1 From Anti-Causalism to Causalism and Back: A Century of the Reasons/Causes Debate Giuseppina D'Oro and Constantine Sandis 1. Introduction Are our reasons for acting the causes of our actions? If Maria goes to the fridge to fetch a cold drink, are (a) the belief that there are drinks in the fridge, and (b) the desire to cool down, the causes of her action? If the question had been asked in the middle of the last century the most common answer would have been: 'no, reasons are not causes'. The justification for such a negative reply would have taken the following form: when we explain actions by citing reasons we establish an internal connection between the explanans (the agent’s beliefs and desires) and the explanandum (the action). We do so by reconstructing a syllogism in which beliefs and desires stand to the action as the epistemic and motivational premises stand to the conclusion of a valid practical argument. Since the connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument is internal (e.g. logical or conceptual, rather than empirical) See note 33 below. rational explanations are a species of justification, not of causal explanation. When the same question, 'are the reasons for acting the causes of action?' was posed some twenty years later, the predominant answer was 'yes, reasons are causes'. The motivation for such a U-turn largely derived from the consideration that if reasons are not the causes of the actions which they rationalize, then they remain epiphenomenal. Talk about reasons is mere bourgeois ideology which conceals the real material forces that determine world historical events. So, if beliefs and desires are not to remain epiphenomenal, they must play a causal role, either directly or indirectly, via their physical realizers. In this opening chapter we outline the vexed history of the reasons/causes debate in an attempt to delineate the increasingly complex landscape against whose background the subsequent contributions for and against causalism need to be understood. The debate has a long history dating back to ancient and medieval questions about the guise of the good, early modern conceptions of (altruistic and/or egoistic) motivation, and the early twentieth century reaction of neo-Kantian philosophers to the positivism of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Our focus, however, will chiefly lie on debates within the analytical tradition in the second half of the twentieth century and our main goal will be that of identifying the underlying philosophical assumptions that are responsible for the shift from an anti-causalist to a causalist consensus. This is easier said than done, for although contemporary philosophy of action is a relatively recent discipline within philosophy, it has become a busy crossroads where issues drawn from the philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind and moral philosophy intersect. In the following discussion we identify three phases in this history. In the first phase the consensus is anti-causalist, the debates are largely of a methodological nature, and discussions cut across the philosophy of action, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of (social) science. The second phase, inaugurated by Davidson, is one in which the orthodoxy has become causalist, there is greater cross-over between the philosophy of action and the philosophy of mind, and the philosophies of history and social science have more or less been left behind; debates are no longer confined to a discussion of explanatory practices but also address ontological questions about the mind-body relation and the possibility of mental causation. Finally, we consider what may be described as a fin de siècle movement of revolt against the causalist orthodoxy of the middle phase. This anti-causalist backlash against the Humean conception of reasons with which Davidson is largely identified is fuelled by a concern with the nature of practical rationality and brings the philosophy of action in greater proximity with moral philosophy and the philosophy of criminal law. 2. The Claim for Methodological Unity in the Sciences: Hempel’s Revival of Mill’s Empiricism In the analytic tradition the reasons/causes debate was reignited by the publication of Hempel’s 1942 article 'the function of general laws in history'. Hempel (1942). Hempel revived a claim, already made by empiricists such as Mill, Mill (1843). according to which the distinction between the human and the natural sciences is a distinction in degree, not in kind. Mill argued that the prima facie reason for distinguishing between the human and natural sciences is that they appear to have different subject matters: the natural sciences study events, whereas the human sciences are concerned with actions. But such a distinction in subject matter is purely superficial. For a science to be genuinely autonomous it must have a distinctive methodology, and the human sciences have no such thing. We predict human behaviour by appealing to general psychological laws, much in the way we predict natural events by formulating general natural laws. The difference between the human and the natural sciences lies not in the method they employ, but in the degree of exactness to which they can aspire. The human sciences are thus like tidology and meteorology. They are sciences because they appeal to general laws, but they are inexact sciences because the complexity of the antecedent conditions with which they have to reckon means they have low predictive power. The proper distinction to draw, for Mill, is thus not between the natural and the human sciences but between the exact and the inexact sciences. Once the line is drawn in this way, it is clear that the distinction between the human and the natural sciences is a distinction in degree not in kind. For the dividing line between say, psychology and physics, is no greater than that between meteorology and physics. Like Mill, Hempel sought to establish that there is no distinction in kind between explanation in the natural and human sciences. All explanation, according to Hempel, appeals to covering laws. Events are predicted (or retrodicted) by deducing their occurrence from a set of antecedent conditions and a general empirical law: hence the claim that the logical structure of scientific explanation is 'deductive-nomological'. For example, the cracking of a car radiator is deduced from a) the antecedent conditions (there was water in the radiator and the car was parked outside on a freezing cold night) and b) a general law (water freezes below 32 °F, and the pressure of a mass of water increases with decreasing temperature). Hempel (1942: 36). Explanations in the human sciences are covert deductive-nomological explanations or mere 'explanation sketches'. Thus, historical explanations such as 'Dust Bowl farmers migrate to California 'because' continual draught and sandstorms render their existence increasingly precarious, and because California seems to offer them so much better living conditions' are a truncated form of a deductive nomological argument whose general premise is: 'populations will tend to migrate to regions which offer better living conditions'. Ibid: 41; cf. Tanney (this volume). Hempel later revised the covering law model to allow for probabilistic predictions and retrodictions that could not be falsified by one single exception to the general law. Hempel (1962a). But such a revision amounted only to the concession that there is a distinction in degree between the natural and human sciences, thus echoing Mill’s claim that there is only one method and one conception of science. What are the implications of Hempel’s revival of Mill’s claim for methodological unity? If there is no principled methodological distinction between the human and natural sciences, then the human sciences have no distinctive domain of enquiry. Actions, (which are allegedly the subject matter of the human sciences) stand to events (the subject matter of the natural sciences) as the species 'king fisher' stands to the genus 'bird' and human scientists stand to natural scientists in the way in which king fisher specialists stand to ornithologists. The human sciences are nothing but branches of natural science and human scientists are just specialised kinds of natural scientists focussing on a subset of events, namely ones which have internal, rather than external causes, and which go under the name of actions. It is precisely this view of the relation between the human and natural sciences that the rival position disputed. Human scientists are not kinds of natural scientists; they are engaged in an altogether different sort of endeavour. The human sciences are engaged in a hermeneutic, not an empirical enterprise, whose goal is to understand rather than classify. The concessions made by Hempel and Mill presuppose that the explanatory goals of the human and the natural sciences are the same and simply miss the point that human scientists have a very different notion of what it means to 'explain' an action. 3. The Claim Against Methodological Unity: Dray’s Revival of the Early Twentieth Century Distinction Between the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften. Whilst Hempel revived the neo-positivist argument in support of the unity of science, W. H. Dray’s See Dray (1957, 1958, 1963,1964, 1966, 1980, & 1995). defence of the autonomy of the human sciences echoes the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen that informed the early twentieth century revolt against the positivism which had dominated in the second half of the nineteenth century. The distinction between Erklären and Verstehen had been introduced by Droysen Droysen (1858). and the slogan that the goal of the human sciences is to understand (verstehen) rather than explain (erklären) united many philosophers opposed to methodological monism, philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windelband. Windelband construed the methodological distinction between the human and the natural sciences to be one between 'nomothetic' sciences, or sciences which search for laws, and 'ideographic' sciences, or sciences which are concerned with individual phenomena. Windelband (1894). From this perspective, the need to distinguish the human from the natural sciences arises from the consideration that whereas the natural sciences are concerned with events that either occur periodically or which can be reproduced under experimental conditions, the human sciences are concerned with unique phenomena. The French revolution, for example, is a unique historical event. Historians are not concerned with the causes of revolutions as such, but with the specific causes of the French revolution. A different take on the methodological divide implied by the Erklären/Verstehen distinction was offered by Dilthey who gave the Geistes/Naturwissenschaften distinction a psychologistic twist by claiming that the characteristic method of the humanities is the empathetic method, which requires the recreation of the thoughts of agents in the mind of the historian. Dilthey (1989). In the spirit of this neo-Kantian tradition Dray reaffirmed the existence of a principled methodological divide between the human and natural sciences but also construed the distinction in a very different way. The human sciences differ from the natural sciences neither because they are ideographic nor because the method that they employ is empathetic, as Windelband and Dilthey had claimed respectively. The human sciences are concerned broadly with the mind and the study of mind is a rational and normative pursuit. The relevant distinction, he argued, is between explanations which are causal and explanations which are rational. His work thus became associated with the claim that the explanation of action is rational, not causal. The inspirational figure behind Dray was not a German but a British philosopher, R.G. Collingwood, whose ideas he translated into the idiom of contemporary analytic philosophy and mobilised against the claim for methodological unity in the sciences that had been revived by Hempel. That said we must not discard the indirect influence of Hegel via Collingwood. For Hegel's account of Action see Quante (1983/2004) and Laitinen & Sandis (2010a&b). Since much of Dray’s work introduced ideas and distinctions that had been drawn from R.G. Collingwood, it is helpful to revisit Collingwood’s key claims. For an overview of Collingwood’s work see D’Oro (2002). Collingwood agreed with Mill that in order to be autonomous a science must have a distinctive method, but he took exception to the claim that the method of the human sciences is essentially the same as that of the natural sciences. The natural and the human sciences have very different goals and different methods to achieve those goals. The goal of natural science is to subsume an occurrence under general laws, for the sake of prediction, as Mill and Hempel correctly claimed. But the goal of the human sciences is to render human behaviour intelligible in the light of thought processes that rationalize it: When a scientist asks “why did that piece of litmus paper turn pink?” he means “on what kind of occasions do pieces of litmus turn pink?” When an historian asks: “why did Brutus stab Caesar?” he means “what did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?” Collingwood (1946: 214). It is only in so far as behaviour is made intelligible that it can be deemed to be an action stricto sensu and can thus become the appropriate subject matter for the human sciences. No human action can count as historical subject matter unless it is explicated in this way. Focusing on history, as a paradigmatic example of a human science, Collingwood claimed that the subject matter of history is what he calls Res Gestae. These: are not the actions, in the widest sense of that word, which are done by animals of the species called human; they are actions in another sense of the same word, equally familiar but narrower, actions done by reasonable agents in pursuit of ends determined by their reason. Collingwood (1999: 46). It is because the human sciences are concerned with actions in this technical sense of Res Gestae, that their subject matter is genuinely distinct from that of the natural sciences. It is plausible, then, that the reasons/causes debate is at least partly fuelled by contrasting notions of what action actually is, neither of which is illegitimate (see Sandis 2012). From this perspective, the human sciences differ from the natural sciences not because they do not yield exact predictions, but because they are concerned with what occurs as an expression of thought or reason. What gives history its autonomy is not that it is concerned with human actions rather than with natural events, but that it approaches the object of its study in a different way. It is the method of a science that determines its subject matter; and since the method of history is radically distinct from that of natural science, so is its domain of enquiry. The action/event distinction is thus a somewhat technical distinction which captures the methodological divide between the human and the natural sciences. The natural sciences are concerned with events because they approach the object of their study through the experimental method of observation and inductive generalization. The human sciences study actions because they approach their object as being in principle open to rational investigation. Since method determines subject matter, actions (in the sense of Res Gestae), are not a subset of natural events. By the same token history is not a specialised branch of natural science, it is a science in the Latin sense of the word scientia, meaning a form of enquiry with a distinctive method and subject matter. Collingwood (1940: 4). But what is the exact method by which action is investigated? In so far as history is concerned with thought it is, Collingwood claims, not a descriptive but a normative or criteriological science. As he puts it: … a science of thought must be ‘normative, or (as I prefer to call it) ‘criteriological’, i.e., concerned not only with the ‘facts’ of thought but also with the ‘criteria’ or standards which thought imposes on itself. ‘Criteriological’ sciences, e.g. logic, ethics, have long been accepted as giving the correct approach to the study of thought. In the sixteenth century the name ‘psychology’ was invented to designate an ‘empirical’ science of feeling. In the nineteenth century the idea got about that psychology could not merely supplement the old ‘criteriological’ sciences by providing a valid approach to the study of feeling, but could replace them by providing an up-to-date and ‘scientific’ approach to the study of thought. Owing to this misconception there are now in existence two things called ‘psychology’: a valid and important ‘empirical’… science of feeling, and a pseudo-science of thought, falsely professing to deal ‘empirically’ with things which, as forms of thought, can be dealt with only ‘criteriologically’. Collingwood (1938: 171). The study of thought is not an empirical but a normative, or as Collingwood would put it, ‘criteriological’ endeavour. The explanation of action is thus not a descriptive but a hermeneutic affair. The task of the historian is not to describe but to rationally reconstruct the thoughts of agents whose actions he or she is trying to understand. This is a point that it is worth pausing to stress because the insight that a science of thought is normative lies at the basis of the view that the explanation of action is a species of justification, not of causal explanation, a view with which W. H. Dray became associated, and which also defined the nature of non-reductivism prior to Davidson. What led Collingwood to the claim that the study of action, which involves reconstructing the thoughts of agents, is a criteriological/normative affair? Collingwood claimed that when we explain something qua action we make reference to two factors, the causa ut and the causa quod. Collingwood (1940: Chp. XXX). The causa ut expresses a purpose or goal and the causa quod a belief. The action is an inference from these. But due caution should be exercised here because such a claim could be interpreted, and has indeed been interpreted, as implying that an agent’s beliefs and desires are the efficient causes of his actions. Nothing could be more remote from the view that Collingwood, and Dray after him, were defending. The causa ut and the causa quod are not psychological states of agents or token psychological acts. They stand not for the state of believing x and desiring y but for the 'propositional content' of what is believed and desired. Beliefs and desires explain an action not in so far as they are believed or desired, (as mental states) but in so far as they function as epistemic and motivational premises in a practical argument. As such the causa quod and the causa ut jointly supply the logical ground of the action, not its antecedent conditions. One should add that as propositional contents, beliefs and desires are recalcitrant to the attempt to naturalise them. Collingwood was in fact very careful to distinguish the (psychological) act of thinking (to which he gave the technical name of 'feelings/sensations') and the 'propositional content' of thought (which he called, again in a technical sense, 'thought'). For Collingwood’s account of re-enactment see Collingwood (1946: Epilegomena § 4). Cf. D’Oro (2000: 87-101), Saari (1989: 77-89), and van der Dussen (1995: 81-99). Unlike the psychological act of thinking, thoughts are not individuated spatio-temporally. An act of thought occurs at some specific time and place. Archimedes discovered the principle of specific gravity in the bath sometime around 250 B.C. The psychological act he went through is his and his alone. But the 'propositional content' of his thought, as opposed to the act, cannot be described by using spatio-temporal predicates. Thoughts (in the technical sense) are said to be individuated by their semantic content, not by location in space and time. Every time that a person thinks about the principle of specific gravity, they entertain one and the same thought as Archimedes, though they will never be able to feel Archimedes’ own excitement at the discovery, or identify themselves with his psychological act of thinking. The goal of interpretation is not to empathise with psychological processes but to reconstruct rational ones. The reconstruction of rational process does not require telepathic powers of access to other minds, any more than seeking to understand Archimedes’ principle of specific gravity requires re-experiencing his act of thought. Collingwood’s distinction between the human and the natural sciences was therefore premised not on the claim that the method of the human sciences is empathetic, whereas that of the natural sciences is nomothetic. It was based on the claim that the sciences of mind are criteriological or normative. Dray mobilized the apparatus of Collingwood’s philosophical approach against Hempel’s argument for methodological unity. He revisited Collingwood’s claim that the subject matter of history are actions, in the technical sense of Res Gestae, by saying that the explanation of action requires establishing a rational or conceptual connection between the explanans and the explanandum. Since, on this view, to explain an action requires establishing a conceptual connection between the explanans and the explanandum, the investigation of action is very different from the explanation of events (including human bodily movements, or actions in the broader non-technical sense) because the latter are investigated by the experimental method of observation and inductive generalization. Cf. Alvarez (this volume). The function of action explanation, Dray argued, is 'to resolve puzzlement'. Dray (1963: 108). And puzzlement is relieved by the discovery of a 'calculation' that the historian/interpreter ascribes to the agent: In trying to account for the success of the invasion of England by William of Orange, Trevelyan asks himself why Louis XIV withdrew military pressure from Holland in the summer of 1668 – this action being, he tells us, “the greatest mistake of his life”. His answer his “Louis calculated that, even if William landed in England there would be a civil war and long troubles, as always in that factious island. Meantime he could conquer Europe at leisure”. Furthermore, “he was glad to have the Dutch out of the way (in England) while he dealt a blow to the emperor Leopold (in Germany).” He thought “it was impossible that the conflict between James and William should not yield him an opportunity.” What makes Louis’ action understandable here, according to Trevelyan, is our discovery of a “calculation” which was “not as absurd as it looks after the event.” Indeed the calculation shows us just how appropriate Louis’ unfortunate action really was to the circumstances regarded as providing reasons for it. In fact, of course, the king, in a sense miscalculated: and his action was, in a sense, not appropriate to the circumstances. Yet the whole purpose of Trevelyan’s explanatory account is to show us that, for a man in Louis’ position, with the aims and beliefs he had, the action was appropriate at least to the circumstances as they were envisaged. Ibid: 109. There is an important difference, Dray argued, between showing an action to be routine and showing it to have a point. The criterion of success in the case of action explanation is to show not that the action was to be expected because it happens routinely, but that it made sense from the perspective of the agent. And even if such calculations could be used prospectively, to anticipate how an agent might act in the future, the anticipation of an action which appeals to a calculation or a practical argument is still very different from an explanation which predicts what will occur on the basis of an inductive generalization. For the calculation reveals why it would be rational to act in such and such a way, rather than simply telling what kind of behaviour one might expect. Historians and natural scientists have very different expectations regarding the role of explanation and thus mean very different things when they make 'becausal' statements. The role of the philosopher is precisely to distinguish these different meanings where one and the same linguistic expression is used. As Dray puts it: 'what historians usually mean, in offering an explanation of a human action, simply does not coincide conceptually with showing an action’s performance to have been deducible from other conditions in accordance with a general law'. Ibid: 108. Historical explanations are thus not truncated explanations of a nomological kind, as Hempel had claimed, but complete explanation of their own (rational) kind. The debate between Dray and Hempel was methodological rather than ontological in nature. They were concerned with what historians and natural scientists mean when they use the terms 'cause' and 'because'. For the latter term see Tanney (this volume). When the merits or demerits of 'causalism' were discussed, 'causalism' was taken to be a view concerning the logical structure of explanation, not a commitment to the metaphysical claim that causality is a real or extensional relation. The complaint that Hempel raised against Dray was that the method of the human sciences is covertly causal/nomological. Dray retorted that the method of the natural sciences is ill-suited to capture the goals of the human sciences, for the latter are hermeneutic, not experimental endeavours. But there was a shared sense that the battle could be either won or lost on this conceptual/methodological terrain alone. Collingwood, in fact, had explicitly denied that there was any metaphysical terrain on which such disputes could be fought. He argued that metaphysics is not an enquiry into being as such, but a science of absolute presuppositions which is primarily concerned with bringing to light the conception of explanation (or as he put it, the sense of 'causation') that is absolutely presupposed by the practitioners of different sciences. The analysis of explanatory practices, is thus not a prolegomenon to substantive ontological investigation into the nature of 'real' causal relations. Dray’s Collingwood-inspired anti-causalism was a methodological, not a metaphysical thesis; it was a thesis concerning the disunity of science, not the disorder of nature. See Dupré (1993). A consequence of this methodological approach is that problems that became prominent in the philosophy of mind and action just a few decades later, such as the problem of causal over-determination and explanatory exclusion, simply did not appear on the philosophical agenda. Since the reasons/causes debate was about explanation, not causation, the question of the relation between the mental and the physical was understood to be a problem concerning the relation between explanatory practices, not one about the possibility of causal interaction between the mind and the body. As Collingwood put it, the relation between the mind and the body …is the relation between the sciences of the body, or natural sciences, and the sciences of the mind; that is the relation inquiry into which ought to be substituted for the make-believe inquiry into the make-believe problem of ‘the relation between body and mind’. Collingwood (1942: 11). Collingwood and Dray kept the debate at a conceptual/methodological level as a matter of principle: they thought that since the issues at stake are methodological or explanatory in nature the goal of the philosopher of science is to render explicit the sense of 'cause' or 'because' that is implicit in the explanatory practices of first order disciplines. A few decades later, however, (more about this later) the purely methodological nature of the causalist/anti-causalist debate came to be perceived as a failure to engage with the ontological problem of mental causation, and the need to provide an answer to this problem motivated a shift towards causalism, See D’Oro (2012). even amongst those who, like Davidson himself, wished to remain champions of the autonomy of the human sciences. 4. The Era of Small Red Books The year 1957 saw not only the publication of Dray’s book-length reply to Hempel, Laws and Explanation in History, it was also the year of the publication of Anscombe’s Intentions. Anscombe (1957). Dray and Anscombe appealed to different muses. Whilst Dray was inspired by Collingwood, Anscombe was inspired by both Aquinas and Wittgenstein. For the role played in this debate by Wittgenstein and Anscombe's evolving reactions to Hume see Hyman (this volume). But in spite of these very different backgrounds their works bear remarkable affinities. First and foremost, Anscombe maintained that the fact that we can explain an action by re-describing it is a symptom of the more general truth that to fully understand what one did is to understand why one did it (and vice versa): The description of something as a human action could not occur prior to the existence of the question 'Why?', simply as a kind of utterance by which we were then obscurely prompted to address the question. Ibid: § 46, p. 83, emphasis in original. Anscombe's remark is strongly reminiscent of Collingwood's assertion that when the historian 'knows what happened he already knows why it happened'. Whilst neither philosopher denied that one may know what one did under some description without knowing why one did it, For the logic behind this sort of point see Gibson (1960: 186ff., esp. fn.1) they were keen to affirm that not only was it possible to explain action non-causally but that intentional action was never the effect of intention but always its expression (a view arguably also found in Hegel). Collingwood (1946: 214; see also 177ff.). For further comparisons between these philosophers and their respective schools see Sandis (2011: IV); cf. C. Taylor (1979 & 1983) and Laitinen & Sandis (2010a&b). Whether or not we are to conclude from the point about expression that the relation between intention and action is either conceptual/rational (Collingwood 1946, Dray 1963), or logical (MacIntyre 1962 & von Wright 1971) is a controversial issue we do not attempt to resolve here, though so much seems obvious to us: the connection is an internal one insofar as changing the intention or purpose ascribed to an agent ipso facto changes the nature of the action said to express it (and vice versa); cf. Powell 1967: 47ff.). Anscombe thus thought it an error to assume that an intentional action is a compound made up of two distinct elements: a pre-intentional bodily movement and some inner psychological state or process (e.g. an intention or volition) which turns the pre-intentional bodily movement into an intentional action when added to it, by setting the body into motion in much the same way as the turning of the key into the ignition starts a car engine: In describing intentional actions as such, it will be a mistake to look for the fundamental description of what occurs – such as the movements of muscles or molecules – and then think of intention as something, perhaps very complicated, which qualifies this. The only events to consider are intentional actions themselves, and to call an action intentional is to say it is intentional under some description that we give (or could give) of it. Anscombe (1957: §19, p. 29). A man who states 'There is no camera in the loft and yet I am going there to fetch it' does not explain what he does, for his action is not intentional under the relevant description (cf. Anscombe 1957: § 22, p.36). Anscombe’s claim here echoes Dray's view that since the explanation of action is a species of justification the practical argument that the interpreter advances to explain the action must be at least valid since, as he puts it '[o]ne cannot rethink a practical argument one knows to be invalid' (Dray 1963: 113). This amounts to a rejection of both the causal theory of action (which claims that an action is a bodily movement with a special sort of cause) and certain versions of the causal theory of action explanation, For a persuasive account of the distinctiveness and relation between the two theories see Ruben (2003:192ff.). For scepticism about Ruben's distinction see Aguilar & Buckareff (2011:21, n.2). A separate dispute is that regarding the criteria for an explanation's being causal (see Davidson 1971 and Hornsby 1993). viz. those which claim that we can only ever explain an action by pointing - be it directly or otherwise - to some internal, private mental cause. Anscombe (1957: §§ 22-25, p. 36ff.). She did not, however, claim that actions could not be explained causally. Nor was she keen to jump on the Wittgensteinian bandwagon which contrasted causes with reasons: ...we should often refuse to make any distinction at all between something's being a reason, and its being cause of the kind in question; for that was explained as what one is after if one asks the agent what led up to and issued in an action. But his being given a reason to act and accepting it might be such a thing. And how would one distinguish between cause and reason in such a case as having hung one's head hat on a peg because one's host said 'Hang up your hat on that peg?' Nor I think, would it be correct to say that this is a reason and not a mental cause because of the understanding of the words that went into accepting the suggestion. Here one would be attempting a contrast between this case and, say, turning round at hearing someone say Boo! But this case would not in fact be decisively on one side or the other: forced to choose between taking the noise as a reason and as a cause, one would probably decide by how sudden one's reaction was. Ibid: § 15, p. 23. As we shall see, this steadfast refusal, in combination with her view that all actions are events which are intentional under-some-description, would come to greatly influence Davidson and his followers, though it is arguable that Davidson failed to understand some of the subtleties of Anscombe's account, just as his own followers would in turn oversimplify his own views. For the relation between Anscombe and Davidson's philosophies of action see Anscombe (1979), Ricœur (1990/1992: 67ff.), Vogler (2002: 213-222), Thompson (2008: 136, n.7), Moran & Stone (2009: 135-141 & 159ff.), and Sandis (2012: 35). Anscombe further distanced herself from Dray and the neo-Wittgensteinians by explicitly stating that it is unhelpful to try to give a mark of intention by contrasting expressions of intention with predictions, proposing instead that 'prediction' cover expressions of intention and commands, as well as 'estimates' such as 'I'm going to be sick'. Anscombe (1957: § 2, p. 2) The latter are to be distinguished from expressions of intention not because they are 'descriptions of future occurrences' based on grounds but, rather, because a different species of grounds are given to justify them. Ibid: § 2, pp. 3-4. Thanks to Roger Teichmann for pointing this out to us and also reminding us that expressions of intention (of the form 'I'm going to φ'), like estimates and unlike orders, can (for Anscombe) be called true or false, e.g.: 'For if I don't do what I said, what I said was not true' (p.4). Expressions of intention, so conceived, do not have a world-mind direction of fit even if intentions do. Dray and Anscombe’s groundbreaking works were followed by Peter Winch’s book, The Idea of a Social Science (1958). Winch (1958). Like Anscombe, Winch denies that expressions of intention are inferentially or evidentially grounded. He expands on this picture by adding that reason-giving statements of intention not only aim to be justified in themselves but also to justify the intention in question: Suppose that N, a university lecturer, says he is going to cancel his next week’s lectures because he intends to travel to London: here we have a statement of intention for which a reason is given. Now N does not infer his intention of cancelling his lectures from his desire to go to London, as the imminent shattering of the glass might be inferred, either from the fact that someone had thrown a stone or from the brittleness of the glass. N does not offer his reason as evidence for the soundness of his prediction about his future behaviour. Rather he is justifying his intention. His statement is not of the form: ‘Such and such causal factors are present, therefore this will result’...; it is of the form: ‘In view of such and such considerations this will be a reasonable thing to do. Ibid: 81. Winch’s concern was chiefly with social and institutional behaviour rather than with isolated individual actions, but his critique of a unitary model of explanation for both the human and natural sciences was similarly motivated by a commitment to some version of the internal connection argument. Social relations, Winch argues: are an unsuitable subject for generalizations and theories of the scientific sort to be formulated about them: Historical explanation is not the application of generalizations and theories to particular instances: it is the tracing of internal relations. It is like applying one’s knowledge of a language in order to understand a conversation rather than like applying one’s knowledge of the laws of mechanics to understand the workings of a watch. Ibid: 133. The Idea of a Social Science formed part of R.F. Holland's successful series of short books, Studies in Philosophical Psychology, published in red hardback (and, later, paperback) covers by Routledge and Kegan Paul. The series was the target of Davidson's phrase 'small red books' Davidson (1976: 261), cf. Lepore and Loewer (1989: 175), quoted at the outset of Hutto's contribution to this volume., coined to describe the 'very strong neo-Wittgensteinian current' that Hempel was swimming against when he wrote 'Rational Action', presented to the APA in 1961. Hempel (1962). Other books published in the series during that period included Hamlyn (1957), Peters (1958), MacIntyre (1958), and Melden (1961). Of these, Hempel himself only mentions Peters, though he attempts a forceful attack of other works written in the same spirit, namely Ryle (1949), Peters (1958), and Dray (1957). Hempel (1962: 324-5) also contains an interesting critique of Davidson, Suppes, & Siegal (1957). Whilst the series soon also provided a home for one work of reductive materialism, Armstrong (1962). this was to be the exception that proved the rule, followed as it was by Kenny (1963) and Alexander (1963). The former was published just in time for it to be highlighted by Davidson alongside 'most of the books in the series edited by R.F. Holland' (and other works by 'recent writers' who attacked the view that 'rationalization is a species of causal explanation'). Davidson (1963: 3, fn.1); cf. McLaughlin (this volume). The books Davidson mentions by name are Melden (1961), Dray (1957), Anscombe (1957), Hampshire (1959), and Hart and Honoré (1959). Subsequent volumes in Holland's series would come to include Bennett (1964), Kovesi (1967), Teichman (1974), Wilkes (1978), and Newell (1986).The series is not to be confused with the International Library of Philosophy [and Scientific Method], edited in quick succession first by A.J. Ayer (in 1961) then by Bernard Williams and finally and for the long run (from 1965 onwards) by Ted Honderich) which published large red books (including the Pears & McGuinness translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Charles Taylor's The Explanation of Behaviour, three books by von Wright, and monographs by Dretske, Ducasse, Smart, Husserl, Brentano, Mackie, Hornsby, among many others). For a subjective history of this series see Honderich (2001:136 & 287ff.). Whilst there are important differences between all these authors, there are also common assumptions that underpin the view about the nature of action explanation prevailing in this pre-Davidsonian phase. The debates, as we have seen, tended to be conducted on a conceptual plane, the participants in the debate frequently adhering to some version of the internal connection argument, and, as a result, there was a general reluctance to identify beliefs and desires with mental states. The conception of action explanation was thus anti-Humean in character because the explanatory factors in action explanation (beliefs and desires) were not identified with inner psychological processes. The internalization of beliefs and desires was in fact generally regarded with suspicion, not least because it could easily pave the way to their naturalization. As von Wright pointed out, the internalization of desires: has played a very great role in philosophic thinking at least since the time of Descartes. This is the view of the will as a cause of behaviour (bodily movements, muscular activity). If this view were true, then teleological explanations of behaviour would be 'translatable' into causal explanations. The goal 'pulling from the future' could be replaced by the will (to reach the goal) 'pushing towards the future.' An extreme version of this view identifies the will itself with some states of processes in the body (brain), and is thus a form of materialism. von Wright (1971: 92). von Wright’s remarks were quite prescient because it is precisely by construing the desires and beliefs that are ascribed to agents in order to make sense of their actions as antecedent conditions of an inner nature (as believings and desirings) that the subsequent generation of philosophers would seek to reconcile action explanations with a naturalistic picture of reality. 5. Davidson and the Rise of Causalism The year 1963 saw the publication of Davidson’s 'Action, Reasons, and Causes', the essay that rocked the anti-causalist consensus by revatilising the Humean theory of motivation. Whether Hume himself held this view is a different matter altogether (see Sandis 2010). Prior to Davidson, the presumed existence of some kind of internal connection between our psychology and our behaviour was taken to support the claim that reasons are not causes. The non-reductivist anti-volitionism which Ryle and the Wittgensteinians shared with logical behaviourists such as Hempel and Carnap was thus largely deemed to pretty much entail the falsehood of mental causation. When he eventually rejected the behaviourism he had helped to establish, Hempel combined his view that the logical connection between explananda and explanantia requires scientific laws with a new-found psychological realism that allowed for mental causation. The resulting view was, in this respect, much closer to that of Davidson, though Hempel continued to maintain that explanation requires knowledge of the relevant law(s). (Hempel 1969, 1973, & 1977). It took a little under a decade for 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' to have any serious impact. During this period, most works in the philosophy of action continued to distinguish reasons from causes, actions from events, and human agency from mechanistic conceptions of behaviour, with no mention of Davidson at all. See, for example, C. Taylor (1964), Louch (1966), R. Taylor (1966), Powell (1967), Malcolm (1968), Brown (1968), Knox (1968) von Wright (1971), Harré & Secord (1972), as well as papers by Anscombe, Chisholm, and A.R. White. Knox's book was subject to a savage criticism from Fred Dretske (Dretske 1971; see Laitinen & Sandis 2010b:5 for context and discussion). For a more recent causalist response to anti-mechanistic arguments see Heil's contribution to this volume. Even David Pears' rebellious defence of 'Desires As Causes of Action' (Pears 1968) seemed to be oblivious to the existence of 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes'. Things rapidly changed, however, with Alvin I. Goldman's 1970 book A Theory of Human Action, soon followed by Arthur C. Danto's Analytical Philosophy of Action (1973). The latter revised his earlier account of basic actions (Danto 1963a&b) in the light of Davidson's claim that all actions are basic under some description. In the preface to his book Danto neatly captures his own journey through the change of Zeitgest between 1963 and 1973: Many of the ideas I thought (and others hoped) would follow naturally from the concept of basic actions did not follow at all, and often only their contraries were even compatible with it. And other ideas I had hoped I might remain neutral towards, in fact demanded a stand, since certain problems could not have been otherwise solved. Thus I became, in the course of writing, a Materialist and a Determinist of sorts. Danto (1973: xii). The Davidsonian view prevailed and causalism became the new orthodoxy, a state of affairs which was to last for nearly three decades. During this time the Humean thesis would be modified and developed in a variety of conflicting directions, both by Davidson himself as well as by a diverse range of philosophers. See, for example, Armstrong (1968), Fodor (1968), Goldman (1970), Brand (1984), Dretske (1988), Bratman (1988), Mele (1992), Kim (1995), and Enç (2003). It infiltrated moral philosophy with the help of Michael Smith’s landmark 1987 paper ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, which would later play an important structural role in his influential book The Moral Problem. Smith (1987 & 1995). During these decades, challenges to Davidson from the anti-causalists were few and far between. Indeed, as we shall see, the opposition typically came from naturalists such as Kim, urging him to abandon the anomalousness of his monism. Both Davidson’s own thesis and the Humean views that it encouraged rapidly evolved through rational selection to form what has come to be known as the ‘Standard View’ See, for example, Dretske (2009), and Stoecker (2009).. The view in question has two distinct components: a theory of action and a thesis concerning the reasons for which actions are performed. The first maintains that actions are events that are identical to movements of the body caused, in a ‘non-deviant’ way, by a combination of beliefs and so-called ‘pro attitudes’; the second states that the primary reason for which an intentional action is performed is whichever combination caused the bodily movement in question. For the notion of a 'primary reason', see Hutto's contribution to this volume. Alvin I. Goldman provides us with a paradigmatic illustration of such an account: If I ask you, for example, ‘Why did Jones go to the concert tonight?’ you might reply, ‘Because Smith told him they were going to play the Trout Quintet’. The only event explicitly mentioned in this reply is Smith’s telling Jones something. How does this explain Jones' act? Obviously, the reply implies that Smith’s telling Jones that they were going to play the Trout Quintet caused Jones to believe that they were going to play the Trout Quintet. And this belief, presumably in conjunction with Jones’ desire to hear the Trout Quintet, caused Jones to go to the concert. Thus, Jones’ act is explained by implicitly indicating certain beliefs and desires and explicitly indicating the cause of the relevant belief. Goldman (1970:138) Davidson's major achievement was to synthesise a psychologised version of Hempel's causalism with an Anscombean sensitivity to descriptions. Notwithstanding his inevitable change of mind regarding the ontological status of intention, Davidson (1978). Davidson arguably sustained this position throughout later articles See, for example, Davidson (1967b & 1976)., a fine-balancing act which would later lead to accusations of epiphenomenalism by those who either did not share or could not understand his account of the relation between properties and their descriptions, an outlook influenced in equal measure by Spinoza and Anscombe. For this debate see the essays by Davidson, Kim, McLaughlin, and Sosa in Heil & Mele (1993: Part. I); cf. Davidson (1967b). See also note 80 below. As Hyman and Steward put it: Since the 1960s... the predominant view has changed... the orthodoxy is now a combination of ideas drawn from the positivist and anti-positivist traditions. Some philosophers regard this as a plausible synthesis; others regard it as an unstable compound. See Hyman & Steward (2004: v). Davidson thus inaugurated a new compatibilist era that championed a Humean causalism according to which explanations of action that appeal to the reasons for which we act are causal in that they depend upon the agent possessing a relevant belief-desire pair which 'causes' the action: What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. I want to defend the ancient – and common sense – position that rationalization is a species of causal explanation ... Whenever someone does something for a reason ... he can be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards actions of a certain kind and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind. Under (a) are to be included desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a certain kind ... Giving the reason why an agent did something is often a matter of naming the pro attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both. Let me call this pair the primary reason why the agent performed the action ... rationalizations are causal explanations ... the primary reason for an action is its cause. Davidson (1963: 3ff.). Davidson is here reminding us of a basic but important distinction, namely that between generic reasons which an agent may have for acting and those reasons among them for which she actually acts. Let us call the reasons that rationalize actions justifying reasons and the reasons which motivate the agent to act motivating reasons. Davidson seems to use the term 'primary reason' to refer to a causally effective form of what Hempel called a 'motivating reason' (Hempel 1962b:312ff. & 1963:289ff.; cf. Smith (1987) & Sandis (2012: 78 & 180). Davidson maintains that all motivating reasons are justifying reasons (in the 'somewhat anaemic' sense 'in which every rationalization justifies’), Davidson (1963: 9). Smith & Pettit (1997: 73) call such good reasons rational springs which they distinguish from rational grounds. but not vice versa. Justifying reasons that are not part of the agent's motivational set arguably rationalize action without actually explaining why the agent acted as she did. Williams (1982) would later argue that there can be no such (external) reasons which we cannot in principle become motivated to act upon. This claim fits well with Davidson's suggestion that our primary reasons for action may be thought (rightly or wrongly) to justify them. A similar point had previously been made against Dray by both Passmore and Hempel: For a critical analysis of this debate see Sandis (2012:48-58). [E]xplanation by reference to a “principle of action” or a “good reason” is not, by itself, explanation at all…For a reason may be a “good reason” - in a sense of being a principle to which one could appeal in justification of one’s action - without having in fact the slightest influence on us. Passmore (1958: 275), emphasis in the original. See Dray (1963: 112) for his reply to Passmore. [T]o show that an action was the appropriate or rational thing to have done under the circumstances is not to explain why in fact it was done…[T]he presentation of an action as being appropriate to a given situation, as making sense, cannot, for purely logical reasons, serve to explain why in fact the action was taken. Hempel (1963: 102 & 105). Let us give a concrete example. Gina may have numerous reasons for cycling: to keep fit, to breathe fresh air, to avoid traffic jams, to be environmentally friendly etc. On Davidson's view, such rationalizations of her action cannot be genuinely explanatory unless they also capture the specific reasons which actually motivated her to act. We should thus distinguish - as Dray and Collingwood arguably failed to - between explaining action and (merely) rendering it intelligible. See also Strawson (1986/2010: 35ff., 29 & 31). Whilst Gina may recognise that avoiding traffic jams is a good reason for cycling, it may not be the reason that she actually acts upon. Perhaps her real reason for doing what she does is that she wants to lose weight. The question now arises: what are the criteria for distinguishing between genuine explanations and mere rationalizations (which render intelligible why the agent might have done something without explaining why they actually did it)? How are we to determine which of the reasons Gina had for acting (reasons which Davidson thinks can potentially explain her action) is the one she actually acted upon? Davidson maintains that the only possible method for distinguishing between reasons we acted upon and ones that were epiphenomenal is causation, hence the motto 'the primary reason for an action is its cause'. Davidson (1963:2). Primary reasons are belief-desire pairs: Gina’s belief that exercising leads to weight loss and her desire to lose weight jointly double up as both reasons and causes. By contrast, justifying reasons that do not cause us to act are rationalizations with no causal influence and, consequently, no explanatory value. Interestingly, Dray (1963:112) was aware of the sort of distinction that Davidson wanted to introduce and rejected it. Similar replies to Davidson are to be found in Tanney (2005) and D’Oro (2007). This argument was by Davidson's own admission vulnerable to an objection based on the possibility of 'deviant' causal chains: it is logically possible that a justifying reason may cause an action without it being the agent's primary reason for it. Davidson (1973:79). For critical analyses see Stout (2005: 83-98 & 2010) and Hyman (this volume). Put it in a slightly different way, a belief-desire pair may cause the action it rationalises in a manner that does not in any way track the rationalising in question. Be that as it may, Davidson's influential argument is still widely believed to provide additional ammunition to that of his 1970 paper ‘Mental Events’, in which he develops a unique form of non-reductivism: Anomalous Monism (AM). AM is devised in an attempt to explain how it is possible to hold on simultaneously to three apparently inconsistent principles: (1) The principle of causal interaction, according to which some mental events interact with physical events; (2) the principle of the nomological character of causality, according to which events related as cause and effect fall under deterministic laws and (3) the principle of the Anomalism of the mental, according to which there are no bridge laws between mental and physical events. According to Davidson, the problem that AM seeks to solve is analogous to the one that Kant addressed in the Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals, Kant (1948). namely how we can reconcile the demands of freedom with those of nature. Moral laws, Kant claimed, are normative: they prescribe how we ought to act and morality presupposes the possibility of freedom. This creates a conflict with natural laws, which are descriptive and presuppose determinism. Kant sought to solve this conflict by arguing that there are two irreducible standpoints. When we think of ourselves as agents capable of free action, we consider ourselves as members of an intelligible world which is governed by moral laws. When we think of ourselves as knowers, we think of ourselves as part of the phenomenal world, where natural laws are operative. Conflict between moral and natural laws is avoided by separating (by way of a thought experiment) the phenomenal from the noumenal world. Davidson took up Kant’s challenge but modified Kant’s solution. Whilst Kant sought to avoid conflict by separating the noumenal from the phenomenal world, even if just by way of a thought experiment, Davidson argued in favour of ontological unification in the face of methodological non-reductivism. AM married the physicalism of Ducasse Ducasse (1925). and Hempel Hempel (1962b). to Anscombe's conceptual non-reductivism See Davidson (1971) for the account of action individuation upon which the claim that whether or not an action is intentional is a matter of description (as defended in Davidson 1967a: 121) is based, and Davidson (1963: 5), for the related claim that all action done for reasons is intentional (under some description). Davidson held on to these Anscombean beliefs even after he came to reject her account of what it is to have an intention in Davidson (1978). , thereby giving birth to a distinctive form of non-reductivism, Davidson (1970). one which challenged the incompatibilist assumptions that had governed the reasons/causes debate by arguing that (a) actions are events, (b) the reasons that ‘rationalize’ action are causes of the events in question, and (c) the explanation of action nonetheless makes no reference to any strict psycho-physical laws, for there are none. In affirming (c) Davidson may be seen as making a concession to (perhaps even taking sides with) the conceptual non-reductivism that flourished in the era of little red books. Be that as it may, his influential defence of (a) and (b) was so immense that it has come to represent a crucial turning point in philosophical history. Davidson’s compatibilist project has been the object of continuous debate. On one interpretation AM is a form of non-reductive physicalism. See for example Yoo (2009) and McLaughlin (1985a). So conceived, it is a monism because all events are physical events. It is anomalous because there are no strict laws which connect mental properties to physical properties. AM is thus none other than a form of token physicalism which holds that all events are physical events but there are no law-like regularities connecting the mental and physical properties of events. As a form of non-reductive physicalism, AM explains how the connection between the mind and the body is possible, thus providing an answer to the question 'how can the mind interact with the body?', a question that had been left largely unanswered by a generation of non-reductivists who had been primarily concerned with explanatory practices and dismissed the problem of mental causation as a pseudo-problem. Mental properties are causally efficacious because all events are physical events and physical events are causally efficacious paradigmatically. But whilst AM rehabilitates the problem of mental causation as a genuine philosophical question, it is not clear whether it can satisfactorily resolve it since, as is often argued, it fails to vindicate the claim that mental properties are causally efficacious qua mental. Yet any adequate solution to the problem of mental causation would have to do precisely that. Hence the accusation that AM is a type epiphenomenalism. McLaughlin, B. (1985b). Indeed it must be a form of type epiphenomenalism because if mental properties were causally efficacious qua mental, they would threaten the completeness of physics. AM must choose between two equally unpalatable alternatives: explanatory exclusion or epiphenomenalism. Jaegwon Kim has been one of the most vocal critics of the viability of Davidson’s compatibilist project. See Kim (1993, 1995 & 2000) and note 60 above. Davidson responded to the charge of type-epiphenomenalism by arguing that the objection fails to take into account the distinction between causality and causal explanations. The former is an (extensional) relation between events which 'holds between them no matter how they are described'. Davidson (1993: 6). Causal explanations, by contrast, are (intensional) statements whose truth is sensitive to the descriptions given of the events (the explanantia and the explananda) they connect. So, for example, in the deductive nomological model the freezing of the water (explanandum) is deduced from the dropping of the temperature below °C and a general law (explanans). This entailment which holds between the premises and the conclusion of a deductive-nomological explanation should not be conflated with the causal relation which holds between the actual events mentioned, regardless of how they are described. For more on the distinction between causal explanation and causation see Hornsby (1993) and McLaughlin (this volume). The so-called qua problem, so the extensional reply goes, evaporates once this distinction between causality and causal explanations is made. There is a great deal of controversy over whether Davidson’s extensional reply succeeds in overcoming the charge of epiphenomenalism, an issue we do not propose to settle here (though see the paper by Daniel Hutto in this collection). Whatever conclusions one may reach about it, however, the strategy which lies at the heart of Davidson’s extensionalist reply is potentially at odds with the view that beliefs and desires do their justificatory work not as token events of believing and desiring (which may be spatio-temporally identified) but in virtue of their 'contents'. The reading of AM as a form of non-reductive or token physicalism has been dubbed the 'standard interpretation' and attacked on the grounds that it singularly fails to take notice of the fact that Davidson’s metaphysics is more akin to Spinozistic (ontologically neutral) monism than it is to twentieth century forms of non-reductive physicalism. One of the chief proponents of non-standard interpretations of Davidson's philosophy of mind, action, and language has been Frederick Stoutland (1999, 2007, 2008, 2011a&b). So understood, there are crucial continuities between the non-reductivism of the previous generation and that of Davidson. For example, in arguing that there is a methodological divide between the human and natural sciences because the explanation of action has a normative dimension with no echo in the natural world, Davidson is far closer to the views of Collingwood, Dray, and Anscombe than he is to, say, functionalism. See McDowell (1985). Be that as it may, the ontologically-neutral interpretation of AM as a dual aspect ontology rather than a form of non-reductive physicalism differs in some very important respects from the non-reductivism which dominated in the era of small red books. As we have already seen, Collingwood and Dray did not conceive of actions as events and, in addition, claimed that since historians and natural scientists have different conceptions of explanation, the things they seek to explain (their explananda) differ. Even if one rejects the standard interpretation of Davidson (according to which he is a non-reductive materialist who grants ontological priority to the physical realm), and interprets him instead as a neutral monist, his philosophy of mind and action would still differ greatly from that of Collingwood and Dray. See D’Oro (2011). 6. Fin de Siècle Reasonology The causalist view was to remain commonplace until the last decade of the twentieth century. As the turn of the century approached, however, objections to causalism emerged from a variety of sources. Relevant books include Stout (1996), Hornsby (1997), Rundle (1997), Steward (1997), Dancy (2000), O’ Connor (2000), Pietroski (2000), Bittner (2001), Searle (2001), Ruben (2003), Schueler (2003), Hyman & Steward (2004), Hutto (2008), Lowe (2008), Thompson (2008), Alvarez (2010), Sandis (2009a & 2012), and Ford, Hornsby, & Stoutland (2011). Two of the most important sources of this fin de siècle movement were (i) the emergence of a realist reasonology in ethics and (ii) a revival of moral psychology which placed much emphasis on moral motivation and free agency. Whilst some of the views defended by practitioners in these fields bear similarities to those prominent in the 1950s and 1960s, contemporary anti-causalists are chiefly motivated by concerns about the ontology of reasons and its relation to action and agency, rather than by any views concerning the nature of understanding and explanation. Ever since Plato, philosophers have debated whether the belief that something is the right thing to do is sufficient for motivation (on some accounts even necessarily motivating), or whether the triggering of human action requires the additional presence of a desire to do what is right. Hume ostensibly extended this debate to cover all beliefs, arguing that reason cannot motivate alone, without the influence of the passions. For whether or not Hume himself was a Humean see Sandis (2010). It is also possible to hold this Humean view with regard to normativity (e.g. Frankfurt 2004 & Schroeder 2007). Such concerns have led to an ongoing debate between Humeans about motivation (who claim that beliefs alone cannot motivate us to act) Proponents include Strawson (1986/2010), Mele (1992), Smith (1994), and Lenman (1996). and anti-Humean 'cognitivists' (who do not think that the additional presence of desire is required). Proponents include Nagel (1970), Foot (1972), McDowell (1978, 1979, & 1995), and McNaughton (1988). A purer cognitivist brand of anti-Humeanism claims that desires are never part of our motivational set (Parfit 1997 & 2011 & Dancy 1993 & 2000). Internalism and externalism about motivation should be distinguished from similarly-named views about normative reasons. Indeed, Dancy (1993: 253-7) has argued that internalists about normative reasons had better be externalists about motivating ones. Unlike strong externalists Dancy himself does not claim that any belief (including moral ones) motivates necessarily, only that it can motivate without the presence of a desire. Indeed, Dancy believes controversially asserts that to desire just is to be motivated (Ibid:18ff.) It has been argued, however, that both of these positions are overly psychologistic. See, for example Dancy (1993: 32ff. & 2000:98ff.) The argument may briefly be summarised as follows: according to the ethical realism which gained prominence in the late twentieth century, moral reasons are facts, states of affairs, or true propositions which count in favour of an action (or are grounds for refraining from action). Dancy (1993), Raz (1999). Assuming that it is at least possible to act for a good or normative reason For the original distinction between normative and motivating reasons see Smith (1992: 329; cf. 1994: 96, 131, & 206-7). It is worth noting that Smith has since distinguished between two different senses of ‘good reason’, contrasting rational grounds (facts) with rational springs (psychological states), cf. Smith and Pettit 1997: 297ff). Dancy’s normative constraint is concerned with the former sense. While Smith concedes that we may act upon reasons so conceived, he denies that they have any explanatory power (which he takes to be part of the notion of a ‘motivating reason’). Dancy, by contrast, adopts a version of the motivating-normative distinction which allows normative reasons to meet the explanatory constraint of being ‘capable of contributing to the explanation of an action that is done for that reason’ Dancy (2000: 101) and motivating reasons to meet the converse ‘normative constraint’ of being ‘capable of being among the reasons in favour of so acting’ (2000: 13). In an earlier article, however, he suggests that philosophers might be altogether better off without a theory of motivation (Dancy 1995). See Raz (2009) contrasts normative reasons with explanatory ones., then, it would seem that the reasons for which we act may also be external to our psychology. (e.g. Dancy 1995 & 2000, Collins 1997, and Stoutland 1998). This normative constraint puts pressure on the causalist to distinguish between one's believing and what one believes. Various forms of this distinction may be found in Wittgenstein (1921/1969:§ 1 & 1953/2009: §§ 95 & 429), Frege (1818-19), White (1972), McDowell (1996: 27), Hornsby (1997), and Dancy (2009b). The former is frequently referred to as a 'mental state' and the latter as its 'content', often further identified with a proposition. On pain of accepting some version of fact causation E.g. Mellor (1995) and Stout (1996)., the causalist is further pressured to allow that, strictly speaking, the former does the causing and the latter the rationalizing, whilst insisting that the two are nonetheless so deeply interconnected that they are really two parts or aspects of one thing (a 'mental state') or that, at the very least, one cannot explain action in terms of the agent's reasons without citing (directly or otherwise) the mental state(s) that caused it.. See Smith (1998), Mele (this volume) and Stueber (this volume); cf. Sandis (2012: 61-81). On such views the things we believe are typically said to be the 'contents' of our beliefs, a view not dissimilar to Collingwood's (see § 3 above). It is sometimes also suggested that the distinction is one between a belief type and a belief token. But see Steward (1997: 120-134) for why this is a deeply problematic move. Such claims appear to concede that the reasons for which we act are not causes of our action whilst denying Dancy's further claim that facts about the agent's psychology are not parts of the explanation, but mere 'enablers' of it. Dancy (2000: 126-8). A separate difficulty that Dancy highlights is that what the psychologist appears to be focusing on here is not psychological states themselves but purported facts about them. The theorist is here forced to choose between the view that such reason-giving explanations are not causal (but, say, non-reductively teleological) E.g. Kenny (1963: 97), Schueler (2003) and Sehon (2005 & this volume). See Stueber (this volume) for a causalist critique of teleological realism, and Müller (2011) for an anti-causalist one. and the position that (if they are not causal) they are not genuine, once again inviting the charge that rationalizations are epiphenomenal to action explanation. A particular difficulty for the anti-psychologist about 'motivating reasons' is that of false beliefs As Dancy himself notes, there is ‘more than one way in which things can go wrong. The agent can be wrong about whether p, or wrong about whether if it were the case that p, that would be a reason for acting’ (Dancy 2008: 267; cf. Dancy 2000: 140 & Parfit 2011: Vol. I, 150-164). We shall not concern myself with the second way here, though my suggestions are compatible with its possibility. Mele (2007) argues that non-psychologists such as Dancy should take the possibility of agents performing actions which they mistakenly think of as being ‘objectively favoured’ to show that not all ‘intentional, deliberate, purposeful’ actions are performed for reasons, unless the concept of a reason geared towards action explanation is different from that geared towards evaluation (Mele’s own view is that such conceptual matters should be experimentally informed).. If I act upon my belief that p but, as it happens, it is not the case that p, how can my reason nonetheless be 'that p'? Indeed, 'that p' does not appear to refer to anything. Davis (2003: 454-5). Cf. Dancy (2003b: 481). Moreover, whilst falsehoods may render an action intelligible by explaining why it might have been performed, they cannot possibly explain why it was actually performed, let alone do so causally. James Lenman puts the problem as follows: The biggest headache for anti-psychologists such as Dancy however is furnished by cases where the agent's belief is false. The fact of Angus' being fired is naturally adduced to explain his punching his boss in cases where he has indeed been fired. But in cases where Angus punches his boss, believing mistakenly that he has been fired, it seems quite wrong to say he so acts because he has been fired. In such a case we surely must retreat to a psychologised explanation if we are to have a credible motivating reason explanation at all. Lenman (2009: § 6). Dancy bites the bullet and accepts that in those cases where what the agent believes is false, her actions may be explained by the falsehood in question viz. the reason she acted upon. In his own terminology, action explanations which cite the agent's reason for acting are non-factive, for what the agent believes can explain her action even if it is false: [T]he point of this rephrasing of things is that it removes any suggestion that the explainer is committed to its being the case that p. This helps with my second difficulty, which is how 'that p' can explain anything when it is not the case that p. A familiar form of argument threatens. Where the agent's belief is false, his reason must be that he believed that p. But he will not be acting for a different reason just because he is in the right on the matter. So even when he is right, his reason must still be that he believes that p, not just that p. I try to undercut this argument (whose conclusion was already shown to be false by the crumbly cliff example) by denying that explanation in terms of reasons is factive, i.e. that the explanans in such cases must itself be the case. First, it is not required for the purposes of the sort of light that reasons-explanations cast on action that things should be as the agent supposed. Second, it seems perfectly possible to continue at least some forms of reasons-explanation with a denial of the contained clause, thus: his reason for doing it was that p, a matter about which he was sadly mistaken. Dancy (2003a: 426-7).If reasons-explanations were themselves factive, as causal explanations are supposed to be, such a continuation would lead to incoherence or contradiction. But no such result emerges. The point of all this is, of course, that if reasons-explanations are not factive there is no need to turn to 'that he believed that p' as the agent's reason wherever it is not the case that p. Of course it is odd to suppose that on occasion a nothing (something that is not the case) can explain a something (an action that was done). But I maintain that we can live with this oddity. Or rather that it is not as odd as people make out. Ibid (427). Cf. Dancy (2004: 25ff.) For the view that acting for reasons precludes acting in ignorance see Hyman (1999). These pronouncements come dangerously close to denying the fact that only truths are ever capable of genuinely explaining anything. We do, of course, use the term ‘explanation’ in ways which do not imply that the explanation given is true, and accordingly speak of people offering ‘poor explanations’ or explaining things incorrectly. However such explanations are generally thought to be putative not genuine: they do not actually explain anything but merely purport to. A poor explanation of action will at best correctly point to why someone might have done something, without offering any true information about why they actually did so. Cf. Achinstein (1983: 19 & 116ff.). Ruben (2003: 185-6) is right to point out that 'poor' may also be used as a relative term, both objectively and subjectively. For the perils of conflating the analysis of explanation with the pragmatics of giving explanations see Ruben (1990: 21). This thought has led some philosophers to the compromise of adopting a disjunctivist perspective according to which an agent's reasons can only explain her action when her relevant belief is true, but not when it is false. One such account has recently been put forth by Maria Alvarez. According to Alvarez, our actions are to be explained by what we believe in veridical cases and by facts about our believing what we believe when our beliefs are false: Dancy thinks that expressions such as ‘Her reason for failing him was that, as he supposed, he had cheated, (although he hadn’t)' are not strictly speaking contradictory, and he thinks that this suggests that this form of words provides an explanation of her action that is not factive. I think that Dancy is right in saying that such statements allow us to explain the relevant action but wrong in saying that such explanations are not factive. For the explanans here is ‘she supposed that he had cheated (although he hadn’t)’. Alvarez (2010: 177, fn 11); cf. Dancy (2000:134). Alvarez's disjunctivist account of agential reasons should be distinguished from disjunctivist accounts of acting for a reason, for it does not follow from the view that I acted for the reason that p if a, b, or c that my reason (that p) was either a ,b, or c. According to non-disjuctivism about reasons, acting upon the false belief that p just is acting for the reason that p. As Dancy (2008: 268ff) has noted, this best coheres with disjunctive or trisjunctive accounts of acting for a reason; cf. Dancy (2000: 140) for an earlier suggestion. On this view, the reasons that motivate us only explain our actions when our beliefs are true. In all other cases we merely act for apparent reasons and our actions can therefore only be explained in Humean terms. Alvarez (2010: 197). Alvarez accordingly concludes that 'the reasons that motivate and the reasons that explain our actions have been systematically run together when it is sometimes necessary to separate them'. Ibid: 199. By contrast Dancy, as we have already noted, thinks of facts about our psychology as mere enablers for non-Humean explanations in terms of the agent's reason(s). Whatever the truth of the matter, such debates demonstrate that it is of vital importance that we clarify our concepts of motivation, reasons, beliefs, and explanation. Such clarifications will not provide any knock-down arguments, but they certainly challenge many presuppositions, causalist and anti-causalist alike. See Alvarez (2007 & this volume). A different worry with causalist accounts of the relation between actions and our reasons for them is that they seem to lead to an overly mechanistic picture of human behaviour, one which leaves little room for certain valuable aspects of human agency, such as the ability to do otherwise than one chooses to. E.g. Hornsby (2004) and Steward (2011); cf. Malcolm (1968) and Heil (this volume). No doubt causalism is compatible with weaker understandings of agency according to which even washing detergents are agents (see Alvarez & Hyman 1998). It is also worth pointing out that the question of what we might call free or intentional agency is prima facie distinct from those of free will and moral responsibility. After all, if all of our actions were causally produced by so-called mental states or events For a ‘non-statist’ account of most mental phenomena see Collins (1987)., it would be no more possible for us to perform voluntary and intentional actions at will than if our behaviour were caused by the gods. See Sandis (2009b). For Davidson, and Wilfrid Sellars before him, the solution to this problem lies in distinguishing between cases where our mental states cause us to act and cases where they cause our actions to occur, without causing us to perform them. According to this thesis, an agent’s psychological features may be said to cause the occurrence of an action performed by the agent without causing the agent to perform it. Sellars (1966: 144 & 156), Davidson (1973: 65). For a critique of the Sellars-Davidson thesis see Sandis (2009b & 2012: 74 & 159) Consequently, causalist accounts of agency need not view agents as mere victims of events that happen to occur in their brains. The Sellars-Davidson thesis stems from a rationalist conception of human motivation according to which we always intentionally do what we judge to be best, our actions being caused by our reasons for judging them to be best. Davidson (1969: 23). This view has been defended by both volitionists (e.g. Sellars and Goldman) and anti-volitionists (e.g. Davidson and Railton). Joseph Raz offers the following summary of it: In broad outline, the rationalist holds that paradigmatic human action is action taken because, of all the options open to the agent, it was, in the agent’s view, supported by the strongest reason. Raz (1999:47). In its most popular form, this conception claims that: We most desire to perform whichever action(s) we judge to be best. We always intentionally do what we most desire to (and believe we can) do. Davidson (1969:26). His claim that this states ‘a mild form of internalism’ is somewhat modest. On such a rationalistic picture, all practical reasoning inevitably concludes in a corresponding action (or act of refraining). Hence the age-old difficulty such theories face when it comes to providing an account of how it is that we can ever act against our better judgement (see note 121 below and the passage it is attached to). This arguably leaves no room for the agent's will between her judgement and her action, no space for her to influence things by deciding whether or not she should act upon the judgement in question. This loss is the impetus behind what Raz calls the classical conception of human agency, So named because Raz holds that it may be found in both Plato and Aristotle (but see Price 2009; cf. Stocker 2004: 303-4 and Railton 2004:178-9). contrasting it with the aforementioned rationalist conception, favoured by Davidson, Goldman, and Sellars: In broad outline, the rationalist holds that paradigmatic human action is action taken because, of all the options open to the agent, it was, in the agent’s view, supported by the strongest reason. The classical conception holds that the paradigmatic human action is one taken because, of all the options the agent considers rationally eligible, he chooses to perform it. Raz (1999: 47), our emphasis. On this model, we do not necessarily will to do what we take ourselves to have the most reason to do: normative judgment does not necessarily motivate. On Raz's view this is because practical reasoning never concludes in action or intention but in a belief about what ‘the thing to do’ is (this is intended to be analogous to theoretical reasoning concluding in a belief about what ‘the thing to believe’ is) . See Raz (2007: 4-5). . The agent may or may not subsequently decide to act upon this belief: we can appropriately respond to reason because we have a will... we follow our will when we act against our better judgement. Raz (1999: 115-6). For Davidson’s competing characterization of the classical conception see Davidson (1969: 35). Rationalists, by contrast, tend to define the will in terms of desires. Bratman, for example, thinks of the phenomena of planning, intending, and valuing as kinds of willing that may act as causes of action. Bratman (2004: 29). Similarly, Frankfurt defines the will as ‘an effective desire - one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action’ Frankfurt (1971: 14-15). For other identifications of the will with desire see Goldman (1975:81), Sellars (1976), and Railton (2004).. These views appeals to various mechanisms thought to explain how it is that we can identify with actions that are the causal product of the will and the various alien (ultimately external) things that shape it. Examples of such mechanisms include reflexivity, decision, whole-heartedness, and second-order desires (Frankfurt 1998), satisfied plans and intentions (Bratman 1999 & 2007), the capacity for critical evaluation (Watson 2004), self-awareness and the desire to act in accordance with reasons (Velleman 2000 & 2006), and guidance control (Fischer 2006). The project of proposing volitional identification as a source of accountability should not be conflated with the parallel one of appealing to volitional identification as a source of normativity, most notably undertaken by Korsgaard (1996). See, however, Korsgaard (2008) for her related account of self-constitution. In opposition are those philosophers who defend some form of volitionism and/or agent causation according to which agents bring about their actions at will. Ginet (1990), McCann (1998), Alvarez & Hyman (1998), O'Connor (2000), Pietroski (2000), Lowe (2008), and Mayr (2011).This is not the place to assess these diverse conceptions of what, how, and in what sense agents may be said to cause things but it is worth noting that many of these philosophers are attacking causalism on metaphysical grounds as opposed to conceptual ones. As a result of these and other moves, causal theories of action, agency, and reasons-explanation have become increasingly intertwined. See, for example, most of the essays in Aguilar & and Buckareff (2010). Neither the anti-causalist arguments of the '50s and '60s nor the causalist retaliation that followed in the '70s and '80s remain in the foreground of contemporary discussions. The first phase of the debate focused primarily on the nature of understanding and explanation, and the second on mental causation and the mind-body problem. It is a very different terrain upon which the philosophical battles between causalists and anti-causalists are currently fought. As we have just seen, this new field is primarily concerned with (i) reasonology and (ii) the structure of human agency. While the methodological war which previously underlay the debate is far from extinct, This is most clearly evidenced by the very different methodologies employed in this volume by Alvarez, Hutto, and Tanney on the one hand and Heil, Mele, and Stueber on the other. For more on the original battle and war see D'Oro (2012). the terrain upon which the philosophical battles between causalists and anti-causalists are currently fought is very different. No doubt further developments await us. One direction which they might follow is that of the recent revival the Aristotelian account of actions as non-causal processes. Another is that of an embodied cognition theory, inspired by Heidegger and Husserl, which does not see the relation between the mental and the physical as causal. In this, but hardly any other, respect, embodied cognition theory shares crucial common ground with a renewed emphasis on the work of Hegel and Anscombe. This has been largely due to philosophers in Pittsburgh and Chicago e.g. Vogler (2002), and Thompson (2008); see also Laitinen & Sandis (2010a). A large influence here has been John McDowell, though he himself argues that many of Anscombe's insights to be compatible with the Davidsonian claim 'that the understanding supplied by reasons-for-which explanations can be causal, by pointing to counterpart reasons-why explanations that can, unlike reasons-for-which explanations, be taken to invoke something that can be a cause' (McDowell 2006: 139). The debate is likely to take on many additional forms which cannot be anticipated at present. We would like to thank Erasmus Mayr and Roger Teichmann for helpful comments on earlier drafts of parts of this chapter. References Achinstein, P. (1983), The Nature of Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press). Aguilar, J.H. & Buckareff, A. (eds.) (2010), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Alexander, P. (1963), Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Alvarez, M. (2007), 'The Causalist/Anti-Causalist Debate in the Theory of Action: What It IS and Why It Matters', 103-123. ––––––––– (2010), Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Alvarez, M. and Hyman, J. (1998), ‘Agents and their Actions’, Philosophy 73, 218-45. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957), Intention (Oxford: Blackwell). ––––––––– (1979),'"Under A Description"', Noûs 13. Reprinted in her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind - Collected Papers Volume II (Oxford: Blackwell), 208-219, to which any page references refer. Armstrong ,D.M. (1962), Bodily Sensations (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Bennett, J. (1964), Rationality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Bittner, R. (2001), Doing Things for Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Brand, M. (1984), Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Bransen, J. and Cupyers, S. (eds.) (1998), Human Action, Deliberation, and Causation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Bratman, M. (1988), Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Boston MA: Harvard University Press). ––––––––– (2004), ‘Shared Valuing and Practical Reasoning’ in Wallace et. al. (2004: 1-27). Brittan Jr, G.G. (2011), 'Davidson, Kant and Double-Aspect Ontologies', in Malpas (2011: 43-59). Brown, D. G. (1968), Action (London: George Allen & Unwin). Chisholm, R. (1964), Human Freedom and the Self - The Lindley Lectures (Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press). Collingwood, R.G. (1938), The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press). ––––––––– (1940), An Essay on Metaphysics; revised 1998 edition, ed. R. Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (1942), The New Leviathan; revised 1992 edition, ed. D. Boucher, (Oxford: Clarendon Press). ––––––––– (1946), The Idea of History; revised 1994 edition, ed. J. van der Dussen, (Oxford:Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (1999), The Principles of History, eds. W. H. Dray and J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Collins, A.W.(1997), ‘The Psychological Reality of Reasons’, Ratio, 10/2. Crane, T. & Mellor, D. H. (1990), 'There is No Question of Physicalism', Mind 99, 185-206. Dancy, J. (1993), Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell). ––––––––– (1995), ‘Why There is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 1-18. ––––––––– (2000), Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2003a)' A Precis of Practical Reality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.67 , No. 2,423. ––––––––– (2003b), 'Replies', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.67, No. 2, 468-90. ––––––––– (2004) Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2008) ‘On How to Act Disjunctively’, in (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge 262-280. ––––––––– (2009), ‘Action, Content and Inference’ in (eds.) H-J. Glock & J. Hyman, Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of P.M.S. Hacker (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 278-98. Davidson, D. (1963), ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60: 685-700. Reprinted in Davidson (2001: 3-19), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1967a), ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences, in (ed.) N. Rescher, The Logic of Decision and Action (University of Pittsburgh Press). Reprinted with ‘Cricicism, Comment, and Defence’, in Davidson (2001: 105-148), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1967b), ‘Causal Relations’, Journal of Philosophy, 64. Reprinted in Davidson (2001:149-62), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1969), ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, in (ed.) J. Feinberg, Moral Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Reprinted in Davidson (2001a: 21-42), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1970), 'Mental Events'. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.). Experience and Theory. London: Duckworth. Reprinted in Davidson (2001: 207-225), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1971), ‘Agency’, in (eds.) R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh and A. Marras, Agent, Action and Reason (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Reprinted in Davidson (2001: 43-61), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1973), ‘Freedom to Act’, in (ed.) T. Honderich, Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Reprinted in Davidson (2001a: 63–82), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1976),‘Hempel on Explaining Action’, Erkenntnis 10, 239-53. Reprinted in Davidson (2001a: 261-75), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1978), ‘Intending’, in (ed.) Y. Yovel, Philosophy of History and Action (D. Reidly and The Magnes Press). Reprinted in Davidson (2001: 83–102), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1993), 'Thinking Causes', in Heil & Mele (1993:3-18). ––––––––– (2001), Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Davidson, D., Suppes, P., & Siegal,S. (1957), Decision Making: An Experimental Approach (new Jersey: Stanford). Davis, L. (2003), ‘Psychologism and Humeanism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.67, No. 2, 452-9. Dilthey, W., (1989) Introduction to the Human Sciences, in (eds.) R.A. Makkreel & F. Rodi Selected Works - 1985–2002 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). D’Oro, G., (2000) 'Collingwood on Re-enactment and the Identity of Thought', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 38:1, 87-101. ––––––––– (2002), Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience (London & New York: Routledge). ––––––––– (2007), 'Two Dogmas of Contemporary Philosophy of Action', Journal of the Philosophy of History Vol. 1, 11-26. _________ (2011), 'Davidson and the Autonomy of the Human Sciences', in Malpas (2011:283-296). ––––––––– (2012), 'Reasons and Causes: The Philosophical Battle and the Metaphilosophical War', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90:2, 207-221. Dray, W.H. (1957), Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford: Clarendon Press). ––––––––– 'Historical Understanding as Rethinking', University of Toronto Quarterly 27 (1958): 200-215. ––––––––– (1963) 'The Historical Explanations of Actions Reconsidered', in (ed) Hook, S. (1963: 105-35) reprinted in Gardiner (1974:66-89) to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– Philosophy of History, London: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964. ––––––––– Dray, W. H. (ed.) (1966), Philosophical Analysis and History, New York and London: Harper and Row. ––––––––– (1980), Perspectives on History (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). ––––––––– (1995), History As Re-Enactment: R.G. Collingwood's Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Dretske, F.(1971), 'Book Review of Malcolm Knox's Action', The Philosophical Review 80 (2), 251-53. ––––––––– (2009), ‘What Must Actions be for Reasons to Explain Them?’, in Sandis (2009: 13-21). Droysen, J.G. (1858/1893), Outline of the Principles of History, trns. E.B. Andrews (Boston MA: Ginn & Co.). Ducasse, C. J. (1925), ‘Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology’, Journal of Philosophy, 22, 150-5. Dupré, J. (1993), The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). Enç, B. (2003), How We Act: Causes, Reasons, Intentions (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Fischer, J.M. (2007), My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Fodor, J.A. (1968), Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology (New York: Random House). Foot, P. (1972), ‘Reasons for Action and Desires’, Supplmententary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61. Reprinted in Foot (1978: 148-56) to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1978), Virtues and Vices (and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy) (Oxford: Blackwell). Ford, A. Hornsby, J. & Stoutland, F. (eds.) (2011), Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). Frankfurt, H.G. (1971), ‘Freedom of the Will and Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy, 68. Reprinted in Frankfurt (1988: 11-25), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (2004), The Reasons of Love (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). Frege, G. (1918-19), ‘Der Gedanke’ (‘The Thought) in Eine logische Untersuchung, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58-77. Published in an English translation (by Peter Geach and R.H. Stoothoff) as ‘Thoughts’ in ed. B.F. McGuinness (1984), Frege’s Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell), pp.351-72, to which any page numbers given refer. Gibson, Q. (1960), The Logic of Social Enquiry (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Ginet, C. (1990), On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Goldman, A. I. (1970), A Theory of Human Action (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). Hampshire, S. (1959), Thought and Action (London: Chatto and Windus). Hart, H.L.A. & Honoré, A.M. (1959), Causation in the Law, 2nd edition - 1985 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Harré, R. and Secord, P.F. (1972), The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Oxford: Blackwell). Heil. J. and Mele, A. R. (eds.) (1993), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Hempel, C.G. (1942), ‘The Function of General Laws in History’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol 39. ––––––––– (1962a), 'Explanation in Science and in History'. In (ed.) R. G. Colodny Frontiers in Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 9-33. Reprinted in Hempel (2001: 276-96), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1962b),‘Rational Action’, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XXXV 5-24. Reprinted in Hempel (2001: 311-26), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1969), 'Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets', in (eds.) S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White, Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel (NY: St. Martin's Press), 179–199. Reprinted in Hempel (2001: 189-207), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1973), 'The Meaning of Theoretical Terms: A Critique to the Standard Empiricist Construal', in (eds.) P. Suppes et. al, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV (Amsterdam NY: North Holland Publishing Company). ––––––––– (1977), 'Author’s Prefatory Note', Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. (ed. N. Block), (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), 1980. 14-15. ––––––––– (2001), The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality, ed. J.H. Fetzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Honderich, T. (2001), Philosopher: A Kind of Life (London & New York: Routledge). Hornsby, J. (1993), 'Agency and Causal Explanaion', in Heil & Mele (1993: 161-88). Reprinted in Hornsby (1997:129-53) to which any page numbers refer. ––––––––– (1997), Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). ––––––––– (2004), 'Agents and Actions', in Hyman & Steward (2004: 1-24). Hutto, D.D. (2008), Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Hyman, J. (1999), 'How Knowledge Works', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.49, No. 197, Oct, 433-51. Hyman, J.& Steward, H. (eds.) (2004), Agency and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kant, I.,(1785/1948), Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals; translated by H. J. Paton (New York: Routledge). Kenny, A. (1963), Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Kim, J. (1993), 'Can Supervienience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?', in Heil & Mele (1993:19-26). ––––––––– (1995), Supervenience and the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ––––––––– (2000), Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Korsgaard, C.M. (1996), The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ––––––––– (2008), The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kovesi, J. (1967), Moral Notions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Laitinen, A. & Sandis, C. (2010a) (eds.), Hegel on Action (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). ––––––––– (2010b),'Hegel and Contemporary Philosophy of Action', in Laitinen & Sandis (2010a: 1-21). Lenman, J. (1996), ‘Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay on Quasi-Hydraulics’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 33, 3 (July), 291-301. Lepore, E. and Loewer, B. (1989), 'More on Making Mind Matter', Philosophical Topics, Vol. XVII, No. 1. Lepore,E. & Ludwig, K. (eds.) (2005), Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Lepore, E., and Lower, B. (1989), 'More on Making Mind Matter', Philosophical Topics 17/1: 175-91. Lepore, E. and McLaughlin, B. P. (eds.) (1985), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell). Louch, A. R. (1966), Explanation and Human Action (Oxford: Blackwell). Lowe, E.J. (1996), Subjects of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ––––––––– (2008), Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press). MacIntyre, A.C. (1958), The Unconscious (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). ––––––––– (1962), 'A mistake about causality in social science', in (eds.) P. Laslett & W. G. Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd series (Oxford: Blackwell), 48-70. Malcolm, N. (1968), ‘The Conceivability of Mechanism’, Philosophical Review, 77: 45-72. Malpas J. (ed.) (2011), Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Mayr, E. (2011),Understanding Human Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press). McCann, H. (1998), The Works of Agency (New York: Cornell University Press). McDowell, J. (1978), ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 52: 13-29. Reprinted in McDowell (1998: 77-95) to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1979), ‘Virtue and Reason’, Monist , 62: 331-50. Reprinted in McDowell (1998: 50-73) to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1985), 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism', in McLaughlin & Lepore (1985: 387–98). ––––––––– (1995), ‘Might there be External Reasons?’, in (eds.) J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison, World, Mind, and Ethics: The Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Reprinted in McDowell (1998: 95-111) to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (1996), Mind and World, 2nd Edition (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). ––––––––– (1998), Mind, Virtue and Value (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). ––––––––– (2006), 'Response to Dancy' in C. McDonald & G. McDonald, McDowell and his Critics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), 134-41. McLaughlin, B. P. (1985a), 'Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental', in Lepore & McLaughlin (1985: 331-68). ––––––––– (1985b), 'Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical'. Philosophical Perspectives 3, 109-35. ––––––––– (1993), 'On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism', in Heil & Mele (1993: 27-40). McNaughton, D. (1988), Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell). Melden, A. I. (1961), Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Mele, A. R. (1992), The Springs of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2003), 'Philosophy of Action' in (ed.) K. Ludwig Donald Davidson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 64-84. ––––––––– (2007), ‘Reasonology and False Beliefs’, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 36, No. 1, 91-118. Mellor, D. H. (1995), The Facts of Causation (London: Routledge). Mill, J. S. (1843/1973), A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (London: Longman, Green, and Co.). Reprinted in his Collected Works vols. 7-8 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press); any references are to page numbers given in the latter, followed by original by book, chapter, and section number. Moran, R. & Stone, M.J. (2009), 'Anscombe on the Expression of Intention', in Sandis (2009: 132-168). Moya, C. (1990), The Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Polity Press). Müller, A. (2011), 'Backward Looking Rationality', in Ford et. al (2011: 242-69). Nagel, T. (1970), The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Newell, R.W. (1986), Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).. O’ Connor, T. (2000), Persons & Causes (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Parfit, D. (1997), ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary. vol. 71:99-130. ––––––––– (2011), On What Matters, Vols. I & II (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Passmore, J. (1958), ‘Review Article: Law and Explanation in History’, Australasian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 4, No. 2, 269–75. Peters, R.S. (1958), The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Pietroski, P. M. (2000), Causing Actions(Oxford: Oxford University Press). Powell, B. (1967), Knowledge of Actions (London: George Allen & Unwin). Price, A.W. (2009), ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Practical Thinking’, in Sandis (2009a: 384-395). Quante, M. (1983/2004), Hegel's Concept of Action, trns. D, Moyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Railton, P. (2004), 'How to Engage Reason', in Wallace et. al.(2004: 176-201). Raz, J. (1999), Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2007), 'Comment on Dancy's Practical Reasoning': http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/files/razs_commentary_on_dancy.pdf. ––––––––– (2009), 'Reasons: Explanatory and Normative', in Sandis (2009a: 184-202). Ricœur, P. (1990/1992), Oneself As Another, trns. K. Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) Ruben, D-H. (1990), Explaining Explanation (London: Routledge). ––––––––– (2003), Action and its Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Rundle, B. (1997), Mind in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Saari, H., (1989), ‘R. G. Collingwood on the Identity of Thought’, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 28: 77-89. Sandis, C. (ed.) (2009a), New Essays on the Explanation of Action (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). ––––––––– (2009b), ‘Gods and Mental States: the Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind’, in (ed.) C. Sandis (2009: 358-385) ––––––––– (2010), ‘Hume and “Motivating Reasons”’, in (ed.) C. Pigden, Hume on Motivation and Virtue: New Essays (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). ––––––––– (2011), ‘A Just Medium: Empathy and Detachment in Historical Understanding’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, Volume 5, Issue 2. ––––––––– (2012), The Things We Do and Why We Do Them (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Schueler, G.F. (2003), Reasons and Purposes (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Schroeder, M. (2007), Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Searle, J. R. (2001), Rationality in Action (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press). Sehon, S. (2005), Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Sellars, W. (1966), ‘Fatalism and Determinism’, in (ed) K. Lehrer, Freedom and Determinism (1966). ––––––––– (1976), 'Volitions Re-affirmed', in (eds.) M. Brand & W. Walton, Action Theory (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing), 47-66. Smith, M. (1987), ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, Mind , 96: 36-61. ––––––––– (1992), ‘Valuing: Desiring or Believing?’ In (eds.) D. Charles and K. Lennon, Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 323–360. ––––––––– (1994), The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell). ––––––––– (1998), ‘The Possibility of Philosophy of Action’ in Bransen & Cupyers (1998: 17-41). Reprinted in Smith (2004:155-177), to which any page numbers given refer. ––––––––– (2009), 'The Explanatory Role of Being Rational', in (eds.) D. Sobel and S. Wall, Reasons for Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 58-80. Smith M. and Pettit, P. (1997), ‘Parfit’s “P” ’ in (ed.) J. Dancy, Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell), 71–95. Sosa, D. (1993), 'Davidson's Thinking Causes', in Heil & Mele (1993: 41-50). Steward, H. (1997), The Ontology of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press). ––––––––– (2011), 'Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency', in (ed.) R. Swinburne, Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 141-57. Stocker, M. (2004), ‘Raz on the Intelligibility of Bad Acts’, in Wallace et. al. (2004: 303-332). Stoecker, R. (2009), 'Acting for Reasons - A Grass Roots Approach', in Sandis (2009: 276-292). Stout, R. (1996), Things That Happen Because They Should (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2005), Action (Chesham: Acumen). ––––––––– (2010), 'Deviant Causal Chains', in (eds.) T. O' Connor & C. Sandis, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Wiley-Blackwell), 159-165. Stoutland, F. (1998), ‘The Real Reasons’ in J. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 43-66. ––––––––– (1999), 'Intentionalists and Davidson on Rational Explanations' in (ed.) G. Meggle, Actions, Norms and Values: Discussions with Georg Henrik von Wright (Walter de Gruyter),191-208. ––––––––– (2007), 'A Mistaken View of Davidson’s Legacy: A critical notice of Earnest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality' , International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 14 (4) 579-596 . ––––––––– (2008), 'Radical Misinterpretation Indeed: Response to Lepore and Ludwig', International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 15 (4) 587-597. ––––––––– 'Wittgenstein and Davidson on Philosophy of Mind' in Forsberg, Rider, and Segerdahl, eds.Tankar: tillägnade Sören Stenlund (Uppsala Philosophical Studies, 54, 2008). ––––––––– (2011a), ‘Reasons and Causes’, in (eds.) P. Frascolla, D. Marconi & A. Voltolini, Wittgenstein. Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). –––––––––(2011b), 'Interpreting Davidson on Intentional Action', in Malpas (2011: 297-324). Strawson, G. (1986/2010), Freedom and Belief, 2nd revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Tanney, J. (2005), 'Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind', Ratio, vol. XVIII, pp. 338-351. Taylor, C. (1964), The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) .––––––––– (1979), 'Action as Expression' in C. Diamond & J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality: Essays for G.E.M. Anscombe (Sussex: Harvester Press), 73-89. ––––––––– (1983), 'Hegel and the Philosophy of Action' in (eds.) L. S. Stepelevich & D. Lamb, Hegel's Philosophy of Action (New Jersey: Humanities Press), 1-18.Reprinted in Laitinen & Sandis (2010a: 22-41), to which any page numbers given refer. Taylor, R. (1966), Action and Purpose (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.). Teichman, J.(1974), The Mind and the Soul (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).. Thompson, M. (2008), Life and Action (Boston MA: Harvard University Press). van der Dussen, J.,(1995), 'The Philosophical Context of Collingwood’s Re-enactment Theory', International Studies in Philosophy, 27/2, 81-99. Velleman, J. D.(2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (2006) Self to Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Vermazen, B. & Hintikka, M.B. (1985) (eds.), Essays on Davidson - Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Vogler, C. (2002), Reasonably Vicious (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). von Wright, G. H. (1971), Explanation and Understanding (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Wallace, R. J., Pettit, P., Scheffler, S., & Smith, M. (2004), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press). White, A. R. (1967) The Philosophy of Mind (New York: Random House). ––––––––– (1968) (ed.), The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ––––––––– (1972), ‘What We Believe’ in N. Rescher (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, APQ monograph series no.6 (Oxford: Blackwell), 69-84. Winch, P. (1958), The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Wilkes, K.V. (1978), Physicalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Windelband, W. (1894), Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. Reprinted in Präludien, 3rd ed. (Tϋbingen : J.C. Mohr), 1907. Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1961), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, revised trns. D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge). ––––––––– (1953/2009), Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, & J. Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell). Yoo, J.(2009), 'Anomalous Monism', in (eds.) A. Beckerman & B. McLaughlin, Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 95-109. iuseppina D'Oro and Constantine Sandis From Anti-Causalism to Causalism and Back 51 1