Who should abate carbon emission?
Graciela Chichilnisky and
Geoffrey Heal
June 1993, revised October 1993
Discussion Paper No. 683
to appear in Economic
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY*
GEOFFREY HEAL1"
June 1993, revised October 1993
ABSTRACT.
We review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi-country world. We model explicitly
(with the model in Chichilnisky [4]) the fact that the atmosphere is a public
good. Within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for
optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries.
These condition are quite restrictive, and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which
lump-sum transfers can be made between countries. These results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits, which as normally advocated
will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries. The
observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to
look at a Lindahl equilibrium rather than a Walrasian equilibrium in tradeable
permits.
Key words: Carbon dioxide, environment, global warming, abatements,
emission, public good, marginal abatement costs, emission permits, tradeable
permits.
JEL Classification: Q2, H4.
1.
WHO SHOULD ABATE?
The 1992 Rio Convention acknowledged the need for international co-operation in responding to the threat of climate change posed by the rapidly increasing concentration
of CO2 in the atmosphere. There are however substantial differences of opinion both
about the main issues and about the framework for resolving them. Industrial countries typically focus on the potential problems posed by the growth of population in
developing countries, and on the environmental pressure from carbon emissions that
this could create over the next half century. Abatement efforts, they feel, should be
initiated in the developing countries. On the other hand, developing countries view
the carbon emission problem as one which originates historically and currently in the
industrial countries, and one which requires their immediate action. Indeed, the large
majority of all carbon emissions, about 73%, originate currently and historically in
*Professor of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.
t Professor and Senior Vice Dean, Columbia Business School, New York NY 10027.
1
Letters
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
2
the OECD countries and in the ex-Soviet Union; the developing countries have almost
4/5 of the world's population yet contribute at most 30% of all carbon emissions1.
CO2 emissions are a by-product of animal life, and of economic activity which
involves burning fossil fuels. The rapid increase in the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere which has occurred since the second world war has become a matter
of great concern, as it could lead to major and irreversible climate changes. This
concentration affects us all equally, because COi mixes uniformly throughout the
planet's atmosphere.
From the economic viewpoint, therefore, the abatement of carbon emissions increases our consumption of a public good, a "better" atmosphere. However, this differs
from the classic public good in that it is not produced in a centralized fashion. Its
production is decentralized: each consumer of the atmosphere is also a producer.
Each country uses the atmosphere as a "sink" for the carbon emissions which are
a by-product of its economic activities. We have therefore a public good which is
independently produced as well as consumed by all, a case which is closer to that of
an economy with externalities, e.g. Baumol and Oates [1] and Heal [7]. The classic
questions of optimality in the provision of the public good now become questions
about the optimal abatement levels of the different countries. Who shall abate, and
by how much? And how are the optimality conditions for abatement related to the
countries' levels of income, their marginal costs of abatement, and the efficiency of
their abatement technologies?
We find some answers to these questions in a simple model of the world economy
(introduced in Chichilnisky [4]) consisting of a finite number of countries2. Each
country has a utility function which depends on the consumption of a public good
and of a private good, such as income. The production of private good emits carbon
dioxide as a by-product, and in each country the private good can be transformed
into the public good through an abatement technology.
We show that Pareto efficiency dictates that the marginal cost of abatement in
each country must be inversely related to that country's marginal valuation for the
private good (Proposition 1). In particular, it is not generally true that Pareto optimality requires that marginal abatement costs be equated across countries: this is true
only if marginal utilities of income are equated across countries, either by assumption
or by lump sum transfers across countries. If richer countries have a lower marginal
valuation of the private good, then at a Pareto efficient allocation, they should have a
larger marginal cost of abatement than the lower income countries. With diminishing
returns to abatement, this implies that they should push abatement further.
There is a presumption in the literature that efficiency requires equalization of
1
2
There is more detail in Chichilnisky [2] [3] [4], and Chichilnisky and Heal [5]
It is, in fact, consistent with that of Baumol and Oates [1], Chapter 4.
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
3
marginal abatement costs: this presumption underlies proposals for the use of uniform carbon taxes and tradeable carbon emission permits (Weyant [9], Coppel [6]).
However, in view of the public good nature of the atmosphere and the fact that carbon emissions are produced in a decentralized fashion, efficiency will not in general
require the equalization of marginal costs of abatement across countries without lump
sum transfers.
In a two-country example we show that, at an efficient allocation, the quantity
of income allocated by a country to abatement is inversely proportional to the level
of income—or consumption—of that country, with the constant of proportionality
increasing with the efficiency of the country's abatement technology (Proposition 2).
The equalization of marginal costs would be necessary for Pareto efficiency if
the goods under consideration were private goods. But in our case we are dealing
with a public good, i.e. one which, by definition, is consumed by all in the same
quantity: the atmospheric CO2 concentration. This public good is "produced" by the
CO2 emissions (or by the abatement of these emissions) of a finite number of large
agents, namely the countries. In this sense, it differs from the classical treatments of
Lindahl and Bowen, which were extended subsequently by Samuelson, see Atkinson
and Stiglitz, p. 489, footnote 3, [8]. In those cases the public good is produced by a
single agent, as is the case for a law and order or defense.
2.
PARETO EFFICIENT ABATEMENT STRATEGIES
Consider a world economy with N countries, N > 2, indexed by n = 1,...,N. Each
country has a utility function un which depends on its consumption of private goods
c n , and on the quality of the world's atmosphere, a, which is a public good. Formally,
un(cn,a) measures welfare, where un : R2 —>• R is a continuous, concave function
and dunldcn > 0, dun/da > 0. The quality of the atmosphere, a, is measured by for
example the reciprocal or the negative of its concentration of CO2. The concentration
of CO2 is "produced" by emissions of carbon, which are positively associated with
the levels of consumption of private goods, c n ,: i.e.
N
a = ^2<in where an = $ n (c n ), for each country n = 1,..., N, $'n < OVn.
(1)
n=l
a is a measure of atmospheric quality overall, and an is an index of the abatement
carried out by country n. The "production functions" $ n are continuous, and show
the level of abatement or quality of the atmosphere decreasing with the output of
consumption. An allocation of consumption and abatement across all countries is a
vector
(c1,ai,...,cN,aN)
€ R2N'.
An allocation is called feasible if it satisfies the constraint (1). A feasible allocation
(ci,a\,..., c*N, ax*) is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible solution at which
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
4
every country's utility is at least as high, and one's utility is strictly higher, than at
(c?,a*,...,c^,a;v*).
A Pareto efficient allocation must maximize a weighted sum of utility functions
N
W(ci,...,Cn,a) =
n=l
with Yin ^n = 1 subject to feasibility constraints. Varying the Ans, one traces out all
possible Pareto efficient allocations. The Xns are of course exogenously given welfare
weights, and a standard set of weights is An = 1/N for all n. We are assuming in
this formulation that utilities are comparable across countries. This means that we
cannot change the units of measurement of utility in any country without making
similar changes in other countries. Each country n faces a constraint in terms of
allocating total endowments into either consumption cn or atmospheric quality, an,
represented by the function $ n . Then a Pareto efficient allocation is described by a
solution to the problem:
N
Max W(cu ..., cn, a) = ]T Anun(cn, a),
(2)
71=1
N
subject to an = <I>n(cn), n — 1...N and a = ^ an.
(3)
n=l
Note that, by definition, the marginal cost of abatement is the inverse of the marginal
productivity of the function $ n :
MCn(an) = -I/KM
(4)
A Pareto efficient solution solves problem (2).
Proposition 1. At a Pareto efficient allocation (c^, a^,..., cj^-, a^v*), the marginal cost
of abatement in each country, MCn(a^), is inversely proportional to the marginal
valuation of the private good cn, \ndun/dcn. In particular, the marginal costs will be
equal across countries if and only if the marginal valuations of the private good are
equal, i.e., Xndun/dcn is independent of n.
Proof. . The solution to the maximization problem (2) must satisfy the first
order conditions:
N
n=l
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
5
for each country j = 1...N. Since at a Pareto efficient allocation the expression
(Yln=i Xndun/da) is the same constant for all countries, denoted K, and since, as
noted in (4)
we have that a Pareto efficient allocation is characterized by:
and the proposition follows. <0>
Proposition 1 shows that the product of the marginal valuation of private consumption and the marginal cost of abatement in terms of consumption, is equal across
countries. Writing this product Xjduj/dcj.dcj/da, we see that it can be interpreted
as the marginal cost of abatement in country j measured in utility terms, i.e. in terms
of its contribution to the social maximand ]Tn \wn( c ru a)- An immediate implication
is that in countries which place a high marginal valuation on consumption of the
private good, typically low income countries, the marginal cost of abatement at an
efficient allocation will be lower than in other countries. If we assume an increasing
marginal cost of abatement (diminishing returns to abatement), then this of course
implies lower levels of abatements in poor countries than in rich countries.
Under what conditions can we recover the "conventional wisdom" that marginal
abatement costs should be equalized across countries? We need to equate the terms
Xndun/dcn across countries. This could be dome by assumption: we can just decide
as a value judgment that is an input to the planning problem that consumption will
be valued equally on the margin in all countries. Given the enormous discrepancies
between the income levels in OECD countries and countries such as India and China,
and the need for all of them to be involved in an abatement program, such a value
judgment seems most unattractive. It is however implicitly done in simulation models
which seek to maximize world GNP or similar measures.
There is an alternative possibility. Modify the original problem to allow unrestricted transfers of private goods between countries:
Max W(cu c2, .c n ,.., a) = £ n A n u n (c n , a)
subject to an = $n(yn) and a = J2an and Y^Vn^T.Cn
. .
This is the same as before except that we now distinguish between the consumption
of the private good by country n, denoted c n , and the production of the private good
by country n, denoted yn. These need not be equal. In addition we now require
the sum of the consumptions across countries to equal the sum of the productions
" J2Vn = Z)c n , instead of having these equal on a country by country basis. By
this modification we are allowing the transfer of goods between countries, i.e., we are
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
6
allowing lump sum transfers. Note that this is not a model of international trade,
which would require the imposition of balance of trade constraints. Clearly the first
order conditions now are just
An
&f =uVn
tf
(6)
(7)
Set K = £ 9-?fc. Hence from (6) and (7) we get
K9-^ = -KK
as before. However, we now have an extra condition (6)- namely ^n^*
Substituting this into (8) gives
v = -$'nK
(8)
= v Vrz.
which of course implies that physical marginal cost is the same across all countries,
as v and K are common to all countries. So if we solve an optimization problem that
allows unrestricted transfers between countries, and we make the transfers that are
needed to solve this problem, it will then be efficient to equate marginal abatement
costs.
Consider now the case of two countries, each with a Cobb- Douglas utility function,
un(cn,a) = can{af-a = c«( a i + a 2 ) 1 " a ,
where the abatement production function $ n is
an = $n(cn) = K{Yn - c n ) 1 / 2 , kn > 0, for n = 1,2,
for example, k\ = k and A?2 = 1. This allows us to accommodate potentially different efficiencies of abatement across countries. For simplicity, the two countries are
assumed to have the same utility function. In this case:
Proposition 2. At a Pareto efficient allocation, the fraction of income which each
country allocates to carbon emission abatement must be proportional to that country's income level, and the constant of proportionality increases with the efficiency of
the country's abatement technology.
Who should abate carbon emissions?
Proof. .
An international viewpoint
Our problem (2) can now be written as:
MaxCuC2 W(ci,c2) =
1 2
Max [cf [hp! - d) / + (Y2 - c,) 1 / 2 ] 1 " + c? [k^ - d ) 1 ^ + (Y2 Let
The first order conditions for a maximum are then:
aca-i Ai-a
and
_ ii2(Yx - ci)-1/2Ar {c«A~a(l - a) + cj(l - c*)A"a} = 0
j " 1 A1"" - 1/2(Y2 - c 2 )" 1/2 {c?A-a{l - a) + c£(l - a)A" a } = 0,
which simplify to:
Since a < 1 this implies that for Pareto efficiency, the income allocated to abatement
by each country (an = Yn — cn, n = 1,2) must be proportional to the income level,
or the level of consumption, of the country (cn). Furthermore the larger is the abatement productivity of a country (k = &i), the larger is its abatement allocation as a
proportion of income. 0
3.
ABATEMENT COSTS, TAXES AND EMISSION PERMITS
While the atmosphere is a classic public good in terms of consumption, it is produced in a decentralized way, and the first order conditions for efficient allocation
and provision of this "good" are different from the classical ones and closer to those
characteristic of a general externality, as modeled in Heal [7].
Once the optimal consumption/abatement levels in each country are found, then
quotas on emissions could be assigned to each country on the basis of these levels, and
permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across countries on
the basis of these quotas. A system of permits for carbon emissions has of course been
contemplated for some time, but as far as we know, the country-by-country quotas for
these permits have not been connected to the optimality conditions for the allocation
of public goods produced in a decentralized way. It would be desirable to ascertain
what form of market organization for the permit market would be required in order
to reach efficiency. For example, would it involve uniform pricing as in a competitive
market, or rather personalized prices as in a Lindahl equilibrium? This should be a
subject for further research.
Who should abate carbon emissions?
An international viewpoint
8
REFERENCES
[1] Baumol, W.J. and W. Oates, (1977 and 1988) The Theory of Environmental
Policy, Cambridge University Press.
[2] Chichilnisky, G. (1993) "North-South Trade and the Dynamics of Renewable Resources", Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Oxford University Press,
to appear.
[3] Chichilnisky, G. (1992) "Global Environment and North-South Trade" Technical
Report No. 31,Stanford Institute of Theoretical Economics, Stanford University,
Stanford California 93405.
[4] Chichilnisky, G. (1993)"The Abatement of Carbon Emissions in Industrial and
Developing Countries", The International Conference on the Economics of Climate
Change, OECD/IEA Paris, 14-16 June 1993.
[5] Chichilnisky, G. and G. M. Heal (1993) "Global Environmental Risks" Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Symposium on Global Climate Change, in press.
[6] Coppel, J.(1993) "Implementing a Global Abatement Policy: Some Selected
Issues", The International Conference on the Economics of Climate Change,
OECD/IEA Paris 14-16 June 1993.
[7] Heal, G. (1990) "Economy and Climate: A preliminary Framework for Microeconomic Analysis" Agricultural Management and Economics: Commodity and Resource Policies in Agricultural Systems, (eds. R. Just and N. Bockstael), Springer
Verlag, 1990.
[8] Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz, J. (1980) Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw
Hill.
[9] Weyant, J. (1993) "Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions: An Overview"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Symposium on Global Climate Change, in
press.
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Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search
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Do Vehicle Emissions Testing Program Improve Air Quality?
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612. Irreversible Choice of Uncertain Technologies with Network Externalities
Jay Pil Choi
613. The Real Exchange Rate and U.S. Manufacturing Profits: A Theoretical framework
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614. Co integration. Aggregate Consumption, and the Demand for Imports: A structural
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615. Projecting the Number of New AIDS Cases in the U.S.
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617. Financial Innovation and Endogenous Uncertainty in Incomplete Asset Markets
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644 North-South Trade and the Dynamics of Renewable Resources
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645. Global Environmental Risks
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