Hegel on Action

This article discusses three topics that have been the subject of debate in recent scholarship on Hegel's social and political philosophy: first, the relevance of Hegel's systematic metaphysics for interpreting Hegel's social and political writings; second, the relation between recognition (Anerkennung), social institutions, and rational agency; and third, the connection between the constellation of institutions and norms that Hegel calls "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit) and Hegel's theory of freedom. This article provides a critical overview of the positions in these three debates. In the case of the first debate, I clarify the conceptual terrain by distinguishing between several kinds of systematicity that are at issue. In the case of the second debate, I argue that the views of two of the major participants, Axel Honneth and Robert Pippin, are in fact compatible. In the case of the third debate, I seek to clarify the connection in Hegel between two different ideas of freedom in ethical life, each of which has been emphasized by different interpreters of Hegel: the idea of freedom as non-alienation and the idea of freedom as social freedom. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which ethical life, for Hegel, enables the freedom of individuals. 1 | INTRODUCTION This article discusses recent work on Hegel's social and political philosophy. In Section 2, I introduce two basic concepts of Hegel's social and political thought, familiarity with which is presupposed in the rest of the discussion: Hegel's concept of recognition (Anerkennung) and his doctrine of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The rest of the article is organized around three topics that have been both prominent and controversial in recent scholarship: first, the relation of Hegel's social and political philosophy to his philosophical system as a whole (Section 3) 1 ; second, the function of social and political institutions and institutionally-mediated recognition in Hegel's account of action and agency (Section 4); and third, Hegel's theory of social and political freedom and its relation to his theory of ethical life (Section 5).

CONSTANTINE SANDIS Reader in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, UK. He has published numerous articles and edited three books on action and its explanation.

This conference centers on Charles Taylor’s paper “Ethics and Ontology” (2003) and its central theme of the relationship between ethical beliefs and ontological views. Taylor’s moral phenomenology defends commonsense moral reactions against reductionist views that attempt to dismiss these reactions altogether as mere projection on a neutral physical world. His criticism is that this naturalist ontology annihilates our very sense of morality, that is, the sense that moral values are in some way different from, higher than, or incommensurable with natural desires. Against this background, the central question of the conference is: What do our ethical views commit us to ontologically? In this way, this conference aims to discuss Taylor’s moral phenomenology in order to open up the question of the implicit ontological commitments behind our ethical beliefs. Keynotes: Ruth Abbey (University of Notre Dame) Nicholas Smith (Macquarie University) Arto Laitinen (University of Tampere)

This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action. Contributors: Maria Alvarez - Annette Baier - Stephen Boulter - Jonathan Dancy - Fred Dretske - Stephen Everson - P.M.S. Hacker - Sean D. Kelly - Joshua Knobe – E. J. Lowe -Richard Moran - Charles Pigden - A.W. Price - Joseph Raz - David-Hillel Ruben - Constantine Sandis - G.F. Schueler - Helen Steward - Ralf Stoecker - Martin J. Stone - Rowland Stout - Frederick Stoutland - Julia Tanney - Nick Zangwill

This essay challenges the popular view that we can find in Hegel a theory of tragedy according to which it results from a conflict of ethical claims which the Greeks took to be absolute. I maintain that Hegel's notion of tragedy can only be understood from within the framework of his philosophy of action. In so doing I re-examine the moral significances of Hegel's distinction between Handlung and Tat, comparing it to accounts of intentional action offered by Ross, Anscombe, and Davidson. This results in a new understanding of what makes an action tragic, one in which agential responsibility is too fragile to be straightforwardly inferred from behaviour.

Introductory essay to the collection "I that is We, We that is I" (ed. by Italo Testa and Luigi Ruggiu, Brill Books, 2016). In this book an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm

European Journal of Philosophy, 2012

2016

In "I that is We, We that is I", an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm. With essays by: Fred Neuhouser, Heikki Ikäheimo, Jean-François Kervégan, Luigi Ruggiu, Robert Stern, Arto Laitinen, Francesca Menegoni, Axel Honneth, Lucio Cortella, Luca Illetterati, Emmanuel Renault, Paolo Vinci, Italo Testa, Alfredo Ferrarin, Franco Chiereghin, Leonardo Samonà, Geminello Preterossi