The Determinants of Acquirer Returns in the
Turkish Stock Market
Ebru Reis*
İstanbul Bilgi University
Abstract
This study examines the stock market reaction and the determinants of this reaction to the
announcements of company acquisitions for acquiring firms in the Turkish Stock Market
during the period 1994-2013. Standard event study methodology is used to measure
abnormal returns of acquiring companies during the announcement period. Contrary to
the findings in the developed markets, the acquirers in Turkey earn a significant positive
cumulative abnormal return of 2.27% during an 11-day announcement period. Acquirer
returns are higher in mergers compared to acquisitions, and in same business acquisitions compared to unrelated acquisitions. However, no statistically significant evidence
is observed for the effect of a target firm’s country of origin (domestic vs cross-border),
or public status on the acquirer announcement period returns.
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions, acquirer returns.
JEL Classification: G31; G34
Türkiye Pay Piyasasındaki Şirket Birleşmelerinde Satın Alan
Şirketlerin Pay Getirilerindeki Belirleyici Etmenler
Özet
Bu çalışma, 1994-2013 yılları arasında Türkiye pay piyasasındaki şirket birleşme ve
satın alma haberlerinin satın alan şirket hisse senedi üzerindeki etkisini ve bu etkinin
belirleyici etmenlerini incelemiştir. Satın alan şirketlerin anormal pay getirileri standart olay çalışması yöntemi kullanılarak hesaplanmıştır. Gelişmiş ülke piyasalarında
yapılan çalışmaların aksine, Türkiye’de satın alan şirketlerin duyuru günü merkezli
11 günlük zaman aralığında yüzde 2.27 oranında kümülatif anormal getiri elde ettiği
ortaya konmuştur. Satın alan şirketlerin pay getirileri, şirket evliliklerinde kısmi satın
almalara kıyasla ve benzer sektör birleşmelerinde farklı sektör birleşmelerine kıyasla
daha yüksektir. Bununla beraber, hedef şirketin orijin ülkesinin (yerli veya uluslararası)
ve halka açıklık durumunun satın alan şirketin pay getirileri üzerinde istatiksel olarak
anlamlı bir etkisi gözlemlenmemiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Şirket birleşmeleri, Satın alan şirket getirileri
JEL Sınıflaması: G31; G34
*
Ebru Reis is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Business Administration at İstanbul Bilgi University, Santral Istanbul
Campus, Kazım Karabekir Cad.No:2/13, 34060, Eyüp, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: ebru.reis@bilgi.edu.tr
Boğaziçi Journal Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2015), pp. 21-39.
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
22
T
he stock price reaction to acquirers and targets in company acquisitions has
been thoroughly investigated in the developed markets in the last three decades
largely due to the high number of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities and
the availability of data in these countries. The rapid development of emerging markets
particularly in the last decade resulted in a rapidly growing M&A market in these countries.[1] However, since the dynamics of the financial markets in the developing markets,
such as the market for corporate control, corporate governance, and the transparency
of information are quite different from their counterparts in the developed markets,
there is a growing research on the mergers and acquisitions in the emerging markets as
well as cross-border acquisitions in the developed markets. As the product and capital
markets become more integrated, it remains a question to be explored further if and
how the wealth effects of acquisitions in the emerging markets such as in Turkey differ
from those in the developed markets.
In this paper, I investigate merger and acquisition announcement returns for Turkish
acquirers and analyze determinants of these returns using several deal characteristics.
The consensus findings in the literature show that the target firms gain positive and
significant announcement returns in the range of 10%-30% in the developed markets.
However, the evidence is mixed for the acquiring firms. Researchers document negative,
zero and positive abnormal returns for the acquirers ranging from -1.5% to 2%.[2] In
this study, I find that the Turkish acquirers earn a significant positive 2.27% on average around the announcement date and this positive gain is enhanced if the target and
acquirer firms are in the same business or if the transaction is a merger rather than an
acquisition. I do not find any evidence that cross-border transactions or the acquisition
of a public target rather than a private firm have any statistically significant effect on
the announcement returns for the acquirer.
Parallel to the increasing volume of merger and acquisition activities in Turkey
especially after the financial crisis of 2001, the number of studies investigating M&A
related issues in Turkey is also flourishing in the last decade. However, these studies
primarily focus on the overall M&A activity (Akdoğu, 2011, 2012; Erdoğan, 2012),
the financial performance of acquirer and target firms before and after the acquisition
(Mandacı, 2005; Akben-Selçuk, 2008), mergers in the banking sector (Mumcu and
Zenginobuz, 2002; Çukur and Eryiğit, 2006) and short-term wealth effects of acquisition
announcement on the target firms (Mandacı, 2004; Hekimoğlu and Tanyeri, 2011; and
Arslan and Şimşir, 2015). The stock market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions
for the acquirers in Turkey remains a neglected area in the literature. To my knowledge,
the one directly relevant study to the present study is by Oelger and Schiereck (2011).
They find that in international acquisitions Turkish acquirers earn a significant 5.16%,
whereas announcement returns are indistinguishable from zero if the target is a domestic
firm during 1992-2010. Their sample is comprised of 112 observations including all full
[1]
The total number of mergers and acquisitions in the period 1994-2003 was 53, whereas this number rose to 235 in the
period 2004-2013 in the next decade in Turkey (Source: Securities Data Corporation).
[2]
See Bruner (2004) for a thorough review of findings in the literature.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
23
and partial acquisitions. Contrary to their finding, the present study documents evidence
that the wealth gains of acquiring firms are not statistically different for the cross-border
and domestic acquisitions in Turkey, and acquirers earn on average a 2.13% in domestic
acquisitions if the controlling share of the target is acquired.
The emphasis in this paper is on the acquirer returns in the Turkish M&A market.
However, it is worthwhile to mention a few studies that conduct a similar analysis for
the Turkish targets in recent works. Mandacı (2004), Hekimoğlu and Tanyeri (2011),
and Arslan and Şimşir (2015) document that target firms earn abnormal returns in the
range of 8.6%-9.6% on average around the announcement date of the acquisitions.
These findings also provide support to the argument that the short-term wealth effects
of acquisitions in Turkey for both targets and acquirers differ from their counterparts
in the developed markets on average.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature and it is followed by a description of the sample and the methodology. The
paper then continues with the results of univariate and multivariate analyses followed
by the conclusion in the last section.
Magnitude and Sources of Acquirer Returns in the Literature
Magnitude and Direction of Acquirer Abnormal Returns
The research on the stock price reaction of merger and acquisition announcements
for targets is vast and unanimous documenting large premiums for target shareholders.
However, the evidence on the returns to acquiring companies is mixed.[3] While some
research finds small positive returns for the acquiring company around the announcement date ranging from 0.7% to 1.8% (see Fueller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004,
2005; Georgen and Renneboog, 2004; Bradley and Sundaram, 2006), other studies
report significant negative abnormal returns for the acquiring company ranging from
-1.4% to -0.48%. (see Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Ang and Cheng, 2006; Betton,
Eckbo and Thornburn, 2009). In addition to these, Jensen and Ruback (1983), Lang et
al. (1989), Moeller et al. (2007) find that the announcement date returns are not distinguishable from zero for the bidder company. In a comprehensive study including 67,256
deals, Netter et al. (2011) report that the average acquisition represents a statistically
significant 1.1% gain to the acquirer.
In the emerging markets, Bhagat et al. (2011) report an average of 2.17% announcement returns for the acquiring firms in cross-border acquisitions. Their study includes
the following countries (note that Turkey is excluded): Brazil, China, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Philippines, Russia, and South Africa. Ma et al. (2009) find similar results in
Asian markets over the 2000-2005 period. However, Aybar and Fıçıcı (2009) find that
on average cross-border expansions of multinational companies in emerging markets
(predominantly in Latin America and Asia) through acquisitions do not create value. In
[3]
For a full literature review of short term wealth effects of takeovers for target and acquiring companies see Bruner
(2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Eckbo (2009).
24
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
single country studies, Kohli and Mann (2012) find positive and significant abnormal
returns (2.07%) for the cross-border acquisitions but insignificant abnormal returns for
domestic acquisitions in India. Chi et al. (2011) report positive and significant returns
(0.27%) in China.
Cross-border vs Domestic Acquisitions
The literature proposes competing hypotheses for why a cross-border acquisition
may affect the returns of the acquirer firm.[4] Cross-border acquisitions may increase
the opportunity set and diversification of the acquirer, lower costs, and therefore may
increase the synergy gains of the acquirer. On the other hand, increased competition in
the market for corporate control and increased hubris and agency problems may lead
to lower acquirer returns.
Several studies document that the overall effect of cross-border acquisitions on the
acquirer stock price is significantly negative in the developed markets (see e.g. Moeller
and Schlingemann, 2005; Chatterjee and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Conn
et al., 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Dos Santos et al. (2008) examine the
diversification discount around cross-border acquisitions and find that diversifying
cross-border acquisitions destroy value. However, Chari et al. (2009) find that although
developed market acquirers do not observe a significant announcement return when
acquiring a target in a developed countries, they earn a positive and significant 1.16% on
average when acquiring a target in the emerging markets. In addition, Seth et al. (2002)
show that in the value–increasing cross-border acquisitions, the source of the gains is
mainly reverse internalization of valuable intangible asset, whereas in value-destroying
cross-border acquisitions the source of value destruction is consistent with risk reduction. In summary, the empirical evidence for the effect of cross-border acquisitions on
acquirer announcement returns is mixed.
Public vs Private Targets
The acquirer returns when buying public versus private targets are also examined
in the literature. It is hypothesized that since acquirers receive a better price when buying a private firm compared to buying public ones due, to the liquidity effect and that
the acquirer managers are less likely to make decisions with hubris in privately held
negotiations, acquirer returns are higher when the target firm is private.[5] Chang (1998),
Fuller et al., (2002), Faccio et al (2006) and Bradley and Sundaram (2006) document
that the acquirers have significantly negative announcement returns when buying a
public firm; however they have significantly positive returns when buying a private firm
in the US market. Conn et al., (2005) confirmed this finding in a study conducted for
UK acquirers during 1984-1998 and Capron and Shen (2007) find similar results for a
sample of multinational acquirers including U.S. acquirers. However, although Chang
(1998) Yüce and Ng (2005) also find that there are significant and positive cumulative
[4]
For a detailed discussion of theoretical foundations of cross-border acquisitions see Shimizu et al. (2004).
[5]
For a detailed discussion of these hypotheses see Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002).
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
25
abnormal returns to acquirers buying private firms with stock rather than public ones,
they show that this difference disappears for cash deals.
Same Business vs Unrelated Industry Acquisitions
Industry relatedness is one of the most commonly used determinants of acquirer
returns. Increased productive efficiency is suggested as an explanation for the positive
relationship between industry relatedness and acquirer bidder returns. In the case of
horizontal acquisitions, where the bidder and the target are in the same line of business,
three basic motivations for horizontal acquisitions are productive efficiency, the increased
monopolistic collusion in the industry and increased buyer power.[6] The empirical
evidence seems to support these arguments. Travlos (1987), Asquith et al. (1987) and
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find a positive relationship between the business and
acquirer returns around the announcement date. However, Fuller et al. (2002), Goergen
and Renneboog (2004), Faccio et al. (2006) find no significant relationship between
industry relatedness and acquirer returns.
Mergers vs Tender Offers
In the literature the mode of the acquisition is also shown to be a factor as a source of
wealth gains for the acquiring company. Jensen and Ruback (1983), Datta et al. (2001)
document evidence that acquirers earn more in tender offers than mergers around the
announcement date. In the long-run, Aggrawal et al. (1992) and Loghran and Vijh
(1997) also find that acquirers in tender offers outperform acquirers in mergers over a
five-year period after the acquisition.
Data Sample and Methodology
Sample
The M&A sample for this study is obtained from Thompson Reuter’s Securities
Data Corporation (SDC) database. The sample covers the period 1994 to 2013. To be
included in the study sample, I require the following six points: i) The transaction is
listed as completed with an announcement date in the sample period; ii) the acquirer
firm is a publicly traded company on the Turkish Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul); iii)
the acquiring firm is a non-financial firm; iv) the transaction is identified as a “merger,”
“acquisition of majority interest” using SDC; v) the acquirer does not own more than
20% of the target firm prior to the event date and owns at least 50% after the event
date.[7] This sample consists of 110 successful acquisitions. Finally, vi) the acquirer firms
have available stock return data around the takeover announcement date. This leads to
a final sample of 106 acquisitions. The stock price and market capitalization of firms
are obtained from Istanbul Borsa.
[6]
For a detailed discussion of these hypotheses see Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005).
[7]
By limiting the sample for the acquirer’s ownership in the target company before and after the acquisition, the study
focuses only on acquisitions that are likely to have a noticable impact on the market valuation of the acquiring company.
26
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
The deal-specific characteristics and the firms’ industries are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s database. The variables I consider are commonly used in the analyses of
acquirer returns in the literature. These variables are whether the acquirer’s and target’s
businesses are in the same industry category as defined by SDC (Bradley et al., 1988);
whether the acquisition is cross-border; whether the target firm is public, private or
subsidiary of the acquirer firm; and the market value of the acquirer firms as measured
one day prior to the event window. If both the target and the acquirer firms are defined
in the same industry by SDC’s database, the acquisition is defined as a same business
acquisition; all others are defined as unrelated business acquisitions. If it is the acquirer’s
first deal in the sample period it is defined as the first deal; the subsequent deals by the
same acquirer are defined as experienced deals.
Sample Description
Panel A of Table 1 reports data on acquisition characteristics. In the sample of 110
successful acquisitions, there are 72 (66%) mergers and 38 (34%) acquisitions. There are
13 (12%) public targets, and 54 (49%) private targets. More than one-third of the sample
(38%) comes from acquisition of subsidiaries and there is one government company as
a target company in the sample. Consistent with earlier studies there are only 13 (12%)
cross-border acquisitions and the remaining 97 (88%) targets are Turkish companies.
Table 1
Sample Description
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Acquisition Form
N
Acquisition of
Majority Interest
Merger
110
72
38
66%
35%
Public
Private
Subsidiary
Government
13
54
42
1
12%
49%
38%
1%
Domestic
Cross-Border
Target Public Status
110
Target’s Nation
110
Related Business
110
Acquisition Experience
110
97
13
88%
12%
Same business
Unrelated
45
65
41%
59%
Experienced
First deal
38
72
35%
65%
27
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
Table 1- continued
Panel B: Distribution of industries in the sample
Industry
Acquirer
No. of
Obs.
% of
sample
Target
No of
Obs.
% of
sample
Aerospace & Defense
0
0.00
1
0.91
Agriculture & Livestock
1
0.91
1
0.91
Automobiles & Components
2
1.82
2
1.82
Banks/Insurance
0
0.00
6
5.45
Building/Construction
7
6.36
1
0.91
Chemicals
2
1.82
1
0.91
Computers & Electronics Retailing
2
1.82
1
0.91
Computers & Peripherals
1
0.91
0
0.00
Construction Materials
7
6.36
8
7.27
Containers & Packaging
2
1.82
0
0.00
Discount and Department Store Retailing
1
0.91
1
0.91
Electronics
2
1.82
3
2.73
Food & Beverage Retailing
3
2.73
3
2.73
Food and Beverage
8
7.27
7
6.36
Healthcare equipment
0
0.00
1
0.91
Hospitals
4
3.64
3
2.73
Hotels and Lodging
1
0.91
2
1.82
Household & Personal Products
3
2.73
4
3.64
IT Consulting & Services
0
0.00
3
2.73
Metals & Mining
5
4.55
5
4.55
Motion Pictures / Audio Visual
1
0.91
2
1.82
Oil & Gas
6
5.45
3
2.73
Other Retailing
0
0.00
2
1.82
Paper & Forest Products
3
2.73
1
0.91
Pharmaceuticals
1
0.91
2
1.82
Power
11
10.00
18
16.36
Publishing
4
3.64
2
1.82
REITs
5
4.55
1
0.91
Recreation & Leisure
1
0.91
3
2.73
Software
3
2.73
4
3.64
Telecommunications Equipment
1
0.91
0
0.00
Telecommunications Services
1
0.91
3
2.73
Textiles & Apparel
14
12.73
8
7.27
Transportation & Infrastructure
4
3.64
7
6.36
Wireless
4
3.64
1
0.91
110
100
110
100
Total
28
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
Table 1- continued
Panel C: Distribution of Acquisitions by Year
Year
No. of Observations
% of Sample
1994
1
0.91
1995
1
0.91
1996
1
0.91
1997
3
2.73
1998
1
0.91
1999
1
0.91
2000
4
3.64
2001
4
3.64
2002
3
2.73
2003
1
0.91
2004
1
0.91
2005
5
4.55
2006
3
2.73
2007
6
5.45
2008
8
7.27
2009
9
8.18
2010
10
9.09
2011
19
17.27
2012
16
14.55
2013
13
11.82
Total
110
100
Forty-five (41%) acquisitions are classified as same business based on the industry
code in the SDC database. There are 72 (65%) acquiring firms that have completed their
first deal whereas for 38 (35%) acquiring firms[8] there is at least one deal announced
and completed before the event date during the sample period.[9]
Panel B of Table 1 presents data on the distribution of industry categories in the takeover sample. As consistent with the earlier studies (Akdoğu, 2011), the most pronounced
industry in the distribution is the textile industry (12%), followed by the power industry
(10%) for acquiring firms. For target firms the most active industry is the energy power
[8]
There are 72 individual acquiring firms and 110 target firms in the whole sample.
[9]
If there is more than one acquisition announcement on the same day for the acquiring firm, only one is included in the
sample and the deal is categorized as the first deal if it is the first deal announcement of the acquiring firm within the
sample period.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
29
industry (16%). Panel C of Table 1 shows the distribution of acquisitions across years. As
seen from the table, there is an increasing number of acquisitions in the most recent years,
especially after 2004, which is in keeping with the idea that Turkey has been experiencing a more stabilized economy in the last ten years (See Akdoğu, 2011). Consistent with
the notion of growing M&A market in Turkey, the number of acquisitions increased to
a total of 90 in the last decade (2004-2013) compared to only 20 in the previous decade
(1994-2003) during the sample period, an increase of more than fourfold.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Following the large strand of the M&A literature I use cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) as a measure of the stock market’s reaction to the deal announcement. I use conventional event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) to calculate the acquirer
firm CARs. The longest event window is defined as starting five days before the announcement date of the acquisition and ends five days after the announcement date. Several other
event windows are computed within this large window in order to overcome the difficulty
of determining the correct event window for capturing the full announcement effect. The
standard event study methodology uses a market model approach.
Returns of 240 days through 300th and 60th days prior to the announcement date were
utilized to estimate the market model parameters. Firms are included in the sample if
they have at least 100 daily returns available in the estimation period.[10] The main index
of Istanbul Borsa BIST100 is used as the relevant market index (Rm).
Results
Univariate Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
In Table 2, the abnormal returns measured over several event windows for the acquiring firms are reported. Panel A shows the CARs for the total sample of 106 observations
where the price data is available. For the full sample, the mean and median CAR is
2.27% and -0.22% respectively for the largest event window [-5, +5]. The mean and the
median CAR is 0.75% and 0.17% respectively for the shortest event window [-1,
0]. All the mean CARs for the documented event windows are statistically (mostly at
the 5% level) different from zero. The mean CARs are generally greater than the median
CARs; that indicates that the means are affected by large gains in some acquisitions.
In Panel B of Table 2, the CARs of domestic and cross-border acquisitions are compared for the acquiring firms. For the [-5, +5] event window, the mean CAR is 2.13% for
domestic acquisitions and 3.29% for cross-border acquisitions. On the other hand, for
the event of [-5, 0] the mean CAR is 1.27% for the domestic acquisitions and 0.65% for
cross-border acquisitions. In general, I do not observe a systematic difference between
the CARs of these two groups for different event windows that is inconsistent with the
[10]
If the acquiring firm announces more than one acquisition with overlapping estimation periods, the estimation period
of the first announcement is used to determine the market model parameters of subsequent event windows.
30
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
results of Oelger and Schiereck, 2011. These results indicate that the stock market does
not view domestic and cross-border acquisitions differently, which is more in keeping
with the findings of Moeller et al., 2011.
In Panel C of Table 2, the acquirer CARs are compared in the case of public targets
versus private targets.[11] The mean CAR of the acquirers that are acquiring public targets
is 3.36% for the event window of [-5,+5]. The mean CAR is 2.13% for the private targets
for the same event window. Although the mean and the median CAR for the public target
group is generally higher for all event windows documented in Panel C, this difference
is not statistically significant in any event window. While a significant listing effect is
documented in the literature in global as well as in the U.S. markets, Turkish M&A markets
do not show any similarity to the global markets in this regard. For example, Faccioa,
McConnell and Stolin (2006) show that the acquirers of listed targets earn an insignificant
average abnormal return of –0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earn a significant
average abnormal return of 1.48% in Western Europe. While this result at first seems
puzzling, we believe it is explained by the dominant payment method in the M&A deals
in Turkey. With a few exceptions, all deals are cash deals in Turkey (Arslan and Şimşir,
2015). As documented before (Chang, 1998; Yüce and Ng, 2005), there is no statistically
significant difference in the wealth gains of acquirers when the payment is in cash.
The average cumulative abnormal returns of same business and unrelated acquisitions are documented in the Panel D of Table 2. The mean CAR for the same business
acquisitions is 4.56% whereas it is only 0.77% for the unrelated acquisitions. The difference in mean and median CARs is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level
for the event windows [-5, +5], [3, +3], [-1, +1], [-5, +1], [-3, +1]. Although the difference remains persistent, it is not significant in the narrower event windows. These
results suggest that acquirers earn significantly higher returns if they are acquiring a
target firm within the same industry of the acquiring firm, which seem to support the
idea that increased productive efficiency is received well by the market. The positive
effect of business relatedness on acquirer returns in acquisitions is well documented in
the literature (For example, Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).
In Panel E of Table 2, I compare the average abnormal cumulative returns of mergers
and acquisitions during the period surrounding the event announcement. In all event
windows, acquirers experience significantly higher average cumulative abnormal returns
in mergers compared to acquisitions. For the [5, +5] event window, the average CAR
is 5.57% for the mergers and only 0.57% for the acquisitions. For the event window of
[-5, 0] the difference is similar and the mean CAR is 4.17% for the mergers and 0.32%
for the acquisitions. The significant difference is persistent across means and medians
of all event windows. This result is contrary to the findings documented in the extant
literature. In the developed markets, it is shown that tender offers benefit acquirers
significantly more than mergers around the announcement date.
[11]
In this test, the private target group also includes the private subsidiaries of the acquirers. The comparison tests are
also conducted for subsidiaries versus public targets. The results are qualitatively similar and therefore are omitted for
brevity.
31
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
Table 2
Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
Panel A: Full Sample
Event
Window
N
Mean
CAR
Median
CAR
Min CAR
Max
CAR
t-test
Wilcoxon
signed-rank
test
[-5, +5]
106
2.27%
-0.22%
-22.60%
52.90%
2.12**
1.09
[-3, +3]
106
2.25%
-0.06%
-15.16%
45.89%
2.3**
0.77
[-1, +1]
106
1.35%
0.17%
-11.94%
31.66%
2.29**
1.38
[-5, +1]
106
1.79%
0.70%
-15.91%
26.86%
2.48**
1.92**
[-3, +1]
106
1.88%
0.61%
-13.35%
28.20%
2.68***
1.72**
[-5, 0]
106
1.20%
0.11%
-11.25%
22.91%
1.97**
1.08
[-3, 0]
106
1.29%
0.13%
-11.77%
21.40%
2.44**
1.24
[-1, 0]
106
0.75%
0.17%
-7.77%
15.92%
2.16**
1.28
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel B: Domestic vs. Cross-border Acquisitions
Domestic N=93
Cross-border N=13
Difference Tests
Mean CAR
Median CAR
Mean CAR
Median CAR
t-test /
t- value
MannWhitney test /
z-value
[-5, +5]
2.13%
-0.29%
3.29%
0.80%
-0.35
-0.29
[-3, +3]
2.17%
0.14%
2.85%
-1.73%
-0.22
-0.81
Event
Window
[-1, +1]
1.37%
0.24%
1.16%
0.10%
0.12
-0.45
[-5, +1]
1.84%
0.89%
1.38%
0.43%
0.21
0.51
[-3, +1]
1.92%
0.65%
1.67%
0.55%
0.12
-0.68
[-5, 0]
1.27%
0.02%
0.65%
0.78%
0.33
-0.20
[-3, 0]
1.34%
0.17%
0.94%
0.08%
0.25
-0.32
[-1, 0]
0.80%
0.19%
0.44%
-0.71%
0.33
-0.58
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
32
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
Table 2- continued
Panel C: Public vs. Private Target
Public N=12
Event
Window
Not Public N=94
Difference Tests
t-test /
t- value
MannWhitney test /
z-value
Mean CAR
Median CAR
Mean CAR
Median CAR
[-5, +5]
3.36%
-0.29%
2.13%
-0.22%
0.36
-0.30
[-3, +3]
3.90%
0.20%
2.04%
-0.06%
0.60
-0.04
[-1, +1]
3.22%
0.32%
1.11%
0.01%
1.14
-0.82
[-5, +1]
3.57%
1.60%
1.56%
0.66%
0.89
-0.61
[-3, +1]
3.62%
2.72%
1.66%
0.56%
0.88
-0.67
[-5, 0]
1.77%
-0.24%
1.12%
0.20%
0.34
-0.14
[-3, 0]
1.81%
0.52%
1.23%
0.13%
0.35
-0.03
[-1, 0]
1.41%
0.17%
0.67%
0.15%
0.67
-0.05
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel D: Same Business vs. Unrelated Acquisitions
Same business N=42
Unrelated N=64
Difference Tests
Mean CAR
Median CAR
Mean CAR
Median CAR
t-test /
t- value
MannWhitney test /
z-value
[-5, +5]
4.56%
1.92%
0.77%
-1.18%
1.74*
-2.42**
[-3, +3]
3.98%
1.27%
1.12%
-0.82%
1.44
-2.34**
[-1, +1]
2.72%
0.95%
0.45%
-0.38%
1.92
-1.82*
Event
Window
[-5, +1]
3.83%
2.33%
0.45%
-0.15%
2.35**
-2.75***
[-3, +1]
3.67%
2.57%
0.71%
-0.25%
2.09**
-2.53**
[-5, 0]
2.12%
0.73%
0.59%
-0.04%
1.23
-1.52
[-3, 0]
1.96%
0.67%
0.85%
-0.33%
1.02
-1.32
[-1, 0]
1.01%
0.35%
0.59%
0.14%
0.59
-0.17
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 2- continued
33
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
Table 2- continued
Panel E: Acquisitions vs. Mergers
Acquisition N=70
Merger N=36
Difference Tests
Mean CAR
Median CAR
Mean CAR
Median CAR
t-test /
t- value
MannWhitney test /
z-value
[-5, +5]
0.57%
-1.30%
5.57%
2.74%
-2.25**
-2.49**
[-3, +3]
0.78%
-0.59%
5.12%
1.26%
-2.13**
-1.90
[-1, +1]
0.73%
0.17%
2.53%
0.53%
-1.46
-0.88
[-5, +1]
0.33%
0.48%
4.62%
2.11%
-2.93***
-2.05**
[-3, +1]
0.76%
0.53%
4.07%
1.59%
-2.71**
-1.59
[-5, 0]
-0.32%
-0.56%
4.15%
2.49%
-3.68***
-3.11***
[-3, 0]
0.11%
-0.60%
3.59%
1.44%
-3.25***
-2.61***
[-1, 0]
0.08%
0.11%
2.05%
0.62%
-2.75**
-1.70*
Event
Window
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Multivariate Analysis
In this section, I examine the effect of several deal and firm characteristics on the
cumulative abnormal returns of deal announcements in a multivariate setting for several event windows using the sample of 106 successful acquisitions. The regressors I
include are the following: Merger is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the deal is
a merger, 0 if it is the acquisition of majority interest. Domestic is a dummy variable if
the target firm is a Turkish company, 0 if the target is an international company. Public
target is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the target is listed in a stock exchange, 0
if it is not listed. The same business is equal to 1 if the acquirer and target firms are in
the same industry defined by the SDC database, 0 otherwise. These are the variables that
are considered in the univariate tests as potential sources of acquirer abnormal returns.
As control variables, I also include factors found to be correlated with acquirers’ announcement period returns in other studies. Deal experience is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the acquirer has completed another acquisition deal in the sample period and
it is 0 if the deal is the acquirer’s first deal. The percentage acquired is the percentage of
ownership acquired by the acquirer.[12] Acquirer Size is the log of market capitalization
of the acquirer firm measured one day prior to the event window. The dependent variable
in the regressions is the CAR for the acquiring firm for the event windows [-5, +5] and
[-5, 0] .[13] All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The correlation
matrix of all independent variables is presented in Table 3.
[12]
This variable is set to 100% for the mergers.
[13]
The results are qualitatively similar for other event windows used in this study. To preserve space, the results are reported
for only event windows [-5, +5] and [-5, 0].
34
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Merger
Merger
%
acquired
Domestic
Public
Target
Same
Business
Deal
Experience
Acquirer
Size
1
% acquired
0.3829
1
Domestic
0.0291
0.1446
1
Public Target
0.0301
-0.2121
0.0468
1
Same
Business
0.0601
-0.018
-0.0391
0.0963
1
Deal
Experience
0.2061
-0.0887
-0.0894
-0.0291
0.0954
1
Acquirer Size
0.0222
0.1285
-0.1004
0.0946
0.077
0.2971
1
Firms with multiple acquisitions may learn from prior experiences and this learning
should benefit the strategists in the acquiring company. (Very and Schweiger, 2001;
Hayward, 2002). Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the acquirer returns
and the experienced acquirer dummy variable. It is well shown in the M&A literature
that smaller acquirers earn higher abnormal returns around announcement day. For example see Moeller et al. (2004) report that small acquirers earn 2% higher cumulative
abnormal returns on the announcement of the acquisition compared to large acquirers
(See also Loderer and Martin, 1990; Faccio et al., 2006; Schwert, 2000).
The results are documented in Table 4. The dependent variable is the CAR for the
acquirer for the event window [-5, +5] in models 1 to 4 and it is the CAR for the event
window [-5, 0] in models 5 to 8. Since the merger dummy and the percentage acquired
have a high correlation (0.3829), I include these variables separately and then together
in models. The coefficient merger dummy is positively significant at the 1% or 5% level
wherever it is included except in model 4. The coefficient of the percentage acquired
is positively significant at the 5% level in models 3 and 7, where merger dummy is
excluded. The coefficient of Same Business dummy is positive and significant only in
models for the event window [-5, +5]. Consistent with the earlier findings of univariate
analysis, domestic dummy and public target dummy do not seem to affect the CARs of
acquirer firms. The size of the acquiring firm is negative and significant only in models
3 and 4, consistent with the findings in the literature.
Taken all together, the results in the multivariate analysis provide further evidence
for the findings presented in the univariate analysis.
35
THE DETERMINANTS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS IN THE TURKISH STOCK MARKET
Table 4
Multivariate analyses of acquirer returns
Dependent
Variable
Regressor
Merger
Domestic
Public Target
Same
business
Deal
Experience
CAR[-5,+5]
4
5
6
0.034**
0.025
0.031***
0.031***
0.027**
(2.58)
(2.29)
(1.49)
(3.35)
(3.29)
(2.57)
0.012
0.011
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.015
0.011
0.013
(0.56)
(0.51)
(0.21)
(0.28)
(0.41)
(1.06)
(0.76)
(0.90)
0.012
0.008
0.013
0.013
0.002
0.014
0.016
0.016
(0.56)
(0.34)
(0.53)
(0.53)
(0.16)
(0.92)
(1.01)
(1.03)
0.033**
0.027*
0.024*
0.026*
0.013
0.01
0.008
0.009
(2.38)
(1.91)
(1.69)
(1.81)
(1.40)
(1.11)
(0.82)
(1.05)
0.004
0.011
0.008
0.012
-0.001
-0.002
-0.005
-0.001
(0.28)
(0.71)
(0.55)
(0.76)
(-0.07)
(-0.17)
(-0.50)
(-0.14)
1
2
0.038**
% acquired
Adjusted R2
No of
Observations
7
8
0.001**
0.000
0.001**
0.000
(2.13)
(1.24)
(2.12)
(0.79)
-0.007
-0.008*
-0.008*
-0.004
-0.004
-0.004
(-1.56)
(-1.73)
(-1.75)
(-1.23)
(-1.29)
(-1.34)
-0.022
0.113
0.098
0.105
-0.012
0.048
0.037
0.044
(-0.99)
(1.26)
(1.08)
(1.17)
(-0.81)
(0.84)
(0.63)
(0.78)
0.069
0.044
0.037
0.050
0.075
0.090
0.030
0.086
106
98
98
98
106
98
98
98
Acquirer Size
Constant
3
CAR[-5,0]
The t-stastics are in parantheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Conclusion
This study investigates the short term wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions for
the acquiring company shareholders in Turkey over the period 1994-2013. Contrary to
the findings in U.S. and European markets, the acquirers in Turkey earn a significant
positive CAR of 2.27% during an 11-day announcement period. In addition, the study
shows that the wealth increase is significantly greater in mergers than in acquisitions.
Within-industry acquisitions are also found to create higher abnormal returns for the
acquirer shareholders compared to diversifying acquisitions which is in keeping with
the findings in the M&A literature.
36
BOGAZICI JOURNAL
However, the study does not find any statistically significant evidence that crossborder acquisitions or a target’s public status have any impact on the announcement period
abnormal returns of the acquirer. These findings prevail in cross-sectional regressions in
which acquisition announcement returns are the dependent variable and are robust to the
inclusion of several control variables such as the size of acquirer, whether the acquirer
is experienced in M&As and the percentage of shares acquired in the target company.
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