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German Politics, 2020
At the beginning of this decade, the EU’s foreign and security policy was leaderless, while several crises put Europe under pressure. The economically strong Germany had to become Europe’s new political engine. The way in which Germany took up its new and unusual role and the implications that German leadership has for the EU’s foreign and security policy are analysed in this report. Germany fulfilled the leadership role that it never applied for. It pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and led the Russia sanctions policy of the West. Germany not only followed the French call for military assistance after the Paris attacks, but is also heavily engaged in diplomatic efforts to solve the Syrian conflict. Berlin is central to the development of broader EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. It is in the driver’s seat when it comes to relationships with key international actors, such as Russia, Turkey and the US. Germany has become an unlikely and unusual foreign policy leader, which still differs in various aspects from traditional foreign policy powerhouses. It leads through institutions and diplomacy rather than military power. It seeks European solutions rather than national ones. However, the success and sustainability of Germany’s approach depends on securing Europe’s unity and resilience in the face of crises in the neighbourhood and the effects of globalization.
2021
Continuous crisis in the European Union has resulted in skewed power dynamics between Member States and supra-state institutions. This project explores how German leaders have positioned themselves in the European Union during acute crises and how their discourse promotes integration efforts. Press conferences, press statements, and government statements between 2010–2020 are analyzed, informed by actor-produced policy-narrative analysis and archival research methods. Dominant themes of economic stability, unity, and bordering are revealed. European institutional power and European identity have shifted in the last decade due to the complex institutional dynamics between nation states and the European Union. Broader questions over identity, border control, and the future of Europe have been challenged by theses crises as policies pushed forward by Germany have both increased and decreased integration. Recent trends in anti-Europeanism among the German electorate have shifted domesti...
CER Policy Bried, 2018
Germany’s politicians are at last debating the country’s role in Europe. They should pursue a clear European agenda that overcomes ‘small nation’ thinking: Berlin needs to acknowledge that because of Germany’s weight, its domestic economic policy has consequences for its neighbours. It also needs to take more responsibility for European security. By outsourcing European security to the United States, and closely co-ordinating with France and Britain on European affairs, Germany has long enjoyed the luxury of not having to think strategically about economics or foreign and defence policy. In economics, Germany has been unwilling to give up its partial and self-serving euro crisis narrative; in defence and foreign policy, German politicians have long avoided engaging voters in a debate about the country’s responsibilities for international security. But the election of US President Donald Trump and, to a lesser extent, Brexit, has focused minds in Berlin: if Europe is to meet its many challenges, Germany needs to question some of its longstanding assumptions. This paper examines German political narratives and priorities and outlines an ambitious but realistic strategy in the areas of European trade policy, economic governance, migration management, and defence, and looks at Germany’s relationships with its main strategic partners. First, Germany needs to think more strategically about trade. Under Trump, the US has given up its leadership role in setting the standards for global trade, leaving a void which the EU can fill. Germany has the chance to lead a European push for greater emphasis on social rights, environmental protection, fair taxation and political standards. Berlin needs to develop a trade policy that understands and is willing to use the EU’s considerable economic pull for its strategic goals, such as supporting reforms and social standards, or spreading market economics and the rule of law in its neighbourhood. Second, Germany must take steps to strengthen the eurozone. Berlin is unlikely to support eurozone reforms like debt mutualisation, or a sizeable common budget. But there are other things it can do: Germany could agree with – and even promote – the idea that fiscal policy could do more to lean against the economic cycle at a national level. Berlin should stop dragging its feet on the banking union and make the capital markets union a political priority. Germany could also raise investment at home and abroad by setting up a public wealth fund. Third, after its leading role in the EU migration crisis in 2015, Germany must help develop a long-term European strategy to manage migration. Berlin should be pragmatic about working with Turkey and Libya to stop irregular migration, while also leading the way in ensuring that the use of development aid from European countries is co-ordinated at an EU level. Here, Berlin should go beyond just economic assistance: it could help develop a neighbourhood policy that ties investment support, development aid, full trade access to EU markets, and legal migration routes, to clear standards on the rule of law, democracy, social and minority rights. Fourth, in light of the deteriorating security situation in Europe’s neighbourhood, and in order to become less dependent on the United States’ protection, Germany has no choice but to invest in defence and modernise its armed forces. The government must tackle Germany’s inability to deploy at scale and the low availability of crucial weapons platforms, as well as the domestically controversial subjects of German arms exports, and participation in NATO’s nuclear deterrence arrangements. While Berlin should continue to be a leading voice for the EU’s efforts to rationalise its defence market, it should defer to the operational experience of France and Britain and work with them to increase the readiness of European troops. Finally, Germany must rethink its working relationships with its main strategic partners. Berlin should not make the mistake of assuming that the Trump administration will be replaced in 2020 by a more traditional US leader, and instead invest in rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. It must enter into a constructive debate with Warsaw about migration, and the rule of law. And it should seize the opportunity that Emmanuel Macron’s presidency provides to work constructively with France on eurozone reform.
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 1993
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of Chancellor Angela Merkel in the main crises that the European Union (EU) has gone through in the period 2014-2020. Angela Merkel has been the Chancellor of Germany for 16 consecutive years. During this period, he has had to handle different problems within her country, as well as at the European level, an area in which she has had considerable influence, especially in the decision-making process. For this, we are going to take four central crises as case studies. The first case is the Ukrainian crisis, which began in 2014. It was unleashed after the events of the Euromaidan in Kyiv, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass. The second case is the Greek crisis, in 2015. The election of Alexis Tsipras as Greek prime minister, the unsustainability of the Greek debt interest payments, the economic deterioration of the country, but fundamentally the possible exit of the Hellenic country from the eurozone put the currency project at risk and demonstrated its limits just over a decade after its implementation. The third case is the so-called refugee crisis, which peaked in 2015, although the migration problem continued in subsequent years. Angela Merkel's leadership was key in leading the EU through the migration crisis. Finally, we find ourselves with the multidimensional crisis unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Germany's role was crucial in the negotiations to reach an agreement regarding the "Next Generation EU" economic stimulus package and the multiannual financial framework. To conclude, we ponder the central role that the German leader has played in managing these crises, and how she has performed in each of the cases analyzed.
US-German clash over international order and security. The consequences for NATO’s Eastern flank, 2019
This year’s Munich Security Conference has laid bare the differences in the US and German visions of international order and security in speeches given by Chancellor Angela Merkel and US Vice President Mike Pence. Germany fundamentally disagrees with the Trump administration both on the paradigm of inter-state strategic competition with China and Russia (and Iran) and on the redefinition of the political, economic and military terms of the alliance with Europe. Berlin, aware of the growing challenges to European and global order and security, rejects the American ‘peace through strength’ policy, but at the same time has failed to present any real alternative. Merkel’s defence of the multilateral approach and of the liberal international order (understood as shaping the policy with partners and allies, above all the USA, but also in dialogue with China and Russia) is not a viable alternative any more. Nor is developing comprehensive European strategic autonomy in the French spirit, independent of the United States. Berlin is still aware that the alliance with the USA form the foundations of German and European security and prosperity even if Washington is becoming an increasingly difficult partner and ally. Given the long-term domestic limitations that shape German foreign and security policy, it is difficult to expect any major change in Germany’s in-between course in the coming years. The continued disagreements between the two biggest allies over key security issues will present an increasing challenge to NATO’s Eastern flank countries.
Studia Europejskie, 2018
In the face of changes taking place in the global order and challenges in the immediate vicinity of the European Union, the member states are forced to redefi ne their own security priorities. The directions of the desired changes in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy have been the subject of numerous discussions and analyses. One of the key countries that have a signifi cant impact on the architecture of European security is Germany. That is why the main goal of the article is to answer the question about the role and importance of Germany in shaping the European Un-ion's security policy. The main conclusion resulting from the conducted analysis is the following: in the fi eld of security policy, Germany's attitude is characterized by high ambivalence between the implementation of foreign policy goals by means of the so-called soft instruments and the necessity and inevitability of increasing its own military involvement. The resolution of this dilemma is fundamental to the future architecture of the Common Security and Defense Policy.
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