This article was downloaded by: [103.27.67.2] On: 02 July 2015, At: 08:50 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG Journal of European Public Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20 The "difference engine': constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union Ian Manners & Richard Whitman Published online: 04 Feb 2011. To cite this article: Ian Manners & Richard Whitman (2003) The "difference engine': constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 10:3, 380-404, DOI: 10.1080/1350176032000085360 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000085360 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Whitman ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to develop more fully the notion of the international identity of the European Union (EU) in world politics. We will attempt to balance our previous focus of work on the ‘active dimension’ of the EU’s attempts to ‘assert its identity on the international scene’ by looking at the ‘reflexive dimension’ of the EU’s international identity from a more sociological perspective. Our article will argue that the distinctive polity perspectives and role representations of the EU can be thought of as a form of ‘difference engine’ which drives the construction and representation of the EU’s international identity. Like Babbage’s original difference engine, the EU’s international identity is not a multiplier of difference, exaggerating the dissimilarities between the EU and the rest of the world through the generation of a new European supranational identity, but functions on the basis of addition – by adding an international EU element to Europeans’ complex and multifaceted identities. KEY WORDS Construction; difference; European Union; international identity; reflexive; representation. It is now over five years since we took a first step towards identifying the international identity of the European Union (EU) through an examination of its ‘active identity’. We admitted that the notion of active identity was but one element of a ‘complex and multifaceted international identity’ rather than the totality of the EU’s international role (Manners and Whitman 1998: 238). The purpose of this article is to build on that foundation, and the conceptualization that it introduced, in order to develop more fully the notion of the international identity of the EU (IIEU). In particular we will attempt to balance our previous focus on the ‘active dimension’ of the EU’s attempts to ‘assert its identity on the international scene’ by looking at the ‘reflexive dimension’ of the IIEU from a more sociological perspective. This article will argue that the distinctive polity perspectives and role representations of the EU can be thought of as a form of ‘difference engine’ which drives the construction and representation of the EU in such a way as to introduce and encourage differences which might be characterized as the IIEU. Like Babbage’s original difference engine, the IIEU is not a multiplier Journal of European Public Policy ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online © 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/1350176032000085360 Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 381 of difference, exaggerating the dissimilarities between the EU and the rest of the world through the generation of a new supranational identity. Instead we will argue that, like Babbage’s calculator, the international identity functions solely on the basis of addition – by adding an EU element to Europeans’ complex and multifaceted identities. This article will proceed in four sections to revisit, constitute, theorize, and conceptualize its reflections on the construction and representation of the IIEU. As part of these reflections we also want to suggest that the conceptualization and analysis of the EU requires a series of artificial dualities to be appreciated; a realization which encourages us to break down disciplinary barriers. In particular, the differentiation between positivistic comparative political science approaches to the EU as an instrumental actor motivated by material concerns (or those of its constituent parts) and interpretative sociological approaches to the EU as a sentient actor motivated by symbolic concerns (such as the reinforcement of social group identities) is problematic. By focusing previously on active identity, and now on reflexive identity, we hope to bring some sort of dynamic balance to the study of the EU and the way in which its international activism and identity construction are both part of coming to terms with the complex processes and interactions through which the EU is ‘being’ or ‘becoming’ determined by both similarities and differences among its multiple identities and others. In addition, the differentiation between the analytical perspectives of the EU as a political entity, political system, or polity and the role analyses of the EU as a civilian power, military power, or normative power is also problematic. By focusing on the co-constitution of both the polity perspectives and the role representations of the EU we hope to be able to argue that the way in which the EU is constitutionally constructed is shaped by the way in which the EU’s international role is constructed which is, in turn, shaped by the way in which the EU is constitutionally constructed, ad infinitum. These dualities will be considered at greater lengths in sections 2 and 3 of the article where we reflect upon the co-constitution of the IIEU and theoretical approaches to its study. We will then conclude in section 4 by attempting to conceptualize the IIEU and suggest how we might analyse it. Here we argue that only through an understanding of both political and social theories will we be able to come to terms with the way in which the EU acts as a difference engine, requiring the addition of its international identity into our considerations of the EU in global politics. But first we will revisit the IIEU in order to reflect on its diffusion over the past five years. 1. REVISITING THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EU The notion of the IIEU has become clearer over the past decade since it was first introduced in the 1990s (Whitman 1994; Manners 1994), in particular the extent to which it is ‘not a synonym for ‘‘foreign policy’’ or ‘‘external relations’’, but . . . a position from which to commence conceptualiz- Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 382 Journal of European Public Policy ing the global role of the European Union as being greater than the sum of its parts’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 246). Examples of the gradual diffusion of this conceptualization include analyses of European security, political federalization, the Middle East, competition policy, human rights, and discussions of the sociological understandings of the EU, as will briefly be considered here. The first elements of this diffusion concern the way in which the concept of international identity reflects the non-national features of the EU’s identity. Thus Ole Wæver contends that ‘Europe’s ‘‘Other’’ these years is Europe’s own past. This mythic narrative of European history together with an international actor profile can produce a European international identity’ (Wæver 2000: 279). In addition, Jean Raux advocates that an EU international identity is possible as long as it remains deferential to those of its member states: ‘L’identité internationale de l’Union est problèmatique et néanmoins envisageable, parce qu’elle est elle-même respectueuse de l’identité de ses propres Etats membres’ (Raux 2000: 1). The second elements of this diffusion focus on the distinctive features that constitute the international identity in terms of its intersubjective visibility, its contra-Westphalian extraterritoriality, and its principled conditionality. Ben Soetendorp suggests that the EU is building a visible international identity in the Middle East, arguing that ‘the EU has nevertheless made itself clearly visible on the Middle East stage, presenting a distinguished international identity’ (Soetendorp 1999: 113). Clearly the IIEU is an intersubjective experience where its ‘visibility’ to other actors is part of co-constituting itself. Chad Damro goes further to argue that the EU ‘has expanded its international identity specifically with regard to extraterritorial competition policy’ (Damro 2001: 218). Thus the IIEU is also one which exists in contrast to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territoriality. Karen Smith contends that through the use of conditionality ‘respect for human rights is already felt to form part of the EU’s international identity’ (Smith 2001: 203). So the IIEU is one which can be located in a set of principles, such as respect for human rights, which are part of its co-constitution. Finally, the theoretical elements of this diffusion contemplate the extent to which the concept of international identity is valuable, or not, in the understanding of EU identity from the more sociological approaches of roles, norms and identity. Brian White misinterprets the concept when he writes of the EU as being ‘an international identity’ (White 2001: 29) rather than having an international identity which both reflects and shapes its interactions and manifold identities. Ulrich Sedelmeier’s insightful argument is that ‘from a more sociological understanding of identity, an (international) identity is something that the EU might, or might not have, but if it has a particular identity or role, then this is an independent, rather than the dependent variable’ (Sedelmeier 2001: 6). Thus, he clearly differentiates the study of EU international identity from that of conventional studies of the EU’s actorness which do not consider the causal impact of identity on foreign policy (rather Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 383 than vice versa). Sharing this concern for the sociology of identity, Marika Lerch rightly argues that our previous conceptualization of the IIEU lacked the sociological understanding of identity which she uses in her convincing theorizing of the ‘important role of roles’ in the study of the external identity of the EU (Lerch 2001: 2, fn. 3). Revisiting the international identity and its diffusion allows us to reflect on both the value and the weaknesses of our original formulation. It is worth observing that we have previously considered, although left underdeveloped, the construction of difference with others through ‘the external definition of . . . identity’ and the ‘expectation[s] of these external actors’ or others (Manners and Whitman 1998: 237). We have always argued that the centrality of identity to our understanding of international relations and the EU suggests ‘that a significant reformulation of the discipline itself is required’ and ‘that the politics of identity is the central problem for the EU to solve’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 235). However, we accepted that our original conceptualization left the task of developing the sociological dimensions of EU international identity construction and representation to later: ‘In defining the concept of international identity there is an interrelated requirement to explore how this identity is both constructed and represented’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 246). Thus, we now argue that the notion of international identity is an attempt to think about how the EU is constituted, constructed, and represented internationally. The relationship between the EU and the rest of the world is therefore crucially determined by the nature of this international identity. By constitution, we mean that the constitutive history and principles of the EU play an important role in shaping the international identity. By construction, we mean that the way in which the EU has been, and is, understood also plays an important role in shaping the international identity. By representation, we mean that the ways in which the EU represents itself, and is represented in the minds of those experiencing it, are important mitigating factors in shaping the constitution and identity of the EU. All three of these elements of the IIEU are in flux – sometimes of an evolutionary nature, such as the neo-liberalizing influences of the introduction of the single market, and sometimes of a revolutionary nature, such as the creation of the Union at the end of the Cold War. As well as being in flux, all three of these elements are continually contested, both within and without the EU, by those seeking to change the nature, direction and image of the EU. Finally, changes in any one of these elements will tend to lead to changes in the others; hence if the constitution of the EU changes then so might its identity and the way in which it is perceived by others. In order to make more sense of this reformulation of the IIEU it is now necessary to turn to exploring the constitution, construction and representation of the international identity, before going on to suggest how best to theorize such an identity. 384 Journal of European Public Policy Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 2. CONSTITUTING THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EU The EU is constituted differently in global politics by the interplay between its hybrid polity and its international roles. By hybrid polity we mean that the political constitution of the EU is a hybrid of different polity perspectives, which do not closely resemble those of a state (whether unitary or federal) or those of an international organization (whether regional or global). By international roles we mean that the international role constitution of the EU is a mixture of role representations which sometimes reinforce each other and other times contradict each other (see Aggestam 2000; Lerch 2001; Sedelmeier 2001). This different constitution is the result of its fifty-year-old evolution during which it has acquired a complex multi-perspectival polity and multirepresentational role which are themselves constitutive factors in shaping its political and social consequences for EU citizens and states. As these multiplicities are crucial constitutive features of the IIEU it is necessary to explore them further here. Polity perspectives Since the 1960s the EU has been increasingly conceived of as a political system (Lindberg 1967; Puchala 1972; Webb 1983; Wallace 1983) with a network rather than a hierarchy of decision-making, an expanding membership and agenda, and degrees of boundedness rather than clear-cut boundaries. Instead of attempting to decide whether the EU is a form of supranational or international governance, we suggest that the EU is a hybrid polity which can be examined from three different perspectives – network polity, metaregionalism, and boundedness. All three perspectives are needed to get a sense of the extent to which the EU’s hybrid polity shapes its international identity. Network polity Contrary to the unitary appearance of the state model, the network comprises a hardly soluble grid of close co-operation between units, functionally as well as territorially defined, with overlapping membership. (Diez 1997: 296) As Diez observes, the appearance of the network is one of interactivity which provides governance and policies both within the EU and without. The close co-operation and interactivity between units has been described and theorized as representing ‘policy networks’ (Peterson 1995; Börzel 1997) in which territorial units such as member states and sub-national regions negotiate with functional units such as interest groups and companies, often co-ordinated by the Commission (Webb 1977: 24). The massive expansion of policy-making methods and tasks in the 1990s has led to the conceptualization of the EU as Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 385 a form of ‘network governance’ (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999) where Diez’s overlapping units engage in a variety of different governance modes (Wallace 2000; Peterson 2001). The most common mode is one in which ‘the EC is a multilevel political system which, overall, lacks a clearly defined and universally accepted hierarchy for policy-making’ (Webb 1983: 38; italics in original). Finally, the combination of policy networks in a form of network governance extends into policy-making with groups, units, and states outside the EU as part of its ‘network of relations’ (Manners and Whitman 1998). This network of relations between the EU and the world reflects the extent to which the network polity of the EU is an open political system in which membership is less discriminatory than in the closed governments of its member states. It also reflects the multi-unit and multi-process nature of network governance in that the EU’s network of global relations is shaped by many factors such as the member states, the Commission, the Parliament, non-territorial actors, or the different processes themselves (Manners and Whitman 2000). Meta-regionalism It is possible to use ‘region’ about extremely different phenomena . . . What applies in all cases is that we are dealing with a territorially defined political unit which is not the nation-state. A region is anything which has all the characteristics of a nation-state – except being one. In other terms: territoriality but not sovereignty. (Wæver 1997: 298; italics in original) As Wæver suggests, the second perspective shaping the EU polity is the extent to which it is ‘a territorially defined political unit’ that is not a state but is more than a large region. From this perspective the EU can be seen as going beyond territoriality towards a pooling of sovereignty, in an ongoing process of enlarging itself, and engaging in a form of inter-regionalism with other regional entities. The European integration process of flexible territoriality combined with a pooling of sovereignty can be considered ‘meta-regionalism’ in that it goes beyond the macro-regionalism of creating a ‘quasi-continental region’ (Wæver 1997: 298) but does not ‘merely replicate on a larger scale the typical modern political form’ (Ruggie 1993: 172). Similarly, the process of massive enlargement is a second feature of the meta-regional characteristics of the EU polity and thus represents an extreme version of a polity with flexible territoriality. Clearly this flexibility is crucial for the study of EU relations with its ‘near abroad’ (Christiansen et al. 2000) as the possibility of incorporation problematizes traditional distinctions between internal and external policies. In addition, the EU seeks to encourage meta-regionalism in other continents by engaging in inter-regional diplomacy which implicitly and explicitly promotes mimétisme (regional replication) in places such as south-east Asia (ASEAN), southern Africa (SADC), and south America (Mercosur). 386 Journal of European Public Policy Boundedness Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 In contrast to the politics of the modern state system, recent developments in the EU fail to provide a binary division that is traditionally expected from borders. Instead, the EU has spawned novel policy-regimes that are designed for spaces that are neither properly ‘inside’ nor properly ‘outside’ the polity. (Christiansen et al. 2000: 392) The third perspective comes from Christiansen et al. who encourage us to look at the boundedness of the EU in terms of its untraditional borders, its novel policy-regimes, and its encouragement of trans-boundary ‘regionality’. The EU borders are untraditional in that not only are they constantly moving through meta-regionalism, but they are never quite as solid as one might expect – for many they represent curtains fashioned out of ‘paper’ (Manners 1999). In this respect the boundedness of the EU is not so much about in or out, but more about degrees of in and out, as manifest in a variety of different types of agreements – economic area, free trade, pre-accession, ‘Europe’, association, customs union, partnership and co-operation. It is this uncertainty about inside and outside, together with novel network policy regimes spanning this distinction, which lead Christiansen et al. to describe EU borders as ‘fuzzy’ – ‘because they produce interfaces or intermediate spaces between the inside and the outside of the polity’ (Christiansen et al. 2000: 392). Part of this fuzziness is caused by the way in which the EU encourages trans-boundary ‘regionality’ (Joenniemi 1995) through its region-building initiatives such as the INTERREG programme, as well as the cross-border components to PHARE and TACIS (Christiansen and Joenniemi 1999). Because such regionality links ‘entities across national borders . . . [it] seeks to settle the tension between unity and diversity in a way of its own’ (Joenniemi 1995: 339). The three polity perspectives of network, meta-regionalism, and boundedness give us an insight into the questions of governance, spatiality and permeability when looking at the EU as a political system. In asking questions of governance we are attempting to understand the relationships between the variety of modes, locations, and levels of a network polity and the effects of the pooling of sovereignty and territorial flexibility of European meta-regionalism. In asking questions of spatiality we are trying to make sense of ways in which European meta-regionalism interacts with the untraditional borders, novel policy-regimes and trans-border regionality of the EU’s boundedness. In asking questions of permeability we are seeking to make sense of the interplay between the EU’s boundedness and its network polity in terms of the openness of its political system to participation by insiders, outsiders and those in the intermediate spaces. Thus, these questions cause us to ask how governance works, what spaces that governance operates in, and how permeable these spaces of governance are. All these perspectives are deeply interdependent, as Kohler-Koch suggests – ‘network governance is widening the unitary political Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 387 Figure 1 Polity perspectives of the EU space [b]y bringing in social actors into European decision-making and . . . redefining the boundaries of the European polity’ (Kohler-Koch 1999). This leads us to conclude that the EU’s network polity, the meta-regionalism of its political space, and the re-definition of its boundedness make the IIEU very different: ‘it may constitute the first ‘‘multiperspectival polity’’ to emerge since the advent of the modern era’ (Ruggie 1993: 172). As we will see in section 4, all these perspectives contribute towards making the IIEU look distinctly unconventional in world politics. These three perspectives and the questions of governance, spatiality and permeability may be illustrated as shown in Figure 1. Role representations Just as the EU has been conceived of as a political system with multiple perspectives to its polity, so its role in world politics has become increasingly more complex. The struggle since the 1970s has been to develop conceptual categorizations which adequately capture the complexities of the EU’s evolving immanence in world politics. Rather than attempting to decide whether the 388 Journal of European Public Policy EU is best characterized by notions of role (Duchêne 1972), actorness (Sjöstedt 1977), or presence (Allen and Smith 1990), we suggest that the EU is a hybrid international entity which can be found represented in three different roles – civilian, military, and normative. All three representations are needed to get a sense of the extent to which the hybridity of the EU as an international entity shapes its international identity. Civilian Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. (Duchêne 1973: 12) Writing in the 1970s Duchêne popularized the most long-standing role representation of the EU – the notion of it having a civilian role in world politics which was understood to be primarily located in economic power. Although the end of the Cold War removed the principal structural constraint on the EU in maintaining this role (Whitman 1998: 144), the idea of ‘global civil power’ (Prodi 2000: 3) is still at the forefront of self-reflective discussions. The main components of this role representation are the giving of aid, trade relations, and formalized economic relations. A representational icon of this particular role is the argument that the EU as a collectivity provides 57 per cent of the world’s development assistance, while the European Community (EC) alone is the world’s fourth largest aid donor (OECD 2001). As important, though often contradictory, is the role of the EU as a trading bloc with important relations with developed and developing states, as well as with the World Trade Organization. The mantra here is of the EU as the world’s biggest trading bloc, with a quarter of the world’s exports in 2000 (WTO 2001). Finally, the EU formalizes these economic relations into a whole range of partnership, co-operation, and association agreements which increasingly include political components. All three of these representations are located in a civilian role conceptualization which embraces remunerative aid and trade relationships but is ‘reluctant to use coercive foreign policy instruments’ and should ‘renounce the potential to use force’ (Smith 2001: 186 and 193 n. 11). Military Under the TEU the Union had signalled the intent of the Member States to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union. (Whitman 1998: 135–6) The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) which was to lead to the 1999 Cologne European Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 389 Council commitment to establish a common security and defence policy (CSDP) and a civilian crisis management co-ordinating mechanism. The EU had moved beyond civilian power as its sole role representation and had developed a circumscribed military role for itself. In reality, the EC had been increasingly involved in an indirect military role through the European Community Monitor Mission in Yugoslavia (1991), export control regime for dual-use goods (1994), anti-personnel landmines actions (1995), code of conduct on arms exports (1998), and conflict prevention policy (2001). The Petersberg tasks incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 extended these activities by including a mixture of civilian and military roles for the EU, making it almost inevitable that defence capabilities would need to be acquired (Manners 2000: 224). These civilian and military roles include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’. However, the first visible sign of an EU humanitarian activity was the creation in 1992 of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to ‘provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the EU’. This was followed by the 1999 stability pact for south-east Europe to deal with the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction in the war-torn former Yugoslavia. The events in Kosovo during 1999, following so soon after the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, provided the impetus for the Cologne declaration on strengthening the CSDP by improving decision-making, developing operational capacity, and putting in place arrangements for participation by nonEU NATO members. By the end of 2001 the EU had committed itself to developing a military role (including 60,000 troops by 2003) which would not rival, but had the potential to undermine, its civilian role. Normative The central component of normative power Europe is that the EU exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way. (Manners 2002: 242) The third role representation which the EU has developed over the past fifty years is the most overlooked conceptualization – that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. We argue that, in addition to civilian or military role representations, the EU should be considered a normative power. The idea of the ‘pooling of sovereignty’, the importance of a transnational European Parliament, the requirements of democratic conditionality, and the pursuit of human rights, are not just ‘interesting’ features of the IIEU – they are constitutive norms of a polity which is different to existing states and international relations. Thus the different existence, the different norms, and the different policies that the EU pursues are really part of redefining what Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 390 Journal of European Public Policy can be ‘normal’ in international relations. What we are suggesting here is that the roles of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, both reflect the underlying focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions. This is not to say that the EU’s civilian role, or fledgling military role, is unimportant, simply that its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations needs to be given much greater attention. The three representations of civilian role, military role, and normative role give us an insight into the questions of practical capabilities, Westphalian culturation, and conflict conciliation when looking at the EU as an international entity. The question of practical capabilities is the most common and considers the extent to which the EU is willing and capable of playing a role more as a civilian or a military power. The question of Westphalian culturation is one we ask in order to understand the way in which the EU’s normative power role breaks down the conventions and culture of the Westphalian system which continue to underpin understandings of a civilian power role. The question of conflict conciliation is our way of asking whether the EU seeks conventional military power to intervene and conciliate in conflict or whether it seeks to moderate conflict in a more structural way by encouraging norms, which renders conflict not merely unthinkable but materially impossible. Thus, these ‘systems of representation . . . consist, not of individual concepts, but of different ways of organising, clustering, arranging and classifying concepts, and of establishing complex relations beyond them’ (Hall 1997: 17). All these representations are involved in an ongoing process of evolution and interplay, which might ultimately weaken or undermine the strength of one particular role as the dilemmas of engagement versus sanctions have illustrated in relations with Iran, Serbia and China. Similar to polity perspectives, as we will see in section 4, all these representations contribute towards making the IIEU look distinctly unconventional in world politics. These three representations and the questions of capabilities, culturation and conciliation are illustrated in Figure 2. The combination of polity perspectives and role representations discussed above are both part of the definition of the international identity which we use to conceptualize the evolution of the EU as a particularly constituted polity with a ‘multiplicity of identities’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 236). Thus the polity perspectives found in the absence of hierarchy and single centre of power, when combined with the role representations originating in the absence of shared identity, are part of constituting the IIEU. What is important to clarify here is that the IIEU is co-constituted by the interplay of polity perspectives and role representations. As we suggested earlier, our conceptualization of the EU through three polity perspectives is just one part of constituting the IIEU. The three role representations which we use to organize differing clusters of the IIEU are also part of shaping the way in which the EU polity develops. To take one obvious example, because the EU Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 391 Figure 2 Role representations of the EU is not a Westphalian-type polity with hierarchical governance, fixed territory or clear boundaries, it is unlikely to develop the most cherished Westphalian role of military power. In co-constitutive terms, because the EU is not perceived as representing, and does not seek, military power, it is unlikely to develop a Westphalian-type policy necessary for the legitimacy, capability and exercise of military power. We will further clarify the interrelationships between polity perspectives and role representations in co-constituting the EU when we attempt to conceptualize the IIEU in section 4. But in order to appreciate such a conceptualization, we need to reflect first on how best to theorize this interplay of polity and roles found in the IIEU. 3. THEORIZING THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EU This article accepts the premise that Europe, Western Europe, the European Union and its member states represent a set of varied but interrelated identities constructed and represented through different means and mechanisms. (Manners and Whitman 1998: 236) As our previous article acknowledged, the means and mechanisms through which national and European identities are constructed and represented present us with much difficulty when trying to understand theoretically the IIEU. It 392 Journal of European Public Policy seems simple and seductive to attempt either to compare the EU with the USA and Japan, or to argue that the EU is unique and above comparison. Invariably both these solutions turn out to be empty and unrevealing, particularly when executed in an unreflective way. In this section we will try to think about the IIEU by combining ‘conventional explanations’ from political theory with ‘unconventional explanations’ from social theory, although the labels conventional and unconventional are only understandable from the viewpoint of traditional political and foreign policy analysis. In order to engage in such a combination of processes of thought, it is necessary for us to explain what we mean by political and social theories. Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 Conventional explanations – political theories Conventional explanations for the EU and the processes which shape it are both the tools and the barriers to understanding the IIEU. Because the languages of comparative politics and international relations were originally developed explicitly to deal with different assumptions about governance and sovereignty, the use of the term international identity in thinking about the EU can be problematic. As Figure 3 illustrates, we can broadly generalize about three different domains of political theory when thinking about the EU. As Ben Rosamond has convincingly argued, ‘the question of whether EU studies is an ‘International Relations’ or ‘Comparative Politics’ question is a non problem, relying on a false dichotomy between these two disciplinary domains’ (Rosamond 2000: 196). Thus, we seek not to argue that all political theory falls into one domain or the other, simply that mainstream theories still continue to be thought about in this way by much of the discipline of political science. International relations theory is thought of as the domain for thinking about the EU primarily as a form of co-operation among sovereign states where Figure 3 Political theories of the EU Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 393 intergovernmental relations remain the most important arena for understanding both the EU and its place in global politics. Comparative politics theory is thought of as the domain for thinking about the EU primarily as a form of political system in which member states participate and where theories of comparative politics have become the most important way of understanding both the EU and its place in global politics. Integration theory was the domain for thinking about the EU as lying somewhere between these two domains of international relations and comparative politics where the processes of deepening integration (becoming more like a form of state) and widening integration (to include more members) need to be thought about in dynamic terms. Invariably, more progressive thinking about the EU in global politics builds on insights from all three domains, although much controversy is created because of the desire to discuss the EU only in terms of existing concepts, terminology and domains. We get a sense of some of these existing, if unnecessarily dichotomous, discussions of the EU in global politics if we look at two sets of approaches from each of integration theory, comparative politics theory, and international relations theory. Approaching the study of the EU from the domain of integration theory, we can see that there has been much debate over the extent to which the process of integration has been driven by functional ‘spillover’ from one issue to another (Haas 1958) or whether integration has been driven by state choice in intergovernmental bargains (Hoffmann 1966). The debate between neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist scholars in the integration domain during the past forty years has stunted theorization by trapping many in a ‘supranational–intergovernmental dichotomy’ (Branch and Øhrgaard 1999). Thus neofunctionalists tend to focus on the role of the Commission and examine its role in the EC’s external relations, whereas intergovernmentalists tend to focus on the role of the member states and examine their role in the EU’s CFSP. However, as Rosamond has observed, ‘grand theories of European integration have certainly had their day’ (Rosamond 2000: 197) as many of those working in the domain of integration theory have escaped by turning to the domains of comparative politics theory and international relations theory. In contrast, approaching the study of the EU from the domain of comparative politics theory, we can see that the debate during the 1970s and 1980s focused more on the extent to which the EU could best be described as either a form of federation or confederation with sovereignty shared between state and central authorities. This debate was characterized by the contributions of Paul Taylor and William Wallace who argued that the EU could best be described as a form of consociational confederation (Taylor 1975, 1983; Wallace 1982, 1983). Despite a number of scholars such as Simon Bulmer (1996) and Frederick Lister (1996) attempting to revive the debate over confederal governance in the EU, most scholars agree that the EU cannot be thought about in this way because ‘many of its constituent units are themselves internally federalised’ (Delanty 1998: para. 4.4) and because of its differential Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 394 Journal of European Public Policy constitutive elements, such as network governance, discussed previously. Both federalists and confederalists would expect EU foreign policy and diplomacy to be conducted by the central or federal government, with more economic decisions being taken by the state governments. However, the EU often confounds these simple expectations with its complex mixture of competencies, decision-making and implementation. Finally, approaching the study of the EU from the domain of international relations theory we can see that in the 1990s the debate over the EU revolved around the question of whether it was best characterized as a presence or an actor in global politics. The debate was really about the best way of thinking about the EU and its international influence, with scholars of both presence and actorness looking to characterize the unique features of the EU. David Allen and Michael Smith developed the notion of ‘presence’ as a means of moving the debate beyond the institutional analysis of the 1970s and 1980s and towards a focus on western Europe’s tangible and intangible presence in the international arena (Allen and Smith 1990). In contrast, Charlotte Bretherton and John Volger revived Gunnar Sjöstedt’s notion of actor capacity to look at the EU as a global actor in terms of autonomy, ability and legitimacy (Bretherton and Volger 1999). Those studying presence tended to focus on the loose expression of the EU’s ‘negotiated order’, while those studying actorness tended to focus on the construction of external roles for the EU. In order to study the IIEU both these approaches need to be synthesized, together with the all important missing consideration of social theory. Unconventional explanations – social theory Unconventional explanations of the EU, as represented by social theory, have been largely absent from thinking about the EU in global politics. Despite the observation that social theory encompasses issues that ‘concern all the social sciences’ and in particular the ‘understanding of human action and of social institutions’ (Giddens 1984: xvi), it is rare to find it applied to the study of the EU. This failure to bring the study of human action and social institutions to research on the EU may be partially explained by the absurdity of EU scholars who believe they can isolate social theory from social science (e.g. Moravcsik 1999). But the study of the EU and its international identity will inevitably remain vacuous in the absence of social theories which allow us to understand the relationships between human actions, social institutions, and social identity – all of which are critical to the relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans. In the past decade social theory in an institutionalist variant has entered the study of EU governance through the ‘sociological institutionalist’ work of scholars focusing on the role of institutional norms and socialization (see Richardson 1996; Rosamond 1999). Similarly, social theory in an international relations variant has made inroads into the study of the EU in world politics through the ‘social constructivist’ work of scholars interested in the interplay Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 395 of the intentional agency of actors and the social structuration of their world (see Jørgensen 1997; Christiansen et al. 1999). However, despite these recent influences of social theory in political theory through sociological institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, we maintain that they do not represent the mainstream of EU political science. Furthermore, we suggest that much of this work would be unrecognizable to critical social theorists because of the positivist foundations on which much of these institutionalist or international relations variants build. Hence our opening argument about the relative absence of social theory from thinking about the EU in global politics can be sustained because of the disconnection from largely post-structural critical social theory. In order to make sense of some of the questions which social theory asks in the study of the IIEU, we will briefly reflect on the weaknesses of some current approaches to identity before turning to the insights of critical social theory. The first weakness is found in work on national identity where national social systems and identity politics remain the primary frames of reference for understanding both the EU and its place in global politics. Here the tendency is to think of the IIEU as being the result of conflicts between these national identities, similar to conflicts of national interest. The second weakness is to be found in work on European identity where national frames of reference are giving way to a European framework for understanding both the EU and its place in global politics. Here the dominant way of thinking about the IIEU is as the result of a common or collective expression of EU identity or ‘Europeanness’. Both these literatures suffer from the same problem – a tendency to view identity as mono-dimensional (either national or European), a weakness that is further compounded by the rationalist and positivist predispositions of its writers. Such approaches to the question of national or European identity share many core assumptions about identity found in the study of the EU – that identity is essentially fixed; usually categorical; and that the nation-state social model is the norm. The consequence of these assumptions is a tendency to equate the IIEU with the failure or success of the construction of a supranational identity (and accompanying social system). In contrast, the study of the IIEU needs to be located in critical social theory which emphasizes the complex, multiple, relational construction of identity. Here, thinking about the IIEU is more contingent and dependent on the negotiation of identity within the global–local nexus (Kinnvall 2002a). The three crucial aspects of social theory which should inform our thinking on the IIEU all revolve around the question of difference in the construction of identity. The first aspect is the extent to which identity, and thus difference, is essentially a pre-given (the essentialist position) or whether it is something which is constructed through encounters in life (the constructionist position). The essentialists argue that as identity represents the ‘essence’ of a social group, so the likelihood of transforming it in a short period of time without shared collective experience is very small indeed (see Smith 1992; or Huntington Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 396 Journal of European Public Policy 1993). Assumptions of the essentialist approach to the study of identity in an EU context are widespread in the conventional explanations of political theory – take Kurzer’s primordial discussion of cultural diversity in the EU where certain social traits, such as ‘communication anxiety (shyness in short) . . . [are] considered quintessentially Swedish or Finnish’ (Kurzer 2001: 147). In contrast, the constructionists argue that as identity is continually being shaped by ongoing events and encounters, so the likelihood of creating a different identity is entirely plausible (see Hall 1992; or Calhoun 1991). Critical social theory maintains that many such constructions of difference are so convincing that they appear timeless and unchanging – ‘we have always been this way, they have always been that way’ – but they are constructed as timeless. These observations are important for the study of the IIEU as they challenge the centrality of arguments based on the essentially fixed identities of the individuals, social groups and nationalities which collectively constitute the EU. The second aspect is an extension of the first, and concerns the extent to which it is possible to talk of a simple, single, categorical identity, or whether it is more appropriate to talk of complex, multiple, relational identities. By simple, single, categorical identities we mean that social groups may be shaped by similarities such as nationality, religion, gender, race, language or class (Calhoun 2001: 48; Kinnvall 2002b: 80). Thus, it is common to find writings which assume that these categorical identities provide the sole basis for collective group action, and in particular on the basis of nationality. Such simple categories have been deconstructed by a variety of disciplines within the social sciences, all of which are ‘critical of the notion of an integral, originary and unified identity’ (Hall 1996: 1). The study of national identities in the EU is similarly discussed in such categorical terms with all the implicit assumptions about national traditions, heritage, and interests, as well as the mono-dimensional nature of such identities. If we look beyond simple, single, categorical identities such as nationality we can see that gender, age, class, education are all important elements in constructing national and European identity within the EU. In addition, categorical national identities ignore the diversity of local and regional identities which may contest any simple assumptions of nationality, particularly in the EU with its wide variety of local and regional cultural and linguistic diversity. Such critical social theory suggests that it is far more appropriate to talk of complex, multiple, relational identities constructed from a diversity of differences such as gender, class, race, age, education, and locality, rather than only nationality. The implications here are clear – the mediation and negotiation of the IIEU with the rest of the world is not one of simple discussions of more or less national versus EU identity. Instead we are faced with an attempt to deconstruct far more complex, multiple and relational identities which contribute to the ongoing construction of the IIEU. As important is the extent to which the IIEU may consist of unconventional differences or cultural cleavages not considered here, as we will see in section 4. Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 397 The final aspect is the extent to which it makes sense to think of the social model of the nation-state or supra-nation state when trying to theorize the IIEU. Much of the discussion surrounding the EU, its social identity, institutions and actions, as well as its international identity, tends to be located in a discourse adopted from the nation-state. Social models of the nation-state have a tendency to be built on combinations of cultural ethnos, political demos, modern social institutions, and cosmopolitan citizenship (Delanty 1998). However, what is clear is that the EU shares few of these social aspects, with an almost absent demos, an incredibly diverse ethnos, limited social institutions, and a weak sense of transnational cosmopolitanism. This might lead us to assume that we are therefore prohibited from understanding the social model of the EU at all. But most critical social theorists agree that such difference should not be prohibitive – the EU represents a transformed social model which should not, and does not, conform to our expectations regarding its constitution. Bourdieu goes further to argue that ‘a really European Europe . . . that is free from . . . the imperialism that affects cultural production and distribution in particular’ needs to construct social ‘institutions that are capable of standing up to the forces’ of regression (Bourdieu 1998a: 129; italics in original, and 1998b: 41). From this perspective ‘the notion of a ‘‘knowledge society’’ might be a more appropriate model for the social dimension in European integration, but a ‘‘social’’ with a difference’ (Delanty 1998). The difference is that the EU social dimension should be conceptualized ‘as an institutional arena within which diversity and multiple connections among people and organizations can flourish partly because they never add up to a single, integrating whole’ (Calhoun 2001: 38). If we accept this transformed conceptualization of the EU ‘pluriform social organization’ (Calhoun 2001: 54), the IIEU will partially reflect this network of diverse and multiple connections. Thus, from the viewpoint of conventional work on identity, the notion of a difference engine reflects the attempts within the EU to engineer a single, essential, categorical identity which acts as a multiplier of differences between the EU and the world. However, as we will now see, critical social theory encourages us to analyse the IIEU as far more fluid, consisting of ongoing contestations of complex, multiple, relational identities. From this critical viewpoint the notion of a ‘difference engine’ is a means to analyse these ongoing contestations as part of the IIEU which does not add up to a single, integrating whole. Having equipped ourselves with the necessary theoretical tools, we can now turn to our attempt to conceptualize the IIEU. 4. THE DIFFERENCE? THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EU Having taken the time in the previous three sections to revisit, constitute and theorize the notion of the IIEU, we are now encouraged to go further to attempt to clarify what the combination of the six constitutive features might Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 398 Journal of European Public Policy look like and how we could conceptualize them using conventional and unconventional theories. What is important to reflect on here is the extent to which the construction of the IIEU is facilitated by the way in which the EU is without an invented traditional heritage, and thus even more open to constant reconstruction through interaction with others. Additionally, the absence of a clear-cut supranational EU identity means that unconventional cultural cleavages along the lines of civilian role identity, military role identity, and normative role identity are given expression in interesting new ways. Similarly, the absence of a clearly Westphalian polity means that the EU’s multi-perspectival polity is equally likely to contribute to the IIEU in interesting new ways. We suggest that there are at least six observations we can make here about the evolving character of the IIEU, all of which contribute towards the seventh and most important observation – that the EU is an unconventional difference engine. Drawing on all six constitutive features, but most especially the role representations, is the first observation that the IIEU is constructed and represented as pacific. Despite a mandate for military intervention, the development of military structures and the acquisition of military forces, the construction and representation of the EU as a pacific social grouping is widely accepted. This observation encourages us to look for constructions of difference between pacific versus aggressive actors, groups or orientations. The representation of the IIEU as being pacific is particularly interesting because the majority of its member states are also participants in NATO with its aggressive identity representation. Primarily located in the constitutive elements of normative power and network polity is the second observation that the EU has a principled international identity. By principled, we mean that its particular post-war historical context, its hybrid polity accentuating post-national features, and its political-legal constitution codifying core principles, all contribute to ensuring that certain norms are central to the IIEU. This second observation leads us to focus on constructions of difference between similarly principled versus differently principled actors, groups or orientations. Although it is possible to argue that many actors in world politics share the liberal-democratic principles of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, the IIEU is constructed around particular interpretations of these norms, as well as more social-democratic principles such as social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. As any scholar working on the EU knows, the functioning of its multiperspectival polity leads us to the third observation that the IIEU is one of consensus. In this consensual milieu the EU prefers encompassing, unconflictual approaches which tend to be slow and structural, rather than rapid actions. From this observation we are drawn to examine the construction of difference between similarly consensual versus differently conflictual actors, groups or orientations. Clearly, this consensual identity is one located in the EU network polity of largely consensus politics, an encompassing approach to Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 399 non-governmental organizations and the social partners, and the requirements of conciliation between its institutions. Thus, the fourth observation is that the IIEU is one of networks rather than one clear-cut persona, as we might expect from a multi-role, multi-perspectival socio-political entity. By this we mean that just as the EU network polity consists of a network of linkages, connecting a variety of governance modes, taking place in a number of places, at a multitude of levels and including supranational, national, subnational and non-national actors, so this fluid network rather than a solid entity is an element of its identity. An extension of this observation is that we would expect to find the construction of difference between similarly networked versus differently hierarchical actors, groups or orientations. From this standpoint we can ask some interesting questions about the way in which the EU’s network of relations are viewed as a feature of its network identity by those experiencing them outside the Union. An extension of these two previous observations leads us to suggest that the IIEU may also be seen as being open. The idea of the EU as being characterized as open may be seen as anachronistic to many of its citizens, but we argue that its decision-making processes, systems of consultation and legislation, and permeability of its polity make it more open to outsiders than most political entities. This fifth observation would cause us to search for constructions of difference between similarly open versus differently closed actors, groups or orientations. Potentially this is one of the most challenging facets of the IIEU as its examination requires a broad and detailed deconstruction of a very contested representation. The five observations made above lead us to suggest that the sixth observation about the IIEU is that it is clearly contra-Westphalian. This observation should come as a surprise to no one – the meta-regionalism of the EU, together with its willingness to pool sovereignty, enter into supranational legal agreements both within and without the EU, and generally act in a very un-state-like way, all signify the extent to which the EU represents the antithesis of the state in the post-Cold War world. In particular, the way in which the EU expands its own membership, encourages other regional organizations to mimic its success, and engages in inter-regional diplomacy are one element of this identity. This observation suggests that we should look for constructions of difference between similarly contra- versus Westphalian actors, groups or orientations. The implications of this for the study of the IIEU are significant in that they challenge conventional assumptions about the construction of difference between the EU and others. As we suggested in section 3, in the EU’s member states, as in much of the world, identities are primarily constructed along the conventional cultural cleavages of nationality, religion, gender, race and class. The expectation of the EU acting as a difference engine is that it would replicate these patterns by emphasizing the distinctiveness of European ‘supranationality’. However, the seventh and final observation is that the IIEU is constructed and represented Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 400 Journal of European Public Policy on the basis of unconventional differences – a complex and fluid negotiation of multiple relational identities which represent an additional EU group identity. This makes it obvious why an understanding of both conventional political theory and unconventional social theory is needed to read the IIEU. In particular, the construction of the IIEU with symbolic representations through signification, discursive representations through communication, and relational representations through intersubjectivities all demand that we possess the theoretical tools capable of answering some of the interesting questions about its relative distinctiveness from conventional comparators. In order to examine our thus conceptualized international identity, it is clear that we need to identify ‘others’ with which differentiation occurs, then analyse all three of these representations separately and in synthesis, and finally reflect on the way in which these processes are reflexively shaping the IIEU. In this article we have attempted to argue that our conceptualization of the EU as having an international identity allows, encourages, indeed forces us to think thoroughly about the way in which the construction and representation of the EU shape and mediate between the EU and the rest of the world. In four sections we have suggested that our original formulation needs a ‘reflexive’ dimension added to its ‘active’ dimension; that both polity perspectives and role representations are needed to understand the EU’s constitution; that a comprehension of political and social theories is needed in order to understand its global relations; and that we can conceptualize the EU’s international identity on the basis of unconventional differences. The difference that our approach offers is to be found in the conceptualization of the IIEU in a series of seven observations regarding its different construction and representation. Here we argued that pacifism rather than aggression; principles rather than pragmatism; slow, consensual and structural rather than rapid, conflictual action; networking rather than hierarchical; open rather than closed; and contra-normal rather than conventional are all identity traits which contribute towards ensuring that the IIEU is constructed through unconventional socio-cultural differences. Thus, we conclude by arguing that the co-joining of the terms ‘international’ and ‘identity’ reflects our commitment to analysing the EU in global politics by overcoming the unnecessary divisions, barriers and dualisms that separate the discipline of political science from the study of the social identity constructions of the EU. We have argued throughout this article that the IIEU is, like Babbage’s difference engine, based on addition – the addition of identities, processes, communication, and socio-political networks. ‘It is necessary to state distinctly at the outset, that the Difference Engine is not intended to answer special questions . . . Again, the method of difference required the use of mechanism for addition only’ (Babbage 1864: 34 and 38). We hope that we have been able to argue convincingly that the difference in looking at the IIEU is to be found in the addition of innovative means of reinterpreting, constituting, theorizing and conceptualizing the active and reflexive dimensions of the difference engine. I. Manners & R.G. Whitman: The ‘difference engine’ 401 Addresses for correspondence: Dr Ian Manners, Department of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NX, UK. Tel: ò44 1227 827252. Fax: ò44 1227 827033. email: i.j.manners@ukc.ac.uk/Professor Richard Whitman, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR, UK. Tel: ò44 20 7468 2257. Fax: ò44 20 7911 5164. email: whitmar@westminster.ac.uk Downloaded by [103.27.67.2] at 08:50 02 July 2015 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We are very grateful to Toby Archer, Annika Bergman, Charlotte Bretherton, Chris Browning, Barry Buzan, Nicola Catellani, Tarja Cronberg, Lene Hansen, Pertti Joenniemi, Catarina Kinnvall, Marika Lerch, Jocelyn Mawdsley, Guido Schwellnus, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Ole Wæver, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Ian Manners is particularly grateful to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) for a Senior Research Fellowship enabling him to work in Copenhagen during 2001. 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