(Published in: M. Broers, P. Hicks & A. Guimerá (eds.), The Napoleonic empire and the new
European political culture. Basingstoke, etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.)
7
The Dutch Case: The Kingdom
of Holland and the Imperial
Departments
Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
A forgotten period
The Napoleonic era is traditionally not a very popular epoch in Dutch
historiography. Most older studies have treated the period of Incorporation
into the Empire in 1810 as only a prelude to the establishment of the
Orange Monarchy in 1813. Indeed, there is still no general monograph on
the Incorporation (Inlijving) of the Dutch provinces. The reaso ns for this
neglect are twofold. Firstly, the Napoleonic period has been perceived as
one of national decline; political independence was under threat and finally
lost entirely in 1810. Instead of returning to the glories of the Golden Age
of the Dutch Republic, the economy shrank, cities depopulated and young
men were conscripted for the Napoleonic army. Indeed, immediately after
the collapse of the Empire in the Dutch departments in October 1813,
many pamphlets were published describing the atrocities committed by the
French. Secondly, and probably more damaging for the Dutch remembrance
of Napoleonic rule, was the official policy of forgetting by King William I
(r. 1813- 40). According to this policy of oubli, the Napoleonic period was
simply not to be mentioned, whether positively or negatively. Thus, the
years 1795-1813 were draped in silence du ring the Restoration. 1
Dutch historians are not solely to blame for this lack of interest. The Dutch
case is also often neglected in general surveys. Even Simon Schama has placed
most emphasis on the revolutionary years and sees the Napoleonic period only
as the aftermath of conflicts of the Revolutionary period .2 Dutch researchers
have only now begun to show interest in the Napoleonic period. As a result
new insights are emerging, partly from fresh archival research, partly under
the influence of new concepts being applied to Napoleonic studies. We think
that the Napoleonic Netherlands should no longer be studied from an exclusively national point of view, but from a European perspective, as Michael
Broers suggested in his introduction to this volume, and that new insights
will be gained from making comparisons with other European countries and
regions under Napoleonic rule. It has become clear that Napoleonic control
100
The Dutch Case
101
was not as absolute as has been portrayed, and in many subject states the
French took a pragmatic approach to incorporating annexed lands into the
Empire.3
In this chapter we will examine the extent to which pre-Revolutionary
Dutch institutions and elites survived or re-emerged as a result of Napoleonic
rule. The years 1799- 1814 are marked by a series of regime changes and
each of these regimes had their own characters and specific problems. The
question of whether Napoleonic rule represented a revived old order or a
new regime will be examined for each regime, in turn, but it is not easily
answered.
The Regency of State (1801-05): the politics of fusion
In 1795 French troops overthrew the old federal Dutch Republic and
Orange Stadholderate and engineered the Batavian Revolution. With French
support, a coup d'etat was staged in 1798 by radical Batavian revolutionaries, resulting in the Constitution of 1798, which turned the Netherlands
into a unitary state for the first time. This first Dutch constitution closely
resembled its French counterpart of 1795, which ushered in the Directory,
although in many respects it also drew on earlier Batavian drafts, as well
as the American Constitution.4 By 1801, however, the French Consulate
sought an end to the revolution it had helped to create six years before. The
French envoy, Semonville, and his master Talleyrand, the Foreign Minister,
now saw the constitution of 1798 as a disreputable relic of radical republicanism. In accordance with Napoleon's policy of fusion within France
itself, Semonville supported the rapprochement between moderate revolutionaries and supporters of the House of Orange, who had been excluded
from office after the 1795 Revolution.5 French calls to reform the Batavian
constitution coincided with a general climate of disillusionment with the
Revolution in the Netherlands. Eminent revolutionaries were disappointed
with the results of the 1798 constitution and felt that reform was needed in
order to implement a truly revolutionary programme. According to some
radical revolutionaries, the Constitution had been too quick to discard the
old provinces, the pillars of the pre-Revolutionary Dutch Republic, while
the growing popularity of the ideas of Montesquieu gave the old provinces
a renewed role as intermediate bodies that formed barriers against state
despotism. 6
However, the attempts by the Directors in September 1801 to replace the
radical constitution with a new one modelled on the Napoleonic constitution of the Year VIII/1799 met with resistance in the representative assembly,
which, in turn, provoked a Caesarian solution to the problem of reform. On
18 September, French troops sealed the doors of the legislative assembly
and its proceedings were terminated. A new constitution, establishing
the Staatsbewind (Regency of State) was proclaimed . It was not nearly as
102 Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
groundbreaking as the first Dutch constitution of 1798, but it promised the
stable administration that a large part of the population hoped for. The 1801
Constitution was indeed more moderate than its predecessor and aimed at
political reconciliation. In this new constitutional order, political participation by large sections of the population diminished, just as in the French
Napoleonic constitution of 1799.
The constitution of 1801 also implied a partial return to pre -revolutionary institutions. The pre-revolutionary frontiers of the old provinces
were restored and the eight ancien regime provinces, as well as the great
cities, received more powers at the expense of the central government.
Importantly, instead of concentrating all executive powers in the hands of
one figure, as in France, the French and Dutch agreed that the Netherlands
needed a collegiate administration. Thus, collegial government, the hallmark of the administration of the old Republic, was restored. In this spirit,
the Batavian Republic was renamed the Batavian Commonwealth, to give it
a less revolutionary flavour, and the symbolism of the old regime gradually
reappeared .
Along with the symbolism and the institutions, the old regime elites also
started to re-emerge. Henceforth, the vacancies in the legislative assembly
were filled according to provincial quotas just as under the ancien regime.
Moderate patriots like the Amsterdam regent, Jan Bicker, were appointed
in this way, as well as staunch Orangists, who had been excluded after the
Revolution. Thus, old enemies who had fought during the ancien regime,
now formed a united front against a new common enemy, radical revolutionary republicanism and, in this way, Napoleonic rule ended centuriesold conflicts within the Dutch elite. The reconciliation of moderate patriots
and Orangists was facilitated by the fact that the last Stadholder, William
V, had given up his claims to the Netherlands in exchange for a financial indemnity. For his cooperative attitude, Napoleon awarded William's
son, the future King William 1, the government of Fulda and Conrey, in
Germany. Just as in Napoleonic France, the Dutch governing elite was no
longer selected for its ideological purity, but according to social standing
and wealth.
Despite appearances, the Regency of State was not a real return to the
past, but the start of something new. First, it meant another step in the
process of Dutch state formation. While the regime was supposed to be less
centralist than the previous administrations, in reality the government
managed to get a firm grip on local and provincial administration. It initiated important new policies hitherto considered impossible to implement.
Above all, provincial finances, primary education and the creation of new
cultural institutions could at last be dealt with on a national level. As a
result, the bureaucracy in The Hague grew considerably, whereas one would
have expected a decreasing civil service in the process of federalization .?
Second, the Regency of State was the first attempt to find a middle way
The Dutch Case 103
between the old regime and the revolution. A new policy of national unity
was proclaimed from which only radicals of the extreme left and right were
excluded. What resulted was the Dutch corollary of the Napoleonic policy
of fusion, the dominant presence of moderate revolutionaries and Orangists
within the new government. Successor regimes continued this striving for
national reconciliation and the search for a compromise between the old
order and new regime. From 1801 onwards the middle way would form a
central theme in Dutch political culture.
Schimmelpenninck (1805-06): a presidentia l government
The moderate Staatsbewind did not prove the stable ally Napoleon hoped
for. Although the need for a national figurehead had been questioned by
the Dutch, d iscussions on the necessity of a stronger executive authority
kept resurfacing in the years following 1801. Napoleon criticized this lack
of a strong executive authority, and wanted to impose a head of state on the
Batavian Republic. Consequently, Talleyrand and Napoleon asked Rutger
Jan Schimmelpenninck, the Batavian ambassador in Paris, to draw up a new
constitutional framework for the Netherlands. A plebiscite was then staged,
and the Staatsbewind was pushed aside. Schimmelpenninck's new constitution restored the unitary state without its radical revolutionary ideology.
The new constitution was considerably shorter than its predecessor of 1801,
notably curbing the civic and political rights of citizens. Schimmelpenninck
became Raadpensionaris, Grand Pensionary, of the Batavian Republic, a term
that used to designate the highest post within the province of Holland. This
archaic title was insisted on by the French, whereas Schimmelpenninck, an
admirer of the American model, actually preferred the title President of the
Batavian Republic. 8 Most surprisingly, Schimmelpenninck, who in his youth
had been an advocate of popular sovereignty, reduced the power of the legislature to a minimum.9 During his one-year presidency, Schimmelpenninck
was reasonably successfu l. He appointed a number of excellent men who
managed to complete the initiatives of the Staatsbewind. In place of provincial excise taxes, the Minister of Finance, Isaac Gogel, introduced a progressive income tax, while Adriaan van den Ende completed the new legislation
on primary education, which was far ahead of its time.10
However, Napoleon continued to be troubled by the instability of the
Batavian regime, which he attributed to its political organization and the
weakness of the Grand Pensionary. He felt that only a monarchy could
prevent either the country succumbing to British pressure, or the Dutch
continuing to long for a return to the old regime.'' The conversion of the
country into a k ingdom was unconstitutional and undemocratic, and therefore impossible, according to the well-known jurist joan Melchior Kemper.
He stressed the need to hold a referendum, but at the same time feared the
'apathetic' Dutch would stay at home.12 When Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck
104
Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
sent his diplomatic delegation to Paris for talks with Napoleon in spring
1806, he also impressed upon the diplomats that a hereditary head of state
was incompatible with the Batavian national character. 13
The Kingdom of Holland (1806-10): a monarchical experiment
On 5 June 1806 the Batavian Republic and the French Empire signed the
Treaty of Paris and Louis Bonaparte was created King of Holland . Napoleon
gave his brother an ambiguous job description, which placed Louis in an
u nfavourable position from the outset; the Emperor had simply placed
Louis at the head of the Batavian Republic without working out this
dramatic constitutional change in detail. This produced half-hearted
results. Seemingly, the Kingdom of Holland was a fait accompli, but the
Batavian Republic remained hidden under the surface as its political reality.
Unhappy with this situation, Louis began to give real shape to his kingship.
He considered constitutional monarchy the for m of government best suited
to coping with the political difficulties that had plagued the country for
decades. Louis's words made reference to the general desire of the Dutch for
harmony and unity, a desire of which he could make use. Louis hoped to
fuse his personal interests, that is those of the new Dutch monarchy, with
the general interests of his subjects. He therefore consistently presented
himself as the Majeste nationale, a title he regarded as 'the most beautiful
and the most appropriate'.14
Because the Kingdom of Holland found itself in a constitutional vacuumthe old constitution was not geared to the monarchy and the new constitution was still in the making- royal power knew relatively few bounds.
During the rewriting of the constitution, Louis himself took over executive
power, in piecemeal fashion .15 In a short period of time, the Netherlands
received a new set of constitutional laws that promised a very authoritarian
monarchy. Louis had control over the administration, made the legislature
dependent upon him, juggled m inisterial positions and created new royal
administrative bodies at will.
Among his first acts as King of Holland, Louis opened an inquiry into the
codification of Dutch law. He instructed the legal expert, Joannes van der
Linden, to formulate a civil code. Van der Linden's approach was original;
he was the first to compose a civil code designed explicitly for the new
centralized Dutch state, which was also partly based upon customary law.
Napoleon intervened, however, for an original Dutch civil code could undermine the allegiance of his brother's people to the French Empire. 'A nation
of 1,800,000 souls cannot have a separate legal system', Napoleon claimed. 16
Instead, Louis appointed a commission to arrange a Dutch t ranslation of
the Code Napoleon. Rather than just translating the Code Napoleon from
French, however, it came up with a number of significant changes. The
commission felt that the Code Napoleon did not meet Dutch requirements
The Dutch Case 105
as it was written in a foreign language, was not grounded in local circumstances and it conflicted with Dutch conventionsP The outcome was a civil
code that was a fusion of the French and Dutch legislation which repealed
all local regulations and customs. It would remain in force until the French
Incorporation in 1810. Under Louis, Holland also received an original Dutch
penal code, very close to earlier Batavian projects, which came into force
early in 1809. 18
The rewrit ing of the Code Napoh~n
is typical of the reign of Louis
Bonaparte. He wanted to modernize the Dutch state in a French style,
but without neglecting tradition. His administration was modelled on
the Napoleonic state, but retained many Dutch features.l9 Similarly, the
administrators of the Kingdom of Holland worked on their own versions
of the Institute and the Imperial University. .Just like the previous regimes,
the Kingdom of Holland offered a middle way between new reforms on
the model of the Napoleonic Empire and older Dutch traditions. 20
Incorporation (1810- 13): the incomplete police state
Dissatisfied with his brother's obstinate stance against his demands,
Napoleon used the British invasion of the southern island of Walcheren in
1809 as a pretex t to incorporate the Kingdom of Holland into the Empire
in 1810. Napoleon presented the Incorporation as something inevitable;
the Netherlands were simply too small to survive in the world of great
power politics. The 'adoption', as Napoleon euphemistically called the
Incorporation, was essen tially a compassionate act in his eyes . There was
surprisingly little Dutch resistance to the loss of independence and a large
part of the elite supported the Incorporation, or at least thought it inevitable. The diplomat Anton Reinhardt Falck felt an immediate incorporation
by France would 'be better for most of the nation than another temporary
or intermediary administration'. 2 1 The Incorporation was seen by Dutch
administrators, such as the lawyer Cornelis van Maanen, as a cha nce finally
to establish the uniform legal system he had been striving for since the
outbreak of the Batavian Revolution in 1795.
The period of the Incorporation presents a break with the norms of the
earlier Napoleonic regimes, all of which sough t to find a juste milieu (the
right balance) between historic tradition and revolutionary reform. In civil
administration, the legal system and policing, Napoleonic institutions were
ru thlessly introduced . Napoleon ignored suggestions made by the Conseil
pour les affaires de Holla nde, a committee of thirty Dutch notables that was
sent to Paris to facilitate the Incorporation of the Dutch provinces into the
Empire.22 In the organic decree of 18 October 1810, the general con tours of
administration in the Dutch departments were laid down. At the top stood
the Governor-General, who was to be the eyes and the ears of the Emperor
in the Netherlands; Charles
-F ran~ois
Lebrun, an administrative veteran
106
Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
who had also overseen the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic into
the Empire in 1806. Together with six senior civil servants, the GovernorGeneral formed the General Administration which was to function as an
intermediary between the Dutch departments and the central government
in Paris.
At the departmental and local levels, a system of civil administration
was established consisting of prefects, sub-prefects and mayors. A uniform
system of administration, controlled by the Parisian Ministry of the Interior
and the General Government, was now in place, reaching into the smallest
and most peripheral towns of the Dutch departments. Although its implementation was far from perfect, this new administrative hierarchy greatly
enlarged the control of the central government over its subjects. The traditional administrative culture of collegial government, which had to a certain
extent survived under the previous regimes, was now replaced by the French
system of centralized government at every level of the administration.
A wholly new legal system was also installed . On 1 March 1811, the hybrid
Wetboek Napoleon was replaced by the Code Napoleon, since Napoleon
wanted a uniform legal system throughout the Empire. 23 Following the
introduction of the Code Napoleon, the public registration of births, deaths,
and marriages was introduced. Its purpose was to facilitate taxation and
conscription. In general, all this represented an attempt by the Napoleonic
state to increase its control over the subject population. The power of the state
was also enlarged by the systematic collection of information and the gathering of statistics on the Dutch population by the imperial administrators.
Importantly, the Incorporation ended the long debate in the Netherlands
on the establishment of a uniform organization of legal institutions. Just
as with the civil administration, a hierarchical and uniform court system
was introduced. At the lowest level, justices of the peace were established in
each canton. A law court was established for each arrondissement, the subdivision of the department. At the top of the legal pyramid in the Dutch
departments was the Imperial Court in The Hague, chaired by its president,
Cornelis Felix van Maanen. The legal officials of the old Dutch republic,
such as the aldermen and the sheriffs, were abolished and replaced by new
administrators on the Napoleonic model. Judges were usually chosen by
Van Maanen from among the old Dutch legal elite. The public prosecutors, however, were selected by a Belgian, Beyts, and were often Belgian or
French. The particularistic and multiform legal tradition of the old republic,
was now replaced by a uniform system on the imperial model. Legally, the
ancien regime had ended .24
Another aspect of the new regime of the Incorporation period was the
creation of a modern police force, replacing the traditional urban model.
The new police organization was also much larger than before. In this
way the Ministry of Police in Paris had direct access to every Dutch town,
greatly increasing the control of the central government over law and
The Dutch Case 107
order- something unprecedented in history.25 Typical ancien regime institutions were replaced by professional gendarmes and agents de police. The
wholly new figure of the commissaire entered Dutch policing. This official
was the core of a political police, concerned with political crimes. Besides
the ordinary police force, Holland counted 127 Gendarmerie brigades scattered over the country, each consisting of five to ten soldiers. In times of
need, the military Gendarmerie was called upon by the authorities, making
it a swift, loyal and feared apparatus of repression. 26 One pamphleteer would
later describe the general climate of suspicion and fear in the period 1810- 13
as follows : 'the sister would denounce her brother, the son his father and
friends suspected each other of being a traitor'.27
Although the Incorporation presented a radical breach with the age old
particularistic republican tradition of administration, the legal system and
the police, in many other ways state formation in the period 1810-1 3 was
a failure. To a large extent, the cultural and educational institutions of the
old Dutch regime surv ived under the Incorporation, and even the implementation of the Napoleonic legal and police apparatus was not flawless.
Many French institutions that were introduced suffered from a constant
lack of resources. 28 A total failure, furthermore, was Napoleon's policy of
nation building. Napoleon's attempt to fuse the Dutch with 'the Great
Nation', for instance through marriages between French officers and the
daughters of the Dutch elite, was not successful. Quite the reverse, for
the experience of the Incorporation actually reinforced Dutch national
consciousness. 29
The failure of Napoleon's reforms must to a large extent be explained
by the short duration and the timing of incorporation into the Empire.
From 1812 the overstretched Empire came under increasing pressure from
the armies of the Fourth Coalition. Some Napoleonic officials like Lebrun
and the Intendant for the interior, Franc;:ois, Baron d'Aiphonse, genuinely
tried to establish an enlightened administration in the interests of the local
Dutch population, as well as serving their imperial master. Other French
officials regarded the Netherlands merely as a conquered country, whose
only purpose was to prov ide as many men and materials for the Grande
Armee as could possibly be squeezed out of the impoverished population.
The first and foremost task of the Napoleonic prefect was enforcing
conscription. The oppressive character of the regime met with increasing
opposition from the Dutch population, which had initially remained quiescent over the loss of independence. The protest started among the lower
social strata of the population against the increased taxes, the regulations
against smuggling and conscription. When on 1 April 1813, the sons of the
Dutch notables were forced to become gardes des lwnneurs in France to guarantee the loyalty of their fathers, the compliant Dutch political elite became
increasingly hostile to the Napoleonic regime. As a result of the demands
of war and the short period of the Incorporation, the process of creating a
108 Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
new and uniform regime was not completed when imperial rule collapsed
in November in 1813. Paradoxically, the Napoleonic project would, in many
ways, only be achieved after Napoleon's fall.
Restoration (1813- 30): the nationalization of
the Napoleonic heritage
Joseph Fouch e famously said of th e restored French monarch, Louis XVIII,
that he slept in the bed of Napoleon, implying that he took over the institutions of the Napoleonic state instead of restoring the ancien regime as
the term Restoration might suggest. This is equally true of King William I,
the son of the last Stadtholder, who had no intention of going back to the
old regime. The powerful instruments of the Napoleonic state were far too
useful for him to dismantle. In many ways, the incomplete police state of
the Incorporation years was brought to completion during the Restoration.
Not only were the institutions of the Napoleonic state retained and furthe r
developed by the Restoration, as was most of its personnel. 30
This does not imply that the regime change of 1813- 15 had no effect on
the administration . The Council of State, the pinnacle of the Napoleonic
administrative system, for instance, diminished in importance under the
Restoration. By contrast, the role of the Secretary of State grew enormously
after 1813, as it was the ideal, obedient vehicle for the authoritarian objectives of King William. The Napoleonic legacy was nationalized under the
Restoration, and the institutions of the newly centralized state were given
traditional names suggesting continuity with Dutch tradition. The legislative assembly of the restored monarchy, for instance, was called EstatesGeneral, although this institution had hardly anything in common with its
ancien regime namesake. The Council of State, a Napoleonic institutional
innovation, was given the historic medieval name of Raad van State.
Although William's monarchy was in many respects the heir of the
Napoleonic regimes, he far from acknowledged this debt. The recent past
was not mentioned by the officials of the Restoration, whether in a negative
o r a positive sense. Those few reactionaries who demanded retribution for
the behaviour of Dutch officials during the Incorporation, were derided as
mischief-makers who endangered the stability of the new state.31 The postrevolutionary centralized state presented a breach with the federa list and
particularistic traditions of the old Dutch republic. After 1813, however, it was
increasingly viewed as a system of government that was typically Dutch.
Conclusions: a new regime or a revived order?
In Napoleon's Integration of Europe, Stuart Woolf describes ' the gradual emergence of a class of civilian professionals, convinced of the potential of
The Dutch Case
109
modern administration and expert in its application' as the most important
legacy of the Napoleonic empire.32 The Napoleonic era, according to Woolf,
marked the beginning of modern administration, while Isser Woloch sees
an increased pervasion of the state in many aspects of society. French civic
order in the years 1789-1820, according to Woloch, was transformed into a
'new regime' that was radically different from its pre-revolutionary predecessor. 33 However, Michael Rowe, studying the case of the Rhineland, offers
a d ifferent interpretation. The importa nce of the Napoleonic age for the
Rhineland, according to Rowe, lies not in political modernization and
renewal, but in the way the imperial system allowed older political forms to
survive and reinforce themselves. 34
Rowe's thesis is also true for the Dutch Regency of State of 1801- 05.
Napoleonic rule ended centuries' old conflicts within the Dutch elite. In a
classic case of fusion or ralliement, Napoleon tried to blend moderate revolutionaries and the moderate Orangists who stood aside from the antiOrangist Batavian Republic. The fusion of elites is a theme in all regimes
before the Restoration of 1814. At the level of institutions, the so-called
Staatsbewind meant a partial return to the ancien regime, which had been
abolished by the founding of the unitary state by radical revolutionaries in
1798. In other ways, however, the process of state building was continued.
The regime change of 1805 reinforced the executive power and consolidated the unitary state, although during Schimmelpenninck's rule, classic
republican symbolism had a brief revival. Subsequently, Napoleon placed
his brother Louis on the Dutch throne. Louis' reign ended more than two
hundred years of republican tradition in the Netherlands.
During the Incorporation, after 1810, Napoleon imposed his centralized model of admin istration on the Dutch provinces without much ado,
establishing an authoritarian police state. The administrative innovations
were facilitated by the collaboration of many Dutch administrators at all
levels of the imperial administration, who regarded the incorporation as
a unique chance to implement institutional reform and break the resilience of the old institutions. The Napoleonic period, however, was too
short and the Empire was already under too much stress, to complete all
these reforms. In many ways, the Napoleonic project was fulfilled after
his fall. The restored Prince of Orange, the new King William I, retained
most elements of the centralized state and many Napoleonic administrators. The Napoleonic origins of the new state were, however, officially
forgotten . In short, th e new Dutch state resembled a modern new regime,
along the lines outlined by Woolf and Woloch but, just as in the Rhineland,
the Napoleonic era also consolidated and revitalized many political and
social structures of the old regime. Therefore, we can conclude that the
Napoleonic legacy in the Netherlands, was in fact a new regime disguised
as a revived order.
110
Mattllijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg
Notes
1. N. C. F. van Sas, De metamor{ose van Nederland. Van oude orc/e naar moderniteit,
1750-1900 (Amsterdam, 2004), 345.
2 . Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780-1813
(London, 1977).
3 . E.g. Michael Broers, Europe Under Napoleon, 1799- 1815 (London, 1996). Michael
Rowe, From Reich to State. The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830
(Cambridge, 2003). Stuart Woolf, Napoleon's integration of Europe (London,
1991).
4. Annie Jou rdan, 'Le role des agents franc;ais dans Ia constitution batave de 1798',
Annales historiques de Ia Revolution fran{:aise 351 (2008), 99-119.
5. See for literature on the Regency of State in English: Schama, Patriots and
Liberators, 410-465.
6 . W. R. E. Velema, 'Revolutie, republiek en revolutie. De ideologische context van de
eerste Nederlandse grondwet', in De eeuw van de grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in
Nederland, 1798-1917, ed. N.C.F. van Sas and H. te Velde (Deventer 1998), 20-44.
7. Hendrik Boels, Binnenlandse Zaken. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van een departement
in de Bataa{se tijcl, 1795-1806: een reconstructie (Den Haag, 1993), 349.
8 . L. de Gou, De Staatsregeling van 1805 en de Constitutie van 1806 (Den Haag, 1997),
XIX.
9. Renger de Bruin, 'De opbouw van een nieuwe staat. Bestuurlijk-politieke veranderingen tussen 1780 en 1815', in Het ontstaan van het moe/erne Neclerlcmc/: staats- en
natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830, ed. Wantje Fritschy andjoop Toebes (Nijmegen,
1996), 123- 156, 149. H.T. Colenbrander, Schimmelpenninck en Koning Lodewijk
(Amsterdam, 1911), 30- 37.
10. Martijn van der Burg, 'L'ecole primaire dans le royaume de Hollande et durant
!'annexion a Ia France', in Louis Bonaparte, roi de Hollcmde, ed. Annie Jourdan
(Paris, 2010), 185- 197.
11. Archives na tionales Paris, AFIV 1820, 5. Louis Bonaparte, Documents llistoriques
et reflex ions Sllf le gouvernement de Ia Hollande, vol. I (Bruxelles, 1820), 68- 69.
12. ]. M. Kemper, Brieven over de tegenwoorclig in omloop zijncle geruchten (Amsterdam
1806), 13.
13. Martijn van der Burg, 'Transforming the Dutch Republic into the Kingdom of
Holland', European Review of History (2010) forthcoming.
14. Louis Bonaparte, Documents historiques, vol. I, 141-142.
15. De Gou, De Staatsregeling, 309.
16. Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 700.
17. A.H. Huussen, Huwelijks- en lmwelijksgoederenrecht tot 1820 (Bussum, 1975),
313- 314.
18. Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 543.
19. .J. Roelevink, 'Cette grande inertie qu'on rencontre sans cesse dans Ia marche des
affaires. Lodewijk als wetgever en uitvoerder', De Negentiende eeuw, 30 (2006),
177- 191.
20. Martijn va n der Burg, Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staatsvorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799-1813 (Amsterdam, 2009). See also: Martij n
van der Burg, 'Transferts culturels franco-bataves a l'epoque napoleonienne',
http://gesch ic h te-tra nsna tiona I.e lio-on line. net/forum /id=1009& type=a rti ke l.
21 . .J. Naber, Overlleersing en vrijwording. Geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Jnlijving
bij Frankrijk (Haarlem, 1913), 23-24.
The Dutch Case
111
22. Marie Elisabeth Kluit, Cornelis Felix van Maanen. Tot het herstel der onafhankelijkheid (Groningen, 1953), chapter 7.
23. Van der Burg, Nederland onder Franse invloecl, 94.
24. Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam. Onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten
tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de Inlijving bij het Franse Keizerrijk (1806-1813),
(Amsterdam, 2000), 582- 586.
25. Martijn van der Burg, 'Law Enforcement in Amsterdam: between Tradition and
Modernization', in Serving the Urban Community. Tile Rise of Public Facilities in the
Low Countries, ed. Manon van der Heijden et al. (Amsterdam, 2009), 217-241,
235.
26. Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, 639- 641.
27. Schets der gevolgen van den invloed cler Franschen op Nederland sedert het jaar 1795
(Amsterdam, 1814), 18.
28. This goes especially for the French Universite imperiale. See Van der Burg,
Nederland onder Franse invloed, chapter 6 and 'Transferts culturels franco-bataves'.
See a lso Chapter 8 in this volume johan joor, 'Resistance against Napoleon in the
kingdom ol' Holland'.
29. Van Sas, Metamorfose, 87- 89.
30. Matthijs Lok, Windvanen. Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse
Restauratie, 1813- 1820 (Amsterdam, 2009). Idem, 'L'extreme centre est-il exportable? Une comparaison entre Ia France et les Pays-Bas, 1814-1820', Annales
historiques de Ia Revolution fran(aise 3 (2009): 147-163.
31. Jeroen va n Zanten, Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard. politieke discussie
en oppositievorming 1813- 1840 (Amsterdam, 2004).
32. Woolf, Napoleon's integration of Europe, 69.
33. lsser Woloch, The New Regime. Transformations of the French Civic Order, 17891820s (New York, 1994), 429.
34. Rowe, From Reich to State, 8.
Timeline Dutch History
1588-1795:
1795-1806:
1806-1810:
1810-1813:
1813/14-1830/9:
1830/9-present:
Dutch Republic/United Provinces
Batavian Republic
Kingdom of Holland
Part of Napoleonic France
United Kingdom of the Netherlands
Kingdom of the Netherlands