made efforts to actively or
passively resist the Nazi persecution of Jews and others;
these were not responsible for the genocide. Most had
indirect responsibility, at least because they knowingly
acquiesced. Many of the latter were additionally conscious
though passive beneficiaries of the spoils. But much worse, a
great many people had various degrees of direct individual or
collective responsibility, having participated in the horror as
conquering army, appointed mass killers, efficient
bureaucrats, railway workers, death camp planners and
24
One special case to consider (at least for theists) is God’s
indirect responsibility. According to the Judaic theory of volition,
God gave humans volition by a voluntary act of withdrawal
(tsimtsum). He chose to abstain from exercising His omnipotence,
so as to make possible small pockets of individual freewill.
Nevertheless, this did not annul His infinite power: He retains the
capacity to overwhelm any creature’s will. In that case, we may
well wonder why He does not prevent horrible willful crimes, not to
mention murderous natural events. Why does He not limit human
powers within certain more gentle bounds, to the exclusion on
principle of the most heinous deeds?
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personnel, slave-labor exploiters, poison manufacturers, etc.
25
I should mention here the Buddhist principle that at the root
of all evil attitudes and acts is a fundamental ignorance of the
true nature of reality. Although rather convincing, this
principle should be regarded critically. It is true that at the
base of our selfish indifference or hatred towards others,
disregarding or enjoying their sufferings, there is a stupid
blindness to the common nature, source and destiny of all
sentient beings. However, to refer only to this fundamental
ignorance is to effectively exonerate those guilty of crimes.
For the term ‘ignorance’ refers to a failure of knowledge or
understanding, a paucity of consciousness – and does not
include reference to volition. Yet, it is precisely through our
will, our choices, that we may be held responsible and subject
to moral judgment. Of course, ignorance mitigates
responsibility, if we have sincerely sought wisdom. But
insofar as our will is misguided by inadequate cognitive
practices, we remain responsible for it.
3.
Judging, and Misjudging, People
What we have said thus far concerning responsibility
provides some guidelines for making just judgments about
25
See for instance Paul Johnson: “The German people knew
about and acquiesced in the genocide” (p. 498). Of course, not just
Germans, but many other European peoples (he mentions notably
the Austrians and Romanians), were actively involved; some did
not collaborate but did nothing to help Jews, some resisted and did
what they could to help.
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people. But such judgments are no simple matter, and we all
very often err in making them. Even knowing in general
terms, ontologically, what constitutes responsibility, it does
not follow that we are fully armed, epistemologically, against
misjudgment. We shall here, in passing26, attempt to describe
some of the methods and pitfalls involved, without claiming
to exhaust this vast subject.
Above all, it should be stressed that judging responsibility is
a category of factual judgment. It is not in itself moral
judgment, though evaluations may subsequently be based on
it; that is, it involves no standard of value. The question
posed by judgment about responsibility is “whodunit?” (who
did so and so, and to what extent is he or she the doer), rather
than “was the thing done good or bad?” (which is a separate
issue). Of course, judging responsibly is a moral imperative –
an absolute one, since whatever our norms, logic dictates we
apply them realistically, and to do so we must know the truth.
The object of judgment may be oneself or other person(s).
Indeed, judgment about responsibility is relevant to both the
inner life and to social life. We may also use such judgment
to philosophically judge God’s responsibility in world events,
or to determine whether one’s dog or cat ate the cheese – i.e.
it relates to any presumed volitional agent. However, here we
shall concentrate on humans.
Assessments of responsibility depend on three factors: the
facts of the case as we see them, our skill or wisdom at
determining responsibility on the basis of such data, and our
26
This section is not directly relevant to our analysis of
volition at the present stage, but is nevertheless inserted as a
continuation to the discussion of responsibility, dealing with some
of the epistemological issues relative to that topic.
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capacity for objectivity or fairness. Judging one’s own
responsibility differs from judging that of others in two
important respects.
Firstly, the empirical data at our disposal is greater in the
case of self-assessment, since we have direct cognition of our
subjective states and actions, as well as perception of their
mental and physical consequences. Such introspection is not
infallible, since it depends on the degree and clarity of one’s
awareness of internal events as they occur, and on the
durability of one’s memory of those facts. In the case of
assessing others, our database consists essentially of
externally perceivable data (physical words and deeds), from
which we infer (spiritual or mental) internal events by means
of analogies to one’s own experiences.
Secondly, although in principle given certain data, the
conclusions we draw from them are dependent on our
conceptual framework, and so likely to be about the same
whether the object of judgment is self or any other, in
practice the identity of the person judged and our
predisposition or partiality towards that person affects our
judgment considerably. For instance, if we are well disposed
or sympathetic to the latter, we will make more effort to find
extenuating circumstances; whereas, if badly disposed or
antipathetic, our efforts will be directed at condemnation.
One usually judges oneself and one’s loved ones favorably,
and those one dislikes as unfavorably as possible; although,
to be sure, some people have masochistic tendencies, and
some people do make an effort at objectivity or impartiality.
The function of self-judgment is generally attributed to a
faculty called conscience. In truth, this concept is a mere
abstract construct, though a useful one. One’s conscience is
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not a structure separate from oneself – it is a part of one’s
soul (in time, rather than place) acting as judge in relation
some other part of one’s soul. If one is judging sincerely,
with objectivity and honesty, one ‘has conscience’ – if our
judgments are not in earnest or non-existent, one ‘lacks
conscience’. By judging conscientiously, one effectively
gives oneself a ‘conscience’. The concept extends to one’s
judgment of others, insofar as we are responsible for the
supervision of our own intellectual faculties, including those
involved in our judgments about other people.
Introspection aims at identifying subjective, mental and
physical data. Subjective data includes: (a) one’s volitions,
velleities, or inactions; (b) one’s knowledge or ignorance of
something; and/or (c) one’s attitudes towards someone or
something, including affections and appetites, hopes, fears,
and so forth. Mental data includes: one’s memories, fantasies,
expectations, whether expressed as phenomenal qualities
(sights, sounds, etc.) or verbally, indeed all our mental
projections, emotions and thoughts. Physical data here refers
to sensations and sentiments appearing in the body, such as
feelings of sexual arousal or indifference, or feelings of love
or hate.
Subjective data is known intuitively, i.e. it is a direct selfknowledge, not based on phenomenal (mental or physical)
data, although it may be confirmed and reinforced by such
data. In practice, subjective events are not always
perspicuous, so that what we assume them to be must be
regarded as an inductive construct. That is, based on fleeting,
vague and partial intuitions, one proceeds by trial and error
to a firmer, clearer and fuller estimate of one’s volition,
knowledge or evaluation. The elements of doubt in
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successive intuitions are attenuated by repeated experience.
Although the database is composed of direct experiences,
judgment is still involved in comparing and contrasting such
experiences and distilling a considered summary of them.
Additionally, we may and do infer such deeper, more
subjective events (when they are not evident by intuition)
from mental and physical data, on the basis of past
conjunctions in experience (i.e. apparent causations). In this
context, we often reason according to the format post hoc,
ergo propter hoc (sequence, therefore consequence),
proposing an adductive construct (“this sort of mental or
physical phenomena seem to imply that kind of event in the
soul”), which we repeatedly test with reference to all direct
and indirect experiences and reasoning, maintaining our
assumption so long as it seems plausible to us, and
abandoning it if ever it ceases to do so.
Mental data, i.e. sights, sounds and other phenomenal
qualities projected by memory or imagination or anticipation
within one’s mind, are known by inner perception. Physical
data, is known by sensory perception, i.e. through the organs
of sensation deployed in one’s body, whether these organs
have been stimulated by psychosomatic events (occurring in
the body, due to mental causatives; e.g. anxiety feelings),
physiological events (in the body, due to bodily causes; e.g.
indigestion), or external events (bodies around one’s own,
impinging on it).
It should be stressed that these distinctions between soul,
mind, body and beyond, are somewhat conventional, in that
in practice events in these four domains are very tightly
intertwined, and we may only assign an event to the one or
the other after considerable reflection. The resultant
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classification of the event concerned is therefore not purely
empirical data, but itself a product of conception and
inductive judgment.
Judgment of others is both extroverted and introspective. It is
extroverted, insofar as based on information we have directly
or indirectly ‘perceived’ concerning the person to be judged.
And it is introspective, insofar as that data is necessarily
interpreted according to one’s own inner experience and its
customary relation in oneself to similar externally
perceivable events. Scientific data, based on the objective
observation of the behavior of many people under similar
circumstances may be brought to bear, as a third factor of
judgment; but such data, note well, itself also logically falls
under the preceding two categories, namely ‘externally
perceivable data concerning others’ and ‘the interpretation
thereof based on one’s own inner life’.
With regard to the external ‘perceptions’ involved – this
refers to (a) the things oneself actually sees or hears the
person judged do or say, and (b) the things that someone else
has actually seen or heard that person do or say. The former
(a) is direct evidence, and refers to any data (prior to any
interpretation) available to one’s own senses, which cannot
be distorted or faked by third parties. If such data can in
principle be manipulated, it should be considered with due
caution, and of course regarded as open to revision. The latter
(b) refers to hearsay evidence, which depends on the
reliability of the alleged witness, who may intentionally lie
for a variety of personal motives, or be too emotionally
involved to distinguish fact from fantasy, or merely be a very
incompetent observer.
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Note that direct evidence includes concrete evidence of any
sort, i.e. physical traces or leftovers of the past events under
scrutiny, which may be considered as emanations of the
person judged, still available for perception by the one
judging. Circumstantial evidence – concerning time, place,
opportunity, possible motive, and the like – can be similarly
considered, although more abstract or speculative.
Also note, hearsay evidence may be first-hand testimony by a
participant in the events, reporting his or her own thoughts,
words and deeds; or second-hand testimony about the words
and deeds (but not the thoughts) of someone else. The latter
witness may be a participant testifying about another
participant, or a bystander (a non-participant who observed
without affecting events).
Obviously, the person judged may intentionally project a
fictional representation of his or her external actions or inner
workings; for example, a murderer may wipe off his
fingerprints from the weapon used or loudly proclaim his
innocence in court. This too must be taken into account when
estimating data.
With regard to witnesses, obviously, the more there are of
them, the more reliable their common testimony. If their
testimonies converge, they corroborate each other, though
conspiracies are of course possible. If their testimonies
diverge, the judge would want to know why. Perhaps some
partial common ground is found between them; perhaps some
of the witnesses are more reliable than others.
Obviously too, even when one bases one’s judgment on one’s
own perceptions, one must be attentive to one’s competence
as an observer, emotional involvement and personal interests
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(including financial and other advantages) in the affair; i.e.
one should clearly distinguish between raw data and
subsequent interpretation – no easy task!
The insight that interpreting the actions or words of others
depends largely on one’s own inner life and behavior patterns
is very important. It means that when we judge others, we are
to some extent exposing and judging ourselves. Criminals
actualize certain potentials; by doing so, they reveal to all of
us what we, as humans, are probably equally capable of (if
not actually guilty of); for this reason, by the way, every
crime is doubly so, in that it further diminishes one’s selftrust and trust in others, fragmenting society. Conversely,
when we project presumed motives or behaviors onto
suspects, we are extrapolating these from motives or
behaviors we suppose potential (if not actual) within
ourselves; i.e. we are also saying something about ourselves.
Thus, judgment is a two-edged sword, to be handled with
care.
Judgments about responsibility are a heavy responsibility,
which few manage to discharge equitably in all cases. A
person may unfairly judge himself or herself, claiming
undeserved credit or discredit. People may misjudge each
other in the family, the workplace, the community at large,
the media, and of course the courthouse. Such injustices may
befall groups (e.g. religious, racial or national groups), as
well as individuals. The legal principles “a person must be
presumed innocent until proven guilty” and “guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt before condemning”
are often ignored in the courtroom, and more often still
outside it.
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Many people lack intelligence and intellectual rigor in their
everyday life and dealings, so it is not surprising to find them
exercising the same stupidity and laxity when they are
required to judge people. Such people liberally mentally
project their delusions, fantasies and fears on those around
them, lacking the training to distinguish fact from fiction.
Many people (men, women and children) take pleasure in
slander and talebearing, thinking that by bringing shame and
disrepute on others they enhance their own status. In fact, all
they do is reveal their own foolish thoughts and their hatred:
Judaism rightly compares such people to murderers, and
wisely commands: “thou shalt not bear false witness against
thy neighbour”27.
Nowadays, with the advent of mass media, gossip, slander
and talebearing have become an institution, a full-time
livelihood! Here, certain thought patterns should be pointed
out, which promote prejudice.
One is the very human tendency of generalizing – we take
the behavior of some people in certain circumstances and
assume the same behavior for other people in similar
circumstances. Generalization is a legitimate process,
provided it is subjected to checks and balances. The need for
repeated testing and, when appropriate, particularization is
true for all natural objects – but all the more so with regard to
volitional agents, and in particular people. The latter, by
definition, do not act in a uniform manner in the same
circumstances – so in their case, generalization should be
indulged in very carefully. Especially in view of the
disastrous consequences of wrong judgments in this field,
27
See for instance Talmud: Arachin 15b. Quotation is from
Torah: Exodus 20:13.
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one cannot allow oneself to generalize at first sight, without
due research and verification of hypotheses.
Another common tendency is that of stereotyping – trying to
fit all human behavior in a limited number of pre-established
categories. Here again, there is some epistemological basis to
the process: the human mind naturally pursues
categorizations, as neat summaries of information. This is an
aspect of conceptualization: seeking out patterns in data, by
comparing and contrasting cases. The problem lies in the
need to keep an open mind and continue this process all the
time, whereas people tend to get lazy and stop it when they
have one, two or three such stereotypes in mind. Thereafter,
all natural flexibility is lost, and the mind tries to force-fit
new cases into the few, rough and ready, prior patterns,
instead of modifying categories or generating new ones as
and when necessary. Many people misjudge, simply because
they constantly refer back to clichés that have little to do with
the persons or situations under scrutiny.28
Erroneous generalizing and stereotyping are related, the
former concerning propositions and the latter concerning
terms. Both are due to the failure to practice the logical
28
It should be pointed out that people who judge others by
stereotypes tend to adapt even their own behavior to stereotypes!
They absorb a number of behavior patterns from TV, movies and
novels – which are often artificial concoctions in the first place,
based on the fiction writer’s superficial understanding of the human
psyche. When faced with a real life situation, rather than draw out
an appropriate response from within their own soul, they simply
apply one of the formulas they have been fed by the media. They
play set roles: the rebellious protester, the macho politician, etc.
Even the dialogues are standardized. The sum total of available
roles and dialogues is called ‘a culture’.
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virtues of open-mindedness and empiricism, careful
adaptation, clarity and precision. If one is satisfied with
approximation and fixation, one is bound to judge wrongly
sooner or later. Another major pitfall is, of course,
emotiveness. Under the weight of an intense emotion, a real
effort is required to judge correctly. And, of course, emotions
are most stirred precisely when people are involved – the
very circumstances when cool judgment is called for. In such
situations, one must consciously remind oneself to be
objective and impartial.
Note lastly that reasoning about responsibility is not just
concerned with volition, but often has more to do with
causation. Arguments involving if–then statements are often
crucial to determinations of responsibility, or the share of it.
For example, the premises “if A + B, then E” and “if A + not
B, then not E” suggest the conclusion that, given A (which
may in turn refer to a conjunction of causes, C + D +… etc.),
B causes E and not B causes not E. By such means, we would
determine that agent B, rather than potential agent(s) A, is
currently responsible for effect E (although to get the full
picture, we would have to also check out what happens in the
absence of A)29.
A more thorough analysis of reasoning about responsibility is
outside the scope of this book. A volume on this topic, with
emphasis on legal issues, which I have found very interesting
and recommend, is that of Hart and Honoré.
29
See my The Logic of Causation for a full treatment of such
arguments.
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6. CHAPTER SIX
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 5.
INFLUENCE AND FREEDOM
1.
Influence Occurs via Consciousness
An important and complex concept in causal logic, and
specifically in the logic of volition, is that of influence. This
refers to the impact on one’s volitional act, before or while it
occurs, of some cognized natural event(s) and/or other
volition(s) by oneself or other agent(s). Note well, the agent
of volition concerned must have cognized the natural event(s)
and/or other volition(s) in question, for the latter to count as
‘influences’. The distinguishing characteristic of influence,
compared to other ‘conditions’ surrounding volition, is the
intermediary of consciousness.
The philosophical importance of this concept is due to the
confusion of most people relative to the concept of freedom
of the will. On the one hand, most people in practice believe
the will is free somehow; on the other hand, they realize it is
varyingly affected by surrounding natural events and persons.
These givens seem theoretically irreconcilable because the
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latter is mistaken for conditioning or partial causation,
whereas it is influence, a different, subtler sort of causality.
For example: a man’s muscles are conditions affecting his
volitions, in that he can in fact lift a certain weight with them
and also in that he cannot lift more weight than they
physically make possible; these same muscles however
become influences on his volitions, only when thinking of
their supposed limited strength he chooses another course
than he would if they seemed stronger or weaker. Note well
the subtle difference. Conditions and influences both affect
actions, but not in comparable ways.
Influence is a special kind of conditioning, differing from an
ordinary condition in that it operates specifically through the
medium of consciousness, i.e. of any kind of cognitive
process. The influencing object is one that has been sensed or
imagined, perceived or conceived, remembered or projected,
found evident or inferred, induced or deduced, or in any way
thought about. What it influences, strictly speaking, is the
Subject of such cognitions or thoughts, i.e. the eventual
Agent of volition. When the agent finally ‘makes up his
mind’ and wills something, he does so either in the direction
of or against the tendency implied by the influence at hand.
Thus, influences imply positive or negative tendencies,
temptations or spurs to voluntary action. If such tendency
was in the direction of the eventual will, the will was
facilitated by it; if such tendency was against the eventual
will, the will had to overcome it. The agent is always free to
accept or refuse to ‘follow’ a given influence, i.e. to ‘yield’ to
its weight or ‘resist’ it.
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The concept of effort refers to a degree of will. Volition is
not an either-or proposition, something one switches on or
off; it has degrees. Powerful will is required to overcome
strong opposing influences; a weak agent is easily influenced
to go against his will. Thus, we may speak of amount of
effort involved in an act of will. If influences are favorable,
the effort required to complete them is comparatively
minimal. If influences are counteractive, the agent must
pump proportionately more effort to get his way.
We may also view effort as a measure of the agent’s
responsibility, his causal contribution or ownership of the
action and its outcomes. The more effort he requires, the
more wholly ‘his own’ they are. The less effort he requires,
the greater the part played in them by surrounding influences.
The postulate of freedom of the will is that an influence is
never alone sufficient to produce some effect, irrespective of
the will of the agent concerned. Granting surrounding
conditions allow the power of will in a given case, the agent
always has ‘final say’ to resist the tendency implied by the
influence, though such resistance might require a maximum
of effort. As of when conditioning occurs via consciousness,
i.e. in the way of influence, necessity does not apply, though
the effort required to overcome influence may be daunting.
Wherever necessity does apply, one cannot say that there was
possibility of will, nor therefore speak of influence. The
subject was simply overwhelmed, proving in this case to be
not an agent but a mere patient. He may have been an
observer of the events, but he was in this case a passive
recipient of natural forces.
If this postulate is correct, it means that consciousness of an
object cannot by itself move a spiritual entity (soul, subject)
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to action, by way of complete causation. Though such
consciousness may play a major causative part in the action,
approaching one hundred percent, still the action cannot
effectively occur without the final approval and participation
of the spiritual entity concerned. If necessity is indeed
observed occurring, then the conditioning involved was not
via consciousness of the object but directly due to the object.
Note that not only an influence cannot by itself ever move an
agent into action, but also – granting the possibility of pure
whim – the agent can well move himself in the absence of
any influences. Therefore, influence is neither sufficient nor
necessary for volition.
Thus, note well, we are not here involved in verbal
manipulations. Freedom of the will is a thesis, a hypothesis,
concerning the causal relations possible in the domain of the
spirit. Consciousness may well occur in cases where there is
no volition, i.e. where causation (necessity) takes over; but
when this happens, consciousness has played no part in the
effect. Consciousness becomes a condition only as of when
causation recedes, and a space is leftover for volition to
intervene; in that event, consciousness (or its objects, through
it) becomes influential, and the will remains free (to at least
some extent).
All volition seems subject to some influences to some degree.
This seems evident of human volition, which usually occurs
in response to an apparent mental and material context,
though it could be argued to be at times indifferent to all
influences. Other animals, likewise, and perhaps much more
so, have powers of volition subject to influence.
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With regard to God, our theoretical conception of
Him by extrapolation to extremes suggests we should
consider God as the quintessential ‘unmoved mover’,
i.e. His volitions as always entirely independent of
influences. That need not be taken to mean He acts
without regard to anything, but rather that His power
of will is so superior to influences severally or
collectively that the latter are effectively negligible. A
tiny drop of water cannot affect the ocean!
As for the relation between God and lower volitional
beings, we should consider that just as God retains the
power to interfere in causative processes (i.e. to Him
all natural laws are inertial rather than necessary, as
earlier discussed), He retains the power to
‘overwhelm’ the willpower of any creature’s soul.
Thus, the power of will of any limited creature is in
principle always conditional upon the infinite God’s
continued tolerance. However, the Divine power to
dominate or overwhelm lesser wills seems unused in
practice (judging by our religious documents, at
least30). Rather, God seems to condition and/or
influence lesser wills – giving agents life or
prematurely killing them, or affecting their bodily,
mental or external environments, or again making
items appear that (strongly or to some extent)
influence them in some way. This Divine preference
30
I make no claim to special knowledge of the Divine, of
course. As a philosopher, I merely conceive possibilities, cogent
hypotheses, concerning God. Here, I note that while ‘overwhelming
of lesser wills’ would seem doctrinally consistent with the idea of
God’s omnipotence, it is not a doctrine stressed within Judaism
and similar religions.
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is assumed to stem from an ethical motive, to sustain
freedom of the will and therefore personal
responsibility31.
2.
Knowledge of Effort, Influence and Freedom
Effort and influence are, clearly, derivative concepts of
cognition and volition. The empirical basis of our knowledge
of them is therefore the same as for cognition and volition,
primarily introspection or subjective apprehension. This
direct self-knowledge, which I call intuition (or
apperception), concerns objects that do not per se have inner
or outer phenomenal qualities – i.e. no shape, shading or
color, no sound, no smell or taste, no touch qualities –
although they may produce perceptible objects.
Just as we intuit our own will, so we intuit the amount of
effort we have put into it. Colloquially, we say that effort is
‘felt’. ‘Physical effort’ is experienced as a sensation in the
body; but ‘mental effort’, or more precisely ‘spiritual effort’,
is a more subtle experience, which may or not give rise to
discernable phenomena. Measurement of effort is therefore,
of course, not exact and absolute, but rough and comparative.
It depends not only on the immediate intuition, but also on
31
Clearly, the problems of theodicy remain whether we
assume God’s action to include overpowering wills, or to be limited
to conditioning and influencing. It would have mattered little to
victims of the Holocaust whether God saved them by
overwhelming Hitler’s hate-filled will, or by killing or otherwise
neutralizing him early enough.
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personal memory of past intuitions for purposes of
calibration.
If estimate of effort is inexact with regard to oneself, it is all
the more so with reference to the effort of others. We can
only guess it, by analogy to one’s own experience and by
observation of indirect indices, like (in the case of physical
effects of it) the sweat on someone’s brow or his facial
expressions or bodily postures. Thus, as for will, knowledge
of effort is generally based on adductive arguments.
It is not inconceivable that one day soon biologists succeed in
measuring effort more objectively and scientifically, by
means of physical instruments. Quantification of effort would
then become more precise and verifiable. Such practices will
of course involve adductive reasoning, an initial hypothesis
that such and such detectable physiological or neurological
phenomena may be interpreted as proportional to the effort of
will. But in the meantime, we do have a rough yardstick in
our personal experience.
Influence is a more abstract concept, not experienced or
measurable directly, but constructed with reference to
amounts of effort involved in willful action (making it easier
or harder). An object is said to influence one’s action if its
appearance to oneself directly or indirectly affects or
conditions the action, in contradistinction to an object
affecting or conditioning action by mere existence. Note well
the phenomenological differentia.
If the influence occurs only by perception of the object, it is
simple, direct. If it occurs after considerable mental
processing of the image of the object, it is proportionately
complex, oblique. Since thought about an object perceived
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may have many pathways, of varying intricacy, the influence
by one and the same object may be multiple, involving many
theses and layers, some of which may well be conflicting.
Even at the perceptual level, the various sense organs yield
different aspects of the (presumably same) object. Thus, one
and the same object may give rise to many, variant
influences. We must keep this insight in mind, to avoid
oversimplification in our understanding of influence and
volition.
Another epistemological issue concerns our estimates of the
relative weights of different simultaneous influences. Such
estimates are based in part on generalization of personal
observations (when data on conjunction and separation is
available); but in large part, they are hypotheses, adhered to
so long as they continue to be confirmed by our experiences
of effort. Knowledge of one’s own psyche is very often as
tentative as that of nature, or of other people’s or animals’
psyches. People often think that they have ‘direct insight’
into, or at least ‘deductive knowledge’ of, inner events or
relations, when in fact all they have is inductive knowledge.
What is important is to realize that the latter is pretty good,
quite enough.
Knowledge of freedom of the will is partly introspective, but
mainly adductive. Our inner sense of freedom of will
provides the occasion for the theoretical search for supporting
data and postulates. We may have faith in freewill as a
working hypothesis, but are still called upon to develop over
the long term convincing definitions of it and arguments in its
favor. The formula above proposed for freedom of the will is,
I think, a good start.
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The doctrine of freewill is important psychologically and
socially, the foundation of morality and law. The doctrine
declares our responsibility for our actions, however many and
strong the forces impinging upon us may seem. Thus, a
criminal cannot disclaim responsibility for his crimes,
arguing he was ‘driven’ against his will.
We should note the doctrine’s own influence on human
action, by the power of suggestion: if one believes he can do
or avoid something he is more likely to be able to do so, than
if he thinks that he cannot do so no matter how much he tries.
Thus, belief in freedom of the will increases one’s ‘freedom’,
and disbelief in it is an added obstacle.
3.
Formal Analysis of Influence
It is empirically evident that the Agents of will are all
conscious beings: they are Subjects. This observation
suggests a fundamental feature of volition, that it is allied to
and inconceivable without consciousness. Given that insight,
we can better understand the mechanics of influence.
We have seen that a natural event or another agent can
influence an agent in his will, by presenting to the latter an
idea which, though it does not definitely determine or control
his subsequent will, constitutes a more or less important
parameter in its exercise. Note that the idea presented may be
illusory, just as well as real; but insofar as it is aroused by
something or someone, the latter is influential. Note also that
the ‘other agent’ influencing one may be an earlier moment
of one’s own existence (as e.g., in the case of habits).
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Influence is a causal relation of sorts, though a weak one
since it is never determining due to the essential freedom of
the willing soul. Our linguistic practices are evidence that we
do consider influence to be a form of causality. We often use
verbs suggesting it, e.g. ‘he caused me to do it ‘ or ‘he made
me do it’. Influence involves causation, in that some object or
appearance (if only partially and contingently) gives rise to
some cognition or idea. We may also consider as causation
the relation between the appearance, or its cognitive effect,
and the fact that the eventual volition, if any, is ‘made easier’
or ‘made harder’ by it. But influence in itself, as a relation
between the object cognized or its cognition, on the one hand,
and the outcome of volition, cannot be classified as
causation, nor for that matter as volition. It is another
category of causality, mediating those two.
We might express influence formally as follows: let A be an
agent, and W be his will at a given time. Let object Y be
some event naturally occurring, or willed to occur by some
agent(s) B (which B may include agent A at a previous time).
Let content of consciousness X be some belief, opinion or
knowledge aroused in A by Y (X may of course simply be Y
as cognized by A, or X may have some more complicated
cognitive relation to Y).
Then, we can say “X influences A to will W”,
provided “A with awareness of X requires less
effort to will W, than A without awareness of X” –
that is, provided X inclines towards W, the will of A.
If, alternatively, X inclined away from W, then A
would need more effort to will W with X than without
it, and we would say that “X influences A not-to will
W”.
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These forms define positive and negative influence, both of
which may be referred as simply ‘influence’, leaving the
direction of influence (for or against) indefinite. If the effort
requirement is exactly equal either way, there is effectively
no influence. The amounts of effort involved are known in
various ways, as earlier discussed. Note that in everyday
discourse the implied forms “X inclines to W” and “X
inclines away from W” are sometimes be taken as equivalent
to the forms of influence, because it is tacitly understood that
X was cognized by A and A willed W.
We can of course, mutadis mutandis, similarly clarify various
forms of influence involving notX and/or notW as terms,
such as “notX influences A to will notW”.
In practice, we would consider that whatever gives rise to an
influence is itself an influence. That is, the occasion of X that
we have labeled Y, or its natural causatives or its volitional
agent B – can all be called influences once X is so
established. But, note well, whether that practice is strictly
speaking valid needs to be discussed. The issue is a logical
one, concerning causal chaining or syllogism. It is left open
for now.
Thus, to review the process of influence in sequence:
a. Something (Y) natural occurs, or is made to occur
through the will of some agent or agents (B, which may
be or include A).
b. That occurrence (Y) comes to the attention of a subject
(A), or causatively produces some physical, mental or
spiritual affect in him that he becomes aware of, and
possibly thinks about further (X).
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c. This subject (A) then engages in some act of will (W),
whether a direct volition or an indirect one.
d. And it so happens that such will (W) involved less effort
for that agent (A) in the presence of that thought (X) than
in its absence.
e. Then the thought (X) can be said to have positively
influenced the agent (A) in so willing (W).
Note that Y and X may be one or two. If A is directly aware
of Y, then it is the term of reference. If, however, A is not
aware of Y, but of some effect of it labeled X, then X is the
influential term. The influential term is whatever is the object
of cognition, i.e. some appearance, be it real or illusory, faint
or intense, far or near. The cognition involved may be
sensation (then X is a physical phenomenon) or introspective
perception (then X is a mental phenomenon), or even
intuition. In the latter case, A is aware of prior reactions of
his own soul (so X is a spiritual event). Objects of sensory
perception include things observed outside or within one’s
body, including visceral emotions. Mental objects include32
memories, imaginations, and possibly mental emotions. The
object of awareness may also be an abstraction (then X is a
conceptual object, a term within a more or less complex
thought). Usually, all these means of cognition are involved,
in various combinations.
It should be remarked that the causation by Y of X is a
principle to be separately established, but which need not be
known to A to be operative. More interesting is the question
concerning the comparison of amount of effort, involved for
32
One could here also include telepathic communications, if
we suppose that telepathy exists.
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A to will W in the presence or absence of X. For A might
well be aware of his effort while he wills W in the presence
of X; but that does not tell him what effort he would feel in
the absence of X! The answer is that one does not need to be
aware of the influence of something for such influence to be
operative. Consciousness is crucial, but it is the
consciousness by A of X, not the consciousness by A of his
effort with or without X or of the influence of X. The agent
need not at all take notice of the effort expended, though his
attention is likely to grow with the effort expended.
Indeed, the agent may positively think or claim to
think that something has no influence which in fact
has some influence, or inversely that something which
in fact has no influence has some! In such cases, note,
the thought or claim must be considered as a separate,
superimposed item, which may or not have a degree
of influence of its own, quite apart from the fact.
The above formula is relevant only to the logician, or to
whoever wishes to establish the existence of a causal relation
of influence between something (X) and an agent (A)
engaged in a volition (W). Just as the relation of causation,
for instance between Y and X at this moment, cannot be
established with one observation, but only through repeated
observation over time – so with influence. We cannot say for
sure that X influences A to will W with reference to any one
observation, like the amount of effort in the presence of X.
We must refer also to other events, such as the effort in the
absence of X.
And indeed, here as with induction of causation in general,
certainty is proportional to the frequency of such
observations. The more often we have observed the
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conjunction, the more confident of a causal relation we
become. Knowledge of influence is empirical and inductive.
Notice the relation between the object X (as cognized by A)
and the amount of effort (say E, for A to will W) – it is a
standard causative relation. It consists of two if–then
propositions (natural hypotheticals), “if X, then effort E(X)”
and “if notX, then effort E(notX)”, and a comparative
proposition “effort E(X) is less than effort E(notX)”. Nothing
special – the procedures for such knowledge are
commonplace. This refers to the case of positive influence by
X. In the case of negative influence by X, E(X) would be
greater than E(notX); and in the case of no influence, the
effort needed would be the same either way.
Of course, any calculation of effort must take into account
not just one influence, but all influences currently active for
or against the intended will. The total effort requirement call
it E, would be the effort requirement if the will was
uninfluenced by anything (E0), plus all the additional efforts
required to overcome negative influences (E–), minus all the
reduced efforts made possible by positive influences (E+).
That is, E = E0 + E– – E+.
Effort is something the volitional agent must call forth out of
himself or put forward, as a precondition to his succeeding in
doing his will. Effort is known to us by inner experience; but
the agent need not be conscious of his effort every time he
exercises it. Nevertheless, in our definition of influence we
have assumed that some effort is always involved in volition,
and that its quantity varies, being greater in some
circumstances than in others. Whether or not it is focused on,
effort is there wherever volition occurs. Volition implies
effort.
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Also remember, effort is relative. The quantities of effort
required for each action vary from individual to individual,
and even within the lifetime of a given individual. I may find
a job easier to do today than yesterday, for a variety of
reasons (e.g. I no longer have a cold); and some other person
may find the same job more difficult any day (being less
muscular or brainy than me, say).
4.
Incitement
We have distinguished influence from ordinary conditioning,
with reference to the consciousness that mediates the cause
and effect in the case of influence. We have pointed out that
influences may equally be natural events or events brought
about by volition or both, provided in any case the one
influenced has cognized these events. Let us now consider
more closely the possible interactions of different volitional
agents.
One or more volitional agent(s) may impact on another in the
way of ordinary conditioning, i.e. by causation. For example,
a man while knocked out is tied up by others; as he awakens,
he tries unsuccessfully to move his arms and legs, before
becoming conscious that he is tied up. His attempt to move
are acts of will, whose limited scope is not due to influence
but to causation, since he did not notice the rope before trying
(but rather became aware of his predicament by trying). If the
man happens to be Samson or Superman, he might break the
ropes on first trial: his will has overcome the man-made
obstacle they present. On the other hand, if the man feels or
sees the rope before trying to move, his will is then braced
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against the resistance of the ropes – and in that case, it is
appropriate to say that influence is involved.
A subsidiary concept of influence, by one or more volitional
agent(s) of another, is incitement – which may be defined as
intentional influence. In the case of unintentional or
accidental influence the influencing agent(s) will something
with certain purposes in mind, which do not include the goal
of influencing the other agent in a certain direction; yet that
other agent is indeed influenced, since he cognized that
previous will or its outcomes and acted in the same direction,
or against it, in relation to such cognition. We have
incitement, by contrast, if the one of the goals of the
influencing agent(s) was in fact to influence the other agent a
certain way, interfering with his life, presenting him with
some enticement or obstacle.
We may formalize incitement by means of propositions like
“X incites A to will W”. This is a specialized form of “X
influences A to will W”, which it implies, where X is
something willed by some agent(s) B, who intend(s) agent A
to will W. (Thus for the positive form; similarly, mutadis
mutandis for the negative form and for forms with negative
terms.)
Here, the will X of B could be any perceivable physical
activity or product thereof, such as a push or pull, a punch or
arm-lock, a gesture or speech, a written text, or whatever.
Such will, note well, has to have as one of its goals the
orientation of A in a certain sense. The mere awareness by B
that A might perchance be so led does not qualify as
intention; B has to want that result. Though A must cognize
X (and that before willing W), he does not have to cognize
any of the intentions of B. But X must in fact influence A to
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will W, i.e. reduce the effort needed for A to will W and thus
the likelihood of his doing so. Influence without intention and
intention without influence are equally inadequate to qualify
for incitement. And of course, just as influence does not
eliminate freedom of the will, so incitement does not.
Thus, whereas influence refers to the consciousness of the
influenced agent, incitement refers to both that and the
consciousness of the influencing agent(s). The concept of
incitement has gray areas, with regard to who and what (and
where and when) the intentions involved are aimed at. We
must distinguish specificities of intention, ranging from
general intentions to more and more defined ones. The
former intend a kind of result, whereas the latter focus on a
designated agent performing a precisely specified action. For
example, advertisers want to sell a product to as many people
as possible; but it would not be accurate to say that they
incited Mr. Smith in particular to buy a particular sample of it
(even on a given date in a given shop).
The most obvious case of incitement is physical coercion or
intimidation. This may involve actual blows or incarceration,
to someone or to others that this person cares for, or merely
the threat of such direct or indirect physical suffering, with a
view to get the victim to do or not-do something. The legal
authorities may resort to such measures to protect society. Or
thugs of all kinds may use them for their own selfish ends.
Depending on one’s courage, training and motivation, one
may often resist such attempts at domination. Sometimes,
individuals try to and fail; sometimes, yielding to fear of
pain, they do not try at all. People usually manage to defend
themselves collectively, if not individually.
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Intimidation, involving the threat of force to someone or the
use of it against his loved ones, is of course a psychological
rather than physical means of incitement. Indeed, most
incitement is psychological, ranging from promises of some
advantage or reward to threats of some disadvantage or
punishment. The promise or threat is often very tacit and
vague, though sometimes explicit and defined; it may in
either case be true or false. Its content may fall under any
existential category: it may be physical, psychological,
spiritual, economic, social, political, or whatever.
Incitement by means of language in any form (gestures and
sounds, speech in words, written language) is considered as
special enough to be named distinctively, say as
‘persuasion’33. We may make further distinctions with
reference to the interrelation involved: ‘ordering’ (by an
authority or superior), ‘entreating’ (by an equal or inferior),
‘instructing’ (by a teacher), ‘example giving’ or ‘emotionally
inspiring’ (by a role model), ‘advising’ (by a friend), and so
forth. Often, pressure is applied by seemingly merely giving
information (true, false or uncertain), without specifying
what it is in aid of; an idea is imbedded in a mind, with the
likelihood that it will lead to certain desired conclusions and
actions. A promised reward for a certain course of action is
an ‘incentive’; a promised penalty is a ‘disincentive’. If an
incentive turns out to have been a false promise, it was
probably intended as ‘bait’.
Note that in relationships of influence between two or more
volitional agents, the interaction of wills may be competitive
or cooperative. We should not necessarily view the
33
I use the term very broadly, including both fair persuasion
and persuasion by distortion.
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influencer(s) as active and the influenced agent as passive.
The agents may have conflicting or shared purposes, with or
without intention to do so. They may work at cross-purposes
or together, struggling or in harmony, in a variety of relations
– for examples, as commercial partners or political
opponents, as equal co-workers or as boss and employee or
as master and slave, as parents and children or as teacher and
student.
All such relations can in principle be defined by analyzing
the intentions of the players involved. Some interactions are
de facto, some are contractual, mutual agreements by word of
mouth or in writing; some are more or less enforceable, some
not. We see here how the whole range of human or animal
social life becomes an object of aetiological study.
An important issue in this context is that of parsing
responsibility. Volitional acts are primarily the responsibility
of their agent, no matter how much they are influenced by
external factors or persons, since he has free will.
Nevertheless, in a more nuanced sense of the term, his
responsibility may be mitigated with reference to the
influences impinging on him. If something good was very
easy to do, the praise in doing it is less marked than if it was
difficult. If something bad was very hard to do, the blame in
doing it is more marked than if it was easy. Our concern may
be moral or legal.
When we consider human influences, and especially
intentional ones, sharing the praise or blame is necessary,
since more than one agent is involved in the result.
Obviously, unintentional influence implies a lesser share of
responsibility for the influencer than intentional influence
(i.e. incitement). In some cases, the scenario relates to an
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association between two or more persons who perform some
deed in common. We might then ask, who played what role,
and what their mutual relationships were, to determine the
hierarchies of responsibility involved. Such judgments are
not based on exact science (to date). Many virtues are needed
to arrive at a fair judgment, among them respect for facts,
attention to detail, impartiality, the sense of justice, a pure
spirit, wisdom.34
34
I particularly recommend in this context the already
mentioned work of Hart and Honoré.
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 6.
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCE
1.
Some Features of Influence
We defined influence as the relationship, to the action of a
volitional agent, of contents of consciousness that make his
exercise of will easier or harder. To ‘make easier or harder’
means that: in the presence of these objects, provided one is
minimally aware of them just before acting, the effort of will
needed for some purpose is increased or decreased by
comparison to that needed in their absence. If they are not
contents of consciousness, they are effectively absent as
influences, whether present or absent as facts.
The contents of consciousness involved may be experienced
material, mental or even intuitive objects. That is, they may
be concrete environmental or physiological factors or
conditions, or phenomenal contents of mind (memories,
imaginations, verbal thoughts, emotions, whatever), or again
acts or attitudes within the agent himself. The operative
contents of consciousness may also include abstractions from
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any such experiences (that is, concepts, inferences, any
intellectual considerations). The degree of consciousness
involved may be intense (‘conscious’), peripheral
(‘subconscious’) or virtually nil (‘unconscious’); this may or
not affect the degree of influence.
But in any case, the medium of consciousness is essential to
characterization of something as an influence. If something
has an effect on an agent’s actions independent of
consciousness, i.e. (as we say) ‘objectively’, we may speak of
ordinary conditioning, but not of influence. Thus, for
instance, a person’s natural constitution (such as brain
makeup or bodily structure, in comparison to other
individuals of the same species or to other species) certainly
affect his actions, but not in the way of influence. These may
well yet be influences – if their apprehension plays a role in
his actions. For example, if a man seeing his poor physical
appearance in a mirror is discouraged from pursuing a
woman – his ugliness ceases to be a mere condition and
becomes an influence (on his own volition35).
Influences are not sufficient conditions for will, but are
‘efficient’ in the sense that without them or others like them
the willed act would be improbable, though still possible
somehow. Positive influences make things more readily
accessible (facilitate); negative influences make things more
difficult (hinder). It depends which way one is headed.
A simple way to represent these tendencies is to visualize
someone moving an object up or down a hill: the hillside (or
35
Of course, regarding the woman’s volition, it may be
influenced by the man’s appearance in her sight, whether such
appearance is a mere condition or an influence relative to his
volition.
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the force of gravity) is analogous to a positive influence on a
person moving the object down, but analogous to a negative
influence on a person moving it up. The degree of influence
may be illustrated by the inclination of the hillside. If it is
steep, influence is great, pro or con. If it is not steep, the
influence is small, pro or con. If the inclination is strong in a
favorable direction (downhill), little effort is needed to
achieve the desired end; but if it is unfavorably strong
(uphill), much effort is required. If the inclination is not
strong, comparatively more effort will be needed for positive
goals (down) and comparatively less effort for negative ones
(up) – comparatively to a stronger inclination, that is.
For this reason, we often speak of people’s proclivities or
inclinations. The term inclination carries a useful image,
suggesting a landscape with valleys or canals symbolizing the
easy (more inertial) paths, and hills or other obstacles as
requiring special (more volitional) effort to go over or
overcome. We can imagine a marble (one’s will) traveling
over such variable landscape, subject to alternative
developments and the conditions of transition at different
times from one to the other. The landscape idea allows us to
view effort not merely in terms of modifying the paths of a
marble (going with little effort on the easy courses, or with
more effort on the harder ones), but also more radically in
terms of remodeling the landscape itself36.
36
For example, in a physiological context, we might refer to
the general health and tonus of one’s body as the underlying
landscape. Every action occurring within a favorable bodily context
is easier, so in the long run it is best to keep fit without having to
predict what one will eventually undertake. Similarly, with regard to
the mind and soul.
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To influence the course of events is to make them tend to go
a certain way rather than any other. To clarify this, we might
refer to effort, since effort is diminished or increased
according as it goes with or against tendencies. But we
should not confuse a heuristic formula with a description or
an explanation. Our impression is that influences stimulate or
stagnate our responses, i.e. increase or decrease our will. This
aspect of influence can perhaps best be expressed with
reference to the likelihood of a certain response.
It seems that the more effort an act of will requires, the less
likely is the agent to provide it; the less effort it requires, the
more likely will he do so. The agent is naturally lazy or
economical: if things are made easy for him, he will probably
go for it; if difficult, probably not. This is said ‘all things
considered’, i.e. taking into account all the influences
involved, and not just focusing on some and ignoring others.
It does not exclude that the agent may indeed invest more
effort, and overcome some great resistance, especially if
motivated accordingly by some other influence (for instance,
a moral principle or a vain self-image).
A tendency may be viewed as a ‘force’, which goes in the
same direction as the ‘force’ of one’s will, reducing the
amount of effort needed and increasing the likelihood of such
will, or in the opposite direction, making more effort
necessary and the will less likely. The advantage of this
concept of ‘force’ is to provide a common measure between
tendencies and will, although they are very different in
nature, making a calculus (additions and subtractions)
possible.
Note that here, when we speak of probabilities (more or less
likelihood), we mean something radically different from the
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statistics intended in causation, in that it does not signify that,
under certain unknown or unspecified conditions, the
likelihood becomes a necessity. We here just report that that
the greater the effort required the less likely it is to be
provided; and the less effort required, the more likely
provided. That effort and likelihood are thus inversely
proportional may be viewed as a sort of principle of inertia
observed in the spiritual realm. But such analogy is not meant
to imply inevitable behavior patterns.
As we have pointed out, the assumption of freedom of the
will is that irrespective of all influences, where volition
occurs it is nevertheless ‘freewill’37. Perhaps an inner sense
of freedom is involved, which allows us to think that, even if
we have always behaved in a certain way in certain
circumstances, we are still free to behave otherwise in similar
circumstances. Nevertheless, we are inwardly aware that had
the influential circumstance been different, we might well
have behaved differently. In other words, the influential
factor played a role in our decision, though not a determining
one.
A person is said to have a (relatively) ‘strong will’, if over
time his conduct is less readily influenced – especially by
other people’s wills, but also more broadly by any
circumstances. A person with ‘weak will’ is often
(comparatively) driven or thwarted in his will, i.e. his effort
is rarely equal to his intentions. Note that these two concepts
are relative: they may compare different periods in the life of
37
Influence may therefore be likened to natural spontaneity
in that its results are only probabilistic, never determining. See
chapter 1.3 of Volition.
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the same person, as well as the behavior patterns of different
people.
The influence of something on one’s will is essentially
subjective, since it depends on a cognitive act. Nevertheless,
the influence as such is objective enough, in the sense that its
increase or decrease of the effort requirement for a given
volition in given circumstances may be considered as a
‘natural law’.
One’s cognitive assessment of a situation may be true or
false, objectively justifiable or unjustifiable; the influence of
something ‘perceived’, or assumed to be a fact, does not
depend on its being a fact in fact. It suffices that one believe
something to be a fact, or to be likely enough, for it to have
considerable influence. Whether such belief is based on
experience, reason, emotion, wisdom, intelligence, stupidity,
faith, guesswork, confusion or self-delusion is irrelevant, so
long as it is operative.
It follows that a molehill may seem like a mountain, and vice
versa. Thus, one man may be brought to a standstill by the
prospect of resistances that were in fact minimal, while
another may heroically overcome enormous odds because the
challenge seemed puny to him. Neurotic doubts may ignore
all evidence, and artificially inhibit volition, bringing on
defeat. Shining faith may ignore all rational objections, and
fire volition to triumph.
It should be made clear that influences on our actions are
rarely singular and simple. Just as a mass of ordinary
conditions underlie them, so influences are multiple and
complicated.
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To give an example: suppose I lift a heavy load. The lifting is
objectively difficult because of the great weight of the load
and the inadequacy of my muscles, or the wetness of my
hands, or my having insufficiently eaten lately, or my feeling
drowsy. But there are also mental factors, like my selfconfidence, or my fear of dropping the load and making a
noise, or my being in a hurry, which affect things more subtly
and obliquely, in the way of influence. My considering
myself strong encourages me, my fear of falling upsets my
concentration, my feeling rushed spurs me. All these factors
play a role in shaping my physical movements.
At any given moment, with regard to any pending act of will,
there may be a multitude of influences. We may view them
collectively as making one resultant influence. But it is more
accurate to view them severally and analytically. Some point
in one direction, others in the opposite direction; the resultant
is the net influence, which may be positive, negative or
balanced. Moreover, while volition is still undecided, there
may be a range of options; each of these has its own resultant
influences, so that the options may be ranked, ordered
according to the degree and polarity of influence concerning
them.
Furthermore, influences should not be considered as isolated
forces, because they often mutually affect each other in some
way. Causal chains and structures may interrelate them. This
may mean ‘mutual reinforcement’, such that one gives rise to
or increases another, and then the latter generating some
more of the former, till both reach a certain stable level. Or it
may mean ‘mutual counteraction’, such that one decreases or
eliminates another or vice versa.
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Thus, a detailed calculus of influences is theoretically
possible, and needed to fully clarify each situation of will. In
practice, such calculations are very tentative and
approximate, since we do not have sure and precise data. We
should also note the difference between identifying and
estimating influences before the fact, i.e. as an aid to choice
and decision, and doing so after the fact, i.e. as an aid to
judgment about a completed volition. In the latter case, we
are taking stock, to reward or punish ourselves by rating, or
to learn lessons for the future.
2.
Processes of Influence
Natural objects or events influence an agent when appearing
before him, as objects of consciousness (through his
perceptual faculties, outer or inner, or, more broadly, through
his conceptual faculties). Such cognitions may generate
emotions, imaginations and deliberations in him, as well as
consequent actions: these all involve or are influenced acts of
will. Emotion involves evaluation, an act of will; imagination
is largely willed projection of mental images; deliberation is
thought, also largely willed; and of course, action means will.
Also, subjects normally influence other subjects via such
natural objects or events. Thus, for instance, a woman may
attract a man by walking or dancing in front of him (light), by
speaking or singing (sound), by her odors or perfume (smell),
by physical contact (touch), by her cooking (taste), or more
abstractly by her beliefs and values made evident through the
preceding sense data. These external items may generate
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emotions, imaginations and deliberations in the man, which
eventually influence him into appropriate action.
Various subdivisions of influence need to be considered. One
may be influenced by information, which may be perceptual
givens or conceptual insights, whether in the material world
or in the mental matrix, arising naturally or through research
or by the suggestion of other people (through oral, written or
visual means). The information need not be true; it suffices
that it is believed. Our individual beliefs evidently influence
our individual actions; moreover, our belief systems give rise
to behavior patterns38.
One may also or alternately be influenced by emotions: felt in
the body or in the head, concretely or abstractly. Emotions, of
course, often arise in the face of information (be it true or
false). Though information may influence via emotions, it
may also influence without intervening emotions. Some
emotions are apparently ‘spontaneous’, arising without clear
relation to any new information; we experience an emotional
charge in us, but cannot offhand interpret its origin. This is
quite normal; but if it happens too often without rational
explanation, it may become a source of anxiety and
pathology.
Some people believe, rightly or wrongly, in the
possibility of direct ‘spiritual’ influence. In this view,
one may transmit ideas to another by mysterious
pathways, or even will one’s will on another’s will. In
such cases, if influence need not happen through
natural objects or events (i.e. mainly via matter), are
38
One might add that, conversely, our behavior patterns
sometimes affect our belief systems.
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the mechanics of influence more complicated than
normally conceived? In the case of telepathy, this
possibility changes nothing essentially; the label
‘influence’ remains accurate39. In the case of takeover
of will or domination, we may simply refer to an
effective annulment of the power of will of one
subject by another: such overpowering is not
‘influence’ in a strict sense, but more precisely a farreaching volition40, effectively a ‘conditioning’.
As earlier stated, information may influence actions in a
roundabout way, as well as directly. The following is a more
detailed analysis of such oblique influence in the case of
emotions, for instance (similar analysis is possible for all
information).
We can, by the way, distinguish three types of ‘emotions’ –
visceral ‘feelings’ in the body, some of which are products of
physical sensation (e.g. a pleasure during massage or a pain
upon burning) and some of which seem of psychosomatic
39
If telepathy exists, it would mean that the thoughts of one
person could receive information originating in the thoughts of
another. The latter might be an already influential person (a guru, a
parent, a teacher, a lover, a friend), but possibly even an unknown
person. This could occur in waking hours, or equally well in the
course of dreams. It is difficult to account for all dreams with
reference only to subconscious volition of scenarios, coupled with
‘spontaneous’ eruptions of content from the brain. Dreams
occasionally contain totally unexpected scenes, seeming beyond
one’s usual creative abilities and too complex for chance. Is the
explanation for them perhaps that they occurred by intermingling of
two or more minds? Do all minds meet in some ‘collective
unconscious’, maybe?
40
A sort of telekinesis of among spiritual entities. This would
be another hard to prove thesis of ‘parapsychology’.
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origin (e.g. a person wakes up in the morning with a cloud of
anxiety in the stomach area or bubbles of joy in the upper
chest41 or throat), and purely mental emotions whose
phenomenal qualities are very subtle if at all discernable.
It should be stressed that an emotion may be present and felt
– but unadmitted. In such case, it is said to be
‘subconsciously’ cognized, because one is aware of it with a
low or minimal degree of consciousness. This is in contrast to
‘conscious’ emotion, which is more explicitly recognized,
which means that one identifies with it to some extent, at least
enough to consider and deal with it. We may also distinguish
between awareness of an emotion, and awareness that it is
emotion; the latter classifies the former, implying an
additional cognitive act.
When an emotion occurs, our usual response is to try to
explain it, so as to (a) quash it, or at least diminish it, if it is
negative, or (b) continue it, if not intensify it, if it is positive.
We naturally prefer the positive to the negative (unless we
are masochistic, but then the desired positive emotion is
further down the line, more tortuous), and cling to what we
desire and escape from our objects of aversion.
This response of ‘trying to explain’, is a search for the
cause(s) of the emotion or for its exact meaning (besides its
being pleasant or unpleasant) – and the important thing to
understand is that the interpretations we (or others) suggest
are merely hypotheses, which may be right or wrong. In fact,
they are very often mere conjectures, i.e. probably wrong, in
41
I suppose that until modern times people believed the seat
of the soul to be in the heart due to the experience of certain
feelings in that region.
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that the more complex particular emotions usually have
multiple causes, and it is hard to establish which of these are
the dominant ones even when we manage to list them all.42
Thus, emotions influence actions in two ways: simple/direct
or complex/roundabout. First, the emotion itself may affect
conduct, by easing or obstructing certain actions (e.g. a lighthearted child skips around; whereas a person with a headache
avoids movement). Second, the emotion supplies the data
around which we construct hypotheses about its causes, and
these explanations in turn affect our actions (e.g. thinking I
feel good or bad because someone said something to me, I
pursue or avoid that person).
Psychologists study specific influences, which group together
various combinations of the above-mentioned genera of
influences. For example, the various categories of influence
on one’s life might be listed, including one’s parents and
other family members, one’s school teachers, other friends
and acquaintances, certain books read (novels, religious
documents, histories, philosophies, scientific treatises), the
other media (movies, TV and radio programs, etc.), and so
forth. Then for each category, the nature of the influence
would be ascertained – e.g. what did one’s father or mother
influence? Perhaps one’s moral inclinations, one’s manners,
one’s choice of spouse, or one’s political beliefs. And how
did such transmission occur? Perhaps by example, by
42
Whether emotions are necessarily ‘intentional’, i.e. aim in
the direction of some object, is an issue. I think some do and some
do not. The latter may just be bodily or mental phenomena without
significance. In that case, no interpretation will be found for them.
Another question we might then ask is whether all emotions are
perceived at some level or they can exist without being ever felt.
Again, I suspect the latter may be true.
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preaching, or through some shared experience. A nexus of
information and emotions is involved.
3.
Instincts in Relation to Freewill
With regard to the statement made that all volition is freewill,
we have to answer a question concerning instincts, i.e.
seemingly inherited (or at least individually innate)
environmental information and behavioral responses that are
not mere reflexes. How are certain surprising observed
behaviors to be explained? How come all members of a
species behave in the same way in the same circumstances?
Can some cognitive data be genetically stored and passed on?
Can some volitions be controlled by genetic factors?
For a start, we should avoid confusion between intentional
acts and acts with certain incidental consequences. In both
cases, there is will, indeed free will – but the former are
consciously aimed at some goal, whereas the latter only seem
to have a certain direction to an ex post facto observer. The
intention of instinctive acts is obscure, vague and internal; it
is not to be confused with the biological utility of such acts
identified by scientists. The instinctive act responds to an
inner urge, in a way that calms or gains relief from that urge.
The soul’s consciousness is focused on that urge, and the
will’s aim is to answer that pressing demand anyway it can
(whether the ‘how’ is immediately evident, or has to be
discovered or learned). The soul is not told ‘why’ it has to do
it, i.e. need not know what the life-sustaining value of its
instinctive response might be. The urge to so act, on the other
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hand, may well be viewed as ‘programmed’ by nature (i.e. a
product of evolutionary selection).
Consider for example a baby sucking at its mother’s bosom.
The action as a set of mouth muscle movements is one we
would consider volitional, yet we would not seriously suggest
he has consciously directed his muscles for feeding purposes.
The baby’s volition is surely influenced by hunger and
perhaps by the smell of its mother’s milk. In such cognitive
context, there may be a number of reactions the baby’s
volition may choose from, including sucking, crying, waving
arms, say. In this sense, the baby has choice. But it just so
happens that sucking movements are the primary choice, the
most likely choice, i.e. the easiest option in the range of
available options.
Thus, the event involved is equivalent to trial and error
learning, except that the first choice volition is influenced to
take is the ‘right’ one. The other options are therefore not
tried.43
Thus, ‘instinct’ is a legitimate and definable concept: it may
be fully assimilated to our concept of influence. The volition
43
Similarly for animals. For instance, in the case of a baby
turtle rushing to the sea before predators get it, after its egg
hatches on the seashore. How did the poor beast know the danger
and where and how to escape it? I have not studied the matter; but
may suggest possibilities. It may well be born with a nervous urge
to run immediately, a sort of angst it gains relief from by running;
the issue is then what makes it run in the specific direction of the
sea? Perhaps the smell of the sea, the breeze, the light or the
temperature influence it. In any case, we need not assume some
mysterious source of innate knowledge on its part. It suffices to say
that the influences, whatever they be, are such as to favor that
behavior rather than other possible alternatives.
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involved in instinctive acts is not exempt from freedom and
responsibility. We can therefore side with the proposition that
genes do not transmit foreknowledge of the environment or
complex living skills. Technically, the influence of instinct
functions exactly like any other influential item. Simply, an
instinct is an innate influence, which may or may not be
partly affected by environmental circumstances or their
cognition; and this influence happens to be the most
powerful of other innate or acquired influences.
Influences are not all equal: this is true in all contexts, as we
have seen, and not just with reference to instinct. Influences
are of varying effect on volition; some influences are strong,
some are weak; they may be ranked. Influences are all
operative simultaneously on the soul about to will; but the
soul is most likely to will in the easiest direction, i.e. the one
in favor of which the influence is strongest, loudest, most
manifest. That this direction is consistently taken by a baby
or a lower animal does not imply that other options are in fact
absent; they are indeed present as potentials in the
background of the volition, only being less influential they
are less likely to be felt or acted upon.
For a more mature or more spiritually developed soul, the
easiest option is not always the one taken; the soul has
discovered its own volitional power, and can therefore
choose less obvious directions. Note that even an animal may
swerve (or be influenced to swerve) from its instinctive path;
for example, a dog trainer can get a dog to resist its hunting
instinct and obey the injunction to walk on when it comes
across some prey.
In formal terms, we may refer to a disjunctive proposition,
where “P or Q or R…” are the alternatives open to volition in
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given circumstances and influences. However, P may be
more likely than Q, and Q more likely than R, etc. In such
case, the agent will ‘instinctively’ opt for P, the most obvious
and influential choice, although he may eventually discover
his capacity to opt for Q or even R, notwithstanding their
being less manifest and influential.44
4.
Liberation from Unwanted Influences
When we meditate on our internal workings, we can easily
see the force of inertia existing in us. It is very evident that
though we may to some extent have freewill, it is not always
and everywhere immediately operative. Thoughts,
imaginings, memories, emotions, faces, musical tunes, words
– may go on and on for hours, without our being able to stop
them or channel them for more than a few seconds, if that. It
may however be possible to control such dull mental activity
in the long run, thanks to disciplined spiritual exercises like
meditation. Thus, freewill seems to exist, not in all things ‘at
will’, but often only by ‘working on oneself’ over time, i.e.
going through a time-consuming process.
This is how the yearning for inner liberation may first arise.
Once we have witnessed our own incapacity to concentrate
our will over a period of time, we are appalled and become
anxious to remedy this weakness of the will. Some
philosophers think the solution to be asceticism, considering
that most of the force that drags us down into such endless
44
Note that I use a similar schema of ordered disjuncts in my
work Future Logic, with regard to ‘factorial induction’ (see part VI).
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chatter of the mind is the body’s innate desire for food and
drink, physical comfort, sex, and so forth. Others argue that
more pondered methods must be used to overcome mental
scattering and sluggishness.
Many people are not even at the level where they are
concerned with the ongoing obsession and anarchy inside
their minds, but are rather frightened by some of their
compulsive external behavior patterns, such as anti-social
anger and violence, or self-destructive and socially dangerous
lust, for examples. Such actions may be viewed in religious
terms as sins, and fought by prayer and other pious deeds; or
they may be confronted in a more secular perspective. But
what concerns us here is their relationship to freedom of the
will.
Every punctual or sustained attempt to gain ascendancy over
such subtle or coarse tendencies is an expression and
affirmation of freewill. Self-mastery is possible, if we do not
‘identify with’ the influences on our will, i.e. if we do not say
or think of them ‘this is me’ or ‘this is part of me’.
But in addition to the influences already within us, in the way
of thoughts and feelings, we may need to look further out and
consider the way nature and other people condition and
influence our mental and physical actions. I will have
different life-support issues to face if I live in a hot country or
in a cold country. If someone imprisons me, or creates a
totalitarian society around me, it affects the things I need to
think about and what I may do or not do. The contents of my
thoughts are affected by my environment.
Anything that affects our subjective world, or objectively
broadens or narrows the choices open to us in our life,
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anything to be taken into consideration in the exercise of
volition, is an influence. If it is considered good, if facilitates
our pursuits; if bad, it makes things more difficult for us. We
logically prefer the former, and so far as possible oppose the
latter.
Volition is capable of being influenced, but is also capable of
overcoming influences or diminishing their impact. This is
made possible through a policy of awareness, or mindfulness
– ‘working on oneself’.
5.
Propositions about the Future
Volition is expressed through propositions of the form “A
wills W”, which may be called ‘volitional propositions’.
Although the simple present tense is needed to discuss
volition as it occurs (whether in categorical or conditional
propositions), mostly we use such form in the past or future
tenses. Usually, except for introspective reports, we only
know after the fact that “A wills W” was true: i.e. such a
proposition is derived from the past form “A willed W”. The
future form “A will will W”45 has always been of especial
interest to logicians and philosophers, because it seems to
claim as a fact something that depends on free will and
therefore cannot strictly be predicted with absolute certainty.
Many propositions less explicitly involve prediction of free
will, yet depend for their truth on the will of someone or
45
It is no accident that the same word “will” is used both for
volition and for the future tense. It has the same etymology in
either sense [O.E. willa].
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those of many people. For example: “the sea battle will take
place tomorrow”. It should be noted that such propositions
about future will(s) are not only about volition, but also
about the amount of influence on volition. In our example (it
is actually Aristotle’s), the likelihood that the prediction
come true is very high (though not absolute), because all the
people involved are so entangled in their war that it would be
very difficult (though not inconceivable) for them to make
peace overnight. Thus, propositions about influences
involved are tacitly implied.
All forms concerning the relation of influence may be called
‘influential propositions’. This includes positive forms, like
“X influences A to will W”, and their negations, like “X does
not influence A to will W”. Also, as we have seen, the
extreme terms may be replaced by their negations – X by
notX and W by notW. As for the middle term, A, there is no
point considering its replacement by its negation, notA, since
that would not refer to an agent; we can only substitute
another agent, say B or C. A subspecies of influential forms
are the forms of incitement, such as “X incites A to will W”
and its derivatives.
One common form relating to both volition and influences
thereon is “When/if X occurs, then A will do W” - where (i)
X is any influential event, i.e. a natural (deterministic or
otherwise) occurrence and/or a volition by self and/or
other(s), which agent A is aware of or falsely believes to be
true prior to acting, and (ii) agent A is any person or group of
persons or other volitional entity or entities, and (iii) W refers
to some act(s) of will by agent A (individually, in parallel or
collectively), which act(s) of will may simply be a decision
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taken but not yet carried out, or a partly sustained process, or
a process sustained to its conclusion, successfully or not.
Such forms may be referred to as ‘personal conditionals’ in
that they resemble logical, natural and other types of
conditional propositions. However, they are different in
important respects. The antecedent here is an event that has
not only to occur but be perceived to do so, or alternatively it
may even just be wrongly thought to occur - by the agent(s)
concerned. The consequent is connected to the antecedent not
through some logical or natural necessity, but through the
personal resolve of the agent(s) concerned, which may be of
varying strength - which means that though the consequent
uses the copula “will do” it is at best probable but never
certain that the agent(s) will bring it about. The proposition
as a whole can of course nevertheless be declared true or
false, according as all its intended conditions are fulfilled or
not.
Note that the proposition “When/if X occurs, then A will do
W” does not strictly tell us what A will do when or if X does
not occur; we should perhaps rather state more clearly “Only
if X occurs, A will do W” to distinguish this from “Whether
X occurs or not, A will do W”. We may classify personal
conditionals as a category of de re propositions, different
from natural, temporal and extensional conditionals; they are
not, however, to be confused with logical conditionals, and in
particular not with material implication (which is a
subcategory of de dicta proposition, and not at all de re as its
name might lead one to suppose).
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Detailed formal study of these and other such forms is
beyond the scope of this book, but the job needs eventually to
be done by someone.46
46
But see Appendix 1 of Volition for some additional
comments on this topic.
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 8 (sections 2 & 3).
1.
Volition and Biology
It is interesting to note, to start with, that biology textbooks
may refer to voluntary and involuntary processes without
ever admitting volition or asking questions about it. Yet (I
would say), volition is central to many issues in biology.
a.
We have here suggested that consciousness and
volition occur in tandem. On an abstract level, the following
propositions
concerning
them
seem
reasonable.
Consciousness is, of course, the prior of the two, and
conceivable without volition (since we are sometimes aware
of things without reacting to them). But all volition requires
some consciousness, and cannot occur without it. This is
even true of whim, and all the more of volition with a
purpose. Volition is distinguishable from a spontaneous
mechanical event by the involvement in it of consciousness.
Volition is free will; there is no such thing as non-free
volition. Nevertheless, the degree and range of freewill may
vary enormously. The power of will is proportional to the
power of consciousness.
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Consciousness would be without practical utility to an
organism if not complemented by volition. By informing
volition, cognition becomes meaningful as a tool of survival.
Furthermore, most of our cognitive processes depend on acts
of volition. At the sensory level, for instance, opening or
focusing our eyes is volition. At the mental level, recalling a
memory or imagining is often volitional. In thought, volition
is needed to direct our attention hither and thither and to
intensify it as appropriate. Our consciousness, not being
infinite, would not get us very far without volition. The
conjunction of volition and consciousness in organisms is
thus no accident of nature, but necessary.
These propositions are based on observation of living beings,
but also may serve as postulates for biology. Consciousness
and volition are found wherever nervous systems are found.
In humans and higher animals, the latter include a central
nervous system (brain and spinal cord), and a peripheral one,
with sensory and motor capabilities. In lower animals, such
as insects or worms, the physiological apparatus for
consciousness and volition is much less elaborate, but
identifiable nonetheless. In plant life, and (I presume
offhand) in single cell animal life, no organs for
consciousness and volition have been identified.
Movement following sensation does not necessarily indicate
volitional reaction; response to stimuli may be reflex. All the
same, at least for higher forms of animal life, volition to
some extent comparable to ours may be assumed, in view of
their observable behavior. Such assumption seems further
justified by the major morphological and genetic similarities
between them and us, suggesting our evolution from common
life forms. It remains true that human cognitive and volitional
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capabilities, including speech and reasoning47, are
significantly superior, suggesting a quantum leap in
evolution. But we can point to notable differences in brain
structure and size to explain this; it does not ignore or
contradict any law of biology.
Also noteworthy are the observable facts of social interaction
among animals and/or humans, and in particular the
emergence of culture in human groups. These are indicative
of consciousness and volition. They make possible the
transmission, between contemporaries and from generation to
generation, of living skills (e.g. hunting techniques) and, in
the case of human culture, historical and abstract knowledge,
as well as possessions and technology.
In sum, the distinction between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ animals
might be made by saying that the former are more sensory
and reflexive, responding immediately to present stimuli in
standardized ways, while the latter increasingly function
through the medium of a mind, i.e. with reference to memory
(storing and recalling past sensations), imagination
(reshuffling memories, dreaming) and anticipation
(considering alternatives, making choices), which makes
possible their powers of cognition, volition and valuation
stretched over time. Among the latter, humans apparently
excel, probably mainly due to their development of language,
in thought and speech (probably concurrently).
47
But there is no doubt that at least the higher animals
‘speak’ through facial and bodily expressions, as well as uttered
sounds; and we can observe them ‘reasoning’ to some extent,
judging situations and selecting responses to them. The
differences are differences of degree rather than essence. Also, we
should not forget that certain species close to human have existed
and are now extinct.
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Biologists today are content to describe rather than explain
physical processes in living organisms, using apparently
neutral terms like “doing” or “organization”, which avoid
mention of volition or even consciousness, let alone soul. But
to sidestep certain issues is not to resolve them. However, it
is up to biologists to find some credible bridge between the
philosophy of soul and their material concerns and findings.
There is no hurry, and no justification for offhand rejection.
If philosophers are right in postulating soul, biologists will
eventually come around, and no doubt then greatly enrich the
concept.
b.
As we have argued, consciousness and volition imply
a soul, serving respectively as subject and agent in them. Soul
is logically needed to explain both them and our knowledge
of them. Soul of course implies belief in some sort of
‘vitalism’ (here understood as the belief that animal
organisms, including humans, have a ‘soul’)48, as against
‘mechanism’ (the belief that beasts at least, if not also
humans, are merely very complex machines). However,
vitalism need not be understood simplistically, as the
traditional assumption of a ‘ghost in the machine’ of human
and animal organisms. For, as we have explained, soul has no
phenomenal qualities, not even spatial extension or position.
Thus, any imagination of the soul as a transparent cloud
animating the body is misconstrued, and any attack on the
soul that assumes such a symbol literally is an unfair
criticism.
48
Though strictly the term vitalism is also applied to
vegetables as well as animals. A more appropriate term would be
spiritualism (compare to materialism and mentalism), though this is
generally associated with mystical séances aimed at
communicating with the spirits of the dead (also called ‘spiritism’).
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The vitalist-mechanist dispute is of course far from academic,
but scientifically, ethically and politically extremely charged.
It is paradoxical that the mechanistic doctrine, which is
touted as empirical and positivistic, emerged as a pillar of
modern thought some 400 years ago, thanks to René
Descartes. For all his intelligence in many other respects, he
was nevertheless very much an ‘ivory tower’ philosopher,
and his assumption that unlike humans, (the other) animals
have no soul was based on no observation or scientific
process. Yet, as often in the history of philosophy, his
prestige sufficed to give respectability, credence and
momentum to the idea.
The horrendous practical consequences of mechanism are
today increasingly evident all around us. Many people do not
look upon animals (other than their pets, perhaps) as living
beings who can suffer, but as ‘things’ that utter cries and
make faces because they are so programmed to do by
‘nature’. Therefore, industrial agriculture subjects animals to
brutal living and dying conditions, and daily sacrifices
millions of them, under the pretense that the masses can only
be fed that way. Animals are cruelly tortured daily in
laboratories, under the pretext that the needs of ‘life science’
justify such ‘experiments’. And now, we witness the coming
of genetic engineering, the ultimate in disregard for the
difference between living organisms and inanimate matter,
driven by the utmost greed, endangering major species49.
49
For instance, in the case of genetically modified fish, the
engineered specimens are bigger and more sexually active than
their wild relatives. As the former inevitably escape into the natural
environment, they are so bound to gradually genetically displace
the latter. But being, very probably, physiologically weaker
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Altogether, it is an orgy of unconsciousness and moral
ignorance.
The Nazis used similar degradation to justify and
make possible the Holocaust of Jews in 1933-45. As
Paul Johnson writes: “Rather as the medieval antiSemite saw the Jew as non-human, a devil or a sort of
animal (hence the Judensau), the Nazi extremist
absorbed Hitler’s sub-scientific phraseology and came
to regard Jews as bacilli or a particularly dangerous
kind of vermin”50. Mechanism degrades animals to
the level of mere objects; racial and similar hatreds
degrade humans to the level of animals, and therefore
(by way of a syllogism) of ‘things’.
Mechanism is not innocuous; it promotes such heartless
mentality. One may well consider it as a dogma designed to
conveniently rationalize inhumane treatment, against beasts
and eventually humans. Surely, its advocates, and their
practicing disciples, should be in prison, or at the very least
in lunatic asylums, considering the harm they have done, are
doing and are about to do on this planet; instead of which,
our society honors them and enriches them.
The success of physics does not justify mechanism in
biology. Mechanism cannot in reason claim the benefit of the
doubt normally accorded to an untested scientific hypothesis,
in view of its deadly practical consequences. As already
stated, until its proponents actually come forward with
mathematical formulas that exactly predict all the actions of
organisms, the GMO are themselves non-viable in nature in the
long run.
50
Johnson, p. 473. Similar arguments are often used as
pretexts for individual or mass murders.
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animals, or even humans, they cannot pretend to defend
scientific truth.
c.
With regard to the theory of evolution, to which I
subscribe, the following can simply be said. We can conceive
that when inorganic matter (itself star dust, the end result of a
long history of astronomical events) coalesced in certain
sufficiently complex structures, it became living matter
(single cells). These structures evolved into still more
complex structures, viz. plants and lower animals; then the
latter further evolved into higher animals, including humans.
In this latest stage, at least, nature has allowed for living
organisms with souls to appear, having considerable special
powers of cognition, volition and valuation. There is nothing
inconceivable in that from the point of view of evolutionary
theory.
These special characteristics appeared in nature, and have so
far been more or less compatible with the environment. They
have seemed, at first, like particularly good adaptations. They
could well, however, over a longer term prove incompatible.
Indeed, it seems more and more likely, in view of mankind’s
current propensity to destroy other species and the biosphere
itself. Our own demise is perhaps even, for all we know,
already now inevitable within the next few decades. So, if
only on planet Earth, these special characteristics, in the
degree found in the human species at least, may well turn out
to have been self-destructive – an unsuccessful,
overambitious experiment of nature. But for now, they are
here.
(More is said on biological issues in a later chapter of
Volition.)
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2.
155
Therapeutic Psychology
The special sciences aimed at the study of human (and more
broadly animal) behavior, notably psychology and sociology,
are of course, implicitly if not explicitly, closely tied up with
the concept of volition and its allies. All too often, students of
behavior ignore or conceal this basic truth, and develop their
analyses without explicit reference to it, thinking by such
omission to appear more ‘scientific’. They appeal to
chemicals and statistics, without formally analyzing what
logically underlies their discourse. This is foolish, if not
dishonest. My hope is that the present work will help to
overcome such distortion.
A few comments are worth making here regarding mental
disease and its cure, without claiming any clinical
knowledge. The concept of mental disease is presumably
derived by analogy from that of bodily disease. We refer by it
to any state of affairs in our mental life that is experienced as
chronically uncomfortable, or as seriously damaging our
efficacy in dealing with our everyday life, whether
intellectually, emotionally, existentially, socially or
otherwise. Hopefully, such dysfunction is curable; although
we may not ourselves now know how to cure it.
Some psychologists imagine ‘the mind’ (or psyche) as a kind
of cupboard, with the top shelf containing conscious mental
items, the middle shelf subconscious ones and the bottom
shelf unconscious ones. The trouble with this viewpoint is
that it implies the mind to be some kind of entity, made of
‘mental stuff’, suspended somewhere in our heads, with a
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structure of some sort such that, by analogy to diseases of the
human body, parts of it may be wrongly constructed or be
misplaced or missing or extraneous or inappropriately moved
about.
Furthermore, the contents of this cupboard (the said ‘mental
items’) are identified principally with ‘ideas’, a catchall term
including units of information, intentional events and bits of
emotion, which are themselves viewed as ‘entities’ of mental
substance. The motions of these entities, within a shelf and
from shelf to shelf, make up the inner life of the psyche. It is
not made clear how these entities arise, change, move and
depart – whether spontaneously (inexplicably), by interaction
with each other (like billiard balls, subject to causation),
and/or by the will of some additional entity (a person, a who)
placed adjacent to the cupboard.
Also, we might ask: what makes an informative idea
cognized, an intentional idea willed or an emotional idea
valued? Where is the self in this account? These peculiar
qualities are left unexplained. This currently popular model
of the mind (in origin partly Cartesian, partly Freudian51) is
obviously simplistic. It fragments and reifies excessively. It
fails to explain mental events convincingly, and indeed
considerably obstructs explanation, being essentially
mechanistic.
51
The historical question deserves extensive study, of
course. The Freudian model is perhaps more abstract, fragmenting
the ‘psychic structure’ into ego, id and superego, or again into
conscious, subconscious and unconscious, and referring to ‘energy
charged elements’; but it comes to the same mechanistic portrayal
of the psyche, which is aetiologically misleading and sterile.
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Additionally, it leaves the relation of the mind to the brain
(and thence body) as a mystery, since it suggests a
duplication of functions between mind and brain – an
inexplicable redundancy (called ‘parallelism’). Substituting
for it a purely materialistic equivalent (a 100% ‘neurological’
model), as many try today, is no solution – for though the
substance is changed, the structural and causal problems
remain.
My own analysis of the psyche, in the present work and
elsewhere, acknowledges no such scenarios. I refer to a
material body including a nervous system, a mental ‘matrix’
on which cognitive items are temporarily displayed
(memories, imaginations, mental feelings), and a soul in
which events of cognition, volition and valuation properly
occur. This means that there is no storage of mental items as
such, either in the mental matrix or in the soul. Whatever
occurs in our ‘mental life’ that requires storage can only be
stored on a material plane, supposedly in the brain.
In the latter perspective, mental disease cannot be located in
the mental matrix, since everything occurring there is a mere
fleeting projection of images or sounds or other phenomenal
chimera. It might be located in the brain, as stored data items
of questionable accuracy or value, and/or as neurological or
physiological dysfunctions. Or it might be located in the soul,
but not as something stored or structural or mechanical, only
as repeated personal choices of a certain kind in the face of
certain recurring influences and terms and conditions.
The ‘conscious’ and the ‘subconscious’ are both volitional,
i.e. actions or states of the soul – some of which have mental
and/or physical outcomes, but not all of them. The
subconscious differs from the conscious only in degree:
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‘involuntary will’ involves minimal, ad hoc awareness, while
‘voluntary will’ involves broader, more comprehensive
attention. The psyche is thus essentially not a mechanical
system, though some mechanical forces (physical and mental
conditions) may affect it, and though the soul may be
influenced by mental and physical objects of consciousness.
The ‘unconscious’ is not part of the mind, but in its material
infrastructure, the nervous system. Strictly unconscious
actions or states are not volitional, but mindless; they are
generated by the nervous system, like the autonomic motor
system functions (automatic breathing, heartbeat, etc.). The
psyche is not occupied by ‘entities’ other than the soul and
images flashing in the mind – the other components are not
entities, but intentions, actions and states of the soul, as well
as movements and changes caused by the soul or the brain of
mental images.
It is wise, therefore, to avoid ontologically misleading
terminology. Epistemologically, note well, conscious and
subconscious thoughts, intentions, emotions or drives are
ultimately observable by introspection – the former more
easily and clearly so than the latter. On the other hand,
‘unconscious’ thoughts, intentions, emotions or drives are
necessarily inferred, i.e. things we assume by implication
from things observed, by adductive logic. For instance, if we
speak of ‘a conflict’, we need not mean something actual and
concretely expressed, but may refer to something abstractly
known to potentially occur.
For example, if agent A at once believes (or wants)
something X and its opposite notX (as often happens) – we
can characterize this situation as a potential conflict, even
though the agent A may not have become aware of it or yet
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experienced any unpleasant consequences from it. There is an
implicit, objective conflict that we can logically infer from
the two beliefs (or wants), knowing that if A should ever try
to realize them both together he would be bound to fail, since
X and notX are incompatible.
In this view, then, the concept of mental disease proper, as
something not chosen, should be referred to the brain – while
what concerns the soul cannot strictly speaking be so
characterized, being an issue of freewill, but should be
regarded as the domain of morality, ethics or ‘spiritual path’.
Even so, as shown further on, the essentially free soul can
still get entangled in some pretty confusing situations, like
bad habits, obsessions and compulsions, so we may use the
term ‘mental disease’ loosely with reference to such hard to
untangle situations. As we shall explain further on, too,
personality disorders are rooted in our ego construction.
With regard to ‘curing’ such mental diseases, the following
generalities are worth adding. A cause is some behavior or
character of the soul, which generates, sustains or amplifies
that which we consider as a disease. A cure is something that
will prevent, remove or attenuate the disease. The cure does
not necessarily pass through knowledge of the cause, though
such knowledge is often useful and sometimes essential52.
Once the cause has produced its undesirable effect, the cause
may no longer be the issue, except insofar as it may be
52
However, excessive ‘psychologizing’ throws doubts
gratuitously and feeds baseless conjectures, producing identity
problems. The ensuing mental destabilization provides intellectual
pretext for what are essentially (futile if not harmful) ego-building
activities.
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repeated53. If the cause keeps recurring, the effect may recur
successively with about the same intensity, or it may
snowball. The cure may sometimes be aimed at neutralizing
the cause, and thence indirectly the effect. Or it may be
aimed at neutralizing the effect, directly. It is in any case
wise to look out for eventual unforeseen side effects.
To take some examples of mental dysfunction: suppose a
person has abnormally strong, unwanted, disturbing or
uncomfortable, recurrent or persistent, thoughts, dreams,
inner images or sounds, hallucinations, feelings or emotions.
As exposed in the present work, such events may have
volitional roots or be more or less involuntary products of the
brain. The precise diagnosis will vary from case to case, and
guide treatment efforts.
To the extent that the brain is considered the issue, chemical,
surgical or other physiological remedies might be sought.
However, these can only be stopgap measures, to the extent
that malfunctions of the will are involved. That is, in such
cases, medicines can only mask the problem, not solve it.
Moreover, they may in the long run be damaging, or at least
become an obstruction to proper treatment.
For if the problem is at root volitional, ‘psychoanalysis’54
may be needed. That is, an effort to logically sort out errors
53
Although reviewing a person’s history, including
interrelations with other people, can help clarify and modify current
behavior and emotions, the causal relations are far from
determining, since humans are essentially volitional beings. The
patient is thus made to vainly cling to certain ideas, instead of
being freed of them.
54
N.B. by using this term, I do not mean to endorse any
particular doctrine of psychoanalysis.
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of thought and behavior – whether by the subject himself
(who may need to engage in theoretical studies), or with the
help of a professional or capable friend. This may, of course,
in turn call on behavioral changes, personal or interpersonal,
such as the practice of meditation or the performance of
kindly acts.
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9. CHAPTER NINE
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 9.
WILL, VELLEITY AND WHIM
1.
Cognition, Volition and Valuation
Our ‘soul’ is the core of our selfhood and of all our personal
‘life’. From an ontological perspective, the soul has a variety
of abilities of activity, or functions, which may be classified
into three broad groups: cognition, volition and valuation.
Epistemologically, it may be that we become aware of soul as
a distinct ‘entity’ by imagining it at the apparent common
center of all cognitive, volitional and evaluative experiences
(a process that might be called ‘intrapolation’)55, and by
conceptual suppositions. But we must also admit that our soul
has direct self-awareness, as well as direct awareness of these
most intimate experiences (viz. cognitions, volitions and
valuations). For only the admission of such direct evidence of
the self and its functions, which we have labeled ‘intuition’,
55
For examples, we seem to look out and see from behind
our eyes or to enjoy touch sensations from within our body.
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can explain our ability to discern particular acts of cognition,
volition or valuation, even when such acts have no manifest
phenomenal outcomes.
The soul, in this view, is a distinctive entity, having per se no
phenomenal aspects, unlike mental and material entities;
whence we may suppose it to consist of a special substance
(say, ‘spirit’). This intuited inner self is, as we have seen, to
be distinguished from its surrounds, namely: the mental
phenomena it perceives, the physical phenomena it perceives
in its own body and beyond it (the latter including, as well as
the apparent physical world, some supposed perceivable
effects of other souls).
Thus, we have four theaters of experience to consider: the
innermost (in the sense of ‘in the soul itself’), the mental (for
that soul), the bodily (for that soul) and the external (beyond
one’s own body)56. The different ‘distances’ implied by these
terms are of course relative to the soul, and are based on the
varying powers of cognition, volition and valuation the soul
has in them.
The basic functions of cognition, volition and valuation are
operative in each of these four regions (the inner, mental,
bodily and external). Their primary theater is, however, the
soul.
Cognition refers primarily to an event in the soul, the event
of being conscious of some specific thing, whether that object
be within the soul itself, or a mental or physical phenomenon
56
Although the latter three regions are all ‘outer’ relative to
the soul, the mental and bodily domains may be considered
relatively internal with reference to matter beyond the body, with
the mental being regarded as closer to the soul than the bodily.
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beyond it. Cognition is what happens on the soul’s side of the
consciousness relation between subject and object. It is the
‘business end’ of all cognitive processes – where things
‘click’. Sensation, imagination and reasoning are not per se
acts of cognition, but processes that present some concrete or
abstract data to the soul for cognition. The physical organs
and signals of sensation do not in themselves constitute
perception, but at best make it possible. When memories or
inventions are displayed in the mind, it is not the mind that
perceives them, but the soul. When a concept is built, or a
relation is proposed or an inference is drawn, it is the soul
alone that understands.
In like manner, volition refers primarily to an event in the
soul, when it directly wills something specific within itself,
for all apparent volitions beyond the soul are only direct or
indirect consequences of such inner action. Similarly,
valuation is something spiritual (i.e. in the soul) before
anything else. Only within the soul can the three functions be
sometimes clearly distinguished, because in most cases they
are very tightly intertwined. This is evident when we consider
in some detail their interrelations in the four theaters of
experience.57
57
One of the relations between volition and consciousness is
well brought out by José Ortega y Gasset in an essay entitled
‘Aspects and the Entirety’. Volition is needed by a limited
consciousness to focus on different aspects of the object. Every
appearance of the object is its response to the subject’s
questioning regard: the eyes move about the object (as we
approach or distance ourselves from or circle past it), ‘viewing’
different ‘aspects’ of it. An ‘integral’ consciousness would have no
need of volition, but a limited one cannot do without it.
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a. Cognition (in a large sense, including all cognitive
pursuits) uses volition as a tool in various ways.
This is true often even within the soul. For instances: the
intentions of words and other symbols are acts of will; it
takes will to direct and intensify attention, whether
directed inward or outward.
At the mental level, the projection of mental images is
often volitional. Cognition uses such projection for the
fundamental acts of intelligence and reason, namely:
mentally pointing at something, delimiting and
segregating percepts, negating experience, as well as in
abstraction and classification, formulation of hypotheses
and alternative scenarios, making logical inferences, and
of course use of language.
At the bodily physical level, we use volition to prepare
for and pursue cognitive objects. For instances: opening
one’s eyes and looking out, or turning one’s head to face
something, or pointing with one’s finger, or reaching out
with our hand to touch something, or moving one’s whole
body in space to change perspective.
At the external physical level, we use volition to set up
experiments, manipulating objects and moving them
about, placing them in certain relations to each other,
controlling their precise relative conditions.
b. Volition (in a large sense, including all outer consequences of
volition) involves and requires cognition in various ways.
Within the soul, although some volitions may be goalless, volition is usually preceded by cognitions that
identify ends and means for some larger volition, and so
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set the intention of the punctual volition concerned. Even
in the case of whims, some exploratory cognition of inner
and outer conditions may be involved.
At the mental and physical levels, volition uses cognition
not only to identify general goals and means, but also to
reconnoiter the current environment and thus obtain the
feedback from it that allows particular volitions to be
tested and if need be corrected or more precisely
pinpointed, which increases chances of ultimate success.
c. Valuation involves and is involved in cognition and volition
in various ways.
Valuation within the soul is itself, as a particular event,
both a cognitive act and an act of volition. To evaluate
something is to purport to identify its value in relation
some norm, i.e. within a comparative scale – this is a
cognitive act. Valuation then assigns a corresponding
positive or negative intention to subsequent volition – this
is a volitional act.
Clearly, valuation does not occur in a vacuum, but in
relation to a particular subject and environment – which
have to be cognized, whether they are so rightly or
wrongly. The subject may be the soul proper (e.g. in
religious pursuits), or an erroneous identification of
mental and bodily phenomena as the self (an ego), or the
mind or body (e.g. in secular pursuit of psychological or
physiological health), or supposed external souls or egos,
or their supposed minds and bodies. The environment
concerned in valuation is the apparent or assumed sphere
of action and reaction of that particular subject.
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Valuation also occurs relative to cognitive acts –
considering whether such act leads to truth or falsehood.
In its primitive form, such evaluation of cognitions as
such occurs ad hoc, with varying degrees of clarity and
validity (or ‘truth-value’). In more advanced form, this is
what the sciences of logic and methodology purport to
do: to find out exactly under what conditions in general,
items of knowledge and processes of inferences may be
judged valid or invalid.
Valuation is involved in all, or most, volitional acts, since
the latter are generally (except apparently for whims)
oriented towards things seemingly of value and away
from things judged non-valuable.
Note that all three functions of soul may involve verbal
commentary, but do not have to. Words obtain their meanings
by the soul’s intention; they are also produced by volition, as
mental projections of sights or sounds, or as physically
spoken or written symbols. Words are sometimes useful; but
sometimes they can be confusing.
In cognitive contexts, words help us to record, order and
communicate a lot of information, to an extent impossible
without words. But words become counter-productive
when they stop us from referring to fresh experience, and
when we become locked into their symbolic patterns.
In volitional contexts, words may be useful as learning or
teaching tools, to transmit information or instructions
from one person to the next. But they can also preoccupy
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our attention and hinder concentration on the job at
hand58.
In valuation, one may occasionally use adjectives like
good or bad to express one’s intentions, but these words
can become misleading if one forgets the essentially
intuitive nature of valuation.
In particular, we should analyze the processes of reading and
writing, consisting of complex series of both physical and
mental acts of cognition and volition.
Reading a text59, one observes60 letter after letter and then
mentally compares these to shapes and sounds (which,
incidentally, one may express mentally or orally) one has
learned, and groups them into words one has previously
encountered, whose meanings one has memorized (if such
correspondences are lacking in one, one must of course
research them).
Writing implies first drawing from one’s memory banks
the shapes of the letters that form the words one wants put
down (which one may, again, simultaneously utter
58
This is for instance evident in Tai Chi practice. As a novice,
one uses verbal instructions as guides to movement (“turn left,
advance foot, throw punch, etc.”). But eventually, the movements
become automatic, and any verbal remark becomes a hindrance to
their performance.
59
Preliminaries to reading a text may include movements of
one’s body (bringing it to the bookcase or desk), movements of
one’s arms and hands (opening the book, turning pages),
movements of one’s head and eyes (opening, orientating and
focusing them).
60
This visual act if for a blind person replaced by an act of
touch.
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mentally or orally), then moving one’s arms, hands and
fingers in the appropriate ways to draw (or simply type
out) those shapes.
We can observe the intertwining of cognition, volition and
valuation even in meditation, which may from the outside
seem much more static than it is to the practitioner.
The cognitive aspects are of course central to meditation:
looking at some external object, or watching one’s body
breathing, or an emotional charge, or mental images and
conversations, or inner reactions and attitudes – and
ultimately, experiencing effects such as inner silence and
stillness, and hopefully ultimately ‘enlightenment’.
The volitional aspects are numerous, too: physically
sitting down and adopting an appropriate posture, keeping
the pose and correcting it as and when necessary;
attempting to suppress or reduce mental sights, sounds
and thoughts, or at least to observe them with some inner
distance; making an effort to have the right attitudes;
focusing one’s attention on some object, whether it be
external (e.g. a candle), or bodily (e.g. one’s spine or
breathing), or mental (e.g. when reciting a mantra or
visualizing a mandala, although these objects may appear
automatically after a while), or non-phenomenal (i.e.
intuited self or some function thereof).
Valuation is also involved. Although it is ultimately
incorrect to have a goal in meditation, people get into
meditation with goals in mind, whether the grand goal of
enlightenment-liberation or fusion with God, or more
prosaic goals like reducing stress or finding inner peace
and such. Moreover, as meditation proceeds, many
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valuations occur, helping to prepare, direct, generate and
regulate one’s cognitive and volitional faculties.
Evidently, then, cognition, volition and valuation are tightly
knit together in most situations, although we can distinguish
them in very simple situations within the soul. In view of
that, it is worth noting that influences may impinge on all
three. Although the concept of influence primarily relates to
volition, it also concerns cognition and valuation.
As regards cognition, although it per se is free of
influence, we may well be influenced as to what we look
out for, what we allow ourselves to see or not see, the
directions of our research, and so forth. This affects the
scope, though not the content, of our experience. We may
also be recipients of conceptual information and
methodology (which may be right or wrong), from our
teachers or other sources. Naturally, all that will tailor our
database in some respects, i.e. the knowledge context we
refer to in our judgments will be affected; additionally,
our manner of interpreting such data may be affected.
As for valuation, being essentially an act of will, it can be
directly influenced. Our valuations do noticeably vary
across time, and according to our situation. If we are
attentive, we can spot the influences that cause their
variations. Consider for instance a new car model: at first
sight one may find it ugly, and then in time – possibly
because of the ‘lifestyle’ advertising one is subjected to –
one may find it on the contrary very attractive!
The innermost ‘thoughts’ and ‘actions’ of the soul are
primarily wordless intentions, beyond all mental images or
sounds. The latter are mere accessories of the thoughts of the
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soul, and all the more so are the physical productions that
accompany mental events (speech, writing, symbolic
gestures, facial and bodily expressions). Our study of
causality appears finally as one of phenomenology, when we
consider where it is thought and action originate, and
distinguish that from their more superficial displays.
For this reason, in meditation we try to look into ourselves,
more and more inwardly, contemplating the roots of our
thoughts and actions. By sitting immobile and quiet, we
gradually still all mental and physical noise, and can thus
hope to apperceive the more subtle aspects of our inner life.
That is, when the environment becomes less loud and the
body becomes less manifest, and the mental matrix becomes
sufficiently blank and calm, the arising of wordless intentions
in our non-phenomenal soul may begin to be discerned. The
‘still, small voice’ inside us might be heard.
2.
Velleity
A ‘velleity’ is an incipient act of volition. In a larger sense,
velleity refers to a small but insufficient act of volition – i.e.
one that was not brought to completion. Thus, velleity may
suggest hesitation, to which we would contrast determination
(‘getting the job done’, or resolve, resoluteness). But
sometimes, velleity is intentional, in the sense that the
volition is intentionally incomplete; we intend our will to be
no more than inchoate, tentative. We may thereafter further
develop it or interrupt it, or slightly shift its direction.
Thus, postures like willingness (a general openness) or
readiness (a more immediate preparedness) to do something,
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are velleities that for the moment we do not necessarily wish
to develop into full-blown volitions. However, note, such
velleity is more than mere ability; it does imply a minimal
movement of the will.61
Velleity can be detected by the agent through introspection
(intuitive self-knowledge). If the act of volition concerned
has already progressed beyond the confines of the soul, into
the physical and/or mental domains, it may be detected by
perception of some its phenomenal outcomes. In such case,
the agent, or occasionally other observers, may then infer a
velleity from outer events.
Many psychological concepts can only be defined and
explained with reference to velleity. For example, the
presentation of an ordinarily desirable object can only
properly be called ‘interesting’ or ‘tempting’ to that agent at
that time, if he manifests some velleity (if not a full volition)
to go for it; otherwise, neither he nor we would know he
desires it. A distinction is worth making in this context
between a velleity to do something and one not to do
something. For example, ‘laziness’ sometimes refers to a
mere velleity not to work (thusly, if it is overridden by a
more determinate act of will to work – else, it becomes a
volition).
The concept of velleity is also important because it helps us
to understand the co-existence of conflicting values.
Although one cannot simultaneously fully will one value and
will its negation, one can indeed have a double velleity – i.e.
61
‘Eagerness’ is another velleity. This brings to mind a dog
pulling on its leash. The will is more than just willing or ready; it is
held back from springing forth, till an appropriate opportunity
appears.
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velleities for contradictory items. One may also have a mix of
velleity for something and volition for its opposite: the latter
dominates, of course, but that does not erase the fact of
velleity. All this is also true for not-willing, of course. Thus,
if one wants to introspect with great precision, one should
remain aware of velleities as well as of outright volitions.
Velleities are an important tool for inner communications
with oneself. It is mostly through velleity rather than volition
that we register our intentions, the directions of our attention.
We speak to ourselves through velleities, before we ever do
so through words. Thus, I may verbally ask myself “shall I do
so and so?” – and the term ‘doing so and so’ has meaning for
me, not because I actually will so and so now, but because I
just slightly lean in the direction of such a will (velleity). To
intend “not-doing so and so”, I would generate a velleity of
so and so, followed by a willful arrest of further such
volition. Thus, velleities provide the soul with a wordless
language concerning inner volitions. This is occasionally
extended out by symbolic artifices.
An important case in point, which is fundamental
epistemologically, is the so-called “mental” act of negation.
That act is only partly mental, in the sense of referring to
projection of a mental image. It is in large part a spiritual (i.e.
in-the-soul) act, an act of intention – an act of velleity. When
we speak of having observed the “absence” of some
phenomenal object (say, a visual detail in the physical or
mental domain), we are only partly referring to perception.
We of course never in perception see absences; we only see
presences. We can report that something is absent only by
comparing the visual field tested to an imagination (wherein
the object sought for is visualized). Only if we find nothing
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resembling the object imagined in the tested visual field, do
we say: “it is absent”. To “negate” something thus involves
mental projection, but also a velleity of “putting” that
mentally projected object in the visual field under scrutiny
and then a velleity of “removing” it to signal the failure of the
test. Only thus do we get an inner understanding of what
negation means.
Another important case in point is the act of abstraction,
through which concepts are formed. This consists in focusing
on some common aspect(s) of two or more experiences or
concepts, while disregarding their differences. A selective
‘blanking out’ of contents of consciousness is involved, a
negative intention achieved by velleity; we pretend some of
what we observe is not there, so as to emphasize the observed
similarities.
Another interesting example, also requiring careful
awareness to observe, of such use of velleity is the following.
When we think of other people or animals, we usually
imagine them in action to some extent, often in relation to
ourselves. The imagination of their physical actions is simply
done by mental projection of their image going through
certain motions, as in a movie. To imagine them imagining,
we need only ourselves imagine what we would them to
imagine, and intend or say “ditto in their case”. But how do
we ‘imagine’ their subjective dispositions or actions? Since
these are not phenomenal, they cannot be mentally projected.
Thus, we must enact them to some extent within our own
soul. However, we usually would not want to enact them
fully: for example, we would not ourselves actually hate Mr.
Y just so as to imagine Mr. X hating Mr. Y. Instead, we
would generate a velleity, just enough to point our cognition
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in the intended direction. And then we would of course add
(verbally or tacitly): “ditto for Mr. X towards Mr. Y”.
3.
Whim
We have analyzed volition as generally involving cognition
of surrounding terms and conditions, and possible alternative
courses of action, followed by evaluation, through which one
selects one’s preferred goals and means. But it may be argued
that such a description of volition is circular, since the
cognition and valuation involved seem to imply prior acts of
volition. Moreover, the imagination of goals and means
implies the projection of mental images, which is itself often
an act of will. Thus, the concept of volition may seem
logically incoherent, unless we preempt such objections.
We have just to acknowledge that some volitional acts are
primary, so that they do not themselves require prior
cognitive research, mental projection of goals and means,
evaluation or deliberate choice. Such volitions may be
classified as whims or caprices (without pejorative
connotation); for theoretical coherence, we have to admit
such ‘causeless acts’ or ‘initial impulses’. They bubble forth
from within us, ex nihilo62. What is spontaneous about them
62
A whim or random act of will is in practice difficult to
conjure. One may lack a useful end, but one’s end may be said to
be the implicit will to whim. In some cases, one’s secret end may
be the desire to seem whimsical to other people; i.e. one role-plays
a whim. Still, supposing one clears our mind of such motives, the
way a whim would work would be by attaching one’s will to some
passing event, e.g. opting right (or left) without regard for
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is that they are uninfluenced, they are not explicable with
reference to any motive; but they still have a ‘cause’ in a
larger sense: it is the acting soul. When we say “act of will”
or speak about “freedom of the will”, we should always
remember that we mean more precisely: “soul’s act of will”,
“freedom of the soul to will”.
Whim is, in particular, required take action when one is in a
quandary – when one values (or disvalues) a thing and its
negation equally, or one is indifferent or uncertain either
way. If whim did not exist, we would be paralyzed in such
situations of even influence or non-influence in both
directions. This specific case may be regarded as an
additional argument in favor of the existence of whim,
granting volition: if volition could not exist without some
purpose in mind, it would often be blocked from proceeding.
A fortiori, if freewill can go against the current of prevailing
influences, one can will even more freely when influences are
balanced, absent or unclear; the same power is involved in
any case.
Some degree of consciousness is a sine qua non of volition. If
no consciousness is involved in an act, it is not truly
voluntary. So, whim should not be considered a blind,
unconscious act. It suffices to define it as an irreducible
primary. The first impulse to look into oneself or out at the
world may thus be described as a dawning cognitive volition;
consequences. But then, has one not told oneself “I will opt to the
right”? It could be therefore be objected that such decision of
principle sets an end, becoming the motive. But we may reply that
the decision itself is the sought after whim. So real whim is
conceivable – at least with reference to the decision as to which
way to whim!
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it does not refer to prior research, though cognition
accompanies it. The call-up of existing memories
(information obtained in the past) may be similarly classed.
Some imagination is involuntary, contributed by the brain
without voluntary creativity: this can serve volition, without
being volition. The act of valuation per se does not
necessarily need to be influenced, although it may be.
Valuations must here clearly be distinguished from emotions;
the former are voluntary positions or postures of the soul, the
latter are reactions in the mind or body. Emotions do not
necessarily or fully determine valuations. Emotions may
cause later valuations to some extent, in the sense of
influencing them. Indeed, they often do, insofar as most
people consider their emotions as powerful arguments; they
identify with them and are guided by them. But such
emotions are themselves effects of earlier valuations; they are
mental and/or bodily consequences of volitions influenced by
such valuations63. Valuations are not necessarily rational,
either. They may indeed be influenced by rational
considerations; but however strong, such influence is never
determining.
Thus, ultimately, all valuation is purely voluntary. Valuation
gives or grants value. Things have value because the agent
concerned has assigned value to them, period. Even when
such act has objectives or objective justifications, claiming to
be impartial evaluation, it is essentially arbitrary. This does
not prove such valuations “false” – it just means they are
63
For this reason, incidentally, the attempts by some
philosophers to build moral systems on hedonistic or aesthetic
standards have little credibility. Such doctrines cannot guide
valuation, because they refer to a consequence of it as the guide!
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intimate expressions of the self. Although one ought not
identify with one’s emotions, one can well identify with
one’s inmost valuations. So much for the issue of circularity
in the concept of volition.
4.
Inner Divisions
How is it our right hand may not know what our left hand is
doing, as the saying goes? What does it mean to say that we
are often in conflict with our own self?
The self or soul is essentially one, but may partition itself in
various ways. As we have seen, the soul is not an object of
perception, but an object of apperception or self-intuition.
Since it has none of the phenomenal qualities we associate
with space (shape, size, location, etc.), but is a nonphenomenal appearance, it cannot strictly speaking, from an
epistemological point of view, be regarded as spatially
extended or as having an exact place. From an ontological
point of view, however, we may either adhere to the same
restriction (out of positivism) – or we may hypothetically
project a spatial extension and position, if only as a
convenient image (by convention).
It may be more accurate to regard the partitions of soul as
occurring in time rather than in space. For the soul seems
extended in time, which is an abstract concept even in
relation to matter and mind, anyway. We presume that,
although the soul is renewed every moment, it retains some
unity and continuity across time throughout its life64 – on the
64
See discussion of this in chapter 16.2 of Volition.
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basis of which, we may acknowledge our personal
responsibility for our past, present and future thoughts and
actions. This thesis may be upheld, without going so far as to
deny our ability to morally break with the past and change
course in the present and future.
Although some instances of partitioning of self can be
explained by pointing out that the conflicting volitions
involved actually occurred successively in time, it remains
true that some conflicting volitions seem to be
simultaneous65. It is the latter that we commonly map out as
separate in space; although, strictly speaking, there is no
reason to do so, i.e. we could equally well assume them as
emerging from the same point of self.
The self or soul may be divided in a positive or negative
manner. Such self-division is sometimes useful for purposes
of self-regulation or self-control – as when we set up a ‘moral
conscience’ to oversee our own compliance with certain
higher standards, to ensure we are not swept away by the
passions of the moment. Sometimes, the division is
involuntary and unhealthy, causing self-damaging conflicts,
reducing our ability to cope with life. Thus, division of the
self is an issue of management – the manager in us must
decide how much is needed and how much is too much.
We must distinguish in-soul conflicts (which occur in the self
proper) and soul/mind-matter conflicts (which pit the self
against its mental and material environment). One may
pressure oneself to think or act in a certain way; this may be
either in the sense of a will within the soul, or in the sense of
a will pushing the mind and body in the direction concerned.
65
See discussion of ‘double velleities’, higher up.
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Thoughts and deeds may be willfully suppressed for a variety
of reasons: because they are sterile or foolish or painful or
sickening, and so on.
Repression refers to an unhealthy situation, where segments
of current or memorized apperception, perception, and
conceptual thought are blocked from awareness, to a degree
sufficient to ensure their (rightly or wrongly supposed)
implications from being considered. Oppression refers to an
uncomfortable situation, where the self at some level rejects
an ideology – self-imposed under the influence of parents,
society, religion, state, or other authorities – that is currently
operative at another level. In the latter case, one’s autonomy
is at stake – an issue of self-rule or self-determination –
because one does not (or no longer does) identify with the
ideology, yet one is (or continues to be) guided by it in
thought and action.
More will be said on such psychological conflicts in the
coming pages.
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10. CHAPTER TEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 10.
AFFECTIONS AND APPETITES
1.
Valuation
Let us now look more closely at the main affections or
appetites, which are among the major influences on volition.
Our increased understanding of volition and influence can
help us clarify concepts such as: liking and disliking
(affections), desire and aversion (appetites), hope and
despair, confidence and fear, certainty and doubt, and esthetic
responses to beauty and ugliness. These can all be referred to
as ‘values’ or ‘disvalues’, things one chooses to pursue or
avoid. They are all causal concepts, in that they motivate and
explain volitional action; they are ‘allied’ to volition.
Values are at least expressed through velleities, if not through
full volitions.
Note first that each of these pairs of terms refers to opposite
sides in a continuum, the middle point of which is labeled
indifference. Thus, for instance, ‘desire’ refers to a range of
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positive responses, and ‘aversion’ (or desire-not) to the
corresponding range of negative responses. Special terms
may be used for the extremes. Thus, the more intense
expressions of liking are called love; and those of disliking,
hate. Indifference, as the word suggests, means ‘the object
makes no difference to the subject’ – i.e. the latter is
uninfluenced one way or the other by the former.
Note that sometimes pleasure and pain are mixed; i.e. the
same object may arouse pleasure in some respects and pain in
other respects. No contradiction is involved; it is a real
possibility. Sometimes, too, we are not sure whether what we
feel is pleasant or painful. This is different from mixed
feelings or indifference, but refers to confusion; it is not an
ontological position, but an epistemological one.
Although the term ‘affection’ refers primarily to likes and
dislikes, and ‘appetite’ refers primarily to desires and
aversions, they are also used more broadly for all valuations;
presumably, because we are affected by them in our
responses, and like hunger and thirst they involve some drive
to certain actions by the agent concerned.
A drive may be said to have positive or negative polarity, or
to be attractive or repulsive, according as its inclination is
toward or away from the object; and the degree of the drive
signifies its power to influence, how easy or hard it makes
pursuit or avoidance of the object, how likely or unlikely it is
for the agent to go that way. The same agent may at the same
time have “contrary drives”, i.e. drives with incompatible
objects.
One may at once desire X and desire notX; one may even
also desire not to desire X and desire not to desire notX. That
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is all logically acceptable. But it remains true that if one
desires X, one does not not-desire X: the law of noncontradiction applies if the presence and absence of one and
the same drive is under discussion. Furthermore, one cannot
hope to eventually realize both the incompatible objects at
once: if the desire for X comes true, the desire for notX will
not. Moreover, one is not forced to desire any one thing or its
opposite: one may remain indifferent. That is, I do not desire
X and do not desire notX may both be true.
What we value today, we may disvalue or be indifferent to
tomorrow. New cognitions, volitions or valuations can
change our values. Our values are therefore often
hypothetical, rather than categorical. We have more or less
conscious hierarchies of values. Some values take
precedence over others, come what may; others do so
conditionally. Some values are basic and broadly influential,
informing many of our actions over the long-term; others are
ad hoc short-term responses to current opportunities. A drive
may be strong, until its object is shown up to be incompatible
with the object of some more important drive; in that event,
the initial drive is considerably deflated and may even
disappear completely. One drive may therefore be
consciously used to resist or overcome another. Our values
are thus in a sort of dynamic equilibrium, rather than
statically set.
Emotions, of course, suggest valuations. The simplest
emotions are physical pleasures and pains, sensations caused
directly by external physical stimuli (e.g. a caress or a flame)
or purely by physiological processes (e.g. satiety or hunger).
More complex are psychosomatic emotions (sentiments),
which are physical feelings with ‘mental’ causes; they are
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visceral, yet we know them to be due to events in the mind or
evaluations in the soul. Bodily emotions are often a mixed
bag of sensations and sentiments. More subtle are mental
emotions, which seem to occur in the mental matrix rather
than in the physical domain. Possibly, all bodily emotions are
mental projections; possibly, apparently mental emotions are
really physical – it is hard to say for sure.
In any case, note well, such classifications of emotions (as
pleasures, pains; and as sensations, sentiments, mental
emotions) should not cloud the fact that they vary greatly in
quality and intensity. For instance, a pinprick is hardly
comparable to a pang of hunger.
It is interesting to note that even physical pain may be
variously experienced and influential, according to
our perception and judgment of it. This is made
evident in experiments using the ‘placebo effect’,
where a patient’s pain is attenuated by fake pain
reliever. Not only does the patient feel less pain, but
also the fact is measurable through instruments
attached to his brain. Note also the opposite, ‘nocebo
effect’ – by which a misplaced belief gives rise to a
physical, mental or emotional problem. Such ‘effects’
were cunningly used even in ancient times, by
physicians and religious healers (to heal) and by witch
doctors and the like (to heal or harm).
In any case, to repeat, all such concrete emotions are
relatively superficial percepts and must not be confused with
valuations, which occur and are intuited in the soul and are
volitional acts. Their being willed does not mean such most
inner values are artificial, affectations; quite the contrary,
they come from the depths of self. Our knowledge of our
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valuations is self-knowledge. Concrete emotions and
expressions of will give rise to various equivalent abstract
notions of value, like good or bad. Valuations, note well,
need not be verbal or even very conscious; indeed, they are
usually wordlessly and subconsciously intended. We do not
have to say, mentally or out loud, “this is good” or “this is
bad” or “this is neutral”, to mean it.
Something valuated is called a value. Positive values (values)
are pleasures or pleasant (if emotion generating), or
beneficial to one’s self-interest, or good (using more abstract
norms, eventually moral principles). Negative values
(disvalues) are pains or painful, or harmful or bad. Indifferent
things are neither valuable nor the opposite. ‘Self-interest’
here may be understood variously, as real or imaginary,
probable or improbable, of interest to one’s soul, mind, body,
loved ones, possessions, or more abstract concerns.
The terms ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are here intended indefinitely, to
mean ‘valuable’ or ‘not valuable’; we use them because
people do so. We acknowledge that people assign various
contents to such general terms; we need not at this stage give
them any objective status. Note that something may be
neither good nor bad (indifferent); also, something may be
good in some respects and bad in other respects (of mixed
value). Therefore, though good and bad are ultimately meant
as opposites, they are not logical contradictories.
2.
The Main Valuations
There are many sorts of value concepts; below we try to
define some of the more commonplace and so significant.
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Notice what they have in common: they essentially are or
involve cognition (some belief or consideration), and for this
reason are able to influence our volitions. Their repeated or
constant influence on us explains our attachment to them, our
immersion in pursuing or avoiding them. A value may be
more or less long lasting. Our consistent valuations become
our personal attitudes or dispositions.
One likes what one considers positive in some sense, in some
way; one dislikes what one considers negative in some sense,
in some way. One may like or dislike something without
doing anything about it, although normally one makes some
effort to go towards or away from it. Various terms
distinguish varieties of likes and dislikes. For instance, love is
a liking response of some high degree to people or animals
(or even sometimes, though perhaps inappropriately, to
inanimate objects like a house or a country); and hate is the
opposite pole. Love and hate usually imply certain bundles of
emotions and actions. Some people think they love someone,
but are in fact only infatuated or sexually aroused. Hate, on
the other hand, is rarely more superficial than it claims.
Desire signals an expectation of pleasure or some other
benefit if some course is pursued; aversion, an expectation of
pain or some other disservice if some course is pursued. The
more feasible the required course to gain/keep or avoid/lose,
the greater the impulse. If one realizes the object is
unattainable, all the desire or aversion for it is lost. The desire
or aversion for something usually includes the conation to
have a certain kind of interrelation with it (e.g. desiring a
woman, to make love to her or live with her).
Not all valuation is of the nature of desire or aversion, note
well. What distinguishes them is that they usually lead to
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some sort of appropriate action or inaction, although they
may on occasion be consciously ignored or resisted. Desire is
expressed as grasping if we do not yet possess its object, and
as clinging, if we already have it. An aversion is on the
contrary a desire to steer clear of or get rid of the object.66 If
one succeeds in attaining the desired good, the desire is said
to be fulfilled; if one fails, it is frustrated.
We of course often use specific terms for specific desires (or
aversions), usually with reference to their object. Thus, for
examples, thirst is desire for water or other liquids, hunger is
for food (gluttony for excessive food), lust is for sexual
gratification, greed for more wealth (money, possessions),
vanity for admiration (including fame), power-lust for social
dominance, curiosity for learning, and so forth. But many
desires (or aversions) have not been given specific terms; we
just say “the desire to …”.
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction refer to our reaction upon
fulfillment, or admission of failure to fulfill, a given desire or
aversion. Contentment or discontent refer to our no longer
having any, or still having some, outstanding desires and
66
Some of these observations are gleaned from Buddhist
psychology (see the twelve “nidanas”), which offers a very detailed
dissection of desire or aversion: they begin with a sensory stimulus
(“contact”); this gives rise to pleasure or pain (an experience or
evaluation); we tend to adhere to the pleasant or to be repelled by
the unpleasant (“grasping”); this in turn impels us to act accordingly
i.e. do what is necessary to gain and/or keep or to avoid and/or
lose that which gave rise to the initial sensation (“clinging”). I have
personally found this analysis of great practical utility to tame
unwanted passions. The series can be interrupted at any stage:
one can preempt the initial contact; or stoically ignore the pleasure
or pain; or dismiss the tendencies to grasp and cling. If one
opportunity is lost, the next one can still be used.
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aversions; or at least to not-attaching, or attaching, undue
importance (degree of value) to them. Thus, these latter
concepts concern not one object of desire, but one’s relation
to desire more generally (in life as a whole), or at least in
some broad domain (e.g. at work or at home).
Hope and despair also involve the thought that good or bad
may come; but they are more passive than desire and
aversion. Hope is the conviction of the possibility that
something considered good will occur or something
considered bad will not occur. The ‘possibility’ may be
correctly or incorrectly assessed, with reference to solid data
and tight reasoning, or as a mere consideration of
‘conceivability’ or ‘possibility in principle’, or as an act of
faith or as a deliberate self-delusion. Despair is, strictly
speaking, the lack of hope; though, in practice, the term is
used more loosely, if there is almost no hope.
Despair may also be defined with reference to the possibility
that bad occurs or that good not occur. If the good or bad
event under consideration seems impossible, it gives rise to
neither hope nor despair. In view of the ambiguity in the
assessment of ‘possibility’, the proverbial cup may be
considered half full or half empty. In hope, the good or notbad seems probable; in despair, the bad or not-good seems
probable. Even if one holds all the cards, one can only hope
to fulfill one’s desires, since one can never be sure to be alive
a minute from now. Despair is rarely fully justified, because
the unexpected may well happen.
In any case, note, hope and despair relate to future
possibilities or probabilities that may be actualized either by
one’s own will or forbearance – or due to forces beyond
one’s control. One awaits the object of hope, but one does not
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necessarily act to attain it or even have to consider that one
can do something about it. Hope may be a wish rather than a
will for some future good. People often hope in God, or in the
promises of some politician or potential benefactor, or in next
week’s lottery draw. They may feel some present pleasure at
the thought that they may one day be blessed with this or
that. Much fantasy is generated in this manner, keeping them
entertained and superficially happy.
Trust and distrust are concepts in the same continuum as
hope and despair. Whereas the latter concern the possibility
of good or bad or their negations, the former concern
moreover their probability. An event is not only considered,
but moreover expected. Thus, trust is belief that good is
likely to occur, or bad is unlikely to occur; while distrust is
belief that bad will come or good not come. One may trust or
distrust a person, oneself or someone else, with reference to
future responses to events, usually basing the judgment on
the evidence of past conduct.
Patience and impatience refer to our conduct relative to an
expected event, according as one awaits it without worrying
over it, or one wishes or tries to accelerate it. In the latter
case, one not only desires or is averse to the object, but
additionally concerned with its timing. The attitude of
patience is based on the belief (right or wrong) that the
external events or volitions concerned will play out in time
and favorably, or at least in a manner one can adequately
respond to, so one remains passive; whereas, in the case of
impatience, one is doubtful of the outcome or timeliness and
so one thinks interference is called for.
Confidence and fear both anticipate a more or less specific
danger; they differ in the assessment of one’s ability to deal
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with the dangerous entity or event. Both, then, foresee the
possibility of some negative event. But confidence suggests
potential strength or efficacy, fear potential weakness or
inefficacy, relative to the perceived or assumed threat.
The degree of confidence or fear varies, according to the size
of the danger and of one’s expected strength or weakness.
The assessments may be justified or not. The danger may be
real or imagined, explicit or implied; the estimate of strength
or weakness may be objectively accurate or not, admitted or
not. Excessive confidence can be rash; excessive fear is
timidity67. Such excesses respectively underestimate or
overestimate the danger, and/or overestimate or
underestimate one’s resources for dealing with it.
Confidence is sometimes due to foolishness and conceit,
rather than to lucid assessments. The ego struts around,
convinced of its adequacy on very superficial grounds. In
some cases, this leads to success, because inner resistances
are overcome or because other people are fooled by the show.
But such egotism is ultimately brittle, and not true
confidence. We may suspect secret fears to underlie it; these
are best faced and dealt with, to secure genuine confidence.
Fear is compatible with hope, though often allied with
despair. One may, note well, fear the inevitable – for
instance, one’s eventual death; or one may resign oneself to
it. A fear may come and go, according to one’s lingering on
its object or one’s estimates of the conditions and
probabilities. Thus, one may for a moment fear the sudden
67
Paranoia occurs when one unjustifiably regards oneself as
personally persecuted, i.e. when one largely imagines that other
volitional agents intend to obstruct or hurt one, and one feels
inadequate to deal with such a threat.
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approach of a black hole to our planet, and then forget all
about it. Or one may fear an enemy, and then find him
weaker or oneself stronger than previously assumed and
regain confidence.
Fear tests one’s will. Courage is overcoming the negative
influence of fear, i.e. retaining the ability to act more or less
effectively despite a perceived threat; cowardice is the
opposite attitude. Having courage does not mean making a
macho spectacle of oneself; it consists in keeping a cool
head, and making a fair assessment of the danger and one’s
resources, then acting as conceived necessary, doing the best
one can. Bravery implies not being shaken when taking risks,
because one can handle victory or defeat with equanimity.
Fear may give rise to an urge to flight (avoid or evade the
object feared) or one to fight (parry or strike back at it). In
combat, the most efficient way to deal with a threat is
sometimes simply to bypass it altogether; it is sometimes
wiser take a defensive stand, rather than allow the threat to
grow; in some cases, counter-offensive measures are called
for, to neutralize an aggressor; and in others still, preemptive
attack, to make sure one is not surprised. The choice of
means depends on one’s assessment of the danger and one’s
resources.
Fear in itself is not an emotion. But fear may in some cases
produce an emotion of fright, involving a hollow feeling in
one’s solar plexus or tightness in one’s throat, as well as
other symptoms, mental ones like stress and physical ones
like tense neck and shoulders, faster and louder heartbeat, or
skin sensations and hair raising. The exact reaction depends
on the degree of danger relative to one’s self-assessment.
Fright may be a healthy reaction, or it may be neurotic. In the
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latter case, it gives rise to anxiety feelings, the object of
which is not clearly known, i.e. only known at a
subconscious level; false explanations may be proposed, so
that the logic involved becomes tangled and confused.
Fear, especially in conjunction with fright, may also arouse
anger, an impulse to incapacitate (violently harm or destroy)
the dangerous person; anger also involves a vengeful motive,
to punish the frightening person. ‘Cold’ anger is
distinguished from ‘hot’, according to the degree of rational
control outwardly maintained in performance. Hatred is an
emotional response to a person or an animal that has hurt one
in some way. If something feared has actualized, we may for
that reason hate its assumed author. But one may also hate
the latter for causing one fright or anger, insofar as these are
also painful in themselves. Hatred may even turn on God, if
He is regarded as the malicious controller of the events
feared68.
One may fear oneself. If for instance one has in the past
repeatedly betrayed some promise one has made to oneself,
displaying lack of will that has had disastrous effects on
one’s life or on loved ones, one may consider oneself
untrustworthy. This may give rise to strong negative
emotions, some of which may be chronic.
Certainty and doubt are also important valuations – which
have a more epistemological context, signaling the degree of
68
Needless to say, I am not suggesting or approving of such
an attitude, but merely noting that it can and does occur. Fear of
God need not make one rebellious, but may instead make one
submissive. In Judaism, fear of God, in the sense of
submissiveness and obedience, is regarded as the foundation of
virtue.
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reliability or unreliability, or the completeness or
incompleteness, of certain relevant data, concepts,
propositions or inferences. One may also have certainty or
doubt regarding how oneself or another person will react in
such or such a situation of interest to one. Such evaluations of
data or people are of course often very significant to our
actions, determining which way we will go, or influencing us
in taking preemptive measures. Certainty can be encouraging
and energizing, but it may occasionally give misleading
confidence. Doubt can make one hesitate or be demoralizing,
but it may also occasionally stimulate creativity.
There are many other possible value judgments, of course,
but the above are probably the most influential in our lives.
Some attitudes have rather personal relevance (e.g. selfrespect, pride, shame, guilt feelings); others are more directed
at other people (e.g. admiration and contempt), or more
relational (e.g. kindness or cruelty); though all may be
involved in motivation to some degree and have social
implications. Some of these valuations have some rationale;
but many can be absurd. For instance, envy of another’s
external possessions (e.g. house or wife) is understandable
although not commendable, but envy of another’s qualities
(e.g. youth or courage) is logically incomprehensible though
common.
The esthetic responses towards beauty and ugliness are also
worth mentioning, though more difficult to define. These
appreciations of course often relate to our emotions. For
examples, some rock music or contemporary paintings arouse
great irritation in me; whereas in some other concerts or
museums, I have been moved to tears by the beauty offered.
But hearing a beautiful piece of music or seeing a beautiful
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painting does not always arouse a discernible response. Even
so, the work of art somehow seems ‘objectively’ beautiful.
Yet, we cannot honestly claim absolute objectivity, since
different people have different responses; and even the same
person may vary in his or her response over time. So, this
field has much mystery. Which is perhaps its attractiveness.
Our various passions (desires, aversions, etc.) have
hierarchies relative to each other. These hierarchies can in
time become changed; so that, a value that was originally
subsidiary to another, eventually becomes an end in itself, or
at least a subsidiary of some other value. For example, a man
may struggle to become a sports champion, or some other
public figure, not primarily out of desire for fame or fortune,
but as a way to attract the attentions of girls! Later, he may
get to love his profession for quite different motives: for the
spiritual lift it gives him, or because it keeps him healthy,
say.
3.
Ethology
The study of valuation may be called ethology. Ethology
differs from ethics, in that it sets no standards, but merely
studies the ways values arise, combine, conflict, and pass
away in people, treating valuation as a neutral object of
study.
Looking at the above descriptions, we see the many factors
each concept of valuation involves. Memories, abstract
beliefs, anticipations, imaginations, emotions, all come into
play. Everything is weighed in the balance. Attitudes are
formed; policies established. There are velleities, in the sense
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of volitions about to happen. Obstructions and helpful aspects
have their impact. Then action may burst forth and grind on.
A series of consequences may follow, some of which may
boomerang on the actor.
Many other concepts we commonly use in psychological
discourse can similarly be clarified. We can thus gradually
build up a more or less structured lexicon of psychological
terms, with reference to the basic concepts of cognition,
volition and valuation. The importance of all three functions
should be stressed; many writers clumsily ignore or conceal
the one or the other. Flowcharts can be drawn, highlighting
relationships.
Values of various kinds with various objects are often
intertwined in a complex value system. Values are in
principle changeable; but some, being parts of such a system,
have deep and lasting influence on a broad range of volitional
acts.
The value system may include a bundle of attitudes that one
possesses since as far back as one can remember, so that one
may be deeply attached to them as the very expression of
one’s personal identity. Some values are pounded into us by
parents or school. One may as a youth be influenced by the
media (literature, movies) into thinking some attitude is
valuable; and then discover when one meets certain people or
faces certain challenges that the values transmitted to us were
misrepresented. Some value systems, or parts of systems, are
adopted by resolution, for ideological (ethical, religious,
political) motives or to belong to some social group; these
may remain firmly rooted once planted, or come and go.
Many attitudes are acquired on the basis of life experience or
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personal reflection. Some people learn little from life; some
evolve as they age.
The acquisition, maintenance or loss of values is rarely
arbitrary, but usually modulated by life experience. One
could draw an analogy between the induction of values (for
volition) and the induction of truths (for cognition). In
cognition, something may be supposed to be true, but if it
makes false predictions, we come to doubt and reject it.
Similarly, in volition, something may be supposed to have
value, but if it makes false promises, we come to doubt and
reject it. However, I am not sure this is always a reliable
yardstick; people are willing to suffer a lot, before admitting
disillusionment.
Let us not have an overly arithmetical or mercantile approach
to values. In practice, I have found true the adage: “virtue is
its own reward, vice its own punishment”. This may, of
course, be considered as an ethical statement, a moral
judgment, in view of the words virtue and vice. But on closer
inspection, one sees that the words in question refer to certain
behavior patterns, so that the principle does not set specific
standards or criteria, but is axiologically neutral.
It is one commonly intended sense of what we call ‘the law
of causality’ – a statement that, with regard to human
volition, just as in the realm of causation, actions have
consequences (more or less predictable ones, in the short or
long term). If one behaves in psychologically or existentially
destructive ways, one will indeed likely eventually be
accordingly destroyed; and inversely, if one thinks, speaks
and acts in a healthy manner, one will naturally have (gain,
keep) self-confidence, self-respect, serenity and contentment,
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and similar marks of mental health and spiritual dignity.
Generally, we reap what we sow.
The ways of ‘virtue’ or ‘vice’ are known by experience, i.e.
they are forms of conduct so classified because they have
been found by lucid people over time to be conducive or
antithetical to life. I would express virtue summarily as
dignity and decency – acting out of self-respect and respect
of others, in the best senses of those terms. Vice is the
opposite behavior, causing shame and guilt (even if one
feigns indifference or pride) – to be avoided.
Of course, dignity and decency must be real and not
pretended, and it takes effort and sensitivity to intuit them
correctly. They are interactive, each affecting the other; so
that both must be worked on to ensure their enhancement and
stability. Virtue is not the means to some other goal and not
the end of some other practice, but both the means and the
end. The term “virtue” intends “it is the means” and the
phrase “its own reward” intends “it is an end in itself”.
Similarly, mutadis mutandis, for vice. These, then, are ways
of being.
The virtuous stand straight; the vicious are twisted up inside.
This is an ages-old ethological observation, which leaves the
ethical choice to each one of us. It should be noted that it is
only an approximation: it applies to the individual considered
in abstraction from his social context. It refers to the inherent
justice of our mental and spiritual makeup – but makes no
claim to the existence of automatic social or natural justice,
or of theodicy.
The reason why the principle applies to the human psyche,
and not necessarily to human affairs, is due to the interaction
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of individuals in society. If everyone were virtuous, then
virtue would perhaps be its own reward even in a social
context. But since every society is a mix of virtuous and
vicious elements, consistency requires the principle to break
down in the larger context. The same consideration is
applicable to the natural environment.
Thus, to take an extreme case, a wise and kindly person
(indeed, an innocent babe) may well be harmed or killed by
the likes of Hitler; and some such fools and criminals do
observably end their days in material comfort and social
immunity69. A natural disaster may sweep away nice and
nasty people in the same wave. Similarly in more common
situations – virtue does not guarantee material or social
rewards, and vice does not guarantee material or social
punishment. Social and natural forces and upheavals often
pay little heed to the inner status of individuals.
Nevertheless, the virtuous person has spiritual or
psychological riches that cannot be stolen or destroyed, and
the vicious one has inner deficiencies that no external wealth
or welfare can compensate. The former is a winner, the latter
a loser, come what may on the outside. That fact provides
consolation.
The Dhammapada, a 3rd Cent. BCE Buddhist text, puts it
very nicely (v. 105)70:
69
To prevent which we have a judicial system.
I do not know who is historically the earliest proponent of
this truism. However, I personally finally become convinced of it
when reading the aphorisms of Marcus Aurelius (121-80 CE –
Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher), and I remember that it
greatly affected my behavior thereafter.
70
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“…the greatest of victories is the victory over oneself;
and neither the gods in heaven above nor the demons
down below can turn into defeat the victory of such a
man.”
In practice, the condition of being at peace with oneself and
having self-esteem depends on a number of factors. If any of
these is lacking or insufficient, one is sooner or later bound to
suffer proportionate degrees of inner conflict and selfcontempt (or even, in extreme cases, self-hatred).
a.
Self-esteem depends first on integrity or selfpossession, i.e. doing what one values and abstaining from
what one disvalues. This refers principally to one’s present
behavior, but past behavior may impinge on one’s present
self-evaluation (though such impact may diminish with time
and appropriate efforts). Clearly, if one lacks self-control, if
one’s actions are not in agreement with one’s thoughts, one is
bound to feel one is failing or betraying oneself and develop
inner tensions. For example: if one has a ‘bad’ habit, one
should ‘logically’ give it up to ensure one has a ‘good’
conscience.
b.
It follows that the stability of self-esteem depends on
the reasonableness of the demands one makes on oneself. If
one makes impossible demands, one is on a neurotic course
that inevitably shatters inner peace. If one sets one’s
standards too high, if one lacks composure and pressures
oneself (e.g. through anger or whining) to act in unwise ways
– one is behaving disrespectfully towards oneself. One can
only realistically demand what is naturally possible and
currently within reach of one’s actual capacities – no more.
Of course, one can seek to surpass one’s current limits to
some extent; what is possible or impossible in a given
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situation is open to some debate. For examples: it is
reasonable (in most circumstances) to demand one go up to
one’s boss and ask for a raise; it is unreasonable (for most
people) to demand one have the courage to climb Mt.
Everest.
c. Self-esteem is primarily a function of sincerely trying; it
does not ultimately depend on success. So long as one has in
truth made all appropriate efforts in the direction of one’s
values, one is in reason free of blame for failure due to events
beyond one’s control. Of course, how much is truly one’s
best shot is open to debate. In the face of failure, one may try
again, and again; perseverance is not excluded. But reality
may still prevent ultimate success – and this should not in
principle affect self-esteem. This is a corollary of the
previous point. For example: a man tries to save someone
from drowning and fails; if he tried his best, but the currents
were too strong, his conscience is clear, and his self-esteem
unaffected. If he feels dissatisfied with his performance, he
may decide to train himself to swim better, for next time –
but that is another story.
d. All the preceding points suggest that peace of mind and
self-esteem are possible irrespective of the nature of one’s
values. But that is unrealistic; it is too relativistic a position.
Balance is not a product of mere conventions, be they
individual or collective. It is not just a function of one’s
belief system – it is also determined by objective
circumstances. There is such a thing as ‘human nature’;
people are not infinitely pliable and adaptable. The
psychology of self-esteem also depends to a considerable
extent on the constructiveness of one’s values – their
healthiness, their life enhancing power.
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One has to choose one’s values intelligently. If one’s values
are contrary to human nature, they will sooner or later have a
negative impact on one’s inner harmony and self-esteem.
Because the harmful effects of unnatural values may take
time to come to fruition, one may in the short term be lulled
into a false sense of serenity and efficacy, but later on –
sometimes suddenly and with a vengeance – one will
discover the full force of one’s errors. Examples of this
abound, and are worth reflecting on.
Someone living in a society where certain beliefs and
practices intentionally causing harm to other people are
common might on the surface seem perfectly at ease within
this framework (e.g. black magic or racism). Nevertheless,
such behavior may well affect his or her psyche adversely,
and in the long term cause deep doubts and insecurities. The
mere fact of acceptance of the framework does not
necessarily exempt a person from eventual objective effects.
Moreover, the person experiencing consequent disturbances
may remain unable to identify their cause.
The same is true of certain beliefs and practices not thought
by their proponents to cause psychological or social harm
(e.g. homosexuality or masturbation). Psychological health
and wellbeing is not merely an issue of adjustment to
arbitrary personal or social standards. If this were the case, as
some propose, standards could be varied at will and be as
weird as we choose, and there would never be untoward
consequences. But, to repeat, humans have a specific nature.
No one is immune to reality check. Beliefs can be incorrect
and values objectively destructive.
So much with regard to the virtue of ‘dignity’ – it is being
worthy of self-respect and respect by others, through healthy-
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minded behavior. As for the virtue of ‘decency’ – it consists
in treating other people and living beings with due respect (at
least). These are related conditions. Self-respecting people
generally behave respectfully towards others, acknowledging
their dignity, thus revealing and reinforcing their own worth.
(Respect does not of course mean condoning or honoring
vice; it is rather a matter of poise: remaining noble even in
the presence of ugliness, not stooping down to its level.)
People without self-respect tend to exhibit disrespect towards
others, thus revealing and reinforcing their own deficiency.
Decency may range from a courteous hello or smile, to
giving charity or saving a life; indecency may range from
behavioral or verbal insult, to rape or torture.
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11. CHAPTER ELEVEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 11.
COMPLICATIONS OF INFLUENCE
1.
Habits
An apparent issue relative to freedom of the will is the force
of habits, good or bad. If we have freewill, how come we
have habits that are sometimes so very hard to break? Some
habits once acquired remain with us all our life, becoming
(what Aristotle has called) ‘second nature’ to us. Bad habits,
like (for instance) smoking tobacco, are often seemingly
more easily acquired and difficult to shake off than good
habits, like (for instance) keeping one’s home clean and in
order.
We can define as a habit any volitional type of behavior
(response to stimulus), which due to its repeated
performance in the past has become easier to do or more
difficult to abstain from doing. The force of habit is, then (in
our view), that of influence on volition, but this influence is
special in that it is acquired and strengthened by repetition.
The more often and thoughtlessly we allow ourselves to do
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something stupid (or not-do something intelligent), the more
likely are we to do (or not-do) the same again. The more
often and thoughtfully we encourage ourselves to do
something intelligent (or not-do something stupid), the more
likely are we to do (or not-do) the same again.
Habits appear to be due to the phenomenon of reinforcement.
It seems to be a law of the psyche that every volitional act
increases the ease for a similar response in similar
circumstances. Thus, a prior volition influences a later
volition, for good or bad. Underlying habit formation is a
snowball effect.
Thus, Every time one takes up a challenge, it becomes easier
to take it up again the next time it is presented; inversely, the
more often one demurs, the less likely does taking up the
challenge become. Every time one gives in to a temptation, it
becomes easier to yield to it again the next time around;
inversely, the more often one resists, the less likely is it to
overwhelm us. Note that these two formulas are two sides of
the same coin.
This law details more precisely how habits are formed: every
strong act (taking up a challenge or resisting a temptation)
produces an influence for the next opportunity, making it a
bit easier; every weak act (failing to take up a challenge or
giving in to a temptation) produces an counter-influence for
the next opportunity, making it that much more difficult. The
exact measure of influence is not specified here, but it is
never infinite – i.e. it never makes freewill impossible
thenceforth.
The process of habit forming or habituation consists in
repeatedly responding in a certain way to a certain kind of
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stimulus. Thus, the habitual or customary is a quasiautomatic reaction or routine that we have more or less
voluntarily instituted over time, for good or bad. We acquire
a ‘default’ behavior pattern, which can only be broken by a
willful de-programming or a corrective program. Thus, for
instance, repeated laziness can only be overcome by repeated
energetic behavior.
We should mention, incidentally, the role of repetition in
learning. Not all learning is based on repetition; most
depends on trial and error and other methods. But once a
decision is made (by or for the learner) to memorize certain
ready-made information or skills, this is often achieved by
repetition. One may, for instances, memorize a prayer or
some martial arts movements. This form of learning applies
to animals as well as humans; for example, a lion cub may
repeatedly imitate its parents’ hunting techniques.
We may distinguish between a habit of activity and a habit of
passivity. In the former case, some positive will is involved in
the behavior pattern concerned; for example, saying ‘good
morning’ to people one meets. In the latter case, the habit
consists in not-willing something that might have been willed
in a given circumstance, so much so that the stimulus may be
ignored; for example, one may get used to a noise and cease
trying to smother it or escape it, and even stop noticing it.
Habits we approve of do not normally constitute a problem,
though we may conceive situations where we desire to at
least conceal them. It is habits we evaluate as self-destructive
in some way that we wish to avoid. The best way to avoid
bad habits is to steer clear of temptations, while the forces
involved are still at a manageable level. Once habits are
acquired, their influence may be so intense that punctual
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effort may not suffice to free ourselves of them; a certain
course may then be called for, involving effort great enough
over time to overcome the undesirable tendencies. The
additional effort required may be just to remember that one
has a habit to resist, or much more conscious planning,
resolve and perseverance may be called for. A new, counterhabit may have to be instituted.
2.
Obsessions and Compulsions
If we advocate freewill, we have also to give a convincing
account of the obsessions and compulsions that most people
experience to some degree at some time in their lives.
Obsession refers to any persistent or recurring thought or
emotion, especially an unwanted one, which cannot be
stopped at will. Compulsion refers to a seemingly irresistible
impulse or urge to act in a certain way, especially an
undesirable way71.
Common examples of obsession: a man may have the
image of a woman he is infatuated with displayed in
his mind for hours at a time; or a woman may for days
mentally replay a painful conversation she had with
her boss at work; or a man may spend his life trying
to ‘prove’ himself to someone long since dead who
71
We may include inhibition under this term, as a special
case of compulsion, where the tendency involved is abstain from
the exercise of will, as it were ‘against one’s will’ or contrary to
one’s better judgment. In this perspective, not-willing is a sort of
will.
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made a wounding critical remark once that keeps
echoing in his ears.
Common examples of compulsion: a student may
periodically drop whatever he is doing and
masturbate, although seeing the self-destructive
effects of his impulses he keeps promising himself to
take control; or a wife cannot stop herself chattering
to her husband all the time, even while knowing he
dislikes it and it drives him further and further away
from her; or a manager cannot help it, but he just
loves manipulating and torturing his employees.
Many psychological theories have been built around such
apparently involuntary events in our inner and outer life.
Some are optimistic, believing that humans can overcome
their weaknesses and improve themselves. Others are
pessimistic, considering people as mostly sorry puppets in a
show they did not write but only at best watch. It is
significant that the former theories tend to encourage us to
rise to the challenge, whereas the latter tend to promote our
resignation. The former facilitate virtue; the latter, vice. For
this reason, the issues must be dealt with.
Even when one sits and meditates, one is often completely
submerged by ongoing thoughts – significant or insignificant
mental images, meaningful sounds (words) and meaningless
ones (e.g. a musical tune) – and even sometimes by the
perception of bodily sensations and emotions, which may
cause voluntary motor responses (e.g. fidgeting, scratching or
getting up). One may have recently had an exciting
experience, positive or negative, which stirs one up, churning
one’s mind and body, in reminiscence or anticipation.
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Now, one’s self or soul may try and recover control of the
situation, wishing to find peace of mind, serenity,
equanimity. One tries and tries, without success. Sometimes,
one is so caught up that one even forgets to try! One is drawn
in, sucked into the maelstrom. Occasionally, one becomes
momentarily conscious of the situation, and valiantly tries for
a moment to apply some voluntary meditation technique like
breath awareness or stopping thoughts, or even just making
one’s agitation itself the object of meditation. But one cannot
sustain it; a moment later, one’s attention is carried away by
the strong currents of thought, like a leaf in a turbulent river.
Where is freewill in such cases, one may well wonder?
Though the thoughts, emotions and movements involved are
to some extent involuntary, in the sense of coming from the
body, they are also surely to some degree produced by the
self, with some measure of volition. Regarding the
involuntary portion, we can compare the situation to that of a
man tied to a chair and forced to hear an audio tape or see a
video movie; even if this is against his will, he retains
freewill but cannot exercise it. But, regarding the voluntary
portion, how can the self act against its own will?
One might propose as an explanation of obsessions and
compulsions that the soul is self-divisible, i.e. that it may
split itself up into conflicting parts. What is voluntary to one
fraction is involuntary to the other. One compartment may
hide things from another. One part may make demands on the
other, and be obeyed or ignored. And so forth. The splitting
of soul would have to be regarded as an initially voluntary act
or series of acts; these however could not be undone at will,
but require a certain amount of voluntary inner work to
reverse.
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And I think that this proposition, that the soul may function at
cross-purposes with itself, is largely assumed. It may
sometimes be healthy. For instance, one’s “moral
conscience” may be considered as a reserved portion (of
varying size!) of the soul, assigned by oneself with the
permanent task of overseeing the remainder of one’s soul,
judging its actions and shouting foul when they deviate from
certain norms. Often, it is pathological. Some people seem to
have deep chasms in their inner personality, which may last a
lifetime and severely damage all their behavior.
This notion of compartmentalization could explain
why meditators call the achievement of inner peace
‘Samadhi’, which I gather means ‘integration’ in
Sanskrit, i.e. (in the present interpretation) unification
of the soul. But, while I readily concede that the idea
of soul division may be a useful metaphor, I would
not grant it as literal truth that easily. We must first
try to explain the data at hand in less assuming ways.
To understand the aetiology of obsessions and compulsions,
in a manner consistent with freewill and without making any
too radical additional assumptions, we have to examine such
processes in more detail.
With regard to obsession, our above theory of freewill does
not exclude that the brain may bombard the subject
(cognizing soul) with manifold impressions. We have not
suggested that all information used in volition has to be
called forth voluntarily, but have at the outset recognized the
mental domain as an intermediary between the physical and
spiritual domains, such that the nervous system may provide
the subject with uncalled-for data to consider (which may be
relevant or irrelevant to will – it is up to the subject to judge).
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That the soul does not always have the power to stop such
involuntary input at will does not therefore put freewill in
doubt.
The uncontrollable arrival of data for cognition is not per se
the problem of obsession, since volition is not involved in it.
What is obsessive, and needs explanation, is when the soul to
some extent voluntarily invites or sustains thoughts or
consequent emotions, even while wishing to stop doing it or
pretending not to be doing it willingly. In such cases, volition
is in fact involved in the apparition of cognitive data. In such
cases, the problem of obsession is really a problem of
compulsion. For this reason, we are justified in lumping both
problems together as here, and treating them as one. The
underlying cause of the one is the same as that of the other.
Let us therefore turn our attention to compulsive behavior:
what is its nature, cause and cure? Consider for simplicity’s
sake some examples from my own meditations:
One day, I notice I am very talkative, constantly
commenting on everything around me, and verbally
directing almost everything I do. Why such verbosity? In
my case, it is perhaps due to being a writer of philosophy,
who has to express things in words. This turns into a habit
hard to shake off. Linguistic rehearsal is also involved,
preparing phrases for writing. Or again, perhaps I am
unconsciously trying to communicate with someone by
telepathy.
Another day, I notice I am planning a great deal. Not just
planning ahead for something about to happen, which
needs immediate choices and decisions; but planning
further ahead, for things that will happen a few hours,
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days, weeks, months or years from now, as if I will be
unable to make the appropriate choices and decisions at
that time (although I will in fact have more precise data at
hand then). And worse still, not just planning for what is
programmed to happen (for example, I must contractually
leave my apartment in a few months); but even planning
for what might possibly happen, even if improbably (for
example, what I would do if I was on an airplane hijacked
by terrorists, as in the TV movie I just saw). Why such
orgy of planning, beyond all rational utility?
On yet another day, I am fully absorbed by thoughts of
petty conflicts I currently experience with people. This
person said something that vexed me; the memory keeps
returning and I consider the event from all possible
angles: I wonder how I should respond, or debate if I
should respond; I perhaps consider different scenarios,
with responses and counter-responses. By association of
ideas, I then move on to some other person, who I
remember behaved in a similar fashion. I wonder what
motivates such people, why they so lack ordinary
decency or civility, where their moral or social education
failed. Thus, my mind remains focused for long periods
on events irrelevant to my present attempt to meditate –
why?
Thankfully, my meditations are not always that troubled and
confused72; and when they are, my mind does eventually calm
down. Also, compulsions are not always undesirable; for
example, the compulsion to solve an intellectual problem is
72
Simple tiredness often plays a role in such effects; and that
is significant, because it shows that they remain basically issues of
influence rather than credible objections to freewill.
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valuable at the right time and place. But the issue here is:
what is the common character of such busyness, why is one
unable to simply turn it off, how is compulsion of this sort
compatible with claims to freedom of the will? The answer it
seems to me is with reference to: wanting (here using the
term in a specialized sense) – which implies lacking
something, a negative condition, whether one positively
wants something or instead wants to avoid or evade
something.
I may want to remind myself to say or do something; so, I
keep repeating it mentally until I can act it out physically. I
may have missed an opportunity, which does not present
itself again (soon enough, if ever). I may know I will never in
fact (at least, not so long as I am sitting in meditation!) get
the chance to respond to some past event; so I am condemned
to react to it in imagination, again and again. I may be
tortured by an unanswered question, or some forgotten item
of memory; so, I keep searching for an answer.
In all such cases, there is a ‘hole’ needing to be ‘filled’, an
issue to resolve, a problem to solve, a task to be performed,
some unfinished business to attend to. The situation is so
constructed as to keep one ‘suspended’, almost powerless to
untie oneself in the present context. Thus, what drives
volition in such cases, is not a positive force, but rather
something negative, a lack – a want.
If we now turn our attention to compulsive behavior on a
more physical plane, we can discern a similar pattern.
Volition is here too driven indirectly by negatives, rather than
directly by positives. It is sucked in, rather than driven. That
is what makes compulsions particularly insidious: they are
not due to the presence of some temptation or obstacle, but to
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the absence of something. In ordinary desire or aversion, the
object is relatively manifest and identifiable; in the ‘wanting’
involved in obsession or compulsion, the object is more
concealed or deeply buried. Being absent, that thing is
necessarily difficult to spot and be dealt with. There is a
black hole, perceivable only by its effects. Thus, to overcome
a compulsion, it is imperative we uncover the hidden term in
the equation.
Consider, for instance, drug addiction. A voluntary act is
always involved, such as reaching out for a glass of liquor, or
lighting a cigarette or joint, or using a needle, for instances73.
Such an act is usually preceded by a mental rehearsing of the
act: one imagines oneself doing the act and enjoying its
sequels. Perhaps a foretaste of things to come is feasible, like
getting a whiff of smoke. One first mentally toys with the
idea – then physically executes it.
The drug addict thinks or claims the drug will provide relief
from physical, mental or ‘existential’ suffering. The drug is
not intended or expected to cure anything, but only as
‘compensation’. The alleged suffering may take the form of
insufficiency of pleasure or excessive pain. The relief the
drug offers takes the form of an escape from suffering; the
drug does not abolish the suffering, but only momentarily
conceals it. For this reason, the drug is bound to be
73
The psychological processes involved apply equally well to
more metaphoric ‘drugs’, of course. The ‘drug’ may be food or sex,
for instances. In such neurotic situations, of course, eating has little
to do with bodily hunger, and sexual intercourse is no more than
using someone as an aid to masturbation or at best mutual
masturbation. The ‘drug’ may also be more masochistic, something
negative rather than positive. In a way, all use of drugs may be
considered masochistic, since it is self-destructive behavior.
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objectively harmful in some way over time; for if the
suffering used as a pretext is objective, it remains untreated.
The drug may additionally introduce its own physical,
psychological or social damage in the equation; the addict
may develop health, emotional and/or social difficulties.
Because of its ineffectiveness or counter-effectiveness74, the
drug’s use tends to excess. After some time, the drug’s
effects thus come to ‘justify’ its use: a vicious circle is
created.
The compulsion to resort to the drug is thus more than a mere
habit based on repetition. There is an initial argumentum,
which gives the addict a pretext; this may be false and
misleading. The addict considers himself or herself as being
disadvantaged in some way (emotionally, socially, whatever),
and proposes to make up for such deficiency by means of the
drug. Real problems, existing before the drug-addiction, are
ignored; and real problems, due to the drug or the addiction,
are produced; the latter also remaining unsolved. To free
himself or herself from the addiction, the addict cannot
merely make an effort of will at the time of the compulsive
urge, but must first intellectually unravel the convolutions
involved and then stay aware of them. Then only can
willpower (“just say no!”) do its blessed work over time.
The existence of compulsive behavior need not therefore be
considered as putting freewill in doubt. Volition is indeed
influenced, here as in all cases; but that which is really doing
the influencing is relatively concealed. For this reason, it is
particularly difficult for simple volition to overcome
74
For example, cigarette smoking makes one more, not less,
nervous.
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compulsive influences; often, mere strength of will does not
do the job: what is needed is awareness and cunning.
The agent must first realize and admit he is entangled in
some knot, then make the effort to unravel it. This means
identifying the unresolved issue, the quandary, the missing
link, behind the compulsion; and neutralizing it, somehow.
Mere revelation may well suffice in some instances – just
seeing the absurdity or circularity of the compulsion
dissolves it. In most cases, some priority must be set: i.e.
some illusory or lesser value must be abandoned in favor of
some real or greater value. If the dog lets go the bone, it can
pick up the steak. Often, more long-term work on oneself is
required, which may include theoretical studies, detailed
observation, analysis and modification of one’s patterns of
thinking and doing, and (in my view, most important and
effective) meditation.
Another example we can give, that is relevant to
current social mores, is the psychology of sexual
hedonism; this is very similar to drug addiction.
The facts of human nature, which everyone can verify
by extrapolation from their own experience (though
saying this is not an invitation to ‘experiment’ with
such matters), are the following. Given free rein, the
senses ultimately make no distinction regarding age,
gender or species or any other issue of causation; all
they care about is getting more pleasure and less pain.
The senses devoid of rational guidance are only
concerned with quality and intensity of sensations,
without regard as to their sources or their
consequences.
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People who imagine that happiness is to be found in
sensual experience pursue the latter relentlessly. After
a while, they become more and more blasé to such
experiences, and start looking for new experiences.
The sensitivity of their sense organs having been
diminished by repetition and excessive friction, they
desperately yearn for novelty that arouses other
sensory receptors or the same receptors in other ways.
They thus sink deeper and deeper into more and more
depraved sexuality, in a sort of mad desperation.
The result is not happiness, but self-contempt and
self-defeat (not to mention damage caused to others,
used as tools or accidentally affected).
Desire is not proof of need; people can and do desire things
that cause them (and others) much harm. People often use
their reason to find pretexts for their sensuality, to rationalize
it – but in such case, reason is subservient to emotion. To be
free of sensuality, one must admit the independence and
supremacy of reason over it.
Note also, concerning sexual orientation: in general,
spiritually pure people find impurity repulsive, whereas the
impure feel at home in the midst of it. The impure find the
pure attractive, but only as an opportunity to spread impurity,
only in order to soil the pure. The impure are most attracted
by the equally impure, to express their impurity; or by the
more impure, to increase in impurity. As impurity spreads in
a society, tolerance for it proportionately increases; by and
by, impurity becomes more demanding and aggressive.
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The Ego Abhors a Vacuum
It is interesting, finally, to compare our above conclusion
concerning ‘wanting’ as the driver of obsessions and
compulsions, and the Buddhist principle that ‘desire’ is at the
root of all human action (creating karma and thence further
‘desire’, in a seemingly endless cycle). We have earlier seen
that volition usually has some goal (perhaps always so, if we
discount apparent whims, granting them to have ends of
sorts). In the present context, we have noted that sometimes
the purpose involved in volition is particularly perverse
because misleadingly eclipsed.
A very perspicacious observation of Buddhist psychology75,
which explains a lot in the present context, is that the ego is
constantly seeking stimulating experiences so as to reassert
its existence and identity. This is the basic ‘selfishness’ or
‘egoism’, and ‘vanity’ or ‘egotism’, of the ego or false self.
75
The following account is inspired by Buddhist doctrine, but
I have adapted its terms. Thus, most schools of Buddhism deny
existence of a “real (individual) self” (here called soul), admitting
only an illusory “conventional self” (here called ego) and a
substratum for all existence called “Buddha nature” or “original
ground” (what we might call a universal soul). In my view, granting
the existence of such an undifferentiated substratum, we would be
hard put to understand how or why it would give rise to egos (false
selves), if we did not assume that the universal whole is first in the
interim apparently broken into individual fractions (real selves).
Although Buddhist theorists enjoy provocative paradoxes, we must
remain critical and logical.
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By the ‘ego’76, we may understand the (partly or even largely
erroneous) self-image of the soul77. It is a mental projection, a
set of notions and suppositions about itself, which the soul
confuses with itself78. The self-as-ego always needs
buttressing one way or another. We may put it as: ‘the ego
abhors a vacuum’.
As I have explained in my Phenomenology, the ‘ego’ consists
of aspects of one’s body, mind and soul – some correctly
experienced or inferred, some wrongly assumed, some
fancifully projected – to which one (i.e. one’s soul – the
cognizing, willing, evaluating self) attaches to as one’s very
‘self’. It is a partly true, partly false self-image, weaved
76
Note that our use of the term ‘ego’ here derives from its
popular use, and is not to be confused with that in the psychology
of Freud (which refers to a ‘realistic, practical’ segment of the
psyche), though it may encompass aspects of the latter concept,
as well as of the contrasting concepts of ‘id’ (an ‘emotive,
impulsive’ segment) and ‘superego’ (an ‘idealistic, regulatory’
segment).
77
It is interesting to notice how we converse with ourselves,
sometimes in the first person singular (I, my), sometimes in the
second (you, your), and more rarely in the third person (saying
‘one’ or ‘we’, as here). One may also wordlessly project a physical
image of oneself doing or having something. All such discourse
may, together with other events, be added to the basket that
constitutes the ‘ego’.
78
For this reason, the ego may be referred to as the prison of
the soul, or more poetically (to use a metaphor dear to Jews) as its
place of exile. The ego usually involves an inflated vision of our
importance in the scheme of things, due to the maximum proximity
of our body and mind in our perspective on the world; but the ego
is also in fact an artificial limitation on the natural grandeur of our
soul.
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selectively and with fictional embellishments79, to which one
clings tenaciously in the belief that its loss or damage would
be unbearable.
Being a cognitive construct of the soul (and not itself a soul),
the ego has no will of its own (even though we sometimes
speak of it as if it did). It is not a separate entity competing
with the self – although we often present it as such, because
that is a convenient image, a useful figure of speech. Every
supposed voluntary action of the ‘ego’ is an act of the soul or
self, for which the latter remains fully responsible.
Nevertheless, the ego-construct strongly influences most
thoughts and deeds of the soul, sometimes for the good, often
for the bad, acting like a veil to knowledge and an obstacle to
volition, in the way of a filter.
Bodily sensations and sentiments are major constituents of
the ego, which have a particularly powerful influence on
identity and behavior, due to their enormous and insistent
presence. But many other factors come into play, too, such as
ongoing mental chatter.
A common affliction today (in men as well as women) is
repeated gazing at one’s image in the mirror. This is not just
amusing narcissism, but an expression of the ego’s deep
insecurity and need for confirmation of existence and
identity, as well as a preparation for social projection. A
similar affliction is looking at photos or films of oneself, and
showing them to other people.
79
This means, for instances, treating momentary
appearances as established realities, or transient or occasional
traits as lifelong characteristics.
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Our ego is also ‘relative’ to other people, in that we project
some of it (usually the more flattering aspects, though often
also aspects that may excite pity and charity) to them as our
social persona (partly as cunning construct and partly
incidentally or accidentally). To the extent that one manages
to convince others of the personality projected – through
one’s words and deeds, as well as physical appearance – one
reinforces one’s own conviction in the said self-image.80
Although ego building is possible in isolation from other
people, it is (for good or bad) made easier in many respects in
social contexts. The reason is that other people only know the
individual through some phenomenal factors, whereas the
individual also has intuitive (non-phenomenal) knowledge of
self. With other people, we can selectively ‘show and tell’;
also, they linger on the past, instead of letting it stay in the
past, since the image of us they memorize is accumulative
and rather rigid.
The ego is essentially restless and insecure. It prefers
pleasant experiences; but if such are unavailable, it will just
as well seek painful ones rather than none at all. Fearing to
face its own vacuity, it will seek sensations, thoughts,
distractions and possibilities of self-identification (e.g. listen
to heavy metal music on the radio or watch a scary movie on
TV, or just go to sleep and dream, or play games with
someone). It will invent artificial intellectual problems, so as
to have something to think about and express itself through.
It will create psychological, existential or social problems for
itself, so as to have something to respond to and a role to
80
The relativity of ego is also, by the way, an insight drawn
from Buddhist psychology. Truly, the East is a rich mine of human
understanding.
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play. That is, our problems are often not accidental, or even
incidental, to our pursuits, but their very purpose.
In particular, the ego’s need for stimuli helps explain why
man is such a social animal. Of course, humans do
objectively need each other: for common survival, for
procreation, to bring up children. People care for each other,
support and help each other, work together for the common
good, enrich each other culturally. But modern novelists,
journalists and psychologists have come to promote a great
emotional dependence in people (which paradoxically breaks
down human relations in the long run, because it is
misguiding). To correct this erroneous tendency, by showing
up the subjectivity of many social bonds, is not ‘cynicism’,
but lucidity and compassion.
Most people quickly feel lonely if they are alone. Although
the said hunger for stimulation can be satisfied without resort
to company (especially as one matures), the easiest way to
satisfy it is through human exchanges. The advantage here is
precisely the maximum give and take involved. One gets
sensory input, and one has respondents in front of whom to
project a social persona. One acts, one gets feedback, one
reacts – one is almost never ‘bored’. With a companion – a
family member, a friend, a lover, a colleague, even an enemy
if need be – one is always kept busy and entertained. One
prefers a nice, loving relationship; but one might settle for an
argument or a fight, or just a walk in a crowded shopping
center. If a human companion is unavailable, a pet will do.81
81
Of course, some people are loners against their will,
because they cannot handle the challenges of relations. Hermits,
on the contrary, avoid human or other contacts, so as to reduce
unnecessary stimulation, and the artificial problems that come with
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The motivation behind our constant grasping and clinging
after objects of desire may be nothing more than a frantic,
desperate attempt by the non-existent ego (i.e. to be precise,
the self confusing itself with this imagined entity) to assert
itself through stimulants and ‘ego games’. This would be
(according to the said thesis) the mother of all compulsions,
whether bad or good. Therefore, if we managed to abandon
our delusive self-identification with this illusory self, we
would be freed of all compulsions.
A further explanation given by Buddhism is that “existence is
suffering”. The ego necessarily gives rise to suffering – being
finite, it is inevitably subject to repeated vexation, frustration,
pain, fear, anger, hatred, despair, boredom, and so forth,
whether due to the presence of objects of aversion or to the
absence of objects of desire. This suffering is expressed
emotionally, as a sort of background noise of negative
feeling, underlying to some extent all one’s experiences, even
those that superficially appear positive. This negative
substratum, of which we are sometimes acutely conscious
and sometimes only vaguely aware, strongly influences our
behavior, causing us to think and act non-stop, often in
deviant ways (such as drug taking), in a blind and hopeless
attempt to rid ourselves of the inexplicable unpleasant
feeling.82
it. They wish to simplify their life and experience to facilitate
meditation. But some people manage to meditate in the midst of
disturbances.
82
This is the first of the “Four Noble Truths” at the core of
Buddhism. Note that one does not experience the emotion the
French call “le mal d’être” all the time; one may be very happy for a
long time, unaware of this substratum. But this happiness is
inevitably temporary, i.e. it is dependent on causes and conditions
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The Buddhist principle of desire is thus very general83: it
refers to a sort of gluing84 of the self to all objects of
cognition and volition, called attachment or variously desire,
grasping, clinging. However, such attachment is not easily
shaken off. The opposite acts – viz. detachment, indifference,
renunciation, letting go – are equally forms of attachment,
insofar as they are intentional acts. Escape from or avoidance
of attachment is impossible, if it is itself a pursuit of sorts.
The whole difficulty of ‘liberation’ is that the latter circle
must somehow be squared. Thus, Buddhism teaches more
radically that there is compulsiveness of sorts in all our
actions, which can only be eliminated in the ultimate
‘enlightenment’.
like good health, a loving spouse, material plenty, etc. It is brittle,
fragile; and at some level, we all know it and brace ourselves for
the inevitable end.
83
This is worth comparing to the concept of an “evil impulse
or inclination” (yetser haraa), proposed in Judaism. According to
the Rabbis, all men and women, naturally, by the mere fact of
being physically constituted, have such an inherent negative
tendency. This is not, however, all bad. When people work against
such resistance (the matter weighing them down, as it were) to
achieve good, they acquire credit. But moreover, it is sometimes a
good thing when they fail to overcome it. For example, yielding
occasionally to sexual desire makes reproduction possible; if
everyone was too saintly, there would be no one left.
84
See my essay Ungluing the mind, further on (chapter 16.1
of Volition).
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12. CHAPTER TWELVE
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 12.
URGES AND IMPULSES
1.
Physical Urges and Impulses
We all have natural bodily urges, which seemingly ‘force’ us
to perform certain actions. But on closer analysis, they do not
really leave us no choice at all, but present us with relatively
little choice.
Our most manifest bodily urges relate to the digestive
system. They are the urges to drink, to eat, to urinate and to
defecate. Observing their course in detail, the following
features are apparent in common to them all (at least in
humans):
1. We experience a set of physical sensations85, which
triggers the whole process. This may be called the
85
Sensations are of course impossible to describe in words,
being primary phenomena. All we can do is allude to them through
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stimulus. Thirst includes sensations of dry taste inside the
mouth and throat. In hunger, the signal consists of
distinctive pangs in the stomach (often with felt
movements and audible sounds of the gastric juices). In
urination, we have a recognizable feeling of liquid
pressure in our sex organ. In defecation, feelings of bowel
movement and overload inside the rectum are
experienced. This sensation is normally a natural outcome
of an objective state of affairs in the body: deficiency or
excess of liquid or solid nourishment. However, it may
also on occasion be aroused artificially, by mental
images; for example, wondering whether one needs a pee
before going to bed, one may begin to urgently feel like
having one.
2.
We may moreover discern, more subtly, a sensation
of sorts, occurring somewhere in our motor system,
consisting of an impulse to act in a certain way. This
secondary physical sensation is probably not a reflex, but
an unconscious first reaction of the central nervous
system. It signals that the appropriate (or usually
requisite) organs of action are prepared to act in response
to the stimulus. The muscles of our legs and arms are
poised to grab drink or food, and our mouth is already
salivating; or we are ready to run to the toilet. The
familiar expressions and analogies. Furthermore, my descriptions
here are probably incomplete: thirst and hunger may include oral
sensations I cannot pinpoint. Also, in some cases, sensations vary
in detail: for example, more liquid feces give a different sensation
than more solid ones. Sensations are also registered as distinctive:
e.g. hunger differs from pain due to indigestion or intestinal grippe;
or the sensations relating to urination differ from those in sexual
desire.
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impulse is thus a velleity to act (a natural reaction or one
based on past behavior). However, in our present
perspective, it serves as information rather than as action.
It is perhaps what we may most closely identify with the
‘sense of having an impulse’.86
3.
When these sensations of stimulus and impulse come
to our attention, they are evaluated by us in various
respects:
a.
We assess a discomfort that needs to be gotten
rid of. The more intense the discomfort felt, the
stronger the urge.
b.
The degree of urgency involved is estimated,
i.e. how quickly we must respond as urged to. The
essence of ‘urging’ seems to be the time limitation
it imposes on us; we are, as it were, under
pressure of time. The stronger the urge, the less
time it leaves us.
c.
We consider expedients, what might be done
or not-done to deal with the matter at hand. Such
evaluation depends not only on physiological
considerations,
but
also
on
practical,
psychological and social factors.
The practical issue might e.g. be: how easily or soon can
we find nourishment, and what/where is it? Or how close
is the nearest toilet? The psychological issue might, for
86
I extrapolate this assumption from a common experience
in my meditations: as I approach the last few minutes of my regular
period of meditation, I often feel a strong impulse to get up. Such
“okay, time’s up!” signal is worth resisting, by refusing to identify
oneself with it, so as to get the full benefit of the sitting.
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instances, be: are we on a diet or a fast for some reason?
Or: are the toilets here too smelly or dirty? The social
issue might be: can we do it in public, is it ridiculous,
approved, allowed or forbidden?
4.
Such various considerations in making a value
judgment involve mental images – invoking memories,
projecting possibilities, anticipating consequences.
Finally, choices are sorted out and a decision is made by
us. Our will is stirred into action, actualizing our present
response.
a.
This may consist in retarding execution, by
resisting our impulses – willfully not seeking
nourishment or not going to the toilet.
b.
Or it may consist in responding, at the earliest
or last possible opportunity, to obtain appropriate
relief from the sensations, in a more or less
convenient time, place and manner.
c.
Or we may hesitate or abdicate, letting nature
eventually determine the course of events:
progressively weakening us till we die of thirst or
starve to death prematurely, or incontinently
releasing our urine or feces in what may be the
wrong time and place and eventually damaging
some organ.
In the case of imminent danger to life, limb or health, we
are instinctively extremely unlikely to do nothing about it:
this improbability being what we commonly call ‘the will
to live’.
5.
These different possibilities of response are, note
well, all volitional. Whether we retard, preempt or
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abandon things to nature, we have made a choice, though
one involving different effort inputs. Whatever it is, this
is our response. However, any of these choices, and the
above mentioned thought process leading to it, may be
made with varying degrees of consciousness. It may be
effectively ‘involuntary’ (i.e. involve a very minimum of
consciousness) or more and more voluntary. Also note,
the relevant events that preceded our volition, i.e. both (a)
the cognitions of sensations and (b) the value judgments
and the other considerations that went into them, are all
influences on our will.
6.
87
An essential feature of these natural processes is that
they are inertial, i.e. inevitable if not interfered with. If
we do not respond appropriately to the signals our body
sends us (thirst or hunger, or the urges to urinate or
defecate), certain negative events eventually occur
against our will: we may get sick and die, or soil
ourselves. First, however, we may experience a mounting
pressure of stimuli and impulses87. We may be able to
prevent the natural event by application of will for quite a
while. Then at some time, that choice is no longer given
us, and we have to either promptly respond by an act of
will that relieves the pressure, or face the inevitable
natural event (whether weakness and death, or
incontinence and sickness).
In truth, in the case of thirst and hunger, the feelings may
abate after a while. This is evident when I fast for a day; I do not
know what happens beyond that. In such cases, the initial signals
from the body are only a temporary warning, whose memory must
suffice to influence us to appropriate action.
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7.
It is the latter prospect of some untoward events that
influences us to take preventive measures, at the first, or
(at least) at the last, opportunity. That is, some mental
images are the immediate cause of our eventual action,
rather than the pure sensations that initially start the
whole urge process. The closer the event feared gets, the
more our mind is occupied by it, calling for relief.
Although very physiologically centered, the essential
theatre of such urge complexes is mental, and the action
they result in is volitional. Moreover, note well, the
categories of causality of causation, influence and
volition are all involved.
8.
Furthermore, note, whether we obtain relief
volitionally or against our will, sooner or later the same
process starts all over again. We get thirsty, hungry; we
drink, eat; we digest and fell the urge to dispose of the
waste; we go to the toilet; pretty soon, we get thirsty and
hungry again, and so forth. At least these digestive tract
processes are cyclical (more or less daily), and go on
throughout our lives to provide our body with energy and
matter.
One further remark: it should be noted that the initial physical
sensation is in some cases aroused by a prior thought (which
in turn may have been brought about by some other
sensation, and so on). For example: if before going to bed I
ask myself whether I need to urinate, my attention goes down
to my organ and this usually suffices to initiate a sensation of
need that would probably have not been present or intense
enough otherwise. Or again, I may feel no thirst till I see an
advertisement for a drink. We shall return to this issue further
on, when we consider mental urges.
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Another powerful physical urge is the respiratory urge.
Breathing (muscles pumping air rhythmically in and out of
our lungs) is most of the time automatic. Occasionally, it
becomes a more or less voluntary act. If air is lacking in the
surrounds or our throat is blocked, one becomes aware of the
difficulty of breathing and to some extent volitionally
intensifies it. If stalked or stalking, one may find one’s
breathing more marked and noisy, and perhaps try to control
it so as to remain unheard by the enemy feared. In
meditation, when one turns one’s attention to one’s breath,
one’s initial tendency is to take over the function, as if
obliged to breathe consciously; although after a while it is
possible to observe the breath without affecting it. Also, it
seems88, one cannot willfully stop oneself breathing
indefinitely: if one persists, one loses consciousness and the
breathing mechanism takes over again.
The sex drive has two facets. Its basic function is
reproductive. This is a milder, long-term urge, part of the
general will to live, a will to survive in one’s descendants (as
an individual89, or a member of a certain family or race or
species), perpetuating one’s genetic makeup. Here, the
‘discomfort’ to be removed may be the metaphysical fear of
nonexistence, or the more conscious desire to obey an
assumed Divine commandment. The time frame to fulfill that
purpose is anytime after puberty and before natural loss of
88
See Curtis and Barnes. p. 408.
Here, I refer to the Jewish belief that one’s children are
continuations, extensions in time and space, of oneself. But we
may also refer to the Buddhist teaching that sexual desire is the
motor of cyclic existence, because through that desire one
engages in all sorts of pursuits that increase karma and thus
generate one’s rebirth.
89
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sexual potency or fertility, accidental organ damage or death
– which is mostly understood to mean as soon as possible or
convenient.
The sex drive also has a hedonistic component, which serves
to promote the biologically primary reproductive function.
This is a short-term urge, which can become very intense, not
to say overwhelming. Here, the ‘discomfort’ to be removed is
partly the pain of sexual tension, partly the hope of sexual
pleasure. Sensations of physical lust arise in and around one’s
sex organ at the sight of a potential sex partner, and the urge
and excitement become more intense as the relation
approaches consummation. The potential of reproduction is
momentarily largely eclipsed by the immediate urge to
engage in actual intercourse. One may control one’s timing
(or even at the last minute for some reason disengage).
Finally, one lets go and obtains relief in orgasm and
ejaculation, until the next time around.
Among humans, the sex urge is strongest in adolescence and
youth, and perhaps (apparently because of testosterone
levels) more so in males than in females; these facts have
biological utility. Of course, some older people and females
seem considerably influenced by lustful feelings, but this
may rather be a sign of emotional immaturity and gullibility
towards media hype90, than natural necessity.
90
The claim that sex, in whatever guise or form, is a
necessity for mental hygiene and physical wellbeing has become
widely accepted in our culture as fact. But, judging by its
observable negative effects on personality and society, this claim
should in my opinion be reviewed.
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People can, by willpower, altogether abstain from sex for
years or even all their life91; this occurs under the influence of
some common belief (e.g. Christian or Buddhist spiritual
practice) or some personal peculiarity (e.g. a childhood
trauma). A man may nevertheless have wet dreams. Some
people temporarily or permanently ignore the reproductive
aspect of sex, but are committed to its hedonistic aspect.
Today, people may thanks to contraceptive pills and condoms
engage in normal sexual intercourse without risk of
conception, as promiscuously as they like. Some people
satisfy their lust by masturbation. Some people go so far as to
engage in child abuse, homosexual acts or even bestiality.92
A third aspect of the sex drive worth noting is more
conventional than physical, being due to social pressure. This
occurs in traditional society, based on the family; but also in
modern society, which glorifies the appearance of sexual
prowess. If one fails to fulfill social expectations, one may
considerably lose face or be variously stigmatized. Such
penalties are real enough, as one’s life-opportunities in
society may be affected; so people generally comply.
Exceptions may be granted, for instance to monks and nuns;
indeed, in their case, the public regards any sexual interest as
scandalous.
Any feeling of sickness urges us to identify the cause and
find a cure, or at least to relieve the symptoms, or risk some
untoward consequence(s). If we feel tired, our urge is to rest
91
Even animals do not all satisfy their sex urge (at least I
assume so, observing that in many groups a dominant male
monopolizes all the females).
92
Needless to say, by listing such proclivities I do not mean
to condone them.
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or sleep, till our energy returns, or risk collapse (e.g. at the
wheel of our car). If we feel hot or cold, we have an urge to
adjust the temperature of our body (e.g. by taking clothes off
or opening a window, or putting a blanket on or turning the
heater up); else, we start sweating or shaking, and lose
energy, etc. If our skin surface is itching, we have the urge to
scratch it, as if to remove the irritant; in some cases, the
irritant (e.g. a biting insect) is in fact thus neutralized. In each
such situation, our tendency is to avoid discomfort and
eventual illness, and return to comfort and ensure health.
We may of course systematically preempt problems, rather
than wait for them to arise and solve them – for example, by
earning a living, and thus making sure in advance that one
has enough money for basic needs such as nourishment,
shelter, procreation or medical insurance. Clearly, such
functioning goes beyond immediate physical urges, preparing
longer-term responses to them. This is all an expression of
the will to live. Some people care too little for the future,
some too much.
So much for our analysis of the common bodily urges. Of
course, much more can be said about such processes from a
biological or medical point of view – for examples: digestive
and respiratory urges relate to metabolism, temperature
control relates to homeostasis, and so forth. While such
knowledge is truly fascinating, and worth acquiring to obtain
a fuller understanding, our approach here is simply
phenomenological – how the individual directly experiences
things and responds to them. In particular, we have tried to
clarify in some detail the involvement of volition and
influence in them.
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The processes above described, despite some differences of
detail, have largely similar features, so that we can propose a
general definition of the concept of urge, at least with regard
to humans (we may have to make adjustments with regard to
animals). Our interesting finding is the extent to which what
we call a bodily urge involves ‘mental’ components
(presumably, these diminish ‘lower’ down the scale of animal
life93). We are less driven by a physical force than by the
prospect of some negative eventuality and the thought that
the temporal window of opportunity to prevent it may close.
Moreover, although such urges relate to physical processes
with eventual automatic outcomes, they allow for volitional
interference, in the way of temporary resistance and some
convenient preemptive measure.
The preemption may be positive or negative. In the case of
urination and defecation, the event (call it X) that is
minimally bound to occur if we do not interfere is
incontinence, and its preemption consists in going to the
toilet before that happens (i.e. it is also X). Likewise in
breathing: the automatic and volitional acts have the same
effect (bringing oxygen into lungs). In the case of thirst or
hunger, the minimal event (X) is insufficient energy or
matter, and its preemption consists in providing energy or
matter soon enough (i.e. it is notX, the opposite). Likewise in
reproductive sex: the danger faced is generational
discontinuity, while the remedy is to procreate.
93
However, there must be some mental component.
Consider, for instance, why a housebroken dog holds back from
doing its thing indoors – it must have some memory of its master’s
disapproval of soiling the home.
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We might at this stage usefully distinguish between initial
sensations emerging from natural bodily processes, like the
digestive, respiratory and reproductive ones above described,
and those due to some external physical stimulus. For
instances: if a bright light flashes into our eyes, we blink,
fearing damage to our retina; if someone is tortured, he may
scream or cry, hoping to arouse pity in his torturer. It is
useless to attempt an exhaustive list. Suffices to note that any
sense organ(s) may be involved in the stimulus, and there are
standard responses (though sometimes, creative responses
may be called for).
A more radical distinction suggested by our above analysis is
one between urges and mere impulses. Impulses, like urges,
tend us on a certain course of action, and they can be resisted
or indulged. However, whereas impulses can be resisted
indefinitely without risking some untoward natural
consequence, as we have seen this is not true of urges.
Examples of impulses will serve to illustrate this differentia.
If we hear some unpleasant noise, we rush over to stop it if
we can. If we are tickled, our tendency is to wiggle as if to
escape our tormentor. In such cases, note, our volitional
response (resistance or preemption) has no very significant
effect on our health or life94.
We may use the word drive to mean ‘urges or mere
impulses’. Often the distinction between urges and impulses
is moot. Often, what appears as an urge can be construed as a
mere impulse – for example, many of the above described
hedonistic aspects of the sex drive. We may also classify
habits or compulsions like smoking tobacco, the use of hard
94
Though it could be argued that even an unpleasant noise
or sensation is somewhat threatening.
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drugs or alcoholism as impulses. The failure to soon procure
the desired drug may produce withdrawal symptoms
(irritability, insecurity), making it seem like the impulse is an
urge. Thus it seems to the victim’s befogged mind; but,
biologically, the opposite is true – the drug is destructive. So
in fact, if there is any urge, it is a natural urge to stop
smoking or getting doped-up or drinking, or risk disease.
2.
Mental Urges and Impulses
Mental impulses and urges have logical constructions similar
to physical ones, except that usually the initial stimulus is a
thought (or discontent) rather than a sensation (or
discomfort). For example, the above mentioned social
convention aspect of the human sex drive is clearly a mental
urge, rather than a physical one.
The dividing line between them is admittedly sometimes
arbitrary. Often, a physical urge or impulse occurs following
a thought. We have seen, for example, how the mere thought
of urination may give rise to the sensation that triggers the
urination urge; similarly, for instance, the mere thought of a
cigarette may make the habitual smoker ‘feel like’ having
one. Conversely, a mental urge or impulse may be kickstarted by a prior sensation or perception. For examples, one
heard someone say something or saw an ad on TV.
A good illustration of mental urge would be my urge to write
this here book. It starts with a spontaneous, persistent
thought. It is an urge, in that a time constraint is consciously
involved – I constantly tell myself to finish the book before I
die (and pray to be granted life enough). This distinguishes it
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from, for example, an impulse to buy a new car I saw
tantalizingly advertised; although, having so hooked me, the
salesman may try to induce in me an urge to buy it, by setting
a deadline for a ‘special offer’ at reduced price or with extra
features!
The production of mental impulses, and their upgrade to
urges, are common practices of religious traditions; for
example, a religion may teach that standard prayers or other
rituals are necessary to salvation (impulse), and additionally
institute set times for such rituals (urge). Similarly, the tax
office sets a deadline for tax returns, and imposes a penalty if
the task is not done on time. Such expedients are used by all
secular ethical, social, legal or political systems, to promote
duties and their timely exercise. In such cases, the terms ‘to
impel’ or ‘to urge’ someone respectively mean ‘to cause an
impulse or urge in’ that person – the causality involved being
that of influence.
A mental impulse or urge is triggered by some distinctive
memory (perceptual or conceptual), or an imagination (visual
or auditory), or an emotion (a mood or psychosomatic
sentiment or purely physical sensation), or a verbal
proposition. These initial ‘thoughts’ may arise spontaneously,
or through some intellectual process, or by mere association
of ideas; or they may be generated by bodily influences or by
perceived external physical events or persons. Beyond that
stimulus, everything is analogous95. Impulses differ from
urges in lacking temporal pressure. The time factor involved
in urges functions by creating psychological stress, which
95
As we shall see further on, some mental drives have other
differences from physical ones.
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makes us double up our efforts so as to get rid of the
annoyance as soon as possible96.
It is interesting to compare impatience to mental urgency.
They have some affinity, although they are logically opposite
in the sense that urgency is due to (assumed) insufficiency of
time, whereas impatience signals (assumed) excess of time.
Impatience arises when one feels that some process (e.g.
waiting for one’s date) is taking more of our time than one is
willing to devote to it. So one wishes to hurry it on, e.g. by
being less careful or by inciting urgency in other people
involved – and if it is out of one’s power to do so, one suffers
stress. The time one has mentally allotted to the task is
artificially (by wishful thinking) shorter than the time it really
takes. An impossible (and needlessly stressful) urge is
therefore produced to fit a process of longer duration in a
time restriction of one’s own making.
A mental impulse or urge, like a physical one, involves a
certain velleity to action, which may include specific
muscular feelings; e.g. eagerness to play the piano may give
rise to sensations in legs to go to the piano, and in hands to
play it. An evaluation occurs, which determines our degree of
desire or aversion, the urgency if any of its fulfillment, and
the available ways and means. Choices are made and
decisions taken, culminating in volitional acts – whether
temporarily resisting the impulse or urge, or doing what it
impels or urges us to do at an appropriate time and place, or
letting things happen as they may.
96
Note that often two or more urgencies may be
superimposed within a same time frame, increasing our stress
tremendously, because we are forced to prioritize.
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Note that what classifies an impulse or urge as ‘mental’ is its
assumed starting point – the eventual action(s) it drives us to
do may be physical as well as mental. Thus, for instances,
lust is an impulse to grab and kiss the girl, anger is an
impulse to punch the guy’s face in – these are physical acts
proceeding from a thought. Again, yearning for
understanding is an impulse to study – the latter consisting
mainly of mental acts.
Just as bodily urges are cyclical, their fulfillment bringing
only momentary relief, soon after which they recur, so with
many mental desires – they tend to be insatiable and
unlimited. Thus, for instance, for most people, the more
money they can get, the better; because even if they feel
secure for today and tomorrow, there is always the day after
and the one after that to worry about. Urges can thus become
permanent prisons, if given free rein. The lover of wisdom
would here suggest: If you identify with the urge, it
dominates you; if you don’t, you can dominate it.
The passive connotation of the word drive (driven) should
not be overemphasized, however. We should rather keep in
mind that ‘drive’ rhymes with ‘strive’. One may actively
drive oneself. Our mental urges and impulses are not just
happenstance, or innate like most physical ones – they are
generally acquired. They are furniture of our minds that we
have often constructed and placed there97 ourselves. Like the
body, the mind is an instrument of the soul. An instrument is
something that has some uses, though not infinite uses;
97
This is said in a common manner of speaking. Drives are
of course ‘stored’ in the brain, as discussed earlier, in the section
on therapeutic psychology (chapter 8.3).
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something that can be useful, but also obstructive; something
that has a nature, and is not infinitely pliable.
Thus, we may train ourselves – or be trained by others – to
respond in certain ways to certain situations. This may occur
consciously, in the way of ‘working on oneself’ – or it may
be the natural effect of a long series of separate choices and
acts, which together eventually constitute a habitual pattern
of conduct. We may be fully aware of a drive, whether we
approve or disapprove of it; or we may be subject to it while
largely unaware of it as such, whether due to overall poverty
of self-knowledge or because we have suppressed the specific
knowledge to make room for some personal contradiction.
Indeed, we may be subject to conflicting drives, be they
physical and/or mental. For example, one may have to risk
one’s life to save a loved one. Impulses or urges are in
conflict when it is naturally impossible to follow/fulfill them
both. Urges are, moreover, in conflict, when the time
required for their performance and their time limits makes it
impossible for us to satisfy them both. In such cases, we have
to become aware of the potential conflict, or else fail in both
cases; and then we have to prefer one to the other, and in
urgent cases make our mind up quickly enough to avoid
actual clash. Sometimes the dilemma is paralyzing; in which
case, nature follows its course.
When a person deals with such conflicts in a systematically
irrational manner, making little effort to bring them out into
the open and resolve them one way or the other, keeping
them in the dark through fear of admitting unflattering traits
or wishing to indulge in drives he or she knows to be
unsuitable and harmful, the person is eventually subject to
mental pathologies. Such repressive behavior over time may,
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for instances, give rise to chronic negative emotional states
like anxiety, or to occasional ‘inexplicable’ outbursts of
hatred and anger, or to excessive sleep and permanent
fatigue, or to nervousness and hyperactivity, and so forth.
In all such cases, one can glimpse underlying conflicts that
have to be faced, and resolved through appropriate thoughts
and deeds. Mental drives are not permanent features once
acquired. They can, more or less consciously, be attenuated
and eventually eliminated, by making suitable choices over
time – for instance, training oneself to respond differently to
the same stimuli till such new response becomes ‘second
nature’. Such changes usually require sensitivity, cunning,
effort and time – they rarely just happen or can be produced
by immediate will.
3.
Formal Analysis of Physical and Mental Urges
We analyzed in detail some basic bodily urges, and showed
that similar features can be found in other physical urges and
in mental urges, stating that these differ essentially only in
the way our attention is drawn to them. Physical urges are
triggered by certain sensations either originating in the body
or caused by external objects, whereas mental urges spring
from thoughts. We also noted that mere impulses differ from
urges in lacking the factor of inevitability. Impulses involve
stimulus and standard response, but no time limitation; there
is tendency in them, but no urgency.
a. To begin with, let us review (with new numbering) some
of the salient features of physical urges and their closest
mental analogues, with particular emphasis on aetiology:
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1. Some event is bound to eventually occur. This event, or at
least its timing, is undesirable98. The time limit involved
may not be known with any precision, but instead
indicated by the increasing intensity of physical
sensations. In the case of mental urges, the time frame is
often emotionally highlighted, though it may have been
intellectually estimated.
2. But fortunately, the untoward event can voluntarily be
slowed down for some time, or preempted. However, it
cannot be indefinitely retarded, and the time allowance
for its preemption is limited. As we have explained,
preemption may be positive or negative. The
consciousness involved in the volition may range from
minimal (so-called involuntary) to maximal (fully aware).
3. If the event or its time of automatic occurrence seems
inopportune, the agent may be increasingly influenced by
the prospect of such occurrence or mistiming to take
some suitable voluntary steps to retard and/or preempt the
event. Note the words inopportune, prospect, influence,
voluntary and suitable – implying valuation, cognition
and volition at various stages. Even in the case of
physical urges, the central events are mental.
4. The initial sensations or thoughts, that made the agent
aware of the event, do not force him to act in any way; he
may choose not to intervene. If the agent intervenes
inappropriately or too late, or does nothing about it, the
98
E.g. in hunger or thirst, lack of nourishment is undesirable,
whereas is incontinence it is not the waste disposal that is
undesirable but its timing.
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undesirable event occurs anyway, at whatever time
natural circumstances happen to make it occur.
5. Relieving an urge, whether by an act of will or by letting
things happen by inertia, does not mean ridding oneself of
it forever. After a while, it may reappear. This is
particularly true of natural bodily urges, though it may
even apply to mental urges.
This list suggests that urges can be formally defined through
a series of statements, including modal categorical and
conditional propositions. Thus, we might label the agent
concerned A, and the event X, and so forth, and state
concisely: “X will inevitably happen to A by time T, unless A
retards such event (inertial X) by will for a while or until A
preempts X by willing X (or notX, as the case may be) before
X naturally occurs, etc.” However, the above detailed
description serves as definition just as well.
Our analysis makes clear that an urge may be viewed as a
‘causal nexus’ – a series of causal relations of various kinds
together forming a common pattern. The same is true to a
lesser extent of an impulse; it has some of the components of
an urge, but not the more pressing ones. Both are more
complex than the relation of influence, which they involve
among others.
What should be examined next is what we mean here by the
modality “inevitable” – for it is clear that this term has many
nuances.
In its strictest sense, we mean by it a natural necessity,
something deterministically bound to occur eventually
come what may. This sense would apply to the natural
bodily urges earlier described; for instance, once we need
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to pee, we are eventually bound to. A more conditional
version of same would be natural inertia, meaning:
within a certain existing framework, the event is
inevitable, but if this larger context is changed, the
inevitability might not hold. For example, the patient will
‘surely’ faint if not fed, but that won’t happen if the
patient dies.
It should be added that natural inevitabilities do not apply
only to the body or its physical surrounds. The mental
domain also has a ‘nature’ and so is subject to natural
necessities and inertias. For example, if one behaves in
certain foolish ways, one is bound to eventually suffer
certain unpleasant consequences, like neurosis or
madness.
The concept of inevitability can be further broadened
with reference to artificial necessity, and further still with
reference to artificial inertia. For examples: in a legal
system, a penalty may be obligatory once sentenced, or it
may be open to review. Clearly, such artificial
inevitabilities apply in situations organized by someone’s
volition (one’s own or some other persons’). They may be
physical as well as mental; for instances, the penalty may
be capital punishment, or it may be social stigma.
The concept of urge can further be broadened, by
acknowledging the fact that the inevitability and/or its timing
need not be real, as so far implied, but may be merely
imagined. The urge, be it physical or mental, is based
essentially on the agent’s assumption that there is
inevitability (of whatever sort) and/or that the undesirable
event will happen within a set amount of time. Such
assumptions are sometimes justified, and sometimes
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erroneous – but in either case, the urge has the same
stimulating power. Error is perhaps more common in the case
of mental urges; but even bodily sensations and physical
perceptions may be wrongly interpreted.
It follows from the above analysis that we can emancipate
ourselves from physical and mental drives that we find
inappropriate, provided we remain lucid. We should try to
always be aware of the forces impinging upon us, identifying
their nature and sources, checking their underlying premises,
evaluating the benefits and dangers inherent to them, and
confronting them if they need to be rectified. It is preferable
to be proactive than reactive – as the saying goes “a stitch in
time saves nine”.
As already stated, to insure personal freedom of action, it is
necessary not to identify with the urges or impulses
concerned, i.e. not to consider them as part of one’s essential
identity. The object is not, however, divorcing oneself from
one’s passions, or rigidly controlling them, out of fear of
them. Internal harmony and peace, and ‘spontaneity’ and ease
in action, are highly desirable. The most efficient way to find
the right balance is through meditation: achieving inner calm,
everything naturally falls into place.
Humans have free will – but that is a potential we have to
daily actualize. Doing so, the self asserts its mastery of the
house of matter and mind it inhabits.
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Are There Drives Within the Soul?
We may ask the question: are there spiritual urges and
impulses, by analogy to physical and mental ones? Is the
term spiritual appropriate, or are all non-physical ones
mental?
A common early experience of meditation is that thoughts of
all kinds (e.g. focusing on a sensation or memory or emotion;
projecting a mental picture or sound; verbal discourse,
anticipating, planning; etc.) seem to have a ‘momentum’ of
their own – seemingly ‘against our will’. They are not (or not
always) entirely involuntary, but often (if not always) involve
some voluntary mental activity – and yet we do not have
instant and total control over them (at least not till we reach a
certain level of mental calm through meditation).
This is a paradoxical experience, which needs to be
explained. How come human will does not have immediate
and full control over the mental if not material functions at its
disposal? Why can I not stop mental turbulences at will, and
get on with my meditation? What is it below the surface that
drives thought, making it semi-automatic if not completely
hectic? How do obsessions, and more broadly compulsions,
work?
The mind, as well as the body, would seem to have its own
mechanistic inertia. Our primitive response in the face of
such impulses is to ‘follow’ them, doing what they impel us
to do. The soul (through its free will) tries gradually to gain
ascendancy over these naturally moving mechanisms, i.e. to
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resist them and become more autonomous. At first, only
some aspects may be immediately accessible to willful
interference. As we become more calmly focused on the
spiritual self, and cease to identify with mind and matter, we
are able to more and more control them. Control is not a
matter of greater force, but of finding the correct point of
leverage.
If we grant the postulate of freewill, that the soul’s modus
operandi is always and exclusively volitional, it means we
reject any notion that inertia or coercion are possible in the
‘spiritual’ domain, i.e. within the soul. It is therefore an
assumption that all involuntary events occur outside the soul
(in body or mind, or beyond them in the rest of the world),
never in it. This implies that, although it is cognitively
receptive, the soul in itself has no ‘passions’ of volition.
Influences make a direction of will ‘easier or more difficult’
for the soul, but do not literally push or pull it in any
direction.
This theory may make our inner life seem extremely bland
and dispassionate, and some may well wonder if it is
accurate. They will argue that we do seem to have drives,
pressing on us or drawing us hither and thither. It does appear
that there are influences that do not merely increase or
decrease the effort requirement of our volitions, but which at
least are programmed to occur unless voluntarily stopped. If
that is true, then the soul might be said to have ‘real’ drives,
at least in the way of internal ‘inertial processes’ (if not
causative necessity).
But the issue is: are such (seemingly) ‘spiritual inertias’
really occurring in the soul, or in its physical and mental
surrounds? I very much doubt that any such inner impulse or
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urge could move the soul into acts akin to volitional acts even
with the soul’s acquiescence (let alone with determinism).
The soul’s typical ‘acts’ seem to me such that they can only
be performed by the active will of the soul. I suspect the
nature of these acts is such that only the soul can carry them
through to completion.
However, to be clear, we have to distinguish here
between the soul’s willing (positive) from its totally
not-willing (negative). Otherwise, we would have to
assume the soul is always obliged to will, whether a
positive or a negative goal. It would never be at rest,
never uninvolved. This would not be a true picture of
our inner life. When the soul positively ‘acts’ (either
willing or deliberately not willing), it creates
something new in and for itself. But obviously, when
the soul ‘does nothing’, it still has some description –
viz. the way it happens to be thus far. The latter
situation is not to be counted as ‘inertia’ in the above
sense.
If we carefully analyze situations involving drives, such as
the ‘hard to control’ thoughts mentioned above, we find that
the events that are ‘inertial’ are entirely in the realm of
causation, in body and/or mind, i.e. outside the soul. For
instances, speaking out or imagining something. In such
cases, there is a natural process in the nervous system or in
the rest of our body that, either in general or in certain
specific circumstances, is bound to occur, unless the soul
volitionally interferes and stops such a development. The
soul’s volition, or abstinence from volition, is entirely in the
realm of the soul; whereas the precise inertial event, whether
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it is allowed to proceed or prevented, is entirely outside the
soul.
In truth, even our most subtle feelings, such as the
positive and negative moods or esthetic responses that
poetically put seem to permeate our very soul, do not
really occur in the soul proper but in the adjacent
mind. Although very subtle, they are still internally
perceived phenomena, and not intuited experiences.
Therefore, they act on the soul like all other
influences, making its volitions easier or harder, but
are not essentially within it.
Though hard to prove with finality, this doctrine seems more
probable. However, see the further reflections below, which
give more consideration to the different ways consciousness
is implicated in volition.
5.
Formal Analysis of Spiritual Urges
We have just considered where in the psyche seemingly
inertial events like obsessions and compulsions might be
located, and concluded that they could not be assumed as
spiritual (i.e. in the soul) consistently with will and its
freedom, but must be regarded as mental. This, as we shall
now show, suggests certain formal differences in some
mental drives.
There is a special class of mental urges, which deserve
particular attention. As we saw earlier, the volitions we call
‘unconscious’ or ‘inadvertent’ are so called, not because they
lack all consciousness or deliberation, but because they have
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a very minimum of it. The adjective ‘involuntary’ is
paradoxically applied to certain of our volitions, only
hyperbolically in the way of self-reproach for insufficient
attention, not meaning literally to imply total non-volition.
We may on this basis construct a logical form of urge that,
instead of opposing natural or artificial inevitability
(necessary or inertial, real or imagined) to voluntary
retardation or preemption, opposes an agent’s so-called
involuntary (i.e. minimally conscious) will to the same
agent’s voluntary (i.e. more conscious) will. By this means,
we are at last able to clearly formalize the ‘spiritual inertias’
most of us experience daily in our thoughts and actions. We
can thus explain why obsessions and compulsions seem to
occur by themselves although they obviously involve will;
and even against our better judgment, although we are
essentially beings with freewill.
Our proposition is that although such urges do involve
consciousness and will, more effort of consciousness
and will is needed to prevent or stop them than to
start and continue them.
A habitual routine involves consciousness and will, but it is
relatively effortless compared to the investment called for by
any attempt to overcome it, so we repeat it on and on and
thus reinforce it. This explains the analogy between
‘spiritual’ inertias and natural inertia: an extra effort is
required to transcend them. Just as in the realm of causation,
the inertial goes on until if ever diverted by volition, so in the
realm of the soul, there are situations where less demanding
volitions proceed unless or until more effort is invested. We
might thus refer to ‘volitional inertia’, or keep using the term
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‘spiritual inertia’ to stress the agent’s responsibility in the
implied indulgence.
Thus, here, (1) instead of referring as above done to some
event that is “bound to eventually occur”, we refer to a
relatively ‘involuntary’ volitional activity; and (2) whereas
the former would be “voluntarily slowed down for some
time, or preempted”, the latter would be relatively more
voluntary (i.e. require more effort of consciousness and
volition). In both cases, (3) mental events determine the
response. And, finally, (4) if the response is “letting things
be”, the event that occurs here is continuation of the
‘involuntary’ behavior; after which (5) the whole cycle may
resume. The analogy is manifestly apposite, allowing us to
use the term ‘urge’ in both cases.
These specific mental urges may be distinctively called
‘spiritual urges’, for the reason already stated. We can then
(briefly) define such urge in formal terms, as follows.
“Agent A has an urge to will W” means “if A does
not voluntarily will notW, then A involuntarily
wills W”, where ‘voluntary will’ refers to conscious
volition and ‘involuntary will’ refers to subconscious
volition, i.e. volition with the minimum amount of
awareness needed to perform it and no more. It is
logically obvious (since W and notW cannot both
occur at once) that “if A does voluntarily will notW,
then A does not involuntarily will W”, so this need
not be added.
I would like to emphasize the importance of this finding.
Having previously formalized physical and mental urges and
impulses, and here spiritual ones, we can now safely assert
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that in all human drive contexts, the agent retains freewill
and responsibility. Until now, a doubt could subsist, because
vagueness of conception allowed some theorists to give the
impression that the agent could be essentially passive and
therefore unaccountable. But our descriptions show that his
personal involvement is quite conceivable, and thus serve to
confirm it.
For example, Freudian theorists subdivide the person into
conflicting forces, segments or entities – the ego, id and
superego; or the conscious, subconscious and unconscious;
and such like – in an effort to explain various behavior
patterns and psychological effects. However, though such
concepts may well serve a useful therapeutic purpose99 out of
context, from a broader philosophical point of view they are
counterproductive, because they needlessly split up the self
into impersonal heterogeneous fractions, and thus put in
doubt the soul’s fundamental liberty and accountability.
Thus, such theories ultimately obstruct explanation, stopping
us from asking how the unitary self may function in
conflicting ways.
The scenario of spiritual urges is, to repeat, as follows: some
involuntary will W is about to be or has been put in motion;
but the opposite notW can still be voluntarily willed; the
agent is increasingly influenced by the undesirable prospect
of W, until he voluntarily wills notW. In other words: W
seems desirable at first sight (due to the little effort of
cognition and evaluation expended), and the agent naively
pursues it (using minimum consciousness); then the agent
99
Which I tend to doubt, since as far as I can tell such a
disintegrated vision of the psyche is likely to produce psychological
conflicts.
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(suddenly investing more effort of consciousness and will)
reviews the situation and revises his estimate of the
desirability of W, preferring notW; this influences him to
make the extra effort of consciousness and will to pursue
notW, instead of W. Note that notW logically signifies
anything that is contrary to W.
The direction of will W need not in itself be harder than
notW; the opposite may in fact be the case. However, W may
be initially preferred by default, in the way of an instinct,
while notW requires intelligent reflection. That is, W may be
the first choice because it is more manifest, so that one tends
to attach to it unthinkingly, without comparing it to others;
while notW has to be sought out to be noticed.
Notice that our brief definition does not mention the
awareness of something influencing A to will W or notW.
The involuntary will of W may have one set of influences
(say, I) and the voluntary will of notW may have another set
of influences (say, J). Among the latter (J) may be a dawning
‘self-awareness’ by A of his involuntarily willing or about to
will W; the agent may then realize he does not want to
proceed further in that direction, and voluntarily will notW
instead. However, the influences labeled J may equally well
exclude such self-awareness and the ensuing negative motive,
and be concerned with some entirely other purpose and a
more positive motive.
Therefore, although the involuntary or voluntary volitions
involved in ‘spiritual’ urges, as all other acts of will, may be
facilitated or made more difficult by various influences, the
latter are not central to the logic of such urges. The essence
of such urge is that an unconscious willing is incipient (a
velleity) or ongoing (actual action has started), and that this
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proceeds until and unless hindered (prevented or reversed) by
an opposite and more mindful act of will. Therefore, these
urges as such are not necessarily influences.
One may or may not notice what one is doing, before doing
the opposite. The agent need not cognize his impulsive act
(the unconscious willing) to awaken his counteraction (the
mindful will). Although such extra awareness may on
occasion make the latter easier, it may in some cases make it
more difficult and in other cases have no influence at all.
A spiritual urge constitutes an ‘objective’ situation, in the
sense that the agent, although essentially free, has somehow
become locked into a certain course of action, from which he
cannot extricate himself without a special effort of
consciousness and will. This is more constraining than the
situation of influence, which does not imply any prior
commitment or engagement.
The velleity or actuality of the involuntary will involved in
such urge of course does have causes. The main cause is the
soul’s initial choice or decision to will in the direction
concerned; this may be referred to as self-programming. This
initial posture or performance may well be – indeed is likely
to be – influenced by mental or material considerations. The
latter may be the natural alignment of phenomena (terms and
conditions), or phenomena more or less intentionally set up
by some other agents (for example, commercial advertisers or
political propagandists or ‘social engineers’).
The resistance or counteraction to spiritual urge, i.e. the
voluntary will in the opposite direction, similarly has causes.
The main cause is the agent, asserting or reasserting his
freedom, either losing interest in the initial will or gaining
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interest in the new will. Each of these options may as usual
involve various supportive or adverse influences, which may
again be natural or social phenomena. Finally, the soul
deliberately wills to dominate and deprogram its previous
will.
Whereas rectifying improper physical and mental drives
constitutes a struggle of the soul against forces relatively
external to it, revising improper spiritual drives signifies a
struggle between the soul and itself. By preferring
consciousness to carelessness, we take responsibility for our
actions and attain self-mastery.
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13. CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 13.
THE QUASI-PURPOSIVE IN NATURE
1.
Purposiveness
The concept of purpose is initially and primarily one relating
to human action. We mentally visualize, or conceptually and
verbally project, a state of affairs that we would like to bring
into existence or to ensure the continued existence of, and
proceed to do what we consider necessary to achieve that
aim. The goal may be something within us – a spiritual
quality (such as strength of character) or a mental content or
skill (such as knowledge of logic) or a bodily condition (such
as not catching a cold) – or it may be an external acquisition
(such as a meal or new clothes). The means is something we
do to fulfill the desire concerned.
Thus, propositions concerning purpose basically have
the form “I am doing this for that”, or more broadly
“agent A does X in order to achieve or obtain Y”.
Such a proposition concerns volition, its subject (A)
being a human agent, the means (X) being some act(s)
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of direct or indirect will by the agent in hopeful
pursuit of the goal (Y), which has been projected by
the consciousness of the agent.
Note that the agent may be right or wrong in thinking that Y
is at all possible to him (let alone ‘good’ for him!), and he
may be right or wrong in thinking that X specifically is
something that can lead him to Y. Indeed, he may admit that
his goal Y is uncertain and/or that his proposed means may
be inadequate, and still be considered as doing X for Y.
In a second phase, the concept of purpose is passed on to
higher animals (those assumed to have volition), and such
propositions can be used for them too. And as we shall see
further on, in a third phase, the concept is applied by analogy
and in a diluted sense to the non-volitional functions of our
and their organs, as well as to other living organisms (without
volition) such as plants; we may refer to such ‘as if’ purposes
as quasi-purposive.
Furthermore, we commonly apply the concept of purpose to
inanimate objects. This does not mean that we consider such
objects to choose purposes for themselves, or to have
inherent natural purposes. They have the purpose we – i.e.
any volitional being – assign to them. This refers, then, more
precisely to the utility of the object or some part of it to the
purposes of some agent. The useful object may be artificial or
natural. For example, the utility of a chair is to be sat on by
people; a chair is an object designed and manufactured with
this use in mind. For example, a monkey uses a stone it
picked up to break open a nut; although a natural object, the
stone (by virtue of its original size and weight) has utility for
this monkey.
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Works of fine art are, of course, commonly considered as
intentionally ‘without utility’. But this is using a restricted
sense of the term utility, without excluding the utility of
aesthetic expression (for the artist) or pleasure (for the viewer
or auditor), or of communication (between artist and admirer)
or of offering (to God or other loved one). What we would
prefer to exclude from artwork are vanity and mercantilism
(the pursuit of fame and fortune), and other such more
materialistic and less spiritual aspects of human endeavor.
2.
Organic Functions
The definition of the concept of function in biological
discourse is simple and clear:
The ‘function’ of an organ (i.e. of any part of a
volitional or non-volitional organism) and of its
characteristics and activities refers to the causative
role that these play in the preservation, development
and furtherance of the life of the organism as a
whole – or more broadly, in widening circles, in the
furtherance of the life of its kind(s), or of life on
earth.
This, note well, is a derivative of the concept of causation,
not of volition. When we use the term function in volitional
contexts, we intend the purpose or utility of the entity,
character or action concerned in the achievement of some
more or less conscious end, as already discussed. Here, the
term function refers to something unconscious, i.e. it is
intended as analogous to purpose or utility but without
implying an agent’s goal.
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Nevertheless, the concept of organic function is somewhat
analogous to that of willed function, in that the organ seems
to tend to the survival, improvement or reproduction of the
organism. It is quasi-purposive.
Many philosophers have struggled with this issue, trying to
reconcile the idea of mere causation in nature with the
impression that life tends to life, as if some mysterious inner
force impels it in that specific direction. In particular,
Aristotle proposed a concept of ‘final cause’100 to cover such
unconscious tendencies. Others have compared such apparent
striving to conation, and named it ‘conatus’. Modern biology
has explicitly eschewed such teleological explanation;
although in practice, at least in elementary or popularizing
texts, the discourse of biologists is implicitly full of quasipurposive expressions101. (If the reticence is justified, it is
necessary to analyze why such linguistic habits persist and
what more consistent and accurate verbal formulae might
practically replace them.)
Yet, as the definition of organic function proposed above
shows, we can have our cake and eat it too! It is an
observable fact that certain material entities differ in some
significant manner from most others: for instance, if you
plant a seed in the ground, it grows into a vegetable that
eventually gives birth to new seeds; but if you plant a stone in
the ground, it may suffer changes by erosion or by fusion
100
See Appendix 2 of Volition on Aristotle’s doctrine of “the
four causes”.
101
For example, when we say “Nature does so and so”, or
similarly reify a species making it seem like an agent, or tacitly
imply the events – which it is a passive subject of – to be its
activities. Such anthropomorphisms are often concealed in the use
of equivocal verbs, like ‘adaptation’.
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with other stones, but it will never ‘reproduce’. On the basis
of such observations, we have over time distinguished
between living beings and minerals (inanimate matter).
The peculiarity of living beings is that (although natural, and
not man-made) their parts are organized in systems,
sustaining each other and the whole in various ways. Of
course, nowhere in an organ or organism is there a sign
where it is written “I am doing this for that”. Still, unlike
non-living entities, all (or more precisely, most) the qualities
and activities of life demonstrably cause (i.e. are natural or at
least extensional causatives of, or in Aristotelian language:
are efficient causes of) continuation of individual life (or
more broadly, through procreation and social protection and
support, the life of the species or of the genus, or life as
such).
The expression “for” (or similar ones, like “so as to”
or “in order that”) allows us to communicate briefly
a lot of information, concerning organs and the direct
and indirect outcomes of their features and
movements. For example, teeth are organs “for”
eating. The shapes of some of them are such as to
enable them to cut food up; the shape of others, to
crush it. As the upper and lower teeth are moved
against each other, they begin the digestive process
that results in nourishment of the blood with new
matter, which keeps the body (including the teeth)
strong and healthy.
It should be stressed that the epistemological basis for a claim
to quasi-purposive events in living matter is not merely that
the isolated event under scrutiny results (by mere causation)
in longer and multiplied life, but that all (or most) events in
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living matter have this same concrete and abstract result. The
reason we have to admit an incomplete frequency – saying
‘most’ instead of ‘all’ – is that we do observe a minority of
parts, traits or activities of organisms to be (or occasionally,
become) useless to life or even antithetical to it. These
situations we put aside as abnormal or diseased102,
considering them as effectively incidents or accidents in life
processes.
The concept of organic function is thus not directly
ontologically evident, but a product of adductive logic. There
is no logical irregularity in its formulation or defense. It is an
empirically based hypothesis, a tool of discourse through
which we manage to collect and order our observations of
certain entities, characters and movements in the natural
world. It facilitates biological discourse, placing particular
observations in a wider system of explanation. It is a causal
concept entirely based on causation, and not on volition. It is
not purposive, but merely quasi (as if) purposive.
All the concept of conatus asserts ontologically, then, is that
the physical processes of life (mostly) take a certain
direction (more life) rather than any other (less life), just as
we might for instances propose that ‘bodies continue in their
state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless acted
upon by a force’ or ‘like charges repel, opposites attract’. It
simply refers to certain causative necessities or inertias for
certain classes of natural objects (namely living organisms,
not dead ones and not inorganic matter). We can simply say:
‘things just happen to be so’ or ‘that is their nature’. The idea
of inherent orientation is logically quite compatible with the
ideas of natural law and physical mechanism.
102
For examples, an extra finger or a cancerous breast.
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ETHICS
We can argue that just as, at a subatomic (quantum
mechanical) level, events may appear naturally spontaneous,
and yet, on a larger scale (of visible physical bodies), they
seem ruled by natural laws – so may the directionless events
of inanimate matter collectively (when brought together in the
specific structures of life) result in the effectively directional
events of animate matter. Here again (as we saw in the
discussion on volition in relation to the laws of physics),
what prevents some scientists from admitting conatus is their
reductionist mentality, their dogmatic103 refusal to consider
that ‘the whole may be more than the parts’.
No conscious purpose is intended by it, and there is nothing
mystical or metaphysical about such an underlying force104.
Indeed, although the concept of organic function may have
originated by analogy to that of conscious target (keeping the
idea of goal, while artificially dropping its implication of
consciousness) – volitional function may ultimately be
viewed as a subset or special case of organic function, in the
sense that the volitional agent generally thinks he is serving
his life by pursuing his goals.
We may on this basis envisage the development of a ‘natural
ethics’, one with simply ‘life’ as its standard of value, or
summum bonum. However, the main difficulty facing such an
undertaking would be precisely to arrive at a consensus as to
103
I say ‘dogmatic’ because it is a doctrine adhered to without
specific proof (i.e. without experiments and mathematical formulae
deriving the living from the non-living), but by anticipation.
104
It is a secular concept, although theists remain logically
free to assert that this state of affairs was instituted by the Creator
or is regulated by Providence, i.e. that nature was or is so
programmed. Similarly, animists may suppose an underlying ‘will of
Nature’.
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the meaning of the term ‘life’ which can be variously
understood, in a materialistic, psychological and/or spiritual
sense, with reference to the individual or more universally, in
one lifetime or many, and so forth. Everyone claims to be
pro-life in one sense or another! For example, abortionists do.
The question is: whose life? Or: what sort of life?105 So, we
come round full circle.
Nevertheless, I think the logical problems are
surmountable, probably by means of dialectical or
dilemmatic arguments. Such arguments may have
forms like: “whether Y or notY is preferred, the
requirement is still X rather than notX” or
“whether X or notX is pursued, the result is still Y
rather than notY”, where X, notX refer to alternative
intermediaries and Y and notY to alternative
consequences. Certain means are necessary, whatever
the ends one pursues; and there are certain
overarching outcomes, whatever our chosen course.
We might by such teleological reasoning reach at
least some common ground.
It follows that, from a biological point of view, the soul and
its faculties and functions (cognition, volition and valuation)
should be regarded as no different from other organs of the
living organism possessing them, whether physical or mental.
The spiritual ‘organs’ are equally functional, tending towards
the maintenance and perpetuation of life. Their complexity
compared to other organs gives them increased sensitivity,
105
For example, in the case of abortion: “whose life?” – adult
needs or desires are favored over those of the unborn; “what kind
of life?” – the life of the aborting adult is thenceforth weighed down
by the selfish choice made.
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flexibility and power to fulfill that function; but also, this
very advantage increases the possibilities and probabilities of
error and breakdown.
The natural imperative to life inherent in all organisms, as a
sort of conatus, is transformed into an ethical imperative to
life in specifically conscious, volitional beings, in proportion
to their cognitive powers and freedom of will. In lower
animals, cognition and volition function instinctively,
whereas in higher animals, there is progressively more
mindful choice, reaching a peak in humans; and indeed, in
the latter species, there is also a range of behavior, depending
on the spiritual development of each individual.
Note lastly that our above definition of organic function is
broad enough to include not only the functions of organs of
individual organisms, but also populations of organisms.
Reproduction minimally implies transmission of life; but in
many species (even some plants), the parents continue to
support (e.g. feed, protect, train) their offspring for some
time. Individuals not directly related may help each other
within a variety of social arrangements, in groups of various
sizes (like a small tribe of ants or a large nation-state of
humans).
Moreover, different species may behave symbiotically,
effectively favoring each other’s life. Sometimes, they are not
merely of mutual use, but unilaterally or mutually dependent.
One species may actively cultivate another in order to feed on
it. Culling may be useful to the group culled, preventing
depletion of environmental resources. Even when no benefit
to the victim is manifest, one species feeding on another may
be asserted to have as function the maintenance on earth of
life as such or diversity of life or higher forms of life.
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Although inanimate matter per se cannot be said to have
functions, we may of course say that it is used in many
unconscious life processes. For example, plants use nitrogen
and sunlight for their growth. This enlarges the concept of
utility that we introduced earlier with reference to conscious
purposes.
In conclusion, we have here shown that it is possible to
formalize ‘functionalism’, with reference only to causation
and to the common character of certain natural entities called
life. We have thus shown quasi-purposive events in an
unconscious nature to be conceivable, and justified
teleological discourse on this basis.
3.
The Continuity of Life
As we have seen in the previous section, the great majority of
the features and processes of the organs of living organisms
have ‘functions’, meaning that they play some causative role
in the support of life. This object of organic functioning, i.e.
‘life’, may be understood at many levels. In a first phase, we
apply it to the physiological factors of the individual living
being. Later, with respect to the increasing complexity of
animal and human life, we apply it to the psychological
factors, the mental and spiritual.
a.
One of the great discoveries of modern biology is
that, despite their many differences, all living organisms are
composed of one or more tiny ‘cells’, which are visible to
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everyone under the microscope106. Some cells are devoid of a
nucleus (prokaryotes); others have one (eukaryotes). The
former include bacteria and other unicellular organisms; the
latter, both unicellular and multi-cellular organisms – plants,
fungi, animals and humans composed of up to billions of
cells. Thus, when we refer to a potato plant, a cat or a man or
woman as ‘an individual’ organism, we are already really
discussing a symbiotic grouping of smaller organisms (the
cells that make up the organs that make up the whole
organism).
Upon further reflection, it is becomes evident that life is not
just an individual phenomenon, but applicable to populations.
This is not mere metaphor – in many species, the individual
has no chance of survival for any significant duration in
isolation from the particular group (family unit or larger) it
belongs to. In effect, the group is the organism and the
individual is a mere organ of it, with a specific function in
relation to the whole (for example, a bee in a hive). It is a
prejudice of human conception to regard ‘an organism’ as
necessarily something whose organs are all spatially
contiguous and inseparable. We can also logically view as
‘an organism’ an entity whose parts can move around some
distance apart from each other for some time, provided the
interactions of the parts are sufficiently important to them all.
Moreover, since all living things reproduce, we may consider
offspring as organs of their parents, and parents as organs of
their offspring. Again, these are not mere words, but reflect
material and temporal continuities. In some species, notably
106
Viruses are not cellular; however, they are not independent
organisms, but rather bundles of genetic material and protein that
multiply parasitically.
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among higher animals and humans, behavior, information
and material possessions are also passed on from generation
to generation. Such genetic and cultural inheritances are
artificially ignored in conceptualizing discrete individuals.
Furthermore, parents (plants or animals) may support the life
of their offspring for some time – feeding them, warming
them, protecting them from predators, and so forth.
Sometimes, the offspring later in turn serve the parents in
various ways, and may even serve each other (which refers us
back to the groups above discussed). Thus, any line of living
organisms may ultimately be viewed as a single organism
changing form over time, splitting up and merging.
Thus, at least some groupings of two or more living
organisms may be viewed as single organisms with
detachable parts, the function of such parts being to ensure
the subsistence and to enhance the life of the whole – as in
the case of organs stuck together, only with greater
flexibility. This concept is applicable to the continuity of
generations in any family line, as well as to population
groups that may include many families.
The causal relations involved in such spatial and temporal, as
well as material, mental and spiritual, continuities are all
basically of the form: “without the organ, the organism
could not live or would have much more difficulty doing so;
with the organ, the organism’s chances are made possible
or increased”. This formula clearly applies to parts of
individuals and to individuals within groups. Cut out our
hearts, we die; cut off our left hand, our chances of survival
decrease; without our parents, we would not be born or
survive long after birth; without the younger generations, the
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older ones are doomed as soon as they weaken; taken out of
society, most of us would quickly die off.
All of this suggests the continuity of life. Moreover, life is
truly uniform in a material sense, as suggested by another
crucial finding of modern science, namely: the universality of
the genetic material of life (DNA). We can also point to
numerous anatomical, metabolic, behavioral and other
similarities between living beings to buttress and broaden the
concept of continuity. For example, the observation that
ontogeny retraces phylogeny (how a human fetus
successively resembles a fish, then a reptile, and then a lower
mammalian with a tail) is impressive.
b.
We might go one step further in this widening
perspective on life, and argue speculatively that ultimately all
life is one, i.e. all living organisms on earth are apparently
part and parcel of one and the same giant living organism.
This is here conceived, not to ‘prove’ some pet thesis, but
merely to put the continuity of life into perspective, taking
the concept to an extreme for the sake of argument.
The ecological perspective is significant in this context. The
single living organism inhabits a mineral environment that is
always in flux due to physical causes (like the Sun’s rays, ice
forming or melting at the Earth’s poles, wind, rain, floods,
etc.). But additionally, this environment is constantly
changed by that living organism, wittingly or unwittingly.
Furthermore, within this theoretical overall creature,
neighboring species and individuals constitute the organic
environment for each other at any given time and place,
together with the mineral surrounds. Plants compete with
each other for space and mineral resources; sometimes, they
effectively cooperate, as when one species provides the
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chemicals needed by another; plant life provides a changing
theater for animal life; animals destroy, cultivate and eat
plants; animals hunt, raise and eat other animals. Thus, the
vegetable and animal environment is also constantly in flux.
Species in the same geographical region interact, and
likewise individuals in the same group. All living beings in a
given milieu very dynamically interact and affect each other
to various degrees over time.
As earlier mentioned, there are sometimes symbioses
between individuals or groups of different species or genera.
For instance, one may feed and protect another, and feed on it
or be protected by it – as in the relationships between humans
and wheat, cattle or dogs. Going further, we could interpret
the situation when one organism eats another, as the same
larger living entity exchanging its parts, feeding one part of
itself with another, moving matter and energy around itself.
On this basis, we could argue that it is ‘natural’ for a lion to
eat a gazelle, and that the gazelle does its job in the wider
context by being eaten. One kind is made tributary to another.
If we consider in one dramatic sweep the history of life on
earth107, since its appearance some 3,700 million years ago,
about 800 million years after the formation of the planet, the
idea becomes quite thinkable that it is all one organism,
which has over time split-up into a multitude of ‘detached
organs’ (individuals) composed of a multitude of ‘attached
107
I make no attempt here to describe this history in detail,
but every reader should make the effort to read about it, and get
acquainted with current discoveries and scientific theories. There
are many excellent books on the subject; and of course, there is
lots of interesting material on the Internet.
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organs’ (components of individuals)108. Each such ‘organ’ of
the whole organism comes, moves, reproduces with others,
changes and goes, in reaction to changing conditions within
the organism itself (the organic environment) and its mineral
environment, always tending to the conservation of life as
such, the life within it – life being nothing other than this
very behavioral tendency.
Some such extrapolation might eventually be found useful for
the development of a natural ethics. Some ecologists use this
idea of the unity of life to encourage widespread protection of
nature, in an age when mankind is destroying more and more
of it. Some contend that this is excessive and utopian, though
I doubt mankind will ever be guilty of self-destructive
altruism! No doubt, a balanced model is conceivable – one
that erects reasonable hierarchies of value, which give due
consideration to human social needs while maintaining a
broad focus on maximum protection of life on earth.
108
I am here of course referring to the self-replication of the
first unicellular organism(s) – the prokaryotes, followed some 1,800
million years ago by the eukaryotes; and then to the first
multicellular organisms, aggregated algae appearing some 1,500
million years ago. Animals only made their appearance much later,
less than 600 million ago.
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14. CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 15 (sections 1 & 2).
MORE ABOUT EVOLUTION
1.
Social Darwinism
Darwinism has, since its inception in the latter half of the 19th
Century, been influential beyond the field of biology proper,
in ethical as well as economic, social and political theorizing
and commentary, some of which has been pernicious. Under
the heading of ‘Social Darwinism’, racism, exploitation and
violence were given a boost, causing much suffering to many
people. Although similar ideas existed before Darwin
published his theories, they gained credence and prestige
from their superficial association with such an important
work of biological science. Using pseudo-scientific discourse
extrapolated from Darwinism, ideologies like Hitler’s could
thenceforth pretend to justify conquest and domination.
Concepts like “the struggle for existence” and “the survival
of the fittest” seemed charged with meaning, suggesting that
biology condoned harsh, dog-eat-dog societal practices,
pitting people against each other and judging whoever won
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the contest to have naturally deserved to win. Alternatively,
the necessity of “adaptation to the environment” could be
interpreted as a biological call to fit-in socially and not make
waves, to accept and not rebel, to be subservient to the
powers-that-be. The doctrine served both to justify the
oppressors and to keep their victims docile.
Here, we wish to ask the question – is such reasoning
logically appropriate? Given that human society is from a
biological viewpoint an ordinary population grouping, one
might well infer that such concepts can legitimately be
applied to it. But if there are conceptual errors concealed in
such discourse, what are they – i.e. what are the limits of the
Darwinian concepts of evolution?
To begin with, it should be admitted that the conceptual error
is not entirely on the side of the Social Darwinists – they
were dished out a misleading terminology by Darwin himself.
Terms like ‘struggle’, ‘fittest’ and ‘adaptation’ were no doubt
chosen as approximations illustrating certain aspects of
evolution, but the ignorant and their manipulators could
readily misconstrue them as confirming a ‘law of the jungle’
scenario for society. In principle, epistemologically, these
choices were of course legitimate; as our knowledge
develops, we frequently expand and contract the meanings of
existing words to match new data. But they were unfortunate,
in that they were easily misused.
Paradoxically, such terms are based in the human (and
animal, or at least higher animal) experience, but applied by
the biologist by analogy to the whole range of living beings
(including bacteria and plants), who thereby gives them new
and specialized connotations. The Social Darwinist then
comes along and picks up these same terms, reapplying them
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to human society, in view of their anthropomorphic flavor,
glossing over the biologist’s precise intentions, and
concentrating exclusively on the images the terms
superficially project by virtue of their original meanings.
Although the terms have returned to their original domain,
they have in the interim acquired subtle ethological
significations.
Thus, the phrase ‘struggle for existence’ projects an image of
fighting for one’s life against difficult odds and powerful
enemies; the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ implies that in this
life and death struggle whoever won is naturally the best
man, who in fact deserved to succeed all along, as his victory
proved ex post facto; the phrase ‘adaptation to the
environment’ suggests a scenario of submission, which the
losers if they at all survive must remain content with, serving
their masters, keeping their tails well between their legs.
These dramatic connotations were conveniently adopted by
the Social Darwinists, under the pretense that they came from
biology.
What such phrases have in common, in their original senses,
before Darwinism used them as biological expressions, is the
underlying human (or animal) consciousness and will they
imply. When biology co-opted them, it applied them
indiscriminately to organisms without these faculties, notably
bacteria and plants. Moreover, the harsher aspects of the
original words were simply abandoned in favor of wider and
softer applications. For example, when a flower appeared in
nature, with a brighter color than hitherto, one more attractive
to pollinating insects – this was labeled by the biologists as
an ‘adaptation’, a maneuver in the ‘struggle’ and an increased
‘fitness’.
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Apart from such terminological misappropriation, Social
Darwinism involves serious misunderstandings of the
concepts of biological Darwinism. Evidently, bacteria and
plants cannot be said to have purposes, since they lack
consciousness and will – their ‘actions’ can only at best be
regarded as quasi-purposive, in the sense that they apparently
de facto have a common direction, viz. the perpetuation of
life. Thus, the flower in our example did not ‘do’ anything
that could literally be characterized as adapting, struggling or
becoming fitter; the flower can claim no credit for its
evolution. According to Darwinism, there were just random
genetic mutations, which happened to be physically
compatible with surrounding conditions that happened to
occur.
The concept of struggle for existence, as understood by
biology, treats every possible behavior pattern under the
same heading. It is not limited to situations of conflict or
even of difficulty, but covers every aspect of the life of
individuals and populations that happens to be ‘good for’
them. In this broad perspective, cooperation, sharing, mutual
service and symbiosis are equally forms of ‘struggle’ – they
are expedients adopted by the organisms concerned –
consciously, or of course (by analogy) unconsciously, as the
case may be – to further their own lives, by means of
exchanges of goods and divisions of labor. Even true altruism
(to the extent of self-sacrifice) may be assimilated under this
concept, if separate individuals or groups are conceived as
really parts of the same whole. Tolerance and peace are also
expedients. Social Darwinism foolishly or cunningly ignores
such nuances.
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Furthermore, Social Darwinists misunderstand natural
selection. Survival is not a product of conquest or at least
compromise in some dramatic struggle of the organism with
other organisms and with the environment. Survival, even for
humans, is not proof of some sort innate fitness or personal
credit; things are not that simple, orderly or satisfying109. As
Darwin was careful to stress, survival is mostly a matter of
plain luck. The law of averages makes some individuals or
groups survive and some die off, with little or no regard for
their genetic potential.
For example, a city tree has thousands of seeds; most of them
fall on the pavement, with no chance of ever germinating;
one or two may fall on the lawn under the tree and not get
raked away by the gardener, each giving rise to a seedling;
then comes the lawn-mower and puts an end to that attempt,
though one seedling may be missed and grow on for awhile.
In this example, the seeds all have genetic content of more or
less equal value for the furtherance of life, though some may
in fact be more robust and fertile than others; but it is
generally mere chance and not their relative genetic potential
that has determined which finally survived.
The same truism applies to all individual lives. Lightning
may strike a tree, which falls and kills the dominant monkey
in a group – supposedly, the best genetic specimen; it was not
killed by any inherent unfitness, but by bad luck; there was
no fault in its makeup that differentiated it from its mates,
that earmarked it for genetic extinction (assuming it had no
offspring before) – it was simply in the wrong place, at the
wrong time. As, indeed, was the tree. The trees and monkeys
109
If they were evidently so, everybody would believe in God
and Job would never have written his book!
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spared by that accident of nature may in fact be genetically
much weaker and in the long term have less chances of
survival, so that the world’s genetic pool has in fact been
impoverished by those two deaths.
Similarly, with regard to whole species: The existence of the
human species today is just, according to biology, due to the
mass extinction of the dinosaurs about 65 million years ago
when a giant meteor struck planet Earth. The dinosaurs were
eminently ‘fit’ for life here, more so than the mammals, since
the former did much better than the latter for over 130
million years, keeping them small and insignificant. Only
after these essentially fitter species were wiped out, could the
mammals (those that happened to survive the cataclysm)
emerge, diversify and grow, eventually giving rise to the
human species.
It may be that if dinosaurs had survived, they would have in
time given rise to species far superior to the human (i.e. more
intelligent and more powerful, in the best senses of those
terms). Maybe the genetic strains that did survive the
catastrophe, and give rise to the human species, were by far
inferior in every respect, except for a lucky break. One could
of course argue that the mammals were proven fitter by the
very fact of their survival; their fitness consisting presumably
in being smaller (under 25 kg) and thus able to take shelter
from the physical upheavals that destroyed the dinosaurs
(though not all of them, note – since reptiles, birds, and other
of their descendents persist). But this argument is rather
circular, because it treats exceptional events as on a par with
routine events.
Fitness, or adaptive capacity, should not be construed as
implying a sort ability in principle to somehow preempt
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eventual disasters. In our above example of the tree and
monkey struck down by lightning, the natural event involved
was such that it would have killed any other tree and monkey
that happened to be there at the time. The trees and monkey
that survived had nothing notably different in their makeup;
nothing saved them other than coincidence. In particular, the
surviving monkeys did not sense the lightning coming and
scatter.
Some commentators, after similar reflections, have suggested
the expression ‘survival of the luckiest’ would be more
accurate. More precisely, we might say that, within the range
of those biologically fit enough to survive in a give
environment, the fittest are not always the luckiest. The
specimens that do ‘make it’ are not necessarily the ideal
candidates. I shudder to think of all the great genes destroyed
in natural disasters, and due to human wars and
environmental devastation. Ours is not ‘the best of all
possible worlds’.
The concept of fitness (as here described) is faulty not only
because it ignores the important factor of luck, but also
because it is applied in an undifferentiated manner to the
whole organism or species, rather than to specific
characteristics, and is then used for comparative purposes. It
should be kept in mind that (a) each fitness is relative: what is
fit in one respect may be unfit in other respects; and (b)
overall fitness is an average: the same individual or group
may have more characters that are usually more fit than
characters that are usually less fit, and so be declared ‘on the
whole fit’; therefore (c) comparisons of fitness between
individuals or species are not very meaningful, since different
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circumstances are necessarily involved in their respective
lives.
If a man is eaten by a tiger, it does not prove the tiger to
belong to a higher species than the man. It just means that the
tiger is physically stronger than the man. It remains true that,
in other respects, the man is superior to the tiger, being able
to invent a spear or gun that kills it at a distance, or simply by
virtue of being able to write poetry. If the human species ends
up eliminating the tiger species, it does not prove the tiger
species to have been unfit for life on earth. It just shows how
stupid and shortsighted mankind can be. Similarly, in human
society: if a thug kills a gentleman, or a Nazi kills a Jew, it is
only a demonstration that the former was more violent, and
certainly not proof of greater moral or social worth. The
victim is not shown genetically deficient or constitutionally
less viable.
2.
Spiritual Darwinism
Those who believe in Social Darwinism usually wish to
flatter themselves that they belong to the class of the fittest;
the superior, beautiful people; the dominant elite. I would say
that a more logical impact from Darwinism would be to make
us kinder, more sympathetic to other creatures. That is its
impact on me, anyway. Once we realize that we are all really
made of the same stuff, just genetic variations on the theme
of living matter, we feel closer to other people, other peoples
and other species.
Social Darwinism promoted a culture of racism, claiming a
genetic basis for its collective evaluations of peoples. But the
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‘value’ of a person is not in his or her genes, but in what he
or she makes of them – in his or her ‘virtue’. The dignity of a
human being, as of an animal, is in how it responds to the
challenges of life with the means at its disposal, the use it
makes of its cognitive and volitional powers. In the case of
humans, the possibility and necessity of decency towards
others seems essential, since violence, hatred and fear are in
the long run to the disadvantage of all, even if they may in
the short run seem advantageous to some. Nothing in
biological science justifies the reading that war, of some
against others or of all against all, is natural. For creatures
like us endowed with reason and freewill, wisdom, kindness
and intelligence are obviously the best course.
It is interesting to note that the image of human society
projected by Social Darwinists matches perfectly with the
traditional portrayal of the egoist grasping and clinging,
climbing over the bodies of all those that are in his way,
taking whatever he wants whenever he can. It shows up the
essence of Social Darwinism, as a narrow-minded doctrine
designed to vindicate selfish pursuits and the social injustice
resulting from them. Instead of such mindless behavior,
spreading suffering, one may of course propose an
enlightened self-interest that considers the broader and
longer-term consequences of one’s actions. In Darwinist
terms, one could say that only justice, peace and love (excuse
the clichés110) are over time likely to ensure survival of
human life and life in general.
110
Most people would in principle agree with these “politically
correct” generalities. However, some people treat “peace and love”
as absolutes, which one must impose on oneself without regard as
to whether the opposite party does so too. With that, I find it hard to
agree – one has the right and duty to self-defense when
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Finally, it is all an issue of quality of life. What kind of world
do we want to live in – an obscure place of stupidity and
conflict, death and destruction, or a shining place of wisdom
and harmony, life and progress? Of course, utopian
philosophies and religions can also cause much harm, but
they should not for that reason be ignored, constituting as
they do mankind’s attempts to probe more deeply into such
issues.
Can Darwinism, properly conceived (and not as some have
historically misconstrued it), assist the humanities (i.e.
ethical, social, economic and political discourse)? The time
frame of biological evolution is very long, very much longer
than the span of human history. The humanities mainly draw
on the latter for their empirical data, to predict what forms of
social behavior and organization are likely to bring good or
bad to individual humans, human groups or humanity as a
whole. The survival of the human (and other) species is a
legitimate standard of judgment for the humanities, drawn
from biology. But within that broad framework, many
conjectures are possible, between which we can only judge
with reference to history, if only approximately. Many
questions faced by humanity remain unanswerable, whether
we look to biology or to history, for the simple reason that
they deal with novel issues that have no precedent in the past.
In any case, we have seen in the present work the specificity
of human beings, in terms of their degree of consciousness
and volition compared to other animals. These two differentia
are radical enough to suggest that whatever conclusions
biology may come to with respect to life in general, it has to
necessary. That is why “justice” should also be mentioned; it
ensures equilibrium.
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reconsider them very carefully when trying to apply them
specifically to homo sapiens. A species that displays such
major distinctions is bound to be subject to some more
specific, less mechanistic biological considerations. Our fate
cannot be left to chance. If humans have the power of choice,
then their nature is to refer to ethical discourse, to help them
decide in a pondered manner what courses to follow.
It is important in this context to understand the term
‘survival’ in a large and deep sense. Ultimately, it does not
just mean physical continuity at all costs; this is only minimal
survival. There are greater degrees of survival, ranging from
physical health up through psychological wellbeing to
spiritual life. The human being, especially, is no mere body,
but a largely mental and spiritual entity. Mankind is not just
driven by matter, but has other, seemingly ‘higher’
considerations. Consequently, the standards of success or
failure may be different for humans than for other species.
A person may succeed materially but woefully fail in other
dimensions of his or her being. Another may fail in the
material domain yet succeed in the intellectual or spiritual
domain. Who is ‘better off’? If we insist on applying ‘genetic
perpetuation’ as the only conceivable biological norm, we
will prefer the first. But if we allow that at the human level of
existence other issues may be involved, we may prefer the
second. The fact is, many people are no longer subject to the
reproductive instinct, and choose to have sex lives without
begetting children, or to become monks or nuns.
Physically, they are naturally selected out; but what does that
prove? Perhaps some of the latter function on another
evolutionary scale, wherein it is not the genes that matter
most but the soul. Perhaps genes only exist to eventually give
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rise to souls, or as vehicles for souls. The materialist
interpretation of things is not necessarily the final word. I
mean, from an ethical point of view, it is just a doctrine like
any other.
It could be argued, in accord with the biological principle of
evolution, that the soul ‘evolved’ in certain forms of living
organism, as an instrument of the body, improving the body’s
chances of survival and reproduction. In a materialist
perspective, ‘spiritual philosophy’ may then be considered as
an aberration, whereby the tool (the soul) has forgotten its
original function and acquired the pretension that it is life’s
goal and that the body must serve it. But it is equally
conceivable that, once the soul appeared on the biological
scene, it surpassed all other considerations in the material
pursuits of the organisms that had one.
The latter perspective might be characterized as ‘Spiritual
Darwinism’ – or as the salvation of the morally fittest – a
doctrine diametrically opposed to that of historical ‘Social
Darwinism’, which refers to the physical or political
dominion of thugs. If we reflect, the spiritual principle of
salvation of the morally fittest is nothing new; it has always
been the basis of spiritual philosophies like Judaism or
Buddhism. Some people advance on the spiritual path, and
some are left behind or regress. Some people make the effort
to evolve spiritually and are ‘saved’ or ‘enlightened’; others
refuse to use their life constructively, and remain in darkness
or sink further down. So it goes – and few, very few, find
their way to true ‘survival’ – i.e. ‘eternal life’.
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15. CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 17.
SOME TOPICS IN DEONTOLOGY
Deontology is a vast topic, which we can only touch upon in
the present volume. I have already made scattered remarks
on this subject in previous chapters, and in earlier works111;
here some additional comments seem worth making.
1.
Founding Ethics
The term ‘deontology’ may be taken to refer to the theoretical
study and foundation of ethics, without initial preference for
any particular ethical system; another term for this is ‘metaethics’. This philosophical discipline is concerned with the
form, rather than the content of ethics – how ethical systems
are structured, the logical forms and arguments used in them,
how standards or norms might be first established
111
See chapters 3.4, 10.3 and 13.2, here; also, chapter 13 in
Judaic Logic.
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(‘axiology’112), and indeed all ontological and epistemological
issues relative to ethical judgment.
Deontology will, for instance, emphasize that the concepts of
life, consciousness and volition are central to any ethical
claim or system.
Ethical discourse can only concern living beings.
Inanimate entities (e.g. a table or a molecule) have
nothing to lose – for their defining boundaries are fluid
and arbitrarily set. We may break a diamond or
disintegrate it – but ‘it’ has lost nothing. Living beings,
on the other hand, have things to lose – their limb and
life, which may be harmed or destroyed. A microbe is not
just a mix of matter; kill it, and the matter remains but it
no longer behaves as a living cell.
Ethical discourse is of no use to unconscious organisms,
since they have no way to gain knowledge of it. We do
consider that some things are conducive and others are
detrimental to plants or microbes – but knowledge of
such things concerns us, not the plants or microbes. Such
knowledge tells us humans how to cultivate them,
presumably so as to eat them or otherwise use them – so
it is really a subset of human ethics. Animals can acquire
knowledge of sorts, and so may conceivably learn facts or
behavior (e.g. from their parents) that protects and
furthers their life.
112
The term axiology is often used in the wide sense I here
give to deontology. I prefer to use the term axiology more
specifically with regard to the issue of norm setting, because of its
similarity to the word axiom (they both have the same Greek root,
‘worth’).
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Ethical discourse presupposes volition. If the conscious
organism has no volition, no ethical proposition
concerning it is meaningful – since it can do nothing
other than whatever it happens to be doing in the
circumstances concerned anyway! Ethics is for organisms
with freewill, meaning humans and higher animals.
Ultimately, of course, ethics is the prerogative of humans –
who are not only alive and conscious and volitional, but
moreover able to reason about ethics in general, to formulate
and understand particular ethical propositions, and to monitor
and manage their own behavior systematically. There is no
point researching and writing an ethics, if the subject of it is
unable to read it or follow it.
Imperatives, prohibitions, permissions and exemptions – all
such statements, whatever their specific contents, logically
presuppose an acceptance that the subject has some
rationality and free will113. It is absurd (self-contradictory) to
make or imply statements like: “don’t refer to the concepts of
consciousness or volition in your discourse” – since to say
“do not” implies one has awareness and choice.
Of course, volition is (as we have seen) something very hard
to fully define and prove, because it is – like consciousness
113
Immanuel Kant appears to consider that we know of our
freedom indirectly from our ‘sense of duty’ and the logical
consideration that duty is only meaningful to a free agent. This is of
course nonsense. The sense of freewill is, in my view, far more
radical than that of duty. Also, I am not at all sure we have an
innate sense of duty – our intuitions of duty are derivatives, not
primaries. Even logically, liberty without duty is not something
inconceivable; in a sense, we consider God as being free even of
duties.
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and like feelings – a primary object of experience. It is not
like something else, to which it might be compared and
reduced; it is something sui generis, a basic building block of
experience. There is no logical basis for excluding volition
from the realm of existence, just because it cannot be entirely
described in terms of material or mental phenomena. It
suffices to point out that it is something we experience
distinctively (through ‘self-knowledge’, ‘introspective
intuition’ or ‘apperception’ – however we choose to call it).
We do not, note well, merely conceive it as a generality – but
distinctly experience particular acts of volition within us.
Most human propositions and reasoning about causality are
really about volition and allied concepts. Although the world
of nature, or causation, is of course of great daily concern to
us – we are also all the time greatly involved in thinking
about our place in that world and in society, as well as our
inner world, and all such thought is essentially to do with
volition and allied causal concepts, including ethical
concepts.
As we have seen, the ethical modalities (i.e. imperatives,
prohibitions, permissions, exemptions) have to do with the
realm of the possible. What is impossible in any respect does
not belong in the realm of ethics (except to deny
responsibility). With reference to any domain we face
(nature, society, our own psyche), the following truisms are
worth keeping in mind:
Some things are inevitable; some future events are
naturally necessary, no matter what anyone (except
perhaps God) does to avoid them. A contrario, some
things cannot happen, no matter what anyone does in the
attempt to make them happen.
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Some things are inevitable (or unfeasible) for some
volitional agents, but not so for others. Or they are so at
one time, but not another. Or under certain conditions, but
not others.
Some things are bound to happen, unless we make a
determined effort to prevent them (e.g. a natural disaster,
a war or a nervous breakdown). Some things are bound
not to happen, unless we act in a timely and appropriate
manner to make them happen (e.g. a building, a social
system or a psychological development).
To prevent dangers from actualizing, it is usually
necessary to be aware that the things concerned are
dangerous, preventable, and likely to occur if not acted
upon. Similarly, to achieve some positive value, it is
usually necessary to identify it as such and to believe in
the possibility of achieving it, as well as to acknowledge
the need to make an effort to achieve it.
With regard to “freedom of the will”, this phrase – as already
pointed out – refers more precisely to the freedom of the soul
to will, whatever influences to the contrary accumulate. In a
Buddhist perspective, where the ‘soul’ or ‘self’ is radically
denied, we might identify the concept of freedom of the will
with that of “the unconditioned” – i.e. it is one’s “Buddha
nature” that is free, and we only attain true freedom by
getting to and abiding in that place within one’s psyche.
Otherwise, according to Buddhist psychology, we are greatly
moved by “desire”. In this context, it would perhaps be well
to draw a distinction between “general desire” and “particular
desire”. The former concept would refer to the emotional
base of desire as such, a diffuse substratum without specific
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object; while the latter concept would refer to the application
of general desire to a particular object (e.g. a loved person),
often merely on the basis of a random fantasy or other
pretext.114
Many influences impact on any given act of volition; some
facilitate it, others make it more difficult. As we have seen,
influences may be outside factors, which condition the
volitional act through having been perceived or conceived by
the agent. Mental factors of various sorts are also of course
often influential to varying degrees. Some influences are
simple, short-lived, ad hoc; while some seem to be more
complex and deeply ingrained. Habits, for instance, are
produced and reinforced by repetition. Obsessions and
compulsions involve complicated hidden factors, which
produce inertias unless certain work is done to overcome
them.
We have seen how impulses and urges – be they physical,
mental or spiritual – can be reconciled with the fact and
concept of freewill. We were particularly concerned to find
out why and how some normally volitional aspects of mental
life, such as some thought processes, might sometimes give
the impression that they occur automatically, indeed against
our will. We arrived at the conclusion that such thoughts,
although products of consciousness and will, are hard to
114
If the felt emotions are sufficiently distinctive, we might
subdivide general desire into broad (intermediate) categories such
as “lust for sex”, “power lust”, “greed for food”, “greed for money”,
“yearning for fame”, etc. This supposes that not only do we feel
vague ‘desire’ before we desire something specific, but also there
is an intermediate stage where general desire first takes shape as
vague lust or greed etc. before it focuses on a particular object of
lust or greed etc.
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control instantaneously, just because a greater and more
sustained effort of consciousness and will is required to rein
them in than to let them loose.
Many actions we label as ‘unconscious’ or ‘involuntary’ are
really minimally conscious or voluntary. Our linguistic habit
in that regard should not be allowed to mislead us into
erroneous doctrines. When we have an impulse to do
something, we may immediately (more or less whimsically)
‘follow that impulse’ and do the thing concerned – or we may
restrain ourselves momentarily, at least long enough to reflect
and make a considered decision. The amount of effort put
into that reflection determines how (i.e. to what degree)
‘conscious’ and ‘voluntary’ is our subsequent action or our
further restraint from action. A policy may be instituted for
future recurrences of similar choices, or a habit may be
programmed by repeating the same decision.
Through such formal analyses of psychological factors, we
have (I believe) greatly succeeded in buttressing the concept
of volition.
The development of ethical propositions – and eventually an
ethical system – constitutes an attempt to prepare in advance
answers to questions that naturally and inevitably arise in the
course of volition. It is a service the ethical philosopher seeks
to render to fellow volitional agents115, just as the logician
seeks to facilitate human pursuit of knowledge or the
physical scientist seeks to facilitate human interactions with
nature.
115
Of course, such philosophers must be careful to remain
modest, and not imagine they can tell everyone what to do in all
circumstances.
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It is a necessary endeavor, because judgments made in the
heat of the moment, under the impact of all sorts of emotional
and other influences, are not always as broad-based and
accurate as those made ‘in the ivory tower’. Sometimes,
admittedly, the philosopher on his armchair cannot anticipate
all the factors that the agent in the field actually faces.
Sometimes, to be sure, it is better to act “intuitively” rather
than in a “pondered” manner. But more often than not, it is
wise to consider matters with a cool head, and with plenty of
time to reflect and take a maximum number of issues into
consideration.
But whatever ethics proposes, or whatever this or that ethical
theory proposes – and whoever is behind the proposition,
oneself or others – such an ethical proposition is merely one
influential factor among others in the act of will. It does not
remove the responsibility of the agent for his action. It is just
an influence; the volition remains his own.
Even if one believes the ethics one is following to be of
Divine origin (i.e. decreed or inspired by God, and
transmitted by some religion) – one remains responsible. The
act of faith in that religion is itself a volitional act, for which
one is responsible. All subsequent acts performed under the
influence of such faith remain acts of free will.
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2.
291
Ethics Concerns the Living, Thinking, Willing
Ayn Rand wrote somewhere116, concerning values – “of value
to whom and for what?” – implying that the term ‘value’
does not stand alone, but is relative to certain subjects and to
certain standards. This is not a mere grammatical
observation, but a logical insight too often ignored.
As we have said, ethics concerns the living, and in particular
organisms with consciousness and freewill, who have and
make choices – i.e. the thinking and willing. This fact
signifies that, whatever content we give to ethics, it must be
consistent with these three basic factors – life, cognition and
volition. They are necessary conditions for any ethical
system. That is, the “to whom” and “for what” aspects of
valuing are ultimately one and the same, or they at least
intersect considerably. By knowing whom we are concerned
with, we know what their needs are.
The distinction between living and non-living matter is
admittedly not easy to make with final precision, so that the
materialist perspective on life continues to seem equally if
not more credible to many people. They argue that life is a
phenomenon essentially like any other in the material world;
they define life as a natural outcome of certain combinations
of atoms.
They may be right – but the issues remain: how come this
complex phenomenon was potential in the building blocks of
116
Atlas Shrugged, p. 939.
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matter (quarks, or whatever); how come matter evolved after
the Big Bang through elementary particles, atoms, molecules,
organic molecules, till living cells emerged; and how come
the latter in turn gave rise to consciousness and will?
These questions are difficult to formulate, for it is difficult to
express the kind of answer that is sought through them. We
seem to have descriptive answers (i.e. the process of
evolution of matter and life is, let’s say, adequately
described) – but these answers do not answer those questions.
The issue is not, either, epistemological – we do not seek
more proof, we do not doubt the descriptive scenario given.
Our questions are, rather, why did these potentials exist in the
original substance of matter; why would matter take so many
different forms, and evolve all the way to life, consciousness
and volition? Why did quarks exist and why did they not
remain quarks forever? Why are the ‘laws of nature’ that
made them change (whatever these laws be) inherent in
them?
Yes, there are questions of sorts – so no one, not even the
convinced materialist, can claim to ‘know it all’. We have
seen how the concept of natural ‘conatus’, of distinctive
quasi-purposiveness in living processes is a legitimate
concept, which does not call for special epistemological
dispensations, but is formed in regular ways. It implies a sort
of striving without consciousness, life relentlessly pursuing
more life. Perhaps this abstract observation is the best
definition of life we can propose.
The prime standard of natural ethics is bound to be Life,
since the phenomenon of life is the core thing that gives
meaning to the concept of ethics. That is, of course, a very
vague norm, which biology, physiology, psychology,
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sociology and kindred sciences may clarify and enrich for us,
telling us not only what furthers life, but also what gives it its
fullest expression. This more precise account would need to
refer not only to life – but also to consciousness and volition.
They too are underlying standards that all ethical theories
have to support, since ethics is meaningless without them.
With regard to life, I know that my own readings in biology
have greatly affected my understanding of this standard,
shifting its sense from a more self-oriented “my life” or “the
life of my loved ones”, over to a broader interest in “life as
such” or “life in general” or “all life”.
Beyond the struggle for survival of individuals, groups,
species (which is undeniably fundamental), we may discern
the struggle for survival of life per se, independent of any
particular form or genetic content. In the latter perspective,
the various forms of life are but means to the more basic end,
that of life as a whole. The diverse forms may struggle
against each other, competing for limited resources, using
each other as well as minerals as natural resources117, but
ultimately their efforts can be considered as converging to a
common goal, the continuation of life as such, in some form
or other at least, but better still in as many forms as
possible118.
One might thus argue for the ‘unity’ of life, as if we speak of
one organism that can split up into many smaller interacting
entities, yet nevertheless remains one. We, and all animals
117
Except for the lowest creatures in the food chain, which
feed on minerals only.
118
It does not follow, of course, that genetic engineering is in
the long-term favorable to life. Nor does this doctrine condone
having sex with animals!
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and all vegetables are not just cousins – we are the same
entity. This “Gaia hypothesis” may have some validity and
utility. Nonetheless, we can conceive of a hierarchy or
pyramid of living organisms, from the simplest to the most
complex, at the top of which (at least here on Earth) we
seemingly happen to be in numerous or most respects.
Mankind is the species (or perhaps the only remaining
species on Earth) with the maximum amount of
consciousness and freewill. These powers are found to a
lesser degree in other species, but most in us. Even within the
human race, there are individual variations, some of which
are perhaps inherent to a genetic makeup, while others can be
improved on by personal effort. Considering all this as an
outcrop of matter at the Big Bang, it is as if matter strove to
see and know itself, and volitionally act upon itself, going
way beyond the blindness and ‘natural law’ determinism
(including, here, the mindless indeterminism of quantum
mechanics) of the mineral realm.
These are speculations, of course; but I ramble on because
they seem to have some impact on the idea of a universal
ethical standard. We should also, in this context, keep in
mind the last phases of the biological story – what we call
‘history’. After eons of animal evolution, a weird species
called humans emerged, and at times seemed the crowning
achievement of nature, though now looks more and more like
its nemesis. Is evolution collapsing onto itself in a final flurry
of fickle frenzy?
And within that framework, we need to consider the history
of ideas, and in particular the history of philosophy, to
understand the thoughts and behavior of the individual
humans we are today. Ideas and philosophies, from a
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biological viewpoint, are just ways and means people have
through history responded to changing environmental, social
and psychological challenges. It is a long story of trial and
error, in which those who wrote the most or became most
famous were not necessarily those who understood the most.
Looking back, one is at times amazed at the incompetents
philosophy has attracted.
But what is wonderful about philosophy is that even stupid
philosophies are useful to the development of philosophy,
because they encourage other philosophers to distance
themselves from their positions, and explain why. For this
reason the history of philosophy is an integral part of
philosophy, because each philosophy in it is somewhat
delimited by all the others.
3.
Conscience and Conformism
Most people, perhaps not all, have a functioning conscience.
What is that? It seems to be a reserved ‘part’ of us, which we
charge with the task of supervising the rest. Of course,
granting that the soul has no spatial extension, this
description is only a manner of speaking, a mere analogy.
One’s conscience is no other than one’s self behaving in a
certain way in time; it is a volitional function, although it
may be habitual to various degrees, even obsessivecompulsive. Conscience may thus be ‘big’ or infinitesimally
‘small’.
Conscience essentially means consciousness (in French, the
two words are the same) – being aware. The role assigned to
conscience by us is to critically oversee our thoughts and
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actions, and judge whether they fit in with our deepest
standards of what is humanly appropriate in given
circumstances. This job may be performed consciously, or
subconsciously; in the latter case, we can induce the implicit
judgments by observing the subject’s patterns of behavior.
Conscience is thus revelatory of effective ethical standards.
Note that the concept of conscience is also applicable
in the more neutral realm of ‘ethics of knowledge’,
where we monitor and regulate our cognitive
processes (our intellectual honesty, our will to
realism, our efforts of research, the logic of our
inferences, and so forth).
We can, by observation of a person’s consciousness and
volition at work, infer that person’s underlying ethical
standards. Insofar as most people have common standards,
such observations may give rise to a notion of ethics based
on conscience. However, such a doctrine is hard to uphold, as
it seems to involve circularity. Are the deep ethical standards
that conscience bases its judgments on innate? That would
seem doubtful, although some could be posited as instinctive,
i.e. as genetically transmitted emotional influences.
For the most part, however, the norms implied by our
conscience are acquired and changeable. For most people,
this means mostly reference to the cultural norms of the
social group around them, which are largely conventional,
though often based on the accumulated wisdom of a society
or mankind over time. Some people, to some extent, take a
more active part in the formulation of their guiding norms. A
person may start with one set of norms, acquired through
education or by cultural osmosis, and later acquire a
somewhat different set, whether by change of peer group and
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adoption of a new convention, or through more conscious and
rational efforts.
Most people function by conformism. In a modern, mediabased society, like ours today, this occurs as conformity to
stereotypes – for examples, the stereotype of the rebellious
youth (who, however, wears the right type of clothing and
uses the appropriate language), or the stereotypes of the
crusading reporter, tough-guy lawyer or hotshot investment
specialist. Conformism makes things easy: one does not have
to think too much about what to do – and one is easily
classified by others, gaining ready benefits from such
identification.
Conformism is nothing new, but found in all societies,
throughout history and geography. It is not just a matter of
external appearance or behavioral patterns, but controls
thought processes. The practice is especially evident in
closed religious or political groups. People in such
ideological circles are prone to thinking by means of clichés,
rather than investigation. They tend to cognitively function
by subsuming people and events under preordained
categories, rather than by developing categorizations
inductively. A person or event is forced into a limited number
of given labels, with no room for conceptual adaptation.
Even if the natural sciences are essentially neutral with
regard to setting ethical standards, in the sense that we do not
observe ready-made ones in nature, they still have a
constructive function, helping us to identify objective means
to our ends. They also play an eliminative role, helping us to
get rid of ideologies based on false presuppositions. But of
course, granting that the body, in itself or as a vessel for the
soul, is important to life, biology is also informative as to
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what standards are natural. Science is therefore important to
deontological efforts.
The Kantian view of ‘duty’, as something that must be done
whatever the human cost119, ought to be considered in this
context; it appears as the notion of a stiff-minded extremist. I
should add that, although Rabbis have a similar
fundamentalist attitude with regard to certain mitzvoth
(commandments), they do consider that the law has to be
tempered occasionally, to save a person from unnecessary
harm or pain. Such avoidance of doctrinal rigidity may be
characterized as ‘humanism’; it is remembering we are
concerned with human beings, not robots.
Also worth noting here is the observation that people
sometimes commit sins (according to their standards) almost
deliberately, in order to rationalize – even if ex post facto –
their sufferings as punishment for their sins, preferring this
twisted option to the frightening idea that there might be
unjustified suffering in the world! This is another instance of
ideology, where one tries to force experience into
preconceived ideas, instead of remaining cognitively flexible.
Although ethics is built up primarily around the individual,
since individuals are the ultimate units of its injunctions and
inhibitions, its social aspect should not be underrated. The
individual soul has three powers – consciousness (the soul as
subject), volition (the soul as agent) and valuation (which
gives rise to the emotional life). But additionally, the soul has
a social dimension, which is not entirely reducible to the said
119
For example, one should not lie to someone just to avoid
hurting the person’s feelings.
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three powers. This fourth aspect of soul is fundamental to its
nature, although hard to pinpoint.
We do not exist as isolated entities, but as part of a social
fabric. Why else would people congregate in communities
and nations? An unloved baby is as good as dead
psychologically, losing intelligence, the ability to
communicate, and so on120. People need each other, not
merely as means but as ends. This is a complex issue that
deontology must take pains to integrate.
4.
Tai Chi, Karma Yoga and Faith
Doing Tai Chi some years ago, led me to an insight
concerning “virtue”.
The Tai Chi form comprises a great number of
incremental individual ‘positions’, which slowly flow
into each other, forming whole ‘moves’, which in turn
naturally succeed each other, resulting in a complete
‘form’.
No position in or portion of the form is justified by
any others, although stringed together they form a
consistent and powerful whole.
120
A few years ago, when the Rumanian dictator fell,
orphanages were made public, where children were barely cared
for at all. They were found to be horribly underdeveloped, mentally
and physically. Interestingly, babies closer to the door of a dorm
were slightly less affected than those farther away, because they
experienced the rare passages of the nurses a bit more often!
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Each incremental Tai Chi position within a move
must be experienced as important in itself, and not
merely as a ‘way station’ en route towards the final
position in that move. It is not instrumental, but to be
enjoyed and appreciated as it is, without anticipation
of its eventual destination or utility. Every
‘intermediate’ position is a ‘value’ or goal in itself,
and not merely a ‘virtue’ in the sense of a means to an
end.
The movement from one such position (or one whole
move) to the next is also a moment of which we
should always be firmly aware. The instant of change,
of shifting over into a new position, is also to be felt
with great concentration.
By so treasuring every point and transition in the
trajectory of Tai Chi, we incidentally maintain its full
potential towards an infinity of other moves. We also
get a sense of the discontinuity and continuity of time.
A move has little value if one is not intensely
conscious of all the segments comprising it. For this
reason, Tai Chi is considered a meditation and should
be performed as slowly as possible.
Tai Chi illustrates the Stoic principle that “virtue is its own
reward”121. It teaches us how each virtue is a value, and how
the expression of many varied virtues is also a value.
Such a lesson in living may be valuable even at the time of
our death.
121
Volition.
See earlier discussion of this principle, in chapter 10.3 of
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Rather than be afraid of that great unknown, no matter what
form our death takes, we could regard it as a great
opportunity! Just as we should go through life contemplating
its course with equanimity, viewing the bad as well as the
good as a great and interesting show – so, when death arrives,
we should meditatively watch it come.
Just think: your one and only chance to experience this
mysterious event first-hand! It is worthwhile training oneself
throughout life to be conscious in all circumstances.
Watching oneself die, if only for a moment, one may at last
know what death is – or what life is.
Another Oriental discipline that teaches the same concept is
“karma yoga”. Karma yoga is going about your daily work
activities without concern for the advantages they may bring
you personally. This is practiced in yoga ashrams and the
like; for example, a Zen monk may sweep the courtyard or do
a bit of gardening every day.
Many people suffer much in their work life, wondering why
they have to perform certain boring routines to earn their
living. Karma yoga teaches: enjoy it! Do the job, without
involving your ego – without ‘selfish motive’. This is of
course an idealization, not a call to or justification of
amorality or immorality. It merely means: concentrate on the
job you have undertaken to do; take one thing at a time, and
all tasks eventually get done.
It is important to realize that faith is an essential building
block of all ethical systems.
Religions, like Judaism or Buddhism, are ridiculed by some
people because of their requirement of ‘faith’. Such people
argue that in an ethic based entirely on reason and
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experience, nothing would be assumed worth doing until and
unless we first established that our proposed actions were
bound to or likely to have certain positive consequences
considered worth pursuing – whereas in religious ethics, we
cannot know the truth and value of the goal (God or Nirvana,
as the case may be) in advance of ourselves attaining it, and
we must also take it for granted that the alleged means
(suggested to us by the tradition concerned) lead to that
putative goal.
Thus, religious ethics would seem in principle contrary to
reason, since their defining characteristic is faith – in both the
goal and the means. They are made to appear as a sort of
gigantic con game, whereby some future events inaccessible
to experience or strict inference from experience are forecast
(heaven or hell, or similar notions), and we are told (as a
revelation or ‘witnessing’) that we must do this and that, and
abstain from doing so and so, to achieve the positive
consequences and avoid the negative ones.
But though such arguments have weight, they are not entirely
fair and conclusive. In truth, all purposive action involves
faith. For our knowledge of the empirical world through
reason is essentially an inductive, tentative one. It consists
mostly of generalizations and adductive arguments, based on
past experience and dependent for confirmation on future
experience – which means, ultimately, it is built by trial and
error. Most propositions we believe are attempts at truth,
which we hope will hold, but which we may need to correct
further on.
One may still contend that, whereas secular ethics make
relatively small or at least discrete demands, religious
systems demand we invest our whole life in a purpose whose
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validity and value may just be figments of someone’s
imagination, and the efficacy of the means to which is far
from evident. But is that fair criticism? Surely, in common
pursuits like raising a child or pursuing a career, we invest
our whole life in purposes without guarantees of success.
Human beings inevitably gamble, whatever their course of
action, whatever the way of life they choose.
So, the demand of faith by religious ethics should not be
viewed as a determining argument in favor of secular ethics.
Concerning religion, Pascal’s Wager comes into play; for
those who totally reject religion, there are still great
uncertainties to cope with. Thus, the deontologist must keep
an open mind, neither rejecting religion offhand, nor (of
course) naïvely accepting its claims.
I have elsewhere122 attacked the principle of karma, dear to
Indian philosophy, pointing out the epistemological
difficulties involved (for us ordinary mortals) in establishing
alleged karmic relations. Similar objections can be raised
with regard to claims of Divine reward or punishment: how
could such claims be proved? But here I wish to point out
how even secular ethical principles are often based on mere
suppositions, and do not for all that lose of their power.
If I claim, in accord with karmic law, that it is best for me not
to do some deed harmful to others, because the same will
surely happen to me if I do so – I am involved in a circular
argument of sorts. I can claim this as a generalization from
past bitter experience, but that generalization will not be
tested in the particular case at hand if I believe in it and
122
See Buddhist Illogic, chapter 9.
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abstain from the deed, and so it will somewhat paradoxically
remain forever unempirical!
On the other hand, it would suffice for me to claim more
hypothetically that if a similar harmful deed were done to me,
as it well might, I could not then consistently complain that I
was a victim of some cruelty and injustice, having allowed
myself to do the same. In this way, the benefits of karmic
principle can be maintained – the consciousness of
reciprocity – without having to prove actual causal
connections.
Another example: I can pursue the Buddhist ideal of
‘cessation of desire, so as to avoid rebirth’, just in case there
is such a thing as rebirth and on the supposition that it is
caused by desire. Although these assumptions are unproved,
and we cannot even imagine how they might ever be proved,
they may still legitimately be used as working hypotheses.
Similarly, one might argue: in case God exists and gave man
the Torah, I had better act thus and thus. I have to do
something, so it might as well be that.
In other words, behavior need not be based on certainties,
which are anyway rarely if ever available, but can be based
on frankly conditional judgments. The conditioning involved
may have any mode – not only the natural mode, but also the
extensional and the logical modes. Since human knowledge
is inevitably limited, it is largely uncertain to some degree.
Nevertheless, life cannot be blocked by this truth; volition
still needs guidance. Therefore, action based on hypothetical
reasoning has ethical validity.
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16. CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Drawn from Volition and Allied Causal Concepts (2004),
Chapter 18.
MORE TOPICS IN DEONTOLOGY
1.
Inducing Ethics
How is ethics actually built up in people’s minds, and how is
it to be justified epistemologically? My proposed answer to
these questions is as follows.
We all have our own ‘intuitions’ of right and wrong, good
and bad, just and unjust, kind and unkind, etc. Some of these
are primary – arbitrary valuations of the free agent. Others
are basically emotional, sentimental or sensual. Others are
derived from conceptual insights, based on accumulated ideas
and values of which we may be more or less conscious, and
which we may have more or less justified. At this stage, we
need only consider them all as notions, as mere phenomena,
at their face value – without regard as to their sources,
structure, consistency or validity.
Taken one by one, in isolation from other such valuation
experiences and from knowledge as a whole, these intuitions
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may, of course, be real or illusory. They are not necessarily
‘correct’ or ‘justified’ just by virtue of their occurrence, nor
of course automatically invalidated by the fact that they as
yet have not been established as true and valid. This is
analogous to my treatment123 of appearances in general as
neutral, before we start classifying them as realities or
illusions.
Thus, initially, these intuitions of value or disvalue are
acknowledged to have some small credibility just by virtue of
appearing, but not enough of it to decide whether they are
ultimately reliable or not. But, through an inductive
procedure that treats these individual insights of right and
wrong as hypothetical raw data, and then faces them off with
all other data, comparing and contrasting these value-insights
to each other, and with the wider context of non-evaluative
knowledge, we manage to gradually build up a consistent
structure that includes some of them and excludes others.
From this ordering process, emerge the modalities of ethical
propositions (must, may and may not, cannot). Using
syllogistic and factorial techniques similar to those used with
non-ethical propositions124, ethical insights are statistically
ordered, collectively yielding ethical systems. By ‘statistical’,
here, I mean ‘for all, most, some, few, no other valuations (as
the case may be), this one is compatible or incompatible,
implied or not-implied’. Thus, I suggest, ethical logic is
constructed in much the same way as logic in general is.
123
See Future Logic, chapter 2.
Non-ethical propositions have been labeled ‘alethic’.
Regarding ‘factorial’ analysis, see Future Logic, Part VI.
124
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Note that ethical propositions do not only have categorical
form, like “X must do Y”. Some have conditional form, like
“if Z occurs, X must do Y – but if Z does not occur, X need
not do Y”. The former are applicable under general
conditions, whereas the latter under particular conditions; but
apart from that difference, their force of “imperativeness” is
the same.
My theory is, therefore, similarly intuitionist. This is not,
however, a relativistic position, at all. Some ethics are more
reliable than others. What distinguishes the ethical systems of
different people at different times is, simply, the clarity and
amount of ethical and non-ethical intuitions that have been
taken into account, and the logical rigor with which each of
us orders this raw data into a consistent whole. People with
confused minds are drawn hither and thither by their feelings
and notions, and fail to evolve a trustworthy ethic. Others are
more careful, and produce a sounder end product.
Thus, the right-wrong or good-bad experiences at the ground
of ethics are technically akin to the true-false or correctincorrect experiences at the ground of non-ethical knowledge.
The procedure for judging them is the same: we grant them
some ab initio credibility, but reserve our final judgment till
further research has confirmed them in all respects (until and
unless new evidence or arguments emerge to the contrary).
Thus, in effect, value-intuitions are treated as empirical data;
this gives them some weight, but does not in itself constitute
full justification, which requires a longer and more holistic
process of review.
As raw data, ethical intuitions are not only comparable to
sensible qualities like colors or feelings, but also to logical
insights. By this, I suggest that, given the very same level of
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intelligence and information, two people in similar
circumstances would theoretically have the same ethical
intuitions. Granting this bold assumption, we acknowledge a
certain ‘objectivity’ to ethical judgment. Of course, this
assumption cannot be definitely proved by experiment, since
in practice we cannot hope to make two people – or even the
same person at different times – sufficiently the same.
This hypothesis allows us to develop ethical concepts from
the ethical notions, in the same way as in general discourse
the logical modalities are constructed from apparent logical
insights of identity, contradiction, compatibility or
implication – by recourse to factorial analysis and factor
selection. We revert to adductive methods – trial and error,
the elimination of doubtful data, till what we are left with
seems reasonably well tested and confirmed.
The leftover ethical judgments are then logically ordered
relative to each other, as goals and means, so that the list of
final ends is reduced to a minimum, which implicitly contains
all subsidiary values. This is the teleological stage of the
proceedings. These final ends constitute the ‘standards of
value’ for the particular subject (man or woman) who has
concluded them.
Of course, these standards are to some extent in constant flux,
changing with new life experiences, reflections, incoming
information, and under the influence of other people. Some
aspects of people’s value systems remain firmly anchored in
them, to the degree that they personally identify with them.
Some values diminish or lose their importance in time; others
acquire or increase in importance later on. Note well that we
are speaking here of seeming values, i.e. of the appearance of
value to some particular person at some particular time.
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There may thus be divergences of opinion among people’s
values, even though they live in the same milieu. Inversely,
many people in a community or historical period may have
the same values, so that these common values appear to them
immutable and objective.
Thus, ethical logic, like the logic of non-ethical knowledge,
should be viewed as an inductive enterprise. It is not a
deductive system, wherein we are at the outset given, in one
way or another, a set of “top moral principles” from which all
moral judgments are syllogistically inferred, as many moral
philosophers propose. Ethics is not casuistry, based on more
or less agreed, arbitrary “axioms” (so-called). Rather, we
gradually evolve standards of value over time: they are our
short list of most impressive and important looking moral
insights.
These norms (or “highest goods”) may, once arrived at, be
used in the way of axioms, but they remain open to review
and verification at all times, in recognition of the fact that
they were originally products of induction. Although many of
us tend to enshrine certain norms, and insist on their eternity,
such rigidity is neither justified nor necessary. A norm carries
more conviction if it is felt sufficiently confident to face and
withstand challenges, than if we block all reconsideration.
Nevertheless, some norms are logically very secure, if not
immovable. This refers to the norms that fit the general
teleological argument: “whatever your particular values, you
must still refer to so and so (the secure norm) as a supreme
value, because it is a precondition to the pursuit of any
values whatsoever”. We can in this way argue that life, body,
cognitive faculties, awareness, volitional faculties, liberty,
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health, sanity, and so forth, are all preconditions that any
value system we propose has to accept.
Although, note well, such basic values do not by themselves
make possible an answer to all ethical questions – they
nevertheless provide a framework for all other values.
This is comparable to the role played by the laws of thought,
and indeed by logic in general, within knowledge. These top
principles or axioms are self-evident, because they are
implied even by propositions that attempt to deny them.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that logic by itself allows us
to deduce the world without reliance on experience. We must
still largely depend on experience. Logic just helps us to
make sense of that experience.
In the domain of values, some values act as sine qua
non conditions for all other values. Since all values
are to some extent relative to these values, they may
be considered as effectively absolute values. If we can
argue of some value Y that “whether you value X or
you value notX, you must still pursue or retain Y
and/or avoid or remove notY” – Y is established as
such a precondition. Note that X and notX are
presumed values, and not merely indifferent objects.
This is essentially dilemmatic argument, similar to
that used in general logic to establish necessary
propositions.
It is an aspect of teleological reasoning, which (as already
said) investigates ways and means to intuited values, in the
light of natural and artificial tools and obstacles available.
Teleological reasoning refers to the natural and extensional
modes of modality, rather than to the logical mode. It makes
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consistency checks between our different goals, and places
them in hierarchies and priorities. It seeks out the most
effective means to these goals, considering all surrounding
conditions and time factors. The use of such reasoning should
not be taken to imply an essentially utilitarian or epicurean
view of value systems.
People often declare “happiness”, or some particular version
of it, as their ultimate goal. But most people would find it
difficult to say just what they mean by happiness – is it
fulfillment of one’s major goals, a positive emotion or a
maximum of pleasures? Paradoxically, Buddhism suggests,
the active pursuit of happiness is not likely to result in
happiness. In any case, such “eudemonism” is not a sine qua
non of all values, and so not an absolute value. That is, we
can in fact live without happiness, and most of us do.
Nevertheless, we would naturally prefer to feel good than feel
bad; and, within limits, this is often possible if one lives
virtuously. Dignity and decency beget a measure of
contentment.
Note lastly this important remark. Though we have value
intuitions, and however these intuitions arise, we are never
forced to act in accord with them. We (men and women)
remain at all times free agents, who are responsible for their
final choices. Even when we develop a complex ethical
system, we remain free to act or not act in accord with our
beliefs. We may ignore them or even act against them. Our
beliefs have causal power as influences, but no more. This is
freedom of the will, without which no ethic can be claimed.
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2.
ETHICS
Ethical Formulas
Ethics and law systems can, at least partially, be built on
certain logical considerations.
People often say “don’t be so judgmental”, and “live and let
live!” – or they may sneer , implying contempt for such
idiocy. This is presented as an argument against ethical
distinctions, an attempt to generally invalidate ethics by
claiming all moral judgment to be relative and uncertain.
However, the proponents of this thesis fail to realize that it is
logically inconsistent, since it is itself composed of
judgments.
To say: “don’t judge” or “do let live”, or otherwise imply it is
wrong to judge, is to propose the paradoxical ethical
proposition “one should not make ethical propositions” –
which is self-contradictory. It logically follows that the
opposite position is true, namely that “it is indeed permissible
to make ethical propositions”.
In this way, we have definitely proved, as logically selfevident, the existence and demonstrability of some ethical
propositions. We have established an axiom for deontology.
Those who say “be tolerant” (towards just anything) are
effectively making an uncompromising, intolerant statement
– therefore, they cannot be right, by their own terms.
Such arguments are not rhetorical tricks – they clarify the
way things are, by virtue of our having consciousness and
volition, and being able to engage in discourse and argument.
Concepts of ethical moment naturally evolve from our
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experience of the world and interaction with it. They are not
arbitrary constructs, which can be manipulated at will. Once
evolved, they have a logic – of which we must be aware and
which we must respect.
Many moral judgments, and indeed many laws, are
based on the principle of reciprocity: “do not do
unto others as you would not have them do unto
you”125. This is an ethical formula most people would
intuitively accept, even if they might disagree as to
what they or others would or wouldn’t want done to
them.
When a murderer kills, or tries to kill, he tacitly, by the
implication of his act, claims the right to kill. Since he is, in
fact, no different from his human victim, he thereby grants to
others the right to kill him, at least in self-defense, if not
punitively. He cannot consistently argue that he has the right
to kill others, but others do not have the right to kill him.
Ethics takes every claim as a universal principle,
unless good arguments can be adduced to
125
In the Jewish tradition, this adage is first found in the
Talmud (Shabbat 31a), in the form “what you hate, do not do to
your friend”, as an interpretation by the sage Hillel of the Torah
commandment “love your neighbour as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18).
Note that the form he gives it is negative; it is a minimalist call to
forbear from causing harm, rather than an injunction to do good
(which is covered more specifically through many other
commandments). In the Buddhist tradition, it is similarly taught that
we will act humanely towards others if we remember that all
sentient beings have, like ourselves, a natural desire to be happy
and not suffer. This, too, is an appeal to reciprocity.
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particularize it126. One cannot exempt oneself from
the imperatives one gives others, or permit oneself
what one has prohibited to others, unless some very
convincing distinction between self and others is
offered (for example, that the others belong to a
different species). It is reasonable to assume that
particular moral claims derive from general
principles.
This is one application of the reciprocity principle, on the
basis of which we grant the state the right to execute
murderers, to keep the peace. Some people argue that the
death sentence is not necessary or useful, and many countries
have abolished this extreme penalty, but that is not my
concern here. I am not arguing that issue one way or the
other, but am only trying to clarify our reasoning with regard
to reciprocity.
Note, in any case, that society’s killing of the murderer is
very different from the murderer’s killing of some innocent
victim. The murderer has initiated violence; the state merely
retaliates. When society avenges the victim and punishes the
culprit, protecting society from further injury, there is no
basis for further retaliation against the executioner or those
who appointed him. All that, of course, is said on the
theoretical assumption that there has been due process, under
just laws, beyond a reasonable doubt, and so forth. In
practice, these caveats are admittedly often inadequately
respected.
126
Note well the differences between this principle, and Kant’s
famous maxim. I am not stating that the mere possibility of
generalization establishes ethical rules; and I am making
allowance for the particularization of such rules.
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A similar argument can be constructed with regard to theft.
When a thief steals, he thereby ignores or denies the
existence of private property, and therefore cannot be
indignant if others (in practice through the state) impound his
property or fine him. If he is indigent, he may be imprisoned
on the argument that this deprives him of the liberty to enrich
himself, and incidentally, prevents him from further theft.
Here again, justice is served through the logic of
reciprocation.
We often argue: “if everyone did this (or didn’t do that),
everything would be fantastic (or everything would be
terrible)”, but such general arguments are idealistic, since in
practice it is improbable if not impossible that literally
everyone will do (or not do) some one thing in concert; there
are always recalcitrants!
A person could well argue that he is willing to live in a world
where everyone can do as they please: he is willing to take
the risk involved. We cannot argue against such an anarchist
that he too might get hurt, since he is gambling he won’t. Our
argument is circular and impractical.
It follows that such a person will not be convinced by any
rational arguments not to kill or steal, but must be
overpowered by society into compliance with the law. The
reciprocity principle as here used is not abstract ethics, but a
justification for concrete force.
It should be stressed, in this context, that many crimes have
not only certain direct and obvious effects on a particular
victim, but also much wider and more insidious
consequences on society as a whole. Every crime – insofar
as people are victims to it, witness it or hear about it –
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causes people to lose some of their natural trust in other
people.
When a murderer kills, people begin to fear someone might
kill them. When a thief steals, people have to hide their
money and lock their doors. When a rapist rapes, women
begin to fear men in general. When a schoolteacher abuses a
pupil, all educators become suspect. And so forth, with every
criminal act – and this principle is all the more true
nowadays, when the media give wide and loud coverage to
the more heinous crimes.
This, then, is the further crime of every criminal – he
decreases people’s trust in each other. Suspicion grows, and
everyone’s freedom is curtailed. ‘Potential victims’ (i.e.
anyone in any way resembling past victims of the crime
concerned) must take protective measures, and ‘potential
criminals’ (i.e. anyone with any resemblance, however
remote, to actual criminals) must limit their movements.
Society thus loses its cohesion, and everyone becomes a little
less happy. In some cases, relations between people become
aggressive.
Some of the reasoning involved in this distancing between
people is, of course, logically unjustified. If a news bulletin is
about a husband killing his wife for her money, other rich
wives may come to imagine that their own husband could
well do the same. If the news is that a boss raped his
secretary, many secretaries will the next day look at their
bosses with a bit of concern. The categories ‘husband’ and
‘rich wife’, or ‘boss’ and ‘secretary’, are enough to generate
some analogy, and sow a doubt, even if the psychological and
other conditions involved are totally different.
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Statistics are sometimes read, or misread, in ways that
reinforce such reasoning. If a number thieves are foreigners,
all foreign-looking people become ‘probable’ thieves in
people’s eyes, even if the proportion of thieves among
foreigners is less than that among locals; the actual degree of
probability involved becomes irrelevant in people’s minds.
(For example: suppose 20% of population are foreigners and
10% of population are thieves, it may be that only 5% of
foreigners are thieves, in which case 11.25% of locals are
thieves!)
People also wrongly convert propositions, thinking that “all
X are Y” implies “all Y are X”. For example, ‘all rapists are
men’ becomes ‘every man I meet could be a rapist’ in some
women’s minds, and they behave as if he is so. Absurd it
might be, but people are human.
Society is thus a collective victim of every crime, and it is
proper for the state (as the instrument of society) to
vigorously intervene, and prevent, repress and punish crime.
In all such negative situations, the principle of reciprocity is
used to hinder, limit or repair the damage caused to other
people or society as a whole by some individuals or groups. It
should be stressed, however, that in most situations, the
principle of reciprocity plays a much gentler role in people’s
minds, encouraging mutual respect and trust. This occurs
when the persons concerned reflect before committing a
wrongdoing, thinking: “I would not like that done to me, so I
will not do it to others” or “I shall not behave in this way, so
as not to spoil our world even more” or the like.
Some people do go one step further, and apply a positive
version of the reciprocity principle, thinking: “if I was in this
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difficult situation, I would hope or expect others to come to
my aid, therefore I will offer my help”. This is an admirable
attitude. Of course, those to whom help is offered may not
want help, or not that particular kind of help, or at least not
the way it is offered. One cannot stuff it down their throat.
For this reason, the positive version of the principle is less
easy to formulate: the recipient(s) of our attentions must be a
willing party to the transaction. Still, it often does come into
play, promoting tolerance, friendship and even love. This, in
turn, increases social bonds and makes everyone’s life that
much easier.
3.
Philosophy of Law
Ethics naturally arises first of all within the individual, in the
sense that he or she may have certain imperatives, inhibitions
or liberties. Ethics as a social phenomenon presumably arose
in the family, as the head of household (on the basis of his or
her personal ethic) gave advice or orders and was obeyed
(whether out of love or fear). More broadly, the surrounding
community would have traditions and rules to be respected,
as well as advice or orders from the leadership, whoever that
included, to maintain social bonds. Eventually, the local
shaman or other religious figure gave instructions, in the
name of the deity or deities of the group. As these informal
social ethics became more formal institutions, the concept of
law emerged.
What I wish to discuss here is the distinction between ethical
principle and legality, so as to stress that making something
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legal doesn’t make it moral; making something illegal
doesn’t make it immoral.
A distinction that people seem to often find confusing is that
between ethical and political law. People generally do
understand that the laws currently on a nation’s statute books
(here referred to as ‘political’ laws, meaning that they are
enacted and enforced by the body politic, though they may
concern any matter) are not necessarily moral in content; but
they also generally consider that what such laws allow is
ultimately permissible and what they forbid is best avoided.
For this reason, society may in some cases interdict practices
that its proponents claim harmless, being “private acts
between consenting adults” – on the basis that such acts
nevertheless indirectly affect people who are not directly a
party to them. For example, homosexuality can reasonably be
made illegal on the grounds that making it legal gives some
youths the impression that it is moral, causing such behavior
to spread, to the consternation and against the will of a great
many citizens (including very many parents), so that it is no
longer a private affair but an issue of public policy.127
Let us briefly consider the concepts involved. Ideally, an
absolute ethics would be derived from wise and informed
consideration of human nature and of man’s place in the
world. Armed with such general moral guidelines, each wellmeaning human being would in principle be able to know
right from wrong in each particular situation facing him or
127
Even if the practitioners did nothing to promote their
practice, their mere negative influence on society would be
sufficient reason to prohibit it; how much more so, if they make
efforts to propagate it.
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her, and would exercise will accordingly. There would be no
need for laws enforced by society.
Practically, such a utopian scenario can only lead to social
havoc. Even in a society filled with good will, people have
different ideas as to what is right or wrong, and absolute
proofs are hard to find. All the more so, since humans have
free will, and many of them – under various influences –
often opt for what they (themselves) consider bad, rather than
(as logic would dictate) do the good. Conflicts thus inevitably
arise, which are ultimately to the disadvantage of all. For
these reasons, it is generally agreed that some minimal
common standards have to be conventionally imposed by the
majority or an empowered minority.
We accordingly constitute states, governments, legislatures,
judiciaries and police forces, which together make and
enforce laws. A guiding principle in enacting and enforcing
such laws would be that “the rights of one person end where
those of other people begin”. Another useful adage is “do not
do unto others what you would not have them do unto you”.
But clearly, such statements do not provide us with an exact
science. It is not always easy to decide what needs legislating
and what is best left alone. Political science is a changing,
empirical discipline.
In this corrected perspective, ethical law covers all human
action, while political law covers only some of it. The former
is ideally universal; but only a fraction or subset of it is
politically enacted and enforced, the rest being the
responsibility of the individual to discover or at least practice.
The scope of such political law is vast, but not as vast as the
scope of moral law. It includes criminal law (against murder,
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theft, etc.), civil law (about marriage, inheritance, etc.),
commercial law (concerning property, contracts, etc.), and
indeed any legal issue that may arise in the interactions
between human beings.
Theoretically, at least, the purpose of such laws is to ensure
social peace, the common weal, personal security, justice,
and so forth – although in practice, as everyone knows, they
are often instruments of exploitation and unjust. In principle,
what makes them stand out from the mass of ethical laws is
the need to reduce frictions between people to a reasonable
minimum. Historically, such minimalism has not always been
accepted; some societies have been totalitarian, attempting to
control almost everything.
In practice, for epistemological reasons already stated, the
domains of ethics and political law are bound to somewhat
drift apart, so that although the two domains intersect to some
extent, the political domain is not wholly contained within
the ethical domain, but partly falls outside it. Laws enacted
by society, whether by democratic means or otherwise, may
differ from the laws suggested by personal conscience or by
reasoned study and debate by ethical philosophers.
Such divergence is in some cases reasonable; but it is often
irrational. In a non-democratic system of government, the
prejudices of the governing few are imposed on the majority,
without room for argument. In a democracy, where in
principle rational argument is the rule, pressure groups
occasionally manage to format laws that accord with their
aberrant views simply by virtue of the power of their
numbers or through other considerations that force politicians
to submit to their will. In recent decades, many activities
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traditionally judged as immoral have been declared legal in
Western countries.
Now, let me say that this is not a political tract128; I do not
expect anything I say or do is likely to stem that unfortunate
tide. My philosophy of history is very skeptical. In each
generation, some faulty belief held by large segments of the
public comes to the fore and gains ascendancy, until it is
brought to its natural absurd conclusion, like a sore spot
bursting and releasing its pus, and disaster strikes, so that
enough people learn to avoid that particular folly
thenceforth.
Nazism and Communism were typical examples: they arrived
on the scene of history to the sound of popular cheers, and
left in the midst of countless tears. People in Europe learned
certain lessons, about the active use of brute force, about
persecution of racial minorities, about national and class
hatreds, and so forth; they changed their ways somewhat
thereafter. They might have saved themselves the trouble and
the pain, if they had resorted to reason, instead of yielding to
their lowest emotions.
Remember that Hitler was democratically elected (more or
less). Realistically, democracy is without doubt the best and
fairest system of government available to us; but as we all
know, it is not perfect. The fact that certain legislation is
passed is not proof of popular support, let alone right129. Most
128
I generally avoid getting into political comment or debate in
my writings, because my philosophical aims are at a deeper level
of epistemology and ontology. Controversy is bound to alienate
some readers, who might consider some of my views as either too
‘liberal’ or too ‘conservative’.
129
All the more, the support of major media means nothing.
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laws are based on indirect democracy; the legislators and
judges involved in the matter may well be cowardly, amoral
or personally compromised. If referenda were used, the
results might well have been very different. But even in the
case of laws established by direct democracy, numbers of
votes do not determine what is right or wrong.
From this reflection it follows that the fact that some laws on
the statute books socially-politically prescribe, allow or
forbid some behavior pattern, does not mean that the
behavior pattern in question is ethically-morally prescribed,
allowed or forbidden, respectively. What society happens to
have favored (or forbidden) may nevertheless, from the point
of view of ethics, be wrong (or right, respectively). The
arguments involved may have been fallacious or based on
inadequate information.
‘Legal’ and ‘moral’ must be understood to be distinct,
separate categories, although conceptually they are partly
related (as we have explicated). Making something legal
doesn’t make it moral; making something illegal doesn’t
make it immoral. Youths should especially be made aware of
this important distinction.
The individual may not reasonably regard the existence of
certain legal tendencies in the statute books as indicative of
ethical truth, because legislation is not exclusively based on
rational reflection, but depends on social forces. The
legislator may be faulted for misguiding fellow citizens, but
these remain responsible for their own acts.
The individual is still required to think for himself or herself,
and to at least consider the ethical advice of the wise
doctrines that humanity has produced. The existence of
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political freedoms or limits does not exempt an individual
from moral responsibility for his or her choices. Legislation
is not a substitute for conscience, or a just alibi for moral
abdication. Although a legal threat or protection can mitigate
moral responsibility, it does not absolve.
From an ethical point of view, laws are just one influential
factor among others in behavior, which in certain cases it
may be wise to volitionally dismiss or oppose.
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17. CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
Drawn from Ruminations (2005),
Chapter 8 (sections 8 & 9).
1.
Against Kant on Freewill
Various comments against Kant’s view of freedom of the
will.
As I explain elsewhere130, freedom of the will should not be
conceived as “doing what you want”, in the sense “doing
what you desire”, for being moved by random desires is not
freedom but slavery. It does not follow that, as Immanuel
Kant suggests, freewill is “doing what your reason tells you
to do”.
The colloquial definition of freedom, “doing what you want”,
should be clarified to mean that our actions express our
personal will. It is the “you” rather than the “want” which is
at the center of that popular definition. “Want” is here not
intended to refer to values, wishes or purposes (be they
rational or irrational) that may have preceded the “doing”, but
is merely a post factum inference from such doing; i.e. it is an
130
7.
Again, see Volition and Allied Causal Concepts, chapter 5-
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interpretation of the will that did occur after it occurred. The
doer or author is thereby held responsible for such “want”.
Freedom of the will refers to our willing irrespective of
influences, such as desires or rational judgments or
whatever. The point in characterizing will as free is to stress
it is the agent that wills, and the influences are not
determining causes. In that case, whether the agent wills in
accord with or against some ethical injunction, he is indeed
responsible for his action.
Kant seems to claim that the will is only free when it is
aligned with the dictates of reason, suggesting that the only
alternative to that is slavishly following your passions. He
argues: if you disobey reason, you are a puppet, therefore,
obey it, and be free. Non sequitur!
Logically, if Kant’s thesis on volition is true, people have no
freedom or responsibility either way, and can neither be
blamed nor praised for whatever happens to them. In this
perspective, if reason is heard and obeyed, its ethical
injunction (or whoever suggested it) becomes the causative
of virtuous action, and the subject does not merit praise – just
as, if reason is ignored or disobeyed, the subject’s desires and
impulses take control, and he is devoid of blame. Thus, Kant
did not think his proposal through sufficiently.
Clearly, we must say that the choice to submit to reason
implies an anterior act of freewill, which has to be
spontaneous, otherwise reason would be controlling the agent
against his will. Some people are unmoved by rational
arguments, even if reason does influence many of us. Thus,
the will is fundamentally as independent of reason as it is of
passions. The agent has a choice between the two. If he fails
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to follow reason, he is drawn by passions; if he follows
passions, he ignores reason. But ultimately the choice is
spontaneous: that is freedom of the will.
It is interesting to note that some post-Kantian philosophers
have come to the contrary conclusion that we are ‘free’ only
when we act against reason. This very postmodern posture is
in a way a predictable outcome of Kant’s rationalist-moralist
stance. If one realizes that rigid adherence to principles like
that proposed by Kant is just another form of slavery, the
only space left for freewill seems to be moral anarchy.
But this “anything goes” position is just the hedonist side of
the same coin; it is not a logical answer to Kant. It merely
reverts to the idea that freedom is “doing whatever you
wish”. Kant’s objection to that remains valid131 – even if his
proposed alternative, “doing what reason orders”, is also
objectionable.
131
Kant here is of course reaffirming an ancient wisdom,
th
found in the major religious traditions. When 20 Century Western
man rejected Judeo-Christian religion in favor of the ‘pleasure
principle’, Kant’s wise insight came to seem like old-fashioned,
rigid ‘moralism’. But now, perhaps thanks in part to the spread of
Buddhist ideas in the West, many people are beginning to realize
again that the unbridled pursuit of pleasure is ugly, weak, and
destructive of self and others. The characterization of hedonism as
slavery is increasingly perceived as accurate, once one reflects on
the many ways commercial and political interests use this cunning
means to exploit and control the populace. The “hippy” revolution
of the late 1960’s was not the liberation it claimed to be, but a
thorough enslavement to drugs, sexual promiscuity (ending in
depravity), and rock and roll music (i.e. omnipresent loud noise).
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The dilemma can only be overcome through deeper
understanding of the relation between agent and volition, and
influences like desires or rational-moral insights.
It is important to distinguish one’s self (or soul or spirit) from
one’s body and mind. The latter include all one’s involuntary
thoughts and emotions, i.e. all one’s felt affections and
appetites. It is a cognitive error to identify with any such
passive body and mind event, i.e. to think: “this is me or an
expression of me”. The self may be dissociated from such
events; they are essentially ‘outside’ it. (The self is “empty”
of such relatively material and mental events, to use a
Buddhist phrase.)
However, this does not mean that we may dissociate
ourselves from our voluntary physical or mental actions. The
latter must be viewed as extensions and expressions of the
self that wills them; the self is responsible for them, however
much influenced by passive body-mind factors. We cannot,
in an attempt to act viciously without taking on blame, argue:
“since this body-mind is not wholly me or mine, all its
actions are not me or mine”. This too – i.e. the failure to
identify with active body and mind events – is an error of
judgment.
The role of reason here is thus clear: it serves primarily to
honestly distinguish the active from the passive, i.e. the areas
of responsibility from those of non-responsibility in the life
of the self. Such lucidity does not guarantee morality, though
it is a precondition of it (and therefore in itself a moral act).
Reason here acts as a counterweight to the influence of
emotion. The self must still thereafter intuit the ‘moral’
choice and exercise freewill in that direction.
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An act of will may be considered as most ‘free’ and
‘responsible’ when its Agent is maximally aware of all the
positive and negative influences impinging on him, and of his
having freedom of action and responsibility for his actions all
the same.
By definition, influences are conditions of which one is more
or less aware, and which thereby play a role in the volition
concerned. Here, we note that the degree of such awareness
affects the degree of freewill. A fully awake person has more
freedom and responsibility than someone who functions halfasleep.
Note well the radical difference between freedom through
awareness and freedom from awareness. People who affirm
the existence and freedom of the will do so with the good
intention to take control of their lives. Whereas, people who
deny or doubt it generally do so in order to excuse
themselves for past shameful or evil acts, or in order to
facilitate such acts in the present and future. They reject
freewill so as to liberate themselves from their conscience, by
putting it to sleep. They cunningly use such philosophical
denial as a bad influence on their will, making possible
unbridled pursuit of unethical values.
2.
Alleged Influences
An alleged influence on volition is not necessarily an
influence in fact. The mere saying that something was an
influence on one’s action does not imply it to have indeed
been so; i.e. it does not make the alleged influence ex post
facto become an influence. This may seem obvious – but the
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issue is worth raising, because people confuse initial
influence with later influence.
For instance, a debtor may tell a creditor “I couldn’t pay
you off today because of my son’s wedding”, when in
fact the wedding did not actually influence the decision
not to pay, or take so much time that payment was
impossible, but was used as a false excuse, a pretext. If
neither the wedding itself nor the thought of the wedding
in fact affected the non-payment in any way, the latter
event cannot truthfully be said to have been caused or
influenced by the former. However, this does not imply
that the creditor cannot thereafter be influenced by the
excuse given, if he has believed it or even if he has
disbelieved it.
For X to ‘influence’ some volition Y, it is necessary that the
thought of X precede the action Y, as well as make it easier
or harder to some degree. If the thought of X only occurred
after Y (e.g. as when X is falsely declared ex post facto as the
reason for Y) – the reality of X not having influenced Y is
not changed. However, X may well thereafter, after such
false declaration has been made and mentally registered,
begin to influence other, subsequent actions of the initial
agent (the agent of Y) or of some other agent(s).
Saying something is so, doesn’t make it so – even in the
realm of the spirit. There is ‘objective’ truth, even with
regard to ‘subjective’ relations. One may, for lack of
attention or introspective skills, or due to weak memory, not
be sure as to what one willed, or what influenced one’s will.
In such cases, one’s witness concerning one’s inner
processes, even if sincere, may be erroneous. Additionally, in
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some cases, even knowing the truth, one may deliberately lie,
wishing to manipulate someone somehow with one’s lies.
An external observer is of course very disadvantaged in
assessing the will of someone else and the influences
impinging upon it. In such contexts, we often rely on what
could be construed as post hoc ergo propter hoc thinking, but
more precisely (usually tacitly, of course) consists in
eliminating all thought-of alternative explanations of
perceived behavior but one, or opting for the most likely
looking explanation in our present perspective.
(This is of course a whole field of logic by itself, which I
cannot hope to cover in a few comments.)
Incidentally, when we speak of someone having a certain
‘spirit’, we originally mean that the person concerned
functions with a certain attitudinal pattern, i.e. we refer to
aspects of his own volition. For examples, a person may
have ‘a good spirit’ (e.g. be hard working, enthusiastic) or
‘a bad spirit’ (e.g. be constantly complaining, resisting).
But some people have reified this sense of the word
‘spirit’, implying that some external non-material entity
(something like a ghost) invades and inhabits people,
forcing them to behave in this way or that. The actions of
the person concerned are in that case no longer his own,
but someone else’s. The person’s soul has lost its
freewill, and been subjected to a spiritual takeover.
This mode of explanation is found in the Christian
religion and among African shamanists, for examples.
‘The holy spirit’, ‘the devil made me do it’ – are cases in
point. Another common belief is that wine or liquor
instills a ‘spirit of drunkenness’ into the drinker.
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The trouble with such explanations, logically, is that
instead of explaining volition by the influence of nondetermining conditions, they ipso facto annul volition and
void responsibility.
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18. CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapters 3 & 8.
1.
The Goals of Meditation
Meditation is a means to enhanced consciousness. The
ultimate goal of meditation is, accordingly, to attain the
highest level of consciousness possible to one. This summum
bonum (highest good) is generally understood as threefold,
although the three aspects are ultimately one and the same
event, which may be called ‘realization’.
The first aspect is ‘enlightenment’, which may be defined as
the overcoming of all personal ignorance, illusion or
delusion, in the broadest sense. It is a maximal, all-inclusive
consciousness; the widest and deepest potential for
knowledge (including information and understanding).
The second aspect is ‘liberation’, which may be defined as
the overcoming of all personal weaknesses, difficulties or
obstructions, in the broadest sense. Thus, enlightenment
relates to cognition, while liberation concerns volition.
Granting they are possible achievements, they necessarily
come together and not apart, with liberation as a necessary
adjunct of enlightenment. Knowledge is freedom.
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Note that the term ‘enlightenment’ (or ‘illumination’)
is often construed as referring to some inner
experience of light. But that mental analogy to
physically ‘seeing a light’, though occasionally
valuable, is not the essence intended by the term. One
should rather have an image of a man walking
tentatively in the dark, feeling his way slowly – when
suddenly a bright light is turned on. Now, he can at
last see everything around him and where he is going,
and he can walk about freely, and find any object he
seeks without knocking into things. This analogy is
preferable, because it illustrates the conjunction of
light and liberty. A man in the dark is like a man in
chains, hardly able to move, uncertain and afraid,
unable to travel directly to any destination and having
to expend much too much effort to go any distance.
When the light goes on, he is instantly freed from his
invisible chains, and he can hop, skip and jump at
will, and dance with joy.
The third presumed consequence of achieving the apex of
consciousness is greatly enhanced ethical understanding – or
‘wisdom’132. This relates to the third function of the soul,
132
Some would contend that the attainment of
enlightenment/liberation places one “beyond good and evil”. But
the sense of that phrase should not be misconstrued as implying
that one then becomes independent of morality. Quite the contrary,
it means that one becomes so wise that one cannot imagine any
trace of value whatsoever in immoral or amoral practices. The
proof of that is that realized teachers always preach morality to
their followers. Not because the teacher needs to remind himself of
such strictures, but so as to preempt the followers from losing their
way on the way to realization.
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which is valuation. It suggests a maximum of sagacity in
one’s value judgments and pursuits. It would not suffice to
have knowledge and freedom, if one were ignorant of values
and thus incapable of virtue.
Just as valuation in general involves the operation of both the
functions of cognition and volition – so wisdom is the natural
and necessary outcome of enlightenment and liberation. At
every level of human experience, sagacious valuing is
indicative of a harmonious intersection between knowing and
willing. Wisdom, or extreme sagacity, occurs when these
functions reach their peak of perfection.
It should be stressed that wisdom does not only signify
knowing right from wrong in any given situation, but also
implies naturally doing what is right and avoiding what is
wrong in that situation. It is not a mere theoretical
understanding of values, but additionally involves a practice
of virtue that testifies to having fully internalized such
understanding. The cognitive and volitional faculties of the
sage are concordant.
While full enlightenment, liberation and wisdom may be
identified as the ultimate goal(s) of meditation – we may of
course still consider increased but less than complete degrees
of knowledge, freedom and discernment (between good and
bad, right and wrong) as valuable intermediate goals. The
situation is not “either-or” – i.e. either total blindness,
impotence and stupidity, or utter perfection. We may have to
gradually work our way towards the ideal, going through
partial improvements until we attain the desired result.
Our experiences are likely to be proportionate to our progress
along that Path or Way. We may have momentary so-called
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mystical experiences of lesser intensity than the ultimate
experience of enlightenment, but find such reward
encouraging and stimulating. If we practice meditation
correctly and regularly over an extended period of time, our
sense of freedom may increase noticeably. Things seem
clearer and easier, and we exhibit more and more wisdom in
our choices.
Traditions thus speak of a via perfectionis or dhammapada
(way of perfection), implying a long spiritual road to be
traveled, until the final step radically changes everything for
us and we attain full realization.133
It should be noted that the term ‘realization’ has a double
meaning, one relative and one absolute:
It signifies, firstly, the actualization of one’s personal full
potential as a human being, i.e. the full maturing of our
faculties of cognition, volition and valuation.
Additionally, it suggests that this self-perfection
coincides with the extreme achievement of cognition of
absolute reality, maximum freedom and wisdom of
choice.
133
I should add that I cannot, so far in my life, personally
vouch for the feasibility of utter enlightenment, liberation and
wisdom. I assume it to be possible, because many human
traditions claim this to have been attained by some individuals: this
is hearsay evidence in favor of the thesis. Moreover, it seems
conceivable and reasonable to me that such heights of
achievement should be possible. However, to be quite frank about
it, I have not myself reached them. But even if I too were a live
witness, the reader would still have to consider the information as
second-hand, until if ever he or she in turn personally attained
realization.
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Logically, these two attainments are not necessarily identical:
it could be argued that a given person’s relative best is still
not good enough in absolute terms. However, some spiritual
philosophies overcome this possible objection by considering
the possibility of stretching the pursuit of ultimate perfection
over more than one lifetime.
Furthermore, there are two ways to view the meditative
enterprise; these ways are referred to in Zen as pursuit of
gradual vs. sudden realization.
We can view ourselves as standing somewhere on a
mountain, eager to climb up to its peak, by diligently
“working on ourselves”. We have to find the best way to
do that, either feeling our way alone or using maps
handed down to us by predecessors, or traveling with
other seekers. Sometimes we may fall back, and have to
climb again just to reach our previous position.
Sometimes the mountaintop seems nearby; then, as we
approach it, we discover the mountain is much bigger
than it seemed from lower down. This mountain climb
may take a lifetime of hard labor; some say many
lifetimes.
Another way to view the challenge is as a puzzle to be
solved. If we could only find the key, it would open for
us the door to realization. No need for one to climb or
move mountains. One needs only constantly be alert for
some clue, attentive for some hint – which may fleetingly
come from anywhere134. If we spot it somehow, a veil
134
This is the proactive spirit of koan meditation, advocated
by the Rinzai Zen school, as opposed to the more “passive”
looking zazen meditation, advocated by Soto school. The latter,
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will be lifted and all will become clear right where we
stand. The mountain will instantly disappear, and we will
suddenly find ourselves at its central axis (just like
someone at the top). There is no climbing to do; the job
requires detective work.
Of course, both perspectives are true and worth keeping in
mind. The long-term climb seems to be our common lot; but
it is our common hope to somehow immediately pierce
through the mystery of existence. The latter is not so much a
shortcut on the way up, as a cutting through and dissolving of
the underlying illusions. Moreover, the theater of our search
for insight is not so much “out there” as “in here”.
Another distinction to note is that between temporary/partial
and permanent/full realization. On the way to complete
realization, one may momentarily experience glimpses of it.
Such fortunate foretastes of heaven do not however count as
realization in a strict sense. One is only truly realized when
one is irreversibly installed in such experience.
With regard to terminology, note that the terms realization,
enlightenment, liberation, and (the attainment of) wisdom,
are in practice mostly used interchangeably, because one
cannot attain any one aspect of this event without the others.
Sometimes, realization (etc.) is written with a capital letter
(Realization), to distinguish complete and definitive from
partial or temporary realization. Usually, the context makes
clear which variant is intended.
which would be classified in the preceding paradigm of mountain
climbing, is of course in fact not as passive as it would seem to the
onlooker.
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Another term commonly used for realization is ‘awakening’.
This term suggests that our existence as ordinarily
experienced is like a dream – a dream of problems that
cannot be solved from within the dream, but only by getting
completely out of the state of sleep. I have experienced such
dreams occasionally: I was somehow cornered in a very
difficult situation and could imagine no way out of it, no
winning scenario; so (realizing I must be dreaming), I simply
willed myself out of sleep135, solving the problem in a radical
manner.
To the person who has just awoken, the world within the
dream, with all its seemingly inescapable difficulties,
permanently loses all importance, instantly becoming nothing
worth getting concerned with anymore. This metaphor
illustrates how spiritual awakening is more than a set of ad
hoc solutions to the problems of ordinary existence: it is a
general solution that cuts through the illusions and takes us
straight to the underlying reality. This image makes
realization easier to conceive.
2.
The Individual Self in Monism
Granting the Monist thesis briefly described (in the preceding
chapters of Meditations), we can understand that our
respective apparent individual selves, whether they are
viewed as souls (entities with a spiritual substance distinct
from mind and matter) or as something altogether non135
The experience may be compared to being at some depth
underwater, and deliberately swimming up to the surface.
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substantial (as Buddhism suggests), have a relative mode of
existence in comparison to the Soul of God (in Monotheistic
religions), or to the underlying Original Ground of such being
or the Tao (in competing doctrines).
If our selves are relative to some absolute Self (or a “Nonself”, in Buddhism), they are illusory. In what sense,
illusory? We might say that the illusion consists in artificially
differentiating the particular out of the Universal – i.e. it
consists in a para-cognitive somewhat arbitrary act of
individuation. Apparently, then, tiny fractions of the original
Totality have given themselves the false impression of being
cut off from their common Source. They (that is, we all) have
lost touch with their true Identity, and become confused by
their limited viewpoint into believing themselves to have a
separate identity.136
To illustrate the illusoriness of individuation, we can point to
waves in a body of water. A wave is evidently one with the
body of water, yet we artificially mentally outline it and
conventionally distinguish it, then we give it a name “the
wave” and treat it as something else than the water. There is
indeed a bump in the water; but in reality, the boundaries we
assign it are arbitrary. Similarly, goes the argument, with all
things material, mental or spiritual.
The Buddhist thesis on this topic is generally claimed to
differ somewhat, considering that all empirical appearances
136
Rather than suggest like Bishop Berkeley that we are
ideas in the mind of God, the viewpoint here advocated is that we
are, as it were, ideas in our own minds. God invented us, yes, and
allowed for our seeming individuation; but He has no illusions
about our separateness. It is we, in our limited and therefore
warped perspective, who misperceive ourselves as individuals.
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of selfhood are phenomenal, and nothing but phenomenal.
And since phenomena are impermanent like wisps of smoke
– arising (we know not whence – thus, from nowhere),
abiding only temporarily, all the while changing in many
ways, and finally disappearing (we know not wither – thus, to
nowhere) – we may not assume any constancy behind or
beneath them. Our particular self is thus empty of any
substance; and similarly, there is no universal Soul.
This thesis is of course sufficiently empirical with regard to
the fact of impermanence of phenomena; but (in my view)
there is a conceptual loophole in it. We can point out that it
rejects any idea of underlying constancy without sufficient
justification (i.e. by way of a non-sequitur); and we can
advocate instead an underlying substance (material, mental or
spiritual), with equally insufficient justification, or maybe
more justification (namely, that this helps explain more
things).137
Furthermore, we may, and I think logically must, admit that
we are aware of our selves, not only through perception of
outer and inner phenomena, but also through another direct
kind of cognition, which we may call ‘intuition’, of nonphenomenal aspects. There is no reason to suppose offhand
only phenomenal aspects exist and are directly cognizable.
Indeed, we must admit intuition, to explain how we know
what we have perceived, willed or valued in particular cases.
Conceptual means cannot entirely explain such particulars;
they can only yield generalities.
137
We shall further debate the issue of impermanence later
on in Meditations.
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Thus, while understanding and respecting the Buddhist nonself doctrine, I personally prefer to believe in the spirituality
of the individual self and in God. I may additionally propose
the following arguments. To start with, these ideas (of soul
and God) do not logically exclude, but include the notion of
“emptiness”; i.e. it remains true that particular souls and the
universal Soul cannot be reduced to phenomenal experiences.
Moreover, Monotheism is logically more convincing,
because the Buddhist thesis takes for granted without further
ado something that the God thesis makes an effort to explain.
The manifest facts of consciousness, volition and valuation in
us, i.e. in seemingly finite individuals, remain unexplained in
Buddhism, whereas in the Monotheistic thesis the personal
powers of individuals are thought to stem from the like
powers of God. That is, since finite souls are (ultimately
illusory) fractions of God, their powers of cognition, freewill,
and valuing (though proportionately finite) derive from the
same powers (on an infinitely grander scale) in the overall
Soul, i.e. God.
In truth, Buddhists could retort that though this argument
reduces the three human powers to the corresponding
(greater) powers of God, it leaves unexplained the existence
of these same powers in Him. They are derivatives in
humans, all right, but still primaries in God.
Yes, but a distinction remains. Monotheism views the
ultimate Source as having a personality, whereas for
Buddhism, the Original Ground is impersonal. For the
former, there is a “Who”, while for the latter, only a “What”
if anything at all. It seems improbable (to me, at least) that a
person would derive from a non-person. Rather, the particular
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soul has to have this sense of personal identity in the way of a
reflection of the universal soul’s personality.
But in truth, we can still intellectually reconcile the two
doctrines, if we admit that such arguments are finally just
verbal differentiations and that we should rather stress their
convergences and complementarities.138
In any case, the apparent meditative success of Buddhists
does not logically exclude the logical possibility that their
doctrine denying soul and God may well be an error of
interpretation – since other religions also report meditative
successes although they resorted to other interpretations. If
we generously accept all or most such human claims at their
face value, we logically have to conclude that correct
interpretation is not necessary for meditative success.
This suggests that meditation is ultimately independent of
doctrinal quarrels. Competing, even conflicting, doctrines
may be equally helpful – depending on cultural or personal
context. Therefore, meditation is ultimately a pragmatic
issue; it does not need particular dogmas to yield its results.
Whatever your religious preference, or lack of it, just add one
ingredient – meditation; this single measure will over time
naturally perform wonders anyway.
138
Needless to say, I do not intend this statement as a
blanket approval, condoning all beliefs and practices included in
practice under the heading of Buddhism. I have in past works for
instance voiced my reserves regarding the worship directed at
statues (idolatry). Even from a Buddhist point of view, this is a
weird and spiritually obstructive practice (since it involves mental
projection of “selfhood” into purely physical bodies). Moreover, I do
not see how this can be an improvement on the worship of God. If
devotion is a good thing, surely the latter is its best expression.
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The modern Secularist denial of spiritual substance (a soul in
humans and God) can be depicted as follows. We are in this
case dealing with a materialist philosophy, which grants solid
reality only to the phenomenal (and conceptual inferences
from it). The material phenomenon is regarded as exclusive
of any other, although if pressed secularists will acknowledge
some sort of additional, mental substance, imagined as a sort
of cloud of “consciousness” hovering in the heads of certain
material entities (i.e. at least humans and possibly higher
animals).
This substance is conceived as a sort of epiphenomenon of
specific combinations of matter (namely, those making up a
live human body, and in particular its neurological system).
They effectively consider mind as a rarified sort of matter.
The proponents of this thesis make no clear distinction
between the stuff of memories, dreams and imaginings, on
the one hand, and the one experiencing these inner
phenomena and indeed (via the senses) outer phenomena, on
the other. And therefore, they reject all notion of an
additional spiritual substance or soul as the essence of self.
This philosophy can thus be doubted on two grounds. Firstly,
it fails to clearly and honestly analyze mental experience and
draw the necessary conclusions from such analysis. Notably
missing is the distinction between the intuited “cognizing,
willing and valuing self” and his (or her) “perceived mental
(and sensory) experiences”, i.e. the distinction between soul
and mind within the psyche. Secondly, while secularism does
tend to monism in respect of matter, it refuses a similar
monist extrapolation with respect to souls, and so denies
God.
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Today’s Secularists of course pose as “scientists”139, and by
this means give their doctrine prestige among nonphilosophers and superficial philosophers. But this stance is
not scientific, in the strict sense of the term. Physical science
has to date not produced a single mathematical formula
showing the reducibility of life, mind, consciousness, or
spirit/soul to matter. Materialists just presume that such a
universal reductive formula will “someday” be shown
possible. Maybe so; but until that day, they cannot logically
rely on their presumption as if it were established fact.
They think their materialism is “sure” to be eventually proved
all-inclusive – but this expectation and hope of theirs has for
the moment, to repeat, no scientific justification whatsoever!
It is just a figment of their imagination, an act of faith, a mere
hypothetical postulate. Secularism is thus just another
religion, not an exclusive inference from Science.
“Science” is entirely defined by rigor in cognitive method,
without prejudice. It demands all available data be taken into
consideration by our theories, and duly explained by these
theories. Genuine philosophers are not intimidated by the
intellectual thuggery of those who pretend that science is
exclusively materialist.
In the case of the Materialist theory, the evident data of life,
mind, consciousness and spirit or soul has hardly even been
139
Some are indeed scientists – in their specific field, such as
Physics. But this does not entitle them to a free ride in the general
field of Philosophy. I am thinking here of Hubert Reeves, who
appears on TV claiming atheism as incontrovertible fact, as if any
other view is simply unthinkable. Laypersons should not confuse
his prestige and media-presence with logical confirmation of his
view. The underlying fallacy is ad hominem argument.
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acknowledged by its advocates, let alone taken into
consideration. It has simply been ignored, swept under the
carpet, by them. That is not science – it is sophistry. What is
speculative must be admitted to be such. And two
speculations that equally fit available data are on the same
footing as regards the judgment of science.
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19. CHAPTER NINETEEN
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapters 12-14.
1.
Distinguishing the Ego
The self was above defined – from a philosophical
perspective – as the apparent Subject of cognition and Agent
of volition and valuation. But – in common parlance – most
people identify themselves with much more than this minimal
definition. To clarify things, it is therefore useful to
distinguish two meanings of the term.
In its purest sense, the term self refers to what is usually
called the soul or person. In a colloquial sense, the term is
broader, including what intellectuals refer to as “the ego”.
The latter term – again from a philosopher’s point of view –
refers to the material and mental phenomena, which indeed
seem rightly associated with our self, but which we wrongly
tend to identify with it. Thus, by the term ego we shall mean
all aspects of one’s larger self other than one’s soul; i.e. all
extraneous aspects of experience, commonly misclassified as
part of oneself.
This is just a way to recognize and emphasize that we
commonly make errors of identification as to what constitutes
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the self140. If we try to develop a coherent philosophical
system, looking at the issues with a phenomenological eye,
we must admit the self in the sense of soul (i.e.
Subject/Agent) as the core sense of the term. The latter is a
non-phenomenal entity, quite distinct from any of the
material and mental phenomena people commonly regard as
themselves.
We tend to regard our body, including its sensory and motor
faculties, as our self, or at least as part of it. But many parts
of our body can be incapacitated or detached, and we still
remain present. And, conversely, our nervous system may be
alive and well, but we are absent from it. So, it is inaccurate
to identify our self with our body.
Nevertheless, we are justified in associating our self with our
body, because we evidently have a special relationship to it:
we have more input from it and more power over it than we
do in relation to any other body. Our life takes shape within
the context of this body. For this reason, we call it ‘our’
body, implying possession or delimitation.
140
The word ‘ego’ originally, in Latin, meant ‘I’. Nowadays, in
English, it is commonly understood in the pejorative sense used by
me in the present essay. I do not subscribe to the sense used in
psychoanalytic theory, which presents the ego as a segment of the
psyche “mediating between the person and reality”. Such a notion
is to me conceptually incoherent, since it ascribes a separate
personality (i.e. selfhood) to this alleged segment, since to
“mediate” anything implies having cognitive, volitional and
evaluative powers. The ego of psychoanalysts involves a
circularity, since it raises the question: who or what is mediating
between the person and reality, and on what basis? The common
sense of ‘ego’ is, I would say, closer semantically to the ‘id’ of
psychoanalysis.
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With regard to the mind, a similar analysis leads to the same
conclusion. By ‘mind’, note well, I mean only the apparent
mental phenomena of memory and imagination (reshufflings
of memories), which seem to resemble and emerge from the
material phenomena apparently experienced through the body
(including the body itself, of course). Mind is not a Subject,
but a mere (non-physical) Object; a mind has no
consciousness of its own, only a Subject has consciousness.
This limited sense of mind is not to be confused with a larger
sense commonly intended by the term, which would include
what we have here called soul. I consider this clarification of
the word mind very important, because philosophies “of
mind” in which this term is loosely and ambiguously used are
bound to be incoherent141.
The term I use for the conjunction of soul and mind is
‘psyche’. Of course, below the psyche, at an unconscious
level, lies the brain or central nervous system, which plays a
strong role in the production of mental events, although it is
not classed as part of the psyche but as part of the body.
Some of the items we refer to as ‘mind’ should properly be
called brain.
The term “unconscious mind”, note well, refers to
potential (but not currently actual) items of
consciousness stored in the brain (and possibly the
wider nervous system); for example, potential
memories. Such items are called mind, only insofar as
they might eventually appear as mental objects of
141
Equivocal use of the term mind leads some philosophers
into syllogistic reasoning involving the Fallacy of Four Terms, in
which the middle term has different senses in the major and minor
premises, so that the conclusion is invalid.
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consciousness; but strictly speaking, they ought not be
called mind. The term “unconscious mind” is
moreover an imprecision of language in that the mind
is never conscious of anything – it is we, the Subjects,
who are conscious of mental items (mental
equivalents of sensory phenomena, as well as ideas
and emotions).
Thus, mind refers to a collection of evanescent phenomena,
without direct connection between them, which succeed each
other in our ‘mind’s eye’ (and/or ‘mind’s ear’) but which lack
mental continuity, their only continuity being presumably
their emergence from the same underlying material brain.
The mind cannot be identified with the self, simply because
mental events are experienced as mere objects of
consciousness and will, and not as the Subject and Agent of
such psychical events. Moreover, the mind may momentarily
stop displaying sights or sounds without our sense of self
disappearing.
Nevertheless, our mind is ours alone. Only we directly
experience what goes on in it and only we have direct power
over its fantasies. Even if someday scientists manage to look
into other people’s private minds and find ways to affect their
contents, one person remains in a privileged relationship to
each mind. It is therefore proper to call our minds ‘ours’, just
as we call our bodies ‘ours’.
Thus, the self, in the colloquial sense, is a collection of three
things: soul, mind and body – i.e. spiritual, mental and
material experiences. But upon reflection, only the soul
counts as self proper – the ego, comprising mind and body, is
indeed during our whole lifetime “associated with” our strict
self (that is, soul), but it should not be “identified with” that
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self. The ego is merely an appendage to the self or soul,
something ‘accidental’ (or at best ‘incidental’) to it.
However, this should not be taken to mean that the soul has
no share in the ego. Many of the physical and mental traits
that comprise the ego are at least in part due to past choices
and actions of the soul. The soul is thus somewhat
responsible for much of the ego; the latter is in effect a
cumulative expression of the former. Some people have big,
mean egos, to their discredit; others have smaller, nicer egos,
to their credit. Moreover, the soul tends to function in the
context of the ego or what it perceives as the ego.
In more narrow psychological terms, the ego is a particular
self-image one finds motives for constructing and clinging
onto. It is a mental construct composed of images selectively
drawn from one’s body and mind – some based on fact, some
imaginary. Compared to the real state of affairs, this selfimage might be inflationary (flattering, pretentious) or it
might be depreciative (undemanding, self-pitying). Ideally, of
course, one’s self-image ought to be realistic; i.e. one must at
all times strive to be lucid.
2.
Dismissing the Ego
On a practical level, such insights mean that what we regard
as our “personal identity” has to be by and by clarified. We
gradually, especially with the help of meditation, realize the
disproportionate attention our material and mental
experiences receive, and the manipulations we subject them
to.
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Because of the multiplicity and intensity of our sensory and
mental impressions, we all from our birth onwards confuse
ourselves with the phenomena impinging upon us. Because
they shout so loudly, dance about us so flashily, weigh upon
us so heavily, we think our experiences of body and mind are
all there is, and we identify with them. To complicate matters
further, such self-identification is selective and often selfdelusive.
It takes an effort to step back, and realize that body and mind
phenomena are just fleeting appearances, and that our self is
not the phenomena but the one experiencing them. Even
though this self is non-phenomenal (call it a soul, or what you
will), it must be put back in the equation. We may associate
ourselves with our bodily and mental phenomena, but we
must not identify with them. There is no denying our identity
happens to currently be intimately tied up with a certain
body, mind, social milieu, etc. – but this does not make these
things one and the same with us.
Gradually, it becomes clear that our personal confusion with
these relatively external factors of our existence is a cause of
many of the difficulties in our relation to life. We become
attached to our corporeality or psychology, or to vain issues
of social position, and become ignorant as to who (and more
deeply, Who) we really are.
To combat such harmful illusions, and see things as they
really are, one has to “work on oneself”. One must try and
diminish the influence of the ego.
Specifically, one has to overcome the tendencies of egotism
and egoism. Egotism refers to the esthetic side of the ego, i.e.
to our narcissistic concerns with appearance and position, our
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yearning for admiration and superiority and our fear of
contempt and inferiority. Egoism refers to the ethical side of
the ego, i.e. to our material and intellectual acquisitiveness
and protectionism.
The issue is one of degree. A minimum of self-love and
selfishness may be biologically necessary and normal, but an
excess of those traits are certainly quite poisonous to one’s
self and to others. Much daily suffering ensues from
unchecked ego concerns. Egotism produces constant vexation
and resentment, while egoism leads to all sorts of anxieties
and sorrows.
On this point, all traditions agree: no great spiritual
attainment is possible without conquest of egocentricity. Selfesteem and self-confidence are valuable traits, but one must
replace conceit with modesty and arrogance with humility.
Meditation can help us tremendously in this daunting task.
Of course, it is none other than the self (i.e. soul) who is
egocentric! The ego is not some other entity in competition
with the soul in a divided self, a “bad guy” to pour blame on.
We have no one to blame for our psychological failings other
than our soul, whose will is essentially free. The ego has no
consciousness or will of its own: it has no selfhood.
The ego indeed seems to be a competing self, because – and
only so long as and to the extent that – we (our self or soul)
identify with it. It is like an inanimate mask, which is given
an illusion of life when we confuse our real face with it. But
we should not be deluded: it is we who are alive, not the
mask.
Rather, the body and mind (i.e. the factors making up the
ego) are mechanistic domains that strongly influence the soul
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is sometimes negative ways. They produce natural
inclinations like hunger for food or the sex drive or yearning
for social affiliation, which are sometimes contrary to the
higher interests of the soul. For this reason, we commonly
regard our spiritual life as a struggle against our ego
inclinations.
Not all ego inclinations are natural. Many of the things we
think we need are in fact quite easy to do without. As we
commonly say: “It’s all in the mind”. In today’s world, we
might often add: “It is just media hype” for ultimately
commercial or political purposes. People make mountains out
of molehills. For example, some think they cannot make it
through the day without a smoke or a drink, when in fact it is
not only easy to do without such drugs but one feels much
better without them.
Often, natural inclinations are used as pretexts for unnatural
inclinations. For example, if one distinguishes between
natural sensations of hunger in the belly and the mental desire
to titillate one’s taste buds, one can considerably reduce one’s
intake of calories and avoid getting painfully fat. Similarly,
the natural desire for sex for reproductive purposes and as an
expression of love should not be confused with the physical
lusts encouraged by the porno industry, which have
devastating spiritual consequences.
Thus, the struggle against ego inclinations ought not be
presented as a struggle against nature – it is rather mostly a
fight against illusions of value, against foolishness. It is
especially unnatural tendencies people adopt or are made to
adopt that present a problem. It is this artificial aspect of ego
that is most problematic. And the first victory in this battle is
the realization: “this is not me or mine”.
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Once one ceases to confuse oneself with the ego, once one
ceases to regard its harmful inclinations as one’s own, it
becomes much easier to neutralize it. There is hardly any
need to “fight” negative influences – one can simply ignore
them as disturbances powerless to affect one’s chosen course
of action. The ego need not be suppressed – it is simply seen
as irrelevant. It is defeated by the mere disclosure of its
essential feebleness.
Meditation teaches this powerful attitude of equanimity. One
sits (and eventually goes through life) watching disturbances
come and go, unperturbed, free of all their push and pull. The
soul remains detached, comfortable in its nobility, finding no
value in impure forces and therefore thoroughly uninfluenced
by them.
This should not, of course, be another “ego trip”. It is not a
role one is to play, self-deceitfully feeding one’s vanity. On
the contrary, one experiences such meditation as “selfeffacement” or “self-abnegation”, as if one has become
transparent to the disturbances, as if one is no longer there to
be affected by them.
This is, more precisely put, ego-dismissal, since one has
ceased to identify with the forces inherent in the ego. Such
dismissal should not, of course, be confused with evasion. It
is abandonment of the foolish psychological antics – but this
implies being very watchful, so as to detect and observe them
when they occur.
There is no need for difficult ascetic practices. One has to just
become more aware and sincerely committed; then one can
nimbly dodge or gently deflect negative tendencies that may
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appear. Being profoundly at peace, one is not impressed by
them and has no personal interest in them.
Many people devote much time and effort to helping other
people out materially or educationally. This is rightly
considered as an efficient way to combat self-centeredness,
although one should always remain alert to the opportunities
for hidden egotism and egoism such pursuits offer.
Granting Monism as the true philosophy, it would seem
logical to advocate ‘altruism’ as the ultimate ethical behavior.
However, this moral standard is often misunderstood to mean
looking out for the interests of others while ignoring one’s
own interests. Such a position would be simplistic if not
dishonest. If we are all one, the all-one includes and does not
exclude oneself.
Thus, I would say that whilst altruistic behavior is highly
commendable and admirable, working on oneself first and
foremost would seem a very necessary adjunct and
precondition. Conceivably, when one reaches full realization,
one can pretty well forget oneself altogether and devote
oneself entirely to others – but until then one must pay some
attention to one’s legitimate needs, if only because one is best
placed to do so.
3.
Relief from Suffering
Many people look to meditation as a momentary oasis of
peace, a refuge from the hustle and bustle of the world, a
remedy against the stresses and strains of everyday living.
They use it in order to get a bit of daily peace and calm, to
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get ‘centered’ again and recover self-control, so as to better
cope with their lives. Even so, if they practice it regularly,
over a long enough period, for enough time daily, they are
sure to discover anyway its larger, more radical spiritual
benefits.
One general goal of meditation we have not so far mentioned
is relief from suffering. We all to varying degrees, at various
times of our lives, experience suffering – and nobody really
likes it142. The wish to avoid or rid oneself of suffering is
often the primary impulse or motive for meditation, before
we develop a broader perspective (like “spiritual
development”, for instance) relating to this practice.
Thus, “liberation” is often taken to at first mean “liberation
from suffering”, before it is understood as “liberation from
restraints on the will”. These two interpretations are not as
opposed as they might seem, because suffering is a negative
influence on volition, so when we free ourselves of the
former, we experience the latter’s release. Contentment, the
antithesis of suffering, implies a smoothly flowing life.
The relation between meditation and relief from
suffering is not always simple and direct. Although it
is true that over time meditation renders one immune
to many disturbances, it may first for awhile make us
much more sensitive to them143. When we are more
142
Not even masochists, who use one kind of pain as a
palliative against another kind of pain. For instance, they might
pursue physical pain to avoid having to face some sense of guilt or
to forget some unpleasant childhood experience.
143
A meditator may barely notice a sudden loud noise like an
explosion, yet find “music” like rock or techno (with very few mellow
exceptions) utterly unbearable! In contrast to a non-meditator, who
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unconscious, our faculties function in coarser ways,
so we feel less. As we refine our faculties, and
become more conscious, we naturally feel more
clearly. For this reason, a meditator may even on
occasion find inner peace a bit scary and build a
resistance to it, like someone who gingerly avoids a
surface he suspects has a static electricity charge144.
Peace, too, takes getting used to.
Suffering should not be confused with pain, but rather refers
to our psychological response to feelings of pain. Some
people cannot handle felt pain at all; whereas some, though
they feel the same pain, do not take it to heart as much.
Moreover, suffering refers not only to experienced pain, but
may refer to lack of pleasure; i.e. to the frustration of not
getting pleasure one wished for or expected, or of having lost
pleasure one had for a while.
All this of course concerns mental as well as bodily pain or
pleasure. Pain or pleasure may be felt as a purely physical
sensation (e.g. a burnt finger or a pang of hunger); or as a
visceral sentiment occurring in the body but having a mental
cause (e.g. cold fear in the belly or warm love in the chest);
or again, as a purely mental experience (e.g. a vague feeling
of depression or elation).
might jump up with fright at the explosion, yet find supermarket
canned music relaxing.
144
Such resistance has been called “the dread of
enlightenment”. In fact, most people who have heard of meditation
but have never dared to try it have this dread. They think that they
will somehow get lost and drowned in the sea of enlightenment.
Indeed, they will do so – in the sense that they will lose their
individuality. But what must be understood is that this prospect is
not frightful but cause for elation.
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Suffering primarily refers to actual pain; but it often refers to
remembered or anticipated pains. For example, one may
suffer for years over a bad childhood experience; or again,
one may suffer much in anticipation of a big and difficult job
one has to do soon. Suffering can also relate to abstract or
conceptual things, whether past, present or future. For
example, one might suffer at the general injustice of life. In
all such cases, however, some present concrete negative
feelings are felt, and the suffering may be taken to refer to
them.
Buddhist teaching has the fact of human suffering at its
center. This is made evident in the Four Noble Truths taught
by the founder of this religion, viz.: (1) that life is suffering,
i.e. that suffering of some kind or another is inevitable in the
existence of sentient beings like ourselves; (2) that such
suffering has a cause, namely our attachments to things of
this world, our desire for pleasures and aversion to pains; (3)
that we can be rid of suffering, if we rid ourselves of its cause
(attachment); and finally, that the way to be rid of suffering is
through the Eightfold Path.
The latter list of means includes meditation, as a very
effective tool for discovering one’s attachments and the ways
to break away from our addiction to them. Just as soon as one
begins to practice meditation, one discovers its power to
make us relatively indifferent to pain or lack of pleasure – i.e.
to make us suffer less readily and intensely.145
145
In yoga, they teach an attitude called pratyahara, which
consists in focusing clearly on pain one is feeling, calmly assessing
its exact extent and intensity; after awhile, a pain thus stared at
tends to disappear or at least it feels less urgent. This is, then, a
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Buddhists argue, additionally, that the ultimate obstacle to
freedom from suffering is belief in a self – for to have a self
is to have particular interests, and therefore to experience
pain when these interests are frustrated (as is inevitable
sooner or later) and pleasure when they are (momentarily)
satisfied. It follows, in their view, that liberation from
suffering (the third Noble Truth) would not be conceivable, if
the “emptiness” of the self were not advocated. For only a
‘non-self’ can be free from the blows inherent to an
impermanent world like ours.
However, I beg to differ from this doctrine, not to
categorically reject it, but to point out that an alternative
doctrine is equally possible. We could equally argue, from a
Monotheistic point of view, that when the individual soul
dissolves back in the universal Soul, which is God, it is
conceivably free from all subjection to the vagaries of this
material-mental world. The illusion of individuation, rather
than the alleged illusion of selfhood, may be considered a
sufficient cause of liability to suffering; and the removal of
this cause may suffice to remove suffering.
Again I emphasize: the debate about the self is theoretical
and does not (in my view) affect the effectiveness of
meditation.
The practical lesson to draw from the Buddhist teaching is
the importance of ‘attachment’ in human psychology. This
realization, that the root of suffering is the pursuit of
supposed pleasures, or avoidance of pains, is central.
Anxiety, frustration, vexation, anger, disappointment,
sort of detachment from or transcendence of pain – not through
avoiding it, but by facing it.
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depression – such emotions are inevitable under the regime
of attachment, in view of the impermanence of all mundane
values.
If worldly pleasure of any sort is pursued, pain is sure to
eventually ensue. If the pursuit of pleasure is successful, such
success is necessarily short-lived, and one is condemned to
protect existing pleasure or pursue pleasure again, or one will
feel pain at one’s loss. If the pursuit of pleasure is
unsuccessful, one experiences the pain of not having gotten
what one wanted, and one is condemned to keep trying again
and again till successful. Similarly, the avoidance of pain is a
full time job with no end in sight – a pain in itself.146
It is therefore wise to steer clear of attachment, and develop a
more aloof approach to the lower aspects of life. This not
only saves one from eventual suffering, but releases one’s
energies for the pursuit of lasting spiritual values.
Meditation helps us (the self, the soul) to objectify and thus
transcend the feelings experienced in body and mind. This
can be understood by contrasting two propositional forms:
(a) “I feel [this or that feeling]”, and
(b) “I am experiencing [having a certain body-mind
feeling]”.
146
Suffering takes many intricate or convoluted forms.
Consider for instance the frustration of a rich man, who already has
everything he could possibly need or want, and so finds nothing
new to spend his money on. He is not free of material attachments,
he has the necessary material means, but the world has nothing
more or new to offer him. This is a danger of riches – because the
tendency in such situations is to turn to new, more and more
perverse, sensations.
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These two sentences might be considered superficially
equivalent – but their different structure is intended to
highlight important semantic differences. In (a), the subject
“I” is a vague term, and the verb and its complement are
taken at face value. In (b), the subject “I” is a more specific
term, and the verb and complement are intended with more
discrimination.
In (a), the subject considers the act of feeling a feeling as its
own act, an extension of itself. In (b), the subject lays claim
only to the cognitive fact of experiencing, considering all else
as mere object relative to this exclusively cognitive act. The
sense of “I” is therefore clearly different in the two sentences:
in (a), the ego is meant, whereas in (b) it is the self or soul
that is meant.
This is to illustrate that to transcend feelings, we have to
objectify them, and more precisely identify our “I” or self
with our spiritual dimension (or soul) rather than with our
body and mind.
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20. CHAPTER TWENTY
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapters 15 & 16.
1.
Taking Up the Challenge
People without a spiritual life are comparable to walking
dead; they are like busy empty shells. They have a body and
mind, for which they work in many ways; but it is as if they
have no soul, since they devote almost no energy to it. It is
only when one lives a spiritual life, a life filled with more and
more spiritual concerns, that one can be truly said to be alive.
Try it, and you will understand.
Once one has desired and resolved to attain one’s fullest
potential realization147, one should go about doing whatever is
necessary or useful to that end, and not dither or indulge in
conflicting or useless pursuits. One should strive with
determination, intelligence and discipline.
The seeker has to take personal responsibility for his or her
enlightenment and liberation. Do be open to and indeed look
for spiritual guidance, but fundamentally be your own “guru”
(wise teacher).
147
A posture Buddhists call “boddhicitta”.
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It is important to realize that life is short and the work to be
done is long. When one is young, one generally has the
impression that there is plenty of time left to one to do what
has to be done, and one thinks one has time to indulge a little
(or a lot). As one passes middle age, and looks back, one
realizes how quickly time flies and how much time one
wasted for nothing worth anything. And as one reaches an
older age, one is very sorry one did not make the required
effort when one was younger and much stronger.
And of course, none of us knows how quickly he or she will
die. It could be today, tomorrow, this week, this month, this
year, within a few years… no one knows. We are all like a
flower: first a bud, then a fresh, tender unfolding of beauty,
then we wither away, never to be seen again.
A good image of the spiritualizing process is that of a baby in
the womb. The womb symbolizes ‘this world’ (i.e. the
material world), and outside the womb is ‘the next world’
(i.e. the spiritual world). Just as a baby in the womb gradually
forms and grows, in preparation for its exit into a more
independent existence, so does our spiritual work prepare us
for ‘death’ from this world and ‘birth’ in the next one.
Spirituality facilitates our transition.
With regard to the quality of volitional response required, a
general recommendation I would make is: rather use “smooth
will” than “rough will”. Our will is rough when we try to use
“force” to effect change, i.e. when we act in a relatively
unconscious manner, without accurate aim, wasting energy.
Smooth will is the opposite approach – it is “thoughtful”,
quiet strength, masterfully applied how, where and when
appropriate, for as long as necessary.
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We can illustrate the difference with reference to
fighting. The less experienced fighter throws punches
wildly, blindly, hoping one will perchance land
successfully. The winning fighter calmly waits for an
actual opening, and aims his blows precisely; he
sticks to his opponent and shoves him off with just the
required amount of power, following up on his
advance till the job is fully done.
I do not propose to write a guidebook for spiritual seekers. I
do not consider myself sufficiently qualified. I would just be
repeating what many other people have said or written in all
the traditions. Moreover, there is so much to say, so many
details to mention, that the task is in truth infinite.
Nevertheless, I would like to make some remarks relevant to
the current cultural situation. Present-day society, under the
influence of educators, media and politicians who pander to
the lowest impulses of people, has swerved very visibly (in
the space of my own lifetime) to the side of utter shallowness
and moronic hedonism. I would like to here respond to some
aspects of this onslaught, and offer readers some advice.
Whoever is sincerely interested in meditation, has to adopt a
lifestyle favorable to it. This may not be found easy at first.
There are many bad habits to break, but with sustained
intelligent effort, it is quite feasible.
In fact, little effort is necessary other than continued, regular
meditation practice – more and more daily. Because, as one
advances in meditation, one’s behavior tends to naturally
align itself with the level of consciousness it produces.
Things that seemed valuable before simply cease to impress
us so much, and they fall by the wayside by themselves.
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Still, some personal determination is needed – or one risks
losing the treasure of meditation. One has to have character
to move forward.
2.
Face Facts with Equanimity
A first step in spiritual work is to look upon one’s present
“life situation” as a given – i.e. to accept it as stands, without
whining and complaining as to how “the cards were dealt
out”. This is not an attitude of fatalism, because the intent is
to improve on that situation. It is just a realization that any
situation one finds oneself in at any time is mere landscape,
mere theatrical décor around the play of one’s life, which is
essentially an internal play. Things and people around one
are only stage sets and supporting cast – the inner drama is
what counts.
In particular, one should not allow oneself to be distracted or
distressed by people and events in the surrounding world one
perceives as stupid or evil, to the extent that one’s spiritual
work is considerably hampered or blocked. Meditation
requires and fosters equanimity and serenity; if this is
indifference, it is born of perspective rather than narrowmindedness. If we were in “nirvana” instead of “samsara”,
there would be no need for spiritual development.
It is silly to waste precious time and energy on resentment.
We have to view the world we happen to find ourselves in as
a given – this world is by its very nature (as a multiplex, with
changing and interacting particulars) an imperfect world with
imperfect people. It is useless to get sad or angry at situations
or people; things and people are what they are. Once these
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facts are acknowledged and accepted, rather than evaded or
rejected, one can begin to act (mostly on oneself) to change
things for the better.
Whatever one’s situation – whether one is healthy or sick,
surrounded or alone, free or enslaved, rich or poor, employed
or jobless, married or single, etc., etc. – one will always be
called upon by life to exercise certain virtues, like courage,
effort, perseverance, purity, strength, kindness, integrity, and
so on. A rich person seems to have it easier than a poor one –
but poverty may in fact facilitate certain virtues whereas
riches make them more remote; similarly, in all other cases.
Life makes the same moral demands on all of us, and
changing the surrounding scenery makes no difference to the
basic challenge involved. It is useless to shake one’s fist at
God, or to envy or blame other people, for one’s present
condition. One should regard one’s current situation
(whatever it be) as the best possible context and framework
for the virtues one spiritually needs to exercise right now.
One must see that the situation one happens to be in provides
the ideal opportunity for the currently needed virtues. One
can view it as “God’s will” or as “one’s karma”; but in any
case, as the best place to be for one’s spiritual progress. With
this realization, one can face one’s situation with gratitude
and optimism, and deal with its difficulties with energy and
even relish.
I recently had a very strong direct experience of
detachment. It was after a full day of fasting and
prayer (Yom Kippur), including periods of
meditation. I stood in my room in the half-light
coming from the window, realizing that all things and
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events can be compared to furniture laid out in a
room. All experiences, whether good or bad, pleasant
or painful, can indeed be viewed as mere parts of the
scenery, without attachment or self-identification.
Whatever you come across, you can take in stride,
just as you walk around furniture.
Face every situation in your life with equanimity. Face the
facts – and put the emphasis on solutions, rather than on
problems. There is never any justification for feeling
overwhelmed by the tasks at hand: deal with one task at a
time, and all the work gets done. Keep bouncing back no
matter what difficulties arise; resilience is the mark of
liveliness, the will to live.
There is no doubt that will is continuously called for in the
course of meditation – at the physical, mental and spiritual
levels. In sitting meditations, we have to sit down and stay
put, controlling our posture, directing our attention. In
moving meditations (such as yoga or tai chi), likewise, we
have to make the appropriate moves, at the appropriate rates,
with appropriate attention. We have to develop the right
attitudes, direct and intensify our awareness, detach from our
passions, be patiently mindful, and so on.
All this implies volition, although not always in the simple
sense of “forcing oneself to do” something, but usually in a
more refined and precise manner. Gradually, as one’s
discipline develops, one finds it easy to do the right things at
the right time, seemingly without effort.
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21. CHAPTER TWENTY ONE
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapters 17-19.
1.
Stop Substance Addictions
Meditation is all about getting to “know yourself” – your
body, mind and soul. Almost as soon as you start meditating,
you realize that you want to know yourself as you basically
are – and not yourself as modified by various substances.
In this matter, there is no difference between substance use
and abuse. Any quantity that has a noticeable effect, whether
it is harmful or indifferent to physical health, is too much for
meditators.
If you take drugs, such as psychotropic chemicals148,
marijuana, tobacco or alcohol, or even coffee, occasionally or
regularly, in small or large quantities, whatever your pretext
or excuse – both your mind and your body are necessarily
affected.
If you are having a meditative experience, and you have
recently taken some substance, you will naturally wonder
148
Heroin, Opium, LSD, Cocaine, Crack, Speed, Ecstasy, etc.
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whether what you are currently experiencing is “for real” or
just an effect of it.
If the experience is negative, you are clearly being shown the
need to stop taking such substances. If the experience is
positive, ask yourself whether you are satisfied with kidding
yourself that you are on a spiritual level worthy of such
experience or you will henceforth demand of yourself “the
real thing”.
On a mental level, then, even if the effect of substances
seems or feels good, it is bad. From the meditative point of
view, there is no profit in it, only loss; it is not a shortcut to
spiritual experience, but a constant hindrance.
On a physical level, too, whatever the substance you indulge
in, it is sure to retard your progress in meditation. For
instance, so long as you smoke grass, hash or tobacco, you
cannot properly practice meditation on the breath. Or again,
if you are drunk or stoned, and try to do yoga or tai chi, you
will find your equilibrium and coordination inadequate.
Apart from their direct effects on mind and body, the
substances we are discussing here all have nefarious spiritual
implications. The very fact of resorting to some sort of
substance – whether to palliate one’s life difficulties or out of
sheer hedonism – constitutes a spiritual weakness and
surrender. Whether such substances are harmful, or merely
useless indulgences, with regard to body and mind, the very
fact that one has not gotten the matter under control is
indicative of a failing of the soul. One has either not reflected
sufficiently on the issues involved, or not exercised
willpower in accordance with reason.
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Spiritual development requires one take full charge of one’s
life. It is imperative to completely purify oneself of artificial
material inputs, as soon as possible. Of course, this cannot
always be done in a flash – but it is much easier to do than it
seems to be (as one realizes later, looking back). Use every
means at your disposal.
There are social services ready to help drug addicts of all
kinds. The medical establishment and alternative medicine
offer all sorts of solutions to the problems of tobacco and
alcohol dependence. Do whatever works for you, but do it! If
you are serious about meditation, and refuse to only pretend
to meditate, be an absolutist and get rid of all material
impediments without delay and forevermore149.
The practice of some sport(s) is very helpful in this struggle
for physical health. When you walk, run, cycle, swim or play
ball, you soon see for yourself the negative effects of the use
of substances; and when you do stop using them, the love of
exercise will remove from you any desire to return to your
old ways. Keep meditating all the while, because that will
motivate you and show you the way to go.
149
A policy of zero tolerance is most likely to succeed in the
long run. For instance, an ex-smoker need only smoke one puff of
one cigarette to return to his old ways; so, no compromise should
be indulged in, not even in imagination, ever. When one is free of
such dependence one has no regrets, only a sense of relief, and
incredulity that one ever found such a thing at all attractive.
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Don’t Stuff Yourself Silly
The use of drugs is but one aspect of a larger vice – that of
pursuing sensations. Our bodies and minds are constantly
hungering for sensory inputs and outputs – that is their
‘nature’. It is their way of self-assertion, their expression of
existence. Such sensationalism, let loose unchecked, is bound
to debilitate us. Fortunately, we have inner resources that
enable us to judge and restrain such tendencies – our reason
and willpower.
The main sensuous dependence of many people nowadays (in
our rich Western societies) is simply food. Food is of course
natural and necessary to our life and health, in reasonable
quantities. But some people are munching for much of their
waking hours; or, if they manage to limit their eating to
regular meals, they eat far more than they need or is good for
them.
A full stomach is not conducive to meditation. Energy that is
required to focus consciousness is diverted for purposes of
digestion. Food is soporific, or at least tiring. For this reason,
meditators control their intake of food – not only its quantity
and frequency, but also its quality. It is wise to abstain from
heavy, difficult to digest foods, for instance. Many opt for
vegetarian diets to various degrees.150
150
One should not of course eat too little, either. This too
stresses the body and disturbs meditation.
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Sports (if only a bit of daily exercise or walking) are helpful
for digestion, as well as to develop resistance and recover
fitness. Physical exercise is energizing, raising one’s level of
alertness during meditation, but one should not get overly
excited by it to the point that one cannot calm down. To
avoid getting drowsy during meditation, enough (but not too
much) regular sleep is necessary.
A good way to reduce one’s eating is, paradoxically, to take
the time to enjoy it – growing it (if possible) or shopping for
it, preparing and cooking it carefully, laying then clearing the
table, washing the dishes. Eating then becomes more
conscious, in the way of a ritual151. Eventually, one finds time
to notice the difference between pleasing one’s taste buds and
satisfying natural hunger.
One gradually realizes the impossibility of ever satiating the
hunger for oral sensations, and the need to resist such
pseudo-hunger if only to relieve one’s body of the stress of
incessant digestion, not to mention the accumulation of fat.
All this is of course obvious and generally well known. But
one has to actually take control. To do so, one must realize
that one can indeed readily do so – by looking upon the
stirring of desire as something external to oneself, a mere
phenomenon that can and does influence one’s freewill but
cannot overwhelm it.
151
Some have called this “slow food”, in contradistinction to
“fast food”.
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Limit Input from the Media
It is nowadays nearly impossible for most of us to avoid
influence in one form or another from the various media of
communication among human beings. Whereas in times past
many people could pass most of their lives in relative
isolation and freedom from external influences, today this is
very difficult.
Of course, in the past one’s family relations and village
neighbors could and usually did have overwhelming
influence. In today’s more individualistic setting, in a much
more populous and technological world, the overwhelming
influence comes from the media.
“The media” includes principally every press, cinematic and
electronic medium of information, propaganda and
entertainment. Novels and non-fiction books, newspapers and
magazines, fiction movies and documentaries, radio and
television, the Internet and mobile telephony – these are the
major media we are subject to, at time of writing, in my part
of the world.
On the surface, the media are free (of government controls)
and competitive. But, in view of the spiritual and intellectual
poverty of most producers and consumers, most of the media
tend to develop, and for a time perpetuate, certain beliefs and
values in common. We call this almost general tendency
towards the lowest common denominator our “culture”.
Thought is standardized and formatted in easily digested bits,
and the flavor of the day is mass-fed. Although fashion
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currents are getting more and more short-lived, the fact of
homogeneity continues. This is of course a reflection of
human nature – “man is a social animal”, and imitation is the
stuff of social cohesion.
Admittedly, not everything is spiritually debilitating in our
culture, but many things are and it is important to be aware of
such things. It is for instance very important to be aware of
the devastating emotional influence of daily, and indeed
hourly, news bulletins in the press, on the radio and on TV,
and in the newer media. The emphasis being on dramatic bad
news, we are bombarded with data that seems designed to
arouse negative emotions in us152.
All this is food for sensation and idle thought. One who is
intent on developing the art of meditation has to overcome
the strong temptations the media offer. It is important to
reduce such sensory input to the minimum necessary,
because it only serves to keep us in a certain excited state of
mind. We cannot truly plunge into the depths of our nature,
into true self-knowledge, if we allow such distractions to
constantly rule over us.
Of course, as concerned and responsible citizens, we do need
some information, on which to base our judgments and
actions. But consider the massive input from the media, and
ask yourself how much of that you actually need to fulfill
your duties. Following such considerations, find ways and
means to limit input as much as possible.
152
Pity at the victims of natural disasters, heinous civil crimes,
wars and terrorism. Anger at criminals, at unjust officials, or even
at lying and misleading journalism. Hatred towards people who
seem to be destroying the world, or simply in response to other
people’s hatred. And so on.
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Gradually, as one advances in meditation, one realizes most
media inputs to be useless interference in our lives, which
block rather than enhance contact with reality. The media
pound images and sounds into one’s mind, and it takes great
effort and time to clear them out. It is easier to just stop them
from entering it in the first place.
In this respect, one particularly poisonous input is pop music.
This is like a mental virus, because it is sound that is easily
memorized even against our will. It consists of some simple,
usually repetitive, often loud, jingle – which seems designed
to enter the mind of anyone within earshot and remain glued
there as long as possible. This causes people to become
habituated and attached to the sounds in question, and to buy
the record (as the music publishers have well understood).
Such “music” differs considerably with regard to adhesive
properties from more classical music. When such a virus
enters one’s mind, it is sometimes difficult to shake off. We
may try to listen to or recall some other sound, to smother out
the first. Or the virus may stay on for quite a while,
disappearing from consciousness (though often remaining in
memory, to reappear at some future time).
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22. CHAPTER TWENTY TWO
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapters 20-22.
1.
Forget Your Face
We live in an age of utter narcissism. Many multi-billion
dollar enterprises, such as the clothing and cosmetic
industries153, depend on making egotists out of us and keeping
us that way. Of course, one should look decent and smell
nice; but there are reasonable limits to such external
concerns. At some point, they cease to be expressions of
hygiene, and self-respect and respect for others, and become
ego obsessions and compulsions.
The confusion of self with one’s face and body leads more
and more men and women today to pass a lot of their time in
front of a mirror. This culture of the body is materialism, in
its most radical sense. It indicates a failure of spirituality.
Some people “speak to themselves” in the mirror. In my
view, a person who does so suffers from a severe alienation
from self. Looking into the reflection of one’s eyes and
153
I should also mention the photographic and home movie
industry, which thrives on people’s desire to linger on their own
physical appearance.
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speaking to one’s image, as if it is another person, is
indicative of confusion between self and factors of the ego.
Why address oneself so indirectly, when one can do so
directly within the mind (or out loud, but without a mirror)?
Many people gaze at their reflection for extended periods,
fretting and worrying about the shape and size of each feature
of their body, and in particular their face. They use artificial
means to conceal uglier aspects and emphasize more
beautiful aspects. Some spend hours in “fitness centers” to
improve their physical shape (not meaning their health, but
their contours). Some go so far as to resort to plastic surgery
(of their face, their bosoms or their sex organ)154.
Such behavior patterns are contrary to meditative pursuits.
When meditating, we strive not to identify with face or body.
At first, they seem very present – because we look upon the
world through our face and some parts of our body are visible
to us, and because of the weight of the touch sensations
within the body and in the surfaces of contact between the
body and its physical surrounds. But we strive to eventually
become effectively ‘transparent’ to these and all other
phenomenal impressions.
Such transparency is facilitated to the extent that one forgets
one face and bodily form. Literally, forget! Beware of even
accidental confrontations with a mirror. One may
occasionally look into a mirror, e.g. to comb one’s hair or to
shave – but in such case one should not look at one’s whole
face, and especially not into one’s eyes. Big mirrors are best
154
Sometimes, at the supermarket, I notice women who have
had their face turned into something monstrous by plastic surgery.
Can these women truly imagine they have been beautified, I
wonder? I feel so sorry for them.
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avoided – prefer smaller ones, or stick to the edges of larger
mirrors155.
It sounds silly at first, but the vain attraction to one’s
reflection in mirrors has to be resisted, if one wants to
eventually free oneself from one’s ego. Once one forgets
exactly what one looks like (which can be done, as memories
also fade), one can no longer bring up images of “oneself”
during meditation, and the burden of ego is reduced. And
incidentally, beauty (true beauty) naturally ensues from a
healthy and spiritual lifestyle.
2.
Give Up Sensuality
A certain level of spiritual realization is required to overcome
another weakness common in this day and age – sensuality,
by which we shall here mean the yearning for and pursuit of
sexual sensations. Sensuality includes sexual fantasies,
reminiscences and anticipations, since all such mental
rehearsing of sex causes sexual sensations, almost as
effectively as actual sexual acts do (and indeed, some
people’s sex lives are entirely imaginary).
Sexual activity is of course normal and necessary from a
biological point of view156, as is food. The problem with it is
155
I call hotel suites with a wall-to-wall mirror in the bathroom,
which are common these days, “wanker’s paradises”.
156
Human beings would not exist as such without
reproduction. Moreover, sexual relations not specifically aimed at
or resulting in reproduction are biologically justified, since they
serve to maintain a family bond, which is useful to survival of the
couple and their children. This biological perspective is also, by the
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that it is a very strong force in our body and mind, capable of
driving us on a mad search for gratification at any cost. This
is especially true when we are young, and our reproductive
instincts and powers are at their peak. But it can also be true
during late middle age and early old age, when many people
cling to their waning sexual abilities (to seduce and perform).
From the meditative point of view, one problem with sex is
the energy it dilapidates, which would be better used for
spiritual advancement. Without sufficient energy, one cannot
meditate long or deeply. Loss of sperm for men (and I
assume there is some equivalent incident for women), even if
involuntary, is a spiritual retardant; all the more so, if
voluntarily caused.
More broadly, sensuality diverts one’s attention from the
things in life that really matter, the deeper issues. It reinforces
confusion of self with ego157. It narrows people’s concerns to
futilities, making them shallow. Their thoughts become
frivolous and prurient, their language full of “dirty words”.
They cannot concentrate or think straight.
Once enslaved to sensuality, one becomes dependent on the
receptiveness and complicity of others. When partners are
way, the Jewish “middle way” regarding sex – a more moderate
doctrine than that found in other religions, one based on the
general idea that life on earth (if properly lived) is a good thing,
intended by the Creator.
157
Notice, as an indicator, the chutzpa that is eventually
written on the face of people who engage in unnatural sex acts, for
example. Such people confuse their brazenness, impudence and
insolence with self-assurance. They boast of “gay pride”, only to
mask their profound sorrow and shame. But even straight sex
(even based on “love”) takes its toll, increasing narcissism and
selfishness.
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available, all seems well for a while. But when relationships
become more tenuous or complicated, or they cease to be,
much emotional and social difficulty ensues. Sometimes,
sufficient anger is aroused to generate physical violence.
Much time is wasted trying to “fix things” in the couple; and
very often things get even more problematic. One’s life
becomes woefully entangled – for what has ultimately very
little value: some mere sensations!
People regard “romantic love” as the ultimate justification of
sex (apart from bonding and reproduction)158. But, honestly,
most sexual relationships are not based on love, but on lust159
mixed with possessiveness and dependence. The word love is
brought up as sugar coating, as a seductive lie; the liar even
lies to himself or herself, too, so as to make the lie more
credible to the partner. The true love people may sincerely
feel for each other has nothing to do with sex: it is a matter of
mutual respect, trust and support.
Of course, sexual attraction for members of the opposite sex
is normal and natural. When a man sees a pretty, wellshaped, fresh girl or young woman, he cannot but feel
attraction; and similarly, a woman is attracted by a man.
These are biological instincts, inscribed in our genes, for the
perpetuation of our species. But for this, we would not be
158
This is, historians tell us, a relatively recent argumentum.
Lust may either be selfish (in which case one pursues selfgratification, without concern for the partner’s pleasure or even
pain), or it may be cooperative (in which case, the sex acts
involved are most accurately described as mutual masturbation).
Cooperative lust is sometimes confused with love, note. As for sex
with prostitutes (some of which, by the way are unwilling partners –
effectively slaves), it is frankly based on lust – but its inherent
cynical truthfulness does not justify it.
159
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here. One has to accept the fact and take it into consideration
as a factor, when trying to increase one’s chastity. One does
well to remember that “grace is delusive and beauty is
passing”160.
Look upon your sexual impulses and desires as mere visitors
in your house – as temporary events that can never rule you,
if you do not allow them to. Strength of character is possible,
even easy, and very rewarding. Do not draw pleasure even
from passing sensations, not even in your dreams. Keep your
mind and hands clean. Purity of thoughts, words and deeds is
essential to spiritual success. And it makes one happy, too.
3.
On “Sexual Liberation”
Contrary to what popular psychology teaches, so-called
sexual liberation is in fact enslavement to passions. Sexual
indulgences of various sorts may give one a momentary
feeling of relief from the pressure of sexual urges, but their
longer term spiritual (and indeed physical and psychological)
effects are mostly devastating.
Masturbation is not a solution to sexual urges, but a further
problem. Masturbation diminishes sexual potency, and
general energy and health levels; it reduces self-respect and
self-confidence, and lowers attractiveness to the opposite sex;
it produces inner conflicts, and makes one melancholic161.
160
Proverbs 31.
Moreover, I suggest, it draws many to homosexuality, or at
least increases their tolerance towards it – for two reasons: firstly,
masturbation is an intrinsically sexually ambiguous act, since the
161
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However strong one’s urges, they can be overcome. Never
indulge in masturbation at all: it is not worth the trouble!
Nowadays, posing as “sexologists”, psychologists, journalists
and other opinion-makers, shamelessly tell youth that
masturbation is harmless and even good for them. But in
truth, such teachings and encouragements are spiritually
destructive; their purposes are, in the last analysis,
commercial and political. They serve only to enslave people
to their baser impulses, and thus to weaken them physically,
psychologically and socially.
The same popular opinion makers and “sexual liberators”
have given modern society widespread pornography and
homosexuality. Sexual activities, which less than a
generation ago were commonly regarded as among the most
ugly and depraved, have apparently become fashionable and
are defended with “righteous” indignation162.
The destructive effects of such ignoble behavior, on
individuals and on the fabric of society, are willfully ignored.
Do not be a “fashion victim”; do not believe in these media
figures, those who pretend to liberate (from moral restrictions
and rules) when they in fact enslave (to sensations). They are
man or woman engaged in it is effectively playing both sex roles,
the active and the receptive; secondly, the pornographic stimulants
in use often involve images of people of one’s own sex (in couples
or groups), or worse still people of the same sex (one’s own or the
opposite sex) in homosexual situations. Such licentious behavior is
antithetical to spiritual progress.
162
This reversal of moral roles has to be noticed and
understood, especially by inexperienced youths.
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just seeking to justify their coarseness and perversity of spirit,
by sullying everyone else.163
Next in line are pedophilia and bestiality, no doubt. Today
these are frowned upon and illegal, but who knows for how
long more? I just read on the Internet that efforts are being
made to change that already164. From the spiritual point of
view, this is just a logical development: once the floodgates
of sensuality are sufficiently loosened within them, people
lose all sanity and become slaves to increasingly weird
passions. The abnormal then seems normal.
It is good and wise to have certain inhibitions. Anyone intent
on spiritual progress has to learn to master their sexual
impulses and behavior. This refers to all sensuality, whatever
form it takes, from the normal to the deviant. Control your
thoughts and words, as well as deeds; remember: first come
tempting thoughts, then come encouraging words, and finally
the deeds are done.
163
Don’t let them tell you “it is okay, it is natural” (as they keep
hammering, ad nauseum) – it certainly is neither okay nor natural.
It all depends where an opinion is coming from. If a person is
spiritually base, his or her opinions are accordingly muddy.
Inversely, if a person is spiritually high, his or her thinking is
accordingly clear. You do not have to first believe in any tradition to
despise homosexuality – just live a pure life and you will be able to
see for yourself the spiritual corruption it causes in the people
concerned. Opposing it is not “just a religious prejudice”, as its
proponents contend, but a clear insight from spiritual purity.
164
“Pedophiles in the Netherlands are registering a political
party to press for lowering the legal age of sexual relations from 16
to 12 and to allow child porn and bestiality. The [party], which plans
to register tomorrow, says it eventually wants to get rid of the age
limit on sexual relations” (worldnetdaily.com news alert,
30.5.2006).
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In this matter as in all others, the psychological sequence of
events is as follows165: first, we perceive something (or
someone, e.g. a beautiful girl); then we evaluate it, finding it
likeable (or disliking it); then we desire to have greater or
more permanent contact with it (or to avoid it); then comes
imaginations (building up the desire by projecting its
satisfaction) and rationalizations (so as to fit, however
artificially, the idea of such action in one’s belief system);
finally, we take action (and eventually have to face the
consequences).
To say we have free will is to admit that we can at any stage
in this sequence of events intervene in our inner or outer
behavior, and to stop or reverse things – although this is not
meant to deny that such good will may get more difficult as
things proceed. To realize this freedom of will, one has to
understand that the perceptions, affections, appetites,
imaginings and self-justifications that precede volitional
action are just only influences (of varying intensity) on such
actions, they can never determine it.
The simplest intervention is to avoid the initial perception,
i.e. to deliberately steer clear of potential temptations or turn
one’s eyes away from them when they accidentally occur.
Next, we can challenge the evaluation, and suggest that the
object is not as likeable as it may seem. Or again, we can
admit the object likeable in itself, but still avoid desire by
pointing out its incidental disadvantages. If desire persists,
we can still control ourselves by not indulging in
imaginations or rationalizations that reinforce it and make it
more likely.
165
Based largely on descriptions in Buddhist psychology.
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Finally, however weak we have been till now, we can still at
the last moment opt out of the misdeed concerned; or having
already put it in motion, we can still change course. It may be
increasingly hard to do, but it is still in our power. This is
why we are held morally (and legally) responsible for our
actions – and this power of choice is also our great dignity as
human beings. So never say “I can’t stop myself” – you
would only be lying so as to excuse yourself!
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23. CHAPTER TWENTY THREE
Drawn from Meditations (2006),
Chapter 23.
PRACTICE NON-ATTACHMENT
1.
Attachment
As previously implied, suffering is a negative personal
response to sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touch sensations, or
feelings or emotions of any sort, that have been, are now or
are anticipated to be experienced (for whatever reason) as
painful or as loss of pleasure. It is an attitudinal or volitional
response of the soul to certain actual or potential information
inputs – a response of rejection, of wishing or trying to avoid
or get rid of certain psychologically unpalatable objects.
It should be noted that there is a positive equivalent of this
response – it is enjoyment. This attitude or will, to sense or
mental impressions perceived as positive (i.e. pleasant or as
loss of pain), consists in wishing or trying to grab or cling on
to certain objects. Enjoyment is not to be confused with
pleasure. Enjoyment is to pleasure (and negation of pain) as
suffering is to pain (and negation of pleasure).
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Suffering and enjoyment are thus two sides of the same coin
– which we can (like the Buddhists) call attachment166. These
are not phenomena, but spiritual reactions to phenomena,
note well. That is, whereas pleasure and pain are parts of the
realm of body and mind, enjoyment and suffering are direct
expressions of the soul.
In the case of suffering, we “draw pain” from pain or
insufficiency of pleasure – we are sad, depressed, etc. in view
of experiencing negative phenomena. In the case of
enjoyment, we “draw pleasure” from pleasure or reduction of
pain – we are joyful, euphoric, etc. in view of experiencing
positive phenomena. This is said primarily of current pain or
pleasure of any sort, but it also applies to remembered or
anticipated pains or pleasures.
Suffering is adding pain on to pain (or to insufficiency of
pleasure) – it compounds and prolongs pain by reinforcing
our susceptibility. For example, say a motorist rudely drives
into the parking place I got to first; there is a first reaction of
pain at the experience of such an uncouth person, as well as
at the loss of the parking place and at the prospect of having
to seek another; but if I allow anger to rise in me – this is the
extra pain of suffering.
Similarly, enjoyment is getting pleasure from the fact of
increasing pleasure (or of decreasing pain). For example, say
the said rude motorist feels pleasure at having gotten the
parking place first; if he starts congratulating himself and
166
This is, of course, but one facet of the connotation of
‘attachment’, which includes all affections and appetites – likes and
dislikes, desires and aversions, hopes and fears, etc. See my work
Volition and Allied Causal Concepts, chapter 10.
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boasting about it to his passenger – that’s the extra pleasure
of enjoyment.
2.
Non-attachment
Detachment or asceticism, or (less pejoratively put) nonattachment, consists in becoming aware of the distinction
between the attachment of self to pleasures or pains, and the
primary pleasant or painful objects, events, sensations,
mental impressions, ideas, etc. Once one develops this
awareness, one becomes able to abstain from “drawing”
pleasure from pleasure, and pain from pain, i.e. able to cease
emphasizing pleasant or painful feelings with enjoyment or
suffering. Such emphasis (i.e. attachment) is, in the last
analysis, an unnecessary compounding of the problem posed
by pleasure and pain.
Pain is known to all as a negative influence on the will –
although, if we ignore or overcome this influence, we turn the
pain into an instrument of improved will. Similarly, people
must realize, pleasure can be a negative influence, if we
attach to it – i.e. it is equally wise to detach from pleasure as
from pain. The two poles must be treated in the same way,
for one cannot become independent of the one while
remaining dependent on the other.
To succeed in detaching from pain, one must also detach
from pleasure. One cannot be a hedonist and hope to avoid
suffering pain or displeasure. The moment one allows oneself
to enjoy (i.e. cling to) pleasure, one sets oneself up for the
suffering of pain (i.e. trying to head it off or push it away or
run from it). The two imply the same addiction of spirit, the
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same spiritual affliction. One has to give up on enjoyment of
pleasure or diminished pain to become truly free.
It is of course easier to give up suffering than to give up
enjoyment. But one has to understand that both these habits
build up the ego (or more precisely, the self-identification
with the body-mind complex). If the ego is sustained by
enjoyment, it will continue to feed suffering. Such habits
cannot of course be stopped overnight: but, gently does it,
they can be weeded out over time.
Thus, when experiencing pleasures, do not linger on them
and try to maximize them, as we are all wont to do, but
instead look upon them meditatively. This will enable you to
also find liberation from pains – i.e. to contemplate them
calmly, without fearing them or trying to minimize them.
The causes of or reasons for the pleasures or pains are
interesting to know, but ultimately rather irrelevant.
Meditators do not pass too much time looking into their life
story for the particular sources of their psychological
problems; Freudian-style psychoanalysis is itself a form of
attachment and self-confusion with phenomena. Meditation is
concerned proactively with remedying and preventing the
root causes of problems, just as a mechanic fixes a car
without needing to know how it crashed.
Underlying both suffering and enjoyment is some sort of
radical discontent. Suffering expresses this condition by selfpity; enjoyment expresses it by trying to give oneself a boost.
The opposite of both these reactions is the attitude of
contentment. This is not the opposite of suffering only, note
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well, but the antithesis of both suffering and enjoyment167. It
is freedom of the spirit from passing material and mental
phenomena of whatever polarity, freedom from the ups and
downs of random emotions.
Non-attachment does not mean feigned or forced detachment
(the latter is a pejorative connotation of the term detachment,
but not its only sense). Non-attachment is not emotional
paralysis, in the way of someone who has built up rigid
defenses against emotions. It consists in being cool and
collected, not frozen or repressed. It is “being zen” (as people
say nowadays in French), i.e. not getting overly excited over
virtually nothing. If one meditates sufficiently and well, nonattachment comes naturally.
3.
Wise Moderation
It has to be stressed, so there is no misunderstanding:
recommending ‘non-enjoyment’ (in the sense above defined)
does not mean being against pleasure. To be impassive is not
to be apathetic. Naturally, pleasure is preferable to pain or
even to non-feeling.
167
Most translations of Buddhist texts imply the opposite of
suffering to be happiness; but this is inaccurate. The term
contentment is more appropriate here, and this is the contrary not
only of suffering but also of enjoyment, as just explained. Note well
that contentment is not an emotion, something the soul passively
feels, but an attitude, an actively chosen posture of the soul’s will.
The term happiness is perhaps best reserved for the ultimate bliss
of enlightenment, for no one can be said to be truly happy who has
not permanently reached such realization.
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If one experiences a pleasure (or is relieved of a pain), so
well and good – there is no intrinsic harm in that. There is no
reason to in principle reject pleasure as such when it happens
to occur; nor even to avoid pleasure if one sees it coming –
indeed, to do so would constitute another form of attachment.
On the other hand, one should not try to make an existing
pleasure last or increase; nor, a fortiori, should one pursue
pleasure for its own sake or pass one’s time dreaming of it
when one lacks it. Such hedonist behavior is bound to result
in unhappiness (sadness, resentment, conflicts, weakness,
etc.) – it is not worth it.
Note however that, because of the polarities involved, our
position relative to suffering is not entirely symmetrical to
the one just formulated with regard to enjoyment. Our advice
to avoid suffering does not logically imply a fatalistic
acceptance of pain as such. In the case of pain, if one can
avoid it (before the fact) or get rid of it (after the fact), one
should of course do so, if there are no more pressing
considerations to the contrary.
One should do so – because pain is an obstruction to
consciousness and volition, as is most evident in tragic
situations (like certain diseases, or like torture). The problem
of suffering arises only when pain becomes one’s overriding
focus, i.e. when any amount of pain (real or imagined) is
unbearable. Oversensitivity to pain is spiritually unhealthy.
It is natural to protect and cure our soul’s body-mind
appendages from harm, and even to look after their
wellbeing. The issue here is only to what extent such
concerns and pursuits are biologically valuable, and at what
point they become harmful in themselves. The limit is
attained when our more materialist concerns and pursuits
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begin to hinder or damage our ultimately more important
spiritual values.
Thus, the posture advocated here is: neither exacerbated
hedonism nor extreme asceticism, but moderation and
wisdom.
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24. CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR
Drawn from Logical and Spiritual Reflections (2008),
Book 1, chapters 6 & 7.
1.
Freewill
Next, let us consider Hume’s opinions regarding freewill.
Given his opinions with regard to the self and to causation,
we can with relative ease anticipate the way his thinking will
go with regard to human volition and ethics.
Since Hume has denied the self, he cannot be expected to
believe in volition in the ordinary sense, i.e. in freedom of the
individual soul to will or not-will something irrespective of
influences one way or the other. Therefore, one would expect
him to opt for some sort of determinism168. Although he has
denied causation, or our knowledge of it, in the physical
realm, this does not logically exclude causation in the
168
Parenthetically: to his credit, Hume realizes that freewill
ought not be identified with mere spontaneous occurrence.
Indeterminism, whether in the physical or mental realm, constitutes
a determinism of sorts relative to human beings. If things happen
to us at random, without any cause, we are subject to them as
surely as if they were determinist causal factors. That is, their own
lack of causes does not diminish their causal impact on us.
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“mental” realm, so such determinism would be consistent for
him.
Yet, he struggles to salvage for human beings some vestige
of volition. We are not in his view mere rubber balls that
react to events in wholly predictable ways. We are it seems
somewhat free to do what we feel like doing. Our actions are
related to our character, desires, passions; it is such
distinctive attributes of ours that make these actions our own.
We are thus determined by impulses, preferences and
emotions – or rather, they are ‘us’, we are their sum total.
This is consistent with his view of the self as an aggregate of
passing mental phenomena.
This is of course not what we would call free will. It is rather
slavery to random passions. Hume admits as much when he
says: “Reason is, and ought only to be, slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and
obey them”169. By this he means that, though induction and
deduction provide us with information that may affect our
actions, they cannot determine it. According to him, only the
passions can truly move us; it is ultimately with them that we
identify and go.
Now, this tells us a lot about the way Hume’s mind works,
and even about the way many other people’s minds work, but
it does not accurately reflect the full range of human nature.
It may apply to some of the people some of the time, but does
not apply to all of the people all of the time. For though it is
true that reason does not necessarily affect our actions, it is
also true that passions need not do so. Just as the information
reason gives us can influence our actions but may well be
169
Treatise, Book II, Part III, Sect. iii.
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ignored, i.e. is not determining – so it goes for the passions.
We do not have to be slaves of our passions or identified with
them; we are in fact distinct from them and able to transcend
them.
It is true that many (maybe even most) people are not aware
of this freedom of the will, and let their passions rule them.
Some people, by the way, are similarly ruled by their reason,
i.e. they are tormented by family, social, political or religious
obligations, and unable to resist them. But such passivity or
dependence is not normal or inevitable; it is a curable
sickness of the soul. The passions, like reason, can only
really ‘influence’ the soul, not ‘determine’ it – the soul still in
all cases has the capacity and the responsibility to choose
between them and decide which way to act. This is clear to
anyone who practices self-control.
We can with effort learn to rule over our own minds, and
indeed such policy is wisdom itself. But this demanding
virtue depends on our making a clear distinction between
causation (or deterministic causality) and volition (or
personal causality), and on our understanding what
‘influence’ means.
A person is said to be influenced by something to act (or not
act) in a certain way if the person’s perception or conception
of the thing makes acting in that way easier (or harder). Such
facilitation (or on the contrary, impedance) of the will is
never determining: the person remains free not to will in the
direction of (or against) the influence; he or she can still go
the other way. The potentiality of the will is increased (or
decreased), but the person still has the final choice.
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Thus, influence is a special sort of conditioning of voluntary
action. The action is not caused (in the sense of causation)
directly by the event or thing influencing it – but rather, our
awareness to some degree of that event or thing (be it
concrete or abstract) affects us (the doer of the deed), by
making such action more or less easy than it otherwise would
be. The influential thought pushes us or slows us down, but
we still (so long as we have freewill) have to make an effort
to actualize anything.
Once we understand the causal relation called influence, we
can distance ourselves from our passions and even from our
reason, and view them all as mere influential information, to
be taken into consideration in motivating or deciding action,
but which should never be allowed to usurp the sovereignty
of the soul, who ultimately alone commands the will and is
responsible for its orientations. But Hume cannot see this,
because he is himself still too unconscious and too involved
in his passions. Having denied the very existence of a self or
person, he naturally misconceives the will as subservient to
the passions.
Thus, Hume confuses his personal opinions and behavior
with general truths about human nature. Here again, we find
him making inaccurate observations and over-generalizing.
He does not always realize the hypothetical nature of his
propositions, and the need to try to establish them with
reference to precise inductive procedures. Since he has
misconceived induction to begin with, he has incapacitated
himself methodologically.
Philosophers do not have special powers of ‘insight’ into
truth, independent of logical scrutiny and correction. They
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think like everyone else by inductive means, and they can
make mistakes like everyone else if they are not careful.
2.
The Is-Ought Dichotomy
David Hume’s views and opinions on many philosophical
topics seem (to me) to be driven by the desire to exempt
himself from ‘morality’. That often seems to be the
underlying driving force or motive of all his skeptical
philosophy, what it all manifestly tends towards. By denying
induction, causation, the self and an effective power of
freewill, he is justifying the idea that “anything goes” in
knowledge and in personal behavior. This overall trend is
again confirmed when we consider some of his positions
regarding ethical reasoning.
Hume questions the possibility of deriving prescriptive
statements, which tells us what we ought to do or not do,
from descriptive statements, which tell us the way things are
or are not. The distinction between these two sorts of
statement is in his opinion so radical that one cannot be
reduced to the other. This means effectively that moral or
ethical propositions have no formal basis in fact, i.e. they
cannot be claimed as true in an absolute sense. There is no
logical way, in his view, to deduce or induce an “ought” from
an “is”.
Prescriptive statements are then, according to Hume, at best
just practical advice on how to pursue our self-interest and
the interests of the people we value (or more broadly,
sympathize or empathize with). This is a kind of pragmatism
or utilitarianism, in lieu of heavier moral notions of duty or
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obligation. In this way, ethics is made essentially amoral – an
issue of convenience, a mere description of the ways we
might best pursue our arbitrary values. The implication is one
of relativism and convention.
It should be added that Hume’s conclusion with a non-ethics
or relativistic ethic is consistent with his position on freewill.
For if we do not really have freewill, but are inevitably driven
by our passions, and moreover can rely on them rather than
reason for guidance, then we have no need for ethics. Ethics
is only meaningful if we have a real power of choice and
must therefore take decisions.
Hume’s view of ethical logic is an interesting mix of truth
and falsehood, which is why many have agreed with him and
many have found it difficult to refute him. Ethics is of course
a vast and complex subject, and I do not propose here to treat
the topic in detail170. I would just like to show briefly how and
why Hume’s approach, for all its seeming skeptical mastery,
is here again superficial and narrow.
The issue raised is primarily formal. What are prescriptive
propositions and how do they relate to descriptive ones? The
obvious answer to the question would be that prescriptions
relate ends to means. I ought to do (or not-do) this if I want
170
Note that I do not believe it is the task of the ethical
philosopher to foresee every situation in life, and prescribe
optimum behavior for them. Certainly, the philosopher is called
upon to consider difficult general cases and propose wise
responses. But each situation is unique in some respects, so the
main task in this field is to teach people to think for themselves – in
sensitive, intelligent and logical ways – about ethical issues. Ethical
philosophy is primarily ethical logic, and only secondarily deals with
certain contents. It is not a totalitarian doctrine. Each person has to
live his or her own life.
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to (or not-to) obtain or attain that. The ‘ought’ (or ‘should’ or
‘must’) modality is essentially the bond in a specific kind of
if-then proposition, with a desire or ‘value’ as antecedent and
an action or ‘virtue’ as consequent.
Such if-then propositions are not themselves descriptive, but
are deductively derived from descriptive forms. When we say
“if we want so and so, then thus and thus is the way to get it”,
we are affirming that “thus and thus” is/are cause(s) of “so
and so”171. The latter is a factual claim, which may be true or
false. It follows that the prescriptive statement can also be
judged true or false, at least in respect of the correctness of
the connection implied between its antecedent and
consequent.
Be it mentioned in passing, prescriptive statements may be
positive (imperatives) or negative (prohibitions). As well,
note, the negations of prescriptive statements, viz. not
imperative (exempt) and not prohibited (permitted) are also
significant ethical modalities. But for brevity’s sake we will
here only concentrate on imperatives, for the rest logically
follows.
We see from our above definition of an imperative that it is
conditional. Good or bad mean good or bad for something or
someone. The imperative is only true as such if we grant that
the value pursued is indeed of value. But how can we ever
know whether any of our values are valuable in an absolute
sense? This is Hume’s query, and it is quite valid. But his
171
I won’t here go into the different determinations of
causation. Suffices to say that obviously if A is the only way to X,
then I can say: “I must do A to get to X”. But if there are alternative
ways to X – say. A, B and C, then I can only say: “I must do A or B
or C to get X” – i.e. my prescription is disjunctive.
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conclusion that values are formally bound to be arbitrary (i.e.
cannot be deduced from plain facts) is open to challenge.
Our task is to show that we can arrive somehow at
categorical imperatives172, i.e. ethical standards that can
ground and justify all subsequent conditional imperatives.
One conceivable way to do so is to use a dilemmatic
argument: ‘Whether you want this or that or anything else,
the pursuit of so and so would in any case be a precondition’.
Something is an absolute value if it is necessary to the pursuit
of any and all arbitrary values one personally opts for. A
relative value can be by-passed in the pursuit of other relative
values, but an absolute value is one presupposed in every
pursuit and must therefore be respected unconditionally.
Are there any such absolute values? Clearly, yes. An obvious
such value is life itself: if one lacks life, one cannot pursue
anything else; therefore life must be protected and enhanced.
Another absolute value is the self – if the soul is the source of
all our actions, good or bad, then the soul’s welfare is an
172
It should be clear that, although I use this expression
intentionally, I do not mean by it the same as Kant did. It is form,
not content. I am here discussing formal ethical logic, not
advocating a general or particular categorical imperative. Kant
considers an imperative categorical if it is universal, i.e. applicable
to everyone, all agents. Whereas in my view, a categorical
imperative can be quite singular. What makes an imperative
categorical, instead of hypothetical, is its necessity to all goals
open to that agent. Logically, this is more symmetrical. What
means are universal in this sense, i.e. universal to all goals (not
necessarily all people)? Life, bodily wholeness and health, soul,
cognition, volition, valuation, mental wholeness and health – these
are means we always need to succeed, whatever our particular
goals.
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absolute value. Whatever one wants, one needs the
physiological and psychological means that make such
pursuit at all possible – viz. one’s bodily and mental faculties.
And most of all, one needs to be present oneself!
These are obvious examples. What do they teach us? If we
wish to understand, use and validate ethical propositions, we
have to realize what makes all such discourse possible and
necessary. A simple illustration and proof of that is that if I
tell you ‘don’t follow any ethical doctrine’, I am uttering an
ethical doctrine, and therefore committing a selfcontradiction.
Ethical propositions do not apply to inanimate objects. They
apply only to living beings, because only such entities have
anything to win or lose. But to apply them to all living beings
is not correct, for though plants, insects and lower animals
can objectively be said by us to have values, their functioning
is either automatic or instinctive, and they cannot understand
or voluntarily apply ethics.
Only humans, and maybe higher animals like chimps or
dolphins, can have ethical thoughts and the power of will to
carry them out. These thoughts are verbal or non-verbal in
the case of humans, and necessarily non-verbal in the case of
higher animals. Thus, in the last analysis, explicit ethical
discourse concerns only human beings.
And we can say at the outset that to engage at all in ethical
discourse, humans have to study and take into consideration
their nature, their true identity. They have to realize their
biological and spiritual nature, the nature of their physicalmental organism and the nature of their soul. Moreover, since
biology and spirituality relate not just to the individual in
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isolation, but to larger groups and to society as a whole –
ethics has to be equally broad in its concerns.
If this large factual background is ignored in the formulation
of ethical propositions, one is bound to be arbitrary and
sooner or later fall into error. In conclusion, we can develop
an ethic that involves absolute values and is based on factual
truths. Ethics is clearly seen not to be arbitrary, if we
consider the conditions that give rise to it in the first place –
viz. that we are fragile living beings, with natural needs and
limits, and that we are persons, with powers of cognition,
volition and valuation.
If all the relevant facts are taken into consideration, then, an
“ought” encapsulates a mass of “is” information, and can
therefore be regarded as a special sort of “is”. That is, if
properly developed, an ethical statement can be declared true,
like any other factual claim. It is ethical fact, as against
‘alethic’ fact. Of course, if not properly induced and deduced,
an ethical can be declared false – but not all ethical
propositions are false.
Hume failed to realize the said logical preconditions of any
ethics, and therefore got stuck in the shallow idea that ethics
cannot be deeply grounded in fact. Since the scope of his
considerations was partial, he could at least see that an
“ought” is to start with conditional, but he could not see
further how it could eventually be made unconditional. He
therefore wrongly concluded that inferring an “ought” from
an “is” is fallacious reasoning. This was later pompously
called “the naturalistic fallacy”173.
173
By George Edward Moore, in his Principia Ethica (1903). I
say ‘pompously’ to stress that no logical fallacy is involved, in my
404
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The Standards of Ethics
In the above discussion of the ethical means and ends, I
pointed out that, for instances, life and soul were two things
that could logically be affirmed to be natural and absolute
standards of value, since they are preconditions of any ethical
discourse, i.e. since ethical discourse is only applicable to
beings with life and more specifically with soul, i.e. beings
with powers of consciousness, volition and valuation like us
humans.
As I have suggested in my work Volition and Allied Causal
Concepts, the term “life” in this context does not just mean
bodily life – though this is doubtless its primary meaning.
The term can also legitimately be taken to refer to spiritual
life, i.e. the life of the soul. Indeed, in the last analysis ethics
is concerned with bodily welfare rather accessorily: its main
concern is with the soul’s welfare.
An obvious consequence of such extension of meaning is that
those who believe in life after death (as in Judaism,
Christianity and Islam) or in reincarnation (as in Buddhism
and Hinduism) can construct an ethics without committing a
view. The issue is a logical problem – but one open to solution. My
rejecting this so-called fallacy is not intended to reject offhand
Moore’s central thesis, viz. that of the intellectual primacy of the
concept of ‘good’, i.e. that we tacitly understand the term in some
way before any theory attempting to define it.
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logical error. That is to say, ethics is not necessarily limited
to this life and this world.
Clearly, if we assume that our life goes on or returns in some
form even after our body has died, it is logically quite okay
(though at first sight it might seem paradoxical) to build an
ethics in which the body might be deliberately risked or
sacrificed in favor of the soul’s longer-term interest.
Those who view their life on earth as a mere visit in a longer
journey naturally and quite logically evaluate their thoughts,
words and deeds with reference to that broader context rather
than in the narrow sense of physical survival. Although such
survival is important to ethics, it can on occasion be
overridden by more abstract, wider or higher considerations.
Such occasions provide one with a test of one’s true values.
Of course, such self-sacrifice can easily be wrongly based on
fantasy and illusion, since we do not know of the hereafter
except by hearsay or presupposition. In most circumstances,
it is wise to assume that one’s continued survival is the most
beneficial course of action. But in special circumstances one
might well judge that to accept some present evil would
endanger one’s future life or lives. For example, some saintly
persons have preferred to die rather than to be forced to kill
an innocent person.
People can conceivably and sometimes do risk or give their
physical lives in defense of their family, their people or
nation, humanity as a whole, life as such, or in God’s service,
because they perceive themselves, not as delimited bodies
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and independent individuals, but as parts of a larger whole –
a group of people or of living things or the collective or root
soul that is God. The value of one’s life is in such case a
function of the value of the larger unit.
In sum, though we may use the term “life” as a short and
sweet standard of ethical discourse, the term should not
exclusively be understood in its simplest, material sense, but
may logically be widened to admit more spiritual goals,
whether this-worldly and other-worldly.
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25. CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE
Drawn from Logical and Spiritual Reflections (2008),
Book 3, chapters 20 & 21.
1.
The Laws of Thought in Meditation
The three laws of thought are commonly considered by many
current commentators174 to be (at best) only relevant to
rational discourse, and not relevant at all or even antithetical
to meditation and all the more so to its finale of
enlightenment. Nothing could be further from the truth, as
will now be explicated.
The laws of thought are principally ‘moral’ imperatives to the
thinker, enjoining him or her to have certain cognitive
attitudes in all processes of thought. They call upon the
thinker to make an effort, so as to guarantee maximum
efficiency and accuracy of his or her thoughts. The
‘metaphysical’ aspect of the laws of thought is a substratum
and outcome of this practical aspect.175
174
Judging by Internet postings and debate on this topic.
It could also be said that the two aspects are ‘coemergent’, mutually significant and equally important. But here I
wish to stress the psychological side of the issue.
175
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1. The law of identity is a general stance of ‘realism’.
In discursive thought, this means: to face facts; to observe
and think about them; to admit the factuality of
appearances as such and that of logical arguments relating
to them; to accept the way things are (or at least the way
they seem to be for now), that things are as they are, i.e.
whatever they happen to be; and so on.
Clearly, these same cognitive virtues are equally
applicable to meditation practice, which requires
awareness, receptivity and lucidity. The antitheses of
these attitudes are evasiveness, prejudice and
obscurantism, resulting in “sloth and torpor”176.
At the apogee of meditation, in the enlightenment
experience, this is expressed as (reportedly)
consciousness of the “thus-ness” (or “such-ness”) of
“ultimate reality”.
2. The law of non-contradiction is a general stance of
‘coherence’ (which is an aspect of ‘realism’).
In discursive thought, this means: while giving initial
credence to all appearances taken singly, not to accept
two conflicting appearances as both true (or real), but to
place one or both of them in the category of falsehood (or
illusion); to seek to resolve or transcend all apparent
contradictions; to pursue consistency in one’s concepts
and theories; to reject inconsistent ideas as absurd and
self-contradictions as untenable nonsense; and so on.
Clearly, these same cognitive virtues are equally
applicable to meditation practice, which requires
176
See Kamalashila, p. 253.
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harmony, balance and peace of mind. The antitheses of
these attitudes are conflict, confusion and neurosis (or
madness), resulting in “restlessness and anxiety”177.
At the peak of meditation, in the enlightenment
experience, this is expressed as (reportedly) the “oneness” (monism or monotheism) of “ultimate reality”.
3. The law of the excluded middle is a general stance of
‘curiosity’ (which is also an aspect of ‘realism’).
In discursive thought, this means: engaging in research
and study, so as to fill gaps in one’s knowledge and
extend its frontier; engaging in speculation and
theorizing, but always under the supervision and guidance
of rationality; avoiding fanciful escapes from reality,
distorting facts and lying to oneself and/or others;
accepting the need to eventually make definite choices
and firm decisions; and so on.
Clearly, these same cognitive virtues are equally
applicable to meditation practice, which requires clarity,
judgment and understanding. The antitheses of these
attitudes are ignorance, uncertainty and delusion,
resulting in “doubt and indecision”178.
At the pinnacle of meditation, in the enlightenment
experience, this is expressed as (reportedly) the
“omniscience” of “ultimate reality”.
Thus, I submit, rather than abandon the laws of thought when
we step up from ordinary thinking to meditation, and from
that to enlightenment, we should stick to them, while
177
178
See Kamalashila, p. 249.
See Kamalashila, p. 258.
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allowing that they are expressed somewhat differently at each
spiritual stage. Whereas in discursive thought awareness is
expressed by intellectual activity, in meditation the approach
is gentler and subtler, and in enlightenment we attain pure
contemplation.
When such final realization is reached179, the laws of thought
are not breached, but made most evident. “Thus-ness” is the
essence of existence; it is the deepest stratum of identity, not
an absence of all identity. “One-ness” is not coexistence or
merging of opposites, but where all oppositions are dissolved
or transcended. “Omniscience” is not in denial of ordinary
experience and knowledge, but their fullest expression and
understanding. What in lower planes of being and knowing
seems obscure, divergent and uncertain, becomes perfect at
the highest level.180
Those teachers or commentators who claim that the laws of
thought are abrogated once we transcend ordinary discourse
are simply misinterpreting their experiences. Either their
179
I submit, on the basis of my own limited experience, but
also out of logical expectation of consistency between all levels of
being. I think many people more knowledgeable than me would
agree with the descriptions here given of the higher realms.
180
Buddhist, and especially Mahayana, philosophers often
stress that nirvana (the common ground of all being) and samsara
(the multiplicity of changing appearances) are ultimately one and
the same. Even while admitting this, we must remain aware of their
apparent difference. The whole point of the philosophical idea of
monism (“nirvana”) is of course to resolve the contradictions and
gaps inherent in the experience of plurality (“samsara”). At the
same time, the one-ness of nirvana is in a sort of conflict with the
multiplicity of samsara. We must somehow both admit and ignore
this tension. In truth, all this remains an unsolved problem at some
level.
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experience is not true “realization”, or their particular
interpretation of their realization experience is just an
erroneous afterthought that should not be viewed as part of
the experience itself.
Instead of the laws of identity, non-contradiction and
exclusion of any middle, they propose a law of non-identity,
a law of contradiction, and a law of the included middles!
According to them, the ultimate reality is that nothing has an
identity, all contradictories coexist quite harmoniously, and
there may be other alternatives besides a thing and its
negation!
They adduce as proofs the Buddhist principles of nonselfhood, impermanence and interdependence.
But they cannot claim that something has no “nature”
whatsoever, for then what is that “something” that they are
talking about? If it is truly non-existent, why and how are we
at all discussing it and who are we? Surely these same people
admit the existence of an “ultimate reality” of some sort – if
only a single, infinite, universal substratum181. They call it
181
The “great self” or “ocean of permanence”, to use the
words of Dogen (p. 267). Note that Dogen is not here saying there
is no such thing, but is stressing that we do not – as some people
claim – automatically all return there after death, but rather are
subject to various rebirths according to our respective karmas; he
is implying that to get there is hard-won realization, not something
given gratis to all comers). Some identify this underlying ultimate
reality with the “Deus sive Natura” of Baruch Spinoza (Holland,
1632-77). But I hasten to add that I do not subscribe to Spinoza’s
equation of God and Nature, which implies that God is like Nature
subject to determinism. For me, as in normative Judaism, God is
the free, volitional creator of Nature. He underlies and includes it. It
is a mere product His and but a tiny part or aspect of Him.
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“void” or “empty”, but surely such a negation is not logically
tenable without the admission that something positive is
being negated; a negation can never be a primary given.
Similarly, we might argue, “impermanence” means the
impermanence of something and “interdependence” means
the interdependence of two or more things. They cannot
claim infinite impermanence, without admitting the extended
existence in time of something however temporary; and they
cannot claim a universal interdependence, without admitting
causal connections between actual facts.
There is an unfortunate tendency here to use words without
paying attention to their relational implications. Another
example of this practice is to speak of “consciousness” (or
perception or thought or some such cognitive act), without
admitting that this implies consciousness of something
(called an object) by something (called the Subject).
This is done deliberately, to conform with the ideological
prejudice that there is no cognizing self and nothing to
cognize. Similarly, so as not to have to mention the Agent
willing an action, volition is concealed and the action is made
to appear spontaneous or mechanical. They refuse to admit
that someone is suffering, thinking, meditating or becoming
enlightened.
Another claim often made is that our common experience of
the world is like a dream compared to ultimate reality. The
implication being that the laws of thought are not obeyed in a
dream. But in truth, even in a dream, though images and
sound come and go and seem to intertwine, actually there is
no contradiction if we observe carefully. As for the difference
between dream and awake experience, it is not strictly a
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contradiction since they are experienced as distinct domains
of being.
Contradiction is not even thinkable, except in words (or
intentions). We cannot even actually imagine a contradiction,
in the sense defined by Aristotle (is and is not at once in
every respect). We can only say (or vaguely believe) there is
one. We of course commonly encounter apparent
contradiction, but that does not prove that contradiction exists
in fact. It is an illusion, a conflict between verbal
interpretations or their non-verbal equivalents.
We formulate theories; they yield contradictions; we correct
the theories so that they no longer yield these contradictions.
We tailor our rational constructs to experience. We do not
infer contradiction to exist from contradictions in our
knowledge. We question and fix our knowledge, rather than
impose our beliefs on reality. That is sanity, mental health.
That is the way knowledge progresses, through this dialectic
of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.
2.
Reason and Spirituality
In Judaism, the rabbis consciously practice non-contradiction
(and the other laws of thought) in most of their discourse; but
in some cases, they desert this virtue.
For example, it often happens that equally authoritative
commentators have divergent interpretations of the same text;
nevertheless, both their positions are upheld as traditional and
true so as to avoid any suggestion that any important rabbi
might ever be wrong. In such cases, the rationale given is that
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the different, even conflicting, perspectives together deepen
and enrich the overall understanding of that text. In non-legal
contexts (haggadah), there is no pressing need to decide one
way or the other, anyway; while in legal contexts (halakhah),
a decision is often made by majority182.
Also, as I have shown in my Judaic Logic, some of the
hermeneutic principles used in the Talmud are not in
conformity with syllogistic logic; some yield a non sequitur
in conclusion, and some even a contradiction. In such cases,
the absurdity occurs on a formal level, within a single line of
reasoning (rather than in relation to conflicting approaches);
yet the conclusion is often accepted as law anyway, because
the (erroneous) form of reasoning is considered traditional
and Divinely given.
However, it is interesting to note in this regard that there is a
Talmudic law183 about two people who find a prayer shawl
and bring it together to the rabbinical court, both claiming it
as their property (on a finders-keepers basis); these people
are not permitted to both swear they found it first, since these
oaths would be in contradiction and that would make one of
them at least a vain use of God’s name (a grave sin).
This Judaic law shows that the rabbis are ultimately forced to
admit the logical law of non-contradiction as binding, i.e. as
indicative of objective reality.
Similarly, in Buddhism, there are many teachers who insist
on the importance of keeping one’s feet firmly on the ground
182
Although in some cases, centuries later, scattered groups
of Jews may follow different interpretations of the same decision.
183
I unfortunately cannot find the exact Mishna reference at
this time, but I heard it discussed by two Rabbis.
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even while one’s head is up in the heavens. They teach that
karmic law should not be ignored or denied184 – meaning that
one should not act as if there are no laws of nature in this
world and anything goes. To act irresponsibly is foolish and
at times criminal. I would include under this heading
adherence to the laws of thought; for without the awareness,
harmony and clarity that they enjoin, healthy respect for
causality would not be possible.
It is important, at this juncture in the history of philosophy,
that people understand the danger of denial of all, or any, of
the laws of thought. Due to the current influx of Oriental
philosophies, and in particular of Buddhism, some would-be
philosophers and logicians are tempted (perhaps due to
superficial readings) to take up such provocative positions, to
appear fashionable and cutting-edge. But while predicting
that Western philosophy will be greatly enriched by this
influx, I would warn against abject surrender of our
rationality, which can only have destructive consequences for
mankind.
Logic is one of man’s great dignities, an evolutionary
achievement. But it is true: logic alone, without meditation,
morality and other human values, cannot bring out the best in
man. Taken alone like that, it can and sometimes does
apparently lead people to narrow-minded and sterile views,
and dried-up personalities. But in the last analysis, people of
184
I give you for example Dogen, who quoting Baizhang
(“don't ignore cause and effect”), Nagarjuna ([do not] “deny cause
and effect in this worldly realm... in the realm of practice”), Yongjia
(“superficial understanding of emptiness ignores causes and
effect”) and others, decries “those who deny cause and effect” (pp.
263-9).
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that sort are simply poor in spirit – their condition is not the
fault of logic as such. In fact, they misunderstand logic; they
have a faulty view of it – usually an overly deductive,
insufficiently inductive view of it.
The current ills of our society are not due to a surfeit of logic.
Rather, our society is increasingly characterized by illogic.
Many media, politicians and educators twist truth at will, and
people let themselves to be misled because they lack the
logical capacity or training required to see through the lies
and manipulations. Rationality does not mean being squareminded, rigid or closed, as its opponents pretend – it means,
on the contrary, making an effort to attain or maintain
spiritual health. To give up reason is to invite mental illness
and social disintegration. Taken to extremes, unreason would
be a sure formula for insanity and social chaos.
Aristotle’s answer to irrationality was effectively to train and
improve our reason. I do not think this is “the” single,
complete solution to the human condition – but it is for sure
part of the compound solution. Logic is only a tool, which
like any tool can be unused, underused, misused or abused.
Logic can only produce opinion, but as I said before it helps
produce the best possible opinion in the context of
knowledge available at any given time and place. It is not
magic – only hard work, requiring much study.
Rationalism is sometimes wrongly confused with ‘scientism’,
the rigid state of mind and narrow belief system that is
leading mankind into the spiritual impasse of materialism and
amorality. On this false assumption, some people would like
to do away with rationalism; they imagine it to be an obstacle
to spiritual growth. On the contrary, rationality is mental
health and equilibrium. It is the refusal to be fooled by
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sensual pursuits—or spiritual fantasies. It is remaining lucid
and open at all times.
The ‘scientific’ attitude, in the best sense of the term, should
here be emphasized. For a start, one should not claim as raw
data more than what one has oneself experienced in fact. To
have intellectually understood claims of enlightenment by the
Buddha or other persons is not equivalent to having oneself
experienced this alleged event; such hearsay data should
always be admitted with a healthy ‘grain of salt’. Faith
should not be confused with science; many beliefs may
consistently with science indeed be taken on faith, but they
must be admitted to be articles of faith.
Note well that this does not mean that we must forever cling
to surface appearances as the only and final truth. There may
well be a ‘noumenal’ level of reality beyond our ordinary
experience and the rational conclusions we commonly draw
from such experience. Nevertheless, we are logically duty
bound to take our current experience and reasoning seriously,
until and unless we personally come in contact with what
allegedly lies beyond. Those of us who have not attained the
noumenal may well be basically “ignorant” (as Buddhism
says), but we would be foolish to deny our present experience
and logic before such personal attainment.
Wisdom is an ongoing humble quest. An error many
philosophers and mystics make is to crave for an immediate
and incontrovertible answer to all possible questions. They
cannot accept human fallibility and the necessity to make do
with it, by approximating over time towards truth. I suggest
that even in the final realization we are obligated to evaluate
our experience and decide what it is.
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The phenomenological approach and inductive logic are thus
a modest, unassuming method. The important thing is to
remain lucid at all times, and not to get carried away by
appearances, or worse still by fantasies. Even if one has had
certain impressive meditation experiences, one should not
lose touch with the rest of one’s experience, but in due course
carefully evaluate one’s insights in a broader context. Logic
is not an obstacle to truth, but the best way we have to ensure
we do not foolishly stray away from reality. Rationality is
wise.
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26. CHAPTER TWENTY SIX
Drawn from Logical and Spiritual Reflections (2008),
Book 4, chapters 6 & 9.
1.
Mental Health
Just as our physical health is defined with reference to the
human body, and its various members, organs and systems,
as the optimum condition and function of that body – so in
the case of mental health. Mental health is the optimum
condition and functioning of the psyche.
The psyche, the subject-matter of psychology, is of course a
very large concept. It includes to some extent the body, since
our mental life is largely psychosomatic, and since the body
is the substratum of the so-called mind; especially, our
mental health depends on the healthy condition and
functioning of our nervous system, including the brain and
the sense organs. On a less physical level, the psyche has two
main domains, the spiritual and the mental (in a narrow sense
of the term).
By the spiritual domain, I mean the soul, and by the (narrow)
mind I mean the mental phenomena that occur (as it were)
around the soul. With regard to those mental phenomena,
they are perceptible (to various degrees) things or events, like
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thoughts, dreams and emotions. They are, strictly speaking,
outside the soul. They can be experienced and manipulated
by the soul, but their existence depends on the nervous
system too; and indeed, sometimes they are entirely products
of the nervous system.
The soul is the true self, that which constitutes a person
within us. The soul may be active or passive relative to
mental phenomena and relative the physical aspects of the
psyche (i.e. the nervous system). The soul itself has three
obvious faculties185 or powers, namely cognition (intuitive,
perceptual, logical and conceptual), volition (our will) and
valuation (our values). The core issue in mental health is the
health of the soul, although the issue is wider than that.
Mental health refers mainly to the correct functioning of the
three faculties of the soul. It has three components,
corresponding to these three faculties. These are of course
closely interrelated, each requiring both the others to
function. Mental health has degrees. The degree of overall
mental health is proportional to the degrees and combinations
of degrees of health in these three areas of human endeavor.
The faculty of cognition is at its best when it is well
prepared and trained to know the surrounding world and
how to deal with it. That is certainly true and important,
but the main cognitive health issue is self-knowledge.
This is achieved by introspection186 and self-observation
185
The term ‘faculties’ should not be taken to imply that the
soul contains entities or departments – it merely refers to
capabilities to cognize, to will and to value.
186
Note that ‘introspection’ has a widening circle of meanings.
The deepest level of meaning is the self intuitively aware of itself
(i.e. of the soul), and of its cognitions, volitions and valuations. The
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in action. Without a lucid, profound and extensive
knowledge of one’s own inner workings (motives,
desires, fears, emotions, capabilities, etc.) and outer
behavior, one is bound to feel imprisoned or lost in
strange territory.
The faculty of volition, likewise, has to be maintained for
maximum efficiency in dealing with mental and physical
phenomena. But the essence of health in relation to it is
self-control (in the best sense of the term, not implying
oppression), i.e. getting into the habit of doing what needs
to be done (energy) or not-doing what needs to be
avoided (restraint). This is essential to self-trust and selfconfidence. For it is clear that if one allows oneself to be
at the mercy of every passing fancy, impulse, urge,
obsession, compulsion, bad habit, one will soon
experience great anxiety, for anything might happen
anytime. Without discipline one becomes one’s own
worst enemy.
The faculty of valuation is properly used when or insofar
as one’s values are conducive to life, to self-knowledge
and to self-control. This may be called self-value (in the
best sense of the term, not implying egoism or egotism,
selfishness or vanity). Clearly, if one has twisted values,
next level is the self aware (perceptually and conceptually) of the
mental phenomena in its mind (in the narrow sense), i.e.
memories, imaginations, verbal thoughts, moods, etc. The third
most superficial level of meaning is awareness (again, perceptual
and conceptual) of its bodily phenomena, i.e. physical sensations,
visceral sentiments, the sights of its body in different postures and
positions, and so forth. All these levels are significant – but in
ethical judgment, it is intuitive introspection that has the most
impact.
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contradictory values, an inclination to perversion of some
sort, and so forth, one will soon become confused and
ultimately bring about one’s own self-destruction.
Thus, briefly put, the three most spiritual aspects of mental
health are self-knowledge, self-control and self-value. These
are spiritual, because they concern the soul (or spirit or self),
the core of our psyche or mental existence. When the Subject
of cognitions, the Author of volitions and the Valuer of
valuations is appropriately looked after, he or she is healthy
and the rest follows. If the self’s faculties are on the contrary
neglected, the opposite occurs. We may thus speak of
spiritual health – or in the opposite case, of a sick soul.
This is one aspect of mental health, its most intimate aspect.
Of course, mental health does not only refer to how we take
care of our soul, but to the full range of survival conditions
and tasks. We need to improve our general cognitive abilities,
e.g. by studying inductive and deductive logic, by being
attentive, by remaining sober, and so on. Our capabilities of
action will be improved by controlling our diet and our sex
life, by staying physically fit, and so forth.
In short, without going into details, mental health relates to a
wide range of inner and outer behavior patterns. It is
therefore closely related to what we call ethics, the study of
what is conducive to life. A person who cultivates mental
health gets inner equilibrium and self-respect as reward, and
achieves happiness, or at least basic contentment. Whereas
the opposite person, sentences himself or herself to much
inner conflict and self-contempt, and ends up suffering
considerably.
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Moreover, although the primary task of mental hygiene
relates to oneself, this has a strong impact one one’s social
relations. That is to say, a mentally healthy person will
naturally treat other people with respect and consideration,
since that is the way he or she is used to dealing with himself
or herself. On the contrary, a mentally unhealthy person will
have many inter-personal conflicts, and suffer fear, anger,
hatred, and similar negative emotions as a consequence.
Thus, mental health begets both dignity and decency. And
inversely, mental sickness spoils life for self and others.
Mental health is ennobling; mental sickness is debasing.
When one has mental health, the ongoing task is to maintain
it and increase it. When one lacks it, the first task is to obtain
it, i.e. to cure oneself of mental sickness. A very powerful
way to obtain, maintain and improve mental health is
meditation. Through meditation, one gets to really know
oneself, gets to really take charge of oneself, and gets to
really see for oneself what is good and what is bad in life,
right and wrong in behavior.
2.
Transcending Suffering and Karma
Bodhidharma makes clear that causes within this world
cannot produce effects outside it; the Absolute can only
conceivably be reached independently of the relative. Thus,
the key to overcoming suffering and its underlying bad karma
is not to be found in external rituals and deeds aimed at merit,
but through an internal change of mind.
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He insists that “invoking buddhas, reciting sutras, making
offerings observing precepts, practicing devotions, or doing
good works” are useless; only by “seeing [your buddha-]
nature” can you “attain enlightenment”. As he explains:
If you attain anything at all, it’s conditional, it’s
karmic. It results in retribution [i.e. reward or
punishment]. It turns the Wheel [of karma]… Unless
you see your nature, all this talk about cause and
effect [i.e. acquiring religious merit] is nonsense. (P.
17.)
Thus, Zen meditation is not a way to change something, to
annul our bad karma and its consequent suffering, but a way
to awaken us to something that is already ever-present,
something beyond karma, i.e. our “buddha-nature”. This is
liberating, for:
Once a person realizes his original nature, he stops
creating karma (p. 41). That which is truly so, the
indestructible, passionless dharma-self, remains
forever free of the world’s afflictions (p. 93).
It follows that: “The essence of the Way is detachment” (p.
47). In his Outline of Practice187, Bodhidharma describes how
this spiritual path is treaded. He refers to “reason and
practice”. By reason, he means meditations that “turn from
delusion back to reality”; while by practice, he means:
“suffering injustice, adapting to conditions, seeking nothing
187
This essay is also reproduced in D.T. Suzuki’s First Series
of Essays (pp. 180-183), under the name “Meditation on Four
Acts”.
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and practicing the Dharma” (p. 3)188. All four of these
practices are about detachment, or non-attachment.
1. “Suffering injustice”: when you encounter some hardship
that seems unfair to you, tell yourself that somewhere in
your history (it does not matter just where) you must have
deserved it somehow. In this way, you neutralize the
suffering that believing you are being unjustly treated
gives. You transcend the academic and fatiguing issue of
justice or injustice, and remain internally unaffected by
relatively external circumstances.189
2. “Adapting to conditions”: this does not refer to external
adaptations to conditions, but again to an attitude of
willingness to make do with any currently existing
188
At first sight these “four all-inclusive practices” seem
intended to parallel the Buddha’s “four noble truths”, viz. the fact of
suffering (i.e. that existence is suffering), the cause of suffering (it
is due to attachment), the cure of suffering (removing the cause,
becoming unattached), and the way to the cure (the prescribed
eightfold noble path). But while the two sets are obviously
associated, they are not identical. The Buddha’s foursome consists
of three descriptive items and one prescriptive item; whereas,
Bodhidharma list is altogether prescriptive (with three negatives
and one positive).
189
Note that I (unlike Bodhidharma) do not believe that
universal justice necessarily exists. I agree however that one
should strive to be as indifferent to the issue of justice as one can,
because to get locked up in such concerns is definitely a spiritual
retardant. Notwithstanding, the pragmatic wisdom of unconcern
with justice for oneself ought not be taken to imply that one should
be indifferent to justice for others. The latter concern would fall
under the fourth heading here, that of “practicing the Dharma”. One
should obviously neither afflict other people with unjust acts, nor
(as far as possible within one’s power) allow third parties to so
afflict them.
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conditions or eventual changes of conditions. In this way,
one is not at the mercy of favorable or unfavorable
circumstances, but remains at all times mentally (i.e.
more precisely, spiritually) prepared for and able to cope
with whatever life dishes out.
3. “Seeking nothing”: is a virtue based on the realization that
you open yourself to negative experiences when you are
dependent on positive experiences. Everything in this
world that appears desirable comes together with other
things that are undesirable. You may for a while find
satisfaction in certain people or possessions; but sooner or
later, these will turn into less pleasant experiences, since
all things are impermanent. All data considered, it is more
pleasant to remain aloof and serene.
4. “Practicing the Dharma”: seems to refer to altruistic
attitudes and acts. But even here, non-attachment is
stressed, in order that egoism or egotism does not result
from them. The aim is to transcend the distinction
between self and other, to work for the good of all.
Thus, these four practices can be described as different forms
of non-attachment. Not getting worked up over one’s
supposed deserts; not preferring this to that, but being well
able to deal with whatever comes; not pursuing sundry
material and social things, thinking foolishly that one will
find happiness by such means; and, on the positive side,
being helpful to others.
Non-attachment saves one and all from suffering. It is
attachment that ties us to karma and causes us to suffer; by
non-attachment we immediately transcend this finite world
and get to live our life from the infinite perspective of our
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buddha-nature (i.e. in nirvana). This buddha-nature is, of
course, empty “like space”190.
190
P. 43.
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27. CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN
Drawn from Logical and Spiritual Reflections (2008),
Book 5, chapters 8-10.
1.
Enlightenment Without Idolatry
The phenomenal self. When Buddhists speak of one’s
‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’ they are often referring to what
could be described as one’s sphere of experience at any
moment. Moment after moment, all around the central point
where cognition actually takes place, there is a cloud of
phenomena: bodily sensations and sentiments, appearances of
surrounding sights and sounds, and mental images and
sounds, verbal and non-verbal thoughts, and moods. It is
important during meditation (and eventually, beyond it) to
get to be and to remain aware of this totality of variegated
experience, and to realize the great weight of this experience
in one’s life.
According to Buddhists, this phenomenal mass is all there
really is to one’s life – and thence they conclude that there is
no self. This phenomenal cloud, they claim, is what we call
the self, it is the whole of the self. Moreover, according to the
Yogacara school, this cloud is only mind (since, they argue,
all experience is necessarily mediated by consciousness). But
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I beg to differ on such views – and claim that we must pay
attention to the center of that sphere of experience too.
At the center is the self, the one who is experiencing. This
Subject experiencing the changing phenomenal objects is the
real meaning of the word self. It is a non-phenomenal entity,
who is not experienced outside itself, but is known to itself
by intuition. That is the soul or spirit. Buddhists philosophers
deny it, but I am not convinced by their reasoning. Even so, I
am convinced that Enlightenment is (as they claim) the
central goal of human existence – the meaning of it all.
The Jewish core value is, of course, service of God, i.e.
fulfilling the commandments given in the written and oral
Torah. But, it seems to me, the higher one tends spiritually,
the better one can fulfill such a mission. Enlightenment
means the perfection of wisdom. So there’s no contradiction
between these values. The more perfect the tool, the better it
does the job.
The value of Enlightenment. The Buddhist idea of
Enlightenment (boddhi) is one of its great contributions to
human aspiration and inspiration. I would like Judaism to
more consciously value and pursue this goal, through
meditation. Of course, Judaism would never accept the idea
that Enlightenment makes one a ‘god’. I agree with this
crucial caveat.
There are some significant points of similitude between the
Judaic-Christian-Islamic group of religions and the HinduBuddhist group. One point all (or at least some schools in all)
might agree with, is the notion that we are all rooted in an
infinite God or Original Ground and that we will all one day
return to this Source. Indeed, these grand religions may be
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viewed as teachings on how to prepare for or accelerate such
a return.
Now, both groups would consider that when an individual
human manages somehow to merge back into God (or
whatever the Source is called), God remains unaffected, i.e.
nothing has been added to Him. From the latter’s viewpoint
there was never separation, no breach of unity. Where the
two groups would differ, however, is in the status acquired by
an individual who fuses with the Deity. The religions of
Indian origin would regard such a person as having become a
‘god’, or even identified with the one and only God; whereas
the Middle Eastern religions would consider the individual as
ceasing to exist as a distinct entity.
I would refer to the tacit image of a drop of water flowing
back into the ocean: certainly, that drop loses all
‘personality’, and moreover it becomes a mere part of and
does not become equated with the ocean as a whole.
The Jewish religious way often seems like a constant hectic
rush to perform countless rituals. It seems intended to keep
you busy and stressed, as if agitation is proof of devotion. Set
prayer sessions, some of them hours long, obligations to
study without time limit, and many other demanding duties
fill the days, evenings and weekends of those who faithfully
follow this way.191
191
I should also mention, here, how we are sometimes (e.g.
late at night at Pessach) required by the law to eat and sleep at
unhealthy hours, not to mention the consumption of unhealthy
foods and drinks (meat and alcohol). Moreover, little allowance is
made for fresh air and regular exercise. The natural cycles and
needs of the human body are too often overlooked.
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Although that way gives one some satisfaction, if only the
feeling of having a good conscience, if one has done all that
needed doing fully and correctly (which is not always easy),
it cannot be said bring peace of mind in the sense of cessation
of “running after” things. Indeed, some commentators boast
of this:
The Jewish approach to life considers the man… who has
a feeling of completion, of peace, of a great light from
above that has brought him to rest—to be someone who
has lost his way. (Adin Steinsaltz, p. 99)
Such an attitude is, in my view, an unfortunate devaluation of
Enlightenment. In fact, it is a sort of cop-out: the rabbis,
admitting that the way they have developed is unable to
deliver the inner contentment and illumination all human
beings yearn for, present this restlessness as a virtue above
peace.
The missing ingredient here, it seems to me – what is needed
to slow things down and give us time to breathe is – still and
silent meditation. I here quote the 6th century CE Indian
mystic and founder of Chinese Zen, Bodhidharma (p. 49):
Not thinking about anything is zen. Once you know
this, walking, standing, sitting, or lying down,
everything you do is zen...Using the mind to look for
reality is delusion. Not using the mind to look for
reality is awareness. Freeing oneself from words is
liberation.
Traditional Jewish observances do on the whole perform their
function, which is to bring us closer to God. I believe that
sincerely, which is why I personally continue to practice
Judaism and recommend it to fellow Jews. However,
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sometimes I get the impression that Judaism obstructs or
blocks one’s natural personal relation to God.
The main problem in my view is the ‘commandment’ format
of Jewish law, which results in its excessive ritualism and
legalism and almost non-stop verbosity. Jews are constantly
in the position of slaves receiving peremptory orders under
threat, rather than of free men and women kindly advised to
voluntarily act in wise, objectively good and naturally
virtuous ways. The commandments seem too often of
uncertain value, if not contrary to reason; and those who
object to them are viewed with much disapproval. It is argued
that since these are God’s orders, they must be wise
imperatives; but their lack of evident wisdom in some cases
makes their alleged source doubtful to some people.
At such times, it is actually meditation that keeps me going in
Judaism. Thanks to it, I do not attach much importance to the
imperfections I perceive in it, and remain focused on what
seems to me the essential: getting personally closer to God.
Against Idolatry. Idolatry is clearly forbidden by God to
Jews in the Ten Commandments192. God is to be the one and
only object of worship – there is no other “god” by His side
or in opposition to Him to worship.
Moreover, God does not “incarnate” in human form, or other
material body or ghostly form of limited size; the very idea of
incarnation is idolatrous. We are therefore forbidden to
192
The issue of idolatry in Judaism is a complex one, and I do
not pretend to know all its ramifications. The present remarks may
well go beyond the letter, into the spirit, of Jewish law. They are
intended as an independent, philosophical analysis, not a religious
legal opinion.
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mentally worship any putative god or incarnation through
belief, fear or love. All the more so, we must not physically
worship any representations of alleged gods or incarnations,
by bowing before statues or flat images or movies and similar
acts. This interdiction obviously suggests that the worship of
images of any alleged divinity or even of the true God is
spiritually extremely damaging, in this world and/or the next.
According to the Rabbis, the interdiction of idolatry applies
not only to Jews but also to Gentiles. It is one of seven
Biblical commandments intended for the “Children of Noah”
(i.e. the non-Jews, or Gentiles). This is stated in the “oral
law” and subsequent rabbinical commentaries. In that case,
Judaism may be regarded as categorically rejecting all
religions that involve idolatrous beliefs and practices to any
degree. Similar teachings are in principle found in Islam, no
doubt thanks to Jewish influence.
With regard to Christianity, the issue is more complex,
however. Some Jewish commentators (Maimonides comes to
mind) appear to class it as a monotheistic religion. They
argue that Christians intend to worship the formless one and
only God, even as they worship alleged incarnations of God
(the Son, the Holy Ghost) by prostrating themselves before
images and similar acts. Most Christians would agree with
this assessment, and class themselves as monotheistic. In my
view, certain aspects of Hinduism and even Buddhism may
be similarly classed as ultimately ‘monotheistic’ in intent or
in effect.
It would clearly be preferable, however, from a purely
rational viewpoint, if all religions eschewed all thoughts or
acts that could be regarded as idolatrous from their
curriculum.
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Good People
Discriminating between good and bad. “May all people be
happy!” say the Buddhists. In my Jewish view, this Buddhist
wish should be understood in proper sequence. Not as an
indiscriminate, unjust wish that all people as they are be
happy now – for then evil people would get away with their
evil! Rather as a wish that such people change for the better,
and when they thus earn happiness it will come upon them.
This is similar to the Talmudic story of a Talmudic rabbi who
was told by his wife (if I remember rightly) not to curse evil
people out of this world but to wish evil to depart.
And really, I think that is what the Buddhist expression is
intended to mean. For Buddhism does not consider that
happiness will befall anyone contrary to their karma, but
rather that anyone who attains enlightenment will find
‘happiness’ therein. For they will then have lost their
ignorance, and the intrigue and violence it generates, and
their problems would disappear. Thus, the pious wish should
more accurately be stated as “May all people attain
enlightenment!” – and in this non-provocative form, who
would oppose the idea?
Of course, the issue remains: can all people indeed become
good? Supposedly, if we all proceed from the One, we can all
return to the One – so Buddhism would apparently say.
On the other hand, would we want a Hitler to ever redeem
himself – should there not for him and the likes of him be no
redemption ever?
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The good man. The good man193 is of course a strong man, in
the sense of someone with a power of will sufficiently
developed to overcome morally negative influences and
temptations, and forge ahead towards morally positive ends.
He has character; he is not at the mercy of chance impulses
within himself.
However, such strength of character is not his deepest secret.
His true power is his moral intelligence – viz. his
understanding that the good is valuable and the evil is
valueless and counterproductive. He is not fooled by illusory
attractions or repulsions. It is for this reason especially that
he does not find it so difficult to avoid evil and pursue good.
That is, through lucid insight, the good man neutralizes the
power of negative influences to slow him down or arrest him,
and enhances the power of positive influences to facilitate his
way towards spiritual success. He is consistently wise: he is
not moved by the mirages that the evil impulse presents him,
but on the contrary empowers his better side. He never
dithers between good and bad.
By way of contrast, the spiritually low or evil man is
basically stupid. He convinces himself (sometimes through
superficially clever intricate arguments) that evil is attractive
and good is unattractive – and for this reason he is
overwhelmed by evil and uninterested in good. Alternatively,
he mentally places good and evil on the same plane. It is he,
by his own twisted imaginations, who has given evil power
over himself and weakened his native goodness.
193
Or good woman – here the term ‘man’ is intended as
meaning ‘human being’.
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Thus, the virtuous man is not victorious so much due to
exceptionally strong will, but because of his perceptiveness
and wisdom, which render his ordinary strength of will more
easily effective. The wicked man, on the other hand, has
woven for himself such a delusion about the value of evil or
non-value of good, or through doubt, that he weakens and
incapacitates himself in any attempt to avoid evil and do
good.
I thus, in the last analysis, agree with the Buddhist idea that
the root of evil is essentially a cognitive failure – a selfinflicted fiction, illusion, foolishness and stupidity. The
volitional problem behind moral failure is relatively
secondary; it is subsidiary to the weakening of self and
strengthening of obstacles due to erroneous convictions. For
this reason, meditation and sound reasoning are both essential
antidotes.
This explains why the perfect man (the tzadik in Judaism or
the enlightened man in Buddhism) is said to be free of good
or evil. This does not mean that he is morally permitted to do
evil, but that he has no desire to do evil. And this does not
mean that he is forced deterministically to do good, but that
he clearly sees that evil is without interest and stupid. Thus,
he never falls into vice or fails to be virtuous, not because he
lacks free will, but because of active moral intelligence.
This conception of morality can be clarified further by
considering the extreme case – that of God. We conceive of
Him as having Omnipotent free will, and yet as never
committing evil or even abstaining from good. These
characteristics are seen as mutually consistent, if we
understand that God is obviously not forced by anything (any
deterministic force or influence on His volition) to be Perfect,
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but being Omniscient and All-wise He is simply never fooled
by evil and is anyway always more than strong enough to
overcome its superficial attractions. For this reason, it is safe
to say that utter goodness is the ‘nature’ of God, without
thereby implying that He is at all determined or influenced to
so act. Even though he always opts for the good, it is always
a free choice of His.
We must try to tend in that direction, following the principle
of imitatio Dei. The tzadik is someone who has found the
spark of Godliness within him to such a degree that he
naturally acts in perfect accord with that principle.
The danger of religiosity. Though religions are in principle
intended to improve people, religion can sometimes be an
obstacle to self-improvement, because it may give us a false
sense of perfection. One seems in accord with its essential
demands, and so comes to ignore ‘little imperfections’. Our
shortcoming may be improper social behavior, i.e. lack of
respect, consideration, politeness, and the like (what is called
derekh eretz in Judaism); or perhaps a holier-than-thou
attitude or a more pronounced form of fanaticism.
This observation is nothing new. Many people steer clear of
religion precisely to avoid such ugly side-effects of it. We see
around us, and history has often shown us, many cases of this
disease – in Judaism, in Christianity and in Islam, and no
doubt likewise in the other religions. To be fair, such
unpleasant aspects of religiosity sometimes emerge from
secular philosophies or from science. Conceit and arrogance
are not the monopoly of any single doctrine.
The truth is, all religions and all philosophies (including
science) are part of ‘samsara’. They can help us approach
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‘nirvana’, but they cannot take us all the way there. They are
intrinsically flawed by their format as rational and volitional
pursuits – whereas true transcendence requires a sort of
fundamental ‘letting go’ of this world and one’s place in it.
So, whatever doctrine one adheres to, one should not allow
oneself to be blinded by it. It is always a means, not the end.
3.
A World of Mercy
There is a Jewish doctrine according to which this is a world
of mercy (tempering justice), whereas after death we go to a
world of (strict) justice. One’s first reaction to that claim
might be: ‘what, you call this a world of mercy?’ Yes, the
idea here intended is that the sufferings we go through in this
world are very light compared to what we justly deserve.
Thus, we are better off paying off our debts by suffering in
this world, rather than having them exacted off us in the next
world. For there, the full payment will be required, without
mercy.
The teaching here taught is that we should take advantage of
the opportunities for redemption offered to us by this world,
because here we have freewill and can repent and do good
deeds. Whereas, in the world after death, we can no longer
fix our errors or perform positive mitzvoth (duties), but must
passively receive whatever we have coming. Thus, this is a
teaching designed to push us to act while we still have the
chance to do so.
This idea is comparable to the Buddhist doctrine that to be
born as a human being is a very exceptional opportunity to
attain enlightenment/liberation (nirvana). Such a chance
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should not be wasted on vanities or in negative activities, but
one should strive positively for removal of bad karma and for
spiritual growth. Otherwise, next time one may be reborn in a
less favorable estate, and become stuck in the cycle of
samsara (birth and death, implying suffering) for eons.
Needless to say, one can see in this context the stupidity of
suicide194. According to this teaching, such an act is not an
effective way to escape from one’s difficult situation, but
only a way to make matters worse (in the hereafter or the
next life). Trying to avoid challenges is useless and
counterproductive. One should always bravely face the
difficulties of life and cheerfully try to improve one’s
situation as well as one can. Life is certainly a great gift. And
time passes so quickly.
Lately, the media fashionmongers have started pushing
relentlessly in favor of voluntary euthanasia or ‘assisted
suicide’. Most Western countries have already made passive
euthanasia (i.e. withholding life support) legal, and now some
have legalized active euthanasia (i.e. killing) and the issue
has become hot in most others. The advocates of this social
innovation make it seem like an act of mercy – parading
some people with terribly painful incurable diseases to excite
our pity. These advocates are of course materialists, who do
not believe in any sort of afterlife or rebirth.
They do not consider that it may be more merciful to allow
the sufferer’s bad karma to play itself out on this earth in this
lifetime than to artificially cut it short. They do not consider
194
I mention this, due to reading often lately about youths – in
Japan, in Britain – committing suicide. No doubt they feel afraid of
life, and presumably have been given no spiritual education that
would give them the strength and courage to face it.
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that things might be worse thereafter, precisely because the
karma was not allowed to play itself out. How do I know? I
don’t! But do they? Certainly not! They have no sure
knowledge either, only mere speculations.
Moreover, the advocates of euthanasia do not really consider
that helping someone commit suicide for whatever motive
might still be murder. They are usually the same people or
type of people who legalized abortion on demand, indifferent
to the suffering and privation of life of the babies killed. They
are close to those who support homosexuality, and in
particular the adoption of children by homosexuals. They are
people who consider their pursuit of any pleasure or
avoidance of all pain as unquestionable absolutes. They do
not acknowledge that we may earn certain pains or have no
right to certain pleasures. They have little or no regard for
spirituality or ethics.
And they have nothing to offer the suffering souls other than
a quick and supposedly painless death. At least religion offers
hope of cure or redemption. In situations of great suffering,
why not try prayer and repentance? It might help,
psychologically if not existentially. Also, when possible, try
meditation.
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28. CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT
Drawn from Logical and Spiritual Reflections (2008),
Book 5, chapters 11-13.
1.
Understanding Injustice
Justice occurs when you do some good or bad – through
intention or some other mental act, through speech or some
other physical act – and you get back what you deserve in
relation and in proportion to that deed. Injustice means that
some good is not followed by commensurate good or is
followed by undeserved bad; or that some bad is not followed
by commensurate bad or is followed by undeserved good.
Thus, justice and injustice are concepts depending on our
notions of what deeds are good or bad, and of what is
deserved or undeserved in relation and in proportion to them.
Our ‘perception’ of justice or injustice has an emotional
effect of its own on us. Note first that since justice and
injustice are essentially rational judgments, the word
‘perception’ here may be misleading. We indeed perceive the
situation, but its evaluation as just or unjust of course
depends on a conceptual process.
When we rightly or wrongly perceive justice to have
occurred, we feel comforted and pleased. Inversely, when we
rightly or wrongly perceive injustice to have occurred, we
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feel threatened and angered. (Note the acknowledgment that
such judgments may occasionally be in error; there is no
guarantee of correctness.)
Because perceptions of justice or injustice strongly affect us,
it is important to understand these concepts. Such
understanding has a calming effect on the mind, and even on
the soul. Religious doctrines such as that of Divine justice
(under the religions based on Abraham’s monotheism) or that
of karma (under Hinduism and Buddhism) were certainly
designed to pacify us in this regard. But before we consider195
these doctrines, a number of philosophical reflections are
worth making.
Justice and injustice are not concepts relating to a wholly
mechanistic world. Under a universal system of determinism
and/or spontaneity, nothing is either just or unjust, everything
just ‘is’. Moreover, there being no conscious living being to
feel effects or evaluate them, these concepts are irrelevant
and inapplicable. In a world with only God – i.e. Someone
omniscient, omnipotent and perfect through and through –
there is automatic universal justice and no injustice at all.
The concepts of justice and injustice logically both come into
play only in a world containing any number of living entities
endowed with limited consciousness, volition and powers of
valuation. That number could be only one, provided that
single entity is not God, i.e. is a mere creature with limited
powers (this could be assumed under a solipsist philosophy).
But actually, our world seems to have many such entities,
195
Or reconsider them – for I have commented on this topic in
many of my past works. Here, I seek to bring additional
clarifications.
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with some powers of cognition, freewill and valuation (there
are apparently at least 6 billion humans who would fit this
definition, not to mention other animals).
This insight – that the concepts of justice and injustice
depend on there being some non-mechanistic and less than
Divine entities in the world – is valid whether considered in
the framework of atheism (as in modern materialism or in
early Buddhism) or monotheism (as in Judaism, Christianity
and Islam). It is all the more valid under polytheism (as in
Hinduism, in some forms of Buddhism, and in other
religions), since such religious form by definition involves
numerous competing wills.
If for the sake of brevity we refer to the entities under
consideration as entities with freewill (since this power
presupposes consciousness and implies valuation), what we
want to stress here is that some injustice is inevitable in a
world with competing wills196. In a world without will at all,
there is neither injustice nor justice. In a world with only God
having will, there is only justice and no injustice. It is only in
a world like ours that injustice occurs – and indeed, injustice
is bound to occasionally occur in it.
Once this principle is comprehended, it is much easier to
emotionally accept the existence of injustice. The existence
of injustice in the world is not because the world is badly
constructed or mismanaged – but is a logical inevitability
given the existence of a multitude of competing entities with
limited powers of awareness and will.
196
The word freewill involves a redundancy. An action that is
not free would not be referred to as ‘will’ – but as a mechanistic
‘event’. Will is called free only to stress this obvious fact. Thus, will
and freewill are synonyms.
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Granting God created the world and us in it, He could not
have made it otherwise. To give us some powers of will, He
has to abstain from exercising His full power of will
(omnipotence). To have freewill is to be able to do good or
bad – i.e. not to do the good one ought to do, on occasion;
and even to do the bad one ought not do, on occasion. Even if
some people were to always do only good, there is every
likelihood that some people will occasionally do bad or not
do good, or simply make mistakes.
This is equally true in a belief system devoid of God (which
many people favor nowadays). In a mostly mechanistic world
containing some entities with some powers of freewill, such
entities are not likely to act always in a fully beneficial
manner. Some people will sometimes inevitably, through
wrong judgment or bad will, cause harm to themselves or to
others, in a way that bears no rational relation and/or
proportion to preceding deeds.
This “inevitability”, note well, is a statistical fact, not
implying determinism (otherwise, we could not logically
refer to such events as acts of will). However, the intent here
is not to reduce all events in human life to luck. It is only to
deny that there can be automatic universal justice in our
world, and to acknowledge that some injustice must occur, by
virtue of the complexity of that world. It is not a statement
that all is unjust, but only a statement that justice and
injustice both occur.
And indeed, that is how we see the world in common sense,
as a mixture of both. It is precisely for this reason that we
have notions of both justice and injustice. Given this as an
empirical fact, two questions arise.
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The first question is: even if injustice appears to occur in the
short run – might not justice be restored later on in life or in
an afterlife? Such an assumption is a premise of many
religions. In Hinduism and Buddhism, there is belief in a
natural system of “karma” – through which every good or
bad deed is automatically eventually (in this life or some later
one(s)) compensated. In Judaism, Christianity and Islam,
there is a similar faith in future reward or punishment, except
that it is made dependent on the will of God, who may
choose to mercifully withhold retribution.
In the latter case, God’s behavior towards us is conceived as
dependent on our later behavior (regret, repentance, etc.),
and on our prayers. There is also, to a lesser extent, in all
these religions, a doctrine that one person may sometimes
take on the suffering of others and so lighten their load
somewhat. In this context, it is considered useful in some
religions to direct prayers to saints197.
On a more secular plane, the awareness that justice is not
automatic and some injustice is inevitable gives rise to
private and public efforts at redress. Individuals sometimes
reward a good deed or avenge a wrong by someone else.
Societies usually establish elaborate justice systems, to
ensure some of the injustices that do occur are compensated
in some way.
197
No one in Judaism prays to living or dead people (e.g.
Moses or some Rebbe). Likewise (to my knowledge) in Islam (they
do not pray to Mohammed). But prayers to saintly people and to
people presumed to be gods incarnate are common in other
religions: Christians pray to Jesus or Mary, Buddhists pray to
Buddhas or bodhisattvas, and Hindus even pray to their flesh and
blood gurus.
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Note well: if we believed that natural justice and/or Divine
justice ensures appropriate retribution for all good and bad
deeds, there would be no point in human acts of justice or a
societal system of justice. On the contrary, such interference
on our part could create confusion. It is precisely because we
understand that justice is, at least in part, a human moral
responsibility that we elect parliamentarians to enact laws,
and appoint judges and a police force to implement these
laws.
This leads us to the second question: what to do about
injustice? From a spiritual development point of view, it is of
course essential to demand a maximum of justice from
oneself (towards self and others). One should also help others
obtain justice, whenever and to the extent possible. But to
expect constant and full justice, or worse still to demand it,
from others (towards self) is not very wise; it is to condemn
oneself to unnecessary conflict and suffering.
One should as much as possible disregard the misdeeds of
others towards oneself, and move on. To get entangled in
concerns like revenge is a waste of valuable time, a
distraction from more important spiritual pursuits. One
should realize the “samsaric” nature of this world we are in:
it is so made that one cannot hope for 100% justice within it.
So, it is best to accept things as they are, and take things in
stride, as far as possible. One can train oneself to be “above it
all” – and become relatively immune.
Of course, in some cases it would be wrong and even suicidal
to accept injustice. For instance, it would not be wise (for
others’ sakes, if not one’s own) to allow a murderous
dictatorship to pursue its course. On the other hand, often our
vexations are due to envy or excessive desire. For instance,
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one may get upset at not getting as much salary as one’s
colleagues at work. Follow the golden mean.
A word about the concept of “social justice” is appropriate
here. This concept is based on the naturalist idea that all
humans are born “equal”, and the context they are born into
(genes, family, social milieu, wealth, etc.) is a matter of good
or bad luck. This could be construed as a relatively
materialist notion, which is less emphasized by people who
believe in karma or in Divine management. But that does not
belie it.
Often, it is true, people who demand social justice (meaning
mainly economic equality) are simply envious and wish to
obtain unearned benefits. On the other hand, it is true that
“we are all in it (this world) together” and we can by
judicious effort make it a world with maximum opportunity
and minimum suffering for all. This is the real premise for
social justice: it is ultimately good for everyone. Helping
others does not impoverish the haves, but enriches them by
improving the world surrounding them and inside
themselves.
2.
Forgiveness
It is not always easy to forgive those who have caused us
some tangible or assumed harm. Yet, forgiveness of some
sort seems in ordinary circumstances wise, if one wants to
avoid wasteful entanglements. So, it is worthwhile reflecting
on this topic. Forgiving means abstaining from demanding
reparation for damage sustained; or again, refraining from
seeking revenge.
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Forgiveness varies in kind, with regard to the victim’s
attitude towards the offender:
One does not punish someone one believes culpable.
Or one ‘understands’ the culprit, considering him or
her at some level or to some degree less guilty than he
or she strictly appears to be.
Or one is willing to relinquish judgment, going so far
as to let the matter drop and forget it altogether.
Forgiveness may take different forms:
Conditional pardon: this is not forgiving without first
receiving at least a sincere apology, an
acknowledgment of guilt and promise not to repeat
the offense, so that one is not taken for a ‘sucker’ and
‘screwed’ again.
Unconditional pardon: this is graceful forgiving, not
dependent on a prior sign of repentance from the
offender, considering that such grace may eventually
cause his or her conscience to realize the harm done
and the debt owed.
Pragmatic pardon: disregarding the offense, moving
on to other things. This may mean avoiding the
offender thenceforth, or resuming interactions with
him or her as if nothing happened. One may take such
an attitude out of practical necessity; or so as not to
remain blocked by hate, dropping the matter to be
emotionally freed of it.
These are some aspects of forgiveness and common motives
concerning it. Note that to forgive is not necessarily to forget.
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Even when one forgives, one may nevertheless vow not to
forget, so as not to be victimized again. In such cases, one
remains on guard against a proven danger, ready henceforth
to defend oneself.
In this context, a reflection on the Christian statement
“forgive them, for they know not what they do”198 is in order.
Such a motive for forgiveness may be considered selfcontradictory, insofar as forgiveness presupposes some
responsibility, which presupposes actions that were to some
degree voluntary and conscious – if they were totally
unconscious and involuntary, there is nothing to forgive, i.e.
the concept of forgiveness is not applicable. One can still
consistently say “don’t be angry, for they know not what they
do”; for one might well be angry at a natural phenomenon,
and seek to calm one’s anger, although one has no one to
resent or forgive. Of course, it is also consistent to say:
“forgive them, for they hardly know what they are doing”,
implying a bit of self-awareness – but one must consider to
what extent “they” have chosen to be so unconscious. But in
any case, one should not forgive by fooling oneself into
doing so.
Forgiveness is usually the wisest course, because anger and
hatred are attachments, i.e. weaknesses. One should not let
one’s enemy have this hold on one – i.e. weaken one and
make one swerve away from serenity and nobility. It is bad
198
As I recall, this was uttered by Jesus against the Jews or
the Romans involved in his crucifixion, somewhere in the Christian
Bible. This dramatic event was sadly used for centuries as a
pretext to bash “the” Jews in general. That is to say, the “forgive
them” statement was paradoxically interpreted as a call not to
forgive!
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enough that one has been wronged; it is preferable not to
make matters worse for oneself by getting overly hung up on
the episode. Let it pass, so far as possible. However, some
crimes are unforgivable and it would be a crime to forgive
them. Sometimes, one refuses to get involved in punishing
guilt, out of laziness or selfishness. One then descends into
advocacy of moral relativism or amorality, to justify one’s
inaction. No, one must conscientiously fulfill one’s
responsibilities, where applicable. Thus, be neither hotheaded
nor indifferent, but find the right balance between mercy and
justice.
Meditation both requires and produces forgiveness. One
cannot advance far in meditation, if one is not willing to “let
go” of unpleasant experiences. Also, the more one advances
in meditation, the less are unpleasant experiences of any
interest or importance. The mental influence of negative
events diminishes, so that they appear less negative and so,
when applicable, more easily forgiven.
General forgiveness. The Buddhists have a concept of
“metta”, which emphasizes universal love and compassion –
even towards one’s enemies, even towards people who have
committed great crimes. This is of course a concept of total,
immediate and unconditional forgiveness. The idea is that,
through such magnanimous non-attachment to hatred and
revenge, one becomes able to change people for the better
and forge peace. It is argued that if one hangs on to
resentment one only keeps the spiral of violence going.
I find it hard to subscribe to such a view, which in today’s
morally confused world is serving more and more as a
justification for passivity to injustice. It is the sort of upsidedown view that places Nazis and Nazi-hunters – or
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Palestinian terrorism and Israeli self-defense– on the same
moral plane. The net result of this Buddhist idea is that
victims are reproved for complaining or defending
themselves, and their aggressors are tolerated and appeased
no matter how heinous their crimes.
Permit me to doubt that such an attitude can lead to world
peace, or social peace, or inner peace. It is, instead, a formula
for suicide and utter anarchy; justice has to be enforced at
some level, or injustice is bound to reign. By failing to resist
crime, we weaken the innocent victims and make them more
and more vulnerable, and we strengthen and encourage thugs.
Justice must be swift and firm, to make clear to all potential
criminals that there is no profit in their antisocial behavior,
and thus to protect the innocent as much as possible.
As for the universal compassion enjoined by Buddhism, I
wonder whether it is fair to describe it as a high-minded
virtue. If we examine the motivation involved within the
individual practitioner, who in meditation trains himself to
forgive and love his enemy, or anyone he perceives as evil,
we see that: in the hope of gaining personal spiritual
elevation or liberation, he is willing to be indifferent to the
suffering of the victims of criminals, or even to reach-out in a
friendly manner to criminals. This is best described as a
selfish cop-out or sell-out.
However, if we avoid extremes, ‘metta’ is certainly
commendable. An almost general loving-kindness can be
cultivated by reflecting on the fact that we are all in this
difficult world (samsara) together. We are all poor sods who
landed here all of a sudden, not knowing from where and not
knowing till where and when. This is our common lot. Some
of us may seemingly have a luckier fate, but all of us
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experience some difficulty. One should not be too judging.
Perhaps if I was born and raised in the place of this other
person, I would have come out worse than him or her.
3.
Actions and Reactions
The consequences of actions. All human actions have some
sort of consequence; that is evident and not open to debate.
However, discussions arise as to whether our actions always,
necessarily have just consequences (for good or bad, as the
case may be), or whether they may have unjust or non-just
consequences (i.e. more or less than exactly what is
deserved).
According to the “karma” theory of Buddhism (and indeed
Hinduism), justice is ensured quite naturally. Actions
automatically cause eventual symmetrical reactions, although
the agent of the action (i.e. the doer of the deed) may have to
reincarnate after death to receive the whiplash (i.e. for the
“law of karma” to hold). But Buddhism has not clearly
described this reincarnation process, nor provided convincing
empirical evidence for it (some sort of demonstration of
continuity between purported incarnations). Note that
ultimately there is no mercy built into this conception, except
perhaps for the mercy that individual humans199 might choose
to exercise.
In Judaism (and similar religions), justice is conditionally
ensured by Divine intervention. God sees the misdeed and
199
Or their more enlightened counterparts, i.e. Buddhas,
bodhisattvas or devas (“gods”).
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reacts to it as He wills, in strict justice or with mercy. This
conception could either mean that God always takes complete
charge of the connection (so that without Him human actions
would have no necessary consequences), or more probably
that He has instituted a natural action-reaction justice process
that He may on occasion override with mercy. Here, then, the
reactions to our actions are not (or not entirely)
preprogrammed, but depend on ad hoc decision by God case
by case. Obviously, such decisions involve some degree of
willful choice by Him, else they would never mercifully
derogate from justice.
In Judaism, as in Buddhism, the ethical account may be
settled within the present life – or it may have to be dealt
with in an afterlife. For it seems evident empirically that not
all accounts are settled in the present life, else we would not
have the impression that some evil people sometimes get
away with evil and even enjoy more than they deserve and
that some good people suffer unjustly or remain unrewarded
for their good deeds. Both lines of thought, therefore, tend to
agree on the existence of a ‘heaven’ and a ‘hell’ of some sort
after the current life. These might be distinct places, or they
might merely characterize specific conditions of rebirth
within this same world.
Thirdly, of course, there is the philosophy of Naturalism,
based on realistic assessment of empirically evident
phenomena without assuming anything beyond them (i.e. a
vague and unproved reincarnation, let alone Divine
intervention). This hypothesis considers that good or bad
deeds do sometimes impact on the universe and are absorbed
by it, without respectively benefiting or harming their doer.
This view is also logically credible, although least satisfying
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to our native sense of right and wrong. It is (I presume) the
view held by most people in the West today.
I cannot pretend to logically prescribe one of these views to
the exclusion of the others. They are all theories, all to some
extent based on facts and all involving proposals that
inductively go beyond these facts. Who can say for sure
which one is objectively correct? I can however, echoing
Pascal’s Wager, say that people who ignore the Judaic or
Buddhist warning of eventual retribution if we do not do right
and avoid wrong may conceivably eventually find themselves
in dire straits. Comparatively, nothing much is risked by not
opting for the Naturalistic thesis – the only ‘loss’ is not being
able to do whatever one likes or not-do whatever one
dislikes, i.e. a more limited range of possible action.
Based on this reasoning, it would seem wise to act as if
justice exists (i.e. even though one cannot definitely prove it),
and do good and avoid doing evil. Moreover, it would seem
wise to hope and pray for God’s mercy (again, even if there
are no guarantees one will get it). One might otherwise, to
repeat, eventually have some unpleasant surprises.
The concept of karma. The Buddhist (and likewise Hindu)
concept of karma is inconsistent and imperfect in various
respects.
For a start, it presupposes a world that has existed eternally,
so that every event in one’s life has a karmic precedent in
previous lives in infinite regression. But this is contrary to
modern ideas in astronomy and biology, according to which
the material world has an undifferentiated beginning (quarks
or earlier) and life has a start (on earth at least, some four
billion years ago). The Buddhists may of course reply that
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such apparent beginning is a mere continuation of existences
in previous material worlds or of previous purely spiritual
existence(s).
Actions do indeed have consequences, but these are perhaps
not always very ‘just’ (in all appearance). The hypothesis that
actions always ultimately have just consequences involves an
act of faith. It is an attempt to make the world more
‘reasonable’, an attempt that sometimes only produces
painful disappointments and disillusions. We have to be
honest and ready to accept that Nature is apparently
sometimes just but not always so. This unpleasant
observation might be mitigated through a karmic (or
monotheistic) theory, but at the empirical level it is
indubitable and best kept in mind.
Next, consider that logically there has to be a first crime (an
aggression, or whatever), and an innocent victim of that first
crime. For if we believe in free will, the crime is a gratuitous,
ex nihilo, choice, and its victim is innocent. If we claim that
the victim is on the receiving end because he (or she) did the
same or a similar crime before (in this or in a previous
lifetime) – we are effectively saying that he is not innocent,
but deserves the victimization this time round. We should
then congratulate the criminal, for committing an act of
justice, punishing an evil person, closing the karmic circle
(inevitably, according to the karmic premise). Thus, the
karmic theory turns a victim into a criminal and the real
criminal into an enforcer of justice!
Moreover, the real criminal cannot then be deserving of bad
karma later on for his action (since it was de facto a ‘just’
act), whether he chose his action freely or was
deterministically pushed to do it (by the force of universal
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karmic law). He is largely exculpated. At most, he could be
faulted for his inappropriate motive. In that case, the infinite
cycle of karma is interrupted; i.e. there is no reason to expect
him to be in turn a victim later on. This is the inherent
inconsistency in the eternal karma viewpoint – it logically
eliminates itself. The concepts of victim/criminal are only
relevant in a freewill-doctrine context. The concepts are
stolen in other contexts.
In my view, there are truly innocent victims of crime, firsttime events of crime, and criminals truly guilty of crime. To
explain away crime by karmic/deterministic views is to
effectively accuse without any evidence (i.e. ‘on principle’)
the victim of being an ex-criminal (and so deprive him of his
dignity as a victim) and to praise the criminal for effectively
doing justice. The proposed explanation produces confusion:
it reverses the roles of the protagonists. It is an ideological
viewpoint and a patently unfair one.
We may suppose that the karma theory was introduced as an
explanation, to console people shocked by the injustice of
physical aggressions, and other such events in the world. It
obviously has some ‘grain of truth’ in it: there is indeed some
‘karma’, in the sense that some human actions apparently
have consequences that are satisfyingly just (for good or bad)
in our eyes. The problem is that not all human acts manifestly
have such appropriate consequences; some seemingly have
inappropriate consequences, either neutral or contrary to
ethical expectations/demands. Thus, the theory cannot be
inductively proved by generalization, only at best by
adduction.
We may also object to the universality of karmic explanation
by pointing out that not all suffering is due to victimization
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by someone else. This means that we cannot lay the blame on
a similar crime by the sufferer, as it suggests. I am referring
here to accidents and natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes,
epidemics, famine and the like). Since in such cases there is
(usually) no human action at root and indeed (again, usually)
no human action could have prevented them, we cannot
establish a causal connection and claim the untoward event
happened because the victim deserved it (and even less that
the victim can be inferred to have deserved it because the
event happened!)
Karmic theory would have to claim equivalencies, i.e. work
out some sort of conversion or exchange rates, between
certain human acts and various accidents and natural
disasters. Such intractable theoretical complications mean
that karmic theory lacks technical precision (that is, it is not
sufficiently fleshed-out, as required by epistemology) and is
very hard to substantiate. Furthermore, we should not only
look at bad natural events, but also at good ones – and how
would we establish that someone Nature has well taken care
of deserved it?
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REFERENCES
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Bodhidharma. The Zen Teaching of Bodhidharma.
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Red
Cheng, Hsueh-li. Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from
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Curtis, Helena and N. Sue Barnes. Invitation to Biology. 4th
ed. New York: Worth, 1985.
Dogen. Enlightenment Unfolds: The Essential Teachings of
Zen Master Dogen. Kazuaki Tanahashi, ed. Boston:
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H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honoré.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1959.
Causation In The Law.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature.
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Johnson, Paul. A History of the Jews. New York: Harper,
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Kahan, Rabbi Aharon Yisroel. Taryag Mitzvos. New York:
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Kamalashila (Anthony Matthews). Meditation: The Buddhist
Way of Tranquility and Insight. Birmingham: Windhorse,
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Lichtenstein, Aaron. The Seven Laws of Noah. New York:
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Ortega y Gasset, José. The Origin of Philosophy. Trans.
Toby Talbot. New York: Norton, 1967.
Rand, Ayn. Atlas Shrugged. 1957. New York: Signet, 1959.
Steinsaltz, Adin. The Thirteen Petalled Rose: A Discourse
on the Essence of Jewish Existence and Belief. Expanded ed.
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Suzuki, D.T. Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series. London:
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REFERENCES
461
Works by Avi Sion, to date
•
Future Logic: Categorical and Conditional
Deduction and Induction of the Natural, Temporal,
Extensional and Logical Modalities. Revised ed. Geneva:
Author, 1996. (472p.)
•
Judaic Logic: A Formal Analysis of Biblical,
Talmudic and Rabbinic Logic. Geneva: Author, 1995.
(326p.)
•
Buddhist Illogic: A Critical Analysis of Nagarjuna’s
Arguments. Geneva: Author, 2002. (216p.)
•
Phenomenology: Basing Knowledge on Appearance.
Expanded ed. Geneva: Author, 2005. (424p.)
•
The Logic of Causation. Third ed. Geneva: Author,
2010. (386p.)
•
Volition and Allied Causal Concepts. Geneva:
Author, 2004. (408p.)
•
Ruminations: Sundry Notes and Essays on Logic.
Expanded ed. Geneva: Author, 2005. (400p.)
•
Meditations: A Spiritual Logbook. Geneva: Author,
2006. (218p.)
•
Logical and Spiritual Reflections. Rev. & exp. ed.
Geneva: Author, 2009. (404p.)
•
A Fortiori Logic: Innovations, History and
Assessments. Geneva: Author, 2013. (700p.)
All these works may be consulted on the Internet, at
www.TheLogician.net
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