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Key actors mapping: Somalia Rapid literature review
Key actors mapping: Somalia Rapid literature review
Evie BrowneRelated Papers
Many poor countries in the world where the governments can barely ensure that their societies withstand poverty and insecurity may be described as ‘fragile states’. Several of these are either in conflict or pursuing reconstruction.1 Under such circumstances, the country’s government cannot effectively administer its territories and provide security and other basic services. Somalia has suffered from warring factions since the era of Mohamed Siad Barre, who ruled the country for more than 20 years before being ousted in 1991. In 1993, the United States took a more hands-on approach to the country’s instability and sent troops into Mogadishu. Familiarity with the terrain worked to the advantage of the insurgent forces who pushed the US troops out of the capital city, killing and wounding several others. Since then, several militant Islamic groups have violently fought for control. These include Al-Shabab, which was labeled a terrorist organization by the United States. Al- Shabab has also been the main opponent of neighbouring Ethiopia. In 2006, a group of Somali Islamic leaders going by the name "The Union of Islamic Courts" took control over parts of Southern Somalia before being ousted by U.S.-supported invasion by Ethiopian forces. This led to the installation of internationally recognized transitional leaders to guide the country to a semblance of democracy. U.S. forces have reportedly offered financial, logistical and military support to Ethiopian forces and have also been said to secretly support secular warlords in their fight for power against militant Islamic groups.
2011 •
2015 •
This thesis addresses the question: How has Al-Shabaab’s position of power across large swaths of Somalia challenged assumptions about the organizational capacities of terrorist organizations within the context of state failure? At its core, this question is composed of four parts: an assessment of the power maintained by Al-Shabaab; an evaluation of the assumptions made about the operational abilities of such groups; an understanding how organizational capacity can be measured; and an assessment of state failure’s relationship to informal institutions and non-state actors. This research noted a significant shift in the capabilities of non-state actors attempting to consolidate power in Somalia as social and political contexts evolved over time. Such dramatic shifts exposed the specific circumstances necessary for the development of conditions that allowed for organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, to accumulate domestic power and authority, while extending their reach regionally.
2008 •
2020 •
Somalia has seen a rise of various fundamentalist groups who have engaged in terrorism and numerous wars crimes and human rights violations in the territory they control with relative impunity.It became imperative for the international community and the United Nations to intervene in limiting the massive humanitarian crisis. The United States carried out several strikes targeting Islamic terrorists in Somalia.The purpose of this paper wasto provide a brief overview of governance and conflicts in Somalia and its role in facilitating the rise of various terrorist organizations in the country and the region. In this context, this paper has explored and compared the number of aerial strikes in Somalia under the last three years of President Barack Obama's presidency (2014-2016) and the first three years of President Donald Trump's presidency (2017-2019). The economy of Somalia is recovering slowly and it is improving the lives of people in areas controlled by the Somali Governme...
2024 •
A preoccupation with piracy, radical Islamic terrorists, human traffickers, weapons smugglers, and failed state policies towards Somalia have caused donors and international policymakers to neglect these social and state building activities. This neglect has been manifested by their ignoring the numerous Transitional Federal Governments' (TFGs) many missed opportunities to foster the kinds of leadership, governance, and administrative organizations that could have moved the institutional evolution of the country in a more positive direction. The first chapter of the book describes why, despite $10 billion poured into the country, the State of Somalia is not capable of governing effectively. The answer to this question can be found in the roles of social and organizational elite leadership. The strength of all states is dependent upon the capabilities of the leadership and organizational systems they promote within its societies and why such leadership either promotes or fails to invest in the institutions and administrative capacities needed to govern the domestic affairs of the state effectively
Armed conflict and state collapse since 1992 in Somalia have resulted in over 1,000,000 international refugees and 2.6 million people internally displaced people (IDPs). In this paper, we summarize the findings of the 2017 Somali Minorities Survey, a face-to-face survey of 139 Somali Bantu households (Jareer) who had been displaced from the Lower Jubaa Valley in Somalia during the previous year. The survey was conducted face-to-face between October and December 2017 by local interviewers and used quota sampling. Our objective in the survey was to understand Al-Shabaab’s treatment of the Somali Bantu and other groups in the five administrative districts located in the Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley, the traditional homeland of Somali Bantu. The Bantu are a sizable ethnic group with East African slave ancestry who live largely in farming communities. The Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley came under Al-Shabaab control in 2009 and only the regional city of Kismayu has been successfully retaken by the Darood-led militia known as the Interim Jubbaland Administration. The rest of the Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley remains under Al-Shabaab control. The Survey The survey asked questions about experiences living under Al-Shabaab rule and focused on two areas: extraction and service provision. Evaluating Al-Shabaab’s predatory extraction practices across ethnic groups and five administrative localities in Somalia Jubba River Valley, we find that Al-Shabaab exploits the Somali Bantu while allowing Somalis from the powerful clans better access to vital services. Extraction We find that Al-Shabaab focuses mainly on extraction, providing limited services only to majority-clan members such as the Darood and others, and governs in a way that harms the weakest people in society. This includes not only the Somali Bantu but also women and weak members of other clans. We find that Al-Shabaab, in order to fund and sustain the war, extracts more resources from and treats most brutally, the Somali Bantu, who may make up to one-third or more of the national population and have a lower social status than other clans, than from members of other clans. The respondents indicate that Al-Shabaab commits numerous atrocities against the Somali Bantu in Somalia, restricting their movement, forcing them to live by Al-Shabaab’s version of Islam, taking their children at young ages for a forced marriage or military service, and punishing any resistance with violence. The Somali Bantu are systematically subjected to extortion by Al-Shabaab, which generates revenues by imposing house taxes, collecting Zakat, seizing remittances, and taking half or more of most farmers’ harvests. For instance, we find that many Somali Bantu boys are conscripted and that this occurs on average at age 13. Bantu boys receive about one-third of the salary of a Somali soldier (when paid at all). Somalis from Majority clans are reported as subjected to conscription by about one-third of respondents. Many Somali Bantu girls are forcibly married on average at age 16 to Al-Shabaab fighters. Most respondents state that Somali Bantu girls forcibly married to Al-Shabaab militiamen can expect to live fewer than seven days per month in their ‘spouse’s’ household. Moreover, Somali Bantu households are subjected on average to approximately $300 per year in Zakat payments, according to our survey. They must also pay $60 per month on average in a “house tax” and they lose more than 20 percent of their remittances and 50 percent of their harvest to Al-Shabaab extortion. The most common clan to which respondents gave their harvests and house tax was the Ogaden, which is part of the larger Darood clan. The Somali Bantu also state that members of other groups face extortion (e.g., conscription, forced marriage, taxation), but it is less severe than that faced by the Somali Bantu. Service Provision We find that Al-Shabaab offers few if any services to Somalis, instead harshly extracting material and human resources. According to the 139 Somali Bantu households interviewed, Al-Shabaab offers few services to majority-clan Somalis except for religious courts and protection for middlemen engaged in trading goods such as charcoal, much of it produced by through Al-Shabaab coercion of Somali Bantu laborers. The Somali Bantu were not entitled to any services, except for religious courts, which are often used as means to punish or coerce minorities and others not abiding by Al-Shabaab rule. In order for Somali Bantu to access basic services like healthcare, education, and government documents, they are required to pay bribes to Al-Shabaab, despite these services mostly being provided by local communities and businessmen. Comparison with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) The Somali Civil War has moved through several stages over the decades, with the identities of the primary combatants shifting as the struggle has evolved. Al-Shabaab’s immediate predecessor was known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and it was the ICU’s defeat at the hands of a US-backed Ethiopian invasion that effectively left Al-Shabaab--formerly the ICU’s youth wing--as the most powerful successor. Based on the survey responses, we find that Al-Shabaab treats the Somali Bantu more harshly than did the ICU. A Post-Al-Shabaab Somalia Although some news outlets, research organizations and academics claim that the Somali Bantu enthusiastically join Al-Shabaab, the UN Security Council’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea counters this by reporting that the “range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the [Somali Bantu] community as documented by the Monitoring Group may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and also crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts of persecution, murder, torture and sexual slavery.” While there may have been some early Somali Bantu acceptance of Al-Shabaab, our research results support the contention that the terrorist organization has lost any support from the Somali Bantu. The Somali Bantu are almost unanimous in claiming that they will abandon Al-Shabaab’s religious practices once the organization is gone and that they perceive themselves to be victims of Al-Shabaab persecution. Conclusions The UN has already claimed that Al-Shabaab is exploiting Somali Bantu farmers. Our research is among the first survey evidence showing that this is occurring and how it is conducted. In this respect, our findings are consistent with other analyses which suggest that some members of majority-clans benefit from this extractive system and thus do not have an incentive to end the war, which also attracts foreign aid. We believe the current US military strategy in Somalia is unlikely to be successful if the Somali partners from majority clans do not have an incentive to fully defeat Al-Shabaab and end the war. Our research sheds light on the nature of the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia and offers insights into difficult choices that the international community generally and the US in particular face in Somalia. On a security level, it may be effective to work with the Somali Bantu to defeat Al-Shabaab or at least to force the terrorist organization out of the Jubaa Valley in order to alleviate the gross human rights violations being perpetrated against the Somali Bantu. On the diplomatic level, it may be more effective for the US to use foreign aid and military support as leverage to bring the parties to the table to negotiate a political framework that is acceptable to all stakeholders.
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Rapid literature review
November 2013
Evie Browne and Jonathan Fisher
About this report
This rapid review provides a synthesis of some of the most recent, high quality literature on the topic of
power and influence in Somalia. It aims to orient policymakers to the key debates and emerging issues.
This report was researched and written in September 2013, before the attack on the Westgate shopping
mall in Nairobi that Al-Shabaab said it carried out.
The report as p epa ed fo the Eu opea Co
issio s Instrument for Stability, © European Union
2013. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or the European Commission.
We extend our thanks to Ken Menkhaus, who acted as consultant and peer reviewer for this report.
Expert contributors
Stig Jarle Hansen, Noragric
Mary Harper, journalist
Markus V. Hoehne, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
Rachel Thompson, Concern Worldwide
Senior INGO employee (Somali national)
Suggested citation
Browne, E., & Fisher, J. (2013). Key actors mapping: Somalia. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham.
About GSDRC
GSDRC is a partnership of research institutes, think-tanks and consultancy organisations with expertise in
governance, social development, humanitarian and conflict issues. We provide applied knowledge
services on demand and online. Our specialist research team supports a range of international
development agencies, synthesising the latest evidence and expert thinking to inform policy and practice.
GSDRC, International Development Department, College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
www.gsdrc.org
helpdesk@gsdrc.org
Contents
1.
Overview
2
1.1 Limited nature of available data
2.
Clans
4
2.1 Minority groups
3.
Internal actors
5
3.1 Political actors
3.2 Militias
3.3 Civil society and non-state actors
4.
Piracy
14
4.1 Dynamics
4.2 Pirate groups
4.3 Individuals
5.
Diaspora
17
6.
International actors
17
6.1 Regional actors
6.2 Multilateral actors and other governments
6.3 International NGOs and aid agencies
7.
References
23
7.1 Key websites
Appendix 1 – Clan and minority groups
28
1. Overview
In Somalia, power is heavily concentrated in individuals rather than formal institutions (Expert
comments). Though Somalia now features a nascent central government as well as regional polities and
one secessionist government, government institutions are not the sole or even primary locus of power.
Most power continues to reside in actors who may operate outside the government, or who may hold a
position in the government but act autonomously from it.
After a period from 2006 to 2011 when Islamist movements and other interests partially eroded clan as
the main organising principle in Somalia, clanism has made a vigorous return and today is the most
powerful driver of political calculations and group behaviour (Expert comments). Though clans and subclans often have clear interests in certain political outcomes, they do not act as an organic unit. Rather,
la s positions and actions are the result of individual leaders and opinion shapers, and it is for that
reason that individual elites in Somalia should be the principal focus of an actor analysis (Expert
comments). As su h, it is ot e essa il the pe so s official position which lends power, but their
connections, their ability to mobilise their lineage, and to forge alliances in pursuit of common goals
(Expert comments).
Important actors in Somalia are those who possess some form of power or influence to shape political
outcomes, mobilise communities, or to block developments they deem undesirable. More than in most
settings, Somali actors have limited ability to drive positive outcomes, but ample capacity to exercise
eto po e . Put another way, Somalia is rich in potential spoilers, due to high levels of clan distrust, the
ease with which clan alliances can unravel, ready availability of small arms, and extremely weak capacity
of governments to make defections costly (Expert comments). This power to shape or block political
initiatives can be derived from multiple sources, i ludi g o e s positio of espe t i a la , fi a ial
resources from private business wealth, shaping public opinion via the media or other outlet, a position
of power in government, control over an armed militia, a strong social network, and perceived access to
powerful international actors and their resources (Expert comments).
The situation in Somalia has been undergoing rapid change, making it nearly impossible to profile all the
power- oke s. B this stud s e ko i g, at least twenty actors hold strategic influence in the country
(Expert comments). People on the ground are able to identify current power-brokers more effectively
than a literature review (Expert comments).
Most commentators agree that the country needs stronger institutions, but nearly all reports show a
strong desire from Somalis not to be ruled by outsiders, which they define not only as Western,
Ethiopian and AMISOM influence, but also perceived dominance of the diaspora members in
governments. Given the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust, citizens are also wary of any government
perceived to be dominated by clans other than their own, and are quick to threaten to defect from any
such government. State-building which appears to be driven by external aid and agendas or which
appears to enshrine the interests of one clan at the expense of others risks mobilising Somali spoilers.
Armed rejectionists such as Al-Shabaab exploit this by attracting clans aggrieved at their marginal status.
Several militias, religious groups and clan structures are as important to engage with as those with
formal political power. Within the fragmented context of Somalia, a region by region approach may be
the most appropriate (Expert comments), and in some cases village by village, as different regions feature
very distinct and autonomous local actors.
2
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
This report reviews some of the current main actors in the region and provides descriptions of their
activities and power bases. There is considerable overlap between many groups in Somali society (and
thus between sections of this report) as, for example, individuals switch allegiance. The report tries to
focus on actors powerful in 2013 and so does not include some of the previously powerful figures from
the last decade.
The report starts with a brief overview of the clans and ethnic groups in Somalia to provide some context.
It then covers the main internal actors in Somalia, including the various political figures and parties,
militias, and civil society actors. The next section looks at piracy in some depth, examining its dynamics
and effects on Somalia. Next, a brief review of diaspora contributions is presented, and the final section
reviews the international actors involved in Somalia.
1.1 Limited nature of available data
There is a limited amount of first-hand, empirical research which has been carried out on Somalia since
the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. This is primarily a consequence of the poor security
situation in the country since this time (Bradbury, 2010; Hagmann, 2005: 527). Much existing research on
Somalia has therefore been undertaken by UN and Western-commissioned consultants who have
substantial security provision and have rarely been permitted to publish their findings (Marchal, 2007:
1092). Though several Western academics have undertaken research in the country in recent years –
including Ken Menkhaus, Mark Bradbury and Paul Williams – most others have done so from
neighbouring states (notably Kenya), Mogadishu airport or the AMISOM military base in Mogadishu, with
little scope for sustained contact with local actors (Grunewald, 2012: S114; Marchal, 2007: 1092).
Somalis in-country have also encountered difficulties in researching questions of political organisation
and networks. In recent years the “o ali o fli t has prevented, or rather delayed, the emergence of a
young generation of Somali scholars (Hagmann, 2005: 527). A number of Somalis in the diaspora have
nevertheless become increasingly prominent commentators, and their analyses, many of which are
published in blog posts, are drawn upon in parts of this study. Similarly, the most up-to-date sources are
frequently media reports rather than critical academic literature; where this report uses media sources
these are subjectively judged to be credible.
These factors therefore limit the amount of data which can be analysed in piecing together a sociological
study of Somalia and its formal and informal power networks. It is clear that a more lengthy and in-depth
study of this kind would require fieldwork in Somalia itself.
3
2. Clans
Somalia is conventionally viewed as ethnically and culturally homogenous, but the ubiquity of clan
divisions has rendered it one of the most violently divided societies in Africa. Clans believe themselves to
have common ancestral origins (Ssereo, 2003) and are broken into four main patrilineal clan families:1
Darood, Dir, and Hawiye, which are of nomadic pastoralist derivation; and Rahanweyn (also known as
Digil-Mirifle), which historically were associated with sedentary agro-pastoralism (Minority Rights Group,
2010: 7). These large clan families only on rare occasions act as cohesive political units; instead, the many
divisions of clans and sub-clans within them are the locus of most Somali political manoeuvring (Expert
comments). Clan structure is extremely fluid, situational, and ambiguous, with sub-clans continuously
dividing into different groups, and alliances between clans shifting frequently and quickly (Harper, 2012:
36). Somalis traditionally marry outside of their clan (exogamous marriage), meaning alliances and
affiliations can stretch across a number of clan groups (Bradbury, 2008: 13). Ambiguity and fluidity is the
norm (Little, 2003: 51).
Both scholars and Somalis argue about the importance of the clan: some claim it is central to any analysis
while others claim other socio-economic factors are more important in shaping Somalia (Harper, 2012:
38). Little (2003: 46) suggests that the changing nature of Somali sub-clans is a direct result of the
presence of external resource-rich groups such as the UN; new clan identities were expressed in order to
gain material benefit from aid agencies which expected Somalis to operate under a clan system. For some
scholars, growing territorialism and competition over resources may be more important causes of conflict
than clanism; this school of thought argues against reductionist approaches to clans and kinship, and in
favour of encompassing a broader view of the Somali context (Bradbury, 2008: 14). While it is evident
that Somalis organise themselves politically around a wide range of interests and identities, clanism
remains a dominant factor in Somali politics and in its customary law, and cannot be ignored (Harper,
2012: 39).
Over the past 15 years, Somalis – often with external encouragement – have gravitated toward a voting
system of fixed proportional representation by clan as a means of reducing quarrels over representation
and fears of clan hegemony (Expert comments). This was first formalised at the 2000 Arta conference,
introducing the so-called . fo ula fo allo ati g seats – 49 seats to each of the four biggest clans
(Dir, Darood, Hawiye and Rahanweyn), and half this number of seats to the minority groups (Hoehne,
2010). The 4.5 representation of clans in peace talks and politics has subsequently been criticised by
Somalis for institutionalising clanism rather than overcoming it, but it remains a powerful yardstick by
which Somalis judge the representativeness of any conference or government (Menkhaus, 2011).
For more details on specific clan groups, see Appendix 1.
2.1 Minority groups
Minority groups are highly discriminated against in Somalia: they experience exclusion from politics,
employment and access to justice; prevention of inter-marriage; and hate speech (Minority Rights Group,
2010: 7). The legal framework and recognition of minority rights is, however, slowly increasing (Minority
Rights Group, 2010: 7). Although there are no firm data, minorities might represent up to one-third of
1
For further details on Somali clans in general, see Hinds, R. (2013). Somali networks: structures of clan and
society. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 949. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDQ949.pdf
4
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
the Somali population (Minority Rights Group, 2010). They hold 31 seats (11 per cent) in parliament, but
have not had a strong voice (Minority Rights Group, 2010). The main minority groups are Bantu,
occupational groups and religious minorities (Christian and minority Islam). For more details on specific
minority groups, see Appendix 1.
3. Internal actors
3.1 Political actors
Due to twenty years of civil conflict, Somalis do not necessarily see a strong central state as a positive
force; they may see it as a threat and source of conflict (Menkhaus, 2011). Previous Somali leaders have
used the power invested in them to attract external funding for state-building which they have used for
their own gain, not investing in institutional strengthening (Menkhaus, 2011). Those included in the
peace processes have commonly transferred allegiances according to their personal or patronage
interests (Hoehne, 2010). “o e politi al leade s a the efo e ega d the failed state situatio as
profitable for themselves and their clients, with little incentive to change (Menkhaus, 2011).
Formal political representation is characterised by changing affiliations and frequently shifting alliances
across clan and identity lines (Hoehne, 2010). Key figures tend to move around and change allegiance
according to what benefits them most at the time (Expert comments). There has been a lack of political
space for the development of strong democratic opposition parties, meaning political groups are either
part of a coalition government or an armed militia group (Menkhaus, 2011). There are no formal political
parties within the federal government structure.2 However, the government changeover in August 2012
saw around 50 per cent new people joining the parliament, which bodes well for developing a stronger
parliamentary system (Hammond, 2013).
Somalia Federal Government (SFG)
The handover from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the Federal Government in August
2012 is generally seen as a positive development and an opportunity for this leadership to create
credible national institutions in partnership with the international community (African Development Bank
Group, 2013). The leadership underwent a notable change at this time; few members of the TFG were
elected to new leadership positions, signifying a break with the past (Hammond, 2013). The government
is internationally recognised and its instatement heralded an influx of returnees, new business, and
diplomatic relations (Bryden, 2013). International recognition gives it legitimacy and access to resources,
although its actual authority does not extend far outside Mogadishu (Expert comments). Hammond
(2013) suggests that to expand control to rural areas which are currently under Al-Shabaab, the SFG
should negotiate individual alliances with local authorities and militias, which seemed to have worked for
the TFG (Menkhaus, 2011).
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
Hassan was elected as President at the end of the transitional period in August 2012 (African
Development Bank Group, 2013). His election was somewhat a surprise, as he was elected through a runoff vote (Hammond, 2013). It is probable that money changed hands, but his election signifies an
2
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html
5
important shift, in his defeat of a known corrupt, elitist previous government, which was a surprise to all
observers (Menkhaus, 2012).
Hassan previously worked as an educator, founded the Somali Institute for Management and
Development, and worked for the Centre for Research and Dialogue, a Mogadishu-based think-tank with
ties to Interpeace, an international peace-building organisation (Hammond, 2013). Importantly, he has
mostly lived in Somalia since 1991, which buys goodwill with Somalis (Expert comments), as many
politicians are diaspora members parachuted in to take over (Hammond, 2013). He was not backed by
any of the major power-brokers, but his identity as a local peace-builder/civil society activist is likely to
play well with citizens (Hammond, 2013) and can be seen as a victory for civil society (Menkhaus, 2012).
The President quickly outlined his priorities as a Six Pillar Plan:3 1) create stability in the country; 2) speed
up economic recovery; 3) build peace and remove the main drivers of conflicts; 4) improve government
capacity by improving service delivery; 5) increase international partnerships and create closer ties with
neighbours; 6) unity at home.
In his first 100 days, President Hassan emphasised a new relationship with the international community –
the new approach includes the Somali government leading national governance with direct funding from
donors, rather than international involvement and administration (Hammond, 2013). He is adamant
about reclaiming sovereignty and state credibility (Baugh, 2012). He has travelled throughout the
country, holding o sultatio s o er So alia s future ith its people, a gesture which has been warmly
received by Somalis (Hammond, 2013).
Hassan has, however, been criticised for insisting that the federal government has a central role in
determining leadership of regional states such as Jubaland, with critics claiming he has not applied the
same standards to Puntland or Somaliland (Hammond, 2013). His hands-on approach has been criticised
by Somali groups for excluding the Prime Minister and controlling government action too closely (Dunida
Online, 2012), and for keeping power within his inner circle of advisers (Expert comments). There is
some suggestion that he was propelled to power by the secretive Damul Jadiid, a moderate faction of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and that members of this group are now in key positions in the administration
(Bryden, 2013). Some locals view the government as dominated by this narrow set of clan-based
interests, which erodes its legitimacy (Expert comments).
Hassan has said that security and Al-Shabaab are top priorities for his government, including the
possibility of negotiating with the group to reclaim some of the more moderate members and to weaken
the core of the movement (Hammond, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012). The group may be weakened by
eradicating the weak style of central government which created the enabling environment for Al-Shabaab
to recruit easily (Menkhaus, 2012). “o fa , the go e
e t s app oa h to Al-Shabaab has been to increase
its own armoury and attempt to claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Bryden, 2013).
P eside t Hassa is o stitutio all ou d to p ote t “o alia s u it , a d he has
cannot support Somaliland independence (Bryden, 2013).
ade it clear that he
Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon
Shirdon is also a newcomer to the government, having previously worked as a businessman in Nairobi
(Hammond, 2013). He comes from Kismayo, but was not deployed there at the start of the Jubaland
3
From a speech delivered by the President to the International Organisation for Migration:
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-IOM/governing-bodies/en/council/101/H-E-Hassan-ShMohamud-President-of-the-Somali-Republic.pdf
6
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
crisis, which was a confusing oversight (HIPS, 2013a). He was unanimously approved by the parliament,
an unusual event of agreement in itself (Hammond, 2013). Shirdon also conducted a liste i g tour of
Puntland, Galmudug and the central province, which has been received as a positive step (HIPS, 2013a).
Council of Ministers
The Council (cabinet) is largely composed of professionals and technocrats rather than tribal leaders and
politicians from the previous administration (Bryden, 2013). It is considerably smaller than previously,
with only ten ministers (Hammond, 2013). Some are concerned this is too small to be effective, but
others suggest it promotes a sense of ownership (Hammond, 2013) and enables greater focus on key
priorities (Baugh, 2012). The Council was approved by parliament almost unanimously, indicating a clear
commitment to a new direction (Baugh, 2012). However, it does not hold as much power as some
individuals (Expert comments).
The government has several key individuals. Fowzia Yusuf Haji Adam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister, has sparked interest and concern over her possible bias in leading negotiations with
Somaliland, as this is where she is from and she has previously been considered a Somaliland nationalist
(Hammond, 2013; expert comments). Her current position is not yet known (Hammond, 2013), although
she is not a supporter of the current Kulmiye government in Somaliland (Egal, 2013). Other powerful
individuals are Farah Abdulkhadir, the Mi iste fo the P eside t s Offi e, who has a civil society
background and was previously head of the Africa Muslims Agency, a well-connected NGO funded largely
by the Arab world; and Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Minister of Interior and Security of Somalia (Expert
comments). The new speaker of parliament, Mohamed Abdirahman Jawaari, is a highly-qualified legal
expert and has brought a sense of purpose to the legislative agenda (Bryden, 2013). However, he does
not hold much political power (Expert comments).
Somaliland
President Ahmed Mohamoud (Silanyo), of the Kulmiye party, has not yet made any formal agreements
with President Hassan, but they have had cordial dialogues through 2012 and agreed to keep
communicating (Hammond, 2013). His attendance at the 2012 London Conference on Somalia was
significant, as Somaliland has never before been represented at formal international conferences on
Somalia (Healy, 2012), although it caused some furore in Somaliland as an apparent breach of the
principle of non-engagement with central government Somali politics (Egal, 2013). This meeting
recognised that So alila d s parti ipatio is ru ial for stabilisation in Somalia, and appears to have
ope ed a e diplo ati a e ue Heal ,
. “ila o s o fe e e spee h fo used o otto -up
approaches to stabilisation, drawing on traditional and Islamic conflict resolution methods (Healy, 2012).
So alila d s urre t go er e t bodies are all headed by Isaaq, damaging its previously good record
on maintaining clan diversity (Bryden, 2013). Many government members are diaspora, which creates
some tensions with locals (Expert comments). At least o e sou e elie es that “ila o s regime has seen
a return of clan politics, and that he has created a small cadre of close familial associates around him, to
the exclusion of other democratic options (Egal, 2013).
The most powerful actor in the Somaliland government is said to be Hersi (Expert comments), as Silanyo
is in his late 70s and increasingly weak (Expert comments). There is very little literature on Hersi.
Similarly, there is little critical assessment of the role and power of the two main opposition parties,
WADANI and UCID, but they are considered influential (Expert comments), and their existence is
7
encouraging for democracy. All three parties were healthily represented in the 2012 municipal elections,
which saw a large turnout (Egal, 2013).
Puntland
The key political actor in Puntland is the President, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Farole) (Expert
comments). Puntland is the site of most Somali piracy, and those around Farole are accused of at least
turning a blind eye (Expert comments). Al-Shabaab is also increasingly moving to the mountainous
Galgala region of Puntland (Saferworld, 2012). Puntland is regarded as difficult to control; it is unlikely
that any party or group has sufficient legitimacy and authority to control the whole region, with the
most likely route to stabilisation being through voluntary agreements between local leaders (Expert
comments). Puntland supports a unified federal Somalia, and as such, is in support of the accession of
Jubaland to a federal state, and has recognised the legitimacy of Madobe (Bryden, 2013).
The area between Puntland and Somaliland is often contested. Farole is currently trying to stretch his
power westwards (Expert comments). An armed opposition group, Khatumo, currently holds power in
this region and is hostile to both governments but particularly Somaliland (Expert comments).
Jubaland
The administration of Jubaland is currently a topic under fierce discussion, with various actors vying for
control. The “o ali te h i al o
ittee o p ised of Jubaland residents abruptly voted in Sheikh
Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) as President of Jubaland in May 2013, in the face of opposition from
the SFG (Bryden, 2013). At the same time, Barre Aden Shire (Hiiraale) also declared himself Jubaland
President for the SFG (Bryden, 2013).
Madobe is an ex-Al-Shabaab commander, leading the Ras Kamboni brigade, a mainly Ogaden militia
which is supported by Ethiopia (Bryden, 2013) and Kenya (HIPS, 2103b). Ras Kamboni was responsible for
freeing Kismayo from Al-Shabaa o t ol i O to e
HIP“,
. Mado e s objective is to rule
Kismayo and the three Juba regions, and Ras Kamboni is currently hardening its stance in defiance of the
Somali government, helped by overt support from Kenya (HIPS, 2103b). Hiiraale was supported by his old
militia, the Juba Valley Alliance, which had controlled Kismayo from 1999-2006 (Bryden, 2013).
The general mistrust of central government means many communities in the region wish to limit the
role of Mogadishu and operate as a federal state with local government (HIPS, 2103b). The central
government argues that there is no legal basis to form a new state in Jubaland (HIPS, 2103b), and has
been seen to block this process (Bryden, 2013).
In June 2013, both sides met in Addis Ababa to reach a resolution (Bryden, 2013), which has currently
made a settlement in favour of Madobe, although it is a delicate peace and violence will likely flare up
again (Expert comments). Hii aale s failu e to i o t ol a
e see as a loss for the Federal
Government (Expert comments).
Members of the Hawiye clan generally oppose Jubaland, while the Darood generally back it, with the
exception of the Marehan (Bryden, 2013). The Marehan clan is also powerful in the region, and the
failure to include it in power-sharing is seen as problematic (Hammond, 2013). As Madobe left AlShabaab, it is also against him, causing an unlikely tacit alliance between Al-Shabaab and the
government against Madobe (Bryden, 2013). Puntland is in support of the federal accession of
Jubaland, and has recognised the legitimacy of Madobe (Bryden, 2013). Most commentators agree that
8
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Ke a s a ti ities i Ju ala d si e
st o gl suggest a desi e to i ple e t the Ju ala d p oje t
which would provide a friendl
uffe zo e state, offe i g Ke a so e dista e f o “o alia s
instability (Anderson, 2012; Halakhe, 2013; McEvoy, 2013).
3.2 Militias
Militia groups are part of the highly fragmented security sector, with rapidly changing structures and
allegiances (Expert comments). They do not necessarily formalise under a title unless there is an
incentive to do so, such as a peace conference which requires groups to be organised (Expert comments).
Somalis have criticised warlords involved in the peace processes as having power but no intention of
abiding by the agreements, and representing only their own narrow interests (Menkhaus, 2011). In 2012,
up to 50 per cent of police and military personnel in Mogadishu were working for private individuals, in a
vast array of neighbourhood vigilante groups (Saferworld, 2012). These groups are loyal to their leader
and do not display any larger organisational structure (Saferworld, 2012).
Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab4 the youth in Arabic) originated as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union, splitting in
2006 when the ICU disbanded and its moderate members embraced the Djibouti peace agreement
(Stanford University Mapping Militant Organizations Project. (Updated 2013)). Al-Shabaab is the largest
militia group in oppositio to So alia s tra sitio al/federal government and foreign intervention,
specifically against the invading Ethiopian forces at the time of establishment (Vidino, Pantucci, &
Kohlmann, 2010), and is described as the most powerful group in Somalia (Marchal, 2011). Its goal is to
overturn the government and establish an Islamist Somalia adhering to strict Shariah law (Stanford
University. Updated 2013), a combination of nationalist and religious ideology. It probably has several
thousand members, but likely to have a core ideological group of 300-800 (Stanford University. Updated
2013). Its strength lies mainly in the weakness of its opponents and the critical economic situation in
Somalia (Bryden, 2013; Marchal, 2011). It is currently located in the southern region and increasingly in
Puntland (Saferworld, 2012; expert comments).
Al-Shabaab has a central council, but the network is structured loosely so that the loss of senior
o
a de s does ot th eate the g oup s i teg it (Stanford University. Updated 2013). There are
several key figures5 with varying degrees of influence and differing personal agendas. The figurehead
leader is Ahmed Abdi Godane, known as Abu Zubeyr, who has been in known tension with second-incommand Sheikh Muhktar Robow Ali (Abu Mansoor) (Stanford University. Updated 2013). Godane has a
global jihadi agenda, which banned foreign aid, while Abu Mansoor has a nationalist agenda and wished
to allow access for aid agencies (Stanford University. Updated 2013). Al-Shabaab has focused on religious
ideology, and clan-based politics play little role in the leadership of the group (Vidino et al., 2010).
4
The Council on Foreign Relations provides an interactive timeline of Al-Shabaab, available at:
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650
5
The Critical Threats Project, from the American Enterprise Institute, provides detailed personal profiles of Al“ha aa s leade s: Ah ed A di Goda e Mukhta A u )u ai , leade e i ; “heikh Mukhta ‘o o A u
Mansur), deputy leader (deputy emir); Ali Mohamed Rage (Ali Dhere), spokesman; Hassan Dahir Aweys, senior
member and former leader of Hizbul Islam; Fuad Mohamed Qalaf (Shongole), senior member; Ibrahim Haji
Jama Mead (Ibrahim al Afghani), senior member. http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaableadership
9
In February 2012, Al-Shabaab announced its formal merging with Al Qaeda, although it has had strong
ongoing links for at least ten years through training, personnel and financing (Vidino et al., 2010). There
has been a recent internal power struggle over this issue, including some internal killings, with Goda e s
faction supporting the merger and others not doing so (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, & Sheehan, 2012). It
seems likely that the majority of Al-Shabaab do not support the merger and foreign control by Al Qaeda
(Stanford University. Updated 2013).
Al-“ha aa s elatio s ith othe Isla i g oups ha e ee
ostl o k , as it has a more radical global
jihadi agenda than most (Marchal, 2011). In January 2010 the southern Kamboni militia joined AlShabaab (Vidino et al., 2010), and in 2012 so did the Galgala militia in Puntland, which fights against the
Christian government (Stanford University. Updated 2013). Hizbul Islam has been a long-term ally in the
fight against the transitional government, but split from Al Shabaab in September 2012, due to
differences in tactics and the merger with Al-Qaeda (Stanford University. Updated 2013). A moderate
Somali Sufi group, Ahlu Sunna, strongly opposes Al-Shabaab (Stanford University. Updated 2013) (see
below).
Funding comes from a variety of sources. Al-Shabaab makes most money from a protection economy,
but also enforces a reasonable system of taxation, and has been able to pay high regular salaries to
members for years (60-200 USD per month; Marchal, 2011). Weapons and training appear to come from
a variety of Middle Eastern and African countries, principally Eritrea and Yemen (Stanford University.
Updated 2013), with Eritrea the only state known to have financially supported Al-Shabaab (Marchal,
2011). Al Qaeda has called on its international followers to support Al-Shabaab, and this affiliation has
been important for the development, funding and strengthening of the group (Vidino et al., 2010).
Between 2008 and 2012, Al-Shabaab controlled the lucrative charcoal trade in Kismayo – the liberation
of the town by Kenyan-led forces was a crucial blow against Al-Shabaab, as it economically crippled the
group (Masters, 2013). Al-“ha aa s ai s eso ate ith atio alist ai s, a d so e o
u it leade s
have donated resources for the cause; it has also raided UN and BBC compounds for resources (Stanford
University. Updated 2013).
To enhance its legitimacy, it has operated a judicial system in areas under its control, handed out money
and food to the poor, and built roads and organised markets (Marchal, 2011). It has managed to govern
several regions quite effectively, trying to improve health and education services and successfully
reducing corruption (Marchal, 2011). Most Somalis credit Al-Shabaab with bringing some stability, but it
is regarded with disapproval and fear, particularly over the extreme treatment of women, banning
entertainment such as cinema (which is too radical for most Somalis), and the enforcement of Shariah
law through coercion and intimidation (Abdulkadir, 2012). The group banned food aid in 2011 and denied
the famine, which aroused much anger among Somalis and damaged Al-“ha aa s eputatio se e el
(Stanford University. Updated 2013). It also kidnaps children to train as soldiers, a practice which
alienates communities (Masters, 2013).
The link between Al-Shabaab and piracy is unclear, as there is no hard evidence to show this, and the
media reports suggest a smear campaign (Marchal, 2011) (see Piracy section below).
Al-“ha aa s i flue e is see in its ability to recruit foreign volunteers (Vidino et al., 2010). These are
primarily young men of Somali origin travelling back to the home country, but there is concern that
there may also be traffic in the other direction (Vidino et al., 2010). At least twenty US citizens have been
recruited, twenty Canadians and several from the UK, Denmark and Sweden (Vidino et al., 2010). The
2006 Ethiopian invasion may have driven a wave of patriotic fervour for defending Somalia, but the
following steady flow of volunteers appears driven by jihadist ideology rather than patriotism (Vidino et
10
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
al., 2010; Shinn, 2009). New volunteers are not all ethnic Somalis; the group contains Arabs, South Asians
and others (Vidino et al., 2010). Al-Shabaab has increasing influence in Kenya, through infiltration of
Somali community mosques by radical preachers and recruiting students with bribes of mobile phones
and money, and strong links in Yemen through Al-Qaeda (Stanford University. Updated 2013). New
fighters are increasingly from East Africa (Marchal, 2011). Some members are Somali soldiers trained by
the USA, who deserted government forces after not receiving their pay (Stanford University. Updated
2013).
Al-Shabaab recruiters are smart and well-educated; they offer a way of life and a community rather than
just a weapon and a salary, particularly appealing to Somali youth who have few economic prospects and
have lived through the failure of formal political processes (Marchal, 2011). Recruiters are able to frame
jihad as a genuine way of transforming society and a legitimate political option in Somalia (Marchal,
2011). The group is currently tapping into clan-based grievances, including targeting minority clans, which
means understanding clan dynamics is important for tackling Al-Shabaab (Expert comments). New
recruits are likely to be susceptible to radicalisation due to a combination of factors, but for many,
economic deprivation and community isolation play a part, as does war-related trauma (Vidino et al.,
2010). Social networks and the influence of relatives and friends are likely to be the strongest
motivating factors for joining (Vidino et al., 2010).
Al-Shabaab has a highly sophisticated media strategy for recruitment and indoctrination, using videos
and the internet to communicate with members and the diaspora and to put across its own version of
events (Marchal, 2011). It is aimed at the diaspora and infused with the creation of a transnational
political Muslim identity (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012). Al-Shabaab presents news in a way designed
to inspire trust and legitimacy – giving analysis of losses as well as victories, and accurate locations and
timings for the videos – and reporting in Somali, Arabic and occasionally English (Marchal, 2011). Abu
Mansoor al-Amriki (real name Omar Hammami; of Syrian-American descent) from Alabama joined in
2007 and has become Al-“ha aa s leadi g p opaga dist. He is actively recruiting further Western
citizens, drawing on his own experience to reach out to similar leverage points (Meleagrou-Hitchens et
al., 2012).
Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ)
The second most important armed militia is ASWJ, which is opposed to Al-Shabaab and fights it in the
central region (Expert comments). ASWJ claim to represent the traditional early Islamic order of the Sufis
(Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). Its objective is to confront the Salafi and Wahabi ideologies, particularly
where armed groups try to impose this on civilians (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). It is considered an integral
g oup i “o alia s politi al a d security situation, as a mediating force and buffer (Stanford University
Mapping Militant Organizations Project; updated 2012). Prior to 2008, it was a peaceful order,
establishing schools and social activities to support the spread of their brand of Islam, when Al-Shabaab
provoked a reaction by desecrating the graves of Sufi Ulama and increasing restrictions on the regions
under their control (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). ASWJ drove Al-Shabaab out of their areas with Ethiopianprovided arms (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). Ethiopia appears to exert a strong influence on the group,
supporting it as opponents of Al-Shabaab (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010), and has provided training and
weapons (Stanford University. Updated 2012). The TFG signed a power-sharing agreement with Ethiopia
and ASWJ, securing formal position for ASWJ members in the cabinet in exchange for help fighting AlShabaab, but there are debates over whether this has actually happened (Stanford University. Updated
2012).
11
Its organisational structure has a high council of senior scholars, headed currently by Sheikh Ma alli
Mahmud Sheikh Hassan Farah (Ayr clan); a reference council of seven men; an executive council and a
legislative council. They are not as media-savvy as Al-Shabaab, and lack video or web content (Al-Amin &
Al-Hadi, 2010). They are funded by locals in exchange for protection services (Stanford University.
Updated 2012), which appears to be a legitimate operation rather than a protection racket.
The fighting arm is led by Farah, while there is also a Mogadishu arm which does not fight, led by Sheikh
Sharif Muhidin (Abgal clan) (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). This appears to be a leadership divide (Al-Amin &
Al-Hadi, 2010), with both factions being important (Stanford University. Updated 2012). It is primarily
operational in Galgadud, and has established quite strong control over the central region, which some
see as a threat to the government, while others believe it is operating in national interests (Stanford
University. Updated 2012).
3.3 Civil society and non-state actors
Mogadishu has a vibrant and organised civil society (Expert comments) which includes media, clan elders,
religious groups, and humanitarian and development organisations. Civil society is heavily engaged in
social and public service delivery in Mogadishu (Saferworld, 2012). DFID estimates there are more than
2000 local NGOs, think tanks, training institutions and professional associations in Somalia (The EU
Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 35). Religious organisations and hierarchy have a strong influence in urban
centres, while rural areas may draw more on traditional community structures (Hoehne, 2010).There is
no clear legal framework for civil society i a of “o alia s egio s; as i depe dent organisations were
banned under Barre, they have emerged in the period of statelessness (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID,
2012:
. “afe o ld
iti ises Mogadishu s i il so iet o ga isatio s C“Os fo ep ese ti g
narrow clan or political interests rather than community interests, their lack of accountability and
transparency, and their reliance on state sanction and donor funding.
Most Somali CSOs lack sophisticated websites and remain unevaluated, and there is little critical
academic literature on these organisations; this report therefore only presents a few major groups.
Non-state actors: platforms
The EC and DFID fund Saferworld to run three non-state actor platforms, in south-central, Somaliland and
Puntland,6 which has produced a series of consultations with civil society and CSO representation to the
UN and other international bodies; this has increased the visibility of civil society in policy (Saferworld,
2011a). “afe o ld s p og a
e has highlighted that Somalis feel excluded from decision-making and
policy processes, which are generally run by external actors, and that civil society is a burgeoning forum
for real participation (Saferworld, 2011b). The Non-State Actors Platforms provide a structure with which
the international community can engage (Saferworld, 2011b). This programme has been modestly
effective in increasing CSO capacity, developing coalitions and CSO networks and a common voice,
increasing representation of marginalised groups and the emergence of new voices, and increasing
legitimacy for local organisations (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 21-23).
6
South-central (SOCENSA): http://www.soscensa.org/; Somaliland (SONSAF): http://www.sonsaf.org/;
Puntland (PUNSAA): http://www.punsaa.org/.
12
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Council of Islamic Scholars (CIS)
The CIS is a religious organisation which brings together representatives from a variety of Islamist
organisations (Saferworld, 2012). It is based in Mogadishu and wields a moral authority over the city,
with the capability to mobilise tens of thousands of followers (Saferworld, 2012). Its objective is to
uphold Islamic values in Somalia, for instance in the provisional constitution, which it deemed un-Islamic
and called for consultation with scholars in the drafting process (Saferworld, 2012).
Harakat Al-Islah Al-Islamiya (Islamic Reform Movement)
The moderate Islamist group Al-Islah was founded in 1978 in Saudi Arabia, but began to really establish
itself in Somalia from 1990 onwards (Saggiomo, 2012). Many of the founders had studied abroad in
Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Saggiomo, 2012). Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, with
Shariah law, and to promote Islamic principles in Somali society (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). It believes
this can be achieved through the Islamisation of the state, rather than confrontation and hostility,
following the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood model; it is the only recognised Muslim Brotherhood group
in the Horn of Africa (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010).
It has a pragmatic approach to the changing Somali context and has cooperated with many sectors of
society, including warlords (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). It has encouraged a conciliatory approach among
its members, which enabled it to exercise great influence at the Arta peace conference in 2000 (Hoehne,
2010). It has established dozens of schools (Expert comments) and the University of Mogadishu, and
encourages strong social and cultural participation of its membership (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). It has
also successfully operated some conflict resolution activities between warring clans (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi,
2010). Members pay a fee, which part-funds the organisation, while the rest comes from charitable
donations and grants (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010).
Al-Islah lost support in 2006, when it showed support for the invading Ethiopian army, against the general
mood in Somalia (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). This resulted in the total dismissal of the leadership, which
refused to step down, creating two competing leaderships (Al-Amin & Al-Hadi, 2010). There are still two
fa tio s, o e led
the g oup s o igi al fou de , Sheikh Mohamed Ahmed Nur (Garyare) and the other
coalescing in response around the presidential candidate Abdurahman Moallim Abdullahi (Badiyow)
(Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2013). Ga a e s fa tio has e ged ith Damul Jadiid, the powerful
organisation said to be behind President Hassan (Bryden, 2013). Several members of the government
are thus members of, or affiliated with, Al-Islah and Damul Jadiid.
Elders
Any adult male in Somalia can be considered an elder with a right to speak in local council; councils
themselves are ad hoc gatherings to deal with specific issues (Bradbury, 2008:16). Elders are therefore
representatives rather than executive leaders, and tend to act as peacemakers and arbiters (Bradbury,
2008: 17). As with other areas of Somalia, the influence any elder has is dependent on his personal skills,
connections, a d a ility to satisfy his follo ers eeds (Hoehne, 2011).
Local people do not necessarily want their elders to get involved in national politics; they may prefer
them to govern the local level (Hoehne, 2011). Elders have frequently been included in peace processes
and negotiations, but this has also been criticised by Somalis as the elders lack any authority over armed
militias (Menkhaus, 2011). Elders are seen as legitimate, but are also held responsible, along with
politicians, the West and AMISOM, for the lack of progress towards stabilisation (Marchal, 2011: 44).
13
Business community
There are strong connections between business and politics in Somalia, and the business community
holds a lot of power (Expert comments). Politicians are frequently businesspeople and vice versa, while
lucrative government contracts are also awarded to business friends (Saferworld, 2012).
One of the largest business sectors is telecommunications, and, related to this, remittances. The
telecommunications revolution facilitated the rise of remittance companies for diaspora members to
send money back to family members at home (Menkhaus, 2011). The cash funds can be used for a variety
of purposes, but often are invested in socio-economic development (Expert comments), particularly in
water and electricity (African Development Bank Group, 2013), health and education, and real estate
construction (Menkhaus, 2011).
The business community is pivotal in moving money around the country through its networks
(Saferworld, 2012), and can build alliances across clans to secure movement of goods (Menkhaus, 2011).
Business entrepreneurship is largely responsible for the telecommunications and money transfer boom
(Menkhaus, 2011) and, on the whole, the business community is highly valued and controls much of
“o alia s asset ase (Expert comments).
4. Piracy
4.1 Dynamics
The commonest reason for piracy given by Somalis – pirates and non-pirates alike – is the illegal overfishing of Somali waters by large fishing boats, which justified the development of pirates acting as
oastgua ds a d de a di g pa e ts fo eithe a li e se to fish o fo p ote tio se i es (Saferworld,
2011a). This narrative is often cited but is an attempt to decriminalise their activities (Harper, 2012: 149).
Pi ates ta geti g of o
e ial essels, ot just fishi g t a le s, lea l i di ates thei oti atio s a e
profit-focused rather than the defence of fishing waters (Hansen, 2009). Piracy appears to be accepted as
a near-legitimate form of work or trade (Dua, 2013).
Almost all experts agree that the conflict and disorder in Somalia have created the enabling conditions
for piracy, followed by poverty and lack of alternative employment and the lack of effective punitive
systems (Kaunert & Zwolski, 2012). Pirates are almost exclusively young men, largely uneducated, and
attracted by the large ransoms paid by hostages in a context of very few legitimate employment options
(Saferworld, 2011a). Piracy provides jobs and investments in the local economy, making it a lucrative
option (Percy & Shortland, 2013). The literature is very strong and consistent in understanding that the
solution to piracy is not military action but addressing the root causes of conflict and instability on
Somali land (Saferworld, 2011a). Hansen (2009) additionally suggests that piracy is not driven entirely by
poverty, and that strong institutions are as vital to controlling piracy as livelihoods strengthening. The
causes of piracy are economic, social and political, and the solution must respond to these issues rather
than piracy itself (Kaunert & Zwolski, 2012). Where pirates come up against the authorities, they are
usually able to buy them off with a bribe (Hansen, 2009). In January 2011, the Somali parliament refused
to pass a bill making piracy illegal, suggesting that it is tolerated to some degree (Harper, 2013: 150).
Somali pirates hijack commercial ships and hold crew-members to ransom. Pirates use low-technology
weapons such as AK-47s and grappling hooks to capture ships (Percy & Shortland, 2013). Hijacked ships
are anchored near pirate strongholds while ransom negotiations are made; in Puntland this is often near
14
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Eyl, Hobyo and Gharardeere (Percy & Shortland, 2013). Pirates seek to terrorise crew members to speed
up ransom negotiations (International Maritime Bureau and Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012). The recent use
of othe ships , hi h p o ide a ase fo the s alle skiffs hi h do the hija ki g, ea s that pi ates
operational range has expanded well beyond Somali waters (Harper, 2012).
Piracy operates out of four main areas: Sanaag (between Somaliland and Puntland); Bari (Puntland);
Nugal (Puntland) and Mudug, which are not especially poor regions, which Hansen (2009) believes
suggests that piracy is driven more by opportunity than poverty. There are no examples of female pirates.
4.2 Pirate groups
Hansen (2009) describes pirate group organisation. Most groups consist of members from a single clan,
which helps them stay free of clan conflicts within the group, and perhaps offers some protection or
defence by their own clan. Ships captured in clan territory waters are usually kept there, not moved
across clan border lines; and pirates pay quaraan (charity) to members of their own clan. Gangs may
contain strategic members of other clans, allowing access to resources or keeping the local peace
(Hansen, 2009). Some groups are organised around a family, such as a father and sons. A group usually
consists of 12 to 35 individuals, working on commission and divided into attack and hold teams.
It is unclear whether piracy should be considered organised crime or the work of opportunistic
individuals. Ha se s
i te ie s ith pi ates suggest they are far from advanced organised
criminal activity, with the average pirate group being a la -based, low-tech group, consisting of former
fishe e (Hansen, 2009: 41). This is the prevailing view of most authors, who see ransom pirates as
thriving in the lawless environment created by state collapse in Somalia (e.g. Samatar, Lindberg, &
Mahayni, 2010). However, Percy and Shortland (2013) argue that the resistance of Somali piracy to
stabilisation efforts is due to its organised nature. They argue that piracy is an organised activity which
thrives on economic stability rather than the lawlessness purported to be a root cause of piracy in
Somalia.
Pirates interviewed by Hansen (2009: 35) identified three organisational structures:
One man owns and funds the whole operation and receives an agreed percentage of the profits.
The leader carries the financial risk and pockets the most profit.
Each man brings his own food and guns and the boat is owned by one person. This is a
shareholder structure.
A fundraiser collects money from investors and funds the pirate mission. This is a shareholder
structure with a recruiter.
Analysis of EU NAVFOR, NATO and media reports shows that there is an increase in violence between
pirates and hijacking of already-hijacked vessels (International Maritime Bureau and Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2012). It is possible there is a pirate code of conduct, an idea raised in interviews with naval antipiracy commanders (Percy & Shortland, 2013). Codes of conduct differ from group to group, but all have
sanctions against those who break the rules, including imprisonment and fines (Harper, 2013: 157).
In the sudden increase and geographic expansion of Somali piracy in 2005-7, two new groups operating in
the Indian Ocean stand out. The Somali Marines were based in Haradheere, while the Somali National
Volunteer Coastguard operated out of Kismayo (Lucas, 2013). These employed the more advanced
othe ship ta ti s hi h de o st ate a e p ofessio alis Lu as,
. A best guess estimates that
there are around ten gangs currently in operation, of which most are well-established and two or three
15
are relatively new (Anderson, 2010). The increase in piracy since 2007 is therefore attributed to only two
or three new gangs – a small set of inputs has created a large increase in piracy (Anderson, 2010).
The links between piracy and Al-Shabaab are unclear. Some sources say Al-Shabaab considers piracy unIslamic and therefore does not engage, while others suggest pirates offer large sums of money in
exchange for training and weapons from Al-Shabaab (Stanford University. Updated 2013). One
documented incident is the Al-Shabaab capture of two Médecins Sans Frontières workers in Dadaab,
Kenya; the hostages were subsequently sold to a pirate gang for them to collect a ransom (International
Maritime Bureau and Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012). Al-Shabaab probably has little means to pressure
pirates into paying them protection money, as they lack military presence in pirate ports, and it is true
that Al-Shabaab controlled areas have mostly remained free of hijackings (Hansen, 2009).
4.3 Individuals
Pirates appear to be recruited from the ranks of fishermen, by offering large salaries through recruiting
agents. One fisherman in Mogadishu said that he is regularly offered 4,000 USD per month to join a pirate
crew (Mohamed, 2012). While this is a substantial sum
a o e s easu e, it is also o pou ded
the restrictions placed on fishing because of piracy – fishermen operate under a curfew for returning to
shore, after which they may be mistaken for pirates and shot at by the coastal soldiers, and while on the
sea they may be approached or shot at by international navies assuming they are pirates (Mohamed,
2012). However, interviews with some pirates reveal that they ie pira y as just a other for of
trade , rooted in a protection economy which has long historical roots on the Somali coast (Dua, 2013).
There are allegations that pirate leaders are protected by senior political figures. There are almost
definitely links between pirate gangs and corrupt governmental officials in Puntland (Anderson, 2010).
A significant pirate leader, Afweyne, was given a diplomatic passport by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed as an inducement for Afweyne to dismantle his pirate network, and another leader, Abshir Boyah,
was given a short 5-year sentence, in comparison to 20 years for junior pirates (Reuters, 2012). There are
no clear current leaders among the pirates (Expert comments).
Piracy appears to be hierarchical – different pirates get different proportions of the ransom money for
performing different tasks (Percy & Shortland, 2013). High bonuses go to the first man to board the
target ship (Hansen, 2009). Most pirates have spent their money on houses and cars and distributed it
amongst family members (Hansen, 2009). Local community members may receive around 10 per cent of
the profits as donations, the pi ates fi a ie e oups his investment with 20 per cent of the profits, and
government officials and local militias will also receive a hefty bribe (Harper, 2013: 153). When the
hijacked ships are anchored for negotiations to take place, the local economy booms as pirates come
ashore to buy provisions (Harper, 2013: 154), but this also has negative effects on locals by pricing them
out of the market (Dua, 2013).
16
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
5. Diaspora
The Somali diaspora comprises about one million people, residing in the United States, UAE, Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Germany, among
others (Hoehne, Feyissa, & Abdile, 2011).
The diaspora is heavily involved with civic and economic activity in Somalia. The main contribution of
the large Somali diaspora has been in sending money directly to relatives and is a major source of finance
for many Somalis (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 50). The value of remittances may be as high as
one billion USD per year (Menkhaus, 2011). The main source of diaspora influence is therefore on
“o alia s e o o y. The diaspo a s fi a ial esou es a e sometimes used to fund or set up new
organisations, or contribute to political or radical movements (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 50).
Diaspora business investment, especially in telecommunications and money-transfer businesses, has
helped de elop “o alia s e o o
(African Development Bank Group, 2013), and the liquid assets
stimulated new businesses to develop, particularly in the service sector, and health and education
(Menkhaus, 2011). Diaspora role in funding and joining radical movements is increasingly important
(Marchal, 2011), but diaspora remittances can provide a regular flow of income which keeps people
away from crime and violence, and can be used to fund education (Hoehne et al., 2011).
The diaspo a s se o d ole is i the political and policy sphere, as many politicians are diaspora, and/or
have played central roles in the peace processes (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 50). In 2011, an
estimated two-thirds of the TFG cabinet were diaspora members (Menkhaus, 2011). The number is
probably lower in the SFG, but there is a still a difficult balancing act in harnessing the skills of the
transnational community without alienating local people by taking away jobs and opportunities
(Hammond, 2013). Similarly, if the diaspora members in power are seen to be out of touch with local
priorities and problems, they will likely risk losing support (Hammond, 2013). Ho e e , the so ial
remittances
ought
diaspo a e e s skills, ideas, and values) can contribute to peacebuilding
(Hoehne et al., 2011). Diaspora members are expected to promote democratic values, but there is little
e ide e that the ha e had u h i pa t o “o alia s political and civic democracy (Ibrahim, 2010).
Ibrahim (2010) notes that the pe eptio of the diaspo a s i flue e is diffe e t i diffe e t g oups.
Members of the Somaliland diaspora view their return as a homecoming, in which local people wanted
and desired them to return, while local inhabitants may view them as potential cash cows, and/or people
who have lost their Somali culture and need to be rehabilitated. Diaspora members may view themselves
as influential because they have money, but to be considered influential by the community, they must
also show their commitment to Somalia and to Islam through their behaviour.
6. International actors
International actors and organisations hold considerable influence in contemporary south/central
Somalia as providers of development and humanitarian assistance to civilians and political, financial,
logistical and military support to the SFG and its nascent security forces.
Contemporary assessments of the impact and role of international actors in Somalia have been largely
critical and pessimistic with one academi oti g that more than a dozen attempts to build a new
[Somali] government by the international community have failed [si e
] (Hammond, 2013: 183).
There is a broad consensus among commentators that Somalis are deeply suspicious of, and hostile
17
towards, Ethiopian and Western involvement in the country and many view AMISOM and the TFG/SFG
as stooges of Addis A a a a d Washi gto Bruton, 2009; Harper, 2013: 162; Marchal, 2009: 4; Sabala,
2011: 108; Williams, 2009: 521-522). Al-Shabaab has capitalised on these sentiments, targeting aid
age ies a d INGOs ilita il as a assault o Weste i te ests Me khaus,
: 65; Mwangi, 2012;
Williams, 2009: 521-522). This has forced many INGOs to close their operations in Somalia and some
scholars now argue that Weste suppo t is see as a lia ilit
local actors and a gradual
disengagement from the country should become a centrepiece of Western strategy (Bradbury, 2010;
Bruton, 2009; Hammond, 2013: 184).
International interest and involvement in Somaliland and Puntland has been minimal, with a small
number of INGOs constituting the primary non-Somali presence in the territories (Bradbury, 2010: 8).
While e e t i te atio al o fe e es o “o alia ha e i luded a “o alila d p ese e , no scholars
have suggested that this situation is likely to change in the near future (Hammond, 2013: 184-185). This
section will therefore summarise key external players in Somalia, albeit exploring only those in
south/central Somalia.
6.1 Regional actors
Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF)
Ethiopia remains a central military and political player in contemporary Somalia; its forces withdrew from
the ou t i
ut etu ed i
to olste a d suppo t AMI“OM a d the TFG s te uous hold
over Mogadishu (McEvoy, 2013: 4; Williams, 2009:
; Willia s,
. Ethiopia s elatio s with Somalia
are primarily related to Ethiopia s do esti sta ility (Barnes & Hassan, 2007: 155-156). For Addis Ababa,
the potential spread of political Islam from Somalia represents a threat to stability and the political status
quo in Ethiopia, which has a large minority Somali population. Ethiopia has also frequently suggested that
Islamist and other groups in Somalia have provided, or hope to provide, support to irredentist rebel
groups in Ethiopia, particularly in the Ogaden (Balkonyi, 2013; Barnes & Hassan, 2007: 155-156;
Menkhaus, 2007; Williams, 2009: 516-518). Addis Ababa is therefore opposed to a federal political
arrangement in Somalia, fearing that this would further strengthen supporters of Ogadeni separatism.
Ethiopia is in disagreement with Kenya on this issue (Fisher, 2013a).
Ethiopian incursions and interventions in Somalia have therefore largely been aimed at installing or
olste i g f ie dl
atio al o local administrations opposed both to political Islam and to supporting
separatist movements across the border (Balkonyi, 2013; Sabala, 2011: 102). Ethiopia is consequently
deeply unpopular among Somalis and a range of organisations linked to it, including AMISOM and the
TFG/SFG, have also become somewhat unpopular by association (Harper, 2013: 162; Marchal, 2009;
Menkhaus, 2009; Williams, 2009; Williams, 2013).
A number of scholars have argued, however, that Addis Ababa is aware of the negative reputation it
enjoys in Somalia and does not wish to remain militarily engaged (Moller, 2009: 11). The ENDF high
command is reportedly split on the issue of disengagement at present (Expert comments). The ENDF
leadership is clearly the key player in Ethiopia s i ol e e t i “o alia si e the death of lo gti e
Ethiopia leade Meles )e a i i
. Whe e the ENDF has ee la elled Meles e ote o t ol a
by one scholar, its defe e e to Meles su esso , Haile a ia Desaleg , is fa less lea . It has been
suggested that Ethiopian politics is undergoing a transitional phase and that Hailemariam is acting as a
ege t ith li ited autho it o e ENDF ope atio s (Expert comments).
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GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Kenya and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF)
Kenyan involvement in Somalia has traditionally been diplomatic and political in nature. Nairobi played a
prominent role in several rounds of regional mediation and government-formation efforts during the
2000s and hosted the TFG until 2007, along with most Western embassies, UN agencies and INGO offices
assigned to Somalia – many of which still remain in Nairobi today (McEvoy, 2013). The unilateral KDF
intervention in October 2011 has dramatically altered this dispensation and Kenya is now a major
military as well as political player in the southern Somali state of Jubaland. The Kenyan intervention
responded to a range of attacks and kidnappings of Western tourists in northern Kenya believed to be
committed by Al-Shabaab, although Nairobi has long seen the combination of insecurity and political
Islam i southe “o alia as a th eat to Ke a s sta ilit Fishe ,
a: 7.) “ hola s allege Ke a s
government has had plans since at least 2008 to establish a frie dly uffer state i Ju ala d to address
this concern (Anderson, 2012; Fisher, 2013a; Hammond, 2013: 190; McEvoy, 2013) (see Jubaland section
above). KDF troops in Somalia, numbering around 4000, have been incorporated into AMISOM since 2012
but remain almost entirely based in Kismayo and Jubaland (McEvoy, 2013: 4). It is also suggested that
Kenya entered Somalia in order to facilitate a more rapid return of hundreds of thousands of Somali
refugees who have fled to Kenya in recent years (Hammond, 2013: 190; McEvoy, 2013: 3).
Analysts have criticised the realpolitik nature of Ke a s i ol e e t i “o alia si e
, although one
positive development is the reconciliation agreement between Madobe and the SFG in Addis Ababa in
August 2013, hi h ill see ad i ist atio of Kis a o s sea a d ai po t t a sfe ed f o the KDF/Ras
Kamboni to the SFG by 2014 (Reuters, 2013).
Uganda and AMISOM
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was dispatched in March 2007 tasked with protecting
the TFG in Mogadishu and its institutions (Menkhaus, 2007: 364-386; Williams, 2009: 516-521). With the
assistance of the ENDF between 2007 and 2009 and since 2011, AMISOM has been critical to driving AlShabaab out of Mogadishu a d se uri g the TFG/SFG s hold o politi al authority. Scholars disagree
over the level of local support for the operation, with some suggesting it is seen as an unwelcome and
o asio all
utal Ethiopia /Weste T oja ho se a d othe s a gui g that a “o alis a e grateful
to AMISOM for stabilising parts of the country (Bruton, 2009: 86; Freear & Coning, 2013; Harper, 2013:
162; Williams, 2009: 520-522). Most agree that AMISOM enjoys greater local support today than in
previous years o i g to the i p o ed se u it situatio i “o alia although its la k of a lea e it
st ateg e ai s a o e fo a Freear & Coning, 2013; Harper, 2013: 162).
AMISOM remains dominated operationally and politically by Uganda, though joined by Burundian
troops in 2007 and a small number of Nigerian, Djiboutian, Sierra Leonean and other West African
soldiers since 2012 (Fisher, 2013a). The incorporation of KDF forces into AMISOM since 2012 has had
limited effect, with Kenyan troops based in the south and Ugandan troops in command positions in
Mogadishu (Fisher, 2013a; Freear and Coning, 2013: 3 . “ hola s suggest that Uga da s oti atio s for
intervention are more linked to its relations with Western donor governments than to regional security
concerns, although a desi e i Ka pala to gi e the ou t s la ge a
so ethi g to do is also
frequently cited (Fisher, 2012a: 418; Fisher, 2013b; Williams, 2009: 519-520).
Ugandan president Yoweri Muse e i s desire to ar e out a role for Uganda as a regional power-player
and deal-broker is also considered an important factor (Fisher, 2012a:
. Muse e i has used Uga da s
vital role in AMISOM to leverage political change in Mogadishu in recent years, and Ugandan diplomats
atte pted to a age the “FG s d a i g-up of its security sector transformation plans in the lead-up to
19
the 2013 Somalia Conference in London, albeit less successfully (Fisher, 2013a). It is also suggested that
the Museveni government has become increasingly committed to stabilising Somalia to demonstrate the
st e gth a d o pete e of Uga da s a
(Expert comments) at the domestic, regional and
international level (Fisher, 2012b). Aside f o Muse e i hi self, a ke figu e i Uga da s “o alia poli making arena is Nathan Mugisha, AMISOM Commander between 2009 and
a d Ka pala s deput
envoy to Mogadishu since 2011. AMISOM is wholly dependent on Western funding and logistical support
to carry out its mandate, with the US, EU, UK and France being key contributors (Franke, 2009; Williams,
2009: 519-520).
Eritrea and Yemen
A range of commentators have cited Eritrea and Yemen as supporters of domestic opponents of
“o alia s government, particularly Al-Shabaab (Barnes & Hassan, 2007: 156; Moller, 2009: 23; Sabala,
2011: 101-105). Eritrea and Yemen have, according to some scholars, provided military and political
support to the opponents of the TFG/SFG and AMISOM in recent years – although little concrete
evidence exists to support or discredit these claims either way. Both states are argued to have hosted
Union of Islamic Courts officials fleeing Somalia in 2006, while Eritrea is said to have supported AlShabaab until recently (Barnes & Hassan, 2007: 156; Moller, 2009: 23; Sabala, 2011: 101-105). This has
been interpreted as a continuation of the on-going Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict by proxy, originating in a
border war between the two states during 1998-2000 (Connell, 2009). Eritrea s urre t i ol e e t a d
interests in Somalia are little known a d s hola s ag ee that the ou t s fo eig poli is de ided i a
highly personalised manner by the unpredictable and anti-Western president Isaias Afwerki (Connell,
2009).
Gulf States
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are also increasingly important political and economic players in
Somalia, with Harper noting that the former is rumoured to have assisted Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
financially in his successful 2012 campaign for the Somali presidency (Harper, 2013: 163). This reflects a
general observation in recent literature that the SFG is looking beyond traditional Western donors and
institutions in their approach to international relations and securing external support (Grunewald, 2012:
S114; Hammond, 2013: 188-191; Harper, 2013: 163; Mosley, 2012: 11).
6.2 Multilateral actors and other governments
United Nations (UN)
The UN and its agencies, particularly the United Nations Development Programme, have played a
significant role in coordinating humanitarian assistance bodies in Somalia and funding the TFG/SFG,
AMISOM and several security and governance initiatives recently launched by the Somali government
(Bradbury, 2010: 11; Bryden & Brickhill, 2010: 247; Harper, 2013: 164-165; Menkhaus, 2007: 364;
Williams, 2009: 519). The organisation is nevertheless viewed as politically partisan by many Somalis as
a result of its support for the TFG and AMISOM in the later 2000s (Menkhaus, 2007: 364). It has also been
criticised by INGOs and NGOs for attempting to engage them in political processes in support of the
TFG, ith the fo e i sisti g that a lear distin tio should e d a
et ee humanitarian aid and
political agendas in Somalia (Bradbury, 2010: 11). The management of the UN operation in Somalia is
divided between the UN Office for Somalia in Nairobi and the UN Somalia Team in New York; Harper has
20
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
argued that the two often operate at cross-purposes and that both have consequently been manipulated
by political groups within Somalia (Harper, 2013: 162).
United States (US)
The US is the most influential non-African external power in Somalia and has been crucial in financing
and facilitating AMISOM; Washington has also provided crucial intelligence and logistical support to
AMISOM troops since 2007 and continues to fund the training of AMISOM and Somali forces (Bruton,
2009; Bryden & Brickhill, 2010: 247-250; Fisher, 2013b: 11-15; Menkhaus, 2007; Williams 2009). Close US
security relations with Ethiopia – and, to a lesser extent, Kenya and Uganda – have led many Somalis to
be suspicious of US intentions in the country, particularly following US air strikes against purported AlQaeda ta gets i “o alia follo i g Ethiopia s
i te e tio Me khaus,
7: 382; Williams, 2009:
516-519). The US is a central player in the International Contact Group on Somalia and has also played a
critical role in supporting regional and international conferences aimed at facilitating political dialogue
and government-formation since the mid-2000s. In recent years, the Africa Bureau at the US Department
of State has led on Somalia policy in Washington (Menkhaus, 2007: 378).
Many commentators have strongly criticised the overly simplistic approach US officials have taken to
understanding Somali political dynamics, oti g that the di isio of g oups i to e t e ists a d
ode ates has led to pushi g uninformed policies on governance and piracy, exacerbating political and
ethnic tensions in parts of the country (Bruton, 2009: 85; Marchal, 2007; Marchal, 2009; Menkhaus,
2007: 378). The White House s
a o support by US citizens to terrorist groups in Somalia has also
been widely criticised by INGOs and scholars as preventing the transfer of humanitarian aid to areas
under Al-Shabaab control (Bradbury, 2010: 12; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012: 6-9).
European Union (EU) and its member states
As a unit, the EU and its member states are the largest aid donor to Somalia, with the European
Commission, UK, France and Italy being particularly prominent as providers of development aid, of
training to AMISOM and Somali forces, and of anti-piracy mechanisms in the region (Bradbury, 2010: 12;
Franke, 2009; Kaunert & Zwolski, 2012; Williams, 2009: 519-520). The EU has been criticised by several
AMISOM states – notably Uganda – and some scholars as not providing adequate financial support to the
operation since 2007 although these grievances have been less commented upon in recent years (Vines,
2010: 1096-1100). As with the UN and US, European donors are viewed with suspicion by many Somalis
as overly supportive of the TFG/SFG and Ethiopian interests. The EU has nevertheless been praised for
attempting to implement a more comprehensive approach to deterring piracy in the Horn of Africa by
taking into account the developmental as well as security-related aspects (Kaunert & Zwolski, 2012). The
UK has attempted to bring a broader range of Somali actors into political dialogue in the London
conferences in 2012 and 2013, while UK ministers have recently sought to work with Barclays Bank
follo i g the a k s de isio to ithd a
a ki g se ices to money service businesses, which has a
large effect on Somali diaspora remittances (Hammond, 2013:184-185; Taylor, 2013).
Turkey
A range of commentators highlight the growing importance of Tu ke i “o alia s politi al e o o
.
During the 2011 Somali famine Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan visited Mogadishu with his family,
precipitating a large injection of humanitarian donations and assistance from the Turkish population
21
(Grunewald, 2012: S114; Hammond, 2013: 191; Harper, 2013: 164-165; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012: 910; Mosley, 2012: 11). Ankara is also increasingly involved in humanitarian activities, in training Somali
soldie s a d i o e i g diplo ati su
its ai ed at assisti g “o alia s politi al a d e o o i
development (Grunewald, 2012: S114; Hammond, 2013: 191; Harper, 2013: 164-165; Maxwell &
Fitzpatrick, 2012: 9-10; Mosley, 2012: 11). Somalis are reportedly far more favourably inclined towards
Turkey than Western states for a range of reasons including its focus on humanitarian rather than
security issues, the willingness of Turks in Mogadishu to live and work amongst the Somali population as
opposed to in heavily-p ote ted se u e zo es , and direct delivery of aid to recipients (Harper, 2013:
164; ICG, 2012: 9). A
assess e t of Tu ke s ole i “o alia by International Crisis Group
nevertheless criticised A ka a s i ol e e t as o e l unilateral and ad hoc (ICG, 2012).
6.3 International NGOs and aid agencies
In recent years, most Western International NGOs (INGOs) have been forced to withdraw from
south/central Somalia for logistical, legal and security reasons – the number of INGOs in the country has
reduced from around 40 to 15 between 1995-2010 (Bradbury, 2010: 8). CARE left south/central Somalia
in 2008 for security reasons, as did the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2010, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Save the Children in 2012 and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 2013;
these organisations have been increasingly forced to operate from Nairobi and to rely on local NGOs to
deliver humanitarian aid
e ote a age e t B ad u ,
: 10; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012: 9).
The effect of these withdrawals on the Somali population has been varied but commentators agree that
WFP s depa tu e as pa ti ula l de astati g du i g the 2011 famine and its aftermath (Maxwell &
Fitzpatrick, 2012: 9).
This flight of Western INGOs is primarily a result of targeting by Al-Shabaab as representatives of
i pe ialist U“ a d Ethiopia i te ests G u e ald,
: S114), a state of affairs not helped by the
prominence of US and other Western flags on many humanitarian aid parcels, and efforts by UN officials
to incorporate INGO support into political processes in Mogadishu (Bradbury, 2010: 9-12; Grunewald,
2012: S114). Most INGOs managed to come to a de facto arrangement with Al-Shabaab during the later
2000s which allowed them to operate and provide some aid in Shabaab-held areas. This has been
frustrated, however, since 2010 by legal restrictions placed upon the transfer of resources to and through
terrorist organisations in Somalia by the US Government; WFP pulled out of Somalia in 2011 citing not
o l se u it o e s ut inability to meet donor obligations (Bradbury, 2010: 10). These restrictions
have been criticised by some commentators as preventing the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to
Somalis under Al-Shabaab rule (Bradbury, 2010; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012; Menkhaus, 2010: S338).
A growing number of INGOs from Muslim majority states have become increasingly prominent as
fa ilitato s a d p o ide s of hu a ita ia aid. Not ie ed o p ese ted as U“ o Weste puppets
AlShabaab and other local Somali groups, these organisations have continued operating in much of
south/central Somalia while their Western counterparts have been forced to withdraw (Grunewald,
2012: S114; Hammond, 2013: 191; Harper, 2013: 164-165; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012: 9-10; Mosley,
2012). The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has become an increasingly important provider of
humanitarian assistance to Somalia since the outbreak of famine in 2011 and is viewed by Somalis as a
more culturally sensitive and sincere donor than most Western states and organisations (Hammond,
2013: 191; Harper, 2013: 164-165; Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012: 9; Mosley, 2012: 11).
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Key actors mapping: Somalia
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Fisher, J. (2012a). Managing donor perceptions: Contextualizi g Uga da s
i te e tio i “o alia.
African Affairs, 111(444), 404-424.
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Fisher, J. (2012b, July 11). Uganda in Somalia: Five years on, still the same story? Presentation by Dr Jonathan
Fisher, University of Birmingham at the University of Birmingham.
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25
Maxwell, D., & Fitzpatrick, M. (2012). The Somalia famine: Context, causes, and complications. Global Food
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26
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
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7.1 Key websites
Conciliation Resources – Somalia: http://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies: http://www.heritageinstitute.org/
27
Appendix 1 – Clan and minority groups
Clan
Description
Darood
The Darood are made up of three large clans – the Harti, Absame, and Marehan. They
have home territories in Puntland, eastern Ethiopia, portions of Bakool region, the Juba
region, and northern Kenya (Expert comments). In recent years, Darood tensions with
the Hawiye have dominated Somali politics. The Darood tend to support a federal vision
for Somalia and support the accession of Jubaland as a federal state (Bryden, 2013), and
are suspicious of the current government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud as Hawiyedominated (Expert comments).
Dir
The Dir are composed mainly of the Isaaq clan, which views itself as a distinct clan-family
not to be subsumed under the Dir (Expert comments). Other Dir clans populate Djibouti,
parts of eastern Ethiopia, and pockets of Lower Shebelle and the Jubba regions (Minority
Rights Group, 2010, p. 7).
Isaaq
The Isaaq occupy the northwest of Somalia and were a key force in creating the
Somaliland secessionist state (Hoehne, 2010). The Somaliland government is currently
dominated by Isaaq (Bryden, 2013).
Hawiye
The Hawiye dominate in and around Mogadishu, the Middle Shabelle and central
Somalia, though they are also present in parts of northern Kenya and eastern Ethiopia
(Minority Rights Group, 2010, p. 7). The clan is currently seen by many as dominating the
Federal Government, and therefore stands to gain from aid provided to the government
(Expert comments). They tend to back a unitary state (Expert comments) and oppose the
formation of a federal state of Jubaland (Bryden, 2013).
Rahanweyn
The Rahanweyn consist of two sub-clans, the Digil and Mirifle. They live in the fertile
southern region, between the Shabelle and Jubba rivers, which enables them to farm
crops rather than raise livestock (Bradbury, 2008: 11). They speak a distinct dialect, and
in the past were looked down on by the stronger and better armed pastoral clans,
though now the Rahanweyn are well-armed (Expert comments). As agro-pastoralists, the
otio of te ito ialit a d ei g o i a la d ku dhashay) is more important for
identity and belonging than clan affiliation (Hoehne, 2010). Villages may be a more
important social point and self-identification for Rahanweyn than clan (Helander, 1996).
Because of their rooted nature, Rahanweyn are more likely to adopt strangers than other
Somali clans (Helander, 1996). Rahanweyn currently make up a large percentage of the
terrorist group Al-Shabaab (Marchal, 2011).
Ogaden
The Ogaden primarily occupy the Kismayo border region, with a large territory stretching
into northeastern Kenya (Little, 2003, p. 48). They focus on cattle production and engage
in Kenyan markets (Little, 2003, p. 53). They are the prime power-holders in Jubaland.
Harti
The formation of Puntland in 1998 brought together all the Harti sub-clans along with a
few other Darood clans in the region (Hoehne, 2010). Outside of Puntland, Harti occupy
the same area as Ogaden (Little, 2003, p. 49) but mainly reside in Kismayo town and
district (Little, 2003, p. 53). They are primarily engaged in camel pastoralism and
commerce (Little, 2003, p. 53).
28
GSDRC Rapid Literature Review
Key actors mapping: Somalia
Minority
group
Bantu
The Bantu are a number of independent groups living along the southern rivers, which
had little sense of communal identity till the 1990s (Bradbury, 2008: 11). They are the
largest minority group, comprised of indigenous farmers and descendants of African
slaves (Minority Rights Group, 2010). Many Bantu fled to Kenya after 1991 (Minority
Rights Group, 2010). Bantu are over-represented in the terrorist group Al-Shabaab
(Marchal, 2011), but they are also subject to extreme cultural attacks by Al-Shabaab
(Minority Rights Group, 2010).
Occupational
groups
Some particular trades are looked down on: hunters (yibir), leatherworkers (midgaan)
and blacksmiths (tumaal) (Bradbury, 2008: 11). They are scattered throughout Somalia
and comprise the principal minority in Somaliland (Minority Rights Group, 2010).
Religious
minorities
There are small populations of Christians and minority Islam groups (Ashraf and Shekhal)
(Minority Rights Group, 2010). The TFG charter in 2004 declared Islam the official religion
of Somalia, and did not assert the right to freedom of religious belief (Minority Rights
Group, 2010). Christians therefore do not have any representation in parliament or
government (Minority Rights Group, 2010). Christians are at risk of the death penalty
under Shariah law (Minority Rights Group, 2010).
29
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