STATE OF INDIANA V. FORD MOTOR
C O M P A N Y REVISITEDt
PAUL J. BECKER
University of Dayton
ARTHUR J. JIPSON
University of Dayton
ALAN S. BRUCE
Quinnipiac University
ABSTRACT: In 1980, a jury returned "not guilty" verdicts on three counts o f
reckless homicide against the Ford Motor Company. The company was indicted
when three girls were killed after their Ford Pinto burst into flames following a
rear impact collision. This paper re-examines the consequences o f this landmark
case involving corporate wrongdoing from the perspectives o f the participants 20
years later. Interviews were conducted with 22 individuals directly involved with
the litigation, as well as with insightful observers and experts. The lasting impact
of this case is demonstrated through its influence on the development o f corporate
liability, even though the company was found "not guilty."
INTRODUCTION
Three teenage girls in Elkhart, Indiana were killed when their Ford
Pinto was struck from behind and burst into flames in August of 1978.
At the time, there were a number of civil suits alleging that the Ford
Motor Company had designed, built, and sold defective automobiles
(see Cullen, Maakestad, & Cavender, 1987, pp. 163-165). The distinguishing characteristic of the Indiana accident and subsequent trial was
the unique action taken by Elkhart County prosecutor Michael Cosentino in pursuing a criminal case. Cosentino believed the Ford Motor
Company should be held criminally responsible for the deaths. After
presenting his arguments, a local grand jury indicted the Ford Corporation on three counts of reckless homicide.
Cosentino's rationale for pursuing the case against the Ford Motor
Company was his belief that corporations, like individuals, should be
t Direct all correspondence to: Paul S. Becker, University of Dayton, Department of
Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469-1142. Email: Paul.Becker@notes.udayton.edu.
A M E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E , Vol. 26 No. 2, 2002
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held responsible for their actions. A ten-week trial concluded in March
of 1980 with the jury returning "not guilty" verdicts on all three counts.
Two events in the aftermath of this high profile trial marked the official
end to the Pinto case in the state of Indiana. First, prosecutor Cosentino decided not to appeal the verdict (Schreiber, April 10, 1980). Second, the victims' families accepted $7,500 per plaintiff in compensation
from Ford ("Ulrichs Accepts," n.d.).
There is little doubt about the importance of State of Indiana v.
Ford Motor Company from a legal standpoint. This case was the first
time criminal charges were bought against an American corporation for
faulty product design. According to attorney Malcolm Wheeler (1981,
p. 250), "[n]ewspapers referred to it as the most important economic
case of the century . . . . " The notion that a corporation could be held
accountable for its criminal actions was a novel legal concept at the
time. Wheeler was not alone in his estimation of the case as influential.
Because of the application of criminal law to corporate behavior, others
have referred to this litigation as "unprecedented" (Welty, 1982) and as
a "landmark case" (Clinard, 1990; Frank & Lynch, 1992; Hills, 1987;
Maakestad, 1987). Maakestad (1987, p. 7) stated that the case
"[r]eestablished an important precedent: In certain cases involving
human health and safety, corporations and their executives could be
required to submit not only to the scrutiny and sanctions of traditional
federal regulatory agencies, but to state criminal courts as well."
According to criminologists Frank and Lynch (1992, p. 42) "[t]he
case stands as a landmark in the social definition of crime . . . . The
prosecution of this case acted as a marker of moral indignation, and
indicated that the community will not tolerate such behavior." An editorial in the National Law Journal commented that " [ o ] c c a s i o n a l l y . . .
certain trials transcend the pedestrian and crystallize, in a kind of morality play, a social issue which concerns all of us. Saco-Vinzetti, Hiss,
and the Chicago Seven trials are three examples. In its own way, the
Pinto case is also" ("Corporate Criminals," 1980, p. 14). Clearly, all
these statements suggest that the Ford Pinto case was a critical step in
the development of corporate liability and organizational responsibility.
The importance of the case is also illustrated by the amount of attention the various media has paid to it. Several books have appeared
about the case, including a trial summary (Strobel 1980), the use of the
incident as a case study in business ethics (Birsch & Fielder, 1994), and
an examination of the case in the context of an emerging national
movement against corporate crime (Cullen et al., 1987). Whether accurate or not, several theatrical and television films also have used the
Pinto case as a starting point in their dramatic displays of corporate
greed or arrogance.
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The primary purpose of this study is to examine the lasting impact
of the Ford Pinto case. Other scholars (Lee & Eermann, 1999;
Schwartz, 1991) have examined the accuracy of the public's perceptions
regarding the facts of the case and those analyses do not need to be
repeated here. The classic sociological principle, known as the
"Thomas Theorem," maintains that situations defined as real become
real in their consequences (Thomas, 1966). What people believe, either
collectively or as individuals, is real in that it shapes and constrains their
behavior regardless of the actual facts. Before addressing the consequences of the framing of the Pinto case, a brief description of the
methodology used to analyze the case is in order. After that, the discussion examines the effect of the social construction of the Pinto case
and the long-term consequences on litigation, civil and criminal law,
public perceptions of corporate behavior, and business practices.
METHODOLOGY
The primary methods for this study were personal interviews and
content analyses of media reports. This integrated approach allowed
various forms of data retrieval to be used in this research. This multifaceted approach resulted in the largest acquisition of detailed relevant information about the perceptions of participants and
commentators regarding this case.
The primary method used in this research was a document analysis
of the relevant literature and news reports on State of Indiana v. the
Ford Motor Company. The review included materials describing the
actual events and activities leading to the decision to prosecute, the
path of the trial, the trial verdict, and consequences of the trial verdict.
This activity concentrated on how actors close to the case, the media,
and corporate representatives perceived the importance of the proceedings at that time or immediately after its conclusion. While the accuracy of such reporting is typically a matter for concern, such is not the
focus here. Instead, interest is confined to the discussions of the actors,
chronologies, and rationales for the events and activities surrounding
the case. Thus, any apparent media bias surrounding the presentation
of the case demonstrates the definition of the situation applied by reporters and other media commentators.
There is a plethora of analyses regarding the influence of media
depictions of crime, criminals, criminality, and victims (see Barak, 1988,
1994; Chermak, 1994). The news industry has a profound influence on
the public understanding of crime (Surette, 1992). Various sources of
information, commentary, and debate on crime exist in print, video, and
electronic outlets that establish the parameters of perceived wisdom on
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this topic. Marsh (1991) demonstrated that most media illustrate crime
in a mainstream and sensational fashion. One facet of this overly dramatic style is the manner in which victims are presented. However, the
media is not alone in dramatizing certain kinds of victims. Since its
emergence in the 1970s, the scholarly study of victimology has focused
almost exclusively on predatory conventional crime (Karmen, 1990).
Only recently has research expanded to include non-traditional victims,
such as organizations and the wider society. Official crime statistics
themselves fare no better because they pay far more attention to violent
and property crime than to corporate and white-collar offenses (Timmet & Eitzen, 1989, p. 39).
A conventional bias in victimology demonstrates a conservative inclination. Several studies have concluded that the bias in newspaper
reporting on crime issues establishes the parameters of public opinion
on crime and criminality (Ditton & Duffy, 1983; Kappeler, Blumberg,
& Potter, 1996; McCombs, 1994; Sheley & Ashkins, 1981; Smith, 1984).
For instance, Weiss and Chermak (1998) studied all the homicides that
occurred in Indianapolis in 1995 and concluded that white murder victims received more news attention than African-Americans victims.
Mann and Zatz (1998) maintain that popular conceptions of crime and
criminality are constructed within the dominant paradigms of race, gender, and class. They (1998, p. 1) contend that "[b]y linking images of
color with crime, the stereotypes underlying media reporting on crime
and criminality become more apparent." Thus, media constructs of
crime create a lasting impact in the minds of the audience that certain
kinds of crime and victims are worthy of attention.
Most media portrayals are based on street crime rather than whitecollar or corporate malfeasance. As Friedrichs explains, "[t]he most
common image of a crime victim is surely the victim of murder, rape,
robbery, burglary or some other conventional crime. There can be little
question that most people are likely to fear being victimized by such
crime" (Friedrichs, 1996, p. 58). Rather than fearing white-collar or
corporate crime, most American citizens remain unaware of corporate
misconduct. This slant stems from an ideological reification of corporate organization that leads to an ignorance of the regulatory and criminal violations of businesses (Fattah & Sacco, 1986; Friedrichs, 1996;
Williams & McShane, 1992).
The need for research to determine the consequences of media depictions of corporate crimes is apparent and undertaken ably by a few
criminologists (see Barak, 1999). Establishing the boundaries of a sociological imagination focused on organizational behavior is an important
addition to the literature. What experiences, ideas, and situations create serious or trivialized interpretations of corporate or white-collar
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crime? What do the participants in these cases think of the influence of
such cases? In order to broaden the understanding of corporate wrongdoing and criminal behavior, this paper seeks to uncover what the actors think about the Pinto case some 20 years after the litigation has
concluded.
Interviews were conducted with 22 persons connected in various
ways with the criminal case or civil litigation involving the Pinto. A
snowball sampling technique through contact with relevant individuals
and content analysis of previous works helped compile a list of potential interviews. The sample included locatable members of the defense
team, the prosecution team, and media representatives who covered the
case. Also interviewed were attorneys identified as experts in product
liability or who were involved with Pinto civil trials, community members of Elkhart where the case unfolded, and members of area Ford
dealerships. The interviews examined respondents' perceptions of the
case events more than 20 years later. Most respondents were interviewed once and follow-up interviews were conducted as relevant questions arose during transcription.
One of the current authors is originally from Elkhart where the
legal action originated. The presence of a researcher familiar with the
community was important to gain access to data "gatekeepers" (Babbie, 1998; Fleischer, 1995). In addition, the primary author worked as a
probation officer for three years in Elkhart which enabled access to
those involved in the case.
Most of the archival research came from a collection of articles
which the prosecution made available to the research team. This collection included articles from newspapers all across the country. However,
since these articles were photocopied for nonscholarly purposes, there
is limited bibliographical information in some instances. A n o t h e r
source of articles came from a collection maintained at the Elkhart Public Library. These newspaper articles were also photocopied and sometimes lacked complete bibliographical information. Articles from these
sources are identified in the bibliography and all available information
is cited.
THE DEBATE
Two main perspectives emerged after the Pinto trial as to how the
case outcome would affect future uses of criminal law against corporations for product liability issues. One viewpoint was stated by thenpresident of the National District Attorneys Association, R o b e r t Johnson, Sr. H e is quoted as saying "We'll see more prosecutions like this
. . . . A psychological barrier has been broken, and the big corporations
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are now vulnerable" (Bodine, 1980, p. 3). The popular idea was that
corporate malfeasance would be curtailed if corporations were held accountable for their actions. Thus, the feeling among some legal commentators was that the Pinto case represented a fundamental shift in
how the criminal courts would perceive corporations.
At the same time, others believed that the acquittal would have the
reverse effect and that corporations would be less likely to be brought
before criminal courts. P. A. Heinen, vice-president and general counsel of the Chrysler Corporation, contended that "Criminal prosecutions
will not increase in these esoteric areas . . . . I have a feeling we have
peaked in the wave of attempts to pound away at the corporations in
court" (Bodine, 1980, p. 3). Further support came from John Martin,
associate general counsel for litigation at Ford, who explained "[The
acquittal] ought to give any prosecutor who's thinking about trying to
force-fit a product liability case into a criminal case second thoughts on
proceeding" (Bodine, 1980, p. 17). Similar sentiments were voiced by
Herald Fahringer, a white-collar criminal defense attorney. He stated
"The acquittal will deter criminal prosecutions of major corporations
. . . . If Ford had been convicted in every community where there was a
serious accident, you'd have people demanding the prosecutor do like
they did in Indiana" (Bodine, 1980, p. 17). James Neal, lead defense
attorney for Ford, speculated that:
[I]t would have had more impact if there had been a guilty
verdict. It would have immediate impact in the terms of the
many product liability case suits around, as a matter of fact
after this case and after there was a not guilty verdict, those
cases became pretty easy to settle . . . . Had there been a verdict of guilty, Ford Motor Company would have been precluded from probably even arguing that they weren't liable for
punitive damages . . . . " (J. Neal, personal interview, June 4,
1997).
Another perspective was that the case was completely frivolous.
Commenting on civil litigation, Harry Philo, then president-elect of the
Association of American Trial Lawyers of America, commented that
"In my opinion, the Pinto case was a completely irrelevant prosecution"
(Stuart, 1980, p.4). However, he also stated that "[t]he verdict won't
deter civil lawsuits" (Mleczko, 1980, l l A ) .
While some legal commentators and practitioners believed that
criminal law should not be applied to corporations, it would nonetheless still be used. This raises concern that criminal law would be used as
a vehicle to lodge complaints against corporations, regardless of the
outcome. Individuals who believed, for whatever reason, that corpo-
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rate misconduct had harmed them could seek some publicity for their
cause by pressing prosecutors to file charges against the business. Malcolm Wheeler, who worked for the defense in the Pinto case, summarized the actual outcome with regards to the civil litigation:
Certainly, the legal community's view of the Pinto changed as
a result of that trial. We went down to Texas and tried a civil
case later that year in 1 9 8 0 . . . and got a defense verdict and
there was never another Pinto case tried and very few were
brought. Once the truth came out in I n d i a n a . . . anybody who
read that transcript knew that it was a bogus claim and the
Pinto issue went away in the legal community . . . . plaintiffs'
lawyers just stopped bringing the cases (Wheeler, personal interview, August 1, 1997)
It is not clear whether the view of the case actually changed in the
legal community. Wheeler raised the possibility that because of the
outcomes of a few Pinto cases, litigators would be hesitant to accept
product liability cases and prosecutors would be less likely to prosecute
corporations. Clearly, there is disagreement and contention over the
impact of the Pinto case on corporate liability. The two opposing viewpoints--increased reliance on criminal law and deterrence against using
criminal law--will be reviewed and analyzed from the perspective of
persons who were either participants or commentators on the case.
THE DEBATE REVISITED
The question of whether to expand the application of criminal law
to corporations was one critical issue that arose from the Pinto case [for
a historical development of corporate criminal liability, see Bernard
(1984)]. This transformation of a civil issue into a criminal concern is
significant for a number of reasons. First, the issue of punishing corporate misconduct has led to varying views since the interpretation of the
Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t that corporations were "fictitious persons"
with full legal standing. The dominant view has been that the punishment of businesses is an issue of regulatory, rather than criminal, law.
Another perspective is that civil law represents the best form of redress
for corporate misconduct. Both these positions regard criminal law as
an inappropriate solution because the hierarchical nature of corporations make it difficult to determine who actually violated the law and
assign culpability accurately. Related to this consideration is the question of responsibility for a defective product. Interviews uncovered a
clear lack of consensus among the participants and commentators in the
Ford Pinto case.
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Malcolm Wheeler, a lawyer who assisted in Ford's defense, mentions this issue when discussing what he believed the Pinto case was
about:
The highest profile instance and effort by a significant segment
of the legal community to expand the scope of exposure of
corporations for alleged product defects, from what has historically been, and fortunately has remained civil tort liability,
into the area of criminal law.
Wheeler also commented that:
The very fact that there has not been another product liability
criminal prosecution since that case tells you one major impact
of the case w a s . . . [that] it said the criminal law is a very, very
poor tool to use for product litigation. It's just not
appropriate.
However self-serving these comments may be, they do not address
the issue that corporate creation of a defective product may constitute a
violation of criminal law. Wheeler adds that he is referring to the general criminal law (i.e., reckless homicide) as opposed to a very specific
regulatory law that carries criminal penalties. Thus, Wheeler supports
the classic legal contention that businesses, while reaping the benefits of
legal personhood, are not subject to traditional criminal law.
The prosecutors' staff in the Pinto case even shared this view.
Lead prosecutor Michael Cosentino talks about how criminal law
should not be a common alternative:
I don't believe for a second that corporations should be
charged criminally very often--it should be a very rare, rare
thing. It should only be used, the criminal l a w , . . , when the
civil law won't work. You know when you have a corporation
so large and so powerful that a $100 million dollar verdict
doesn't bother it, then it's time maybe the criminal law can
step in and do something about it, where the civil law has
failed. I'm not a person who thinks that we should have
10,000 corporations charged criminally every year. I think that
would be wrong. I think it should be used very sparingly and
very rarely (M. Cosentino, personal interview, June 4, 1977).
If there is a lack of common ground among participants about
criminal law as a viable tool to limit the excesses of corporate conduct,
how do they view the legal issues of the Pinto case? Most observers
consider the Ford Pinto case a precedent-setting case, although they disagree on the interpretation of that precedent. Even though some parties have criticized the notion of using the criminal law in this way, one
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could argue that an effect of the trial was to make people aware of this
possibility. Judge Donald Jones, who heard early change of venue motions in the case, stated the case "demonstrated that corporations could
be held criminally liable under some circumstances" (D. Jones, personal
interview, August 1, 1997).
A year after the trial ended, Cosentino commented that "we
proved a large international corporation can be second-guessed by 12
ordinary citizens in the State of Indiana [and] hopefully that will act as a
deterrent in those rare cases--rare, rare cases-- in the future where it's
necessary" ("Cosentino Still Sees Victory," 1981). In other words,
Cosentino believes the criminal law can, and should, be used against
corporations, yet only as a last resort. This precedent, although used
infrequently, did result in a changed view of law as applied to corporate
activity. In an article examining the fifth anniversary of the trial, journalist Stoner (n.d.) observed that "Both Cosentino and Neal agree that
one of the important factors coming from the case is that corporations
can now be charged with criminal recklessness." Ford defense attorney
Aubrey Harwell shared similar sentiments during an interview with the
authors:
[I] think this case and the widespread national publicity that
was created by this case let law enforcement officials, police
officials, prosecutors know that they could go after a corporation and that even though it was novel, and it was different,
and it was a first time event with regard to Ford, that it was
something they had in their arsenal of weapons they could
use--to that degree I think it made a difference (A. Harwell,
personal interview, July 11, 1997).
Corporations understood that the Pinto case revealed a process beyond social condemnation that could be used against them, if necessary.
William Conour, who drafted the original indictment, stated then that
the reason the indictment received "so much attention [was] because of
its potential for precedent" (Stemm, 1978). Nearly 20 years later, Conour still clings to that view. He explained "[I] think that one of the
victories of the case is that it clearly laid down that corporations could
be charged as corporate entities with homicide . . . . " (W. Conour, personal interview, August 5, 1997).
One could argue that this case set a precedent, regardless of its
outcome, by merely going to trial. Lee Strobel, who covered the case
for the Chicago Tribune, stated:
I believe the enduring significance of the Pinto case was not
that Ford was acquitted, but that the case was tried at all.
That's because the case signaled a determination by the state
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that corporations should be held accountable for their actions,
even when they rise to the level of recklessness or criminal
misconduct. Frankly, the deaths of those three teenage girls so
outraged Cosentino that he called out for justice--even if justice, in this case, meant that he should seek the indictment of
Ford because he believed the girls would have walked away
from the crash had the Pinto been appropriately designed (L.
Stroebel, personal correspondence, July 10, 1997).
One law professor who assisted in the prosecution, Bruce Berner
of Valparaiso University, described how, in a sense, the case was already won because the opinion made by Judge Donald Jones to overrule "Ford's motion to dismiss the charges will stand whether or not
Ford is found guilty" (Schreiber, January 12-13, 1980, p. 1). Similarly,
investigative reporter Mark Dowie commented that even though Ford
won, he thought the indictment was "[a]n important piece of American
corporate and business history just that it was d o n e . . , win or lose" (M.
Dowie, personal interview, August 4, 1997). James Taylor, vice-president and general counsel for Elkhart's CTS corporation, made a valid
point when he commented that even though the Pinto case set a precedent that the criminal law could be applied in this matter to corporations, it left matters of convicting and punishing a corporation
unanswered (Bibler, 1980).
IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC FROM MEDIA COVERAGE
Valparaiso University law professor Bruce Berner, who assisted the
prosecution, stated "the long range impact of this is much more important than the impact it had . . . in 1 9 8 0 . . . the long range impact of
getting into peoples' consciousness, that's where I t h i n k . . , it really had
an impact" (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997). He also discussed how he thought "the case was part of a period where people just
kind of lost their kind of blind confidence in corporate America where
they realized that we need to watch them" (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997). Berner adds to this interpretation by reflecting on
the nature of the case:
I always view this case as piece of a larger movement at that
t i m e . . , of sort of calling corporate America to account in a
lot of different ways. There were, of course, many civil product liability actions against the automotive industry during that
period of time on safety, not just fuel systems. The interesting
thing about those cases is with a civil case the impact for the
public happens at the end. That is, what captures everybody's
attention is a big verdict that comes down with a big punitive
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damage n u m b e r attached to it . . . . What sort of made our case
different was that because it was a criminal case, because it
started with an indictment against a well-known, major corporation, focus was on the case from the beginning during the
trial. That had not happened before other than maybe locally.
A n d so the publicity gets intensified because it's continuous
9. . (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997).
According to Strobel,
The Ford Pinto trial happened to take place at a time when
there was very little national news going on, and so it got disproportionately greater coverage around the country. As a result, people were exposed to this issue repeatedly on T V news
and in their local papers . . . . I think the overall effect of the
coverage was to raise people's awareness that corporations
can be held accountable in a criminal context. I've seen the
Pinto case subsequently discussed in textbooks on corporate
ethics, so I know future corporate leaders are continuing to be
exposed to it (L. Strobel, personal correspondence, July 10,
1997).
Wheeler recalls:
Day by day [you could feel] a shift in the view of the media
representatives who were there . . . All the major networks,
and the major newspapers, and stringers for all the wire services, were there on a daily basis. There's no question that
when it s t a r t e d . . , it was the pack of iguanas going after a
crippled chicken, they really thought that this was going to be
a blood bath and Ford was going to go down in a terrible, terrible defeat because this Pinto was a terrible, terrible vehicle.
They believed Grimshaw and you could feel as the case went
on, I mean it was almost palatable in the court, you could feel,
some of them quite reluctantly by the way, but you could feel
the mast changing, you could feel them beginning to perceive
that it was a very different story from what they had been
thinking about (M. Wheeler, personal interview, August 1,
1997).
Harwell stated that the Pinto case "added to the awareness" of corporate crime. H e expanded this comment by explaining that "[a]ny
high profile case against a well-known . . . brand-name corporation in
America is going to ratchet up the sensitivity and the public level of
awareness" (A. Harwell, personal interview, July 11, 1997) 9
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A more specific effect on the public involves issues of safety.
Bruce Berner felt that regulators became tougher as a result of this case
(B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997). A DePaul University law
professor who assisted the prosecution, Terrence Kiely, stated that "The
only way we're going to get quality products as consumers is to make
corporate executives feel personally responsible for their decisions"
(Pasztor, 1980, p. 23). Berner, in viewing the impact on the public,
commented:
It was very clear that during the period of time that these automobiles were sold, that the one thing you couldn't sell was
safety. The buyer wasn't interested in buying safety, he wasn't
really even conscious about the safety issues and assumed that
major manufacturers were making that stuff as safe as they
humanly could" (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997)
Ulmer also sees a result of the Pinto trial being increased safety
consciousness among manufacturers and the public (J. Ulmer, personal
interview, July 31, 1997). Other members of the prosecution team, besides Ulmer, see a similar effect. William Conour points out that today
most advertisements emphasize safety rather than speed. As he explains it, "[I] think the Pinto case helped direct peoples' attention to
unreasonably dangerous things about vehicles and how quickly they can
be fixed at times and how cheaply they can be fixed" (W. Conour, personal interview, August 5, 1997).
Similar views are shared by Cosentino, who explains how the case
impacted the automobile industry:
I would like to hope that it did because it is my belief now that
cars are much s a f e r . . , than they were in the late 70s and early
80s. They're much more conscious about safety factors in advertisements . . . . I would like to think that the Pinto case had
some small part in the move to Safety in motor vehicles because I think there has been a definite movement (M. Cosentino, personal interview, June 4, 1997).
Another concurring opinion comes from Clarence Ditlow, executive director of the Center for Auto Safety. Among the benefits he attributes to the trial are safer cars for consumers and automobile
companies being quicker to make recalls (Stuart, 1980, p. 4). Finally,
along similar lines, Rosoff and his colleagues wrote in a text on whitecollar crime:
If anything positive came out of the Pinto tragedies, it is that
auto makers are probably far more reluctant today to ignore
design defects post-facto as Ford did. For example, in the face
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193
of a problem remarkably reminiscent of the Pinto, Navistar
International, the nation's largest manufacturer of school
buses, was quick to recall tens of thousands of vehicles in 1992
after government tests showed that fuel tanks could rupture,
producing a fire hazard in a collision. On the other hand, the
continuous plethora of such recalls still raises serious questions of how willing auto manufactures are to put consumer
safety ahead of bottom-line considerations pre-facto (Rosoff,
Pontell, & Tillman, 1998, p. 60).
One reporter at the time, Reginald Stuart from The New York
Times, was not so confident that an impact would materialize. Immediately following the acquittal, he wrote:
The case's effect on automobile safety is dubious. During the
past 10 years, let alone the two years since the Pinto case began, only two major safety standards have been established
and implemented--the 1972 side-impact standards and the
1977 gasoline tank safety standard (Stuart, 1980, p. 4).
IMPACT ON BUSINESS
From the participants' point of view, the Pinto case established a
business, as well as a legal, precedent. Frances Hare, who filed the first
civil case against Ford with regard to the Pinto, told the authors that in
his judgment:
The Pinto litigation was the event that changed the face, the
philosophy, the policy approach to products liability litigation.
All of a sudden, corporate America wakes up and it ain't [sic]
something you send to your insurance company and find out
later on what the results are, it's not a discrete defect involving
just one product of c o u r s e . . , it's not just that it involves all
the products that incorporate that d e s i g n . . , having a multiple
effect on the damages, it inherently involves a management
decision, a design decision is necessary . . . so you're putting
management in the dock and that's what woke them up and
they just said "My God, we ain't gonna [sic] have you damn
trial layers second-guessing how we make decisions . . . . Corporate America then became active in the handling of products liability litigation (F. Hare, personal interview, August 12,
1997).
Hare clarified that he felt it was the civil suits that brought this
issue to light and the criminal prosecution that "crystallized" it. Another perspective with regards to the impact the case has had on safety
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was given by Foy Divine, who has worked on post-crash fire cases since
1972. H e explained:
[I] don't think it was so much any one case, because I know for
a fact that the Ford executives and I'm talking now a b o u t . . .
H e n r y Ford and the president, not Iacocca but one of the ones
that followed h i m . . , were deposed in cases in the late 1980s,
before H e n r y passed a w a y . . , but they were asked what they
personally recalled about large verdicts . . . . The testimony
was striking. Both of them had some vague recollection of the
large verdict out in California . . . they r e m e m b e r e d a large
verdict out in Texas . . . the president said that it would be
irresponsible of him to order his engineers to redesign a vehicle simply because of some jury verdict somewhere . . . . The
attitude that they evinced in these depositions was kind of one
of righteous indignation and defiance (F. Divine, personal interview, August 4, 1997).
James Neal shares this viewpoint on the effect the case has had on
the automobile industry:
I think the automobile manufacturer now recognizes that it
could be prosecuted, and engineers could be prosecuted, criminally if they screw up in designing an automobile; whatever
screwing up means. But, you know, this is the corporate world
that we're into now. A n y b o d y who takes on a job as a corporate executive anymore has to recognize that this fellow may
be vulnerable to criminal prosecution for a lot of reasons.
When I started practicing law, corporate executives use to
think "My God, only criminals exercise their privilege against
self-incrimination." That's no longer true (J. Neal, personal
interview, June 4, 1997).
Mark Dowie states that the case:
certainly put the entire corporate sector on notice t h a t . . .
corporate homicide was going to be . . . seriously considered
by at least one court in the nation and certainly the legal profession and prosecutors nationwide as a possible . . . legal
strategy. I think that anything that is that embarrassing from a
public relations standpoint is going to have an impact whether
they win or lose a case. They don't want to repeat that win or
lose (M. Dowie, personal interview, August 4, 1997).
Dowie later added that Iacocca and H e n r y Ford were briefed every
day and "[t]hey obviously considered it a very serious matter" (M.
Dowie, personal interview, August 4, 1997). Divine also talks about de-
BECKER, JIPSON, AND BRUCE
195
terrence when he states that the two things corporate executives worry
about are huge punitive damages and bad publicity (F. Divine, personal
interview, August 4, 1997). It is the threat of these, rather than the
impact of a single case, that motivates change in the automobile
industry.
James Neal has similar viewpoints as can be seen in his statement
that "[f]or a corporate executive, the punishment is really in the shame.
I don't know if it does a lot of good to lock up a corporate official who's
never going to that again because of the shame" (J. Neal, personal interview, June 4, 1997). Neal also speculated, prior to the verdict, that
the impact would have been greater had there been a conviction. "If
the prosecution succeeds, if the present law is changed, the ramifications will be absolutely phenomenal. Every board of directors, every
president will be liable criminally for the performance of his product"
(Barker, 1980, p. 22). Today, Harwell expresses similar feelings:
Had there been a conviction, there would have been tremendous ramifications, I think, for American industry. In that
there was an acquittal, I think that there w e r e . . , some effects
in terms of corporate America's sensitivity to the potential for
being charged with crimes in regards to the design and manufacture of products. But, I don't think it was nearly as significant as it would have been were there a conviction (A.
Harwell, personal interview, July 11, 1997).
However, even without a judgment against Ford, several of the interviewees still argued that there was a powerful impact on the Ford
Motor Company.
IMPACT ON FORD
There were criticisms that the information published about the
Pinto was false (see Swartz, 1991 for an analysis of the Grimshaw evidence that overlapped with the criminal case). According to Malcolm
Wheeler, what he learned prior to the criminal case led him to believe
that if the criminal case was defended in the same way, the results
would mirror Grimshaw. As he explains,
The information about the Pinto that had been published in
the press had been greatly distorted and very unfairly distorted--unfairly portrayed--and it was pretty clear to me that
one of the reasons that it happened was because of the Grimshaw verdict in California in which the company simply hadn't
been ready to defend that trial and had not even come close to
putting on the true Pinto story. Most of the very favorable
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FORDMOTOR COMPANY
internal documentation and internal decision making had not
come out in the Grimshaw case for a full variety of reasons
(M. Wheeler, personal interview, August 1, 1997).
Paul Weaver worked for the Ford Motor Company from 1978 to
1980 in the corporation's public affairs staff preparing company positions on public policy issues. He criticized Ford for how it dealt with
the controversy surrounding the Pinto. According to Weaver (1988, p.
94), "[t]he design of its [Pinto's] fuel system was essentially the same as
that of other cars of its size and generation" and "Pintos had about the
same rate of death from fire due to rear-end collision as other small
cars." His assertion is that the Pinto was not unusual compared to similar models. Weaver admits that "[w]e should simply have told the truth
about the car" and "[w]e did not fight to vindicate ourselves." Thus, by
refusing to mount a major publicity campaign, Ford gave the impression
that it was guilty.
In hindsight, Lee Iacocca appears to agree with this view while discussing what he learned as an automaker from how Ford reacted to the
Pinto lawsuits. He said:
The suits might have bankrupted the company, so we kept our
mouths shut for fear of saying anything that just one jury
might have construed as an admission of guilt. Winning in
court was our top priority; nothing else mattered. And, of
course, our silence added to all the suspicions people had
about us and the car. I learned something from that. The
Pinto was a legal problem and a public relations problem, and
we choose to only deal with the legal problem. Ever since
then, whenever we've had a similar choice to make at
Chrysler, we've done the exact opposite. We've chosen to
look past the legal consequences and go public with the whole
truth (Iacocca & Kleinfield, 1988, pp. 141-142).
These remarks add an interesting dimension to the Pinto case in
that one of the clear lessons was to confront issues raised about defective products. This concern illustrates that after the Pinto case, corporations became much more willing and adept at handling images
stemming from poor design. In other words, the Pinto case made corporations much more willing to wage public relations battles over design and production flaws.
Another respondent adds a dimension of concern. Neal, in discussing whether the case had an impact on Ford, read a letter to him from
Henry Ford II following victory in the trial. An excerpt from that letter
and a discussion regarding its contents follows:
BECKER, JIPSON, AND BRUCE
197
Neal: [S]ome people can be expected to criticize the verdict in
Winamac. The charge could be that now we're off the hook,
we can forget about product quality and safety. I don't see it
that way. I think the vote of confidence from the jury in
Winamac will serve to encourage our management and our engineers to redouble their efforts to achieve the highest possible
levels of quality and safety.
Interviewer: So it's clear that the case, at least in his mind, and
then, of course, filtering through Ford's upper management
was we really have to take something from this.
Neal: That's exactly right. That's the thrust of this letter.
D o n ' t think w e ' r e . . , going to consider ourselves off the hook.
We've got to take a lesson from this even though it was a great
outcome for us (J. Neal, personal interview, June 4, 1997).
There were contradictory opinions as to how the Pinto case automobile affected sales in Northern Indiana, the area where the accident
had occurred. One Ford dealer from Elkhart County stated that Pinto
sales "flat stopped." A n o t h e r car dealer from neighboring Saint Joseph
County commented that the Pinto sales "stayed pretty much the same."
Former Ford employee Paul Weaver spoke about national sales and revealed that "In the summer of 1978, the Pinto, previously our biggest
selling car, was selling at a rate about 40% off the previous year's level.
The Company's product reputation plummeted" (Weaver, 1988, p. 94).
However, Jerry Slone, assistant director of corporate information for
Ford, commented during the trial that the decline in Ford sales and the
decision to stop producing the Pinto was not directly connected to the
case (Schreiber, February 7, 1980, p. 7). It appears as if Ford did not
suffer any long-term consequences from the case. The corporation
achieved record profits in 1984 and a 1985 "poll of 3,000 readers of
Consumer's Digest voted Ford the top U.S. car maker" (Fisher 1985, p.
21).
DISCUSSION
Lead attorneys James Neal and Michael Cosentino, as well as two
reporters from Northern Indiana who covered the case (David Schreiber of the Elkhart Truth and Jeff Kurowski of the South Bend Tribune),
referred to the case as being "ancient history" during their interviews.
B e r n e r discussed a talk he gave at the SUNY-Buffalo Law School about
ten years after the case. H e was surprised to learn that "[n]early 90%
of those students thought we had won the case, it was a surprise to them
that we hadn't won the case, so it seemed to me that in some ways we
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FORDMOTOR COMPANY
had won the case" (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997). Even
four of the 12 respondents who reside in Elkhart incorrectly identified
Ford as losing the case. These comments underscore the fact that filing
the case and pursuing prosecution was more important than the actual
outcome of the case.
Several respondents emphasized that it was difficult to specify the
impact of the Pinto case alone. They asserted that the outcome of the
case resulted from "other factors" working in conjunction with the publicity and attention brought by the Pinto case. It was argued that this
confluence of factors made it difficult to separate the singular impact of
the Pinto case. This point was illustrated by another comment from
Berner in his discussion of how initial reports on the importance of this
case have stayed over the years. As he explained:
[l]ike everything else sociologically, making all of the interconnections is kind of difficult. It certainly hasn't spawned this
tremendous progeny of other criminal lawsuits against corporations. But you know that's one way it could have worked.
Maybe it works by simply making people more careful and to
the extent that it makes people more careful, then it's consistent that there wouldn't be a tremendous number o f . . . criminal cases (B. Berner, personal interview, June 5, 1997).
Thus, the impact of the Pinto case is that it worked as a collator of
sentiment and argument about unsafe automobiles and corporate
wrongdoing, even though Ford was acquitted of any criminal actions.
This finding is significant when applied to the perspective of deterrence
theory. Deterrence theory contends that punishment for an offender
that is meaningfully carried out may deter future criminal behavior.
What this study suggests, at least for the Ford Motor Company with the
Pinto, is that the perception of guilt can establish a deterrence effect.
The actions of Ford's management at the very top indicated they attempted to act contritely in order to preserve their market share. Thus,
although the prosecution failed to deliver a guilty verdict, the corporation reviewed practices and altered standard actions which resulted in
specific deterrence.
The publicity and media involvement in the case also altered the
perception of the Ford corporation and its actions. Public perception of
corporate responsibility matters to the livelihood of the business and to
the willingness to prosecute. Scathing public ridicule and derision does
not just affect a corporation's bottom line, it also shapes the industry
and field of which the organization is a part. Ford's troubles with the
Pinto prosecution radiated toward the other auto makers as well. Today, corporate responsibility is more than a "buzz word" or a sound
BECKER, JIPSON, AND BRUCE
199
bite. It is part of the corporate impression management that businesses
so carefully craft.
Nearly all the interviewed participants advised that they are still
approached to discuss the Pinto case, although interest appears to be
decreasing as time passes. Perhaps Neal best summarized this situation
when he stated, "It's more of an academic interest because of its [the
case's] uniqueness." While some interest about the legal dynamics of
the case still persist, the assumption is that the Ford Pinto case changed
corporate practices. But in an era in which the Pinto case seems small
when compared to the Enron debacle or Firestone tread separation
cases, changed in what direction?
The policy implications embedded within this study relate to the
issue of not just punishing criminality directly, but also in the "court of
public opinion." The Ford Motor Company acted contritely in order to
persevere in a difficult media and public relations situation. The lasting
dramaturgical effects on the participants are obvious, as are the consequences for a public that may very well believe that Ford lost the case
and was found guilty of three counts of reckless homicide. The effects
of negative publicity demonstrate that individuals, groups, social movements, policy makers, and others have a potential to influence, albeit in
weak fashion, the actions of corporate giants. Whether a criminal
charge is supported by a verdict or not, the process of taking a business
to criminal court may very well lead to some of the changes sought by
filing the charge in the first place. This statement does not mean that
businesses will then become perfect corporate citizens. Ford has had to
grapple with subsequent problems, such as "side-saddle" gas tanks and
alleged problems with the design of the Ford Explorer. However, the
ability of local legal actors to compel corporations to be accountable to
local and state concerns is a promising aspect of the Pinto case that has
gone overlooked and under-analyzed.
CONCLUSION
Future research needs to address how the Pinto case ties in with
other significant legal precedents in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. While
the Pinto case was being fought, Ford and other car makers did change
some of their practices; however, the issue remains unclear. Was the
Pinto case and its influence a solitary catalyst in reorganizing production practices or were there other factors? Was the Ford Pinto case one
among a series of events and cases that persuaded the auto makers to
change some practices? Are corporations abiding by the law--or appearing to abide by the law--because they wish to be good citizens or
because of the fear of public rejection should they get caught? The
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FORD MOTOR COMPANY
recent collapse of the energy-trading giant Enron and the FirestoneBridgestone tread separation cases lend credibility to the concern that
corporate actors are more concerned with their image than with their
legality.
More qualitative, quantitative, and historical data are needed to
compare the short- and long-term consequences of criminal and civil
prosecutions of corporations. Research needs to be directed in a multifaceted manner at all the participants in these cases. This cadre includes the legal scholars and activists who study and participate in the
legal work in these cases, the actual participants themselves, government agencies and individuals, and the news media, not just as a collective agency, but the individuals who write the stories and report on the
cases. Only a detailed examination and comparison of the various
events, cases, depictions, and understandings can create understanding
of the long-lasting impact of corporate activity.
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