TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY:
CHALLENGES, DILEMMAS AND POSSIBILITIES
BERBER BEVERNAGE*
The relationship between transitional justice and historiography is a complex and
contested one. Many historians have pleaded for a greater engagement of their
discipline in the field of transitional justice. However, many others have strongly
criticised this sort of engagement. In this article, I argue that the evaluation of the
relationship between transitional justice and the writing of history is strongly
dependent on particular ways of conceiving the nature of both practices. I claim that
both supporters and critics have predominantly focused on transitional justice’s
popular theses about ‘reconciliation through truth telling’ and about the ‘healing
force of remembering’ or ‘remembrance as justice’. Accordingly, they have defined
the (potential) function of historiography in transitional justice in terms of a search
for (objective) truth and/or as a struggle against forgetting. This approach is
important but too restricted and one should also pay attention to another aspect: that
of the ‘politics of time’ or ‘historicisation’. I argue that a historicising discourse is
often used in transitional justice in order to create or regulate people’s notions of
temporal ‘distance’ and in order to symbolically delimit the borders between past
and present. This raises a number of questions about the ethics of the use of a
historicising discourse in transitional justice.
I
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between historiography and transitional justice is a complex and contested one.
Many historians have pleaded for a greater engagement of their discipline in the field of
transitional justice and several have put this into practice by, for example, serving as
investigators in historical commissions or by functioning as expert witnesses in court cases.
However, at the same time, many historians have strongly criticised this sort of engagement. In
this article, I argue that the evaluation of the role, potential and desirability of the engagement of
historiography in transitional justice has been strongly dependent on particular ways of
conceiving the nature of historiography as well as particular ways of conceiving of transitional
justice. I claim that both supporters and critics have predominantly focused on transitional
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*
MA, PhD (UGent), Assistant Professor at the Department of History at Ghent University in Belgium. The
author would like to thank Estela Valverde, Michael Humphrey and Chris Lorenz for the many inspiring
discussions and comments that helped him immensely in writing this article. This work was supported by the
Interuniversity Attraction Pole Justice and Populations Project. For more information, see
<http://www.bejust.be/>.
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justice’s popular theses about reconciliation through truth telling and about the healing force of
remembering or remembrance as justice. Accordingly, they have defined the function of
historiography in transitional justice practices in terms of a search for (objective) truth and/or as
a struggle against forgetting.
This approach is important but too restricted and I argue that one should also pay attention to
another feature of the relationship between historiography and transitional justice: that of a
specific ‘politics of time’, 1 which one could call historicisation. I argue that historicising
discourse is often used in transitional justice in order to create or regulate people’s notions of
‘temporal distance’ and in order to symbolically delimit the borders between past and present.
This raises a number of new ethical questions about the use of a historicising discourse in
transitional justice.
I first discuss the way in which the evaluation of the relationship between historiography and
transitional justice has revolved around ideas of truth versus lie or myth, and remembrance
versus forgetting. After this, I explain my thesis about the importance of politics of time in
transitional justice. Rather than trying to provide a closed set of final conclusions, this paper
attempts to provide a fruitful starting point for further discussions on the potential role of
historians and historiography in transitional justice.
II
TRUTH VERSUS MYTH
One obvious way in which historians seem to be able to contribute to transitional justice and
broader attempts to deal with the legacy of violent pasts, is by establishing ‘historical truth’ and
by deconstructing ‘historical myths’. The idea that truth telling can contribute to reconciliation
and nation-building, and can even be considered a form of (restorative) justice in itself, has been
a very central one in the discussions and literature on transitional justice. It is one of the central
theses that provides a raison d’être to the establishment of truth commissions (which may well
be called the institutional flagships of transitional justice). Moreover, it also has been one of the
underlying ideas that has sparked an increasing interest in so-called ‘didactic legality’2 among
legal scholars, and it has provided some of the central arguments underlying the creation of socalled memory laws in several countries.3 A right to (historical) truth has even increasingly
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I use this expression in the way in which it is defined by Peter Osborne: ‘a politics which takes the temporal
structures of social practices as the specific objects of its transformative (or preservative) intent’. See P
Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (Verso, 1995) xii.
On ‘didactic legality’, see: Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the
Trial of the Holocaust (Yale University Press, 2001); Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the
Law (Transaction Publishers, 2000).
On ‘memory laws’, see Luigi Cajani, ‘Criminal Laws on History: The Case of the European Union’ (2011)
11 Historein 19.
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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
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emerged as an established part of international law.4 All of this provides an obvious source of
attraction to historians, many of whom consider the search for (objective) truth as their core
business,5 and see themselves as ‘myth breakers’.6
Organisations such as the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation in the Hague
(‘IHJR’)7 and the Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability in New York (‘AHDA’)8
cross the border between academia and advocacy and put historiography ‘on the line’ to
contribute to reconciliation and peacebuilding, and to promote democracy. The IHJR focuses on
‘historically divided societies’. It has completed projects in the former Yugoslavia and Kenya
and is running projects in Armenia-Turkey and the Palestinian territories. It ‘uses the innovative
and effective methodology of shared narratives to engage key local stakeholders in dealing with
their past’.9 The IHJR created a seven step ‘theory of change’ for which it draws on ‘historians
and experts’ from antagonistic communities to come together and create and disseminate ‘shared
historical narratives’, ‘informed interpretations’ and ‘shared information’ that shows all sides of
the conflict.10 The AHDA similarly describes its mission as centred around the construction of
shared narratives through ‘historical dialogue’, and argues that this way of using ‘historical
memory’ is an ‘underutilized mechanism for addressing conflict’.11
Although they shun the outright (neo)positivist discourse that is found in many truth
commissions, and explicitly warn that even a shared narrative is ‘unlikely to be linear or mono!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This new juridical philosophy was pioneered in a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
1988, which stated that states not only are obligated to prevent human rights violations but that they also have
a binding legal responsibility to investigate past violations within their jurisdiction. Other pioneering work
was done by some NGOs, including the Centre for Human Rights Legal Action in Guatemala and the
London-based Article 19, which were among the first to articulate the right to know the truth in the early
1990s. Toward the end of the 1990s, the idea of a right to truth eventually was adopted by the UN. For a
detailed discussion, see Antoon de Baets, Responsible History (Berghahn Books, 2009) 154–163; Y. Naqvi,
‘The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red
Cross 245.
Although most professional historians have, in the wake of post-modernist and post-structuralist criticisms,
become critical of the more naive notions of absolutely ‘objective’ truth, the idea of ‘objectivity’ remains
ones of the central regulating ideals of the profession. For a classic discussion of this ideal in the American
case, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical
Profession (Cambridge University Press, 1988); Paul Newall, ‘Historiographic Objectivity’ in Aviezer
Tucker (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
On historians as myth-breakers, see Chris Lorenz, ‘Drawing the line: “Scientific” History between Mythmaking and Myth-breaking’ in Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas and Andrew Mycock (eds), Narrating the
Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts (Berghahn Books, 2008) 35–55.
See Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation
<http://historyandreconciliation.org/>.
The Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability (‘AHDA’) is a joint initiative of the Swinburne
Institute for Social Research and Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. See
Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability, Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability
<http://www.hrcolumbia.org/ahda/>.
Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, About the Institute for Historical Justice and
Reconciliation <http://historyandreconciliation.org/about/>.
See Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, Strategic Plan — IHJR: March 2014–March 2016
(March 2010) <http://historyandreconciliation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Strategic-Plan-WebsiteVersion2.pdf>.
See Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability, Program Overview (2014)
<http://www.hrcolumbia.org/ahda/>.
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vocal and most likely has distinct registers and diverse perspectives’,12 the ideas of historical
truths versus lies, and myth-making versus myth-breaking, are central to the mission of both
organisations in a direct or indirect way. The baseline of IHJR reads that it ‘seeks to dispel
public myths about historic legacies in societies divided by conflict’.13 The basic ideas
underlying its mission are succinctly explained in one of its annual reports, which states
that ‘misconceptions of history’ are the cause of many current-day ethnic and nationalist
conflicts. 14 The IHJR, therefore, believes that confronting and overcoming these
‘distortions of historical reality’, by creating understanding and shared narratives, will
contribute to the creation of stable peace. According to Elazar Barkan — one of the most
active and eloquent spokespersons of the AHDA — the power of historiography in the context of
peacebuilding and reconciliation is situated in the fact that it strives toward objectivity and that it
is ‘non-fiction’.15 Barkan recognises that combining ‘historical advocacy’ with the maintenance
of the highest professional standards can be challenging. 16 Yet, he is convinced that the
methodology or skills of historians (eg source criticism, knowledge of contexts etc), as well as
the subject of history itself can contribute to reconciliation via the construction of ‘negotiated
histories’. To cite Barkan:
Historical claims vetted by experts become ‘practical truth’ and noncontroversial in the
public arena. On the contrary, controversial conclusions might be innovative, interesting and
challenging, yet they are unlikely to achieve the status of truth until embraced by the
profession.17
As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of a historical activism in the name of reconciliation,
peace or even historical justice is not supported by all historians. Interestingly, it is exactly the
ideas of (objective) truth versus lie, and myth making versus myth-breaking, that are at the core
of many arguments about the reasons for not entering transitional justice or at least being
sceptical about it.
Predictably the use of historicising discourse in courts or tribunals and state-sponsored truth or
historical commissions, together with the more positivist claims about truth telling, have been
most fiercely criticised. Historians especially fear the tendency to present the findings of
tribunals and commissions as official history and they reject all claims that are too hubristic
about the possibility of finding final historical truths.
Some historians take a principled position and reject each confluence between the search for
historical truth and the search for a political good (eg nation-building) or a judicial aim.
According to Asher Moaz, historical research should never be subjected to any limitations
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Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, Annual Report 2010 (2010) 5
<http://historyandreconciliation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IHJR_AnnualReport10.pdf>.
Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, IHJR in Brief <http://historyandreconciliation.org/ihjr-inbrief/>.
Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, Annual Report 2009 (2009)
<http://historyandreconciliation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IHJR_AnnualReport09.pdf>.
Elazar Barkan, ‘History on the Line: Engaging History: Managing Conflict and Reconciliation’ (2005) 59
History Workshop Journal 229, 231.
Elazar Barkan, ‘Introduction: Historians and Historical Reconciliation’ (2009) 114 American Historical
Review 899, 903.
Barkan, ‘History on the Line’, above n 15, 234.
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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
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imposed ‘from the outside’: ‘More properly, one historian’s researches should be criticised by
another historian, and not be made the subject of an examination by a state institution possessing
an official status’. 18 This is especially when the submission of historical truth to the
straightjacket of legal reasoning is conceived as a major threat — whether it be in the form of
judicial verdicts by courts and tribunals, in the form of quasi-verdicts by truth commissions, or in
the form of so-called memory laws such as those that have been introduced in several countries
to criminalise holocaust denial. Tristram Hunt, for example, stresses the ‘fundamental chasm’
that separates the legal and historical professions is
[p]artly due to a degree of naivety but also a shade of arrogance within the legal world,
[where] there is a belief that what is recorded within the court room or inquiry hall can
constitute the irrefutable history of the past. This is both intellectually circumspect and
historically dangerous.19
The recent principled rejections of the use of historiography in transitional justice, in this sense,
go back on a much older tradition of criticising the judicialisation of history. It resembles the
influential criticisms of the confluence of history and (criminal) justice by prominent
intellectuals, such as Hannah Arendt and Carlo Ginzburg.20
Interesting discussions can also be found among those historians and academics who do not
oppose the use of historiography in truth and historical commissions or trials and tribunals in
principle, but critically reflect on practical challenges, limitations and possibilities. An important
discussion on this more practical level is centred around the question about which sort of
institution, and which corresponding regime of truth, would offer the best possibilities for, or
create the least restrictions on, the construction of a contextualising and complex historical truth.
Most historians would probably intuitively believe that historical truth can best be reached under
the conditions of free academic research but that, outside of this traditional habitat, preference
goes to so-called historical commissions followed by classical truth commissions. They would
also believe that the hardest contexts for historians and historical truth are those with a stronger
judicial character, most notably criminal courts and tribunals.
Recent research, however, shows that this intuitive belief needs to be nuanced. Some
commentators convincingly argue that courts and tribunals can yield rich historiography or at
least can deliver important contributions to historical research and debate. In his rich and
inspiring book The Memory of Judgment, Laurence Douglas has, for example, challenged
dominant views on the relation between history and jurisdiction. Douglas does this by arguing
that, depending on their specific legal strategy and didactic paradigm, certain courts successfully
confront their ‘dual burden’ of judging and representing the past. Douglas moreover challenges
another widespread vision by rejecting the idea of a strong contrast between the open character
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Asher Maoz, ‘Historical Adjudication: Courts of Law, Commissions of Inquiry, and “Historical truth”’
(2000) 18 Law and History Review 559.
Tristram Hunt, ‘Whose Truth? Objective Truth and a Challenge for History’ (2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum
193, 193.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994); Carlo
Ginzburg, The Judge and the Historian (Verso, 2002); See also Pieter Lagrou, ‘“Historical Trials”: Getting
the Past Right — or the Future?’ in Christian Delage and Peter Goodrich (eds), The Scene of the Mass Crime:
History, Film, and International Tribunals (Routledge, 2013) 9–22, 10.
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of historical inquiry and the allegedly closed or final character of judgment. Legal
understandings too, Douglas argues, can be fluid and frequently undergo revision.21 As he
explains: ‘Individual trials must be staged to reach closure; yet, the discourse of legal judgment
and the historical understanding it contains remain fluid and can be complexly revised’.22
Richard Wilson similarly claims that tribunals can produce good historiography. Here too, results
can strongly vary. However, according to Wilson, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), for example, in some cases produced rich and innovative insights
on the history of the former Yugoslavia. Much, according to Wilson, depends on the presence or
absence of political constraints, and more specifically on the question of whether courts and
tribunals function in a national or in an international context.23
The historical quality of the findings of truth commissions can also strongly vary from case to
case. Some of the most famous truth commissions, such as the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (‘TRC’) and the Argentinean Comisión Nacional sobre la
Desaparición de Personas (‘CONADEP’), yielded mediocre or even poor historical insights.
Yet, other truth commissions, such as the Guatemalean Comisión para el Esclarecimiento
Histórico (‘CEH’) and Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘SLTRC’) did
much better on this level. 24 In my own research on the government appointed historical
commission that inquired into the Belgian responsibility for the 1961 murder of the Congolese
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, I found that the presence of professional historians does not
necessarily yield better or more profound historiographical insights than those yielded by many
truth commissions, which are seldom staffed by professional historians (at least not in the higher
ranks).25
However, discussions on the use of historiography in transitional justice are not restricted to the
question of whether, and to what extent, good historiography can be produced in a context of
state-sponsored commissions or in a judicial setting. They also revolve around the more
fundamental question: whether the search for historical truth and a political good can ever be
successfully combined, even in situations where the initiative is taken by historians themselves
and where no (direct) pressure comes from legal institutions or overseeing states. The question
then becomes whether one of these aims will not always tend to prevail over, and come to
compromise, the other. Do shared narratives aiming at reconciliation or nation-building not
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21
This dominant vision is clearly expressed by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, in Paul
Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (University of Chicago Press, 2004) 319. Ricoeur claims that:
It remains that the definitive character of the verdict marks the most obvious difference between the
juridical approach and the historiographical approach to the same events: what has been judged can be
challenged by popular opinion, but not retried; non bis idem; as for the review of the decision, it ‘cuts
only one way’ (Garapon).
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Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trial of the Holocaust (Yale
University Press, 2001) 4.
Richard Wilson, ‘Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 908; Richard Wilson, ‘Humanity’s Histories:
Evaluating the Historical Accounts of International Tribunals and Truth Commissions’ (2007) 80 Politix 31.
See, eg, Greg Grandin, ‘The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and
State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala’ (2005) 111 American Historical Review 46.
Berber Bevernage, ‘History by Parliamentary Vote: Science, Ethics and Politics in the Lumumba
Commission’ (2011) 9 History Compass 300.
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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
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always to a certain extent have to be compromised narratives in order to be successful?
Conversely, does the search for historical truth actually always provide a good basis for nationbuilding and reconciliation, or does it rather pose a threat to the latter aims if it is
uncompromisingly prioritised?
It indeed has to be noticed (as the IHJR and AHDA seem to acknowledge) that contested
historical legacies are not always caused by misconceptions, lies or myths and thus cannot
always be solved by truth telling. The efficacy of historical truth for reconciliation seems
doubtful in situations where the conflict is not based on violence — that in retrospect turns out to
have been senseless, irrational or even counterproductive — but rather on mutually exclusive
interests that are structurally reproduced and continue to exist into the present. Some truths, it
seems, simply cannot lead to reconciliation. Also, for historians it is (relatively) easy to help
where simple ‘facts’ are denied by negationists or malevolent revisionists. However, things
become much more difficult where conflicts revolve around more complex interpretations or
evaluations of historical phenomena. Academic historiographical practice shows that, on this
more complex level, historians themselves often cannot reach consensus. This is not due to a
lack of will to be ‘objective’ or due to malicious intents. It seems to be an inherent feature of the
epistemic nature of this practice — a feature often linked to historians’ characteristic use of
narratives.26 In a similar way, it can be questioned whether academic historiography actually
offers a good starting point to help us draw a strict line between myth-making and mythbreaking. For example, the Dutch theorist of history Chris Lorenz argues that even in ‘scientific
history’ this is not easily done, certainly not when the latter’s intimate relation to nationalism and
nation-building is at play. Lorenz argues that, from its genesis in the early 19th century onwards,
academic history has always suffered from an unresolved tension between epistemological (or
‘Wissenschaftsanspruch’) and practical (or ‘Orientierungsanspruch’) claims — with the first
always undermining the second and vice versa.27
III
THE HEALING FORCE OF REMEMBERING AND REMEMBRANCE AS JUSTICE
A second obvious way in which historians seem to be able to contribute to transitional justice is
by preventing forgetfulness from taking place. Historians often identify themselves as
individuals struggling against forgetfulness. They share this self-representation with many
transitional justice advocates. Transitional justice is often considered to be essentially about the
conflict between a will to remember and an effort to forget. Even though some argue that it is
important to find a proper balance between too much forgetting and too much remembrance,28
most transitional justice scholars and activists believe remembrance is inherently superior to
forgetting, and claim that this is the case in relation to both the striving for healing and
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This was most prominently pointed out in some key texts by historical theorists such as Hayden White, Frank
Ankersmit and Louis Mink. See Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and
Historical Representation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Frank Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A
Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language (The Hague, 1983); Louis Mink, ‘Narrative Form as a
Cognitive Instrument’ in Robert Canary and Henry Kozicki (eds), The Writing of History: Literary Form and
Historical Understanding (University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) 129–49.
Lorenz, above n 6.
See, eg, Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass
Violence (Beacon Press, 1998).
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reconciliation and the striving for justice. Many are indeed convinced that collective
remembrance of past evils can have a healing force. And, as Luc Huyse remarks, recent truth
commissions have often been based on the idea that the remembrance of the truth generates an
alternative or even superior form of justice.29 This representation of transitional justice has been
of great importance in the creation of its identity (dare I say myth of origin) and has led to
important discussions. But it is also intellectually restrictive, and certainly problematic, when
assessing the potential role of historiography.
Firstly, the broad consensus about the superiority of remembrance over forgetting is a relatively
recent phenomenon, which is actually not at all self-evident. As Timothy Garton Ash claims, the
advocates of forgetting have been of considerable influence throughout history.30 Much of postwar West European democracy, for example, has been constructed on the foundation of a politics
of forgetting. Further, it was as late as 1975 when Spain made its, once widely celebrated,
transition to democracy with a conscious policy of forgetting.
Paradoxically, the Spanish case has recently been most often referred to by supporters of the idea
of the superiority of remembrance. They refer to the recent upsurge of memory movements in
that country as the ultimate proof of a natural and indestructible urge of people to remember, and
the futility or dysfunctionality of forgetting as the basis of any politics aiming at national
reconciliation and stable democracy.31
Yet it should be asked whether the latter movement for forgetting actually holds in the long run,
and whether it works for all cases. The Indian intellectual Ashis Nandy, for example, has claimed
that the values of history and remembrance (which according to him are Western values that
were externally imposed on many countries) have had a very negative effect on his country and
more specifically on the religious tensions between Hindi and Muslims.32 He therefore pleads for
a more critical reflection on the value of history and remembrance and an exoneration of what he
calls the ‘principle of principled forgetting’. When it comes to nation-building and stopping
violence, Nandy provocatively argues that one should not construct alternative histories but
rather search for alternatives to history.
Nandy does not stand alone when making this sort of claim. Actually he takes part in a long
intellectual tradition. Ever since Friedrich Nietzsche famously argued that humanity has to learn
to forget and think ahistorically in order to be able to live, many prominent intellectuals have
pleaded against an ‘obsession’ with history in the name of a more present or future-oriented
ethics.33 In the context of post-conflict situations, and transitional justice more specifically,
similar claims have been made by people such as Jean Bethke Elshtain, who defends the resort to
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Luc Huyse, All Things Pass, Except the Past (Van Halewyck, 2009).
Timothy Garton Ash, ‘The Truth about Dictatorship’ (1998) 45 New York Review of Books 35; See also Jon
Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
For a discussion of this view see Berber Bevernage and Lore Colaert, ‘History from the Grave? Politics of
Time in Spanish Mass Grave Exhumations’ 7 Memory Studies (forthcoming).
Ashis Nandy, ‘History’s Forgotten Doubles’ (1995) 34 History and Theory 44.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben [On the Use and Abuse of History
for Life] (Diogenes, first published in 1873, 1984 ed); See also, for an influential recent version of this
argument, Keith Jenkins, ‘Why Bother with the Past? Engaging with Some Issues Raised by the Possible
“End of History as We Have Known It”’ (1997) 1 Rethinking History 56.
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a ‘knowing forgetting’ in situations where groups are held hostage to a burdened past, and are in
great need of the ‘drama of forgiveness’. She writes that:
People are very fond of citing Santayana’s claim that those who don’t know their history are
doomed to repeat it. But perhaps the reverse is more likely, namely, that it is those who know
their history too well who are doomed to repetition.34
A similar position is defended by Bruce Ackerman who claims that young democracies should
not focus primarily on corrective or retrospective justice, but rather on forward-looking
constitutional and bureaucratic reform.35 To get rid of the destabilising force of burdened pasts,
Ackerman even advises transitional societies to burn the ‘stinking carcasses’ that are often still
left in their official archives (such as the Stasi files in East Germany).36
Beyond this thorny discussion on the relative advantages or disadvantages of remembrance or
forgetting, a second problem arises with this representation of transitional justice as involved in
the struggle of remembrance against forgetting. The problem is that this struggle is often cast in
far too simplistic and dualist terms. Even though theorists have repeatedly argued that memory
and forgetting are intricately linked, a highly dichotomist interpretation of these concepts keeps
dominating the imagination of both supporters and critics of transitional justice, and it has
equally constrained the debate on the possible engagement of historians. This can be illustrated
by referring to the South African case. There, dualist thinking about memory and remembrance
has led to the paradoxical situation in which the Commissioners of the TRC (such as Desmond
Tutu and Alex Boraine) presented its mission as a ‘struggle of memory against forgetting’, often
citing Kundera and Santayana.37 However, many critics, including several historians, precisely
argued that the TRC was a sort of ‘exercise in forgetting’,38 that it induced ‘social amnesia’,39 or
that it provided ‘a nod at remembering in the interests of a profounder forgetting’.40 While the
criticisms about the dimensions of amnesia in the TRC are to be taken seriously, they tend to
obscure the enormous differences between the work of the TRC and the state-imposed amnesia
that existed under Apartheid rule. For example, during Apartheid, records were systematically
destroyed to keep certain processes secret, while it has been part of the TRC’s mandate to
investigate these malpractices. Moreover, I am convinced that the fundamental TRC concept of
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Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Politics and Forgiveness’ in Nigel Biggar (ed), Burying the Past: Making Peace and
Doing Justice After Civil Conflict (Georgetown University Press, 2003) 43; See also, A G Loureiro, The
Ethics of Autobiography: Replacing the Subject in Modern Spain (Vanderbilt University Press, 2000) quoting
Jorge Semprún, who stated on a personal level, that he attributed his survival after Buchenwald to ‘a long
cure of aphasia, of voluntary amnesia, in order to survive’.
Bruce Ackerman, The Future of the Liberal Revolution (Yale University Press, 1992) 72–73.
Ibid 81.
See especially, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report (1998–2003) vol 1; See also A
Boraine, A Country Unmasked (Oxford University Press, 2000); D M Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness
(Doubleday, 1999).
Jacques Derrida, ‘Archive Fever in South Africa’ in Carolyn Hamilton et al (eds), Refiguring the Archive
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 38–80, citation on 54.
Anthony Holiday, ‘Forgiving and Forgetting: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ in S Nuttall and C
Coetzee (eds), Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2000)
43–56; I De Kok, ‘Cracked Heirlooms: Memory on Exhibition’ in S Nuttall and C Coetzee (eds), Negotiating
the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2000) 57–74.
Verne Harris, Truth and Reconciliation: An Exercise in Forgetting? 3 November, 2002 (unpublished paper
that was featured on the website of the South African History Archive but has since been removed).
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making amnesty conditional on truth telling rests on a sincere conviction that simple forgetting
will no longer do as a way to deal with the past.
Finally, when considering the problem of transitional justice exclusively in terms of a conflict
between remembering and forgetting, one can hardly explain why the turn to historicising
discourses can often be found in countries that do not seem to be confronted with a lack of
memory, but that primarily suffer from what Charles Maier has termed a ‘surfeit of memory’.41
Therefore, I have argued in previous publications, that we should transcend the memory–
forgetting dichotomy, and focus more closely on diverse ways of remembering, which can
sometimes have radically different features and ethical or political effects.42 The current field of
transitional justice, I argue, is primarily the arena for a conflict between two strongly differing
ways of remembering that manifest contrasting or even opposite temporal features. This brings
me to my third and last point about the (potential) engagement of historians and their discourse
in transitional justice.
IV
HISTORICISATION: PUTTING THE PAST IN ITS PLACE
There is, of course, another aspect of modern historiography, about which it is sometimes said,
that it can help in dealing with the legacies of a violent past: that of historicising phenomena or
putting phenomena in their (proper) time. A long and honorable tradition attributes to historians
the emancipatory potential to resist both the tyranny of the past over the present, as well as the
totalitarian dominance of the present over past and future. Historians can do this, it is said, by
demonstrating the fundamental differences that exist between past and present.
One prominent member of this intellectual tradition is the French historian Henry Rousso.43
According to Rousso, the métier of the historian results in a liberating type of thinking because it
rejects the idea that people or societies are conditioned by their past without any possibility of
escaping it.44 The historian can do this because, in contrast to the ‘activist of memory’, they only
bring the past into the present in order to demonstrate the fundamental ‘distance’ that separates
these two realities. While ‘activists of memory’ ignore the ‘hierarchies of time’, and do not seem
to grasp the distance between past and present, historians observe the past where it belongs (or ‘à
sa place’) and are self-conscious that they do so from the present, where they belong (or ‘notre
place’). One could paraphrase Rousso’s argument as follows: a good historian inherently is an
emancipator, because by measuring time, he or she knows what is contemporary or actual, and
what is past or bygone, and because he or she also knows what is the proper timing of
phenomena.
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41
42
43
44
Charles Maier, ‘A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy, and Denial’ (1993) 5 History and
Memory 1936.
Berber Bevernage, History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence (Routledge, 2011); Berber Bevernage,
‘Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice’ (2010) 69
History Workshop Journal 111.
Henry Rousso, The Haunting Past: History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary France (Ralph
Schoolcraft trans, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) [trans of: La hantisse du passé: entretien avec
Philippe Petit first published 1998)].
Ibid 10, quoting Philippe Petit.
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This same plea, for a proper relation to time and timing, also plays a prominent role in Rousso’s
well-known refusal to function as an expert witness in the Holocaust trial of Maurice Papon,
which only took place several decades after the facts. The problem with this trial, according to
Rousso, was that due to the great distance in time, it tended to apply a presentist ethical
perspective to the historical events, and became a trial of memory rather than a normal judicial
process. In this context, Philippe Petit appropriately writes that Rousso became a contemporary
historian to ‘accept the irreparable’.45
The Dutch historian Bob de Graaff, 46 holds similar ideas about the ethical value of
historiography. He too, considers the historian to be an expert of proper times and timing. He
draws a contrast with (genocidal) victims and survivors for whom, according to de Graaff, the
difference between the past and present is vague and who live in a synchronic rather than
diachronic time or even live in an ‘extra-temporality’.47 He refers to holocaust victims for whom,
he claims, the ‘past remains present’, and to whom it seems as if atrocities ‘only happened
yesterday or even today’.48 The task of historians, in contrast, is to place events, even genocidal
ones, in their time: literally to ‘historicize’ them. Historians have to do this by trying to
‘determine the individual character of particular epochs and by that demarcate one epoch vis-àvis the other’. As de Graaff puts it: ‘the historian historicizes’ in the sense of ‘closing an epoch
by recognizing its entirely individual/particular character’.49 The historian recognises the fact
that the past can be ‘called up’ again, but in contrast to the survivor he does this merely
voluntarily. Moreover, he also ‘registers’ that facts of the past are ‘bygone’, ‘definitely lost’ or
have ‘come to a downfall’.50
Good historiography therefore, according to de Graaff, is the antidote for resentment. Much like
Rousso, de Graaff considers that the professional duty of the historian is also socially desirable:
that there is also a societal justification to ‘draw a line under victimhood’. Sooner or later our
gaze has to be redirected from the past to the future. De Graaff therefore approvingly cites the
literary author Hellema that: ‘it has become about time [‘hoog tijd’] to put the past in its place’.
I have long shared this vision of Rousso and de Graaff. It can hardly be doubted that the
historicising skills historians form are an essential part of our critical thought, and that they are
potentially of great importance to transitional justice, especially its search for a closure without
forgetting. However, I have become convinced that this historicising approach comes with
serious risks and ethical dilemmas when applied to transitional justice.
In order to explain this, I must return once more to Rousso’s plea to study the past where it
belongs (that is, in the past) and from where we (historians or contemporaries) belong, as well as
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45
46
47
48
49
50
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Ibid 10, quoting Philippe Petit: ‘Pour accepter l’irréparable, il s’est fait historien du temps présent’ [In order
to accept the irreparable, he became a contemporary historian].
Bob de Graaff is known as a member of the research team that was commissioned by the Dutch government
to scrutinise Dutch responsibilities in the Srebrenica massacre.
Bob de Graaff, Op de klippen of door de vaargeul: De omgang van de historicus met (genocidaal)
slachtofferschap [On the Cliffs or Through the Channel: On the Way Historians Deal with (Genocidal)
Victimhood] (Humanistics University Press, 2006) 27. The translations from this text are the author’s own.
Ibid 28.
Ibid.
Ibid 28, 71.
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de Graaff's claim that ‘it [is] about time to put the past in its place’. There are three questions
about this issue: firstly, how do historians know the proper place for the past; secondly, where do
they get the authority do put ‘in its place’ or ‘close off’ the past; thirdly, how can they decide
when the time has come to do this?
A
How do Historians Know the Appropriate Place for the Past?
Firstly, one should ask whether historians can simply observe the borders between past and
present, and whether they thereby, in Rousso’s words, can also determine the place where they
themselves belong as historians and where their subject of study belongs (eg, academic
historiography, the archive, the historical museum, etc).51 Can we claim to know the proper place
of the past or is this place rather the product of an act of putting in its place and thus constituted
performatively? This question may seem rather sophistic, but it is not. Since the historical
present can never be reduced to a single point in time, its definition will always, as French
historian Jacques Le Goff notes, remain a basic problem to historians, whether they recognise
this or not. Moreover, Le Goff rightly argues that the definition of the present always contains
ideological aspects.52
The latter especially is the case in contexts of profound political, social and cultural transitions,
where the borders between present and past are often vague. Truth commissions, for example,
are generally not created after transition processes are completed or consolidated, but themselves
make up an important part of these transitions. As such, I have argued that these commissions
should not be considered as mechanisms that merely reflect on the past retrospectively, but rather
as actively constituting and regulating the categories of past and present. 53 The use of
historicising discourse in truth commissions, and in ‘new’ democracies in general, form a part of
a broader politics of time in which these countries attempt to exorcise the ghosts of the past by
actively positing what belongs to their (judicial, political, social, cultural, etc) present and what
cannot or should not be considered part of this present. Thus, this process actively posits what
can be considered timely or part of actuality and what to the contrary should be considered
anachronistic, old, bygone or definitely lost or downfallen. In order to understand this
phenomenon and its important political and social effects, I advocate an analysis that interprets
the use of historicising discourse in transitional justice, not just as a type of constative language,
but also as a type of language containing performative dimensions that actively produce certain
realities.54 I agree with the French historian Michel de Certeau, when he claims that the division
between past and present is not merely an absolute axiom of historiography, but the result of an
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51
52
53
54
This question has been the central question of a collective volume that I co-edited with Chris Lorenz. See
Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage (eds), Breaking up time: Negotiating the Borders Between Present, Past
and Future (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).
Jacques Le Goff, Histoire et Mémoire [History and Memory] (Editions Gallimard, 1988) 31.
Bevernage, History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence, above n 42; Bevernage, ‘Writing the Past Out of
the Present’, above n 42.
This distinction between ‘constative language’ and ‘performative language’ was first introduced in language
philosophy by the British philosopher J L Austin. See J L Austin, How to do Things with Words (Harvard
University Press, 1962).
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‘act of separation’ (or ‘le geste de deviser’), which conditions the very possibility of (modern,
Western) historiography.55
De Certeau rightly argues that the idea of a strict division between past and present is founded on
a socio-political logic and in turn has important political implications. I believe the following
citation about the practice of historiography also holds true for the use of historicising discourse
in transitional justice
[w]ithin a socially stratified reality, historiography defined as ‘past’ (that is, as an ensemble
of alterities and of ‘resistances’ to be comprehended or rejected) whatever did not belong to
the power of producing a present, whether the power is political, social, or scientific ...
Historical acts transform contemporary documents into archives, or make the countryside
into a museum of memorable and/or superstitious traditions. Such acts determine an
opposition, which circumscribes a ‘past’ within a given society.56
Our knowledge on the general efficacy of the use of historicising discourse in transitional justice
is still very limited. Yet, while historicising discourse might help transitional countries in their
search for social closure, it can have two negative effects which are each other’s exact opposite:
the first can be described as a sort of temporal Manichaeism which can lead to a ‘hypermoralism’; the other can be described as temporal relativism which can lead to a ‘hypomoralism’ or an incapacity to form ethical judgments.57
A criticism often formulated against truth commissions and historical commissions is that,
because of their focus on a strictly delimited period of the past, they pay little attention to the
continuity of certain historical phenomena. Thus, they do not combine their retrospective focus
enough with a critical analysis of the present.
The South African historian Colin Bundy, for example, strongly criticised the TRC in his
country. According to him, the TRC focused too strongly on the strictly delineated period of
Apartheid, which it described as the ‘beast of the past’, while it hardly took notice of continuities
with the periods before and after.58 Other commentators too deemed the strict focus of the TRC a
missed chance for a more critical analysis of the ‘new’ South Africa.59 The lack of a critical
scrutiny of the present can, on an ethical level, indeed result in the emergence of a double
standard whereby a sometimes-moralistic condemnation of past injustice is combined with an
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55
56
57
58
59
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Michel de Certeau, L’écriture de l’histoire [The Writing of History] (Éditions Gallimard, 1975) 16. The
translations from this text are the author’s own.
Michel de Certeau, ‘History: Science and Fiction’ in Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse (eds),
Heterologies: Discourse on the Other (Brain Massumi trans, University of Minnesota Press, 2006) 216 [first
published 1983].
In previous publications, I have already identified another negative potential ethical effect of the use of a
historicising discourse in transitional justice: namely what I have identified as its ‘allochronist’ tendency (a
term from Johannes Fabian). This is the tendency to (symbolically) allocate into another time or treat as
living anachronism those people who refuse to participate in the process of reconciliation or nation building.
See Bevernage, History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence, above n 42.
Colin Bundy, ‘The Beast of the Past: History and the TRC’ in W James and L van de Vijver (eds), After the
TRC: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (David Philip Publishers,
2001) 9–20.
Jacobus Du Pisani and Kwang-Su Kim, ‘Establishing the Truth about the Apartheid Past: Historians and the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2004) 8 African Studies Quarterly 77.
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inertia or even blindness for present-day injustices. Worse even, the past can even come to
function as a metaphorical storehouse for all evil, which then no longer seems part of the present,
or in relation to which contemporary evil seems rather innocent. When this is the case, a
tendency toward temporal Manichaeism emerges, which unburdens the present by burdening the
past. Richard Wilson, for example, formulated such a critique against the South African TRC,
which he criticised for condemning violence of the past while identical violence was still
continuing in prisons only a few miles away.60
Remarkably, the South African TRC itself became a victim of the very logic of temporal
Manichaeism to which it tended. To many people’s regret, the commissioners of the South
African TRC did not succeed in reaching consensus about all of its central findings. The fifth
volume of its final report, therefore, includes a Minority Position by Afrikaner commissioner
Wynand Malan. Malan, among other things, did not agree with the report’s analysis of Apartheid
and Apartheid violence. Interestingly, according to Malan, the report primarily failed on a
historiographical level, and he uses a historicising approach to denounce the report’s analysis of
Apartheid as being anachronistic. Malan posits that unity and reconciliation can only be achieved
if history is reframed in such a way that it is made clear that both perpetrators and victims are
victims of an ‘ultimate perpetrator’, namely ‘the conflict of the past’.61
The limited attention paid to the persistence of the past in the present, and the related tendency
toward temporal Manichaeism, can partly be explained by referring to the specific political and
ideological context in which most truth commissions function. Yet, the postulate of the strict
division of past and present, and the taboo on presentism and anachronism that underpins many
of the dominant currents of Western historiography, also plays a central role here. Temporal
Manichaeism is moreover reinforced by a widespread tendency in contemporary historiography
that, as Pieter Lagrou appropriately remarks, increasingly focuses on horror and evil in the past
and tends to evolve from a ‘histoire du temps présent’ [history of the present] into a ‘histoire des
autres’ [history of the others].62
Paradoxically, the logic of historicisation can also lead to a moral relativism and an incapacity
for ethical judgment. This especially is the case when the absolute singularity of historical events
and epochs is stressed. Due to the fact that we, in order to formulate an ethical judgment, always
to a greater or lesser extent, need a certain standard that transcends the case under evaluation —
which thus, in a certain sense, is ahistorical — a radical stress on the singularity of each
historical situation can lead to a hypo-moralism. Most historians will not consider this a problem,
but in the context of transitional justice and historical justice this can be highly problematic. This
certainly is the case if one agrees with Antoon de Baets, that even if historians qua historians
should not judge, then at least their insights should enable others to do so in an informed way.63
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60
61
62
63
Richard Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid
State (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report (1998–2003) vol 5, 443.
Pieter Lagrou, ‘De l’histoire du temps présent à l’histoire des autres: Comment une discipline critique devint
complaisante’ [From Contemporary History to History of the Others: How a Critical Discipline Became
Complacent’] (2013) 118 Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire [Twentieth Century: Historical Review] 101.
Antoon de Baets, ‘Na de genocide: Waarheidsstrategieën van rechters en Historici’ [After Genocide: Truth
Strategies of Judges and Historians] (2003) 116 Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis [Journal for History] 212, 225.
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The problem of hypo-moralism by historicisation can, for example, be illustrated by referring to
the case of the Lumumba commission. When writing their final report, to a great extent, the
Belgian MPs fell back on research that was done by a specially appointed team of historians. The
Belgian MPs also took over the latter’s taboo on presentism. This taboo on presentism or, as the
MPs put it, the fear to ‘analyse and comment on the facts from a present-day worldview’,
effected a great reticence among the politicians to formulate an ethical judgment. This eventually
led to a situation in which the Belgian role in the murder of Lumumba was morally condemned
in a nominal way, but in which a series of disclaimers about the difference between ‘norms
concerning public morality of today’ and ‘personal moral considerations at that time’
immediately defused or even cancelled this nominal condemnation on a political level.64
For another example of hypo-moralism by historicisation, I want to return for a moment to the
Minority Position in which Wynand Malan turned against the conclusions of his colleague
commissioners in the final report of the South African TRC. Malan criticises the report on a
methodological plane because the commission, according to him, made too much use of oral
history, a type of history that he regards as untrustworthy. However, he also set up a
historiographical argument against what he considers to be the TRC’s all too moralist approach.
He interprets this approach as the result of a lack of profound historical analysis. According to
Malan, whoever engages in a ‘real historical evaluation’ of Apartheid cannot but recognise the
existence of historical perspectivism. This refers to the fact that each historical phenomenon can
become the subject of different legitimate perspectives, which should all be integrated if one
wants to arrive at a ‘shared history’. Malan, therefore, also criticises the fact that the TRC, in line
with a UN ruling, refers to Apartheid as a crime against humanity.65 For Malan, this clearly is a
continuation of an old historical narrative and a ‘battle of the past’, since the UN took this
decision back in 1973. In contrast, Malan, in line with his historicist approach, stresses that
‘moral imperatives are phenomena of their times and locations’.66
The appellation of Apartheid as a crime against humanity has great practical importance, because
this crime is imprescriptible. Malan regrets that his colleague commissioners do not reject this
imprescriptibility. He poses the rhetorical question of ‘whether an investigation of apartheid
under international law would have any present or future legal or political value’. This, according
to Malan, might have been the case if it concerned genocide, because genocides remain a
potential threat for many societies, but ‘apartheid as a system is dead and buried forever’.67 He
therefore concludes that attempts to retroactively prosecute Apartheid crimes can only be
considered as an anachronistic and senseless stirring up of the past.68
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64
65
66
67
68
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Bevernage, ‘History by Parliamentary Vote’, above n 25.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for
signature 30 November 1973, 1015 UNTS 243 (entered into force on 18 July 1976).
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report (1998–2003) vol 5, 448.
Ibid 449.
Ibid 445.
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Where Do Historians get the Authority to put History ‘in its Place or ‘Close Off’
the Past?
Secondly, and relatedly, one can ask from where do historians get the authority to ‘put in its
place’ or ‘close off’ something of such great weight as ‘the past’, and whether this is merely on
the basis of scientific contemplation. Would it not be worrying if historians would thereby only
have to legitimate themselves by referring to their skill of measuring time? And what about the
relation between the professional duty of historians to ‘close off’ epochs, by demonstrating their
‘entirely individual/particular character’,69 and the social justification for this act? Can these two
actually be distinguished and, if so, is it not often the case that historians tend to see closed,
bygone or definitely lost and clearly identifiable epochs where this is deemed socially desirable?
This question should be raised because several thinkers have pointed out that the notion of the
individuality/particularity of epochs itself, on a historiographical level, depends (at least partly)
on the way in which we demarcate or periodise them. 70 Historians certainly dispose of a
reasonable margin for decision making when demarcating one period in relation to the other and
this makes it hard to talk in a passive, and de-politicising, way about the observing or
recognising of different epochs. Some researchers therefore rightly speak about the existence of
‘periodisation politics’.71 This notion of periodisation politics is highly relevant in the case of
‘transitional’ countries or ‘new’ democracies that often base their national identity and
international legitimacy on an (alleged) break with a dictatorial or violent past, and thus on a
‘discontinuous historicity’.72 The choice for a particular temporal demarcation is thereby never
neutral, but can directly contribute to the legitimacy of the new regime.
C
How Do Historians Know That the Correct Time for Closure has Come?
I want to return a last time to the citation that ‘it has become about time to put the past in its
place’ to raise a third question: how can one know when this time has come? Can a historian say
something about such an inherently ethico-political or even quasi-religious question? Even when
we are convinced that at some point in time a line has to be drawn under the past, does the
central question not remain at what point in time this line has to be drawn?
One can agree with Bob de Graaff when he claims: ‘[v]ictimhood is historically determined. It
comes into existence at a certain epoch. It has a beginning, but also an end’.73 One can hardly
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69
70
71
72
73
de Graaff, above n 47, 29.
See, eg, Irmline Veit-Brause, ‘Marking Time: Topoi and Analogies in Historical Periodization’ (2000) 37
Storia della Storiografia [History of Historiography] 3, 3; P Toohey, ‘The Cultural Logic of Historical
Periodization’ in Gerard Delanty and Engin Isin (eds), Handbook of Historical Sociology (Sage, 2003) 209–
219.
Several researchers have, for example, argued that periodisation often serves a striving for autonomy and
sovereignty. See, eg, Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Robert M. Wallace trans, MIT
press, 1985) [trans of: Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (first published in 1966)]; Kathleen Davis, Periodization
and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time. (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Olivia Harris, ‘“The Coming of the White People”: Reflections on the
Mythologisation of History in Latin America’ (1995) 14 Bulletin of Latin American Research 9.
Wilson, above n 60, 16.
de Graaff, above n 47, 28.
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deny the social need to make a certain distinction between victimhood and what de Graaff calls
‘former victimhood’. The same seems to count for the distinction between perpetratorhood and
‘former perpetratorhood’. However, the question is whether this distinction between victims or
perpetrators and former victims or perpetrators is not primarily an ethico-political differentiation,
instead of a chronological or historical one. The problem with these issues is that they force us to
make the leap from a measured time to an imperative time, and such a leap from the descriptive
to the prescriptive always is problematic.
Moreover, there is the problem that each chronological moment can apparently be appointed as
the proper time to draw a line under the past. This can be done by the ‘good historian’ but also
by perpetrators or politicians with less noble intentions. This indeed is the logic that underpins
many pleas for amnesty and amnesia: a logic which posits that it is never more timely to draw a
line under the past than the moment when it is still present. How then do we ascertain for
ourselves that we are not prematurely closing off the past?
It is clear that many war criminals, dictators and former dictators are suspiciously fond of
historicising discourse. However, the issue of the proper time to close off the past is not
restricted to the perverse or cynical cases of self-amnestying. As Brandon Hamber and Richard
Wilson remark, governments often want to close off the past far earlier than involved individuals
are willing or able to do.74 It is, therefore, important that chronologies, or the fact that events
belong to the chronological past, are not instrumentalised as an alibi for claiming that these
events also belong to the past in a more substantial sense — in that they are considered passé,
bygone or history in the pejorative sense.
V
CONCLUSION
The debate about the possibilities, limitations and desirability of the contribution of historians
and historiography to transitional justice up to now has primarily focused on the aspects of truth
and the contrast between remembrance and forgetting. Both the proponents and the opponents of
the use of history in the context of transitional justice have primarily focused on the tenability of
popular transitional justice claims — about the reconciliation by truth telling, about
remembrance as an alternative form of justice. Therefore, both sides have primarily conceived
the use of historiography in terms of a search for objective truth or as struggle against forgetting.
This approach is important and also yields a number of interesting questions. Yet, this focus
remains too limited if one wants to fully understand the ethical implications of the use of
historiography and historicising discourse in transitional justice.
One should also pay attention to another aspect of the relation between historiography and
transitional justice: that of the specific politics of time implied by the practice of historicising.
The role of historiography and historicising discourse within the field of transitional justice
should not merely be related to its traditional functions of representing the past, of searching for
truth or even of generating meaning or identity, but also to its concept of time and the specific
way in which it conceptualises the relation between present and past. Historicising discourse can
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74
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Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson, ‘Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in
Post-Conflict Societies’ (2002) 1 Journal of Human Rights 35.
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be attractive in the context of transitional justice because of its ambivalent tendency to divide
present and past merely by diagnosing its division: in other words, its alleged capacity to put the
past in its place simply by recognising this place. While the logic of historicisation can be of
great importance in dealing with historical injustice, it can also have a series of negative
consequences. It can, for example, lead to hyper-morality as well as to hypo-morality, and can be
abused to prematurely close of the past or even legitimise impunity.
Does this mean that I see no ethical mandate for historians, and think that historians should not
engage with transitional justice or truth and historical commissions at all? No. Historians should
not stay away because historicising discourse is already often used in transitional justice without
them being present. Historians, I believe, can play an important ethical role but primarily an
indirect one. They should not claim that they can solve complex ethical or political dilemmas
simply on the basis of their expertise in measuring time and determining the ‘hierarchy of time’.
In that case, chronology would indeed serve as an alibi for escaping ethico-political
responsibilities. Historians can, however, play a critical role precisely by reflexively pointing out
the use and abuse of historicising discourses and politics of time in such a way that ethical and
political dilemmas are sharpened and the need for the taking of decisions and responsibility
becomes more manifest.
***
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