DIANE B. OBENCHAIN
INTRODUCTION
FENG YOULAN’S WORK OF A CENTURY
Diane B. Obenchain, Editor and Translator
Part One: Openings
Many working in the field of Chinese philosophy today began by
tracking with Feng Youlan’ through his well-known two-volume A
Histoly of Chinese Philosophy, published in Chinese in 1930 and 1934
and in English in 1952-3.2 For greater audiences o f Chinese and nonChinese alike, Feng’s A History of Chinese Philosophy opened doors and
windows into the walled-in heritage of Chinese philosophical thought that
had been accessed by privileged few for most of the Middle Kingdom’s
three-thousand years of recorded history. Being one of few sources of
its kind,3 particularly in English, it was along with Feng Youlan, as he
penetrated through the issues of Chinese philosophical thought for himself
in these volumes, that those keen to learn more of China’s philosophical
past began their engagement in the long, ceasless hard work of penetrating
through Chinese philosophy for themselves as well. And, having in time
moved on to first-hand, direct study of the Chinese primary sources Feng
Youlan himself had used, many, who continue to track the path of
Chinese philosophy today, keep a copy of Feng’s work near t o hand, an
honest and reliable friend on the way.
This action in itself gives great tribute to one whom many assess as
the greatest philosophical thinker of the Chinese twentieth century.
On November 26, 1990, Professor Feng Youlan passed on at almost
the age of ninety-five. Many had already made travel arrangements to
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 21 (1 994) i-cxii
Copyright 0 1994 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu,Hawaii, U.S.A.
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attend an “International Seminar on the Thought of Feng Youlan” to be
held in Beijing during the first week of December, at which time we
planned to celebrate with him his ninety-fifth birthday on December 4.
Most carried through with those plans once the news of his passing was
known:
we came together to commemorate a lifetime of contribution
to China, to the Chinese people.
Feng’s ninety-five years spanned the whole of the great organismicshaking of China’s twentieth century that cried out, and, indeed, at times
seemed utterly destined, to change everything, from start to finish, to wipe
the slate clean, to begin again. Considerable transposing in the expression
of Feng’s own views there has been as he, alongside others, was taken up
into the upheaval and through it endeavored to discern and to track the
way of Chinese philosophical thinking down through the ages while at
the same time to step forth into a “future ~ n k n o w n . ” ~
As the twentieth century gathered momentum, more voices around
the world from West Asian deserts, to the iiio tempore river’s edge of the
Ganges, to China’s Mount Tai, have added volume to an initially
dischordant but increasingly appreciated two-part harmony of “change
what must be changed, but hold on to what is true.” It is a strain we hear
not only in the Middle East, in India, in China, but, indeed, all over the
world, in North and South America, in Europe, in Africa - everywhere.
As China, along with others, carries on with new variations of its continuing song, we have been priviledged to come alongside and listen to
the piping of one of its transmitters, Feng Youlan, who, along with important others, gave himself to the responsibility, the calling (ming),of
handing down to generations yet to come China’s distinct melody: retuning it to harmonize with new melodies coming from abroad, while yet
not abandoning the old instruments.
This small collection of papers here presented in tribute to Professor
Feng Youlan does not attempt to explain and to interpret in detail the
whole of Feng’s subtle and multi-faceted thinkmg nor those events, particularly political, that pressed upon his life and thought. Analysis, whole
and fine, of the times and philosophy of Feng Youlan will surely engage
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the lifetime work of more than one scholar.’ To such efforts perhaps
this small collection of translated philosophical essays from the commemorative conference within days of Feng’s passing may serve as a resource
of collected vision for investigating and assessing Feng Youlan’s contributions to Chinese philosophy as well as to contemporary world philosophy. In addition, having gathered with others during the first week of
December 1990 to attend the “International Seminar on the Thought of
Feng Youlan,” one’s purpose here is also to share with those who were
not able to attend the moment of Feng’s passing and what it meant at
the time to his colleagues, family, and friends.
The mood of the “International Seminar on the Thought of Feng
Youlan” was complex. On the one hand, there were the reverential li
(ceremonial rites) of mourning and gratitude. On the other hand, there
were the often times heated and intense debates about what Feng Youlan
actually said, what he truly meant, and what difference it all makes to
the direction Chinese philosophy is going now. In presenting images and
sounds from both sets of events, this Editor and translator seeks to let
voices of others do most of the talking. This is to emphasize that
Professor Feng’s life and work, significantly and differently, touched
many.
A documentary film began the conference on the morning of
December 4 . Professor Feng is present throughout the film and for those
who knew him, it was warming to see him still thinking, exploring,
expounding.6 The film in part presents author Zong Pu,’ Feng Youlan’s
daughter, narrating poignent moments with her father. Zong Pu was with
her father through the end of his days at Beijing University. With this
palpable closeness to Professor Feng in heart-mind, we moved from the
film presented during the opening ceremonies in the morning to the
“ggaobie (saying goodbye)” ceremonies which took place in the afternoon.
A translation of excerpts of the documentary film and a remembrance of the ‘kaobie” ceremonies as recalled through the eyes of Mr.
Thanh Van Tran comprise “Section One: Perspectives” of this volume. In
addition, Mr. Thanh in his essay reviews main issues spanning seven
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decades of Feng’s philosophical work and takes one into the heart of what
matters in Feng’s philosophy.
In so doing, Mr. Thanh offers further
orientation to what follows in this volume.
The second and third days of the conference were given to plenary
and small group discussions of papers. The papers delivered in plenary
session “put on the board,” as it were, the topics and range of subject
matter which were taken up in small group discussion. The papers offered
in this volume are a selection of papers from both plenary and small
discussion sessions.
The papers are largely those of members of the
International Academy of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo Wenhua Shuyuan)’
which, along with some participation by members of the Chinese Confucius Society, sponsored the c ~ n f e r e n c e . Translations
~
of the papers and
of the documentary film are those of the Editor who takes responsibility
for any misrepresentation contained therein.”
Translation of papers in this volume is intended for readers of Feng
Youlan’s work in both English and Chinese. Translation of papers herein
is also to assist those starting in the field of Chinese philosophy as well as
to provide further depth of detail for’those advanced in the field. Because
Feng’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, whether in long or short version,
is one work with which Western students often begin their study of
Chinese philosophy or, at least, is one work to which students turn frequently for reference, undergraduates and graduates engaged in the study
of Chinese philosophy in English may find these translations helpful as
a kind of companion volume, lending perspective to and critique of Feng’s
thinking.
Given the range of readers to whom this translation is addressed
and given the range of issues to which Feng Youlan’s philosophy gives
expression, we have thought it helpful to provide an Introduction that is
more detailed than is the usual case with collected papers of a conference.
As a collection of translated papers, with an effort to be consistent in
use of translated Enghsh terms throughout the volume, in this Introduction we seek to introduce not only the conference and overall concerns
of this volume (Part One), significant events in the life of Feng Youlan
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and the essays of the conference as they speak to these events (Part Two),
but also the method of translation which we have used and reasons for
specific choices in English of terms which can convey consistently the
subtlety of both Feng Youlan’s thinking and his critics (Part Three).
One problem in translation work of this kind is that Chinese-English
dictionaries or dictionaries between any two languages are, in practice,
matching manuals. Each term of any language is shaped and colored by
its relationship with other terms in that language, with the whole of a
language being structured by certain principled discernments of the world,
on the part of a group of people speaking that language. Expression of
these principled discernments changes over time as individual persons see
more in and add more to the terms of a language. Hence, one word in
one language rarely, if ever, means exactly what it is matched with in
another language. Matchings of meanings may come very close or they
may not. Some matching may be literal; some may be notional.
A second problem in translation work of this kind is that, on the one
hand, Chinese philosophical terms are used most often with traditional
and customary Chinese meanings and patterns. On the other hand, these
same Chinese terms are increasingly used to translate into Chinese certain
prominent Western philosophical notions. Deciding between these two
types of usage when translating from Chinese into English often becomes
subtly complex and difficult, especially when working with twentieth
century thinkers such as Feng Youlan, who was extremely well-read in
both Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy.
We introduce two examples of these two translation problems here.
These examples and others will be explored further in Part Three of this
Introduction.
First, Chinese li has been matched with English “pattern,” when
a more visual image of its meaning is preferred, and with English
‘principle,” when a more abstract. sense of its meaning is preferred.“
We have put both together in our usual rendering of the matclung as
“li (pattern, principle). Going the other way round, that is, when translating some English or Western philosophical terms into Chinese, it has
”
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become standard t o use Chinese li in the matching process. For example,
English “rational” is rendered in Chinese as lixing de, meaning literally
in Chinese ‘%-natured.”
English “reasonable” is rendered as lizfzi d e ,
meaning literally in Chinese “of the wisdom of li.” English “idea” is
matched with Chinese linian, literally “recitation of li. ” English “theory”
is Chinese lilun, literally “discussion of li.” All of these matches from
English t o Chinese build upon a , perhaps, unconscious yet fundamentally
assumed, match between Plato’s “idea” or Aristotle’s “eidos” (form)
and Chinese li, from which all the other matches just listed are derived.
Feng Youlan himself assumed and, indeed, argued for this very fundamental match.
A problem arises, however, when one who is thinking and writing
in Chinese wants t o question whether this match of Plato’s idea and
Chinese li is as close as philosophers have assumed. How is one going to
talk about the problem in Chinese? What vocabulary will one use? For
example, if, in Chinese, one asks whether li is rational, given the EnglishChinese match between “rational” and lixing, one ends up asking whether
li is living de. Literally, this is t o ask whether li is “li-natured,” which,
to say the least, is redundant! The same is true when asking in Chinese
whether Z
i is reasonable: one ends up asking whether ti is lizhide, which is
literally to ask if li is “of the wisdom of li. ” So also with the fundamental
match of li and “idea”:
one ends up asking in Chinese whether li is
“recitation o f li” (linian). In other words, in these and other examples of
English philosophical terms matched with Chinese terms using Ii, if we
want t o question the match between li and “idea,” it is difficult to d o so
in contemporary Chinese without using Chinese terms which assume the
very match which we wish to question. In the end, we are not able t o ask
anything o f what we want to ask comparatively.
The problem seems not to occur as often the other way round, that
is. when using Western or English terms t o translate Chinese terms,
although occur the problem does, as we shall see when we turn to our
second example below. In recent times, good effort has been made not
to substitute, or at least not so patly, one Western philosophical term for
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one Chinese philosophical term. Instead, having made careful linguistic
as well as philosophical exploration of a Chinese philosophical term,
English romanization of the Chinese term is offered first, followed by one
or more suggested English matches put in parentheses next to it. This
method allows the Chinese term to speak, as much as possible. on its
own rather than through and, possibly distorted by, English substitutes
for it. It is this method which we endeavor to employ throughout this
voIume.12
Of course, Chinese philosophers will say that they know very well
when an instance of Chinese li in combination with another Chinese term
is a Chinese fabricated term for translating English “rational” or English
“reasonable” and that they do not ever take the fabricated term literally.
As true as this may be, still this practice does allow for some casual
glossing over assumed matches between terms that many today want to
re-explore. Is Chinese li a thorough-going or complete match for Western
‘idea” or vice versa? Where are the similarities? Where are the
differences? Getting at these similarities and differences while thinking
and writing in Chinese may well require a new Chinese approach to
handling Western terms, so as to avoid unexplored assumptions
confounding the very investigation one wants to make.
This same problem comes up even more subtly in the translation
of Chinese ‘jxx.i’’ meaning literally “to have” or “having,” which is
not a fabricated Chinese term but which, nonetheless, is used to translate,
indeed, “Jubstitute for,” Western philosophical notions of “there exists/
there is,” “existence,” and “Being.” Again, like Chinese li (pattern,
principle), Chinese you (have, having) has its own philosophical meaning
or meanings long within the Chinese philosophical tradition. While traditional Chinese meanings and uses of Chinese you sometimes match with
English “there exists/there is,” “existence,” and “Being,” significantly,
they often do not. Additionally, in Western philosophical thinking,
“existence” and “Being” are often conceived quite differently, sometimes
oppositely, and, yet, the same Chinese term you is used for translating
both.
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When Chinese you is used in more complex Chinese fabricated terms
wluch translate Western philosophical notions into Chinese, then, the task
of translating from Chinese back into English is straightforward. On the
other hand, when Chineseyou is used alone, it is only very careful discern ing and thinking as much as possible as a Chinese person would that allows
one to make accurate judgment as to whether an instance of Chinese
y o u follows traditional Chinese usage or is a Chinese translation for a
Western philosophical term -and in the latter case, t o make additional
accurate judgment as t o which Western term is intended. Here, also, we
would suggest that a new method of rendering Western philosophical terms
into Chinese, which does not simply substitute Chinese terms for Western
ones, is needed. Without such a new method, it becomes very difficult
to explore conzparurively in what ways Chinese you is similar to English
“existence” or “Being” and in what ways it is different. This question is
very important to evaluating Feng Youlan’s philosophical work as will
be seen in the essays of this volume.
Translation of papers of this volume proceeded fairly easily, using
customary matching of Chinese you with English “ t o exist,” until the
articulate essay of Professor Chen h i simply forced an entire re-thinking
of, and eventual rejection of, this customary niatching. After several
translation efforts, I found that if I translated Chinese y o u with English
“exist” or “there exists/there is,” I could not bring together into one
English conversation (as Professor Chen was doing in Chinese) both Feng
Youlan’s use of you and traditional Chinese philosophy’s use of you.
Thus began some rather serious and lengthy exploration of what a t
root is the problem. Having located at least one source of the problem,
solving the problem required more literal and consistent rendering of
Chinese you into English as “to have” rather than “to exist,” even though
Feng Youlan himself states that Chinese ‘you” is Chinese “cunzai”
( e ~ i s t ) . ’ ~As will be set forth in detail in Part Three of this Introduction,
Feng’s use of Chinese you is traditional enough in linguistic pattern and
meaning to enable a literal translation of you as “to have” or “having”
in English for his writings as well as for those of other authors of this
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volume. This one consistent, more literal translation of Chinese you as
“to have” or “having” in all essays in this volume, not only has allowed
Feng and his critics to talk with one another in English, but also, it has
allowed for that conversation to be exacting and make sense.
Adopting this solution, however, meant re-translation of each of the
other essays in this volume using the new more literal approach to Chinese
you. Initially, a reader of English may find a more literal translation of
Chinese you as to “to have” or “having” somewhat less fluid. But our
purpose here is not poetry, but rather precise, detailed philosophical
discernment and discussion which cannot make the same demands on
fluidity of translation as literature does neither can science for that
matter.
One hopes that the reader will find, as the Editor has, that a more
literal and exact rendering of Chinese you into English offers increased
insight into aspects of Chinese thinking not usually open to Western view.
In fact, the Editor has found that questions uniquely posed in Chinese
metaphysics suddenly appear lucidly in English translation when previous
customary or notional substitutions of Western philosophical terms for
Chinese philosophical terms tended to obscure more than they revealed.
Importantly, use of more literal translation of Chinese you as “to have”
or “having” has been far more efficient in that one has needed far less
explanatory annotation in Endnotes to each paper.
Solving these translation problems concerning Chinese you and li
is essential to any translation of Feng Youlan’s philosophical work and the
work of those analyzing Feng Youlan’s philosophy. Put simply, while
a bridge encouraging initial inter-cultural exploration has already been
built by customary substituting of some Western terms for Chinese terms
and the other way round, the time appears to have come for a re-examination of these customary matchings or substitutions and for a more
exacting method of communicating ideas from one language to another
that allows deeper, comparative questions to be asked. If we do not
continually seek greater precision in this regard, we shall ever be at risk
of discussing Western philosophy while thinking we are discussing Chinese
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philosophy.
In this volume, then, we have tried to enable Chinese thinking to
speak literally in English as much as possible. The philosophy and writing
of Feng Youlan, who thought and worked in both English and Chinese,
demand this. Translations in this volume are the result of many drafts
and revisions of drafts. I leave the reader to decide whether or t o what
extent these efforts at more literal translation of Chinese philosophical
thinking succeed.
To address these and other problems of translation in a manner
helpful t o the reader, the Editor offers the following forms of assistance.
First, specifies of the solution which has worked for this volume in
translating Chinese you more literally as “to have” or “having” rather than
English “there existslthere is,” “existence,” or “Being” are detailed in
Part Three of this Introduction. Those with strength of heart-mind
enough to work through Part Three, having there explored semantic and
syntactic constructions of Chinese you (have, having),
Z Q ~(is
[present]
in), cunzai (exist, existence) and wu (not have, not having), will find
rewarding the last sub-section on translating specific terms of Feng’s
thinking. Those desiring simply a list of Feng’s terms and this volume’s
translation of them will find such a list in the last sub-section of Part
Three.
Second, while working in grammatical English, the Editor has sought
to preserve, when possible, Chinese word order in English,
Third, we present both English translation and Chinese pinyin
romanization for significant terms under discussion. The usual pattern
is to offer English translation first, followed by pinyin romanization in
parentheses. However, we invert this order to Chinese followed by English
in parentheses or no English at all in three cases:
1.
when discussing the four central terms of Feng’s New Lixue
system: li (pattern, principle), qi (energy-matter), daoti (embodiment of dno [Way] ), and d~quan(great whole);
2. when our concern or attention is with the Chinese term or
expression itself;
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3 . when a Chinese term is used repeatedly in discussion such that
English translation is no longer necessary.
With this combined approach, it is hoped that the reader of English or
Chinesq or one beginning study of Chinese will be able to track with
precision the matching of certain Chinese terms with English terms.
Fourth, for readers of Chinese, a Glossary of Chinese terms used
frequently in this volume is presented at the end of the volume. Romanization of Chinese terms together with Chinese characters appear in alphabetical order.
Fifth, when questions of translation do arise, to clarify an author’s
intention, the Editor has offered in the text and in the Endnotes some
annotated explanation of terms put in brackets [
1.
The author of each paper is responsible for the Endnotes of the
paper.
In some cases, following Chinese academic custom, Endnotes
were submitted in a much abbreviated form and needed considerable
amplification for publication in English. To assist with this, the Editor
returned to Beijing University to discuss and complete notes with each
author. Nonetheless, some notes still remained for the Editor to work
out and to provide additiorial information. Additional material in the
translated text and Endnotes that has been provided by the Editor is set
off with brackets [ ] to indicate clearly where the Editor is responsible
for information so that no misrepresentation of an author is made. In the
Endnotes, titles of Feng Youlan’s writings appear without mention of
Feng Youian as author.
A Selected Bibliography of works mentioned in the papers and in
the Endnotes may be found at the end of the volume. Within this Selected
Bibliography, works of Feng Youlan are listed separately according to
collection and date of publication. Assistance with dates, titles, publishers
and translations of Feng Youlan’s writings has come from a Bibliography
prepared for the “International Seminar on the Thought of Feng Youlan”
by Cai Zhongde, the husband of Zong Pu, Feng Youlan’s daughter. He is
currently preparing a complete bibliography of 400,000 characters,
including all of Feng’s published and lesser known writings.
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Compiling, editing and translating for a volume such as this involves
many unforeseen tasks. The Editor made two trips back t o Beijing during
the summers of 1992 and 1993 for these purposes. She wishes to thank
Feng Zong Pu whose hospitality and helpfulness on both occasions are
gratefully remembered and appreciated. During the most recent visit, the
Editor remembers sitting in the Feng living room with Professor TU
Y ~ u g u a n g , ’General
~
Editor of Feng’s Sunsongrung Quunji (The Collected
Works at the Hall o f Three Pines), and Professor Tu’s student John Flower,
a Ph.D. candidate from the University of Virginia, who has lived and done
research in the Chengdu region for several years, as we carefully went over
Professor Tu’s essay for this volume. One sensed Professor Feng sitting
across the table in his usual chair. The work continued o n into twilight
as Feng’s great library of old, traditionally bound books along the walls
receded into darkness. As though from far in the distance, the sound of
Zong Pu’s dot-matrix printer in an adjoining room wafted t o our attention.
The inevitable new infusing the old.
It was fitting, although altogether unplanned, that o n my final day
in Beijing this past September, with all tasks completed and most
questions, at least for the moment, answered, I returned to the Feng
family home.
Zong Pu in her gracious manner responded t o my last
queries and notes and then, as a final blessing, invited us” t o the last
room, around the inner quadrangle, along the old wooden floors, at the
back of the Feng family home.
There a family shrine was laid with
pictures of Feng and his wife illumined in soft light. Around the room
o n all sides were Feng’s original writings. High on one of the wood-andglass bookcases were two worn leather suitchases -those which Feng had
carried to Columbia University on his first trip from China in 1919?
Quietly I was left for a final moment of recollection and silence. Then we
were gone through the garden of Three Pines, leaving the gate open.
Part Two: The Essays
Papers of this volume are arrayed into sections according t o questions
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and issues discussed as well as to significant developmental moments
in Feng Youlan’s thinking over time. Section One entitled ”Perspectives”
presents a translation of the documentary film and Mr. Thanh’s
remembrance of the gaobie (goodbye) ceremonies along with his review of
main issues and debates of the conference. Section Two entitled
“Questions of Culture and Epistemology (1 920s-1930s)” considers Feng
Youlan’s contributions to Chinese intellectual debate on Chinese and
Western culture and pertinent epistemological problems therein. Section
Three entitled simply “New L i m e (1 940s)” settles into thorough-going
presentation, analysis, and assessment of Feng Youlan’s deeply and
broadly conceived “New Lime” philosophical system. Section Four
entitled ‘Marxist-Maoist Themes (1 950s-1980s)” considers Feng’s
enduring post- 1949 philosophical responses to and conversation with
Marxists and Mao Zedong. Section Five entitled “Alternatives (1980s1990s and beyond)” presents work of those who, while standing on the
shoulders of Feng Youlan and others, take considerable leave from Feng’s
kind of philosophical effort to engage in philosophy of quite different
kinds.
As regards Section Two, it may be of assistance to those new to
Chinese philosophy and China’s recent history to provide here a brief
synopsis of events involved in and beyond May 4 , 1919, during which
renewed debated about Chinese and Western culture took place. Background and context offered here by the Editor should not be construed in
any way as representing the views of the three authors whose papers
comprise Section Two.
The May Fourth period or movement is named after a May 4, 1919
incident, when students, numbering in thousands from several universities,
marched to Tiananmen (Gate of Heavenly Peace) to protest an agreement
within the Versailles Peace Treaty ending World War I. According to this
agreement, the province of Shandong was to be transferred from German
hands to Japanese hands. Although China had contributed t o the Allied
cause, the warlord Chinese government needed Japanese support for its
own survival. Students, feeling a kind of national humiliation in being
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handed from one colonial power to another, marched to Tiananmen to
pressure Chinese leaders to reject the transfer, which, in the end, did take
place. As events pressed on, some students marched t o the residences of
President Cao Rulin and Zhang Zongxiang, burning down Cao’s house
and beating u p Zhang. Thus began a many-faceted period of “awakening”
bearing the name ‘May Foruth” which lasted well into three decades and
continues to influence events in China today.I6
The best of Chinese intellectual criticism took part in the May
Fourth movement using every genre:
politics, journalism, and more.
exactly the same.“
literature. history, philosophy,
Views were many with no two voices
At root, it was a movement against foreign imperi-
alism and internal corruption among China’s leaders, but within it
developed another movement, the “New Culture” movement, which
sought a release from decaying remains of traditional Chinese culture,
particularly Ru (Confucian) culture, and a life-giving transfusion from
Western ideas, particularly science and democracy. A new, wakeful awareness of the May Fourth period solidified into valuing the people, valuing
the individual, and valuing the nation.”
Many intellectuals who had studied traditionally in China and later
studied abroad, either in the West (the United States or Western Europe)
or in Japan, heralded these aspirations with a view to the effect that China
is weak in culture and the West is strong; therefore, China should abandon
its own heritage (if not all of it, then most of it) and learn from the West.
Within these efforts to comprehend better China’s current weakness and
the West’s current strengths, came the formation of a Chinese Communist
Party in 1920-1,I9 which, over the next three decades, would promote
a Marxist ideology, both in theory and practice, that, through brilliant
campaign and strategy of its own and through political failures of others,
would overthrow the old and install a revolutionary new approach to
government in 1949 with the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
As turbulent political changes from 1919-1949 took place, another more
subtle shift was taking place as well: multi-voiced analytic sorting through
Chinese traditional culture alongside critical sorting through Western
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culture was reluctantly, perhaps, unintentionally abandoned. In its place
single-voiced allegiance to Marxism and, later, Maoism, took both assent
and ascent.”
In the early 192Os, however, times had been different as hard work
in sorting through strengths and weaknesses of Chinese culture and
Western culture carried forward earlier efforts of Yan Fu (1853-1921),
Kang Youwei (1858-1927), Tan Sitong (1965-1898), Zhang Binglin
(1869-1935) and Liu Shipei (1884-1919) among others.” This multivoiced, explorative approach engaged a diversity of views including that of
Liang Shuming (1893-1988), a young instructor of Indian philosophy at
Beijing University, who, in complete sympathy with students of the May
4 demonstrations, nonetheless, was not ready to abandon Chinese culture
a n d , instead, worked to conserve what, in his view, was the best of China’s
cumulative heritage. It was Liang Shuming in 1921 who re-focused the
culture question or “cultures controversy” in a series of lectures entitled
“Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies” (Dong Xi Wenhua
ji Qi Zhexue), which in their published form (Shanghai, 1922), made
Liang nationally known as a defender of the Chinese Ru (Confucian)
tradition?’
To these many-voiced discussions and explorations seeking to find
and to ponder carefully what Chinese culture has in fullness and what it
lacks -complex work, to which elder and younger Chinese scholars have
been able to return in the last fifteen years wherein deeper, more enduring
answers may yet be found - Feng Youlan, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia
University, added his own developing reflections and essays. It is Feng
Youlan’s early and maturing views on Chinese and Western culture and the
epistemological questions which debates on culture raised that Professors
Li Zhonghua, Wang Shouchang, and Tang Yijie outline and assess in their
essays.
Professor Li Zhonghua begins with an outline of three stages in the
development of Feng’s cultural views. Initially, Feng, along with others
of the 1920s “new culture” movement, worked from what was known on
the surface level of cultural differences to the effect that the West was
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characterized as “outward directed” and China was characterized as
“inward directed.” Then Feng moved more towards examining what
Western and Chinese culture share in common. In the 1930s. in a third
phase of his understanding, Feng found difference between Chinese and
Western culture to be a difference of medieval and modern times.
Refining this view, Feng described the difference between medieval and
modern as a difference of “methods of production.” (This discernment
would link well with Marxist and Maoist views on forces of production,
which later carried the day in China).
By locating the difference of
culture in methods of production, China’s way forward into renewed
cultural strength was made plain.
Professor Wang Shouchang continues this discussion of Feng
Youlan’s views on Chinese and Western culture by offering an overview
specifically of Feng’s adoption of ideas and methods of two major schools
of modern Western philosophy: New Realism and the Vienna Circle.
New Realism enabled Feng to find a connection between his developing,
Western influenced ways of thinking, while studying at Columbia University, and the tradition of Song-Ming Lixue. Then the methods of logical
positivism, advocated by the Vienna Circle, moved Feng to re-establish
Chinese metaphysics on more logically constructed epistemological
ground. Feng did so by following strictly the Vienna Circle’s methods of
logical analysis. However, to correct what Feng perceived as a one-sidedness of the Western positivist approach, Feng added the Chinese intuitive,
experiential approach to his system of thought as well.
Professor Tang Yijie takes this discussion of Chinese and Western
culture yet further with his insightful exploration of epistemology in
Feng Youlan’s work Xin Zhi Yon (A New Treatise on the Methodology of
Metaphysics). As no traditional Chinese philosophy had developed its own
system of epistemology, Feng’s plan in Xin Zhi Yan is quite clearly to
survey the history of Western methodological use of epistemology to
establish philosophical systems. Then, using analytic methods of New
Realism and the Vienna Circle, Feng went on to generate his own new
metaphysics in Xin Lixue (New L i m e ) . Through formal analysis of
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events/things and existence, Feng attained four concepts: Zi (pattern,
principle), qi (energy-matter), duoti (embodiment of duo [Way] ), and
duquun (great whole). Using these four concepts, Feng set forth four sets
of propositions. To this positive method, Feng added what he called the
“negative method” of direct experience and recognition. With these
combined methods, Feng established an cpistemological foundation for
his “New Lixue” system and made his contribution towards resolving the
problem of epistemological theory in Chinese philosophy. Chinese philosophers contemporary with Feng Youlan (1 895-1990)-Xiong Shili (1 8851968), He Lin (1902-1990), Jin Yuelin (1895-1984), and Zhang Dongsun
(1886-1 962)-also made contributions towards resolving the same
problem. With these efforts, Chinese philosophers have addressed
questions raised by Western philosophy, while yet advancing strengths
a1ready within Chinese philosophy.
Section Three’s essays on Feng’s New L i m e as a philosophical
system are replete with detail as to historical circumstances and purposes
for which New Lixue as a metaphysical system was generated. Each essay’
sets forth the main themes and structure of Feng’s New Lixue system
followed by careful critique. About the circumstances and purposes of
his New Lixue, Feng Youlan himself has also written. In the last chapter
of his A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (written in English), Feng
recounts that his Zhongguo Zhexue Shi (A History of Chinese
Philosophy), completed in 1934, was translated into English with the first
volume being published in Peiping (Beijing) three months before the SinoJapanese War began in the summer of 1937.23 The purpose of that work,
as Feng affirms, was to apply Hunxue (Han study)% scholarly techniques,
as well as Western analytic methods, “to clarify the ideas of these philosophers [of the past] ” and “to tell us what the words of the philosophers
of the past actually meant to these [philosophers] themselves.” The
purpose of Feng’s history of philosophy, then, was not to tell us what he
thought the words of the philosophers ought to mean.25 Nonetheless,
as a philosopher himself, in “a process of development from the old to
the new,” Feng wanted to push the ideas of the philosophers of the
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past to their “logical conclusions in order to show their validity or absurdity.” This work now is “no longer the scholarly one of an historian,
but the creative one of a philosopher.” Hence, having finished his history,
Feng “immediately prepared for new work” just as the Sino-Japanese
War broke out.%
During the war (1 937-1945), Beijing University, Qinghua University
and Nankai University formed the Southwest Associated University which
was located for four months in Hengshan before moving farther southwest
to Kunming in the spring o f 1938. Feng remembers vividly the four
months in Hengshan, a time of national crisis, transposition, and also
inspiration, when Feng and his close colleagues, Tang Yongtong and Jin
Yuelin, each finished significant philosophical work.27 Feng’s work, Xin
Lirue, was the first in a series of six books he would call Zhen Yuan Liu
S h (Purity Descends. Primacy Ascends: Six Books),*’ all written during
the war. The collection presents what is known as Feng’s New Lixue
metaphysical system of thought, combining New Realism, Vienna Circle
logical analysis, and Cheng-Zhu Lixue. This was the crzative effort to
which he had aspired in the 1930s. the core of his philosophjcal contributions, and what many consider today as his highest achievement as a
contemporary world philosopher.
Elder among Chinese intellectuals today, Professor Zhang Dainian
opens this section on Feng’s New Lixue with a discerning historical assessment of Feng’s contributions over time. Professor Zhang analyses first
the meaning of Feng’s title for his Zhen Yuan Liu Shu, which when China
was coming into victory in the War of Resistance against the Japanese,
was a patriotic effort to put attention towards a new beginning. Then,
turning to Feng’s New Lixue system of thought contained in Zhen Yuan
Liu Sku, Professor Zhang lucidly presents:
1) Feng’s theory of “two
worlds,” namely, actuality and truth; 2) Feng’s four main concepts
inferred from four main propositions, namely, li (pattern, principle), qi
(energyinatter), daoti (embodiment of dao [Way]), and daquon (great
whole); and 3) Feng’s theory of “four realms,’’ namely, the realms of
spontaneity, utility, morality, and transcendence (Heaven and Earth).
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With the main concepts and structure of Feng’s New Lixue in hand,
Professor Zhang moves on to assess what was and what was not accomplished in Feng’s New Lixue. Zhang acknowledges first Feng’s fervent
love for his country and his hope for China’s people to rise again with
confidence upon victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. Second,
along with others, such as Xiong Shili and Jin Yuelin, Feng Youlan
endeavored to find some link between Chinese and Western philosophy.
Feng achieved this through linking what Professor Zhang calls the
“orthodox” schools of philosophy on both sides: Chinese Cheng-Zhu
L i m e and Western Platonic rationalism, both of which in recent times
have declined in prominence. Third, after liberation in 1949, Feng Youlan
along with others began to explore dialectical materalism and historical
materialism. Feng’s decision to move in this direction was selfchosen and
based in his search for truth.
Having made this decision, in the 1950s Feng Youlan wrote a series
of essays criticizing his own New Lixue system of philosophy. One aspect
of this self-criticism was an incisive look at the question of whether li
(pattern, principle) is prior to events/things or whether li is within events/
things. Whereas earlier Feng had expressed his discernment of li as u
priori, in his later years, Feng argued against a priorism and expressed his
discernment of li as li within events/things. Feng also criticized his theory
of spiritual realms stating that the realm of Heaven and Earth is formed
“out of thin air.” In Professor Zhang Dainian’s view both these selfcriticisms are profound in that they show forth Feng’s courage and
humility in his on-going search for truth. Professor Zhang further
commends Feng for his Zhongguo Zhexue Shi Xinbian (New Edition of
A History of Chinese Philosophy) which explores the development of
Chinese philosophy using Marxist methods. Feng’s aspiration was to
nourish the future of philosophy through this Marxist reconsideration
of Chinese philosophical history. Feng Youlan poured out all he had,
endeavoring to enable China’s old culture to be a source for China’s new
culture.
Professor Zhang closes with admiration for Feng Youlan’s
keeping pace with his times.
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Professor Azuma Juji’s essay takes us into exacting exploration of
the link Feng Youlan discerned between Cheng-Zhu Lixue and Platonic/
New Realism. Professor Azuma presents first the philosophical particulars
of Feng’s New Lixue and then goes on to investigate carefully its philosophical sources. Feng’s early philosophical development began with initial
interest in logic and traditional Chinese philosophy. Then Feng moved on
to Western philosophies of Henri Bergson, pragmaticism, and New
Realism. As an innovative movement at the beginning of the twentieth
century, New Realism took a firm stand against idealism and argued for
recognition of objective reality that does not depend upon a knower.
Further, what we know of reality presented in thought is not considered
“consciousness only” but, rather, objective reality itself before our eyes.
These two points would prove very important for Feng Youlan’s matching
of Cheng-Zhu Lixue with New Realism. Feng’s doctoral dissertation at
Columbia University in 1924 did not yet incorporate Feng’s engagement
with New Realist views, but his revision of his dissertation upon return to
China later that year did. Building upon initial linkages between ChengZhu Lixue and New Realism which Feng discerned in the 1920s, Feng
augmented and integrated these linkages into a complete system of New
Lixue presented in his Zhen Yuan Liu Shu of the 1940s.
Professor Azuma carefully lays out one-to-one parallels between
New Realist concepts and those of Feng Youlan. Turning first to Bertrand
Russell’s influence on Feng Youlan, Azuma examines in particular
Russell’s early philosophy and finds a close match between Russell’s
analysis of universals of category/class (inclusive of things, events, and
relations) as a priori and Feng’s analysis of li (pattern, principle). Further,
Russell’s universals which subsist and events/things which exist match
with Feng’s li which hiddenly exist (qiancun) and shi (eventslthings)
which exist (cunzai). Azuma goes on to trace Feng’s trying on and
rejecting Russell’s later “Neutral Monism,” keeping in the end with
Russell’s earlier view.
Beyond Russell an even stronger influence on Feng Youlan’s
thinking was that of W. P. Montague, in his The Ways of Knowing, parts
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of which Feng translated into Chinese in the late 1920s. Using passages
from both Montague and Feng, Azuma carefully shows that in holding 1)
that every particular has a universal, 2) that universals are more basic than
particulars, 3) that universals are independent of particulars and prior to
particulars, 4) that universals are not only thoughts in the mind, and 5)
that universals, in themselves, are not the whole of an event/thing, Montague’s and Feng’s positions are closely parallel. Even their expressive forms
are similar. Azuma, therefore, suggests that when Feng translated Montague’s work into Chinese around 1927, the foundational structure of Feng’s
own New Lixue system took shape. Professor Azuma closes his exploration of Feng’s New L i m e with a look at Feng’s dismissal of the Vienna
Circle’s rejection of metaphysics and at Feng’s theory of spiritual realms.
Professor Yin Lujun’s essay is the first of two, this and the next by
Professor Chen Lai, which offer critique of Feng Youlan’s New Lixue.
Professor Yin again reviews the basic conceptual theory of Feng’s New
Lixue and examines the influence of Plato on Feng’s thinking. Yin finds
that Feng’s world of li has all the characteristics of Plato’s realm of idea
except, importantly, for Feng, universals and particulars are both real,
whereas for Plato only universals or ideas are real. Feng’s rejection of
Plato on this issue led him to New Realism and eventually back to the
Chinese Ru (Confucian) view of our everyday world as perfectable.
Examining parallels with New Realism, Professor Yin focuses on a
difference in Feng’s methodological approach. In arguing for the objectivity of knowledge, the objectivity of ideas, New Realists relied upon the
Western traditional of Realism which could be traced back to Plato. Feng,
by contrast, endeavors to establish the objectivity of ii (pattern, principle)
through formal, analytic statements, an approach which New Realism
avoided. Professor Yin takes Feng’s “something exists,” with which Feng
begins to construct his metaphysical system, as a logically true analytical
statement?” An analytic statement is one in which the predicate is
implicitly contained in the subject. Professor Yin traces .how, from
“something exists,” Feng logically deduces the four core propositions
and concepts of his New Lixue system and comes to the conclusions that
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the world of li subsists prior to things, that li may subsist without the
existence of things, and that li are real, independent of space-and-time.
Professor Yin points out that Feng Youlan is the first Chinese
philosopher to re-construct Cheng-Zhu Lixue using Western logical
methods. Feng hoped in this way to bring about a new way for Chinese
thinking. Professor Yin criticizes Feng not for making this kind of effort,
but for the particular way in which he makes this effort. For. in Professor
Yin’s assessment, Feng’s process of analysis involves a form of invalid
reasoning. Professor Yin argues this has been avoided i n the West since
Kant’s distinction of analytic and synthetic statements gave positive
refutation to Anselm’s argument for the existence of God. According to
Kant, “being” or “existence” is not a predicate which can be added to
the concept of a thing. In an analytic statement the adding of being or
existence to a thing merely posits that thing as an object in relation to
one’s concept of it. In other words, an analytic statement can make no
claim on matters of fact. In analytically deducing class or type of
thing from “something exists,” then from class or type of thing
deducing li (pattern, principle) by which a class or type of thing is
discerned as that class of thing, and consequently from there deducing
the hidden existence or subsistence of that by which a class or type of
thing is discerned as that class of thing, Professor Yin argues that Feng
makes the same kind of mistake that Anselm did of attaching a predicate
“exist” (in this case, “hiddenly exist or subsist”) to a concept.
Professor Yin notes that Feng’s use of New Realist themes to reconstruct Cheng-Zhu Lixue through rational analysis of li contrasts with
traditional Lixue scholarly efforts to provide empirical evidence for li.
In addition, Feng’s analysis of Cheng-Zhu Lixue is not only logical but
linguistic in that Feng, like Russell, appeals to the linguistic activity of
predication for support of his theory of li as universal. This contrasts
with much of traditional Chinese philosophy which does not find truth
as a function of language. Finally, Feng varies from traditional Lixue in
not emphasizing understanding acquired through personal experience
(tiren).
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Professor Chen Lai in his essay further examines and critiques Feng’s
New Lixue system. Having been a “conversation partner” with Professor
Feng for several years, meeting weekly to discuss writing in which Feng
Youlan was currently engaged, Professor Chen Lai’s analysis of Feng’s
thinking is penetrating. Turning first to actuality (shiji), Chen Lai discriminates between 1) “eventlthing in actuality” as a certain, individual
thing and 1) “actuality” as a universal (category/class name) and as a
general name referring to the factual world. Turning to truth (zhenji),
it is a logical world in which li subsist (or hiddenly exist) and is different
from our everyday world of actual eventslthings which exist. Li (pattern,
principle) is in (zui) truth and eventslthings are in (mi)actuality. A
question then arises: do events/things have li? If events/things do have
Zi, then is li in actuality? If li is in actuality, how can li also be in truth?
To seek an answer to this question, Professor Chen Lai makes careful
examination of Feng’s claim in Xin L i m e that actuality implies truth.
In other words, “having a world of actuality” means “must have that
upon which the world of actuality relies by means of which [the world of
actuality] is so.” Professor Chen Lai points out that giving a category/
class name to something-for example, when one says, “this is dog”is a knowledge determination. We can say that a category/class name is in
knowledge, but one cannot go on to say that this categorylclass or universal or li exists. For this would be to take a logical u priori as an existential
u priori. Professor Chen h i ’ s criticism here is perhaps somewhat parallel
to that of Professor Yin Lujun above, although argued quite differently.
Turning to the question of li’s “is in” (zui), Professor Chen Lai
examines li as “that by which so” (suo y i run), which, in traditional Lixue,
is discerned as internally within eventslthings. According to Feng’s New
Lixue, li is objective, real, but not internally within shape-and-form in
space-and-time, that is, not within eventslthings. Therefore, one cannot
speak spatially or temporally about li at all. One cannot say that li is
above events/things nor can one say that li is within eventslthings. Rather,
according to Feng, one can say only that eventslthings “rely upon” li;
one cannot say that eventslthings “have li.” This being the case, what
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happens to traditional I,ixuc statements to the effect that ‘ b i t h i n things”
has li or “above things” has li? Feng cannot make such statements, for
then Zi would change to in ( Z Q i ) actuality instead of in truth.
By contrast, Feng does state that eventshhings have nature (Xing).
However, it is not li in truth that is a thing’s nature, but the manifesting
in actuality of li in truth which is a thing’s nature. Similarly, the order or
sequence of events/things is not li in truth, but the manifesting in actuality
of li of order or sequence; li remains in truth. Hence, in contrast to
traditional Lirue which discerns li as original nature within events/things,
Feng’s New Lixue places li in truth and not within events/things as original
substance or original nature.
Feng’s concept of “qi” (energy-matter) also differs significantly
from traditional Lixue. Feng’s qi “is that upon which events/things in
actuality rely as a basis” to become eventslthings in actuality. As such,
Feng’s qi is neither a thing in actuality nor truth; it is a logical concept,
and like all logical concepts is subjective and not objective in Fcng’s view.
But Feng’s notion of qi as a logical concept presents problems. First.
qi’s lacking objectivity puts i t out of balance with li, which in Feng’s
discernment is objective. Second, qi’s lacking objectivity makes it difficult to understand what a thing’s relying upon qi as a basis means. In Xiri
Lixue, Feng distinguishes two concepts of qi: qi as factual existence and
qi as logical concept. But then what is the relationship between these two
concepts o f qi? Perhaps, suggests Chen h i , Feng would have done better
to let go of New Realism and render li a logical concept like qi.
Finally, turning to traditional Lixue’s notions of substance and
function, Chen Lai states that we cannot criticize New Lixue by saying
that it is not the thought of former Ru (Confucian) scholars, for neither
was Song-Ming Lkue the thought of former, pre-Qin Ru scholars. Feng
did not endeavor t o pattern after Song-Ming scholars, but rather t o receive
and to carry forward the work they had done, giving new life t o it. With
regard t o substance and function, Feng’s Platonic-styled li in truth, upon
which the form of events/things in actuality relies, is not in actuality, is
not internally within events/things, and cannot regulate the movement o f
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events/things. This differs from traditional Liwue which discerns original
li internally within events/things, transforming within qi to become
li of qi and guiding the flow of qi, that is, guiding the movement of events/
things. Feng’s two world theory in this way greatly differs from SongMing discernment of substance and function as one. Thus, the interconnection between Feng’s New Lixue and Song-Ming Lixue is missing on this
pojnt. Feng, later, with his notions of intension and extension, began to
overcome this difficulty. In final analysis, the questions Feng’s New Lixue
raises are important ones and part of its contribution is its urging us
toward more correct and precise answers.
Papers of Section Four concern Feng’s writings of the next thirty
years aild beyond. Comprehension and appreciation of issues and arguments of these papers require some initial charting of transformative
events in China during these three decades. Our purpose is simply to
provide a general backdrop for what happened to Feng Youlan and his
work during this time. Feng Youlan’s Xin Zhi Yan {A New Treatise on the
Methodology of Metaphysics), the last of his Zhen Yuan Liu Shu, was
published in 1946. Feng Youlan was fifty-one years old. Some would
assess this collective effort as the peak of Feng’s philosophical work, yet
Feng’s life was just one half begun.
The year 1946 was a year of triumph as the Chinese people claimed
victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. But there were yet other
more severe winds blowing in China. The question of who would lead
China through reconstruction and modernization, whether the Nationalists
(Guorningdang) commanded by Chiang Kai-shek or the Communists
(Gongchandmg) commanded by Mao Zedong, had not yet been decided.
Economic losses and political failures on the part of Guomindang forces
rendered them vulnerable to loss of foreign support and paved the way to
their eventual defeat at the hands of the brilliantly trained, disciplined and
strategically astute People’s Liberation Army on the Communist side. In
late 1948 and early 1949, with the taking of Tianjin and Beijing and the
rest of the North China plain (efforts led by Zhu De, Lin Biao, and Deng
Xiaoping), Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists were forced to the south,
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later to move to Taiwan as the last bastion of their power. With
ccjntinuing victorious campaigns south and west, uniting China under the
Communist flag, Mao Zedong took the helm. On October I , 1949. at the
Gates o f Heavenly Peace, Mao proclaimed the beginning of the People’s
Republic of China.3o Now began the massive tasks of recuperation from
a century of war, of centralizing power, of re-education, of building a
domestic united front led by the working class, including the peasantry
and urban professionals, of land-reform -all following principles of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.
Since May 4. 1919, under the influence of a generation of New
Culture critics, traditional Chinese learning had
challenged.
been increasingly
Additionally, a great number of teaching personnel at the
universities and academies as well as those in scientific professions had
studied abroad. During the ascendence of Communist leadership in the
1930s and 1 9 4 0 ~these
~
sorts o f intellectuals were given labels such as
“feudal,” “reactionary,” “capitalist,” and so forth. Their loyalty to the
Communist Party was in question. Nonetheless, intellectuals at home and
those returning from abroad were encouraged and reassured that Communist China offered a new way forward even for ~ h e s e . ~ Many
’
intellectuals initially welcomed the new Communist leadership for the unity.
financial security, and lack of corruption it promised .32
Yet, as has always been the case in China, there was a tension
between political leaders and those o f the literati (scholarly-intellectual)
class, members of which over three thousand years have taken as their
personal responsibility speaking out t o those in power on behalf of the
people. In so doing, literati have risked loss of position, banishment and
even death (including family members), in seeking t o urge those who lead
to put aside selfishness and to return to care and nurturing of the
people.33 Just as leaders of the early Han, which also worked t o unite a
massive China, needed the help of Ru (Confucians), i.e. those who were
literate, so also those w h o came t o power in 1949 needed the help of the
learned t o modernize China productively and scientifically. What they did
not what from the literati was their independence of thought, their pluraxxvi
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lism, and their non-materialist aspirations. Thus, in 1950 would begin
a series of warm-up, cool-off campaigns which continued for over a quarter
of a century until the fall of the Gang of Four in 1977. By means of these
compaigns political leaders sought to bring intellectuals under tighter
ideological and political control, a control not previously experienced in
China except during the unifying fifteen-year rule of the Qin [221-2061,
which “buried the scholars” and “burned their books.” In Communist
China, scholars were not offered, as in China’s more traditional past, the
dignity of their protests being rejected on the part of those who lead.34
Instead, in this modern era with new means of communication, intellectuals were required to participate in, and were carefully monitored
through, thought reform. These efforts began quietly in 1950 and 1951
and came to a crescendo in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) during
which China’s intellectual elite were brought to self-criticism, jail, and
sometimes m a d n e ~ s . ~ ’Given the three-millenia-old calling’of scholars to
work on behalf of the people for the promotion of a nurturing and kind
government, most intellectuals of the People’s Republic of China engaged
in thought reform campaigns with a true sense of duty during the early
period. Such was their responsibility on behalf of a new Chinese people
now being born.
We turn now to the question of how events of this massive
turnabout in China’s political and economic affairs engaged Feng Youlan.
On May 4 , 1946, the Southwest Associated University was closed.
In August, Feng Youlan returned to the United States, taking a post at
the University of Pennsylvania as a one-year Visiting Scholar in Philosophy. There he began work with Derk Bodde to translate his two-volume
Zhongguo Zhexue Shi (A History of Chinese Philosophy). In 1947 the
English translation by E. R. Hughes of Feng’s Xin Yuan Dao (The Spirit
of Chinese Philosophy) was published in London. In the same year,
Feng Youlan received an Honorary Doctorate from Princeton University.
In 1948, Feng Youlan chose to return to China, stopping en route to teach
the Spring term at the University of Hawaii. Then,.sailing against the
tide of many leaving China, Feng returned to Beijing in the summer of
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1948. That fall Feng was selected as a member of the Central Research
Academy (Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan) in Nanjing, where he went to attend
a conference meeting. In this same year, Feng’s A Shorr Hisrory of
Chinese Philosophy (originally written in English) was published in New
York. In 1949 in Beijing, Feng participated in land-reform and gave his
support to Mao Zedong’s leadership. Back at Qinghua University during
the s a n e year, Feng briefly assumed duties as Head of the University’s
Administration Commit tee .36
In 1950 when half-year long courses in revolutionary re-education
for intellectuals began, Feng Youlan, along with tens of thousands of
other scholars, participated. The purpose of these courses was to awaken
intellectuals to their privileged class backgrounds and to the thought of
Mao Zedong, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. In small groups each individual’s persona! case was jointly discussed. Scholars prepared self-critical
autobiographies, confessing their past errors as well as those of their
fathers and grandfathers.” It is not zlways possible to know completely
the inner intentions of such confessions, which no doubt, at least to some
extent, were sincere at the time. In 1950, Feng advanced his first selfcriticism against his New Lixue
In 1951, Feng went to India for
scholarly exchange and was awarded a n honorary doctorate at Delhi
University. As all Chinese higher education institutions underwent
reform, only one Department of Philosophy remained, that of Beijing
University, where Feng Youlan was appointed in 1952.
The start of 1953 brought some relaxation in ideological control,
but this was quickly reversed in 1954 with the announcement of the First
Five-Year Plan requiring conformity in all sectors of the population. The
thought reform campaign continued into 1955 with a refutation of Hu
Feng. Author, editor and Communist Party member, Hu had argued for
higher literary standards and greater intellectual divergence of view .39
Other intellectuals were criticized as well: Hu Shi (1891-1962) for his
Western-informed pragmatism and Liang Shuming (1893-1988) for his
conservativisrn. Feng Youlan along with other intellectuals participated
in these criticisms.
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In 1956, when China began to move away from the Soviet Union’s
model of Communism to develop more of an indigenous model, some in
leadership positions considered knowledgeable skills of intellectuals
essential to the success of the first Five-Year Plan. However, there was a
rift on this issue among those at the center of power?’ Mao, wanting to
work towards improved relations with the people and intellectuals, on
May 2nd set forth to a closed session of the State Council a policy of “let
a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools contend.’*’ When
the campaign was publicized in late May, intellectuals wcre encouraged
to express their own opinions in the arts and sciences, but not on political
issues. Intellectuals could criticize officials, however, for the sake of
improving bureaucratic effi~iency.~’Under this policy, hesitantly at first,
renewed intellectual discussion began to take place in the latter half of
1956. Given the above-mentioned rift among Communist Party leaders
and reluctance on the part of Party cadres who feared the emergence of
intellectual superiority, the Hundred Flowers campaign was not long
afterward temporarily suspended in early 1957.43
To get the campaign going again, Mao used much personal
persuasion. In January, Mao’s collected poems were published for the
first time. In February, Mao offered his “On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions Among the People” speech, in which he responded to the
question of repression.4 in Mao’s view, non-antagonistic contradictions
could coexist in Communist society, but these were to be openly
discussed and resolved by what he termed “democratic methods” of
reasoning and education. Mao trusted that intellectuals had been sufficiently instructed in his new line of thinking and were loyal. Mao now
invited their responsible criticism to keep the leadership responsive to and
not alienated from the people.45 Taking part in the effort, philosophers
began to sort through Chinese tradition for those approaches which,
through critique and remoulding, could align with Marxist principles?6
To this end a series of debates based on Marxist tenets on how properly
to inherit tradition began at Beijing University in January 19574’
According to the Marxist approach, ideas and attitudes are generated
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by social conditions and practical concerns within those conditions.
Matter, in this view, is primary; sensation, ideas, and consciousness are
secondary. While a Marxist would argue that the world can be objectively
known, objective truth comes only through practice, only through living
and adjusting to material conditions. So, in the Marxist view, abstract
ideas d o not exist; they are not material substance. However, ideas or
thinking cannot be separated from matter. Rather, there is a dialectical
retationship between matter, that is, material conditions, and thoughts
or ideas in the mind. This materialist view is linked with politics in that
just as matter is primary, so also workers, those whose work engages them
in the economic modes of production as the forces of history, are primary
and progressive. By contrast, those who promote idealism, that ideas are
not tied to material conditions and may exist separately from matter, are
the exploiters, the oppressors, the reactionary forces of history.
A. A . Zhdanov, a Soviet Party spokesman on cultural matters, had
argued forcefully since 1947 that the history of Western European philosophy was the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism.
Zhdanov’s view held great sway in China and became the line followed by
Chinese philosophers in the early 195Os, when China leaned so heavily
towards the Soviet Union.48 However, by the mid-1950s Chinese scholars,
holding that Chinese philosophy was separate and different from Western
philosophy in its focus on ethics rather than metaphysics and epistemlogy, began to argue somewhat more favorably for idealism and the positive role it had played in the history of philosophy. He Lin, a colleague of
Feng Youlan’s during the
had been severely criticized in 1953 and
1955 for “suggesting that idealism had some good points.”” With the
Hundred Flowers campaign of 1956 and 1957, other philosophers who
would speak more openly on behalf of idealism began to d o so. A few
months prior to the January 1957 debate at Beijing University, Feng
Youlan published an article, entitled ‘Two Problems Concerning the
Study of the History of Chinese Philos~phy,”~‘which inquired into the
meanings of “idealism” and “materialism” and argued that these terms
were not absolute. In his view, many traditional Chinese philosophers had
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both idealist and materialist aspects in their thinking.”
Feng Youlan presented a second paper at the January 1957 debates
at Beijing University entitled ‘‘Zhongguo Zhexue Yichan de Jicheng
Wenri” (“On
the Question of Inheriting the Legacy of Chinese
P h i l o ~ o p h y ” ) . ~ In
~ this piece, Feng argued that while his earlier New
Lixue philosophy had placed too much emphasis o n abstract meaning,
rather than concrete meaning, philosophical discussion in the mid-I 950s
was in danger of going the other way, of putting too much emphasis on
the concrete, neglecting thc abstract, and thereby neglecting what could
be inherited from China’s traditional philosophical past. Feng took several
examples from traditional Chinese t o make his point, arguing from the
I a n Yu (Analects), Meng Zi, and Zhuung Zi. In Feng’s assessment,
principles from all these older texts could be abstracted from the texts,
leaving behind their concrete content, and applied in any age.s4 It was
this argument by Feng which caused a great stir. In the months and years
of ensuing debate, Feng agreed with his critics that traditional philosophy
had t o be critically analyzed and transformed, before being inherited, but
the question was how. In May 1957, a second conference o n inheriting
the Chinese philosophical legacy was held which brought even more
explicit questioning of the importation o f a nonChinese framework t o
resolve the question of what could be inherited and what could not.”
The swelling tide of debate and criticism with regard to certain
efforts of the Communist Party, for example, regarding exclusive control
on the part of leaders, restricting access t o foreign information and arts,
campaigns against landlords, and more, had not been expected, a t least
not by M ~ o . ’ ~ In May and early June 1957, universities around the
country joined in as did middle schools. “Democracy Wall” at Beijing
University was created for posters expressing diverse individual points o f
view, often critical of those in the lead. AS on May 4, 1919, students took
t o the streets with rallies for better academic administrative policies and
greater academic freedom.”
The backlash against the Hundred Flowers campaign began in June
of 1957, driven by those in power who had been reluctant towards the
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campaign in the first place. Mao, too, came over t o their side, changing
his February 1957 speech t o the effect that intellectual freedom was t o
be used only for strengthening socialism.58 In July an “Anti-Rightist”
campaign was announced against critics of the Party, even though intellectuals had been officially invited to d o so. The brief Spring of “one
hundred flowers blooming” came to an end with a thought reform
campaign more severe than any previous campaign. Virtually all intellectuals were forced t o participate in the anti-rightist campaign, whether
they had been critical of the Communist Party or not. Labeled “rightist,”
losing their professional positions, and in many cases their careers for
life, more than 300,000 were sent to labor camps or to jail; some would
not return.59 As the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) got under way,
the gap between central leaders and intellectuals widened rather than
narrowed in spite of the hope of Mao in the Spring o f 1956. As creativity
on the part of the people was extolled, intellectuals went into even greater
isolation.60
In 1958 intensifying voices from the left, led by Guan Feng, labelled
the 1957 debates on cultural inheritance “revisionist,” in that scholars had
“revised” Marxist philosophy by obscuring the line between idealism and
materialism. They had done so by arguing that there had been materialist
approaches prior t o Marx, and by arguing that some philosophical propositions transcend class.61
Guan Feng’s main criticisms were directed
towards Feng Youlan and his “method of abstract inheritance,” in particular, Feng’s examples from Zhuang Zi that an ethical code (duo) could
be abstract and beyond class.62 In 1959, Guan Feng went yet further in
criticizing Feng Youlan’s views on Zhuang Zi. A formidable Zhuang Z i
scholar himself as regards the text and its dating, Guan Feng viewed the
man Zhuang Zi (399? B.C.-295? B.C.) as a reactionary and a negativist.
Zhuang Zi in G u m Feng’s view represented the despair and defeat of
the slave-owning class t o which Zhuang Zi belonged. Similarly, the
thinking of Feng Youlan, as a latter-day student of Zhuang Zi, was deemed
reactionary and erroneous.63
With this challenge of Feng’s views began two years (1960-1961)
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of intense, personalized debate on the dating and content of the Zhumg
Zi text. These debates included other well-known scholars in addition t o
Guan Feng and Feng Youlan.64 During these 1960-61 discussions on
Zhumzg Zi, Feng was already under considerable attack for his “method on
abstract inheritance.” Yet, rather than retreat, Feng chose to head straight
into more severe attacks by Guan Feng and others who had political
power on their side. In an effort t o take Marxist principles seriously, Feng
argued for highest knowing in the midst of material e ~ p e r i e n c e . ~Addi~
tionally, Feng argued that while Zhuang Zi’s thinking was reactionary,
perhaps, in that it was used to ridicule the ruling class in the last days of
the slave era, still Zhuang Zi’s thinking was progressive in that it was used
to criticize the new ruling elite of the Han.66
As regards Feng Youlan’s participation in the “one hundred flowers
bloom” campaign and in subsequent academic/political debates on Zhuang
Zi,we are offered two glimpses i n the first two essays of Section Four.
Essays of this section focus on Feng’s post-1 949 philosophical engagement
with Marxist themes. The first glimpse, very brief, yet poignantly full
of meaning, is offered by Professor Pang Pu, taking us into the moment of
“kaifar2g” (liberation) and Feng Youlan’s return to the classroom in 1957
after years of no teaching. Feng’s lectures were on selections from Zhuang
Z i and Meng Zi. As to Zhuang Zi, Feng elaborated upon the “pivot of the
Way,” wherein what is human does not extinguish what is Heaven-given.
On Meng Zi, Feng lectured on the “unwavering heart-mind” and the
“flood-like energy,” wherein the ten thousand things are complete in oneself. The former was by way of discussing Feng’s realm of Heaven and
Earth, the latter was by way o f discussing Feng’s realm of morality,
although Feng could n o longer use his earlier terminology t o speak about
these as he had in his Zhen Yuan Liu Shu of the 1940s. Instead, in the
spring o f 1957 Feng argued for a non-absolute, non-relative arriving a t the
center wherein t o know the truth.
A second glimpse into Feng Youlan’s participation in the Hundred
Flowers compaign takes us into Feng’s “method of abstract inheritance,”
a centerpiece of the January 1957 symposium at Beijing University, and
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into responses to this method over time. Professor Yang Disheng presents
in his essay excerpts from Feng Youlan’s January 1957 paper “Zhongguo
Zhexue Yichan de Jicheng Wenti” (“On the Question of Inheriting the
Legacy of Chinese Philo~ophy”)~’
mentioned above, in which Feng argues
against neglecting the abstract meaning of philosophical propositions
altogether while favoring strongly the concrete meaning of these propositions. The controversy which Feng’s paper engendered has lasted until
today. In 1958-59 Chen Boda and others challenged that Feng, with this
method
of abstract inheritance, was merely covering up his idealist
New Lixue with a disguise, hiding “restore the old” feudal morality. In
response Feng Youlan re-phrased his argument, but kept the core
approach, that general principles of the past could be inherited while
specific instances in which the principle is expressed would fall away.68
Professor Yang traces a tendency in the early years of the People’s
Republic to deal simplisitically with complex and difficult issues. Yang
recounts Feng’s and Mao’s study-meeting together to discuss this issue
and Mao’s affirming, “we cannot simplify.” Yang goes on to point o u t ,
however, that despite Mao’s remark, for two decades the problem was not
handled well. Two nihilistic thought reform campaigns and years of
catastrophe were the result of simplication in handling the question of
how to inherit culture. Thirty years later, lacking a resolution to this
problem, China still finds itself inheriting the dregs of tradition, whether
knowing i t or not. Offering examples from military strategy and debates
concerning what is right and what is profitable, Professor Yang argues that
inheriting the general and not the specific has been going on for thousands
of years. The question is how to do this in a Marxist, reasoned manner
in contemporary China’s socialist age.
Professor Yang goes on to discuss Feng’s efforts “to elucidate the
old country to assist the new mandate,’“9 a phrase epitomizing Feng’s
“method of abstract inheriting.” Yang discerns that fundamentally the
problem of inheriting the past is the problem of the relationship of
universals to particulars, a problem discussed in philosophy in every
culture, past and present. Feng’s conclusion as expressed in his 1984
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Sunsongrang Zixu (Autobiography at the Hall of Three Pines) was that li
(pattern, principle) is within shi (events).m By this time, Feng’s views had
developed over time through incorporating Marxist and Maoist thinking.
Feng was ever seeking the truth and offering it as best he could to the
Chinese people to build a new nation. Feng respected and trusted Mao
Zedong even in his later years. His respect and trust for Mao were an
expression of Feng’s fervent love for his country and people, motivating
him to write a Zhongguo Zhexue Shi Xinbian (New Edition of A History
of Chinese Philosophy) using Marxist principles to revise his earlier history
of Chinese philosophy. Professor Yang concludes that to the end Feng
was convinced that, in a manner consistent with Marxist-Leninist
principles, Chinese classical philosophy is an important form of nourishment for Chinese Marxist future development.
As the Great Leap Forward (195862) brought with it extensive
famine and other disasters, the Anti-Rightist campaign receded, bringing
a moderate relaxation of political efforts to control scholars, beginning in
1961 and lasting until mid-1962. Led this time by Lui Shaoqi, this new
relaxation sought assistance of scholars toward scientific, technical, and
economic development. In philosophy, the early 1960s saw a revival of
discussion of Kong Zi (Confucius), his teaching methods (making no
distinction as regards class) and his social ethic which puts the social whole
before self-interest. Feng Youlan added to this multi-viewed discussion
of Kong Zi with a series of eleven articles “On Kong Zi” published from
1960-1963. Outstanding of these pieces is “Lun Kong Zi Guunyu ‘Ren’
de Siuiang” (“Kong Zi On Thinking About Bene~olence”).’~ In this
piece, Feng cites from Marx and Engels concerning a new class replacing a
ruling class. The new class offers its ideas in universal form, expressing
that this new class is, in fact, opposed to class and represents the whole of
society.n Using this citation from Marx, Feng Youlan argued that ren
(benevolence), put forward by the feudal class in opposition to the slaveowning class, is of universal value. Similarly, in his Zhongguo Zhexue
Shi .Yinbian, the first volume of selections being published in 1962, Feng
argues for universality of ren and other traditional Chinese concepts. This
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was the next of Feng’s efforts in abstract inheriting, in gleaning resources
from Chinese philosophy in a manner consistent with Marxist principles
to build a new China.
Feng published a second volume of his New Edition in 1964, but the
constant turning of political events delayed publication of the remainder
of the work for two decades. While scholars continued to debate materialist aspects of Kong Zi,Meng Zi, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi,increasing priority
was given, by those in power, to views of Xun Zi and Hanfei Zi, which
easily lent themselves to methods of control. The Cultural Revolution
(1 966-76) sought complete control of intellectuals, designed as it was to
break o r smash any vestige of the old, of nonconformity, of individual
voice. Feng Youlan was seventy-one years old when the Cultural Revolution
began. Detained and criticised, forced to undergo further thought reform,
Feng and other scholars suffered deeply. Under these pressures, Feng
would again discuss Kong Zi, this time in a more critical manner,n in the
early 1970s. Of more enduring value, however, were Feng’s continuing
efforts during these difficult Years to penetrate through to the Way (Dao),
to refine his system of New L h u e along Marxist lines in his New Edition.
With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the fall of the Gang of Four
in 1977, and Deng Xiaoping’s taking the lead in 1978, Feng and other
intellectuals were able gradually to return to and t o publish their philosophical work.
Seven volumes of Feng’s New Edition were completed
and published from 1982-1992.74 In addition, Feng Youlan was able to
tell his own story of his life, thinking, and final integrations in his San-
songtang Z h u (Autobiography at the Hall of Three Pines), published in
1984. In 1985 began continuous publication of Feng’s Sansongtang
Quanji (The Collected Works at the Hall of Three Pines or The Collected
Works of Feng Y o ~ l a n ) . ’ ~
Professor Tu Youguang, Compiler and Editor of Feng Youlan’s
Collected Works, transcriber of Feng’s Autobiography, translator of Feng
Youlan’s A Short Histoly of Chinese Philosophy into Chinese, and main
discussion partner during Feng’s final work on his New Edition, knows
Feng Youlan’s heart-mind and thinking perhaps better than anyone. It
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is to Professor Tu’s essay, the last in Section Four, that we turn for the last
word on Feng Youlan’s New Lixue system and its re-tuning in a Marxist
key.
Significantly, Professor Tu gives thorough-going consideration, more
than any other paper in this volume, to Feng’s “theory of realms” as the
core of Feng’s New L i m e system. In fathoming the realm of Heaven and
Earth, we are brought back full circle to Feng Youlan’s perennial theme,
namely, “arriving at highest illumination, one tracks in the way perfectly
in ordinary living.” This theme Feng Youlan kept in the center of his
work even to his final days.76 Professor Tu then illumines Feng’s reconceptualizing of his New Lixue system, as a result of his participation
in agrarian land-reform of the early 195Os, with the terms “intension”
and “extension.” It is with this re-understanding of his New Lixue, using
a Marxist perspective, that Feng Youlan carried on with his New Edition.
This was surely the culmination of a life-time of careful, discerning effort.
In Part One of his essay, Professor Tu Youguang puts our attention
on the lasting intention of Feng Youlan’s philosophical work: to raise the
realm of human living. In Feng’s discernment, this is the function of any
and all philosophical work. Feng calls the highest realm of human living
the “realm of Heaven and Earth” (Tim Di jingiie). Feng’s Xin Yuan Ren
(New Treatise on the Nature of Man) discusses the realm of Heaven and
Earth at length and is the central work of Feng’s New L i m e system. Even
in 1950, in his first self-criticism after thought reform campaigns had
begun, Feng with courage used his theory of realms of human living to
distinguish between different persons’ comprehension of labour. Professor
Tu goes on to carefully sort out each of Feng’s four realms (of nature, of
utility, of morality, of Heaven and Earth). Putting our attention on the
last of these, the realm of Heaven and Earth, Professor Tu presents four
successive stages within this highest realm (knowing, serving, rejoicing
in and being one with Heaven). Professor Tu points out that human
reason initially draws a line between Heaven and human person, but when
the final stage is attained, this boundary is transcended .as human reason
itself is transcended. Tu then compares this highest stage with similar
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attainments in other traditions and Western philosophy.
Explaining
clearly and precisely what this stage of being one with Heaven is, Professor
Tu emphasizes that one continues t o live within the material world in a
moral, useful, and natural manner, while yet having this realm of Heaven
and Earth.
From his analysis of the centrality of the theory of realms in Feng’s
New Lixue. Professor Tu goes on t o discuss why human beings have the
realm of Heaven and Earth.
This is because human beings each have
li (pattern, principle) of human being (ren) upon which they rely to be
human beings, including having the realm of Heaven and Earth. Professor
T u , then, presents Feng’s metaphysical theory of li, which Feng derived from
one affirmation concerning actuality, that is, from one statement of fact:
some event/thing exists. In using Western logic to advance a new ufiderstanding o f Liwue, Feng’s New L i m e is quite different from old Lixue.
Professor Tu lucidly examines a problem area in Feng‘s logical derivation
of li, a problem area which Professors Yin Lujun and Chen h i , in their
individual essays, have examined as well. Tu’s argument is that to make
the logical inferences that Feng does, one must stipulate certain conditions
as premises. However, these conditions as premises are exactly the conclusions to which Feng’s inferences are intended to lead. So the theoretical
demonstration is circular. Given the times of 1948 when these problems
were being discussed, resolution had t o wait.
Feng continued t o ruminate over these problems during his participation in agrarian land reform in 1950. Learning through experiences
during that time, Feng grasped universals and particulars newly in terms of
Hegel’s
“concrete universal.”
Although his new thinking was not
expressed in writing until 1985 (in Volume Four of his New Edition),
it was originally worked out when working in rural areas and thinking over
the problem of class. He discerned that each class has its intension or
universal and its extension, which is particulars. From extension, one may
infer intension, but not the other way around. Feng’s starting point now
was changed t o category o r class name which has li. An individual,
as a member of a category or class, is an extension of that category or class
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name. L i is the intension of that category or class name. If an individual
relies upon li of that category or class name to the farthest point, one
has the realm of Heaven and Earth.
PJthough the circularity of Feng's argument was now resolved with
this new starting point, there is still the problem that, in Feng's view, category/class has li, whereas in Professor Tu's discernment individuals have li.
One problem with the view that categorylclass has li is that it offers no
meaningful way of explaining or encouraging differences in individual
initiative. Another problem is that the only existence that category/
class has is the existence on the part of the individuals of that category/
class. Third, knowledge begins with knowing the qualities and relations
between individuals.
Li of category/class is a generalization derived
from knowing qualities and relations of individuals. In Professor Tu's
discernment, the realm of Heaven and Earth manifests not the perfection
of category/class, but rather the perfection of an individual. Such is
the Daoist understanding of the realm of Heaven and Earth.
Professor Tu Youguang's essay firmly plants us on the solid ground
of Feng Youlan 's integrative, refined, biographically reflective work of the
early 1980s, a freer, more relaxed period for scholars than had been the
case since the 1950s. Essays in Section Five of this volume take us one
step further into the late 198Os, the early 199Os, and beyond in the work
of two contemporary Chinese philosophers. Professor Zhang Liwen and
Professor Li Zehou both offer assessment of the kind of philosophy in
which Feng Youlan and others have been engaged. In addition, they argue
for new approaches or new alternatives in Chinese philosophy, each connecting with a dimension of Western philosophy different from that with
which Feng Youlan connected, i.e. New Realism. Throughout these two
essays an important question again and again emerges: on what grounds,
by what criteria, within what boundaries, if any, is one's philosophical
work deemed tracking the Way (Dao)?
Professor Zhang Liwen's paper opens his discussion of Feng Youlan's
work and of an alternative way of doing Chinese philosophy, with an
historical outline of three schools of Song-Ming Lixue: 1) that which
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takes li (pattern, principle) as the root, 2) that which takes xiiz (heartmind) as the root, and 3 ) that which takes qi (energy-matter) as the root.
Professor Zhang then goes on to explore developments in the 1940s
within each of these schools of study (xue), calling these: New Lixue,
New Xinxue, New Qixue. All three schools consider their work t o connect
with and succeed (jiezhe) Song-Ming L i ~ u e . Professor Zhang understands
this connection to mean that half of what one is thinking comes from
those who have come before, and the other half comes from oneself.
Zhang offers Feng Youlan’s New Lixue as a good example of such connection in that Feng’s truth and actuality carry forward Song-Ming Lixrie’s
‘
“substance” (ti) and “function” Owzg), respectively. Another example
of connecting with and succeeding Song-Ming L uue may be found in what
Profesor Zhang calls “New Ximuc. ” He Liii, taking heart-mind as Zi and
substance, took thing, which manifests heart-mind, as function. and
carried forward the teaching of Lu Xianpshan and Wang Yangming. To the
thinking of these scholars, He Lin also brought the thinking of Kant. Hegel
and Spinoza by way of adding explanatory interpretation. “New Qixue”
is exemplified in the work of Zhang Dainian [ 1909-
] , who carries,
t‘orwsrd the study of qi established by Zhang Zai in the Song period and
links it with contemporary Marxist materialist philosophy.
From 1949 onward, New Ru (Confucians) (Xi!?Ru Jiu) of the Ncw
Xinxrce view in Hong Kong and Taiwan criticized Feng Youlan in his New
LLx-urue for neglecting Cheng-Zhu teachings on heart-mind ( x i t i ) and inborn
nature (-x-ing). Moreover, these scholars argued for tlie primacy of LuW3ng Xinxue teaching in Song-Ming Ru (Confucian) study-, with Cheng-
Zhu L ~ K u teachings
~!
as a branch of Song-Ming Ru (Confucian) study.
During these same years, on the Chinese mainland, New Qixue scholars
explore the developmental history of Qixrie along with its theo:etical
integration in Marxist thought.
Professor Zhang, however, notes a problem with these efforts in
that these “new” schools have now become systematized in themse!ves and
are in need of renewed creativity, of higher level discussior, which comes
from within oneself. Each of thzse three new schools has not yet gone
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beyond the philosophical tradition of metaphysical ontology which
investigates the original source-whether li, xin, or qi -of the world as
we know it. Science and technology of today urge a new kind of philosophical work. Secondly, these three points of view have had a tendency to
become dictatorial and exclusivistic, claiming what they discern t o be the
source as the one true, good, and beautiful, while all else is false, evil and
ugly. When these views are linked with political power, the result can be
to use li, xin, or qi t o “kill” people in the absence of objective legal procedures.
Thirdly, these three schools lack critical self-consciousness
without which they lose their creative transforming vitality.
A new approach to philosophical theory would be what Professor
Zhang calls the “study of harmony and integration” (Izehexue). Zhang
gives a preliminary outline of this new approach, linking major concepts
in Chinese philosophy with Marxist dialectics and quantum theory in
physics. First, all events/things are produced within a process of moving
transformation. Within this movement, a tendency towards equilibrium
causes events/things t o manifest definite qualities and inter-relationships.
Next, opposition and unification of different qualities result in a fusing
together which becomes a new event/thing.
Finally, what is produced
blends characteristics of both, such that the best o f each quality shows
forth more fully. Using this kind of approach, Zhang urges rejection of
mechanistic determinism and greater comprehension of the fact that any
form of understanding includes the examiner within the examined and,
thus, is relative. The theory of harmony and integration studies events/
things in motion and transcends Song-Ming R u (Confucian) study and its
successors, which analyze stillness. Professor Zhang concludes that the
theory of harmony and integration best expresses China’s cultural essence
and vitality.
Professor Li Zehou sets forth yet another approach t o doing Chinese
philosophy today which differs both from traditional Chinese philosophy
and from Zhang Liwen’s alternative to traditional Chinese philosophy.
Professor Li Zehou, leaning more towards a link between Chinese philosophy and Western continental phenomenology and existentialism, starts
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his philosophical discussion with what his calls the “proto-phenomenon”
of “I live” or “one lives” (ren huozhe). This proto-phenomenon or base
contains three questions:
1) How d o I live?, 2) Why d o I live?, and 3)
In what manner d o I live? Li discerns “I live” as a kind of unchosen
“throwness” into a n existence shared with others in the world. ‘Wow d o
I live?” comes before ‘Why d o I live?” Answering “How d o I live?,”
which is always together with others, eventuates in the creation of tools,
including language. Yet it is answering ‘Why d o I live?” that gives existence its authenticity. Answering this question requires that each person
investigate, discover and choose for oneself why one lives.
Answers to“How do I live?” and “Why d o 1 live?”, in turn, blend
together to answer the third question, “In what manner do I live?” In
other words, in what realm o f living d o I live? Here Professor Li reviews
Feng Youlan’s theory of realms and Feng’s view that philosophy consists
in raising the realm of human living. Professor Li assesses that Feng’s
theory o f realms connects with and succeeds Chinese Song-Ming Lixuc,
what Professor Li calls “New Ru study” (XinRwcuc). Feng’s contribution
in this line of connection and succession could be considered part of
“modern New Ruxue” (xiandai Xin R u x u ~ ) .Professor
~~
Li finds a link
between his own aesthetic realm and Feng’s realm of Heaven and Earth.
However, the point which Li Zehou wants t o make here is that the
effort which Feng Youlan made in his New Lixue is one means among
others for opening u p and reviving the spirit of Chinese tradition. What Li
Zehou is calling for is a ‘inodern Ruxue” (xiandai Ruxue), which is
different from Feng Youlan’s and others’ “modern New Ruxue. ” What
Li Zehou would call “modem Ruxue” is “post-Marxist Rwcue hermeneutics.“
Professor Li then turns t o those who would object t o Feng Youlan’s
being included in the group called “modern New ‘Ruxue.” To some,
Feng’s political character and his focus on a wo€ld of li, rather than upon
li in action, suggest that Feng does not belong to this group. In contrast
with these views, Professor Li holds the view that modern New Ruxue in
its wider sense includes not only the continuation of the Lu-Wang school,
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which may be considered the main school, but also the Cheng-Zhu school.
Because Feng Youlan’s New Lixue in fact does connect with and succeed
Cheng-Zhu explanations, Feng Youlan in Li Zehou’s assessment does
belong t,o modern New Ruxue.
The papers of Section Five present two approaches to doing Chinese
philosophy today which are quite different from each other and from
Feng Youlan’s approach. Their efforts differ from those of Feng Youlan
in that they d o not seek to connect with and succeed fjiezhe) Song-Ming
Lixue. Instead, each sees his approach as breaking from what has come
before. Still, both Professor Zhang Liwen and Professor Li Zehou in their
own remarks about their philosophical efforts evince an intention to
inherit, revive and carry forward the spirit of Chinese culture and tradition. More than this, they seek to carry forward the spirit of Chinese
culture and tradition by participating in a larger world philosophy as
inheritors and enliveners of Western philosophical discernment as well.
In these intentions and efforts, their philosophical work is not unlike Feng
Youlan’s own.
Part Three: Chinese Philosophical Terms in English Tmnslation 78
1.
Guidelines
Translation and critical discussion of Feng Youlan’s philosophical
work brings to the surface just about every major issue in Chinese philosophy today as well as many issues in comparative philosophy, none of
which we can adequately pursue here. Our purpose, rather, is to cut a
path through to a few terms important to Feng Youlan’s philosophical
thinking and to explore alternative matches for these terms in English
translation.
In the main, we. attend to discernments, linguistic patterns, and
arguments for matching Chinese “you” more literally with English “to
have” and “having,” rather than matching it notionally with English
“there exists,” “existence” or “Being.” Necessarily involved in a discusxliii
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sion of Chinese “you”are discussions of Chinese “zai”(is in) and “cunzai”
(exist, existence).
Additionally, we shall examine Chinese “qianyou
”
(literally translated as “hiddenly have” or “hidden having”) and “qiancun ”
(literally translated as “hiddenly exists” and ‘%idden existence”). Feng
used qianyou and qiancun to translate Western philosophical terms “subsistence” and “subsist” respectively.
In so far as Feng and his critics
discuss whether things have (you) Ii (pattern, principle) above them
(wushang) or whether things have (you) li within them (wuzhong), a discussion o f Chinese you also involves some consideration of li and how li
is discerned. Ways in which Chinese terms may be translated into English
using “is” o r “to be” will emerge, inevitably taking us t o the work o f
Angus Graham o n the topic. Using translated examples, we shall compare
some differences between Graham’s approach and our own.
In examining alternative translation possibilities, it is abundantly
clear that simply b y the choice one makes of words in one language to
match those in another language, translation is interpretation, n o matter
how true t o an author’s intention one seeks and endeavors t o be.
Three guidelines direct our translations. First, ways of formulating
philosophical questions emerge, in considerable part, from syntactic and
semantic contexts. As Angus Graham has described, “the way we think
is affected, not only by the language we speak, but by the grammar we
impose o n it and by the languages in which the problems were originally
stated .“79 Further, Graham acknowledges that “each language has its own
sources of confusion, some of which are exposed by translation [from one
language] into the other.””
Experience in translating essays of this
volume confirms that philosophical discernment and linguistic expression
of philosophical discernment are intimately related. Moreover, philosophical discernment and linguistic expression o f philosophical discernment
differ from one language t o another. In this volume, we have tried t o hold
onto Chinese philosophical discernment and Chinese linguistic expression
of that philosophical discernment in English translation. In this manner,
we seek t o keep open a unique Chinese window o n philosophical inquiry
even in English translation.
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Second, no one language, together with philosophical questions
expressed through that language, is a better or worse “instrument of
thought.”” In other words, we cannot take one language’s (or a group of
languages’) ways of speaking and philosophical questions expressed
through those ways of speaking as standard for another. Focusing on the
Western term “Being,” Graham observes that “the verb ‘to be’ is a characteristic of Indo-European languages which is highly unusual.” He further
observes that languages outside this group use terms such as “have,”
“this,” “make” in places where English uses “to be” or ‘‘Being.”’’
Graham concludes that “there is no concept of Being which languages are
well or ill fitted to express.”s3
‘Being” is one way of talking about our
world and our engagement in it, but is not the standard way of talking
about the world and our engagement in it. Therefore, in this volume, we
have chosen not to take the Western-European notion of “Being” as
standard for questions of Chinese philosophy and have not matched
Chinese ‘>ou” with English “Being.” Nor have we matched Chinere
“wu”(the negative of ‘>ou”) with Eng!ish “non-Being.” It is our view
that these notional matchings are often misleading in that they not only
suggest that Western “Being” is standard for Chinese thinking (or any
thinking), but also eclipse what is unique in traditional and contemporary
Chinese philosophical discernment.
Third, matching conventions, customs, and uses of terms between
languages should include matching of syntactic patterns in which terms
are imbedded. In other words, between languages we need to find not
only a semantic match of terms (those which would appear to refer
similarly to events/things in the world), but also a syntactic match of
patterns in which these terms relate to other terms within a language.
Finding both semantic and syntactic matches of terms yields more literal
translation, which, in our view, reveals more of what each language and
thinking have to tell us.
Our effort here, as Graham admits about his own elsewhere, is “to
pin down a problem which will remain elusive for a long time to come.”
One hopes with this effort to encourage others restless with problems of
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earlier translations to add their voices as well to clarify this “obstinately
obscure subject.”84
2.
Chinese Actualist Discernment
Our main thesis is that Chinese thinking, interrelated with visual
characteristics of Chinese language itself, is ‘6actualist.”8s That is to say,
discriminations or patterns of activity on the part of the human heartmind (xin) are deemed to cohere tightly with patterns discerned in actual
events/things in the world. To go one step further, in Chinese actualist
discernment, patterns of discrimination in the human heart-mind are
deemed to be one and the same as patterns discerned in actual events/
things. The device or instrument which conveys this coherence or unity
between patterns of discrimination in the heart-mind and patterns
discerned in actual events/things is language, in particular, the linguistic
function of naming (rning).&
A pattern of discrimination on the part of the heart-mind is given
a name, a mnemonic device imaged in a character. A name, together with
its visual character, points to or refers to an actual event/thing. In so
doing, a name, together with its visual character, the latter itself being a
pattern of lines, conveys or connects a pattern of discrimination in the
heart-mind with pattern discerned in an actual event/thing.”
In this
manner, a name, together with its visual character, corresponds with a
patterned event/thing in the actual world. We need to take account of
four other points regarding names.
First, a pattern of discrimination in the heart-mind is deemed to be
in one-toone correspondence, uia a name, with a pattern discerned in one
actual eventlthing.” That is to say, names are specific: one name corresponds to one e ~ e n t l t h i n g . ~ ~
Second, names compound together. That is to say, while holding to
the view that one name corresponds to one event/thing, in everyday use,
it is a combination of names which corresponds to one actual event/
thing. If names did not combine to refer to one actual event/thing, the
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list o f names would be as long as the number of separate events/things in
the world, that is to say, infinite. In fact, however, every name combines
with other names such that one compound name refers to one specific
event/thing in the world. To illustrate, the Chinese people have almost
always not been concerned with “chair” or “chairness” abstractly, but,
rather, for example, with “the third chair to the left of the person at the
head of the table.” Knowing the specific, combined name of that one
chair in a spccifk time and place, one knows how to act visa vis that one
specific chair. It is the appropriate action in this example, sitting or not
sitting in the “third chair to the left of the person at the head of the
table,” depending upon one’s relationship with the person at the head of
the table and others to his or her left or right, which is what matters in
Chinese society and thinking-not universal “chairness,” which cannot
possibly inform one whether to sit or not to sit in a specific chair.w
Third, as just illustrated in the above example, patterns of discrimination in the heart-mind, which are deemed to be in o n e - t o m e
coherence-via names (ming)-with patterns discerned in actual events/
things, are not patterns of stillness but patterns of action.” In addition,
a name or a combined name, associated with a pattern of discrimination
in the heart-mind which is deemed to cohere with a pattern discerned in
an actual event/thing, is not descriptive of what an event/thing is; to the
contrary, it is prescriptive of what an event/thing ought to do and what
someone vis a vis an eventlthing ought to do.= Were we to use the
Chinese term “duo” (literally, ‘ b a y ” or “path”) to substitute for
“patterns” or “pathways of activity,” we could say that a name conveys
or connects dao in the heart-mind with duo in actual eventslthings.
Learning names, then, is to be instructed in dao (pathways of action).
Learning names or accumulations of names (oral-written tradition)
enlivens dao in heart-mind so that how one lives aligns with dao in actual
eventdthings.
Fourth, names (together with visual characters) that are associated
with patterns (pathways of activity) in the heart-mind, which themselves
are deemed to cohere with patterns (pathways of activity) discerned in
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actual events/things, are learned through convention, custom, and use.93
In W n e s e , practiced use of “this” (shi) and “not this” (fei) is one instrument, among others, to narrow down the range in our actual experienced
world which social convention and custom determine as corresponding to
a name and the heart-mind’s discriminations associated with that name.%
As one learns a language, one is, at the same time, socialized,
“customized ,” into thinking patterns and values of a cultural group.95
Names are collectively known and shared, and, given the mnemonic visual
peculiarities of Chinese characters which enable unusually tight cohesion
among 1) patterns of discriminative activity in heart-mind, 2) patterns in
names and 3) patterns of activity in actual events/things, it is easy to see
how a change in names leads directly to changed patterns of social interactions within the actual world. New names, conveying newly cognized
patterns of discrimination in heart-mind deemed to be in one-to-one
correspondence with newly discerned aspects of patterns in the actual
world. result in newly desired ways of socially interacting i n that world.
These new names function in the same way as the old ones did: to bring
social conformity as well as conformity between human and natural
activity.%
From early on Chinese scholars have been aware that the same name
can be associated with different patterns of discrimination on the part of
the heart-mind, which patterns are deemed t o be in cohesion with
pattern in one and the same actual event/thing. This does not contradict
our “actualist” thesis presented here, but further confirms it in that
persons are aware that pattern in actual events/things can be discerned
differently or incompletely by different persons. While pattern in actual
events/things may itself change, our collective and individual discernment
of pattern in events/things surely changes, deepens, and transforms over
time. One could say that the history of Chinese intellectual thinking is
a history of efforts t o discern or to know pattern in the actual world from
diverging points of view. Differing fragments and corners of Chinese
actualist discernment have emerged at different times often giving rise to
wrangling debates. That history is not yet closed.
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Throughout this history the whole point of knowing, of engaging
in patterns of discriminative activity in the heart-mind which are deemed
to cohere with patterns discerned in actual events/things, has been to
encourage and otherwise enable one's or a group's actions to align with
patterned action discerned as already present in (zai) the world. Why?
The traditional Chinese discernment has been that inborn or Heaven-given
pattern (whether called de [inner moral force] or Xing [inborn nature] or
xin [heart-mind] ) in human persons and in actual events/things is good,
life-supporting, and harmonious: Heaven-given pattern is the pattern or
pathway of activity leading to abundance, the best that life can offer. No
wonder efforts to align with pattern (whether called Tian, dao, li [ritual],
or li [principle]) in actual events/things, to adjust to it, to cohere to it,
to live and move with it, have engaged the seriousness and sincerety of
Chinese people for thousands of years. The effort has been to track in the
pathway of life itself.
One problem that Chinese people have struggled with, given this
actualist discernment, is how to arrive at complete, and accurate knowing
(that is, complete, accurate engaging in patterns of discriminative activity
on the part of the heart-mind) of pattern in the actual world. Precise
knowing of patterned action discerned as already present in actual events/
things enables precise alignment of one's actions with patterned action
in actual events/things. Such precise alignment leads to abundance, life,
and all that is good.
Traditional Ru (Confucian) and Daoist views are those which seek
to align with patterned action discerned as already present in (mi)events/
things in the actual world. Neither Ru or Daoists seek to change pattern
already present in events/things or to impose pattern upon e~ents/things.~'
However, Ru and Daoists differ in their views of the extent to which
pattern discerned as already present in eventslthings fully or completely
manifests ofitselfso (siran) in eventslthings. Daoists tend to take that
which is of-itself-so (siran), untouched by human intentions (wu wei),
as complete and perfect manifestation of dao in a human person or an
eventlthing. Ru tend to take that which is of-itself-so as not yet fully
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manifesting dao in a person or an eventlthing. In Ru discernment, what is
inborn or “endao-ed” we could call “the grain in the wood.” What is
needed is cultivation, pruning, cutting away (xiuyang) “to bring the grain
out in the wood,”98 to manifest fully pattern which is discerned as
already in the wood. In either the Ru or Daoist view, discernment of
dao begins with discerning dao in actual events/things here in the everyday world and leads to ever finer discernment of dao in itself in the
end.
Yet, ever finer discernment of dao in itself in the end does not
abandon discernment of
~ Q Oin
actual events/things in everyday living.
Rather, ever finer discernment of dao leads to ever truer tracking with
dao in everyday life.99
In closing this sub-section, we would return to the point that pattern
discerned as already present in actual eventslthings, may be incompletely
cognized, known, or illumined in one’s heart-mind. Incomplete knowing
of pattern discerned as already present in the world results in action which
is out of alignment with patterned activity in actual eventsithings. If such
incomplete knowing of pattern is shared by a large number of persons,
the result is chaos.
Importantly, in the traditional Chinese view, pattern can be manifested perfectly in actual events/things here in the everyday world. In the
traditional Chinese view, what gets in the way of complete knowing of,
alignment with, and resulting manifestation outwardly of pattern in
human activity and in actual events/things has to d o with some aspect of
the human heart-mind’s engagement with “qi” (energy-matter). Aspects
of qi which are considered to block or muddy patterned discriminative
activity in heart-mind include self-interest, excess emotion, and lack of
study-practice (xuexi). In the Chinese case, the solution to the problem of
knowing involves purification of qi, that is, some form of self-cultivation
which eliminates self-interest, excess emotion, and lack of study-practice.
This is true for members of both
Ru and Daoist schools, although the
terms, methods, and what is studied differs between them.
Interestingly, the Platonic Realist school has it somewhat the other
way around. For Plato, pattern or ideais real and can be known perfectly
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in the mind. By contrast, manifestation or expression of pattern in actual
things here in the world is always incomplete and, therefore, actual events/
things are always to some extent unreal. What gets in the way of events/
things completely manifesting pattern or form is events/things ’ engagement with matter, not the heart-mind’s engagement with matter as in the
Chinese case. The upshot of this view is that purification of the mind
from effects of matter is not required for complete knowing of idea or
form. That is to say, Chinese-style self-cultivation is not required for
complete knowing of idea. Instead, because idea is discerned to be logical
in the Realist view, the more logical one’s thinking is, the more idea is
known. Logical rigor does not require elimination of self-interest, moderation of emotions, or study-practice of books or methods from oral-written
tradition. Therefore, Western logical training is a kind of learning which
is quite different from Chinese self-cultivation.
3.
Chinese ‘you ”(have,having) and “zai”(is (presentJ in)
Were we to express Chinese actualist discernment in Chinese, we
could put it thus:
tianxia you dao (under Heaven has dao). Let us
examine the three terms of this expression.
First, “tianxia (under Heaven) refers to “our everyday world”
as we know it. Tianxia also refers to “ten thousand (infinite) events/
”
things” within our everyday world. Hence, we can translate Chinese
tianxia as either “under Heaven” or “all under Heaven.” As we shall see,
both expressions refer to that which may serve semantically as a general
location.
Second, “you ” is quite similar, both semantically and syntactically,
to English “have.” One may have (you) a book (shu),have (you) a friend
(pengyou), have (you) a life (shenghuo), have (you) a way (duo), and so
forth. Chinese syntactic constructions using “you “ are similar to English
syntactic constructions using “have” in that the “agent” of you may be
a person, an animate being, or an inanimate event/thing. In Chinese, when
an inanimate event/thing as a location serves as agent of you, it has a locali
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tional suffix attached to a noun (which refers to an inanimate event/
In English, the Chinese noun with locational suffix may be
literally translated into English using a prepositional phrase. For example,
in Chinese one may say “ra you yiben shu”(he has a book). Or, may say
“fade shouli you yiben shu”(literally, in his hand has a book). The usual
case in English is that a noun alone, not a prepositional phrase, expresses
an inanimate event/thing as a location which serves as agent of having:
e.g. the table has a book; his hand has a book, the house has a gate.
Hence, in the expression we are considering, rianxiuyou duo, while “under
Heaven has duo” is a literal English translation, a more grammatical
English translation is “all under Heaven has dao.
Third, as regards, the Chinese term “duo, ”Chinese tradition has had
several terms for “pattern” discerned as already present in (mi)events/
things in the actual world: tian (Heaven), d m (Way or Path), li (pattern,
principle), among others. Each highlights a different facet of the Chinese
discernment of pattern in actual events/things. In the discussion which
follows concerning Chinese “you” (have, having) and “zai” (is in), we
shall start by using the term “dao”(pathway of action) and then turn t o
“li“ (pattern, principle), a term which Ru (Confucians) of the Song-Ming
period used as did Feng Youlan.
We want now to take note briefly of some general aspects of Chinese
linguistic patterns. We cannot explore here, as we have elsewhere, the
“ergative” deep structure of Chinese semantics, which takes action undergone by an object as the primary semantic unit. By contrast, Western
languages take a subject performing an action, possibly upon an object,
as the primary semantic unit. While Chinese semantic relations may also
be expressed as subject-action-object relations, we would suggest that
imposing Western semantic relationships upon Chinese expressions may
result in some distortion of what is originally intended in Chinese. In this
regard, we have found “case order,” or even better, “role order,” t o work
best in describing Chinese syntax.lW
In Chinese expressions, focus is on action which an object undergoes.’” An agent in an action which an object undergoes may be known,
thing).
”
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but often may not be stressed in the meaning of an expression. Hence,
although a known agent of an action which an object undergoes has a
syntactic role in an expression, the agent in this syntactic role may be left
implicit and not expressed. Again, semantically, what matters is action
undergone by an object. Therefore, a meaningful expression in Chinese
need only express syntactically an action (in action role) and an object
which undergoes that action (in object role). Moreover, once an object
which undergoes an action has been presented or is known, expression of
the object in syntactic object role can also be dropped, although it retains
its syntactic place, even if unexpressed.
Let us consider how these general remarks about Chinese syntax
are exemplified in the expression “tianxia you dao ” (under Heaven has
dao or all under Heaven has dao). You refers to an action serving in
syntactic action role. Dao refers to an object, serving in syntactic object
role, which undergoes the action you. Tianxia refers to a location in
which the action you, which dao undergoes, takes places. In ‘You’’
constructions, the location where action takes places serves in syntactic agent role. But, as stated above, the agent of an action is often
unstressed and, although known and having a syntactic role to play, may
be left implicit. Hence, Chinese “tianxia you dao” (all under Heaven has
dao), and ‘you duo (has dao) have the same meaning, when the location
is known but implicit in the second instance. What is central in the
meaning of either expression is the action you (in action role) that dao
”
(in object role) undergoes. Tianxia (in syntactic agent role), as the
location where the action takes places, is integral to the meaning of the
expression, but not stressed. In addition, once we know an object which
undergoes an action-in this case, dao-we can drop explicit mention of
the object in syntactic object role and simply state the action in
syntactic action role-in this case, ‘>ou”-which is a thoroughly meaningful and syntactically complete utterance in Chinese.”’
Another Chinese expression “dao zai fianxia” (dao is under Heaven
or dao is in all under Heaven) is in mirror-like relationship with the expression “rianxiu you dao ” (under Heaven has dao or all under Heaven has
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dao). In this new expression, Chinese “zai“refers to an action which duo
in syntactic object role undergoes. Let us take a moment to examine
Chinese “zui” before analyzing the “zui” construction of this new expression
I
Chinese “zai” refers to an action which in English could be expressed
by fabricating an English verb “to in” a location. Normally, “in” is a
preposition requiring by rules of English syntax the addition of “is” prior
to “in” in order to have a proper English verb, “is in,” referring to the
action of “in.” The English term “is’ in “is in,” which we use to translate
Chinese “zui, ” is what we would call “floppy is” in that it carries no deeper
meaning, certainly no existential meaning or existential claim, but simply,
given requirements of English syntax, connects the object undergoing an
action and the action it undergoes, in this case, the action of “to in” a
~ocation.’~~
We could expand upon our knglish translation of Chinese “zai”
with the expression “is present in” a location. We find this expansion
helpful in that it makes clear in English that Chinese “zai”refers to an
action. In addition, when the location is known b u t left implicit in an
expression using “zui, ” “zai” is best translated as “is present” rather than
simply “is,” as the latter expression suggests an existential claim which is
nor intended in expressions using Chinese “zai. Accordingly, the Chinese
expression “shu zai” is best translated as “a book is present” or “a book is
here” (adding a general location word). English statements such as “a
”
book is” or “a book exists” are nor what is intended by Chinese.“shu
zai. ”
Further, English translation of “iui” (is [present] in) may be
modified somewhat depending upon the location in which an object is
affirmed to be present. For example, if the location is an inanimate
event/thing with an attached locational suffix shang (above, on top), then,
“zai” in English becomes “is [present] above, is [present] on top” as in
“shu zai zhuozishang” (a book is [present] on top of the table). The
same is true for other locational suffixes in Chinese such as zhong (within),
xia (below), nei (inside), wui (outside), xiun (before, in front of), hou
(after, behind), and so forth. Accordingly, English translation of Chinese
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“zai” (is [present] in) is modified by changing the preposition in English
to correspond with a locational suffix in Chinese. Hence, “zai”may be
translated into English as “is [present] above,” “is [present] within,”
“is [present] below ,” and similarly for inside, outside, before, after, and
so forth.
Chinese “zai” may also be used in conjunction with other action
terms in Chinese, for example, “zhunzai”(stands in, above, within, below,
before, after) or ‘Yungzui” (put in, above, within, below, before, after).
In combination with another action term, “zui” indicates the action of
“in” or “present in” a location in conjunction with another action undergone by an object in a location.
In general, in this volume, we translate “zui” simply as “is in”
(above, below, within, before, after, and so forth). This translation works
well whether “zai” stands alone as a single action term in syntactic action
role or whether “zai” is used in conjunction with another action term in
syntactic action role. In some instances, for clarification, we will use an
expanded English translation “is [present] in (above, below, within, and
so forth)” to make clear that Chinese “zui” refers to an action of
“presence in” and not to an existential claim.
If we analyze semantically the second expression (duo zui tiunxiu)
in which “zai” appears, “zui” is an action, “duo” is an object/entity
which undergoes an action, and “tianxiu” (under Heaven or all under
Heaven) is a location where an action “zai”takes place. Syntactic roles in
this second expression are somewhat different from those in the first
expression “rianxiu you duo ” (under Heaven has duo), which this second
expression appears to mirror. In the second expression, “zui” serves in
syntactic action role and “duo,” which is an objectlentity undergoing
an action “zai,” serves in syntactic agent role. “Tiumiu,” where an
action takes place, serves in syntactic locative or location role and may
be preceded by Chinese “yu,” which marks terms serving in syntactic
locative role.
In the “zai” construction, as in the mirror-like ‘you ”construction,
the meaning of an expression centers on an action and an object which
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undergoes an action. However, in the “zui”construction, an object which
undergoes an action serves in syntactic agent role and is stressed. Not
only is an object undergoing an ac‘tion given greater stress in the role of
agent in the “zui” construction, the location where action takes place
serves in locative role and is also given greater emphasis than in the
‘you” construction. In fact, the “zui”construction is often used to make
explicit and precise the location where action takes place, while that
location is often left implicit or ambiguous in the you” construction.
In summary, the “y o u ” construction and the “zui” construction in
mirror-like ways make the same affirmation: an action is undergone by
an object in a location. The “you” construction retains underlying
ergative semantic structure in that an object which undergoes an action
does not syntactically serve as agent in the expression. A location, serving
as agent in the action, is unstressed, and, although having a syntactic role,
often remains implicit. The “zui” construction, while retaining ergative
semantic deep structure, is syntactically much more rigorous in stressing
an object which undergoes an action by placing it in syntactic agent role
and in stressing a location in which an action takes place by placing it
in locative role.
As with the “you” construction, in the “zai” construction if the
location is known and not under scrutiny, i t may be dropped from explicit
mention while retaining its syntactic place. Hence, “duo zui tianxiu”and
“duo zui” have the same meaning, when the location is known but implicit
in the second instance. Furthermore, if the object in question is known
and not under scrutiny, it also may be left implicit, leaving simply “zai”
(is present, is here). This expression of a simple “zui,” like its counterpart
“you,” when the location of a n action and a n object undergoing a n
action are known but implicit, is a semantically and syntactically complete
utterance in Chinese.
What is interesting about “you ” and “mi” constructions is that
one construction can always be converted into the other. That is t o say,
an expression which states that a location has (you) an object can always
be converted t o an expression which states that a n object is in (zui) a localvi
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tion. Four aspects of these mirror-like syntactic patterns draw our attention.
First, as stated above, “zai” expressions do not make existential
claims of the sort that an object is or an object exists. Rather, “zai”
expressions intend to affirm “presence in” a location on the part of an
object. Given the convertability of “zai” expressions to “you” expressions, “you” expressions also do not make existential claims. Rather,
“you” expressions intend to affirm that a location “has” an object. One
may want to compare certain specific Chinese “you” and “zai” expressions with certain specific Western expressions that use “exist” or “is,”
but this would be a comparative analysis of specific expressions that are,
perhaps, similar in meaning. One could not, however, on the basis of some
similarity in meaning between certain specific expressions, go on to say
that all Chinese “you expressions are “equivalent” to English “exist”
expressions, such that ‘>ou ”can substitute for “exist” or vice versa.
”
Second, in “you” constructions the location in which the action of
“having” (you) takes place is often left implicit. By converting a ‘YOU”
construction to a “zai” construction, not only is the location where the
action takes place rendered explicit and stressed, the object which undergoes an action in a location is stressed in the syntactic role of agent.
Hence, the “zai” construction makes clear what the more vague ‘You”
construction often leaves implicit:
the linking of an object with a
location. One could say that the linking of an object with a location is
the purpose of either “you” or “zai” constructions.
Third, the meaning of “you” (have) and “zai” (is [present] in) is
generally vague. These are actions which, as we have just stated, link an
object with a location. Using English passive constructions we could say
that when an object is “had” Qou) in a location, it is ‘‘present in” (zai)
a location. Neither ‘You” or “zai” say very much about what kind of
linking takes place between an object and a location. In fact, the kind of
object and the kind of location will tell us more about their actual linkage
than the terms “you”and “zoi”do. That is to say, the precise meaning of
“you”and “zai”is highly dependent upon 1) the object “had” or “present
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in” and 2 ) the location where having or presence takes place. Hence,
when translating into English expressions using either “you” or “zai,”
it is important t o make clear in English both the object which undergoes
an action and the location in which the action takes place. even if these
are left implicit in Chinese.
Fourth, given that the precise meaning of ‘‘you” and “aai” shifts
according to object and location, apart from English “have” for Chinese
‘you” and “is [present] in” for “zai,” it is difficult to arrive at m y
English terms which can be used consistently t o translate ‘:vou” and “zai”
in all contexts.
In closing, both expressions, “tianxia you duo” and “duo zai
tiunxia,” affirm that duo (pattern, way, path) is “had” (you) or “present
in” (zai) in all under Heaven. If we substitute the phrase “actual events/
things in our everyday world” for “all under Heaven,” both expressions
affirm what we have described in the previous sub-section as Chinese
actualist discernment: 1) actual events/things in our everyday world have
(YOU) duo and 2 ) dao is present in (zai) actual events/things in our everyday world.
4.
“You (have), ‘Zai” (is [present] in), and “Cunzai”(exist)
”
To discuss Chinese actualist discernment further, we shift now to
Song-Ming philosophical terms used by R u scholars.
We have already
articulated Chinese actualist discernment using the expressions “all under
Heaven has dao” (tianxia you duo) and “duo is in all under Heaven”
(dac, zai tianxia). Using the term Zi (pattern, principle),1w a term central
t o Song-Ming Ru philosophy, we may express Chinese actualist discernment as “all under Heaven has b o u ) li” and “li is (present) in (zai) all
under Heaven.” Further, as we did at the end of the previous sub-section,
we may substitute “actual eventslthings in our everyday world” for “all
under Heaven .” yielding the expressions “actual events/things in our
everyday world have (’you) li” and “Zi is present in (zai) actual events/
things in our everyday world.”
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In Song-Ming expression
of
Chinese actualist discernment,
“qi” refers to that which manifests Zi (pattern, principle) in actual events/
things in shape-and-form (Xing) in space-and-time (shijiun) in the everyday world. “Qi” is difficult to translate well in English. In some ways
qi is like Greek pneumu or Sanskrit prunu, both meaning something akin
to “breath.” What is intended is a name for fundamental “spirituopsycho-physical matter-energy fluidconcrete stuff” by which all events/
things manifest in actual shape-and-form in space-and-time. Qi is a
continuum of “concreteness,” more or less subtle or gross, which is patterned by Zi (pattern, p r i n ~ i p l e ) . ’ ~For
~ the sake of brevity, to present the
spectrum of Chinese discernment of qi, from subtle energy of the soul to
concrete blocks, we have adopted “energy-matter’’ or, simply, “matter”
to translate both Chinese “qi” and the combined term “qizhi.”
Put simply, “that which is manifested” is Zi, and “that which manifests” li is qi. Li which is discerned as present in (zui) actual eventslthings
is called “substance” (ti) in Song-Ming philosophical terms. Furthermore,
the manifestation of Zi through qi (energymatter) in shape-and-form in
space-and-time, that is, in eventslthings of the actual world, is called
“function” Qong). That is to say, an event (shi) or a thing (wu) is a
function, a manifestation-a setting forth through qi in shape-and-form
in space-and-time-of the presence of substance Zi. In brief, then, li is
substance and Zi and qi together is function. We discern substance (li.)
through function (Zi and qi). In other words, we discern pattern or
principle in actual events/things in the everyday world.
We may use ‘you” and “zui” linguistic constructions to express
discernment of Zi as substance present in actual eventslthings as
function in the everyday world. In linguistic semantic analysis, li as substance is considered an “object” or “entity” which undergoes an action
referred to using either ‘you” (have) or “zui” (is [present] in). Furthermore, in linguistic semantic analysis events/things as function may serve
as a locution or place in shape-and-form in space-and-time in which an
action, either ‘you” or ‘‘zui,” takes place. We have already observed
in the previous sub-section that in “you ” syntactic constructions,
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a location serves in syntactic agent role as that which ‘>you” (has) a n
objectlentity.
In ‘ r a i ” syntactic constructions, a location serves in
syntactic locative role and an object/entity which undergoes an action
semes in syntactic agent role and is that which “zai” (is [present] in)
a location. In this manner, in both “you” and “zai”statements, events/
things as function serve linguistically as a location. What is stated is that
either events/things as function have @ou) Zi as substance or li as substance
is present (zai) in events/things as function.
Expressions such as “under Heaven” (fianxiu),“all under Heaven”
(fianxia), “the world” (shijic), “the ten thousand things” (wan w i t ) .
“actual events/things in the everyday world,” and so forth, may all be used
interchangeably with “events/things.” Each of these expressions refers
to what Song-Ming Ru philosophers call function. In ‘)XU’’ and “zai”
syntactic constructions, each of these expressions (referring to events/
things as function) may serve as a location in which li (as substance),
serving as objectlentity, undergoes an action, either “you” (have) or
“zai”(is [present] in).
“You” and “zai” syntactic constructions niay be used to express
not only discerned linkage between substance and function. but also discerned linkage between one function and another function. That is to
say, “you” and “zai” constructions may be used to express discerned
linkage between one actual event/thing and another actual event/thing.
Linguistically, one actual event/thing serves as object/entity, in syntactic
object role, which undergoes an action. Another actual event/thing serves
as a location in which action takes place. This location takes syntactic
agent role in a “JJou”construction or syntactic locative role in a “zai”
construction. In this manner, for example, “the third man on the left
has b o u ) a very large, blue book in his hand” (zuobian de di san wei de
shouli you yige hen da de lan yansi de shu) mirrors “a very large, blue
book is in (zai) the hand of the third man o n the left” bige hen da de lun
yansi de shu zai zuobian de di sun wei de shouli). Neither of these expressions using
‘YOU”or
“zai” t o express discerned linkage between one
event/thing (function) and another event/thing (function) is an existential
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claim. Similarly, a statement expressing discerned linkage between li or
duo (substance) with events/things (function) is also nof an existential
claim. In our analysis, none of these traditional and customary ‘’you”
or “zai” expressions makes an existential claim. Rather, “you and ‘kai”
”
syntactic constructions are used to express discerned relationship, either
between substance and function or function and function.
In our translations of Chinese ‘>ou” and “zai” to this point, we
have not used the Western term “exist.” We would argue that the issue of
existence, as Western phlosophcrs have understood it, has not been central
to traditional Chinese philosophy. When Chinese philosophers list and
discuss terms and concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy, “cimzai, ”
which is a combined Chinese expression used t o translate the Western
notion of “existence” into Chinese,lW is not usually mentioned.
In the Chinese expression “cutzzai,” the term “cun” is glossed both
as ‘you” (have) and “zai”(is [present] in).’”
However, as a combined
term, “cunzai, ” which is used to translate Western “exist” into Chinese,
means something quite different from either ‘you”or “zai”in traditional
and customary Chinese usage.
Importantly, unlike ‘’you” or “zai,”
Chinese “cunzai” does make existential claims in Chinese. Thus, we may
state that “a book exists” (shu cunzai) or “he exists” (fa cunzai). But
these statements are very different statements from the sort we have been
considering above such as “li is in events/things of the actual world” (li
zai shiwuzhong) or “a book is in his hands” (shu zai fa de shouli). These
latter statements link an object/entity with a location as a way of expressing a discerned relationship. In contrast, “cunzai” (exist) statements do
not express a discerned relationship; rather, they express discernment of
an event/thing in and of itself.
Strictly speaking, Chinese “cunzai” used to translate Western
“exist,” applies on& t o events/things as function, that is, to manifestations of li (substance) through q i in shape-and-form in space-and-time.
Hence, we may state that actual events/things in our everyday world
“exist.”
Furthermore, strictly speaking, we may not state that pattern
(whether li or
~ Q O which
)
is discerned in actual eventslthings “exists.”
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In Song-Ming Ru actualist discernment, events/things as function are
discerned t o manifest li as substance. Hence, in so far as events/things
manifest li, that is, in so far as, events/things are the durable extension in
shape-and-form in space-and-time of li, then the existence of events/
things gives or lends existence to li by extension. Li in and of itself does
not “exist.”
Because the term “cunzai” (exist) ends with “zai, ” “ccunzai” as an
expression shares some syntactic patterns with “zai.” For example, the
statement “a book exists under Heaven” (shu cunzai yu tianxia) syntactically parallels the statement “a book is under the table” (shu zai y u
zhuozixia). In so far as “cunzai” (exist) applies only to events/things in
our everyday world, the general location “rianxia” (under Heaven or our
everyday world) is often dropped from explicit expression. In brief, “x
exists” (x cunzai) often substitutes for ‘‘x exists under Heaven” (x cunzai
y u tianxia).
Further, in a manner similar to Chinese “zai” expressions, which
traditionally and customarily convert to “you expressions, Chinese
“cunzai”expressi0ns may be converted to one recently fabricated type of
‘You expression which has developed to accomodate the relatively new
Chinese term cunzai which translates Western “exist .” Using this recently
adapted type of “you” expression, “x exists under Heaven” (x cunzaiyu
rianxia) may be converted to “under Heaven has the existence of x ”
(tianxia you x de cunzai). We have just noted that in expressions
using “cunzai. usually the general location “under Heaven” is
known but left implicit. Similarly, in the one kind of adapted
“you” construction to which a “cunzai” expression may be converted, ‘ h d e r Heaven” may remain implicit. In this manner, “has
existence of x ” (you x de cunzai) is an abbreviation of “under Heaven has
existence of x ” (rionxiu you x de cunzai). Therefore, just as “x exists
under Heaven” (x cunzai y u tionxia) converts to “under Heaven has
existence of x” (rianxia you x de cunzai), so also the abbreviated expression ‘k exists” (x cunzai) converts t o the abbreviated expression “has
existence of x” (you x de cunzai).
One further abbreviation can take place with “has existence of x ”
(you x de cunzai). Under one set of conditions-namely, 1) if a general
”
”
”
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rocation which has x is “tianxia” (under Heaven or our everyday world)
and ‘2) if x is an event/thing in shape-and-form in space-and-time-an
even more abbreviated expression “has x” (you x ) may substitute for
“has existence of x ” (you x de cunzai). In addition, just as abbreviated
“x exists” ( x cunzai) may be converted to abbreviated “has existence of
x” (you x de cunzai), so also “x exists” ( x cunzai) may be converted to
this even more abbreviated expression “has x” (you x ) . Significantly,
under these conditions (and only under these conditions) both abbreviated
expressions “x exists” ( x cunzai) and “has x ” (you x ) make existential
claims in Chinese.
However, here we come upon an ambiguity with regard to the
abbreviated Chinese expression “you x . ” In the first instance, ‘You x ”
is an abbreviation for the longer expression “tianxia you
under Heaven
has x). “You” statements of this traditional and customary sort link an
object/entity “x” with a general location ‘’under Heaven” or “all under
Heaven .” “You” statements of this traditional sort convert to “zai”
statements of the form “x z a i y u rianxia”(x is [present] under Heaven or
x is [present] in all under Heaven), which also link an object/entity “x”
which a general location. As we have detailed above, these traditional and
customary “you ” and “zai” statements give linguistic expression to discernment of relationship by linking an object with a location and d o not
make existential claims.
In the second instance, under a specific set of two conditions (see
above), “you x ” may be an abbreviation for the longer expression “tianxia
you x de cunzai” (under Heaven has the existence of x). This one adapted
kind of ‘you” statement converts to a ‘%unzai” statement of the form
“x cunzai yu tianxia” (x exists under Heaven). “You x” (has x), as an
abbreviation of “rianxia you x de cunzai” (under Heaven has existence of
x), converts to an abbreviated expression “x cunzai” (x exists). These
adapted “you” expressions (in longer or abbreviated forms) which convert
to “cunzai”expressions, do make existential claims.
Thus, in the first instance, “you x” (has x), which traditionally
converts to “x zai” (x is [present] in), is not an existential claim. However, in the second instance, when the above stated two conditions pertain,
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that is, when “you x” (has x ) is an abbreviation for “tiunxia you x de
cunzoi” (under Heaven has the existence of x), then “you x,” which
converts to “x cunzai”(x exists), is an existential claim.
We noted above that once an object/entity “x” which undergoes
an action is known, it may remain implicit as a location does, leaving
“you” alone as a complete utterance.
In recent Chinese philosophy,
‘you,” as a complete utterance, retains the same ambiguity as “you
x”
does, namely, “you,” like “you x,” may be an abbreviation for a
statement that affirms 1 ) a location has x (and may be converted t o a
“zai“ statement) or it may be may be an abbreviation for a statement
which affirms 2 ) a location has the existence of x (and may be converted
to a “cunzai” statement). The latter is an existential claim whereas the
former is not. Hence, “you” alone is highly ambiguous. However, whcn
we make explicit what is implicit and understood with regard to a
location and an object/entity which undergoes an action in that location,
the ambiguity of both “you” and “you x” statements is largely eliminated.
This ambiguity with regard to ‘’yotc” and “you x ” statements which
abbreviate two quite different types of statements is a fairly recent phenomenon in Chinese philosophical discussion.
As we have stated above,
existential claims have not been central to traditional Chinese philosophi-
i a 1 thinking. However, with increamg assimilation of Western philosophical concerns, existential claims and their analysis have become quite prevalent in contemporary Chinese philosophical discussion today. It is importtant, therefore, to take special note of this ambiguity with regard t o
“you” and “you x” statements which can lead to significant confusion.
For example, this ambiguity in recent times with regard t o the abbreviated
statements “you” and “you x” has suggested t o some thinkers that all
“you ” expressions may be converted to “cunzai” expressions, that is, that
aN “you” expressions are existential claims. But this is the case only when
the above two conditions apply, that is, when “you” or ‘you x” is an
abbreviation for the longer expression “tianxia you .Y de cunzai” (under
Heaven has existence of x).
To say that all “you” statements are “cunzai”statements moves in
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the direction of bringing even more Western philosophical focus on
existence into Chinese philosophical discussion. As we shall learn shortly,
Feng Youlan’s New Lixuc does just this. Feng Youlan’s efforts in this
direction were intentional, to see how far this kind of focus on existence
could go in exploring Chinese Lixue philosophy. Our own view is that
whilc sonie “yon” statements may convert to “cutrzai” (exist) statements, it is important to recognize that in traditional Chinese philosophy,
“,I~OZC”
statements
generally convert t o “zai” (is [present] in) statements.
“You and “zai” statements give expression to discernment of relation”
ship, whether substance to function or function t o function, which is
subtly and importantly different from discernment of existence.
5. “You ”(have, having) arid “Wu ”(not have, not having)
Having examined in sonie detail how mirror-like syntactic constructions I ) use “J2’ou”and “zai” to link an object/entity and a location, and
2) differ semantically and syntactically from “cunzai” expressions which
make existential claims. our purpose in this section is to explore different
liiiguistic contests in which thc terms
‘bou’’(have. having) and its nega-
tion ‘’w~i”(not have, not having) occur. By taking account of which
object/entity is linked with which location, one or the other of which may
be implicit in actual expressioil, we argue that other than “have” and
no other English ternis can be
used consistently to translate these Chinese terms in all contexts. With
literal, explicit translations of y o u and wu in different contexts, one may
compare specific instances of you and wu in specific contexts with certain
Western philosophical expressions such as “existence” and %onexistence,” “being” and “non-being,” “something” and “nothing.” However, in making these comparisons, one needs to remember that these are
comparisons and not translations.
At the end of Sub-section Three above, we noted that the meaning
of “you (has) and of ‘zai” (is [present] in) is generally vague. As terms
whicl: link ail ubject/entity with a location, neither ‘(you”or “zai”offers
“not have” (for you and
~ v z irespectively)
”
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Jetails as regards to how an object/entity and a location are linked. Rather,
it is the object/entity and the location linked that tell us more about a
discerned relationship than the terms “you” or “zai” do. This is why it
is important, when translating into English expressions using either “you ”
or “zai,” to express explicitly in English both the location that has (you)
an objectlentity, that is, the location in which an object/entity is present
(zai), as well as the object/ entity had or present in that location, even if
location or object/entity is left implicit in Chinese.
Before setting forth examples of English translations of Chinese
“you ” and “wu ” in different contexts, three further aspects of ‘ y o u , ”
“zoi, ” and “cunzai”expressions need our attention.
First, how is each of these terms negated? The negative of Chinese
“you” in vernacular Chinese is “mei you” (not have) and in classical
Chinese is ‘ k u ” (not have). “Mei you” and “nu” function syntactically
in the same manner as “you.” For the remainder of this sub-section, we
shall focus on classical “wu.”
The negative of ‘kai” is “bu i a i ” (not
[present] in), which functions syntactically in the same manner as “zai. ”
Just as traditional and customary expressions using “you ” convert to
expressions using “zai,” so also expressions using “wu ”convert to expressions using “bu zai. ” Thus, ‘on the table does not have a book” (zhuozishang wu shu) converts to “the book is not on the table” (shu bu zai
zh uozishang).
The negative of “cunzai”(exist) is “bu cunzai”(not exist). We have
have noted above that the location in “cunzai” expressions is “under
Heaven” (tianxia) and is most often left implicit while yet remaining
understood. Furthermore, strictly speaking, “cunzai” applies only to
events/things in shape-and-form in space-and-time. With location implicit, an abbreviated “cunzai” expression of the form “x exists” (x
crtnzai) converts to one adapted type of “you ”expression, namely, “has the
existence of x” (you x de C U ~ Z Qwhich
~ ) , also leaves the known location,
under Heaven, implicit. Similarly, the negative expression ‘‘x does not
exist” (x bu cunzai) converts to one’ adapted type of ‘ k u ” expression,
namely, “does not have the existence of x” (wu x de cunzai).
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We have detailed how the abbreviated expression ‘you x ” is
ambiguous in that it may be an abbreviated expression for 1) a location
has x or 2) a location has the existence of x. The first of these two possibilities converts to a “zai” (is [present] in) expression and the second of
these possibilities converts to a “cunzai” (exist) expression. The negative
expression “Nw x” is also ambiguous. “Wu x” may mean 1 ) a location
does not have x or 2) a location does not have the existence of x. The
lirst of these possibilities converts to a “bu zai” (is not [present] in)
expression and the second of these possibilities converts to a “bu cunzai”
(does not exist) expression. In addition, once an objectlentity x which
undergoes an action is known and remains implicit along with a location,
then “wu” alone (like ‘you” alone) stands as a complete utterance, yet
retains the same ambiguity as “wu x ” expressions do.
Second, how are ‘you, ” “zai,” and “cunzai” (also their negatives)
nominalized? Generally speaking, each of these terms may serve both as
a verb and as a corresponding noun. What we have called “case” or “role”
order syntax illumines how Chinese terms may serve in syntactic action
role as a verb or in syntactic object, agent, or locative role as a noun.
Having made this general observation, in actual practice “you” and ’luu”
often serve as nouns, “having” and “not having,” respectively, while
“zai” and “bu zai” do not. “Cunzai“ also serves often as a noun
“existence” but “bu cunzai” does not serve Often as a noun meaning
“nonexistence .”
Third, as we have observed previously, in “you ”and “zai” syntactic
constructions, both dao or li and actual eventslthings may serve as an
object/entity linked with a location.’08 On the other hand, in Chinese
“cunzai” (exist) constructions, strictly speaking, only actual eventslthings
in the everyday world may serve as an object/entity affirmed to exist.
Turning now to examples of “you” and ‘Cvu”in different contexts,
in Chinese discernment the greatest possible location is “under Heaven”
(tianxia). We could say that “under Heaven” is the location of all ‘yuu”
(having). We could even say that “under Heaven” is all “you” (having).
With actual events/things in the everyday world, layers of ‘You”
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(having) are possible. Hence, all under Heaven can have a certain person;
that certain person can have a certain book; that certain book can have a
certain map; that map can have certain gradings of color, and so forth.
In each of these layers of ‘ j w u , ” an object/entity (serving in syntactic
object role) which is had (you) in one layer becomes a location (serving
in syntactic agent role) which has (you) another object/entity in a
second layer of “you,”and so forth.
However, when a layer of ‘Lyou” is negative, that is, ‘Ivu,’’ then
layers of ‘ y o u ” come to an end. For if an object/entity is not had, it
cannot, in turn, serve as a location which has anything else in another
layer. Hence, when dao is an objectlentity which under Heaven has Qou),
only two layers of “you”are possible. While under Heaven is discerned to
have
(YOU)
duo, duo of itself is discerned as not having ( w u ) anything
else .
In Chinese, we may express both these discernments, i.e. under
Heaven has dao and dao does not have [any object/entity] , in this combined expression: tianxia you dao er dao wu.’Io The first part of this
combined expression, i.e. under Heaven has dao, which expresses Chinese
actualist discernment, is so integral to Chinese everyday awareness, that it
is often left implicit, bur nof forgotten. Thus, “dao w u ” m a y stand as
an abbreviated expression for the whole combined expression. However,
when one encounters an abbreviated expression such as “dao wu” in a
text, its meaning remains enigmatic until careful linguistic analysis renders
explicit all that is implicit and abbreviated. Let us specify exactly how
this may be done.
For any object/entity “x” taken as a location serving in syntactic
agent role in a “you” or ”avu” linguistic expression, we may assume an
initial discernment expressed linguistically as ‘’under Heaven has object/
entity x” (riunxiu you x ) . Once an object/entity “x” is had (you) under
Heaven, it may be taken as a location, serving in syntactic agent role,
of a second ‘you” or ‘ k u ” statement wherein a second objectlentity is
said to be had or not had in that location. Hence;for the expression
“dao wu,” we may assume an initial discernment linguistically expressed
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as ‘under Heaven has duo” (tiunxiu you duo). Once duo is had under
Heaven, duo may be taken as a location serving in syntactic agent role
of a second ‘you,”in this case, ‘ku”expression.
In the second part of the combined expression in which duo now is
taken as a location serving in syntactic agent role, the action which is
undergone by an object/entity in syntactic object role is “wu” (not
have). However, the object/entity which undergoes the action of “not
have” is left implicit. That an object/entity is left implicit is made clear
by converting the “wu” (or “yrou”) construction to a corresponding “bu
zui” (or “zui”) construction (see above Sub-section Three). “Zui”
construction requires that an object/entity serve in syntactic agent role.
If an object/entity is left implicit in a “you” or “Wu” construction, we
must make this object/entity explicit to achieve a linguistically complete
“zui” or “bu zui” construction. In seeking to accord with the intention
of the expression “duo wu,” we take any actual event/thing as the object/
entity serving in syntactic agent role in the “bu zui” construction and
in syntactic object role in the corresponding “WU” construction. We
make “any object/entity x” explicit by supplying it in brackets. Thus,
we have “[any object/entity x ] is not present in (bu zui) duo” which
converts back to “duo does not have (wu) [any object/entity x] .” In this
manner, we become clear that the expression “duo wu” (duo does not
have) abbreviates “duo wu x (duo does not have x).”
Putting linguistic expression of an initially assumed discernment
that “under Heaven has duo” together with a second discernment linguistically expressed as “duo does not have [any object/entity x] ,” we get the
combined expression:
“under Heaven has duo and duo does not have
[any object/entity x] ” (rianxiu you duo er duo wu). We now have two
layers of ‘pou” construction, the second layer is a negative ‘You”construction, that is, a “wu” construction. In this manner, we arrive at full
explicit expression of what is implicit in the enigmatic “duo wu” expression.
When we analyze the meaning of “duo w u ” a s an abbreviation for
“tiunxiu you duo er duo wu,” we grasp that duo is discerned as had or
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present in the world, but
~ Q O
as
a location does not have (wu)my object/
entity. In effect, we are stating that although dao is had or is present
in the world, dao may not be considered as a location, for it does not have
any object/entity x linked with it. In other words, in Chinese actualist
discernment under Heaven has ~ Q O but
,
~ Q O
cannot be located anywhere
in space-and-time; only eventdthings can be located in space-and-time and
may serve as a location with which another object/entity may be linked.
We may re-state this point using Song-Ming Ru terms, when we say under
Heaven has li as substance, but li cannot be located anywhere in spaceand-time; only function can be located in space-and-time. This point will
be important to discussion of Feng Youlan’s philosophy in the essays of
Section Three of this volume.
With this linguistic analysis, we see that “you” and “wuri” as abbreviated expressions express discernment of “[under Heaven] has [any object/
entity x] ” or “[under Heaven] does not have [any object/entity x] ,”
respectively. If we nominalize “You”or “wu, ” then literal English translations of ‘You’’ and “wu” would be “[under Heaven’s] having [any
object/entity x] ” and “[under Heaven’s] not having [any object/entity
x] ,” respectively.
wu,”we could make one additional analysis of its linguistic structure. In this second analysis, we may
take both ~ Q Oand wu each as an object/entity. “Wu”taken as a nominalized object/entity would refer to “[under Heaven’s] not having [any
object/entity x] .” We may assume an initial discernment regarding each
O
wu. These initial discernments could be linguisticalobject/entity ~ Q and
ly expressed as “under Heaven has ~ Q O (tianxia you ~ Q O and
)
“under
Heaven has [under Heaven’s] not having [any object/entity x] (tianxia
YOU wu).” Once ~ Q O
and wu are discerned as had under Heaven, we can
For the abbreviated expression
“~QO
”
go on to say something more about each. In this second analysis of the
expression “ ~ Q O wu,” we take as its intention to assert sameness with
regard to dao and wu. To make this assertion in English, we supply in
brackets the English copula “is” between the two terms. In this manner,
wu” becomes “dao [is] wu.” If we offer complete literal transla-
“~QO
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tion of the whole of this abbreviated expression, including assumed initial
discernments regarding duo and wu,we have: 1) under Heaven has duo,
2 ) under Heaven has [under Heaven’s] not having (wu) [any object/
entity x ] , and 3 ) dao [is] [under Heaven’s] not having [any object/
entity x] . Importantly, this second analysis of “duo W U ” draws upon
our first literal translation of “wu” as “[under Heaven] does not have
[any object/entity x] .”
By making explicit what is left implicit in abbreviated expressions
such as “duo wu” which we have just considered, straight forward literal
translation and understanding of an enigmatic expression can be achieved.
On the other hand, if we notionally substitute Western philosophical terms
such as “non-Being,” or “non-existence,” or “nothing, void,” for Chinese
“Wu” regardless of syntactic structures which interrelate terms, then,
understanding of an abbreviated expression such as “duo wu becomes
”
confused. For example, if we substitute English “non-Being” for wu, then
“rim wu” in English becomes “duo [is] non-Being.” This substitution,
then, turns the affirmation that “1) under Heaven has duo, 2 ) under
Heaven has [under Heaven’s] not having [any objectlentity X I , and 3)
duo is [under Heaven’s] not having [any objectlentity x] ,” into a statement of quite a different sort, the meaning of which is not altogether clear.
We may well want to compare the three-fold full intent of “dao wu
”
as described above with an English expression which states “dao is nonBeing,” but this would be a comparison and not a translation. That is
to say, we cannot simply substitute English “non-Being” for Chinese
“wu.” We must first make explicit all that is implicit in the abbreviated
Chinese expression, then literally translate the whole Chinese expression,
before making a comparison. The same is true for other English terms
such as “nonexistence,” “nothing” or “void.” None of these terms syntactically matches Chinese “you” and ‘ k u ” well enough to be helpful in
making literal translation. Without careful literal translation, accurate
comparison of the meaning of philosophical statements coming from two
different languages is not possible.
Our own sense is that the three-fold full meaning of
“ ~ Q O wu”
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detailed above is compared better with the meaning of the English statement, “duo is Being,” than with the meaning of the statement, “dao
is non-Being.” But, again, this is a comparative assessment based upon
careful literal translation having made explicit all that is implicit in the
Chinese abbreviated expression. We could hardly take “is Being” as a
translation match for “wu ”in “dao W U . ”
We would offer a second example of an expression using
“WU”
which illustrates the importance of making explicit in English a location
which does not have (wu)a n object/entity and a n object/entity which is
not had. Kong Zi (Confucius) observed that duo did not prevail in the
everyday world of his time.”’ One could express this observation as:
tiunxiu wu duo (literally, under Heaven does not have duo).” However.
given Chinese actualist discernment of dao t o the effect that under Heaven
does have duo, we have t o consider the above espression to be an abbreviation of a longer statement.
We would suggest that an expanded statement of Kong Zi’s observation is a combined expression which has “under Heavzn has duo ”(tiui~xiu
you duo) as the first part. DQO,then. is discerned as liad ( J K X ~ )or present
(mi) in the world. As regards the second part of the combined expression,
what object/entity serving in syntactic object role is not had (wu)’! We
would suggest that “manifestation of duo ” (dao 2/72‘ shixiari)is the object/
entity not had and that “duo,” in this context. is an abbreviation for
“inanifestation of duo. ” In the first part of the combined expression,
“under Heaven” is taken as a location serving in syntactic agent role.
The same is true for the second part of this combined expression, that is
to say, under Heaven is taken as the location which does not have manifestation of duo. Taken together, we have a two-part combined expression: under Heaven has duo, but under Heaven does not have manifestation of duo (tiarixia you duo er tiunxia W U dao zhi shixian). The expression “tiunxiu wu duo” abbreviates this expanded expression by leaving
implicit the first part of the combined expression and abbreviating “manifestation of duo” as simply “ ~ Q o”. Making explicit what is implicit as
well as a careful literal translation of the whole combined expression
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renders clear the meaning of enigmatic “rianxia wzi dao. ” Kong Zi’s
remedy for “under Heaven’s having dao, but not having manifestation o f
duo” is had in the oral-written record of the way of sage-kings, but not yet
fully manifest in the world.
In summary, without making explicit the implicit locations and
objects/entities linked with locations in abbreviated Chinese expressions,
careful, literal translation of ‘(you” and “Wu” expressions is not
possible. Further, while substitution of a Western philosophical term
such as “Being” or “non-Being,” “existence” or “non-existence,” “something” or “nothing,” may perhaps work in one context or another, if at
all, notional substitutions of Western philosophical ternis will not work
consistently in all contexts. Zhang Dainian in his discussion of “you”
and
“wri ” in
traditional Chinese philosophy states, and makes clear in his
examples from classical texts, that “you” and “wrt” have n o constant
determination and are concepts having many layers of meaning.”* In our
view, we are much better off with a literal translation o f ':van ”and “Wu ”
which allows a location and an object/entity had or not had in that
iocation to inform us more fully as to what their linkage or lack of linkage.
linguisticdy expressed using “you ” or
“ ~ v ”~construction,
i
means in any
one context. Then we can compare specific contexts of ‘tvo;i“and “wrt
”
with certain Western philosophical notions.
One final point needs be emphasized. In our efforts t o make clear
the location and object/entity linked or not linked by “yyort”and ‘ k u , ”
we have labored hard throughout this volume t o avoid in each instance use
of the quite ambiguous English expressions “there is/exists” and “there is
not/does not exist” t o translate Chinese ‘You” and “Wu” respectively.
Conversion of a ‘you” or “Wu” syntactic construction t o a “mi”or “bu
mi” construction brings to the surface an implicit object/entity and an
implicit location. By making explict an implicit object/entity and an
implicit location in a “yort” or ‘ k u ” expression, and by literally translating “you” and “Wu” as “have” and “not have,” respectively, one can
invariably avoid English “there is/exists” or “there is not/does not exist”
in translation.
By avoiding “there is/exists” or “there is not/does not
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exist” in English, one avoids substituting existential claims in English
translation for “you ” or “zui” expressions in Chinese which do nof make
existential claims.
We close this section with four examples taken from classical
Chinese texts with 1) literal translation of Chinese “you”and “wu”of the
sort we have demonstrated above, and with 2) notional substitution of
Western philosophical terms offered by A . C . Graham. (In the literal
translations. first offered, we supply in brackets the locations, object/
entities and other terms left implicit in Chinese.)
He Yan (Ho Yen) (died A.D. 249) has made much the samc sort of
expression regarding duo as we have in our first expression above “under
Heaven has duo and dao does not have (any object/entity)” (fiunxiuyou
dao cr duo wu)”:
t.ir dao zhe, wei wu suo you zhe ye.
1.
2.
As for duo, [it is that which] alone does not have that
which is had.
The duo is only that in which there is not anything that
therz is.”’13
A statement by Wang Bi (Wang Pi) (A.D. 226-249) elaborates upon this
point :
Duo zhe, wu zhi cheng ye. Wu bu tong ye. Wu bu you ye.
Kuang zhi yue duo. Mo ran wu ti, bu ke wei xiaiig.
1.
As for duo, [it is] a name for not having (wu). [Under
Heaven] does not have (wu) [that which duo] does not
penetrate.
[Under Heaven] does not have (wu) [that
which] does not follow [duo] . [We] call it duo. [Duo] is
still and does not have (wu) a body and cannot be made
into an image.
2. The Duo is a term for Nothing. Since there is nothing it
does not pass through and nothing which does not
follow it, it is called by metaphor the DQO(Way). It is
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still and has no body, and cannot be treated as an
image. ‘I4
Another well-known passage comes from Lao Zi:
San shi f u gong yi gu, dang qi wu you che zhi yong. Yanzhiy i
wei qi, dang qi wu you qi zhi yong. Zao hu you y i wei shi,
dang qi wu you shi zhi yong. Cu you zhi y i wei li, wu zhi y i
w ei yong.
1.
Thirty spokes share one hub. Precisely where [the wheel]
does not have (wu) has (you)the usefulness o f the wheel.
Clay is taken to make a vessel. Precisely where [the
vessel] does not have (wu) has (you) the usefulness of the
vessel. Chiseling doors and windows is undertaken to
make a house, precisely where [the house] does not have
(wu) has the usefulness of the house. Thus, the advantage
which can be taken of having [is] the usefulness which
can be made of not having.
2. Thirty spokes share one hub; it is just where it does not
exist that the wheel is useful. We turn clay to make a
vessel; it is just where it does not exist that the vessel is
useful.
We chisel out doors and windows to make a
house; it just where it does not exist that the house is
useful. Therefore we draw advantage from them where
they exist, use them where they do not exist.’”
Our last example comes from the Xiang XiuGuo Xiang Commentary
on the Zhuang Zi, which Feng Youlan translated in the late 1920s:
Fei wei wu bu de hua er wei you ye, you y i bu de hua er wei
wu yi. Shi y i you zhi wei wu, shi qian bian wan hua, er bu de
y i wei wu ye. Bu de y i wei wu, gu z i gu wu wei you zhi shi
er chang cun ye.
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1.
[It] is not only that not having (wu) is not able t o transform to become having
(YOU).
Having
OOU)also cannot
transform to become not having (wu). For this reason, if
[we] take becoming things which pertains to having
b o u ) , evcn if [things] undergo a thousand changes and
ten thousand transformations, still we d o not acquire one
which becomes not having (wu). Because we d o not
acquire one which becomes not having, from old we do
not have (wu) a time of not yet having
(YOU).
[Having]
always is present (cun).
2.
It is not only that Nothing cannot be transformed into
Something; Something also can no longer be transformed
into Nothing, Therefore Something is so constituted that,
although it alters and transforms in thousands and
myriads of ways, it can never become Nothing. Because
it can never become Nothing, from the remotest past
there has never been a time before there was Something
and i t will always continue.Il6
6.
One Small Change: Ferig Youlan’s Philosophical Terms in English
Traitslation
We have observed in detail how, in traditional and customary use,
expressions “you ~ Q ”O ([under Heaven] has dao) and “ ~ Q Ozai” (duo is
present [under Heaven] ) mirror each other, semantically and syntactically.
In both expressions, “tianxia” (under Heaven or all under Heaven) is an
implicit location in which an action, referred to with either “you” or
“zai” serving in syntactic action role, takes place. In the discussion
which follows, we continue to be concerned with expressions which take
“rianxia” (under Heaven or all under Heaven) as an implicit location.
In the twentieth century Feng Youlan made one small change: for
statements with “tianxia” (under Heaven) as an implicit location, Feng
took “you” (have, having) statements as equivalent to ‘kunzai” (exist,
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existence) statements, rather than as equivalent to “zai” (is present in)
statements as in traditional Chinese p h i l o ~ o p h y . ” ~It is quite simply this
one small change, having endless ripple effects, that has caused a great
stir.
Feng knew well what he was doing in making this one small change.
His purpose was to explore how well and how far this one shift could
go in presenting traditional Chinese actualist discernment by using terms
of contemporary Western philosophy which cluster around the notion of
existence. Many have criticized Feng for making this shift; others have
marveled a t just how far he was able t o go with it.
In matching Chinese “you ” and “cunzai, the particular version of
”
English “existence” which Feng chose for this matching was that of New
Realism, a school of thought which came into its own during the early
1930s when
Feng Youlan was pursuing his doctoral studies
at
Columbia.”’ Applying New Realist understanding of “existence” to the
modern Chinese expression “cunzai” and matching “citnzai” with Chinese
found what he discerned as a bridge, crossing great waters,
linking Chinese traditional actualist philosophy and Western New Realist
‘ ~ y o r t , ” Feng
philosophy. Across this bridge, Feng willfully traveled t o open up and t o
engage insights of traditional Chinese philosophy within contemporary,
world-wide philosophical discourse.
We cannot explore all the ramifying shifts in Chinese philosophical
thinking that result from this one small change of aligning Chinese ‘Lyou”
with “ c u I ~ ~instead
u ~ ” of “iai” in expressions which have “tianxia” (under
Heaven) as an iniplicit location. We will, however, put our attention t o
four areas in which clusters of important changes occur. In doing so, the
stage is set for more detailed discussion of these changes in essays of
this volume.
We consider first how Feng is able to match all ‘>ou” statements
with “cunzai” statements when an implicit location is “under Heaven” or
“all under Heaven.”
We set forth in Sub-section Three above the ambi-
guity of the Chinese abbreviated expressions ‘ ~ o u and
” “you X ” under
two conditions: namely, when the implicit location of “you” is “under
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Heaven” or “all under Heaven” (riunxiu), and when objectlentity “x,”
which may or may not be implicit, is an actual event/thing in the everyday
world. Under these conditions the expressions ‘(you” and
‘ ~ O U
x”
may
be taken as abbreviations for either 1) under Heaven has x (tiunxiuyou x)
or 2 ) under Heaven has the existence of x (tiunxiu you x de cunzui). The
first of these longer expressions converts to a
‘‘Zai”
expression, i.e. x is
[present] under Heaven, and is not an existential claim. The second of
these longer expressions converts to a “cunzui” expression, i.e. x exists
under Heaven, and is an existential claim. When the above two conditions obtain, some consider that statements 1) and 2 ) are equivalent. That
is to say, under the two conditions above, some deem ’(you” statements
as equivalent to “cunzui”statements.
However, what happens when “duo” or “li” is taken as an object/
entity which is said t o be had (you) or present in (zui) in the implicit
location ”under Heaven” or “all under Heaven”? Strictly speaking,
“cunzui” applies only to actual events/things in the everyday world. If
duo or Zi assumes the role of object/entity in syntactic object role, which
may or may not be implicit, in the abbreviated expressions ’>you” and
“you x ” or their longer forms, can these expressions also be converted to
“cunzui” expressions? That is to say, are these “you expressions with
duo or li also deemed equivalent to “cunzui” expressions? If so, how?
”
In matching Western New Realist discernment with Chinese actualist
discernment, Feng Youlan not only brings withh him New Realist understanding of existence, but also “subsistence.”
English terms “subsist”
‘‘sub” meaning “under” and
“sisrere”meaning “to place, to stand.” English “hypostasis” has a similar
derivation from Greek: ‘‘hypo meaning “under” and “histunui”meaning
and “subsistence” come from Latin:
”
“to stand, to make to stand.” To “subsist” is 1) to be, to exist, 2 ) to
continue to be or exist, 3 ) to inhere (in) and 4) in philosophy, to be
logically conceivable and, hence, to hold true.119 Bearing these several
senses of “subsist” in mind, we could say that “subsistence” is a variant
of “existence” which is continuous, inheres in something else, and is
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ous, underlying, inhering, logically true existence.
Feng uses two Chinese terms, “qiunyou”and “qiuncun, “ t o translate
“subsistence.” Chinese “qiunyou is used in a manner syntactically
I’
parallel with Chinese ‘)um,”while “qiancun ”is used in a manner syntactically parallel with Chinese “cunzui.” We shall have more t o s3y about
these syntactic parallels in a moment. First, as regards the terms themselves, Chinese “qiun means “to hide, to conceal.” Keeping our literal
”
English translation of Chinese “you as “have, having,” “qiunyou”may be
translated literally into English is “hiddenly have, hidden having.” In the
Chinese term “qiuncun, “cun is an abbreviation of “cunzui. Literal
”
”
”
”
English translation of “qiuncun is “hiddenly exist, hidden existence.”
We carry on with these literal translations for the moment.
”
With the New Realist notion of subsistence, the above problem
regarding ‘)mu” statements with duo or li as an object/entity said to be
had or present in all under Heaven appears to be solved. By matching
Western “idea” or “form” (in the Platonic or New Realist sense) with
Chinese li (pattern, principle), li may be said to “subsist” (U qiuncun).
In other words, in New Realist terms, I ) actual events/things in the everyday world exist (cunzui) and 2) li subsist (qiancun). The first expression
in the form “x curzzui” converts to a ‘>ou” expression of you x de
cunzai” (has the existence of x). The second expression in the form of
“x qiuncun” converts to a ‘ ~ o u expression
”
of ‘you x de qiuncun.” In
this manner, whether actual events/things serve as an object/entity in
syntactic object role, or duo or li serve as an object/entity in syntactic
object role, all “you” expressions are deemed to convert to “cunzui” or
“qiuncun” statements. That is to say, all ‘(Yo~”statementsare deemed to
make either existential claims or subsistential claims. Further, when
the implicit location is “under Heaven” or “all under Heaven,” all “zui”
expressions are deemed equivalent to either existential or subsistential
claims.
This is a substantive shift as regards the import of traditional Chinese
philosophical statements. Specifically, as regards the meaning of ‘Pou,
its purpose is no longer understood to link an objectlentity with a location
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as a way of expressing discerned relationship. (See Sub-section Three
abovc.) Traditional non-assertiveness as regards “you” and “zai” expressions is abandoned as an object/entity serving in syntactic agent role
is asserted to “exist” i n itself. That is, instead of saying “(the world) has
a book” or “a book is present (in the world),”one asserts “book exists.”
Or, instead of saying ‘‘(the world) has me” or “1 am present (in the
world),” one asserts “I exist.” So also, instead of saying “(the world)
has dao” or “dao is present (in the world),” one asserts “dao
Before turning t o a second cluster of shifts which come with Feng’s
matching “you” with “cunzai” (instead of “zai”),we want to explore a
bit further syntactic constructions using 1) ‘>you” and “cunzai” and 2 )
“qianyou” and ‘‘qiancun. Syntactic constructions using these terms in
mirror-like ways parallel traditional and customary syntactic constructions
using “you” and “zai” in mirror-like ways. For example, the place or
general location which has (YOU) actual events/things Feng calls
“actuality” (shiji). The place or general location which hiddenly has
(qianyou) li (pattern, principle) Feng calls “truth” (zhenji). For Feng,
just as ‘you” statements convert into “cunzai”statements, so also ‘qiaiij’otc statements convert into “qiamun statements. Hence, “actuality
”
”
”
has events/things” (shiji you shiwu) converts to “events/things exist in
actuality” (shiwu cunzai yu shiji). Similarly, “truth hiddenly has Zi ”
(zhenji qianyou li) converts t o “Zi hiddenly exists in truth” (Zi qiancun
y u zhenji).’”
Bearing ir. mind Feng Youlan’s intentional matching of ‘ y o u ”
(have, having) with “cunzai” (exist, existence), why d o we not translate
both “you” and “cunzai” with English “exist” or “existence” in this
volume? Why d o we maintain a literal translation of ‘5~ou”as “have” or
“having”? Similarly, given Feng Youlan’s deliberate intention t o translate
the New Realist understanding of “subsist” into Chinese using both
“qiancun” and “qianyou,” why d o we not translate both these Chinese
terms back into English with “subsist” or “subsistence”? These are
important questions and after considerable painstaking effort in making
several alternative translations of the papers of this volume, our decision
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to work with literal rather than notional translations for “you,” “qiancun”
and “qianyou,” is deliberate for the following reasons.
First, as regards ‘you,” which for Feng is equivalent to “cunzai”
(exist), we have found that although Feng conceptually matches ‘you ”
with “cunzai,” the syntactic constructions in which Feng puts “JWu”
are traditional and customary syntactic patterns.
In addition, other
scholars whose papers appear in translation in this volume continue to use
“you ” in traditional and customary patterns. Therefore, to be consistent
with one translation of “you” through this volume, even though Feng
Youlan notionally matches ‘you ”with “cunzai,”we continue to translate
“you ” literally in its traditional and customary sense of “have”or “having.”
Second, Feng Youlan uses “qianyou,” the variant of “you” which
applies to dao or li, in traditional and customary patterns of ‘)ou ”as well.
Having decided for literal translation of “you, ” it has been helpful to go
with a literal translation of “qianyou ” (hiddenly have, hidden having)
so that semantic and syntactic parallels between “you ” and “qianyou”
are readily apparent. Similarly, because “qianyou” statements, with dao
or li serving as an object/entity in syntactic object role, convert to
“qiancun” statements, with dao or .li as an object/entity serving in
syntactic agent role, having decided for literal translation of “qianyou,
we opt also for literal translation of “qiancun” (hiddenly exist, hidden
existence). Chinese “cunzai” translates Western “exist” or “existence.”
”
So also, “cun” in “qiancun translates Western “exist” or “existence.”
Both “cunzai” and its shortened form “cun”we return back to English as
“exist” or “existence.”
In summary, in arder that we may present obviously in English
translation syntactic parallels between “qianyou and ‘you as well as
“qiancun and “cunzai, ” we return “cunzai” back to English as “exist,”
but we do not return “qianyou” and “qiancun” back into English as
“subsist” or “subsistence.” Without presentation of these syntactic
parallels in English, arguments of these papers can not be adequately
conveyed in translation. As one works into Feng Youlan’s use of these
terms as well as that of his critics, one will find literal translation of these
”
”
”
”
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terms essential for grasping semantic and syntactic inter-relationships
mong them,
Third, in exploring Feng’s conceptual match of ‘you ”with “cunzai”
while yet using syntactic patterns of “you” and ‘izai,”literal translation
of these terms is helpful in bringing to light “where the new shoe fits”
and where it does not. That is to say, literal translation of these terms
allows one to observe closely where the match between ‘you” and
“cunzai” aligns with traditional and customary use of you" and “zai”
and where it does not. In so doing, one comprehends where Feng’s use of
New Realist understanding of existence and subsistence aligns with
traditional Chinese actualist discernment and where it does not.
Finally, in practical terms alone, with regard to the essays in this
volume, we simply have found literal translation of 1) ‘(you” and 2 )
“qianyou ” or “qiancun ” for more efficient and requiring far less explana-
tory notation in English than notional matching of these terms with
English 1) exist, existence and 2 ) subsist, subsistence, respectively, even
though Feng Youlan did have those notional matches in mind. Importantly, we have found that literal translations of these terms does not detract
from but rather illumines Feng Youlan’s own matching of “you” and
“cunzai. ”
A second important area of shifting that comes with Feng Youlan’s
In
Western New Realist philosophy, ideas subsist and eventslthings exist. As
matching of “you” and “cunzai” concerns li (pattern, principle).
we have said, Feng Youlan matches New Realist “idea” with Chinese li;
so also Feng matches Western “event/thing” with Chinese shiwu. Hence,
li “subsist” (qiancun) and shiwu “exist” (cunzai). In addition, an idea, in
New Realist understanding, is universal and an event/thing is particular.
Feng also applies these notions of universal and particular to li and shiwu.
He does this using the Chinese term “gongxiang” for universal and the
Chinese term “shuxiang” for particular.
The Chinese term ‘ k k n g ” refers to “look, appearance” and has been
used by Buddhists to translate into Chinese the Sanskrit term “~aksam”
meaning “qualitylies of a thing.”’=
In his New Lixue, Feng distinguishes
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between “shared quality/ies” (gongxiang) or universals which are li, that
by which a certain thing is a certain thing, and “different quality/ies”
(shuxiang) or particulars, which are shiwu (events/things). In Feng’s
usage, “gongxiang” is similar to Chinese ‘pubian,” the latter meaning
“general, common.” Both terms, in Feng’s thinking, translate English
“universal .” Feng uses “shuxiang”in a manner similar to Chinese “teshu,
”
the latter meaning “specific, unique.” Both these latter terms, in Feng’s
thinking, translate English “particular.”
Feng’s matching of Chinese li with Western “idea” or “universal”
brings a significant shift concerning li in that Chinese actualist discernment
of one-to-one correspondence between pattern in heart-mind and pattern
discerned in eventslthings of the actual world takes on a new
understanding. (See Sub-section Two above.) Because a universal may
pertain to more than one eventlthing, Chinese actual discernment of li
shifts from one li for one eventlthing to one li for more than one event/
thing. Several philosophers in their essays in this volume will attend to
problems. insights, gains, and losses which accompany Feng’s matching of
Western “idea” or “universal” with Chinese li. We leave further exploration of ramifications, resulting from Feng’s matching of “you” and
“currzai, which concern li and Chinese actualist discernment of li, to
these essays.
A third area of shift resulting from Feng’s matching of ‘)mi’’ and
“cunzai” concerns ti (substance) and yong (function). As discussed in
Sub-section Four above, in Song-Ming Ru discernment li is discerned as
”
substance and events/things are discerned as function. Actual events/
things as function in shape-and-form in space-and-time are discerned
to manifest substance in the everyday world. In linguistic expression,
events/things are said to have (you) li. In this linguistic expression, events/
things are considered a location serving in syntactic agent role and li
is considered as an object/entity serving in syntactic object role.
Recalling He Yan’s statement. cited at the end of Sub-section Five above,
that “as for dao, it is that which alone does not have that which is’had”
cfu duo zhe, wei wu suo you zhe ye),’23 we may say also of li (pattern,
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principle) that li is that which alone does not have that which is had. That
is to say, in linguistic expression, although “under Heaven” or “all under
Heaven” or “all actual events/things” taken as a location serving in
syntactic agent role may be said to have dao or li, neither dao nor li when
taken as a location serving in syntactic agent role has anything else. In
effect, this is to say that neither dao nor li can be taken as a location. For in
Song-Ming Ru discernment, dao and li are not function but substance.
In our discussion of “you” and “zai” in Sub-section Three above,
we observed that in Chinese a locational suffix term such as “shang”
(above), or %a” (below), “zhong” (within), “xian” (before or in front
of), and so forth, may be added to an event/thing to indicate explicitly
that an event/thing serves as a location in a linguistic expression. It is
important to comprehend in English translation that Chinese expressions
such as “before things” (wuxian) or “above things” (wushang) or “within
things” (wuzhong) do not indicate a place separate from things. Rather,
the addition of a locational suffix indicates a sub-location within a location. Hence, in the expression “in front of’ the door, the door is the
location, and “in front o f ’ is a sub-location within the location of the
door. The same is true for the expression “above” the door, and so forth.
In Song-Ming Ru terms, Chinese actualist discernment has been
expressed as “li is [present] (mi) before things” (li zai wuxian), or “li
is [present] above things” (li zai wushang), or “li is present within things”
(li zai wuzhong). When li is described as present “before things” or
“above things” or “within things,” things is taken as a location, and
“before” or “above” or “within” is a sub-location of that location
(things). That is to say, “before” or “above” is not a place separate from
things as a location. Each of these Song-Ming expressions articulates
discernment of relationship between li and things, between substance and
function. Expression of this discerned relationship differs slightly as
regards the specific sub-location (above, below, or within) with respect to
things which are taken as a location, serving in syntactic agent role, that
is said to have li.
However, when Feng Youlan states, on the one hand, that truth has
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li (zhenji you Zi) or that li hiddenly exists in truth (Zi qiancun yu zhenji)
and, on the other hand, actuality has events/things (shiji you shiwu) or
that events/things exist in actuality (shiwu cunzai yu shiji), an important
shift has taken place. In linguistic expression, the location that is said to
have li is no longer actual events/things in the everyday world as in SongMing Ru expressions. Rather, in Feng Youlan’s expression, truth is taken
as a location, serving in syntactic agent role, and is said to have Zi; similarly, actuality is taken as a location and is said to have actual eventslthings.
In this manner, Feng in his New Lixue system does something quite
new with Song-Ming expressions such as “li is before events” (li zai shi
xian) and “Zi is above events” (Zi zai shi shang). He considers “before” or
above” not as a sub-location within a larger location “events,” but rather
as a location altogether separate from events. In this way, Feng enables
the Chinese language to discuss a “two world” theory: a world of li and
a world of actuality quite separate from each other and habng, in fact, no
point of direct contact. This, then, makes for what could be called a
“docetic” view of Zi and events/things.lX Essays of Sections Three and
Four of this volume, in particular Professor Ched h i ’ s essay, will explore
in detail ramifications with regard to Feng’s re-working Song-Ming terms
to express a “two world” theory.
Finally, we turn to a fourth importarit area of change, resulting from
Feng’s matching of “you” and “cunzai, which concerns the purpose for
which one engages in philosophy. Chinese actualist discernment and
”
description of the world would seem to lead in one direction, while
Platonic and New Realist discernment and description of the world would
seem to lead in another direction. This does not necessarily mean that
what is discerned in itself is different. Interestingly, Feng Youlan himself
fathomed that even though these two types of Chinese and Western philosophical discernment and description lead in different directions, still at
important points some of what is discerned and described on both sides
comes extremely close to the other -one could say, even touches the
other, only to part on another path. It is this convergence at significant
points that fascinated Feng Youlan and moved him to explore, deftly
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and brilliantly, whether all could converge between these philosophical
views. Our own view and that of many of Chinese philosophers today is
that while there is convergence at significant points, divergence between
these t w o philosophical views carries the day.
Those of Chinese actualist discernment have discerned actual events/
things in the everyday world as functional extensions into shape-andform and into space-and-time of substance li (pattern. principle).
As
concrete, durable extensions in shape-and-form in space-and-time o f
li. actual events/things are considered to manifest presence o f li in
the everyday world. L i is present (zai) in the world. Actual events/things.
which manifest li present in the world, exist (croizai) in the world. In this
view, w e could consider “cunzai” (existence) as a concrete, durable
variation of “zai” (presence in). That is to say, notionally, “existence” is
modelled o n “presence” and is an extended in shape-and-form in spaceand-time version of presence, In this view, “presence in” (zai) is more
primary than “existence” (cunzai). This is illustrated linguistically in that
“zai” may apply both to li and to events/things. “Cunzai”app1ies only t o
eventslthings. That is, we can state that fi is present in the everyday
world in actual events/things under Heaven, and we can state that events/
things are present (zni) in the world. However, “cunzai”as a variation of
“zai” applies only to events/tl;ings as function which manifests li as substance present in function.
Chinese actualists seek t o manifest perfectly -in shape-and-form
in space-and-time in existing (cunzai) actual events/things in the everyday
world-li which is discerned as already present in (mi) actual events/things
in the everyday world. As we have previously described, their efforts
have been “to bring the grain out in the wood” of everyday living. As
~ Q Oor li is discerned as the way to life, harmony, peace, and what is
good, then knowing ~ Q Oor li is for the purpose of manifesting dao or li
in activity in the world. The more perfect and complete knowing of
~ Q Oor li is, the more perfect and complete manifestation o f duo o r Zi
in practice is. In this manner, life, harmony, peace, and ali that is good
prevails here in the world.
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By contrast, Platonic and New Realist discernment and description
of idea and events/things in the world come from the other way around.
“Existence” pertains to events/things in shape-and-form in space-andtime. “Subsistence” is a rarefied, without shape-and-form,without spaceand-time, variation of “existence.” This is to say, notionally, subsistence
is modelled on “existence,” and is a more rarefied form of existence which
pertains to ideas or forms and is objective, true, and pure. Actual
manifestation of idea in shape-and-form in space-and-time in existence
is discerned as always imperfect, incomplete, and problematic. Therefore, Platonic and New Realists seek to pass through and beyond
existence, the realm of actual manifestation of ideas and universals, to the
realm of idea or form which subsists. What is treasured is perfect idea or
form, which can be contemplated, known, analyzed, and appreciated in
itself. As Bertrand Russell has described it, the world of ideas or universals
is unchanging, correct, precise, pure, bringing happiness and delight to
mathematicians, logicians, metaphysicians and all those who love life
and find it b e a u t i f ~ l . ’ ~ ~
To be sure, for early Western Realists such as Plato and Socrates,
to know idea or form (universal) is to enliven idea or form in
practice which is virtue. Some scholars have discerned convergence
here between China and the West as regards knowing idea/form
and knowing li (pattern, principle) in that both lead to moral practice.
Yet, clearly, the road which leads to unity of knowing and doing is
discerned and described from quite different directions in these two traditions, although, as we have said, there are striking points of convergence
which Feng Youlan mightily endeavored to extend.
In the above analysis, our concern has not been to evaluate which is
the better or more accurate discernment or description of our world and
our engagement in it. Rather, our concern has been with accurate translation, paying attention to differences of philosophical discernment and
of linguistic expression used to convey philosophical discernment. Our
effort in translation has been to allow these differences to speak in one
and the same language and not to cover these over with notional matches
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which, while suggesting much in common, hinder more analytic compari-
son which would bring true similarities and differences t o light.
We close this sub-section on Feng’s philosophical terms in English
translation with a consideration of a few remaining expressions needing
further clarification before embarking upon the essays.
The Chinese term which we translate into English as “actual” is
shi (actual, solid, practical, honest, fruit). Shi (actual) combines with shi
(event, matter, business) in shishi (factual).
In terms used by Feng
Youlan, shi (actual) occurs in shiji (actuality), shixiari (manifest in
actuality), shicun (actually exist, actual existence), shiyou (actually have,
actual having) and in combined expressions such shiji de shiwu (events/
things in actuality), shiji de cunzai (existence in actuality), shiji cunzai
de shiwu (eventslthings existing in actuality).
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in Feng’s and others’ use, shi
(actual) also occurs in the Chinese translation “shizai” of Western “real”
in New Realism (Xin Shizailun) or Plato’s Realism (Shizailun). Shizai
literally translated means “actually present (in).”
As a translation for
Platonic and New Realist ‘‘real,’’ shizai is somewhat problematic. Eeng
Youlan holds that li are “real” (shizai) but d o not exist (cunzai) in
actuality (shiji). The shi of “real” and the shi o f “actuality” are one and
the same. Hence, while in English it may make sense t o say that li are
real b u t d o not exist in actuality, in Chinese, we have “li shizai er bu
shicun” which, literally translated is “li is actually present but not actually
existing,” which to some may be contradictory. One way around using
Chinese “shizai” to translate English “real” is to use Chinese “zhen” for
English “real,” as Professor Chen Lai does when he talks of li as “true
but not actual” (zhen er bu shi).’%
As regards the terms “shiji”(actua1ity) and “zhenji”(truth), Chinese
‘,..,, has the sense o f border, boundary, region, ~ 1 a c e . l ~ ’As we have set
11
forth above, syntactic constructions using “cunzai” parallel traditional and
customary syntactic constructions using “zai. An event/thing exists
(cunzai) in a place/location and a place/location has (’you) existence of a n
”
eventlthing (shiwu de CUnZQi). Thus, in Feng Youlan’s presentation,
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events/things exist (cunzai) in actuality (shiji) and actuality has existence
of event/things.
Similarly, li hiddenly exist (qiancun) in truth (zhenji)
and truth has hidden existence (qianyou) of li (pattern, principle).
Further in this regard, Feng Youlan speaks of “the world of li”
(li shijie) as another term for “zhenji” (truth) and of “the world of facts”
(shishi shijie) as another term for “shiji” (actuality). However, in a
different kind of discussion, Feng speaks of four spriitual worlds (jingshen
shijie), abbreviated as ‘Yingiie. In his theory of spiritual worlds, Feng is
”
not concerned with a theory of existence and subsistence as he is in his
discussion of the world of li (pattern, principle) and the world of shishi
(facts) or shiwu (events/things). Rather, in his theory of spiritual realms,
Feng is concerned with different types of knowing or levels of knowing.
Although some translators have translated shiji as “realm of
actuality” and zhenji “realm of truth,” in this volume, in order to differentiate between 1) Feng’s ontological discussion of two worlds (shijie) of li
(pattern, principle) and shi (facts/events) and 2 ) Feng’s spiritual discussion
of four worlds (shijie), we have chosen to translate shiji simply as
“actuality” and zhenji simply as “truth.” English “world” translates
Chinese “shijie” as is the usual custom. Hence, Chinese “shiji shijie”and
“zhenji shijie are’rendered in English as ‘korld of actuality” and “world
of truth,” respectively. This leaves the English term “realm” for Feng’s
four “spiritual realms” (jingiie).
As regards the term “cunzai” (exist, existence), Feng uses cunzai in
”
two ways: 1) for “exist” in actuality (shiji de cunzai) and 2 ) for “exist”
more generally, including “hiddenly exist” (qiancun [subsist] ). Feng
occasionally states that “li exists” (cunzai). However, when Feng wants
to state narrowly that li hiddenly exist, he will use the Chinese term
“qiancun” to contrast with “cunzai, ” which is used more narrowly of
events/things in actuality. In some instances authors of this volume use
“shiyou and “shicun ” to refer narrowly to “actual having” and “actual
”
existence” in contrast with ‘‘qqianY0u” (hidden having) and “qiancun ”
(hidden existence). Literal English translation of these terms renders the
conceptual parallels between these sets of terms readily apparent.
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As stated in Part One of this Introduction. Feng Youlan’s four
main concepts in this volume are translated into English as follows: 1 )
Zi (pattern, principle), qi (energy-matter), doofi (embodiment o f dao
(Way] ), and duquun (great whole). In Feng Youlan’s New Lixire system,
the great whole includes both shiji (actuality) and zizenji (truth). Because
shiji has b o u ) eventslthings and zhenji has
(YOU) li.
the great whole may
be considered the whole of all ‘you” (have, having), including both
“shiyou
”
(actual having) pertaining t o events/things and “qianyou ”
(hidden having) pertaining to li.
We have earlier discussed the Chinese linguistic custom of abbreviating expressions with you, leaving implicit the location which has (you)
an object/entity and, sometimes the objectlentity had as well. Often times
in ’>you” constructions, n o specific location is iniplied, but, rather. the
whole of all having (you) is implied and taken as a general location whish
is said to have (you) an object/entity currently in our attention. In an
effort to make explicit what abbreviated Chinese expressions of the form
“you” and “yuu x” keep implicit, throughout this volume we use the
expression “the greater world” for Feng’s “great whole” which includes
both actuality (shiji) and truth (zheriji). When no specific location of
having (you) is mentioned or known in abbreviated Chinese expressions
of the form “you” or “you x,” “the greater world” is supplied in brackets
as a general location
To give example to our use of “the greater world” t o refer to the
great whole taken as a general location in ‘porr” constructions, we shall
turn momentarily to Feng Youlan’s well-known proposition which
contains t w o instances of abbreviated ‘)you x.” First, however. we d o well
to summarize which Chinese terms we translate as English “is” in this
volume.
We have discussed our translation o f Chinese “zoi” as “is in” or “is
present in,” where “is” in these expressions is what we have called “floppy
is,” that is, “is” here makes n o existential claim but serves, rather, by
requirement of Enghsh syntax, as a verbal connective.”’ Additionally,
w e have detailed in Sub-section Five above that by making explicit an
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implicit location of having (you) in abbreviated expressions of the form
“you” and “you x,” we may avoid expressions such as “there islare” or
“there existslexist” in English as translations of Chinese you. Chinese
“wei” meaning “to do, to make, to act,” which is used to indicate that
a certain object/entity takes on a certain role, we translate into English
as “is discerned as,” “is considered as,” “is taken as,” and so forth,
depending on context.’29 Here “is” is required by English syntax for
passive forms of verbs “discern,” “consider,” “take,” and so forth. What
remains to translate into English as copulative “is” is simply Chinese shi
(is), formerly a pronoun meaning “this here,” which has become in
modern vernacular Chinese a verb which serves as a verbal copula, much as
English copular “is” does, connecting two nouns or two nouns phrases.
We are now able to appreciate more fully some of the ambiguities
and subtleties of Feng Youlan’s well-known proposition, of the first set of
four sets of propositions which structure Feng’s New Lixue, putting the
whole of the above linguistic analysis of Feng’s philosophical terms and
expressions to work. In its abbreviated form, this proposition in Chinese
reads: ‘you mouzhong shiwu bi you mouzhong shiwu zhi suo y i wei
rnouzhong shiivu zhe. Before we offer three possible English translations
of this proposition, we do well to consider its basic form. The proposition
connects two expressions of the “you x ” type which we have discussed
above. The two ‘ y o u x” expressions are connected by Chinese “bi”
(must). In basic form, the proposition reads, “have (you) a, must have
(you) b” or “if have a, then must have b.”
Due to ambiguity in two places, the proposition may be read or
understood in three possible ways. First, the proposition does not state
explicitly the location which serves in syntactic agent role in either part
of the proposition. Second, it is not clear whether the implied location
which serves in syntactic agent role in the first part of the proposition
is the same implied location which serves in syntactic agent role in the
second part of the proposition.
In this volume, when translating this well-known proposition of
Feng’s New Lixue, generally (unless otherwise indicated), we have taken
”
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“the greater world” as the implied location serving in syntactic agent
role for both parts of the proposition. In this manner, making the implicit
location explicit, w e translate the proposition as: “If [the greater world]
has events/things of a certain kind/type, [the greater world] must have
that by which events/things of a certain kind/type are discerned as events/
things o f a certain kind/type.” This is the most inclusive manner in which
this proposition may be read.
However, the implied location which serves in syntactic agent role
may be understood as different in the two parts of the proposition. Thus,
“actuality” may be taken as the implied location serving in syntactic
agent role in the first part of the proposition, and “truth” may be taken
as the implied location serving in syntactic agent role in the second
part of the proposition.
In this manner, the proposition would read:
“If [actuality] has events/things of a certain kind/type, [truth] must have
that by which events/things of a certain kind/type are discerned as events/
things of a certain kind/type.” This second reading of the proposition is
a more narrow understanding of the proposition which does not in any
way conflict with the first more inclusive reading of the proposition. This
second reading is closest to Feng’s usual understanding of the proposition.
A third reading of the proposition takes “actuality” as the location
which serves in syntactic agent role in the first part of the proposition,
and “actual eventdthings of a certain kind/type” as the location which
serves in syntactic agent role in the second part of the proposition.
In this manner, the proposition would read: “If [actuality] has events,’
things of a certain kind/type, [actual events/things of a certain kind/type]
must have that by which events/things of a certain kind/type are discerned
as events/things of a certain kind/type.” This third reading of the proposition also does not conflict with the first more inclusive reading and, like
the second reading, is a more narrow understanding of the first. This
third reading is probably nor Feng’s usual understanding of the proposition, but may be closer to a traditional and customary Chinese understanding of this proposition.
In order to accomodate both Feng’s understanding of the proposixcii
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tion and a traditional Chinese understanding of the proposition, we have
presented the more inclusive reading of the proposition (the first presented
above) throughout this volume. Notice that without liferally translating
Chinese “you as “have/having” (instead of “exist/existence” or “being”)
”
in English, and without taking account of possible different locations
serving in syntactic agent role in each part of the proposition, we
cannot render clearly or insightfully into English the ambiguity of this
proposition nor its different readings, all of which are essential to understanding and evaluating Feng’s New Lkue, as essays in this volume will
demonst rate.
1.
Feng Youlan ia in Pinyin romanization; Fung Yu-lan is in WadeCiles romanization. Throughout this volume of essays by philosophers from t h e People’s
Republic of China, we use the Pinyin romanization. However, the WadeGiles romanization of Fung Yu-lan will appear in some endnotes and some
bibliographical entries.
2.
Zhon~guoZhexue Shi (Shanghai:
Shen Zhou Publishing Company, 1931,
Volume One only; reprinted Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1934, Volumes
One and Two). Fung Yu-Ian, A History of’Chinese Philosophy, translated
by Derk Bodde (Peiping: Henri Vetch, 1937, Volume One only; revised and
reprinted Princcton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, Volume On, 1952;
VolumeTwo, 1953).
3.
Feng Youlan’s work in English was joined a decade later in 1963 by that
of Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, also published b y
Princeton University Press.
4.
This stepping forth from the known older order into unknown new challenges
is neither new to nor limited t o the twentieth century for China or for any
traditional cultural heritage.
5.
Three recent efforts include those of Michel C. Masson, Phz7osophy and
Tradition:
The Interpretation of China’s Philosophic Past, Fung Yu-lan
1939-1949 (Ricci Institute:
Taipei, 1985); Wang Jianping, Feng Youlan:
Zhexue Sixiang Yanjui (Feng Youlan:
Research into His Philosophical
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Thought) (Sichuan: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987 [in Chinese] 1: and Yin Ding
(Yin Lujun), Fung Yu-lan (Taipei: Tung-ta Publishing Company, a division
of Sanmin Publishing Company, 1991 [in Chinese] ).
6.
From September to January 31, 1988-89, the Editor taught in the Philosophy
Department at Beijing University; she returned in April 1989 to continue that
teaching and left June 7 after the tragic events of Tiananmen Square. During
these months she twice met Professor Feng Youlan at his home at Beijing
University. The return in December 1990 was her second return t o Beijing
for academic conferences after June 1989.
7.
Zong Pu, or Feng Zhongpu, Feng Youlan's daughter, a well-known author of
fiction in China, is a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
of the Institute for Research in Forcign Cultures, and of the Society of
Chinese Writ ers.
8.
T h e International Academy of Chinese Culture (Zhotrgguo Wejihuu Shuyuun)
is a scholarly educational organization whose members desire to rejuvenate
and t o carry forward the positive aspects of Chinese culture and to reintroduce traditional culture in modern China through this academic organization. With this common desire, the International Academy was established
in October 1984 by the renowned scholar Liang Shuming (1893-1988), along
with Beijing University Professors Feng Youlan, Zhang Dainian, Zhou Yiliang,
Tang Yijie, Yin Falu. Zhu Bokun, and the former President of the Institute
of World Religion of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Ren
Jiyu, who is now Director of the Chinese National Library, and other scholars.
With Liang Shuming as Chairman of the Administrative Committee, Feng
Youlan served as Honorary President of the Academy.
Today, Professor
Zhang Dainian holds the latter distinguished position. Professor Tang Yijie
from the beginning has been President of the International Academy. Professor Tang is assisted in the organizational and administrative tasks of the
International Academy by Beijing University Department of Philosophy
Professors Wang Shouchang and Li Zhonghua.
9.
The two exceptions in this volume are t h e papers of Mr. Thanh Van Tran
and Assistant Professor Yin Lujun, a mainland Chinese scholar currently
teaching Comparative Ethics at Louisiana State University, Department of
Philosophy and Religious Studies, who was unable t o attend t h e mnference
but remains in close communication with philosophical work done at Beijing
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U nivcrsity .
10.
Mr. Thanh Van Tran's cssay and that o f Assistant Profcssor Yin Lujun wcrc
submittcd in English.
11.
Sce note #I04 o n the Song-Ming undcrstanding of li as "pattern, principlc."
12.
The Editor rcalizcs that this Wcstcrn approach is somcwhat morc difficuit
for writers of C h i n c x . Wcrc a Chincsc writcr t o prcscnt a Wcstern philosophical tcrm in its original language first, followcd by suggested Chincsc matches
with it, different typefaccs would bc rcquircd, one for alphabetic languages
and onc for Chincsc charactcrs. By contrast, only onc typeface is required
whcn romanizations of Chincsc characters are placcd in a Western language
tcst as in this volume. Noncthclcss, writers of English d o includc Chincsc
charactcrs, often writtcn by hand, in thcir English tcst.
Similarly, somc
Chinese scholars writc out Wcstcrn philosophical terms by hand in rhcir
othcrwisc Chincsc charactcr tcst. This method works wcll whcn the Chincsc
t c s t is running horizontally left to right. It obviously bccomcs more difficult
whcn Chinese tcxt is running vertically,
13.
Surrxongtanfi Zixu (Autobiography at thc Ha11 of Thrcc Pines) (Beijing:
Sanlian Shudian, 1984), p. 25 I. Wc shall havc morc to say o n Chinese 'you"
( h w c , having) and Chincsc "currzoi" (exist, existence) in Introduction, Part
Thrce.
14.
Tu Youguang is currently Profcssor of Philosophy at thc Rcscarch Institute
for Higher Education at Huazhong Ligong Univcrsity in Wuchang. Sichuan.
Hc is a graduatc of National Qinghua University, Foreign Studies Academy,
Dcpartnicnt of Philosophy, where he studied under Feng Youlan. As Cencral
Editor of Feng Youlan's Sunsongfang Quanji, T u has often been called
affcctionately Feng Youlan's "Number Onc Student."
15.
Profcssor Li Zhonghua of the Beijing Univcrsity Philosophy Department
was with me.
16.
For a rccent discussion of May 4, 1919 events and thcir impact o n events
of May-June 1989, see Julia Ching, Probing Chinu's Soul: Religion, Politics
and Protest in the People> Republic (San Francisco: H x p e r and Row, 1990).
Chapter Five.
17.
For rich, indepth narration of Chinese scholars who engaged in the 'Tntellectual enlightenment" of the May Fourth period, see Vera S c h w a r a , The
Chinese Enlightenment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986)
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and her brilliantly literary Time for Telling Truth is Running O u t : Conversations with Zhang Shenfu (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1992).
To follow the continuing track of intellectual dissent in China from the 1940’s
to the present day, see Merle Goldman’s carefully informative trilogy in
sequential order:
Lirerary Dissent in Communist Cl7ina (Cambridge, M A
Harvard University Press, 1967). China’s Intellectuals: Advise a,7d Dissent
(Harvard University Press, 1981, and Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in
China: Political Reform in rhe Deng X b o p i n g Era (Harvard University Press,
1994).
18.
Chen Duxiu, Dean of Humanities at Beijing University, supporter of the
May Fourth 1919 demonstrations, and later one of the founders of the
Chinese Communist Party summarized aspirations of the period: 1 ) to oppose
Japanese imperialistic aggression and corrupt Chinese rulers; 2 ) to oppose
feudalism and its old ethics while promoting emancipation of thought and
women, 3 ) t o put an end to superstition while promoting science and industry,
4 ) to oppose the usc of classical written language in instruction and to
promote the use of vernacular language and literature in education and in
spreading culture t o the people, and 5 ) to promote the rights of the people
while opposing bureaucracy. This list is taken from Roderick MacFarguhar,
The Hundred Flowers (London: Atlantic’Books, 1960), p. 20 cited in Julia
Ching, Probing China’s Soul: Religion, Politics ond Proresr in the People‘s
Republic (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1990), Chapter Five, pp. 109,
253.
19.
See Vera Schwarcz. Time f o r Telling Truth Is Running Our, o p . c i t . . p. 9 7 ,
for details of the “lost,” off-the-public-record, beginning of the Chinese
Communist Party with Chen Duxiu in Shanghai and Li Dazhao and Zhang
Shenfu in Beijing.
20.
Although different in content, perhaps in form and in accomplishment, this
twentieth century, single-voiced allegiance in some ways has not been altogether different from single-voiced allegiances of China’s past.
21.
On Yan Fu, see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen
Fu and the West (Cambridge, MA: The B e k n a p Press of Harvard University
Press, 1964). On Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, Zhang Binglin, and Liu Shipei,
see Hao Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search f o r Order and Meaning,
1890-1911 (Berkeley, dA: University of California Press, 1987).
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22.
Liang Shuming (1893-1988) was Professor of Philosophy at Beijing University
from 1918 to 1924. As one devotcd to China’s culture and people, Liang
gave his life to rural reconstruction and Confucian modernization, while ever
remaining a Buddhist in inner spiritual cultivation.
In line with thcse
cndcavors, several decades later in the carly 1980s. Liang Shuming was the
renowncd
founder of The Intcrnational Academy for Chinese Culture
(Zhorrgwo Wenhua Sliuyuarz) which hosted the “International Seminar o n the
Thought of Feng Youlan”. in December 1990. For reference o n Liang
Shuming, the May Fourth Incident, and the “cultures controversy” as it
continucd to develop in the early 1920s, see Guy Alitto, The Lasr Confucian:
Liang Sliuming and the Chinese Dilemnlo of’Moderriity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 1986), Chapter Three.
Regarding Liang Shuming’s lectures o n Eastern and Western culture, AIitto
writes:
Liang Shu-ming’s statement o n the subject, which was first published
in book form at the end of 1921, was regarded by intellectuals
at the time, and by historians since, as t h e link between Liang Ch’ich’ao’s [Liang Qichao] 1919 articles [which reported “to his
countrynicn that thc West was crying for Eastern spiritual solace”]
and Chang Chun Mai’s [Zhang Junmai; also known as Carsun Chang
in the Wcst] “Philosophy of life” lecture [which raised “doubts
about following the West’s path of industrialism, capitalism and
scientism”] . The three stand together in most people’s minds as
a wave of conservative backlash against the successes of the New
Culture movement. In their anti-positivist bent their search for the
core significance of Chinese culture under the encrustations of
traditions, and their distaste for the modern industrialized West,
the three d o share common themes and approaches. (Ibid., pp.
77-8)
lnfluencing debates o n Eastern m d Western cultures were Columbia University’s John Dewey, who lectured at Beijing University for a good part of
the academic year 1919-1920 and spoke “of a future blending of Eastern and
Western thought” and Bertrand Russell, who, while in residence at Beijing
University in 1921, lectured in the direction “that China would somehow
absorb Western science and technology while retaining the ethical qualities
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and humanistic way of life at which China was superior.” (Ibid.. pp. 76-77)
23.
Feng Youlan, Zhongguo Zhexue Slii (Shanghai: Shen Zhou Publishing Company, 193 1, Volume One only; reprinted Shanghai:
Commercial Press,
1934, Volumes One and Two). Republished: Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju,
196 1. Fung Yu-Ian, A Hisrory of Chinese Philosophy, English translation by
Derk Bodde (Peiping:
Henri Vetch, 1937, Volume One only, revised and
reprinted Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, Volume One 1952;
Volume Two 1953).
24.
Chinese “Harixue” (Han Learning) was a discipline within Rrc (Confucian)
learning.
Hanxue bcgan in the late Ming and carly Qing period and, over
a period of two hundred years, developed mcthods of empirical rcscarch,
using philological and phonological evidence among either types of empirical
evidence, in an effort t o recover “the original texts” of carly Ru (Confucian)
scholarship. Thereby, Hanxue aspired to recover the original meaning of thcsc
texts. The impetus for the school may well havc been to seek authoritative
answers from texts of the “sages” themselves to questions posed by rivaling
schools of Song-Ming Ru (Confucian) study.
25.
A Short History of Chinese Ptri/osophy, (New York:
26.
Ibid.
21.
Ibid., p. 334. See Chapter Five of this volume, note # 2 , for further details
Macmillan, 19461, p.
333.
of these volumes completed by Feng Youlan, Tang Yongtong, and Jin Yuelin.
28.
See Chapter One, note #5, and Chapter Six, initial paragraph, for a discussion
of the meaning of Feng’s title: Zhen Yuan Liu Sliu.
29.
For reference, see also Professor Tu Youguang’s essay in which he cites from
Feng’s X i n Zhi Yon to the effect that the statement “some event/thing exists”
(sliiwu cunzai? is an affirmation concerning actuality, that is, a statement of
fact.
From this one statement of fact, New Li.rue proceeds formally and
analytically, without any further statements of fact, to deduce an entire
metaphysical system.
30.
For a descriptive historical account of these events, see Jonathan D. Spence,
The Search for Modern Chinn, (New York:
W . W. Norton & Company),
Chapter 18.
31.
Ibid., pp. 5 6 3 4 .
32.
Merlc Coldman, “ T h e Party and the Intellectuals,” in The Cambridge History
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01’ Chim (Canibridgc: Cumbridgc Univcrsity Press, 1987), Volume Fourtccn,
Chaptcr Five, p. 234.
33.
SCC the Editor’s “Ministers of thc Moral Ordcr:
Innovations of the Early
Zhou Kings, thc Dukc of Zhou, Confucius, and Ru,” unpublished doctoral
dissertation, llarvard Univcrsity, 1984 which is undcr rcvision for publication.
Scc also Mcrlc Coldman,op. cit.. pp. 218-220.
34.
35.
Mcrlc Goldman, “Thc Party and the Intcllcctuals.”op. cit., p. 219.
For a gcncral history of thcsc campaigns from the 1930s to 1965, which
sought to bring intcllcctuals undcr tight idcological and political control, scc
Mcrlc Coldnian, “Thc Party and thc Intcllcctuals” and “The Party and the
Intcllcctuds:
Phasc Two,” in The Cotnbridgc History of’Chino, op. cit.,
Volunic Fourtccn, Chaptcrs Five and Ten, rcspcctivcly.
36.
l,‘or accounts of cvcnts in Feng Youlan’s life,
SCC
Yin Ding (Yin Lujun), Fung
Yu-/an, op. c i t . , pp. 205-234, and Wang Jianping, FcnR Youlan, Zliexue
Sixiaiig Yanjui, op. tit.* pp. 249-283.
37.
Through a careful program of initial wlidarity, moving to isolation and guilt,
fear and insccurity, then to rcsolution and fullcr intcgration into the work of
thc Party, scholars wcrc remouldcd. SCCJonathan D. Spence, op. cit., pp.
564-5, ior csaniplcs.
38.
I.’cng Youlan gave xlf-criticisms (zi w o piping), beginning in 1950 with a
scli-criticism of his 1940s Ncw Lixue system, cntitlcd ’;Yin Lixue de Eiwo
Jiatitoo
”
(“Sclf-criticism of Ncw Lixue”), Guorigtning Xiboo, October 8 ,
1950. 1:cng’s sclf-criticisms continued throughout the 1950s, more intcnsively
in 1958 in thc Anti-Rightist campaign following the Hundred Flowers Campaign.
His most well-known sclf-criticism is Sishi Nion d e Huigu (Looking
Bock Over Forty Years) (Beijing: Kexuc Chubanshe, 1959); also printed in
. scrics in Philosophicol Rescorch, Volume
3 . This has been reprinted in Feng
Youlon de Doolu (The Path of Feng Youlan) (Hong Kong: Panu Zazhi,
1974). See also an English translation, “Reflections o n thc Past Forty Years
by Feng Youlan,” by William A. Wycoff, Guest Editor, Chinese Studies in
Philosophy, Vol. XIII, Nos. 2-3, 1981-2, pp. 9-126. See also Zhang Dainian’s
essay, Chapter Six of this volume, for excerpts from Feng’s Sislzi Man
de Huigu. Kam Louie, op. cif., pp. 52-53, offers an assessment of these 19589 self-criticisms.
39.
Hu Feng was a student of well-known May Fourth writer Lu Xun (1881-
1936). On the Hu Feng campaign of 1955, see Merle Goldman, ‘ T h e Party
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and the InteUectuals,”op. cir.. pp. 239-242.
40.
Regarding a rigt among leaders o n whether to seek or not t o seek intellectual
support, Jonathan Spence writes:
Among the very senior members of the CCP (Chinese Communist
Party) Politburo who favored an attempt t o relax controls over
the intellectuals, even if it meant allowing criticism of the CCP
itself, were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, the economic planner Chen
Yun, the newly appointed secretary-general of the party Deng
Xiaoping, and General Lin Biao. Among those insisting o n tight
party discipline, and o n the belief that there was no longer a
pressing need for alliance with bourgeois remnants, were two senior
members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Liu Shaoqi
and PLA commander in chief Zhu De, along with General Peng
Dehuai and t h e tough party veteran who was now in the key p s i tion of mayor of Peking [ Beijing] , Peng Zhen.
Jonathan D. Spence,op. cir.. p.567.
41.
See Communist China, 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 151-163;cited in Kam
Louie, Inheriting Tradition: Intepretations of the Classical Pliilosophers in
Communist China 1949.1 966 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.
6,note #20.
The expression “hundred schools” describes scholars of t h e Warring States
(480 B.C.-222 B.C.) period, who presented their views to feudal lords in power
as regards how to order and to harmonize the kingdom and people. If the
feudal lord were favorably persuaded, a scholar’s approach would b e implemented, at least t o some extent, with the scholar receiving stipend and emolument as a Tutor. The parallels between this ancient period and the late-fifties
period, after the break from the Soviet Union, are in the initial purpose of the
latter campaign:
namely, for those at the center of power to hear from
scholars and, via these scholars, the people, as t o how well the Communist
Party was succeeding and what could be done better.
42.
Merle Coldman, “The Party and the Intellectuals,”op. cit., p. 243.
43.
Jonathan D. Spence, op. cir., p. 567-570. Merle Goldman, “The Party and
44.
Jonathan D. Spence,op. cit., p. 569.
the Intellectuals,”op. cit., p. 248.
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45.
Merle Goldman, “The Party and the Intellectuals,”op. cit., p. 250.
46.
Kam Louie, op. cit., pp. 3 3 4 1 .
47.
The issues and points of view articulated at this January 1957 conference
were to influence philosophical discussion for the next two decades in China.
A collection of important papers of the conference was published in the
year:
same
Zhexue Yanjui Bianjibu (ed.), Zhongguo Zkexueshi Wenti Taolun
Zhuanji ( A Symposium on the Problems of the History of Chinese Philosophy)
(Beijing, Kexue Chubanshe, 1957);cited in Kam Louie, op. cit., p. 258.
48.
Kam Louie, op. cit., pp. 4 , 3 4 .
49.
See Chapter Five of this volume note #2.
50.
Kam Louie, op. cit., p. 36.
51.
“Guanyu Zhongguo Zhexueshi Yanjiu de Liangge Weitti” (“Two Problems
Concerning the Study of the History of Chinese Philosophy”), Renmin Ribao
(People’s Daily), October 23,1956.
52.
Kam Louie,op. cir., p. 41.
53.
“Zhoiigguo Zhexue Yichan de Jicheng Wenti”(”0n the Question of Inheriting
54.
Kam Louie, op. cit.. p. 44.
the Legacy of Chinese Philosophy”), Guangming Ribao, January 8 , 1957.
For a discussion of the January 1957 conference and especially Feng Youlan’s
55.
presentations at the conference along with follow-up debates, see Kam Louie,
op. cit., pp. 4 1 4 7 .
Jonathan D. Spence,op. cit., p. 570.
56.
Sce Kam Louie, op. cit., p. 8; Jonathan D. Spence, op. cir., pp. 570-571;
57.
and Julia Ching, op. cir., pp. 110-113.
58.
Jonathan D. Spence,op. cit., p. 572.
59.
Ibid. :
60.
Merle Goldman, “The Party and the Intellectuals,” op. c i f . ,pp. 255-8.
61.
Kam Louie,op. cit., p. 48.
62.
Ibid., p. 50.
63.
Ibid., p. 54.
64.
During these debates, Guan Feng would continue t o criticize Feng for
inheriting Zhuang Zi’s false views. Feng’s spiritual realm of Heaven and Earth
(Tian Di) was viewed as a di’ect inheritance of Zhuang Zi’s “Carefree
‘
Wandering” sort of thinking. In Guan Feng’s view, such false thinking was
detrimental to the social progress of China in that it led to escapist, negative
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tendencies and passive submission. Kam Louie,op. cir., pp. 11 1-1 12, 118-21.
It is questionable whether Feng Youlan construed or used Zhuang Zi’s views in
the manner in which Guan Feng alleged he had, although see ibid., p. 192.
The Afterword of this volume presents further discussion of Fen€ Youlan and
his views of Zhuang Zi interpreted through the Zhuang Z i Zlzu (Xiang X i u C u o
Xiang Commentary o n the Zlzuang Z i f .
65.
See Afterword of this volume o n this point.
66.
See Kam Louie, op. cir., p . 123. Kam Louie notes that Fens Youlan’s argument here had obvious implications for Feng Youlan himself in the early
1960s.
61.
See above note #53.
68.
Kam Louie notes that Feng Youlan, soon after presenting his January 1957
paper, was ready t o substitute the term “general” for “abstract” and the
term “specific” !or “concrete.”
In other words, Fcng would change thc
terminology to s u e the method. Scc Kam Louie, op. cif., p. 4 5 .
69.
Sce Chapter One of this volume for a presentation of this, the f i s t line of
70.
Chapters Six, Nine, and Twclvc of this volume offer further detail o n the
Feng Youlan’s famous couplet.
question of whether li (pattern, principle) is prior to h i (events) or whether
li is within shi. Onc way of understanding the latter position is this: general
principles arc within events from age t o age. This is different from imposing
principles upon events from without o r denying the presence of principle
d t o g e ther.
71.
“Lun Kong Z i Guanyu ‘Ren’ de Sixiang” (“‘Kong Zi On Thinking About
72.
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Selected Works
Benevolence”), in Zlrexuc Yunjiu (Philosophical Research), May 1961.
(Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1960-70), Volume 1, p. 48; cited in Kam
Louie, o p . cir,, p. 5 5 . Feng’s citation from Marx brought considerable criticism in that it would appear that Feng quoted Marx out of context. Marx’s
overall point was that a ruling class imagines its values as universal.
73.
For discussion of Feng Youlan’s views o n Kong Zi along with those of other
scholars in t h e early 1970s, see Kam Louie, Cririques of Confucius in Conrernporary China (Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1980).
74.
See Selected Bibliography for dates of publication for each volume of Feng
Youlan’s Zliongguo Zhexue Shi Xinbian (New Edition of A History of Chinese
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Philosophy). Volume Seven was publishcd post-humously
75.
.
See Selected Bibliography for a listing of the volumes and publication dates
for Feng Youlan’s Sansongtang Quanji (The Collected Works at the Hall of
Three Pines or The Collected Works of Feng Youlan), edited by Tu Youguang.
16.
This is the second line of the couplet which serves as the title of thc documentary film shown at the start of “The International Seminar on the Thought of
Feng Youlan” on December 4, 1990. It is also the themewhich runs through
thc whole of Fcng’s X i n Yuan Dao (The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy).
17.
Professor Li’s modern New Ruxue encompasses, perhaps, Professor Zhang
Liwen’s thrce modern versions of Song-Ming Lixue discussed above.
78.
The Editor owes a considerable debt of gratitude to Professor Chen Lai,
who in his essay in this volume carefully examines significant terms of SongMing L i m e and explains how Feng Youlan’s Ncw Lixue use of these terms
differs from carlicr Song-Ming Lixue use. Translation of Professor Chcn Lai’s
essay required a thorough rc-thinking of customary translations of Chinese
‘j w u ”
(havc, having) and “zai” (is in, is present in) and taking a more litcral
rather than notional approach to translation.
We have adopted Professor
Chen Lai’s format in our focus on terms in Part Three of this Introduction.
However, our discussion of Chinese philosophical terms hcre differs from that
of Professor Chen Lai in that our purpose is to explain thcsc tcrmsin English
for the sake of non-rcadcrs of Chinese as well as, possibly, readers of Chincsc.
In so doing, we seek to provide orientation for what Professor Chen Lai and
others fathom more deeply in thcir own analyses.
79.
Angus C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature
80.
Ibid.,: p. 359.
(Singaporc: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), p. 357.
81.
Ibid.
82.
Ibid., p . 329.
83.
Ibid., p. 330.
84.
Ibid.,p.331.
85.
We havc used the term “actualis:” instead of the term “realist” to differentiate the Chinese case from the Platonic, which will allow us to compare them
rather than to assume from the beginning that they are the same by using the
same name for both.
In addition, there is good reason in describing the
Chinese case to prefer “acrualist” to “realist,” as wiU be set forth shortly.
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86.
For a discussion of namcs and their referring function, see Kao Kung-Yi
and Diane B. Obenchain “Kung-sun Lung’s Chih Wu Lun and Semantics of
Reference and Prediction,” The Journal of’Chinese Philosophy 2 (1975)
pp, 285-324. A s regards the function of naming in Chinese Language use, the
view expressed here in Part Three of this Introduction is gleaned from many
sources, Western and Chinese, and has developed in thought for over twentyfive years. We find that some of our own conclusions at certain points intersect wjth conclusions of some of Chad Hansen’s recent writings, although our
exphnations differ.
O n naming, see Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in
Aricient China (Ann Arbor, M I : The University of Michigan Press, 1983),
especially pp. 3 1-37. (Subsequently Hansen 1983.) See also Chad Hanscn,
“Chinese Idcographs and Wcstcrn Ideas,” in 7’he Journal of’Asiari Siudies 5 2 : 2
(May 1993), pp. 373-399, cspecially pp. 3 9 3 4 wherc Hansen takcs thc
m u n i n g of a name to be its “intention to refer t o ” a n cvcntlthing in actuality.
(Subscqucntly Hanscn 1993.) Finally, scc Chad Hansen, “Language in the
Hcirt-Mind,” in Understanding rhe Cliiriese Mind: The Philosophical Roots,
edited by Robert E. AUinson (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989),
pp. 75-123, which cxplorcs social and cultural aspects related t o Chinese
vicws of naming. (Subscqucntly Hansen 1989.)
87.
While early on Chinese characters wcrc constructcd so as to imagc in a pattern
of lincs the visual pattcrns of evcntslthings to which they refer, Chincsc
charactcrs havc now bccomc systematized both by visual organization and
by sound. Few characters used today arc strictly “reprcscntational pictures”
of patterns discerned in events/things in actuality with which patterns in
characters are deemed to bc in correspondcnce. Nonetheless, the fact that
characicrs remain portents of lines, however visually and phonctically
organized, assists in conveying the discernment of coherence between patterns
of heart-mind functioning and parrerrrs in actual events/things. Notionally,
a sense of alignment of patrern from heart-mind through name (and visual
character) to evcnt/thing endures even with simplificd Chinese characters of
today.
Chad Hanscn has argued that Chinese characters as patterns of lines convey
meaning in a m m n e r different from that of Western alphabetic words; see
especially Hansen 1993. While w e would agree with Hansen’s observation,we
would argue the case somewhat differently. See m y forthcoming study o n
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Ru (Confucians),op. cif.,for more on this topic.
88.
In Hansen’s view, a name refers to “mass-stuff-kind.”
differs from “count-kind” or “category/class.”
“Mass-stuffkind”
The expression “mass-stuff-
kind” suggests notionally one continuous stuff referred t o by Chinese nouns
which are both singular and plural or “mass nouns.” Somewhat differently,
the expression “countkind” suggests that there are instances of a kind which
can be counted and numbered, which are referred t o by count nouns of
Western languages that take pluralization.
Hansen argues that this Western
linguistic characteristic of count nouns encourages a philosophical discernment
that there is one ideal or “universal” form o r pattern which themind knows,
actual eventslthings, called “particulars,” instantiate this universal form in
more than one instance, but always with somc variation and never perfcctly or
exactly. See Hansen 1983, 1993.
89.
Chad Hansen contends that the view that one name corresponds to one
actual event/thing comes from a teaching of the Warring States period called
“rectification cf names” or “correction of names” (zherig rning). In Hanscn’s
view, this teaching belonged primarily t o t h e Ru (Confucians); Gong-sun Long
also subscribed to this view. See Hansen 1983, pp. 106-110 and Hansen 1989,
pp. 107-119.
Whde Ru (Confucians). specifically Xun Zi,made a very strong c a ~ efor this
teaching in the late Warring States period, it is not clear what version, if any,
of this teaching o n “rectification of names” actually was Kong Zi’s (Confucius’)
own. The collected sayings (Analects) of Kong Zi are thoseremembered by tiis
students and their students, and may well have been influenccd by teachings
which came into sway after Kong Zi’s demise. Nor is it certain that the
teaching originated with the Ru (Confucians).
On this point, see A . C.
Graham Dispurers of’ the Tao (La Salk, IL: Open Court, 1989), p. 24, and
Graham’s survey of others’ views. See also Benjamin I. Schwartz, 77rr World
of’ niought irr Ancient China, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1985), pp.92-95,311, 314.
90.
A combined name, in some manner, joins or interconnects discriminative
patterns in heart-mind, associated with each specific name.
Debates o n
how names combine, and how a combined name corresponds t o one specific
event/thing, intensified in the h t e Warring States period among the Later
Mohists and others such as Gong sun Long, Hui Shi, and Zhuang Zi, and
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continue today.
Such debates concern 1 ) what thinking (si) is, 2 ) logical
analysis of the meaning @i) of names (ming), and 3) theories of inborn
nature (Xing) of actual eventslthings.
Importantly in this regard, pattcrn
(whether called duo. Tian. li) is discerned as in thinking, in naming, and in
inborn nature.
On Later Mohist and Gong-sun Long debates, scc Chad H a n x n 1983, Chaptcrs
Four and Five. Scc also A . C. Graham, “Tlirec Sfudies o f K u n , ~ s Lung,’’
u~
in his Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singaporc:
Institute of East A s h n Philosophies, 1986), pp. 125-215. And again, on thc
use of reasoning in Gong sun Long, the Later Mohists, Hui Shi and Zhuang Zi,
see A . C . Graham, Disputers o f t h e Tao, o p . cir., Part I , Chapter Five. Part 11,
Chapters T w o and Three.
91.
Sec A . C . Graham, T w o Chinese Philosophers, (London: Lund Humphrics,
92.
On Chinese philosophy’s not making a clear distinction betwccn dcscriptivc
1958). Chapter o n “Li” (principlc).
laws of nature and prescriptivc rulcs of morality, betwccn is and ought, fact
and value, see David Nivison, “Tao and Tc,” in The Encyclopedia of’Rcligion,
edited by Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan Publishing company),Vol. 9.
pp. 284-6, and A . C . Graham, Disputersof’the T a o , o p . c i f . ,pp.29-30,355-6.
See also Hansen 1989, pp. 84-95, for a discussion of Chinese discourse as
prescriptive.
93.
See P. I;. Strawson’s vicw that “the mcaning of an expression is the habits,
conventions, rules for correct use of an expression, on all occasions, to rcfcr
or to asscrt” in
P. F. Strawson. Logico-Linguistic Papers (London: Methucn
& Co., Ltd., 1971). p . 9 ; cited in Kao Kung-yi and Diane B. Obenchain “Kung-
sun Lung’s Cliih Wu Lun and Scmantics of reference and Predication,”op. cit.,
p. 2 8 5 .
94.
On Chincsc ’Mi-lei”use, sce also Angus C . Graham,Sfudies in C‘hirzescPhilosophy and Philosophical Literature, op. cit.. pp. 331-343. See also Hansen
1989, pp. 99-102.
95.
See Hansen 1989, pp. 75-123 in its entirety for a multi-approached account of
just this theme; see, in particular, pp. 84-95. See also Hansen 1993, p. 393,
and Hansen 1983, p. 105, for summaries of his views on this issue.
96.
Languages of any sort function somewhaat in the same manner as Chinese
language does as far as names referring t o the actual world is concerned.
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However, if, due t o visual Chinesc characters in patterns of lines, patterns of
discrimination in the heart-mind are experienced as in tighter cohcsion with
patterns discerned in actual evcnts/things than in othcr languages, then certain
types of social control through thought or naming campaigns may be possible
using the Chinese spoken and written language.
However, one wondcrs
whether another vdriablc may be operative. For any language, “traditionalist”
one-voiced, authoritativc use of a language differs from “modernist” manyvoiced, clcctivc use of a language.
97.
The imposition of humanmadc pattern upon cvcnts/things is characteristic
98.
This was a favorite expression of my fathcr as m y sistcrs and I grew
99.
This is thc meaning of the sccond line in Fcng Youlan’s famous couplct wluch
of the Chinese Legalist (Fa jin) point of view.
up polishing wood.
serves as the title of thc documentary film o n Fcng Youlan’s life discusscd in
Chapter One of this volumc.
100.
Scc Kao Kung-yi and Diane B. Obenchain, ‘Kung-sun Lung’s Chili Wlr I,un
and Semantics of Reference and Prcdiwtion,” op. cil.. for a discussion of
Chinesc ergativc xmantics and case or rolc ordcr syntax.
101.
This linguistic focus o n action is surcly corrclatcd with Chincse philosophy’s
102.
One hears a literal English translation of C h i n c x you, i.c., “havc,” a s a fully
focus o n action.
mcaningful sentcncc uscd all over Singapore thcsc days. Evcrywhcrc o n thc
strcet Chincsc spcakcrs of English can bc hcard to rcspond t o any qucstion
such as “Do you havc any newspapers?’ with “Have, havc” (in English).
103.
On English “to be” as a “stopo,ap” vcrb, see Graham, “Being in Wcstcrn
Philosophy Compared with Shih/Fei and Yu/Wu in Chincsc Philosophy,”
in Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, op.
cir.. p. 330.
104.
A C . Graham in his study of the two Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi (1033-1107)
and Cheng Hao (1032-10851, who prececded Zhu X i (1130-1200) and offercd
much t o the latter’s metaphysical system, suggests that w e picture li as “veins”
in a piece of jade or in a body. The great innovation of the Cheng brothers,
according t o Graham, was their affirmation that “the innumerable li are one
li.”
(See A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, [London:
Lund
Humphries, 19581, p. 11.) We extend our knowledge of li by tracking with li
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to discovcr where one specific li connccts with anothcr, and this t o another,
until t h e whole o f li. the interconnecting web or pattern of li, is discerned,
cognized, and known. Graham states:
Principle [/i] seems to b e conceived as a network of veins; however
much they diverge from each other, the veins prove when wc
'extend' them to be one; on the other hand we can also go o n
indefinitely making finer and finer distinctions among them, finding
as we proceed that not only classes but individuals and parts of
individuals have li which distinquish them from each other. (Ibid.,
p . 13.)
We arc invited by Zhu Xi to envision li asgrain in wood:
There is only one principle (daoli), but its divisions are not the
same ...Thus there is only one for this board, but the grain runsone
way here and another way there, one for a sin& house, but it has
dil'fcrcnt sorts of rooms onc for plants, but they include both
peach and plum-trees; one for mankind, but thcrc is Mr. A. and Mr.
B . Mr.A cannot bccome M r . B;M r . B cannot become M r . A .
(Zhu Z i Y u k i [Conversations of Master Zhu, Arranged Topically],
6 / 3 8 , 4 A / 3 , c i t c d in Graham,ihid, p. 13.)
Importantly, each individual cvcntlthing has li. The li of an individual evcnt/
thing is onc distinct line in the grain of t h e wood, as it were. As Zhu Xi
has put it:
As far as the things in the universe go, wc can be certain that each
has a reason why it is as it is and a rule to which it should conform.
This is what is meant by principle [li] .
(Zhu Xi'sDaxue Huowen 15:3, cited in Daniel Gardner's translation
in his Learning fo be a Sage, [Univcrsity of California Press, 19901,
p . 90.)
Insofar as each individual event/thing has its own individual li. li would seem
to differ, at least in this aspect, from Plato's idea or Aristotlc's eidos (form) as
a universal. Li is the action which islought to be performed b y an individual
event/thing so named that differentiatcs that individual, event/thing or person
from other individuals events/things or persons. (See A. C . Graham's discussion of this point, ibid., p . 18.) Knowing li resembles knowing names (rning)
in t h e teaching of the Warring States period called "rectification of names"
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according to which every eventlthing or person has a specific name and a
specific task t o perform which corresponds t o that name.
Through logical analysis, w e discover more general li and more specific li;
there is li of being first son and li of being third son. However, while
it is possible to logically abstract, as it were, what is shared in common among
li of first, second, and third sons, in practice this abstraction has not been of
much practical use, for the abstraction does not tell an individual what to do.
If one is f i s t son, one acts in accordance with li of first son which is
spcaific for first son
and further specified by individual family custom,
generation, location, anf so forth. The li of one person is never precisely the
same as that lor another; nor is li exactly the same for individual inanimate
eventlthings. Hence, to know what is shared in common by different li of first,
second, and third sons could be called a universal or an idea, b u t it would not
be of much use in informing one how to act. Appropriate right action, not
univcrsal ideas, has been what matters in Chinese society. Each individual
event/thing has li, an action which that individual is to perform. That action
joins with other actions and these in turn interconnect with others, extending
in
all directions to unite the whole of action in one pattern li o r duo, onL
pattcrncd activity of all actual events/things in our everyday under Heaven.
105.
A. C. Graham has pointed out that unlike li, which is metaphoricdly
illustrated by veins in stonc or grain in wood, qi is “the breath in our throats,
. . . the
source of life,
. . .[we]
feel it rising and ebbing in our bodies
as physical energy, ...w e smell it as odours” and much more. This is the subtle
end of qi.
The more concrete, gross side o f qi is matter (zhi o r zliiliao).
Graham states that by the Song Dynasty, solid things were viewed as
condensing from and dissolving back into a more subtle qi, such that “matter
(ziti) is mrely ether [qi] in a very dense and inert state.” See A. C. Graham,
T w o Ciiiirese Philosophers. o p . cit.8 p. 3 1.
106.
A history of the modern development and use of the Chinese term “curmi”
would make an important contribution t o Chinese-Western comparative
philosophy .
107.
Chungwen f u - t t ’u-fien (The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Chinese
Language), edited by Chang Ch’i-yun, Lin Yin, and Kao Ming (Taipei: Institnte for Advanced Chinese Studies, 196268,reprinted edition, Taipei: Huakang Ch’u-pan-pu, 1974), Volume 3, pp. 279-282.
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IOU.
We would agrce with A. C. Graham that Chinese you is used most often of
eventslthings in the actual world. However, we would disagree with Graham
that other uses of y o u (and its negative w u ) are only “occasional.”
Further,
w c would agree with Graham that “usually” duo or li are described as
‘ktti
(not having),” but would not agree with Graham’s translation of “wu” as
“Nothing” or “Void” in these contexts. See Angus C. Graham, “‘Being’ in
Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/Fei and Yu/Wu in Chinese Philosophy,” in Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy arid Philosophical Literature. o p . tit.* p. 344.
109.
Chinese li (pattern, principlc) can substitute for duo (way, path) in this expression.
110.
Chinese “er“ is a tcrm w h c h connects two expressions. It may b e translated
into English as “and” or “but,” or the first expression may be taken
as modifying the second expression with ”er” connecting them.
111.
Analects, Book 5 , Chaptcr 7 and 21, citcd in Benjamin 1. Schwartz, 77ie
World 01’ T h o u ~ h in
t Ancienl China. op. cit.. p. 62. See Raymond Dawwn’s
translation, Confucius, The Analecrr. (Oxford:
OxCord University Press,
1993), pp. 1 6 , 1 8 .
112.
Zhang Dainian, Zhongguo Gudian Zhexue Gaiuian Fanchou Yao Lun (Discussion of the Essentials of the Conceptual Categories of Chinese Classical
Philosophy) (Beijing, 1989), p. 79.
113
Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature. o p . cit.,
114.
f b i d . , loc. cir. Pinyin romanization added.
115.
Ibid., p. 346. Pinyin romanization added.
116.
f b i d . . p. 347. Pinyin romanization added.
p . 345. Pinyin romanization added.
117.
In Sunsongtang Zixu (Autobiography at the Hall of Three Pines) o p . cit.,
p. 25 1 , Feng states:
In fact, “to have” b o u ) is “to exist” (cunzaz-). If [“to have”]
is not “to exist,” then “to have” has no meaning. (Qishi ‘you”
jiushi “cunzai. ”
Ruguo bushi “cunzai, ” ‘)ou
”
y e jiu meiyou
shenma y i y i le.)
118.
See Chapter Seven in this volume, the essay by Japanese scholar Azuma
Juji, entitled ‘ T h e Formation of NewLixue: Feng Youlan and New Realism.”
119.
This description of “subsistence” follows Websrer S New Twentieth Century
Dicfionary of rhe English Language (unabridged) (Cleveland and New York:
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T h c World PublishingConlpany, 1966), pp. 897 and 1817.
120.
Thc tcrm li (pattern, principle) may substitute in thcsc assertions hcrc as well.
1 2 1.
Wc shall have more to say about English translations of “slriji” and ‘Zheriji”
bclow .
122.
Scng Zhao ( 3 8 4 4 1 4 ) in the third chapter of his book Boriro Wuzhi Lun (On
Prajna Not Being Knowledge) writes:
Bccause Wisdom (is assumcd to) know what is t o b e known and to
apprchcnd the qualitics (of things), it is said to be knowledgc. But
since Absolutc Truth inherently lacks any phcnomcnal qualities,
how is it to bc “known”?
In discussing this passagc in A Hislory of Cliiriese Philosophy, Feng states:
T h c qualities [xinng] of a thing are the answer t o the qucstion
of what that thing is. T o know what a thing is, is t o apprehcnd thc
qualities of that thing. But sincc Absolute Truth is not a “thing,”
it lacks the qualitics of such and hence cannot be known by
ordinary knowledge.
Scc Feng Youlan, A History of’ Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 2. p. 266, for discussion o f and citation from Scng Zhao, Zheo Lun (Thc Book of Zhao)
translated
by Walter Licbcnthal, Morrunicwra Serica, Monograph XIII,
(Pciping: Catholic University of Pcking, 1948). p. 8 0 . (Pinyin romanization
has been uscd for names and titles in this citation.)-editor]
123.
Graham. op. cir.. p. 345. Pinyin romanization added.
124.
Thc tcrm “docetism” is derived from the Crcek word meaning “to sccm”and
has been applied in the history of Christian thought to thc vicw that the
humanity and suffering of Jcsus Christ was only “apparent” and not in fact.
The tcrm could be used to describe Feng’s discernment of the rclationship of
li to cventslthings.
Whereas in Song-Mine Ru discernment, substance is
discerned as actually engaging in function, in Feng Youlan’s discernmcnt,
substance is not discerned as actually engaging in function. Rather, substance
is disccrncd as in the world of truth. Function is discerned as in the world of
actual events/things.
Feng does not discern any direct connection between
substance and function. While for Feng some connection between thc two
obtains, it is not direct or actual, but, rather, apparent or manifest. For this
reason, w e have suggested the term “docetic” to describe Feng’s view.
125.
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1912), Chapter Nine, ‘ T h e World of Universals.” The sen-
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fence presented here is taken from our paraphrased translation of a point
made by Professor Azuma Juji in his essay, Chapter Seven of this volume.
126.
See Section One of Professor Chen Lai’s essay, Chapter Nine of this volume.
127.
Professor Chcn Lai will present in his essay that “ji”has the sense of “cunzni”
(existence).
126.
A.
C. Graham describes “is” used as a connective verb as a “stopgap” verb,
supplied only because English requires that a sentence have a verb. See A. C.
Graham, “Being” in Western Philosophy Compared with Slrih/Fei and Yu/Wu
in Chinese Philosophy,”op. c i f . , p. 330.
129.
See A . C. Graham’s discussion of “rvei”(to d o , to make, to act) in Ibid., p.
326.
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