Accommodating User Innovation
in the International Intellectual Property Regime:
A Global Administrative Law Approach
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG*
*
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law (beginning July 1, 2009). I would
like to thank Kevin Davis, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Margaret Chon, Ruth Okediji, and Graeme
Dinwoodie, along with the participants in the Cape Town Global Administrative Law Workshop
for invaluable comments. I would also like to thank Hima Lawrence for providing excellent
research assistance. A more extensive, but somewhat less up to date, report of this research is
available at Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual
Property Regime, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 861 (2009).
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413296
2
I
INTRODUCTION
Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994,1 the innovative landscape has undergone
dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such as biotechnology,
nanotechnology, and digital communications and computation.2 Notably, the
negotiation of TRIPS coincided almost exactly with the rise in importance of the
Internet following the invention of the World Wide Web and the introduction of
the Mosaic web browser in the early 1990s.3 These technological changes have
spawned major social changes, which increasingly are felt not only in developed
countries, but also throughout the world. The resulting changes in the innovative
landscape, especially as instantiated in the complex technologies of the
information technology industry, have given rise to controversy about the proper
contours of intellectual property protection and to upheaval in the political
economy of intellectual property lawmaking. This upheaval is reflected, for
example, in the split between the pharmaceutical sector and many information
technology companies in their positions on patent reform in the United States.4
Even more than by that debate, however, the social role of intellectual
property protection should be brought into question by an explosion of innovative
activity that does not fit into the sales-oriented, proprietary model which underlies
intellectual property doctrine. Traditional justifications for intellectual property
implicitly assume an innovator who seeks either to sell embodiments of an
invention or to license rights to the invention. Intellectual property rights are seen
as mechanisms to provide incentives for innovation by awarding a period of
exclusivity during which a creator can recoup investments through market
exclusivity.5 The assumption that inventors are motivated primarily by the
possibility of selling their inventions is weakened, for example, by the increasing
1
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS] WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1197. See also D J Gervais The Trips Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2d ed. 2003)
Sweet and Maxwell.
2
For a recent discussion of some of these changes and their implications for intellectual property,
see European Patent Office, Scenarios for the Future (2007), available at
http://www.epo.org/topics/patent-system/scenarios-for-the-future.html. The discussion of the
evidence for the “Trees of Knowledge” (p. 66) and “Blue Skies” (p. 84) scenarios are particularly
relevant.
3
See, for example, Mosaic: The Original Browser, available at
http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/mosaic.htm.
4
See, for a discussion of these differences, C Holman ‘Biotechnology's Prescription for
Patent Reform’ (2006) 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 317. See also, EPO Scenarios (n 2) at
94-96.
5
For discussions of the traditional incentive theories of patenting, see, for example, R D Blair & T
F Cotter, ‘Rethinking Patent Damages’ (2001), 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 at 78–80;
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public
Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413296
3
importance of user innovation.6 User innovation is not new, but it had been
pushed into the background by the ascendance of industrial research and
development along with a paradigm of mass production. Technological advances
have revitalized this and other alternative paradigms for innovation. This Article
contends that shifting modes of innovation must be taken into account in
assessing the global intellectual property regime.
There has been considerable scholarly and public debate about the impact of
the TRIPS minimum standards approach to patent law on consumer access to
patented technology—particularly in the public-health-related fields of
pharmaceuticals and agriculture.7 Indeed, that debate has led to modifications of
the TRIPS agreement as reflected in the Doha Declarations8 and to the adoption
of a Development Agenda by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).9 There has also been increasing recognition of the extent to which
TRIPS minimum standards of IP protection can upset the balance between initial
and follow-on innovation by focusing too much on the need to incentivize initial
innovations at the cost of providing access to those innovations for follow-on
innovators. The few WTO dispute resolution panel decisions to have interpreted
TRIPS exceptions have been criticized for exacerbated these problems by taking
an overly cramped approach to the flexibilities provided by TRIPS.10 There has
been considerably less discussion, however, about the interplay between the
6
For an overview of user innovation, see E von Hippel Democratizing Innovation (2005) MIT
Press. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between user innovation and patent
incentive theories, see K J Strandburg ‘Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine’
(2008) 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467 at 483-90.
7
See, for example, M Chon ‘Intellectual Property and the Development Divide’ (2006) 27
Cardozo L. Rev. 2821; D J Gervais ‘Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play’ (2005) 74 Fordham L. Rev. 505; Peter K. Yu, ‘TRIPS and Its Discontents,’ (2006) 10
Marquette Intel. Prop. Rev. 369; R C Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?’
(2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21. See also articles in G B Dinwoodie, ed., Symposium: Intellectual
Property, Trade and Development: Accommodating and Reconciling Different 1ational Levels of
Protection (2007) 82 Chi-Kent L. Rev. (2007) and articles in Symposium: Traditional Knowledge,
Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture (2003) 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L.; T W Pogge
‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program’ (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy 182.
8
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration]; World
Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
[hereinafter Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health].
9
See documents available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/.
10
See, for example, G B Dinwoodie & R C Dreyfuss ‘Diversifying without Discriminating:
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2007) 13 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.
Rev. 445; G B Dinwoodie & R C Dreyfuss, ‘Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of
Accessible Knowledge’ in The Future of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property (L Guibault
& P B Hugenholtz eds. 2006) Kluwer Law Int’l; G B Dinwoodie & R C Dreyfuss ‘TRIPS and the
Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2005) 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 95; G B
Dinwoodie & R C Dreyfuss ‘WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain
of Science Under International Law,’ in International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology
under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (K E Maskus & J H Reichman eds. 2006)
Cambridge.
3
4
global intellectual property regime and user innovation or any other non-salesmotivated innovation paradigm.11
In this Article, I argue that, over and above previously appreciated problems
with regard to access and the traditional IP balance, the trouble with TRIPS – and
with the global intellectual property law regime more generally – is that it is illdesigned to cope with changes in the innovative process itself and with the likely
heterogeneity of desirable innovation approaches in different global contexts.
While it is possible that current TRIPS flexibilities can be interpreted in ways that
will better balance the needs of initial innovators against those of users and
follow-on innovators, the very structure of the agreement is based on an
assumption of mass market, seller-based innovation which may make it difficult
to accommodate newer innovation paradigms.
The experience of the past 15 years should serve as a cautionary tale regarding
the wisdom of enshrining substantive rules based on any particular paradigm of
innovation in an inflexible international instrument. Thus, along with seeking
solutions to the particular problems confronting today’s innovators in dealing with
the outmoded TRIPS framework, it would be wise to consider how to implement
an ongoing process at the global level for navigating the tension between the truly
global reach of innovation and the heterogeneous and changing social practice of
innovation. The complexity of the innovation environment, in combination with
the need for both flexibility and consistency, calls for an administrative-type
approach which builds in an expectation of the need for ongoing updating of
global innovation policy rather than an attempt to lock in substantive standards
tailored to today’s innovation environment.12
To that end, I propose a re-envisioning of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) as a more broadly conceived innovation policy
organization, which would serve as a center of discourse not only about how
intellectual property law should be adapted to changing modes of innovation but
also about how to confront new dilemmas raised by evolving innovative practices,
which may involve issues beyond intellectual property law.13 WIPO has
11
There are some exceptions. For example, the EPO ‘Scenarios for the Future’ (n 11 at 11, 26,
28,-29, 72-75, 80, 88-90, 99) recognize the increasing importance of open and collaborative
innovation and suggest that such developments might lead to the abolishment of patents or to the
development of technology-specific types of patents. They do not, however, focus on the way in
which such changes might be achieved in the context of international intellectual property
agreements.
12
For general discussions of the varieties of and issued raised by “agency-like” actors at the
global level see S Cassese ‘Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global
Regulation’ (2005) 37 1.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Politics 663; S Cassese ‘Global Standards for National
Administrative Procedure’ (2005) 68 L. & Cont. Probs. 109; D C Esty ‘Good Governance at the
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1490; B Kingsbury, N
Krisch & R Stewart ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 15; R B Stewart ‘U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?’
(2005) 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63; A-M Slaughter & D Zaring ‘Networking Goes
International: An Update’ (2006) 2 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 211; S Burris, P Drahos & C
Shearing ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian J. Legal Phil. 30.
13
See G B Dinwoodie ‘Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright Norms:
The Role of Public Structuring’ (2004) 160 J. Inst. And Theor. Econ. 161 available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=604161; G Dinwoodie ‘The International Intellectual Property System:
5
historically focused on promoting the intellectual property regime14 and has been
criticized for pursuing stronger IP rights myopically.15 Indeed, WIPO has
manifested some hostility to open source software,16 which is to a great extent
driven by user innovation17). Nonetheless, I argue – building on a related
argument by Rochelle Dreyfuss18 – that WIPO is the most promising home for a
broader focus on innovation policy in light of its expertise, its experience with the
Development Agenda, and its relationship with the WTO under TRIPS. Indeed,
there are encouraging signs in this regard in recent WIPO recognition of the
impingement of broader innovation policy issues on the patent system.19 The
Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering’ in Intellectual Property, Trade and
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era (D. Gervais ed.
2007) Oxford; N Elkin-Koren ‘What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons’ (2005) 74 Fordham L. Rev. 375; Severine Dusollier ‘The Role
of Contracts and Private Initiatives: Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private
Ordering’ (2007) 82 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1391 (2007); A K Rai ‘“Open Source” and Private
Ordering: A Commentary on Dusollier’ (2007) 82 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1439; S M McJohn, ‘The
Paradoxes of Free Software’ (2000) 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25; R J Mann ‘Commercializing Open
Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?’ (2006) 20 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 1.
14
Article 3, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (July 14,
1967) 21 U.S.T. 1749, 848 U.N.T.S. 3 available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocs_wo029.html (“The objectives of the
Organization are: (i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world
through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other
international organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among the Unions.”). See D J
Halbert ‘The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past, Present, and Future’ (2007) 54 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 253 for a discussion of the history of WIPO and its goals, along with a
critique of WIPO governance and a proposal that it take on a broader, more participatory role in
the development context.
15
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual
Property 1orms, 39 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008), draft at 37 (“In sum,
WIPO’s institutional transformation and the strategies by which that transformation was effected .
. . were central in entrenching the contemporary prevailing IP orthodoxy in which public policy
concerns can limit the exclusive proprietary rights of rights owner only in exceptional
circumstances.”)
16
See, for example, J Krim ‘The Quiet War over Open-Source’ Wash. Post at E01 (August
21, 2003) (describing WIPO capitulation to pressure to cancel a meeting to discuss open source
software).
17
See, for example, J E Bessen ‘Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public
Goods’ (July 2005) (unpublished working paper, B.U. Sch. of L.), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=588763; von Hippel (n 6) at 87; K Lakhani & R G Wolf ‘Why Hackers
Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects’
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4425-03, 2003) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=443040.
18
R C Dreyfuss ‘Fostering Dynamic Innovation and Development: International Intellectual
Property as a Case Study in Global Administrative Law’ in this volume [hereinafter, Fostering
Dynamic Innovation]. See also, for a similar argument with respect to development issues, Halbert
(n 14) at 283-84.
19
See WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Report on the International Patent
System, , SCP/12/3 (April 15, 2008), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3.pdf; WIPO Standing Committee on the
Law of Patents, Summary by the Chair, SCP/12/4 Rev. (June 26, 2008), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_4_rev.pdf; WIPO Standing Committee
on the Law of Patents, Exclusions for Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to
5
6
thrust of this article is to encourage a more central place for considerations of the
full panoply of innovation paradigms in the development of patent policy – and
intellectual property more generally. As an example, I focus here on the user
innovation paradigm in the patent context.
A broader mandate for WIPO could be implemented in several ways, with
varying levels of administrative discretion vested in the re-imagined
organization.20 As a first cut, WIPO might undertake to develop an Innovation
Policy Agenda incorporating the concerns of innovative communities of various
types, including commercial firms, user innovator communities, scientific
researchers, open source proponents, and of other stakeholders, including
developing and developed countries and NGOs representing users. An Innovation
Policy Agenda would be distinct from the Development Agenda because it would
focus on the effects of evolving innovation paradigms, which cut across countries
at every level of development. Nonetheless, it would benefit from WIPO’s
experience with the Development Agenda,21 which has already taken a peripheral
interest in some aspects of innovation beyond the intellectual property
paradigm.22 One of the tasks involved in proposing an Innovation Policy Agenda
must be to reconsider current WIPO projects in light of a broader view of the
global innovation regime. WIPO committees on patent and copyright have
already begun to study and discuss the availability of flexibility for limitations
and exceptions to IP rights under TRIPS.23 Recently, these discussions have
begun to acknowledge the need to consider various paradigms for innovation.24
An Innovation Policy agenda would provide a focal point for these discussions
and thus bring the question of how best to promote innovation, rather than how
best to promote intellectual property rights, to the fore. In particular, WIPO
should reconsider its attempt to develop a Substantive Patent Law Treaty in light
the Rights, SCP/13/3 (February 4, 2009), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf
20
See Okediji (n 15) draft at 48-52 (discussing potential models for the WIPO-WTO
relationship).
21
See, for example, Halbert (n 14) at 272-76, describing the opening up of WIPO to broader
participation during the period leading up to its adoption of the Development Agenda.
22
See The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda [hereinafter
Development Agenda] at Nos. 16, 17, 23, 27, 35, 36, 45 available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf.
23
Regarding patents see sources cited in note 19. Regarding copyright, see, e.g., Conclusions of
the SCCR, November 5-7, 2008, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_17/sccr_17_www_112533.pdf; Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=16805; Automated Rights Management
Systems and Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=59952; Study on Copyright Limitations
and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=109192
24
For example, the “list of issues for further elaboration and discussion in the future,” identified
at the meeting of the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, June 23-27, 2008, includes
“alternative models for innovation”, SCP/12/4 Annex (n 19).
7
of a broader innovation mandate, just as it has been urged to do with respect to
development and access issues.25
Dreyfuss has considered in detail various legal mechanisms by which WTO
interpretation of TRIPS might incorporate WIPO input, particularly with respect
to interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities under Articles 27, 30, and 31 in light of the
Policies and Objectives set out in Articles 7 and 8.26 Building on those proposals,
as part of an Innovation Policy Agenda, WIPO should consider adopting
procedural mechanisms to vet proposed implementations of TRIPS flexibilities
from an innovation policy perspective. If these procedures are designed, in
analogy to notice and comment proceedings in domestic administrative law, to
provide sufficiently robust transparency and participation,27 the results of these
deliberations might well be given considerable weight in WTO proceedings on
purely persuasive grounds, both by WTO dispute resolution panels and by the
TRIPS Council in its own deliberations.28 The Internet opens up more expansive
possibilities for voice even beyond increased participation by recognized
groups—a global online version of notice and comment is a practical possibility,
which would permit the development of innovation policy to tap into the same
emergent and heterogeneous expertise that drives these newer innovation
paradigms.29
The above suggestions for implementing a broader-based innovation policy
are constrained, of course, by the language of TRIPS itself. While there is
arguably considerable leeway in TRIPS,30 its provisions, with their prohibition on
25
J H Reichman & R C Dreyfuss ‘Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on
Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty’ (2007) 57 Duke L. J. 85; Proposal by Argentina and
Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO WO/GA/31/11 Annex (August
27, 2004) available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf at 2.
26
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 25-33.
27
See, for example, Cassese, 37 1.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Politics (n 12) at 690-93; Esty (n 12) at
1527-37; Kingsbury et al. (n 12) at 37-42; Slaughter & Zaring (n 12) at 220-24, discussing issues
of accountability, transparency, and participation in global governance.
28
Okediji (n 15) draft at 22, 42 discusses the way in which WIPO and its predecessors have
employed publications and studies to play a key role in shaping the substantive debate about the
contours of IP protection in the past. See also P B Hugenholtz and R L Okediji, Conceiving an
International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright, Final Report, Open Society
Institute (2008) at 49-50, available at
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf (discussing the interactions between
WIPO soft law creation and TRIPS in the copyright context).
29
See, for related ideas to promote online participation in governance, http://gplv3.fsf.org
(the discussion process used by the Free Software Foundation in developing its GPL licenses);
www.peertopatent.org (an experimental project inviting online review of patent applications in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office); B S Noveck ‘“Peer to Patent”: Collective
Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform’ (2006) 20 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 123 (proposing
the peer-to-patent review process); B S Noveck ‘The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking’ (2004)
53 Emory L.J. 433 (discussing the potential, generally, for online public participation in noticeand-comment rulemaking in the United States domestic context); C M Ho ‘Biopiracy and Beyond:
A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies’ (2006) 39 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 433 at 532-40 (proposing that WIPO host an online forum for commentary and debate
about potential biopiracy and other moral and policy issues raised by particular patents).
30
See discussion in Part III(1).
7
8
technological discrimination,31 their case-by-case approach to compulsory
licensing,32 their assumption that all exceptions to strong patent rights should be
limited,33 and their requirement that all patentees be afforded exclusive rights of
use,34 were not designed with user innovation in mind and may not stretch far
enough to accommodate newer innovative paradigms in an optimal manner.
An even more ambitious approach to WIPO involvement would be to amend
TRIPS to provide a more open-ended exception provision to accommodate
evolving innovation practices and to set out a more explicit role for WIPO in
vetting potential exceptions. For example, one might imagine replacing Article 30
with a broad provision permitting exceptions that are “reasonably calculated to
promote innovation and not to restrain trade” and explicitly providing that
Articles 27 and 28 are subject to such exceptions. WIPO evaluations of the
reasonableness of particular exceptions could then be assigned a degree of
deference in WTO dispute resolution proceedings.35 Such an approach would be
desirable only if WIPO’s vetting procedures met minimal standards of
transparency and accountability, of course, and there is room for debate as to the
degree of deference that properly should be afforded to WIPO determinations by
WTO bodies.36
The point here is not to answer, or even to pose, all of the substantive
questions that would fall within the purview of an international innovation policy
organization but only to query whether the global governance of innovation
would benefit from a more flexible, broadly-based center of innovation expertise.
The gist of the proposal is to shift the focus of WIPO’s portfolio. Rather than
considering innovation policy only secondarily, as it impacts the intellectual
property regime, a re-envisioned WIPO would put innovation policy front and
center, regarding intellectual property as only one mechanism for innovation.37
In Part II I begin by describing the emerging paradigm of user innovation and
exploring some of its relevant features. In Part III I describe how current TRIPS
provisions may impede the full realization of the potential of this and other
31
Article 27 of TRIPS.
Article 31 of TRIPS.
33
Article 30 of TRIPS.
34
Article 28 of TRIPS.
35
See also Okediji (n 15) draft at 49-50, discussing a possible role for WIPO as an “expert
agency,” though concluding that it would be preferable for the WTO to be the primary setter of
global IP norms. Id. at 54-58.
36
See Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 26-27 (discussing “the legitimacy of relying on
standards generated by WIPO” in interpreting TRIPS).
37
The proposal to re-focus WIPO on innovation policy more broadly is not necessarily
inconsistent with pursuing other approaches, such as, for example, proposals to amend TRIPS in
order to provide mandatory ceilings on intellectual property protection. See, e.g., A Kur & H
Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Enough is Enough – The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International
Intellectual Property Protection,’ Max Planck Institute for intellectual Property, Competition &
Tax Law Research Paper Series No. 09-01, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429;
Hugenholtz & Okediji (n 28), though it emphasizes the importance of flexibility (which is already
recognized in both of these proposals) and argues that WIPO is the best place to focus
consideration of such proposals.
32
9
alternative innovation modes. Part IV discusses the proposal for re-imagining
WIPO in somewhat more detail.
II THE USER INNOVATION PARADIGM
User innovation occurs everywhere, in both commercial and non-commercial
contexts, as the following examples illustrate. A sailplane aficionado develops a
rocket-assisted emergency ejection system.38 Steel manufacturers develop
improvements on the Bessemer steel process that lead to an eight-fold increase in
production in a ten-year period.39 Users of printed circuit computer-aided design
software modify and develop the software to accommodate increasingly denselypacked circuit boards.40 Surgeons improve and modify medical equipment for
their own use.41 Builders develop means for routing wiring through commercially
available "stressed-skin panels" used to form the outer walls of houses.42 Cyclists
interested in off-road cycling invent the original mountain bikes.43 Manufacturers
develop improved designs for their factories. An operator of an online store
develops a method of streamlining the payment process for frequent customers.44
A research scientist develops a new instrument for measuring the chemical
composition of a surface.45
In earlier studies, Eric von Hippel and others demonstrated that “users of
products and services—both firms and individual consumers—are increasingly
able to innovate for themselves” in many fields of technology.46 The twenty-first
century has seen an explosion in user innovation, which has very different
characteristics from the mass market seller-based innovation which was the model
for TRIPS.47 It relies much less than the traditional paradigm on intellectual
38
N Franke & S Shah ‘How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An Exploration of
Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users’ (2003) 32 Res. Pol’y 157 at 163.
39
P B Meyer ‘Episodes of Collective Invention’ (U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics Working Paper No. 368) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466880.
40
G L Urban & E von Hippel ‘Lead User Analyses for the Development of New Industrial
Products’ (1988) 34 Mgmt. Sci. 569 at 571–72.
41
C Lüthje ‘Customers as Co-Inventors: An Empirical Analysis of the Antecedents of
Customer-Driven Innovations in the Field of Medical Equipment’ in Proceedings of the 32nd
EMAC Conference Glasgow (2003).
42
S Slaughter ‘Innovation and Learning during Implementation: A Comparison of User and
Manufacturer Innovations’ (1993) 22 Res. Pol’y 81 at 83–85.
43
See G Buenstorf ‘Designing Clunkers: Demand-Side Innovation and the Early History of
Mountain Bikes’ in Change, Transformation and Development (John Stan Metcalfe & Uwe
Cantner eds., 2002) Springer at 61.
44
See, for example, S Hansell ‘Injunction against BarnesandNoble.com is Overturned’ N.Y.
Times (Feb. 15, 2001) at C3 (discussing patent dispute between Amazon.com and Barnes and
Noble over “One-Click" ordering method).
45
W Riggs & E von Hippel ‘Incentives to Innovate and the Sources of Innovation: The Case
of Scientific Instruments’ (1994) 23 Res. Pol’y 459 at 460–64.
46
von Hippel (n 6) at 1.
47
See von Hippel (n 6) for an overview of these developments.
9
10
property for incentives to invent, disclose, and disseminate,48 and makes use of
dispersed local knowledge to both pose and solve technological problems.49 User
innovation relies on the fact that in many cases innovation is highly contextual -it depends on sticky information which is distributed heterogeneously in the
population and on diverse experiences and knowledge.50 So, for example, user
innovation often results from customization of a mass market product by lead
users, whose needs are heterogeneous and ahead of those of the “average” user.51
Several recent developments exemplify the increasing importance of user
motivations for invention. For example, open source software is significantly
driven by user innovation.52 Besides providing products with mass appeal, such
as Linux, the open source process provides a means to pool inventive resources to
obtain customized software products to suit the needs of dispersed and relatively
small groups of users.53 The expanding patentability of the tools and products of
agriculture, such as genetically modified seeds, brings agricultural firms into
conflict with farmers who have a long tradition of innovation for their own use.54
Those who question whether patents are necessary to produce certain types of
innovations have also met the extension of patentable subject matter in the
United States to encompass business methods has also been met with
skepticism.55 Underlying this skepticism may be an implicit recognition that
48
See K J Strandburg ‘Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine’ (2008) 79 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 467 at 483-90; Y Benkler ‘Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm’
(2002) 112 Yale L.J. 369 at 423-40; S Weber The Success of Open Source (2004) Harvard; J
Lerner & J Tirole ‘The Scope of Open Source Licensing’ (2005) 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 20; D
Harhoff, J Henkel & E A von Hippel ‘Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How
Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations’ (2003) 32 Res. Pol’y 1752; Lakhani & Wolf
(n 17).
49
See, for example, Benkler (n 48) at 406-23; E von Hippel & G von Krogh ‘Open Source
Software and the Private-Collective Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science’ (2003) 14
Org. Sci. 209; E von Hippel ‘“Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving:
Implications for Innovation’ (1994) 40 Mgmt. Sci. 429; C Luthje, C Herstatt & E von Hippel
‘User-Innovators and “Local” Information: The Case of Mountain Biking’ (2005) 34 Res. Pol’y
951.
50
See, for example, Benkler (n 48) at 406-23; von Hippel (n 6) at 63-76.
51
von Hippel (n 6) at 22-31.
52
See, for example, Bessen (n 17); von Hippel (n 6) at 87; Lakhani & Wolf (n 17).
53
Open source software projects are extremely diverse in their participation rates. There is
also great diversity in the nature of participation – from proposing to administering to developing
to merely commenting on projects. A 2002 empirical study of open source projects on
www.sourceforge.net, probably the most popular platform for open source development, showed
that the mean number of developers for one hundred mature projects studied was about six. S
Krishnamurthy ‘Cave or Community?: An Empirical Examination of 100 Mature Open Source
Projects’ (2002) First Monday available at
http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_6/krishnamurthy/.
54
See, for example, K Aoki ‘Weeds, Seeds, & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars’
(2003) 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 247; D R Downes ‘The Convention on Biological
Diversity: Seeds of Green Trade?’ (1994) 8 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 163 at 168; C M Ho (n 29); S Safrin
‘Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property in an Interconnected World’ (2007) 82 1otre
Dame L. Rev. 1917; H Stein ‘Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United
States, Trade, and the Developing World (2005) 3 1w. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 160.
55
See, for example, J Dratler, Jr. ‘Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case against Software and
Business-Method Patents’ (2003) 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 823; R C Dreyfuss ‘Are Business
11
intent to use rather than sell has traditionally motivated the invention of business
methods.56 Scientific researchers are also user innovators, inventing research
tools and methods in the course of their research,57 but universities are
increasingly (and controversially) patenting scientific research tools.58
While user innovation has no doubt always been widespread, its significance
is growing because of technological changes since the negotiation of TRIPS in
1994. The growing importance of software, as both a tool of innovation and a
component of products, means that more and more design and experimentation is
feasible with relatively limited capital expenditure.59 Computerization of
manufacturing and design also decreases the cost of creating custom-designed
products.60 The Internet also enhances the potential for user innovation by
providing mechanisms by which medium-sized groups of users with similar needs
for customization can pool their inventive resources, dividing the costs of user
innovation among themselves and thereby widening the range of cost-effective
user innovations.
User innovation is of greatest importance where users have both unique local
information about their needs and the technical capacity to make inventions that
Method Patents Bad for Business?’ (2000) 16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 263; A L
Durham ‘"Useful Arts" in the Information Age’ 1999 BYU L. Rev. 1419 at 1488–96; J A
Gladstone ‘Why Patenting Information Technology and Business Methods Is Not Sound Policy:
Lessons from History and Prophecies for the Future’ (2002) 25 Hamline L. Rev. 217; N Lee
‘Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms—The
Patent Eligibility of Business Methods’ (2005) 45 IDEA 321; K E Maskus & E V Wong
‘Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents’ (2002) 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y
289; R P Merges ‘As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577 at 580–81; M J
Meurer ‘Business Method Patents and Patent Floods’ (2002) 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 309; M
Pollack ‘The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History’ (2002) 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech.
L.J. 61; J R Thomas ‘The Patenting of the Liberal Professions’ (1999) 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139 at
1143–63. See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (2006) 126 S. Ct. 2921
(Breyer, J, dissenting from dismissal of cert as improvidently granted); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) 126 S. Ct. 1837 at 1842 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (raising questions
about business methods patents and the Federal Circuit’s standard for patentable subject matter).
But see, for example, J R Allison & E H Tiller, ‘The Business Method Patent Myth’ (2003) 18
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 987 (arguing that business method patents are indistinguishable from other
patents on processes).
56
For a more extensive discussion of this point, see K J Strandburg ‘What If There Were a
Business Method User Exemption to Patent Infringement?’ 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 245.
57
See Riggs & von Hippel (n 45); Strandburg (n 48).
58
See, for example, R S Eisenberg ‘Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research’ (1996) 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 at 1726
(positing that the patenting of upstream research tools calls into question the appropriateness of
public funding to support that research); K J Strandburg ‘The Research Exemption to Patent
Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress’ in
Intellectual Property and Information Wealth (Peter Yu, ed., 2006) Greenwood (reviewing the
longstanding debate about whether there should be an exemption to patent infringement for
research use).
59
See Y Benkler The Wealth of 1etworks (2006) Yale at 68-90, 212-33, 277-78; von Hippel
(n 6) at 177.
60
S Thomke & E von Hippel ‘Customers as Innovators: A New Way to Create Value’ Harv.
Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2002) at 74–81.
11
12
fulfill those needs. The comparative advantage of user innovation for a particular
technology depends on factors such as the heterogeneity of uses, the presence of
lead users, the technical difficulty of invention in a particular field, and the costs
of development.61 For purposes of the present discussion, the most important
features of user innovation are its de-emphasis on the "incentive to invent"
justification for intellectual property which is paramount in the high protection
model embodied in TRIPS and its reliance on heterogeneous and local experience
and on tailoring innovation to specific uses, which undercuts the international
trade conception of commodity knowledge goods.
(1) User innovation and the intellectual property incentive story
In sharp contrast to the standard seller-based view underlying most
discussions of the societal justifications for the patent system, user innovators
expect to benefit primarily from developing and using an innovation rather than
selling it.62 Unlike seller innovators, user innovators are motivated primarily by
their own use of their inventions and thus patents play a relatively minor role in
motivating them to invent.63 In some, but not all, cases, user innovators may also
derive non-pecuniary returns from innovation, such as enjoyment of the process
of improving products for their own use, reputational status within a user
community, or opportunities to gain skills.64
Besides motivating invention, patenting is also generally expected to motivate
disclosure and dissemination of inventions. Elsewhere I have discussed in detail
the ways in which patenting affects incentives to disseminate and disclose user
innovations, concluding that on balance patent incentives tend to be much less
important for user innovations than for seller innovations.65 In part this is because
a rather surprising amount of “free revealing” of user innovations takes place.66
Presumably, this is because free revealing has significant reputational, reciprocal,
and other benefits to user innovators.67 This is partly because users often form
innovative communities in which they exchange ideas in a collaborative fashion
61
See J Henkel & E von Hippel ‘Welfare Implications of User Innovation’ (2004) 30 J. Tech.
Transfer 73 (discussing in detail the welfare implications of user innovation in comparison and
relationship to manufacturer innovation); von Hippel (n 6) at 63-76 (discussing circumstances
under which users are low-cost innovators).
62
For discussions of the traditional incentive theories of patenting, see, for example, R D Blair
& T F Cotter ‘Rethinking Patent Damages’ (2001) 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 at 78–80; R S
Eisenberg ‘Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use’ (1989)
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 at 1024–28; K J Strandburg ‘What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain’ 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81 at 90-92. Note that the point of this article is not
to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial motivations, but between the motivation
to invent something in order to sell it and the motivation to invent something in order to use it
ones’ self -- even if the use is in a commercial context.
63
Strandburg (n 48) at 483-85.
64
Von Hippel (n 6) at 85–88.
65
Strandburg (n 48) at 483-90.
66
See von Hippel (n 6) at 77–80; Henkel ‘Selective Revealing in Open Innovation Processes:
The Case of Embedded Linux’ (2006) 35 Res. Pol’y 953 at 954–55, 959–67.
67
See von Hippel (n 6) at 77-80; Harhoff et al. (n 48); E von Hippel & G von Krogh ‘Free
Revealing and the Private Collective Model for Innovation Incentives’ (2006) 36 R&D Mgmt. 295.
13
to the mutual advantage of group members.68 Free revealing may enable others to
improve on a user innovation, thus making that innovation more valuable to the
original user innovator. Free revealing occurs even between competitors, who
sometimes prefer to share certain kinds of information freely while competing in
other ways.69
On balance, therefore, the standard patent incentive story used to justify the
high protectionist approach of TRIPS is not a good fit for user innovation. In
general, patent protection is both less necessary and more socially costly for user
innovations than for seller innovations.
(2) User innovation and heterogeneous and local knowledge
User innovation is also mismatched with the mass market seller-based
innovation paradigm because it is heterogeneous and relies on distributed local
knowledge. Users possess dispersed local knowledge about their specific
situations.70 Transferring this experiential knowledge to manufacturers can be
expensive because of differences in background knowledge, experience, and so
forth, making user innovation more efficient, in many cases, than attempting to
teach manufacturers what diverse users want.71
Users develop innovations that respond to their specific needs and situations,
leveraging their information advantages rather than manufacturers’ advantages in
large scale production.72 Many user innovators are lead users who develop their
innovations by customizing or modifying commercial products to satisfy their
specific needs, which differ from those of the mass of consumers.73 These user
innovators often anticipate features for which general consumer demand has not
yet developed.74 A study of innovations in mountain biking equipment, for
example, found that user innovations often depended on information that the
inventors had obtained through their own cycling experience, reflecting their own
unique circumstances and interests, such as a desire to bike in extreme weather
conditions or to perform acrobatic stunts.75
68
von Hippel (n 6) at 93-106; Franke & Shah (n 38); K J Strandburg ‘Sharing Research Tools
and Materials: Homo Scientificus and User Innovator Community Norms’ in Working Within the
Boundaries of Intellectual Property (R C Dreyfuss, H First, and D L Zimmerman, eds.
forthcoming 2008) Oxford available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136606.
69
von Hippel (n 6) at 10, 87; Henkel (n 66); Harhoff et al. (n 48); Strandburg (n 68).
70
von Hippel (n 6) at 8; see also S K Shah ‘From Innovation to Firm Formation in the
Windsurfing, Skateboarding, and Snowboarding Industries’ (Univ. of Ill., Working Paper No. 050107, 2006) available at
http://research.kauffman.org/cwp/ShowProperty/webCacheRepository/Documents/2006_SonaliSh
ah.pdf at 32–33.
71
Henkel & von Hippel (n 61).
72
S K Shah ‘Open Beyond Software’ in Open Sources 2.0: The Continuing Evolution at 338,
341-43 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2006) O’Reilly; Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation (n
70); von Hippel (n 6) at 45–61.
73
Ibid at 22–43.
74
Ibid at 20–30.
75
Ibid at 73.
13
14
Particularly in the international context, user innovation may be necessary in
order for a technology developed in one environment to be useful in another.76 It
may be extremely difficult and costly for a manufacturer to acquire the degree of
local experiential knowledge needed to customize a technology for its best use in
circumstances different from those for which it was originally designed. Even an
innovation targeted to a foreign market may fall flat without user participation in
the design. A study by Douthwaite, Keatinge, and Park, for example, probed the
role of user innovation in adoption of agricultural technologies intended to assist
development in Asia.77 The researchers concluded that, especially as either the
technology or the local agricultural system increased in complexity, the
importance of user innovation and interaction between the technology originators
and local users increased.78 Recognizing this, Anil Gupta and his Honey Bee
Network provide a means of documenting and sharing grassroots user innovations
in India.79 The organization also is engaged in efforts to match grassroots
innovators with scientists and engineers who can perform more traditional
research and development and with entrepreneurs so as to facilitate the
development of commercial products based on these user innovations.80 Because
user innovation is often heterogeneous and customized to specific local contexts
and because the innovative process depends on dispersed local knowledge, the
kinds of inventions likely to be produced by user innovation are not well suited to
a conventional understanding of the trade paradigm, which is most natural for
mass market goods which can be designed and produced in one place and sold in
another.
(3) User innovation and the "permission to innovate” culture of intellectual
property doctrine
Another feature of user innovation relevant to the present discussion is the
extent to which user innovation relies on functional improvements and
modifications to previous inventions. While users do make major functional
improvements, user innovation often builds on existing technology.81 And while
users may be large corporate entities, often they are individuals, who are unlikely
to engage in ex ante licensing transactions in order to obtain "permission to
innovate."82 Moreover, because user innovation often occurs as a side effect of
76
See B Douthwaite, J D H Keatinge, & J R Park ‘Why Promising Technologies Fail: The
Neglected Role of User Innovation During Adoption’ (2001) 30 Res. Pol’y 819. See also A K
Gupta ‘From Sink to Source: The Honey Bee Network Documents Indigenous Knowledge and
Innovations in India’ (2006) 1 Innovations 49 (reporting on project attempting to document local
innovations and to “forge links” between local innovators and university researchers).
77
(n 76).
78
Ibid at 834-35.
79
Gupta (n 76).
80
Ibid at 61-64.
81
See, for example, von Hippel (n 6) at 29-43 (discussing the important role of “lead users” of
existing technologies in user innovations); Henkel & von Hippel (n 61) at 19.
82
Ibid; V Braun & C Herstatt ‘Barriers to User-Innovation: The Paradigm of “Permission to
Innovate”’ in 2006 IEEE International Conference on Management of Innovation and Technology
at 176 (discussing problems posed by a “permission culture”).
15
use, rather than as a result of a separate program of research and development,
even corporate users may not know in advance that they plan to improve on the
technologies they are using. Because users tend to make heterogeneous functional
inventions, while manufacturers tend to make innovations that spring from their
expertise in standardization, safety, ease of manufacture, and returns to scale,83
user innovation and manufacturer innovation are often recursive, meaning that an
ongoing dialogue of innovation is most productive of technological advance.84
(4) User innovation and development
While user innovation occurs throughout the world, and most studies of user
innovation have focused on developed countries, it seems likely that user
innovation is of particular importance to developing countries.85 The local needs
and preferences of citizens of developing countries are less likely to be well
understood and accounted for in mass markets because those citizens will be less
likely to constitute economically important blocks of consumers and also because
mass market goods are likely to be designed in developed countries.86 User
innovation thus may be an important means of adapting mass market technologies
to the specific needs of citizens of developing countries. User innovation building
upon a primary technology is also more likely to be within the capacity of some
developing country innovators, who may lack sophisticated engineering training
and skills but be able to exploit their own local knowledge and expertise in their
innovative activities.87 Thus, though making space for user innovation in the
global intellectual property regime is of general importance, it may be of
particular importance to the developing world.
III THE TROUBLE WITH TRIPS: CONSTRAINED BY AN OUTMODED
INNOVATION PARADIGM
As mentioned in the Introduction, much of the criticism of TRIPS, as well as
most of the impetus for the progress reflected in the Doha Declarations and the
adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda, has focused on TRIPS failure to
balance adequately the need to promote future innovation with current needs for
consumer access to technology, particularly in the public health arena. Here I
leave aside those pressing concerns and focus on TRIPS – particularly its patent
provisions -- as innovation regulation. As discussed above, TRIPS reflects a
particular mass market seller-based view of innovation88 which tends to evoke a
83
von Hippel (n 6) at 63-76.
Henkel & von Hippel (n 61) at 12-14.
85
See, for example, Gupta (n 76) at 51-61, discussing local innovations in India.
86
See, for example, A Kapczynski, S Chaifetz, Z Katz & Y Benkler ‘Addressing Global
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations’ (2005) 20 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1031 at 1051-57 (addressing the issue of under-production of goods for developing
countries in the context of orphan drugs).
87
See, for example, Gupta (n 76) at 51-61.
88
See Strandburg (n 6) for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between the user
innovation and seller innovation paradigms in the context of patent law.
84
15
16
one-size-fits-all high protection intellectual property regime. The high protection
baseline of TRIPS reflects, among other things, its primary mission as an
instrument of trade rather than innovation and its genesis during a period of
manufacturer-based innovation aimed at producing mass market goods.89 A trade
paradigm based on a concept of static comparative advantage90 is best suited to
mass market goods which can be effectively designed and produced in one place
and shipped off for use in another.
While the pharmaceutical products, off-the-shelf software and, in the
copyright context, mass market entertainment products which dominated the
context in which TRIPS was negotiated might at least arguably fit this conception
(though even that is not at all clear in light, for example, of the very different
public health contexts and available information technology infrastructures in
different countries), TRIPS locked in a set of minimum standards based on the
mass manufacturer model at precisely the wrong moment. As discussed in Part II,
the turn of the twenty-first century has seen a virtual explosion in the importance
of information technology leading to a surge in software innovation, in more open
and dispersed models of innovation by commercial firms, in collaborative and
open models of innovation made possible (and certainly more visible) by the
World Wide Web and other digital technologies, and in user innovation. A
simplistic trade perspective is singularly inapt for these new modes of innovative
practice. Indeed, the very concept of “trade” is often in apropos since these
innovation practices are simply not well-described as means by which goods
invented and produced in one place are sold in another.
The TRIPS “minimum standards” commitment to a mass market seller-based
innovation regime is reflected in its requirement of equal treatment of different
technological arenas (Article 27); its crabbed approach to enforcement exceptions
(Article 30), which reflects an assumption that unauthorized use is nearly always
undesirable and should be permitted only in closely cabined circumstances; and
its stringent restrictions on compulsory licensing (Article 31). The lack of any
substantive maxima for intellectual property protection, along with the
agreement’s failure to put any limits on restrictive licensing practices or to deal
with private ordering more generally, also reflect this myopic focus on one
specific innovative model.91 While it would certainly be desirable to read TRIPS
flexibilities more expansively than they have often been read in the past,92 it is
89
See S K Sell Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights
(2003) Cambridge (arguing that TRIPS was molded to protect the markets of particular intellectual
property rights holders – notably the major pharmaceutical companies). See also Gervais (n 1) for
an overview of the history of the TRIPS Agreement.
90
See, for example, B Greenwald and J E Stiglitz ‘Helping Infant Economies Grow:
Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries’ (2006) 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 141 (arguing
for a concept of dynamic comparative advantage which would take into account the potential for
evolving economic capacity).
91
See, for example, Dreyfuss (n 7); G B Dinwoodie ‘The International Intellectual Property
Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources’ (2006) 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev.
205 at 214.
92
See, e.g., Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000),
the only WTO panel decision to interpret TRIPS Articles. Critiques of the approach taken there
17
nonetheless unlikely that an international intellectual property regime so
thoroughly grounded in a mass market seller innovation model will be optimally
suited to a world of diverse innovation paradigms.
This indictment of TRIPS is not intended to suggest that national legislatures
have done much better at crafting innovation policy regimes. TRIPS was
patterned after high protection national intellectual property policies, particularly
those of the United States. The United States has been struggling to adapt its own
patent law to the changing innovation landscape, a struggle which is reflected in
stalemates between the pharmaceutical and information technology industries in
attempted legislative revision93 and in Supreme Court intervention to dial back
some of the rigid interpretations of patent legislation by the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals.94 The point, though, is that it is particularly problematic to enshrine a
one-size-fits-all approach to innovation in an international agreement both
because states are likely to be heterogeneous in their preferred innovative
approaches and because, as a practical matter, re-negotiating an international
agreement is fraught with difficulty.
That said, the recent history of TRIPS adaptation in the access to medicines
context does provide some grounds for optimism and a model of how regimeshifting95 and what Burris and collaborators have called a nodal approach to
governance96 might lead to incremental progress.97 While the context is different,
include Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 10); C Garrison ‘Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing
Countries’ ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 (October 2006) available at
http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11716/; Dreyfuss (n 7) at 22-24; and D B Barbosa, M Chon, & A M
von Hase ‘Slouching Towards Development in International Intellectual Property’ 2007 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 71 at 109-12. For a similar critique in the copyright context, see, e.g., Declaration: A
Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step test” in Copyright Law, available at
http://www.ip.mpg.de/ww/en/pub/news/declaration_on_the_three_step_.cfm. Initiators and
Coordinators of the Declaration are Christophe Geiger, Reto M. Hilty, Jonathan Griffiths Se, Uma
Suthersanen.
93
See, for example, B Kahin ‘Patents and Diversity in Innovation’ (2007) 13 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 389 at 389-91 (discussing the divergent interests of the two sectors); EPO
Scenarios (n 2) at 94-95 (same); T Dutra, ‘House Hearing on Patent Reform Bill Dampens
Expectations for Passage This Year’, 78 BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal (May 8,
2009) (describing adverse positions taken by industry groups regarding patent reform in the
United States).
94
See, for example, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. (2008) 128 S. Ct. 2109; KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. (2007) 127 S. Ct. 1727; Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. (2007) 127 S. Ct.
1746; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. (2007) 549 U.S. 118; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. (2006) 547 U.S. 388; Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) 545 U.S. 193.
95
See, for example, L R Helfer ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale J. Int’l Law 1; P K Yu
‘International Enclosure, The Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia’ 2007
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1; S K Sell ‘Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions’ (2004) 77
Temp. L. Rev. 363. More generally, on the topic of evolving mechanism of international
governance, see S Burris, M Kempa, & C Shearing ‘Changes in Governance: A CrossDisciplinary Review of Current Scholarship’ (2008) 41 Akron L. Rev. 1. See also Chon (n 7) at
2852-53 for a critique of the effectiveness of regime-shifting in promoting the goals of developing
countries.
96
See, for example, Burris et al. (n 12); J Braithwaite ‘Methods of Power for Development:
Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong’ (2004) 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 297; S Burris
‘Governance, Microgovernance and Health’ (2004) 77 Temp. L. Rev. 335; P Drahos ‘Intellectual
17
18
the access to medicines debate provides an example of how interests not
originally accommodated in TRIPS can organize to produce change. Further, a
number of commentators have suggested creative approaches to interpreting
TRIPS articles 27 and 30 flexibly, especially in light of the Objectives and
Principles outlined in Articles 7 and 8.98 These attempts are commendable and a
more flexible approach is perhaps essential to the promotion of innovation
globally. Here I provide an overview of the substantive challenges to adapting
TRIPS to new modes of innovation before focusing on administrative
mechanisms for an evolving international innovation policy regime in Part IV.
(1) TRIPS flexibilities and evolving paradigms of innovation
TRIPS sets out minimum standards of intellectual property protection. For
patents, TRIPS specifies various minimum requirements involving patent
coverage, term, associated rights, and remedies for infringement. Of particular
interest for our purposes are Articles 27 and 28, dealing with patentable subject
matter and rights conferred, respectively. With certain exceptions, Article 27
requires countries to make patents available “for any invention . . . in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application,” constraining the possibility of a nuanced approach to
patentable subject matter.99 Article 27 also requires that patent rights be
“enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology . . . .”100
Article 28 mandates that patents confer on their owners exclusive rights “to
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” their patented inventions.101 Article
32 adds to the constraints by mandating a patent term of twenty years, which may
be badly mismatched with the cumulative and collaborative pace of invention in
some areas.102
Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Temp. L. Rev.
401. These authors argue that “nodal governance” is a weapon that can be employed by both the
weak and the strong. Specifically, Drahos describes the original methods by which the
pharmaceutical industry obtained a high protection patent regime as an example of nodal
governance, ibid at 407-19, yet argues that nodal governance provides an opportunity for
developing countries with respect to traditional knowledge, ibid at 419-24. Thus, it remains
unclear whether the shift toward a less state-based international governance regime will benefit
developing countries in the intellectual property debate in the long run. For general discussions of
this issue see, for example, Burris et al. (n 95); Slaughter & Zaring (n 12) at 220-24.
97
See, for example, Yu (n 7) at 400-402.
98
See, for example, Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss ‘Diversifying Without Discriminating’ (n 10); C
Garrison ‘Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries’ ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17
(October 2006) available at http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11716/; Dreyfuss (n 7) at 22-24; D B
Barbosa, M Chon, & A M von Hase ‘Slouching Towards Development in International
Intellectual Property’ 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 71 at 109-12. For a similar argument in the copyright
context, see Declaration (n 92).
99
Article 27 of TRIPS.
100
Ibid.
101
Article 28 of TRIPS.
102
Article 32 of TRIPS. For a discussion of the issues of increasingly rapid and cumulative
invention see, e.g., EPO Scenarios (n 2) at 88.
19
The mass market seller-based innovation paradigm is reflected clearly in these
basic all-encompassing requirements. In requiring that patents be available
without discrimination, TRIPS reflects the assumption that patents are equally
appropriate and effective for promoting innovation in all fields of technology.
Similarly, in mandating that patent rights include rights of exclusive making and
use, along with exclusive rights of sale, TRIPS reflects an assumption that all of
these exclusive rights are needed to promote innovation in every context. User
innovation undermines these basic assumptions. As discussed in Part II, the
effectiveness of user innovation approaches varies depending on issues such as
the extent to which users of a technology are likely to have heterogeneous needs
or diverse insights, the extent to which users have the technical capacity to
improve a technology, and the availability of benefits from innovation other than
those obtained by selling it.
The underlying TRIPS paradigm is also reflected in the fact that TRIPS fails
to incorporate any standards of maximum intellectual property protection.103 The
lack of substantive maxima weighs strongly in favor of primary innovators, since
follow-on innovators will often have to obtain licenses from earlier innovators in
order to pursue their inventions. This lack of substantive maxima in TRIPS again
reflects a paradigm of innovation in which follow-on innovation is either
unimportant or occurs within an industry structure in which ex ante licensing is an
effective means to organize it. Such an assumption is inadequate even for
traditional innovation, where a robust public domain plays an important role in
promoting follow-on innovation, but it is particularly detrimental for user
innovation, the distributed nature of which undermines the potential for ex ante
licensing.
One possible response to concerns about the mismatch between the underlying
innovation paradigm embodied in TRIPS and alternative innovation approaches is
to point to TRIPS flexibilities. TRIPS itself bolsters the argument for a generous
view of its flexibilities in Articles 7 and 8, which set out Objectives and
Principles, respectively. Article 7 specifies that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
(Emphasis added.)104
Article 8 states that:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
103
For discussions of the desirability of mandatory maxima of intellectual property protection,
see, e.g.,, Dreyfuss (n 7); Dinwoodie, ‘New Actors, New Institutions’ (n 91) at 214; Kur and RuseKhan (n 37); Hugenholtz and Okediji (n 37).
104
Article 27 of TRIPS.
19
20
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology. (Emphasis added.)105
In parallel with similar arguments with respect to access and with respect to
the traditional intellectual property balance, Articles 7 and 8 may provide a
persuasive basis for interpreting TRIPS flexibly to encourage and support
evolving modes of innovation.106 In particular, Article 7 should be read as
aspirational (rather than as an affirmation that intellectual property will fulfill
these objectives) and its recognition that intellectual property “should contribute”
to the goal of innovation might be taken to acknowledge the possibility of other
mechanisms for promoting innovation.107 Article 8’s statement that members
may adopt measures “to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their . . . technological development” also provides a possible handle for
accommodating alternative innovation approaches under the TRIPS regime since
one could argument that in some contexts these alternative paradigms may by
preferred to a standard IP approach as means for technological development .108
Nonetheless, Article 8 permits the adoption of such measures only when they
are “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”109 Since the provisions of
the Agreement are slanted toward a high protection regime that does not provide
any explicit accommodation for evolving innovation paradigms, the question is
whether the existing flexibilities are sufficient to permit us to shoehorn new
innovation models into what is at bottom a mass market seller-based paradigm.
Certainly it would be possible to make significant progress by interpreting
existing TRIPS flexibilities in light of the overall Objectives and Principles set out
in Articles 7 and 8. Specifically, as argued by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, and
recognized in a recent overview of TRIPS patent exceptions,110 there may be
wiggle room in the interpretation of Article 27’s non-discrimination requirement,
allowing for differential treatment of different industries as long as the differential
treatment is based upon a legitimate purpose.111 It is not clear that WTO panels
105
Article 28 of TRIPS.
See, for example, P K Yu ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Ind. L.J. 827
at 863-66; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss ‘Diversifying Without Discriminating’ (n 10); Garrison (n 98);
Dreyfuss (n 7) at 22-24; Barbosa et al (n 98) at 109-12; Chon (n 7) (arguing generally for the use
of TRIPS flexibilities in light of Articles 7 and 8 to incorporate a “substantive equality” norm).
107
Article 7 of TRIPS.
108
Article 8 of TRIPS.
109
Ibid.
110
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss ‘Diversifying Without Discriminating’ (n 10); Garrison (n 98);
Dreyfuss (n 7) at 22-24.
111
See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss ‘Diversifying Without Discriminating’ (n 10); Garrison (n 98).
106
21
will be inclined to interpret Article 27 with the expansive degree of flexibility
envisioned by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, however. A WTO panel, in a dispute
involving an exception permitting use of a patented invention during the patent
term so as to facilitate regulatory review, did interpret Article 27 so as to allow
“bona fide exemptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain
product areas.”112 This statement leaves open the question of what makes an
exemption “bona fide” (or, in Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s terms, gives it a
legitimate purpose). Particularly in light of Article 7, it might be a colorable
argument that a WTO dispute resolution body should deem legitimate a purpose
to promote innovation outside of the intellectual property-based paradigm by, for
example, providing an exemption from patent infringement for open source
software.113 It seems likely, however, that WTO panels and the WTO appellate
body will take a much more narrow view of Article 27’s anti-discrimination
mandate unless they are given a road map to a more innovation-friendly approach,
a point to which I return in Part IV.
Article 31 provides for ex ante compulsory licensing in certain circumscribed
situations. Most importantly for present purposes, compulsory licensing is
permitted only on a case-by-case basis and only if “prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful
within a reasonable period.”114 Because of these and other limitations,
compulsory licensing under Article 31 is unlikely to play an important role in
making room for follow-on innovation by users, which often does not lend itself
to such case-by-case and ex ante licensing, especially if a cumbersome
government approval procedure is required.
Exceptions attended to accommodate evolving modes of innovative activity
under TRIPS would thus have to pass muster under Article 30. Article 30 states
that:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.115
The most important interpretive questions for present purposes are probably
the meanings of “limited” and “unreasonably.”116 These terms raise crucial
questions of baseline. Against what background standard is the magnitude of an
exception or its reasonableness to be measured? To make room for alternative
modes of innovation, such as user innovation, these terms would have to be
112
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000)
[hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceuticals] (panel decision).
113
See Garrison (n 98) at 76 (mentioning the possibility of such an exemption in passing).
114
Article 31 of TRIPS.
115
Article 30 of TRIPS.
116
Article 30 of TRIPS.
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22
interpreted in light of the impact of the exception on innovation overall. This type
of interpretation would be a far cry from what we have seen so far. There has
been only one panel interpretation of Article 30, in the Canada-Pharmaceuticals
dispute.117 As discussed in more detail by Dreyfuss118 and by Garrison,119 the
panel interpretation construed the requirement of a limited exception very
stringently – based on the extent of impairment of each of the patentee’s exclusive
rights, counted individually, and permitting only the most minor impairment of
any of the rights.
Garrison has argued that the panel’s interpretation is inconsistent with preexisting exemptions that were well accepted by TRIPS signatories and has limited
precedential value in light of the re-affirmation of the importance of TRIPS
objectives and principles after the Doha Declarations.120 The reaffirmation of
Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, though aimed
primarily at issues of access to medicine, may also provide a hook for efforts to
interpret TRIPS flexibilities expansively in view of other important interests such
as accommodating alternative innovation paradigms.121 It is thus possible that the
interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in
the patent arena will evolve in light of ongoing concerns about the international
intellectual property balance. Nonetheless, there is a long way to come from the
approach of the Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel to the breadth of flexibility which
might be needed to accommodate evolving modes of innovation that might
optimally even replace intellectual-property-inspired innovation in some arenas.
As an example, consider the possibility of exemptions for making and use. As
I have detailed in earlier work, exclusive rights to make and use may be counterproductive in some arenas in which user innovation is highly effective. 122
Nonetheless, TRIPS requires under Article 28 that patent infringement encompass
not only unauthorized sales of a patented invention but unauthorized use and
making of an invention.123 Patent protection is less important as an incentive for
user innovation than it is for manufacturer-centered research and development.124
Moreover, patent licensing is likely to be a costly and ineffective means to
coordinate user innovation, which arises mostly not from pre-meditated research
and development but as a side effect of use combined with “freedom to tinker.”
Thus, user innovation may be best promoted in some fields by well-tailored use
exemptions.125 Because a use exemption would promote certain kinds of
innovation by users, while decreasing incentives for innovation by certain types of
117
See (n 112).
(n 18) at 14-18.
119
(n 98) at 18-33.
120
Ibid at 37, 41-42.
121
See Doha Ministerial Declaration (n 8) at ¶ 19. For an example of a more flexible
approach to interpreting the very similar “three-step test” in copyright law, see Declaration (n 92).
122
See Strandburg (n 48) at 483-89, 531-41; Strandburg (n 56).
123
Article 28 of TRIPS.
124
See Strandburg (n 48) at 483-85. This doesn’t mean, of course, that user innovators will
necessarily eschew patent protection themselves if it is available under a strong IP regime.
Though they may not need the IP incentive, user innovators may well find it privately beneficial to
obtain exclusive rights.
125
Ibid at 531-39; Strandburg (n 56) at 267-78.
118
23
sellers (those whose business models involve developing technology that is easily
copyable by users)126 the optimal menu of use exemptions will vary from place to
place and from time to time.
An optimal international innovation regime would thus leave room for
countries to adapt their use exemptions to their innovative strengths. However, it
is highly questionable whether use exemptions of this sort would pass muster
under Article 30 as either limited or reasonable. While it is true that research
exemptions and exemptions for personal and non-commercial use are relatively
common among TRIPS signatories (and hence presumably, though not definitely,
acceptable under Article 30),127 those exemptions are generally premised on a
lack of significant commercial impact on patent holders. While the effects on
innovation of a broader use exemption would be salutary if the exemption were
well tailored, such an exemption might very well not be deemed “limited” under
Article 30 if it had significant commercial ramifications for individual patentees.
Article 30 reflects the one-size-fits-all assumption that patenting is generally the
best way to promote innovation in every technology. It will be difficult to stretch
it to accommodate situations in which patent protection is simply not needed or is
counter-productive.
Even where there are colorable interpretations of TRIPS that might permit a
robust response to evolving innovation mechanisms, it seems unlikely, as
discussed more fully by Dreyfuss,128 that such interpretations will be forthcoming
from WTO dispute resolution unless groundwork for taking broader innovation
policy into account is laid. Part IV discusses the possibility that a WIPO
exploration of these evolving innovation modes and their interaction with
intellectual property can provide expert input, either through soft law mechanisms
such as guidelines, best practices, and model laws or through a more formal
mechanism, to interpretation by WTO dispute resolution bodies and the TRIPS
Council.
IV RE-IMAGINING WIPO: TOWARD AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH
TO CRAFTING A HEALTHIER GLOBAL INNOVATION REGIME
As noted above, there is a broader lesson in the rise of user innovation and
other new innovation practices regarding the unpredictability of innovation and
the wisdom of freezing in substantive intellectual property law requirements at the
international level. Innovation is unpredictable in both its substance and its
process. A rigidly locked-in international intellectual property regime, no matter
how well tailored at its inception, is unlikely to serve innovation well in the long
term. Given this Article's diagnosis of the weaknesses of the present global
innovation regime, especially as it relates to the optimum encouragement of user
innovation, what is to be done? There are no easy answers and there is much to
126
See Strandburg (n 48) at 528-29.
See Garrison (n 98) at 44-49 (discussing pre-existing exceptions for non-commercial use
and for experimentation); Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and exceptions and
Limitations to the Rights (n 19).
128
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 14-20.
127
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24
learn about current innovative paradigms and others which may emerge in the
future as we seek to determine how best to achieve the right balance of public
domain, proprietary "knowledge goods" and private ordering approaches.
Rather than consider in more detail possible substantive approaches to
improving on a narrow reading of TRIPS, this Part discusses possible institutional
mechanisms, based on a global administrative law approach,129 to facilitate
ongoing reform and development of global innovation governance. To this end, I
will discuss three potential roles for WIPO in moving toward a more satisfactory
global innovation policy regime. At a minimum, WIPO should adopt an
Innovation Policy Agenda (in rough analogy to its recently adopted Development
Agenda).130 A WIPO Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a focal point for
global discourse and debate about evolving innovation approaches ranging from
cumulative innovation in the information technology industry through user
innovation and other present-day alternative innovation paradigms, to whatever
new innovation models may develop in the future. Second, perhaps as an
outgrowth of the proposed Innovation Policy Agenda, WIPO should play a greater
role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and examining potential exceptions for
TRIPS compliance through its relationship to the TRIPS Council. Third, and more
ambitiously, we should consider the possibility of amending TRIPS to provide an
exception authorization broader than is available under Articles 27, 30, and 31,
coupled with a more explicitly administrative role for WIPO in vetting proposed
exceptions.
(1) Why WIPO?
As Rochelle Dreyfuss points out persuasively, TRIPS suffers from a lawmaking deficit because of the rarity and non-precedential character of WTO panel
decisions. 131 This law-making deficit is responsible at least in part for the dearth
of examples of states testing the limits of the flexibilities currently available in
TRIPS.132 The barriers to states adopting patent laws that test the TRIPS
flexibilities are many, including, in many developing countries, the capacity and
expertise to engage in cutting edge TRIPS interpretation and the political,
financial, and human capital resources to risk challenges to those interpretations
129
See references (n 27) for general discussions of the theory of global administrative law.
See Development Agenda documents (n 9). See also Halbert (n 14) for an overview of the
history of WIPO with particular attention to development issues. Note that while the
Development Agenda and a potential Innovation Policy Agenda might have some overlapping
interests, neither can be subsumed in the other since the Development Agenda has strong concerns
with interests of consumer access, while an Innovation Policy agenda would focus on changing
innovation paradigms in the developed world as well as in developing countries.
131
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 1-3.
132
See Garrison (n 98) for a detailed study of patent infringement exceptions globally,
demonstrating their limited scope. See also C M Ho ‘A New World Order for Addressing Patent
Rights and Public Health’ (2007) 82 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1469 at 1501-02 for a discussion of the
effects of bilateral Free Trade Agreements on signatories’ flexibility.
130
25
and to pursue disputes before the WTO.133 This means that some other
mechanism is needed to develop interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities that
countries will be willing to adopt.
The WTO and the TRIPS Council are probably not the right places to make
progress on a broader understanding of innovation policy in the first instance.134
Though they may be capable of implementing a more nuanced approach to the
TRIPS flexibilities (particularly with some input from WIPO), organizations
steeped in a trade mandate are unlikely to have either the inclination or the
expertise to make progress on a broader innovation agenda.
In part because of its recent experience with the Development Agenda, WIPO
is arguably best placed to provide a forum for dialogue about how to use TRIPS
flexibilities to accommodate concerns with broader innovation policy.135 This is
the case despite complex questions, discussed at length by Dreyfuss, about how
exactly to incorporate the results of WIPO deliberation into TRIPS interpretation
under the WTO dispute settlement process.136 WIPO has a standing committee
structure for consideration of intellectual property-related issues, which has
already been expanded to include a Committee on Development and Intellectual
Property and could potentially be expanded to include a Committee on intellectual
property as related to alternative innovation paradigms.137 Under the auspices of
such committees and otherwise, WIPO sponsors conferences, studies, and other
forms of discourse involving scholars, NGOs, stakeholders, and country
representatives. By these means, WIPO could conduct an ongoing analysis of how
a variety of forms of innovative activity can be allowed to flourish together in a
global governance framework.138
The relevance of innovation policy is not confined to any single international
organization, of course. Promoting a dialogue on these issues in a number of
venues will ensure that a variety of perspectives are included. Nonetheless it
seems desirable to have a focal point organization around which various
stakeholders can coalesce and create coalitions of participation in the debate.
WIPO is a natural choice for this role in light of its expertise in intellectual
133
See, for example, Dreyfuss (n 7) at 25-27; Yu (n 7) at 387 (discussing some of the
difficulties developing countries face in implementing aggressive interpretations of TRIPS
flexibilities).
134
See Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 32-33. But see K Raustiala ‘Compliance and
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation’ (2000) 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 at
435-38 for an argument in favor of an active role for the TRIPS Council as a primary forum for
TRIPS interpretations.
135
For an argument in favor of WIPO’s greater involvement in promoting TRIPS flexibilities
see, for example, Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 21-34. For general arguments in favor of
WIPO taking a greater role in promoting a more balanced approach to intellectual property, see,
for example, Halbert (n 14) at 283-84; J Boyle ‘A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of
Intellectual Property’ 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 9; Geneva Declaration on the Future of the
World Intellectual Property Organization, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (discussed in Halbert (n 14) at 27376).
136
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 26-29.
137
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/cdip/
138
See Okediji (n 15) draft at 22, 42, discussing how WIPO and its predecessor organizations have
used such avenues to affect substantive global IP norms in the past.
25
26
property and its experience with the Development Agenda. WIPO’s efforts in
undertaking the Development Agenda, along with its recent inquiries into
limitations and exceptions, demonstrate a growing willingness and capacity to
consider ramifications of intellectual property outside of a narrow manufacturerbased paradigm.139 Moreover, WIPO has recently come under new leadership
and the new Director General, Francis Gurry, has recognized the distinction
between promoting intellectual property and promoting the underlying goal of
innovation.140
WIPO efforts to build an understanding of and expertise in new and evolving
innovation paradigms would also do double duty because of WIPO’s role in
developing and administering most intellectual property agreements other than
TRIPS.141 Crucially, WIPO has been engaged for some time in attempts to
develop a Substantive Patent Law Treaty to harmonize further the international
patent system.142 Such efforts clearly raise red flags in light of the problems
already visible in the substantive harmonization reflected in TRIPS minimum
standards for patent law. It is very important to ensure that a broader innovation
policy perspective informs any discussions of further harmonization.
Though WIPO has clear institutional advantages as a focus for global
innovation policy setting, WIPO has a checkered history with respect to
alternative innovation mechanisms. Its Convention holds as its primary goal to
"promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world."143
Moreover, in 2003 the United States government, reportedly as a result of
objections from Microsoft and related corporate interests, pressured WIPO to
rescind a plan to hold a meeting on open source approaches.144 At that time Lois
Boland, director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, reportedly said "that open-source software runs counter to the mission of
139
One should not be too sanguine about this recent openness, of course. WIPO’s history is as
an organization devoted to the promotion of intellectual property rights which has arguably been
brought kicking and screaming to its present openness to development issues. See, for example,
Halbert (n 14) at 272-76 (discussing this history). Nonetheless, of the available institutions in the
international intellectual property regime, WIPO seems the most likely to be both able and willing
to pursue a broader innovation policy agenda.
140
See Francis Gurry, Acceptance Speech, available at http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/dgo/dg_gurry_acceptance_speech_2008.html,,in which Gurry said, among other things:
“In this regard, it is useful to remember that intellectual property is not an end in itself. It is an
instrumentality for achieving certain public policies, most notably, through patents, designs and
copyright, the stimulation and diffusion of innovation and creativity on which we have become so
dependent, and, through trademarks, geographical indications and unfair competition law, the
establishment of order in the market and the countering of those enemies of markets and
consumers: uncertainty, confusion and fraud. In the end, our debates and discussions are about
how intellectual property can best serve those underlying policies: whether modifying the
international framework will enhance or constrain innovation and creativity and contribute to their
diffusion, and whether it will add confusion, rather than clarity, to the functioning of the market.”
141
See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ for a list of WIPO-administered intellectual property
treaties.
142
See Reichman & Dreyfuss (n 25) for a discussion of and critique of WIPO’s efforts in this
regard.
143
Convention (n 14).
144
See Krim (n 16).
27
WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights" and that "[t]o hold a
meeting which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to
be contrary to the goals of WIPO.”145
Times seem to be changing, though, as a result of efforts from NGOs
supportive of open source approaches and along with WIPO's adoption of the
Development Agenda. Though a specific reference to open source software was
removed from the approved version, the Development Agenda proposals agreed
upon in 2007 include calls to ". . . deepen the analysis of the implications and
benefits of a rich and accessible public domain," "initiate discussions on how . . .
to further facilitate access to knowledge and technology . . . and to foster
creativity and innovation . . . ," "request WIPO to undertake . . . studies to assess
the economic, social and cultural impact of the use of intellectual property
systems . . .," and "exchange experiences on open collaborative projects such as
the Human Genome Project as well as on IP models."146 These proposals provide
hooks for consideration of innovation paradigms beyond the intellectual property
regime. Moreover, new paradigms for innovation cut across the traditional divide
between developing and developed countries, splitting the perspective of powerful
developed country actors in new ways.
WIPO is also a good choice as a locus for a broader innovation policy agenda
because TRIPS itself contemplates the possibility that TRIPS interpretation might
be influenced by WIPO. Thus, Article 68 stipulates that the TRIPS Council, in its
activities in monitoring the agreement, “may consult with and seek information
from any source it deems appropriate” and that “[i]n consultation with WIPO, the
Council shall seek to establish, within one year of its first meeting, appropriate
arrangements for cooperation with bodies of that Organization.”147 Though the
metes and bounds of cooperation set out in the subsequently-adopted formal
agreement between WIPO and the TRIPS Council are narrow and primarily
technical, the language of Article 68 implies that the TRIPS Council may consult
with WIPO more broadly.148 Thus, though the current relationship between
WIPO and TRIPS does not warrant explicit deference to WIPO interpretations of
TRIPS by WTO dispute resolution bodies,149 it certainly places WIPO in a position to
begin a dialogue over TRIPS interpretation and for the TRIPS Council to take WIPO
recommendations and interpretations seriously into account in light of its innovation
policy expertise. Moreover, while one may question WIPO’s capacity and
willingness to take a broader view of innovation policy in light of its high
protectionist history and IP-focused mandate, this is an opportune time for a refocusing of WIPO’s mission, given its weakened role in the global IP system after
TRIPS.
(2) An Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO?
145
Ibid.
Development Agenda (n 22).
147
Article 68 of TRIPS.
148
Agreement between the World Intellectual Property organization and the World Trade
Organization (December 22, 1995), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/trtdocs_wo030.pdf.
149
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 26.
146
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28
An important step toward incorporating consideration of evolving innovation
paradigms into the global debate about intellectual property law would be for
WIPO to develop and adopt an Innovation Policy Agenda, along the lines of the
recently-adopted Development Agenda, which would take a wide view of
promoting innovation in the long term. Under the auspices of an Innovation
Policy Agenda, WIPO could provide a forum for vetting interpretations of TRIPS
flexibilities and proposals for national legislation to accommodate a broader
approach to innovation.
Very recently, WIPO has begun to take steps toward recognizing the
importance of user innovation. For example, a list of “issues for further
elaboration and discussion” approved at the June 2008 meeting of the WIPO
Standing Committee on Patents includes “alternative models for innovation,”
“limitations to the rights,” and “research exemption.”150 At the July 2008 meeting
of the WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property the Electronic
Frontier Foundation presented a statement in which it suggested that “WIPO
could also provide Member States with information about the benefits for
education and scientific research of Open Innovation and User Driven Innovation
models” and that these “new theories of innovation” “have the potential to
radically reshape collaboration and innovation in the developing world.”151 These
recent activities lay groundwork for a more formal WIPO Innovation Policy
Agenda.
The development of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO would provide a
focal point for various stakeholders with interests in emerging innovation
paradigms, to form coalitions with others, such as many information technology
firms, that find the one-size-fits-all approach of TRIPS constraining. Thus,
participants in alternative innovation approaches might make use of the network
of connections which link them (particularly those in the open source software
community) to information technology sector stakeholders who are interested in
ensuring that any interpretation or amendment of TRIPS adequately accounts for
the intellectual property balance required for complex innovation.152 In this
respect, an Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a point of coalescence for
these parties to mobilize their resources to create, deploy, and link nodes so as to
affect the process of "nodal governance" that will no doubt be involved in the
adaptation of TRIPS to the needs of the information technology sector.153 Over
time, these changes are likely to be made both directly, by influencing the
150
Annex, Summary By the Chair (n 19). See Strandburg (n 48) for an argument that
researchers are user innovators of research tools and methods.
151
EFF Statement to WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, Second
Session, July 7-11, 2008, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2008July/003378.html.
152
See, for example, S O’Mahony and B Bechky ‘Boundary Organizations: Enabling
Collaboration among Unexpected Allies’ Admin. Sci. Q. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the
important interactions between information technology companies and the open source
community).
153
See Burris et al. (n 12) at 52-53 for a similar suggestion in the context of public health and
access.
29
development of interpretative machinery at WIPO or the WTO, and indirectly, by
influencing the evolution of domestic intellectual property law, which will in turn
influence the interpretation of TRIPS.
The political economy already makes it likely that TRIPS flexibilities will
come to be more widely deployed in recognition of the needs of the information
technology industry. By obtaining a voice in the debate, practitioners of user
innovation can try to ensure that their perspectives are reflected in resulting
interpretations and any eventual TRIPS amendments. Advocates for user
innovation should also deploy their networks of contacts in developing countries
and in organizations serving developing country interests to emphasize the more
direct role that user innovation plays and could play in development.154 A WIPO
Innovation Policy Agenda would facilitate this involvement and would bring
together a different cross-section of stakeholders than would the peripheral
consideration of these issues under the Development Agenda.
(3) A notice and comment approach to WIPO interpretations of TRIPS
flexibilities?
Particularly as WIPO develops broader innovation policy expertise pursuant
to an Innovation Policy Agenda or otherwise, it might begin to play a more
important role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and vetting possible exceptions
for compliance with TRIPS. As Dreyfuss argues, the WTO Dispute Settlement
process is a poor mechanism to provide authoritative interpretations of amorphous
terms in the agreement that might be interpreted so as to provide some flexibility,
such as "limited", "normal exploitation," "without discrimination" and so forth.155
This is in part because dispute settlement proceedings are rare and in part because
the panels are unqualified to make innovation policy. Dreyfuss argues that an
administrative mechanism is needed to give content to these terms in light of the
purposes of intellectual property in general and of the purposive statements
incorporated in TRIPS itself.156 She then suggests ways in which the existing
intellectual property administrative bodies—primarily WIPO and the TRIPS
Council—might take advantage of WIPO's expertise in intellectual property
policy.157
My proposal here piggybacks on her suggestions. The availability of
alternative mechanisms for innovation only reinforces the need for an
administrative approach. The infrequent forays into TRIPS interpretation of WTO
dispute resolution bodies are a completely ineffective mechanism for considering
and vetting TRIPS exceptions under Article 30 once one moves away from the
trade-focused seller innovator paradigm under which it is assumed that exceptions
to rigorous enforcement of patent protection should be few and far between. If
TRIPS flexibilities are to play a positive role in promoting innovation and
ensuring that the intellectual property paradigm does not crowd out other
154
See, for example, Douthwaite et al. (n 76); Gupta (n 76).
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 13-20.
156
Ibid at 20.
157
Ibid at 20-34.
155
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innovation models, then it is critical to have an ongoing discussion not only of
whether proposed exceptions would pass muster under TRIPS, but also of which
exceptions make sense as a matter of innovation policy under a variety of
circumstances. A broader view of the goal of TRIPS as promoting innovation
(rather than intellectual property protection per se) means that exceptions should
be not only tolerated but also promoted under certain circumstances.
WIPO is well placed to provide a forum for vetting potential exceptions that
might be implemented in national legislation. Under the current relationship
between WIPO and the WTO, especially because WIPO and the WTO have
somewhat different memberships, WIPO interpretations would not be binding on
WTO panels.158 Nonetheless, even under the current arrangement, a wellreasoned WIPO analysis would provide persuasive evidence of how a large
number of member states view the TRIPS provisions and also of the perspective
of an organization with expertise in the area of innovation policy.
If WIPO begins to take a greater role in TRIPS interpretation, either as a
persuasive matter or, as discussed in the next section, as part of an amended
TRIPS approach to exceptions, it will be important to deal with traditional
administrative law issues of transparency, legitimacy, and voice.159 WIPO
consideration of potential exceptions should incorporate the views not only of
intellectual property stakeholders, developing countries, and potential consumers
of new inventions, but also of participants in and advocates for less traditional
innovative practices, including user innovation. Historically, WIPO has been very
unwilling to permit participation from diverse constituencies.160 However, its
experience with the Development Agenda and, as Halbert argues, with the issue
of traditional knowledge, appears to be opening it up to more expansive
participation.161
Openness to input from innovators will be critical to the success of an
Innovation Policy Agenda. Once one acknowledges the importance of new and
evolving models of innovation, it becomes essential to combine the expertise of
an organization like the re-imagined WIPO with a means of tapping into the
global innovation grassroots. An ear to the ground would complement intellectual
property expertise in informing a flexible and responsive global system. With this
in mind, WIPO should open up its deliberations on a regular basis to
representatives of those involved in user innovation, as it is doing with indigenous
communities in its deliberations regarding traditional knowledge.162
Beyond a more inclusive approach to NGOs, WIPO should consider adopting
an accessible and open “notice and comment” approach to vetting potential
TRIPS exceptions.163 The same Internet technology which is partly responsible
for the recent surge in new innovative practices provides a mechanism for
158
Ibid at 26.
See references (n 12) for general discussions of these issues in the global context.
160
See Halbert (n 14) at 271-76.
161
Ibid at 271-80.
162
See Halbert (n 14) at 276-80.
163
See Kingsbury et al. (n 12) at 34-36 (discussing the relatively new phenomenon of
adoption of notice and comment procedures by international bodies).
159
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implementing a truly global notice and comment procedure.164
WIPO
conceivably could set up an online forum for proposing and discussing TRIPS
exceptions.165 Interested parties, including states, industry actors, NGOs, and
even individuals could submit comments about specific proposals for exceptions,
interpretations of the TRIPS non-discrimination requirement, and so forth. To
draw out serious and well thought out proposals, each proposal might be required
to include an "innovation impact assessment"—arguments as to why the proposed
exception or interpretation would promote innovation. Online rating or tagging
systems could also be considered to weed out spurious proposals and comments
or to group similar comments.166
An open notice and comment procedure would provide a means to solicit a
variety of perspectives which could inform WIPO and give it access to the
distributed expertise about innovation which is present at the global grassroots.
WIPO could then produce reasoned interpretations of TRIPS in light of a wide
range of input. Such reasoned interpretations could be influential at the WTO, as
already discussed. Indeed, an open process of notice and comment resulting in a
reasoned interpretation of TRIPS might go far to alleviate the legitimacy
problems with WTO reliance on WIPO interpretations raised by Dreyfuss.167
TRIPS provides that the TRIPS Council “may consult with and seek information
from any source it deems appropriate” in conjunction with its monitoring
responsibilities.168 The more transparently vetted WIPO interpretations of TRIPS
are, the more appropriate it would seem to be to rely on them.
Of course, as discussed in Part III, there are limits to the extent to which the
provisions of TRIPS, which were, after all, intended to be limiting with regard to
patentability exceptions, can be stretched to accommodate the needs of a changing
innovation regime. The advantages of having ongoing input and proposals for
how states might implement the TRIPS flexibilities in light of an evolving
innovation environment would extend beyond providing more informed and wellthought-out interpretations of the current provisions of TRIPS. Proposals which
were rejected in the TRIPS/WIPO interpretive process, yet were accompanied by
persuasive innovation impact assessments, would generate suggestions and
support for possible amendments to TRIPS in light of changing technology and
practice. For example, as discussed in Part III, there may be circumstances which
would make relatively broad exceptions to the exclusive right to use an invention
socially beneficial in particular technological fields. Some such exemptions (for
example, the widely adopted research use exemptions) are likely TRIPS164
Of course, not all members of constituencies importantly affected by innovation policy
would have direct access to such an online forum. However, Internet access is becoming more and
more widespread, civil society NGO’s would certainly have access, and, in any event, any
procedure using the Internet to permit direct involvement by citizens worldwide in commenting on
innovation policy would be vastly more inclusive than anything going on at WIPO at present.
165
This proposal is reminiscent of Noveck’s “Peer to Patent” approach to patent examination,
which is being tested at the USPTO (n 29), or of Ho’s proposal for a response to biopiracy and
patent bioethics issues (n 29) at 532-40.
166
See, for example, Noveck ‘Peer to Patent’ (n 29) at 147-49.
167
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 26.
168
Article 68 of TRIPS.
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compliant under Article 30. But other potentially beneficial restrictions on the
exclusive use right might not comply with even a flexible reading of TRIPS. An
open interpretive forum would provide advocates of user innovation with an
opportunity to make the case for amending TRIPS to permit use exemptions to
nurture this innovative practice.
The availability of such a global forum for discussion and evaluation of
proposed TRIPS exceptions and flexibilities would also feed back into debates
about exceptions at the national level and would likely be helpful in giving
political legitimacy to advocates of more flexible national intellectual property
regimes.
(4) Amending TRIPS to provide a more formal administrative role for WIPO?
While the adoption of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO and the
establishment of a WIPO forum for vetting TRIPS flexibilities would be steps in
the right direction, such an ad hoc approach to TRIPS flexibilities may not be
enough to make positive room for evolving innovation practices. Because of the
complexity and continuing evolution of the innovation environment that this may
be an arena in which a more explicit administrative regime is needed at the global
level.169
Here I propose a more far-reaching change than could be accomplished
simply by having WTO dispute resolution bodies take WIPO analysis into
account informally in evaluating TRIPS exceptions. The proposal would be to
amend the TRIPS agreement to shift more of the burden for assessing the
innovative benefits of TRIPS exemptions or of differential treatment of different
technologies to an explicitly recognized administrative process which would not
require the very difficult step of treaty amendment every time new innovative
paradigms emerge.170 To accomplish this, a general provision permitting
exceptions “reasonably intended to promote innovation and not to restrain trade”
would be substituted for Article 30.171 The amendment should also clarify that
Articles 27 and 28 are subject to such exceptions. As an expert innovation policy
agency, WIPO would be given the formal responsibility for vetting exceptions to
see whether they are “reasonably intended to promote innovation and not to
169
As Dreyfuss notes, Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 26, the general framework that
would be involved in explicit WTO reliance on expert international organizations to provide
standards is not new. She also notes, however, that such an approach might be risky at the moment
since WIPO’s institutional identity is in a period of upheaval. Ibid at 28. Most likely a change of
the sort I advocate here would have to follow a period of experience with more informal input
from WIPO under the auspices of an Innovation Policy Agenda.
170
See Okediji (n 15) discussing the potential for WIPO to play the role of an expert agency.
Okediji concludes that the WTO is the more appropriate forum for IP norm-setting in the final
instance. The proposals here are not necessarily inconsistent with WTO dominance in final
decisionmaking. The important point is that WIPO is well placed to formulate and vet innovation
policy proposals even through final decisionmaking power undoubtedly will be vested in the WTO
because of its enforcement powers.
171
Here I address only the patent provisions of TRIPS. Similar changes to the other sections
of TRIPS should also be considered.
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restrain trade.” WTO dispute resolution would then defer, at least to some degree,
to WIPO’s evaluations.
Contemplating a more formal role for WIPO in evaluating TRIPS flexibilities
raises at least two important issues: First, there is the question of the extent of
deference which WTO dispute resolution bodies should give to WIPO
interpretations of the proposed “reasonably intended to promote innovation and
not to restrain trade” requirement.172 Rather than give even a re-imagined WIPO
final authority over the validity of TRIPS exceptions, there are several reasons to
prefer an intermediate level of deference. While a re-imagined WIPO would have
a broad mandate, including, importantly, the current Development Agenda, there
are a number of other international organizations with portfolios that touch on
innovation policy. It would be reasonable to permit parties involved in dispute
resolution proceedings to bring arguments against WIPO’s interpretations based
on the views of organizations with expertise in areas other than innovation that
are related to a particular dispute. Indeed, as noted by Dreyfuss, the WTO itself
has a trade agenda which may not always align with the promotion of
innovation.173 It is only reasonable to leave room for WTO dispute resolution
panels to take specifically trade-focused rationales into account.
Second, there are good reasons, particularly in the international context in
which the legitimacy of an administrative approach may be questioned, to avoid
focusing too much power in one particular international actor (indeed, this is part
of the problem with the current configuration of TRIPS). Giving more
responsibility for interpreting TRIPS to a re-imagined WIPO raises reasonable
concerns about agency capture by powerful developed country interests. These
concerns are mitigated somewhat in the context of new paradigms of innovation
(in contrast to the situation with respect to the Development Agenda, for example)
because, as we have seen in the past few years in the disputes between the
pharmaceutical industry and much of the information technology industry, the
evolution of innovation paradigms can set even powerful developed country
interests at odds with one another. Nonetheless, it would be best to avoid
concentrating too much power over innovation policy in any one organization so
as to avoid creating an overly attractive target for capture. Dividing power
facilitates the ability for weaker players to have influence through nodal
governance and regime shifting.
There is thus a need to balance the advantages of innovation policy expertise
and a reliable institutional framework for vetting proposed exceptions against the
disadvantages of concentrated power. An intermediate level of deference, in
which WTO dispute resolution panels are required to articulate specific reasons
for rejecting any exception which has survived WIPO’s vetting procedure, might
be appropriate. If a panel were to reject WIPO’s determination as to whether a
172
Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have recently considered a similar issue in connection with
their proposal for an agency with broad innovation policy responsibility in the United States. S M
Benjamin and A K Rai ‘Innovation and Its Reform: A Regulatory Perspective’ (2008) 76 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming).
173
Fostering Dynamic Innovation (n 18) at 28.
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particular exception promotes innovation, the WTO Appellate Body would be
empowered to reweigh the WIPO analysis against the panel’s reasoning.
WIPO evaluation of proposed exceptions would provide states with a degree
of certainty in enacting them even if the dispute resolution procedure retained its
role as the finally binding interpreter. Because formal disputes under the WTO are
rare and WIPO’s analysis would be ongoing, WIPO’s interpretations would likely
be very influential. This would be especially the case if WIPO evaluations paved
the way for broad adoption of exceptions by states, which might then constitute
“subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention and hence inform subsequent interpretations of TRIPS.174
V CONCLUSIONS
We stand at what is probably only the beginning of a flowering of new and
emergent innovation practices facilitated by developments in communication
technology, yet we confront these evolving practices with a rigid and outdated
international innovation policy regime. The main message of this Article is that it
is high time to consider seriously both how to accommodate user innovation and
other alternative practices that are already with us and how to avoid repeating the
mistake of institutionalizing any particular approach to innovation in a difficult to
change international instrument. In doing so, we must also meet the need for
sufficient harmonization to allow us to reap the benefits of globally distributed
and diverse innovative practices.
In this Article I suggest that we should seek to deploy an administrative-type
approach to cope with emerging innovation paradigms. To that end, I propose that
WIPO be re-imagined as a broad-based innovation policy organization, at a
minimum through the development and adoption of an Innovation Policy Agenda
and perhaps eventually through amendment of TRIPS to permit WIPO to serve as
an interpretive “agency” under a more formal administrative approach to
intellectual property law exceptions. Primarily, this Article seeks to encourage an
expanded dialogue in global innovation policy which takes into account emerging
innovation paradigms.
174
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Article 31(3)(b) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.