After Conflict in West Africa (2005 DRAFT)

After Conflict in West Africa: Privateers or Democrats? “Experience shows that Princes who have achieved great things have given their word lightly, have known how to trick men with their cunning, and, in the end, have overcome those abiding by honest principles” Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘il Principe’ 1513 Machiavelli was no fool1. Nor are the godfathers2 of West Africa. They know that strong man dictatorship is dieing – many have been the architects of its downfall. But what are they seeking to replace it with – democracy, or a freewheeling non-state oligarchy? If the answer is the latter, and the oligarchs are not held in check, then the long-term prospects for stability in West Africa remain poor. The past twelve months has witnessed further growth of a small but distinct West African democratisation movement among the educated middle classes – highlighted by recent events in Togo – and supported by one or two enlightened states3. Yet the counterweight to this process (one that paradoxically thrives in the ill-defined legal and law enforcement landscape characteristic of embryonic democratic states) is the capacity for opportunistic - and often ‘criminal’4 - oligarchies to colonise newfound economic and political space5. Most importantly these oligarchies do not respect the sovereignty of states – in fact, they reject the idea of the sovereign nation in favour of unfettered crossborder competition between freewheeling moneymaking syndicates – in this worldview the territory where these syndicates compete is incidental and the population must fend for themselves6. There is no doubt that the restoration or reinvigoration of state sovereignty is an impediment to these oligarchs (or at least the successful ones) – and they will resist it wherever they can. Helping to restore states such that they can successfully negotiate this phase7 – and preventing violent backlashes - may represent the single greatest challenge to peace and security across the region. The Case for Privateer Oligarchy Machiavelli wrote ‘The Prince’ long before the European enlightenment. Long before Tom Paine penned the ‘Rights of Man’. In Machiavelli’s day politics were unabashedly about self-interest - how to obtain power and wealth, and how to display and retain this inheritance. The state was an individual (‘The Prince’) - and responsibility for his subject’s well being – compassion, Niccolò calls it – optional. The principle duty of the Prince was to enhance his personal power, status and wealth and ensure that he and his offspring retained those privileges: that his subjects flourished along the way was – if anything - a means to an end, certainly not an end in itself. It has taken more than two hundred hotly contested, sometimes genocidal, years to establish Tom Paine’s8 ideals as a precarious Western political canon9. We should not kid ourselves that encouraging those principles in West Africa will be an easy, or peaceful, undertaking. Contemporary West African polities have had had more in common with Machiavelli’s principalities than Tom Paine’s liberal democracies. And their down-to-earth ideals: the aggrandisement of individuals through politics (over and above the abstract ‘common good’) remain dominant. Despite the democratic rhetoric, political leaderships continue to understand their role as being served by the people rather than serving the people10. The sovereign ‘Prince’ (rather then the sovereign state) is a long held political principle in West Africa. Thus it is not surprising that powerful individuals are capitalising on the process of democraticisation11. And perhaps even less surprising that they have become much smarter at outwitting us and (to a much lesser extent) their compatriots than the old dictatorial order of Big Men12. Blatant attempts to justify or sustain non-democratic systems are now routinely faced down by direct (as occurred recently in Togo) or indirect (as in Nigeria) international responses that no longer make these systems attractive13. The emergence of non-state oligarchy in the wake of Big Man dictatorship has become a much more common and insidious trend in West Africa: and one with which the international community has yet to come to grips. From the rabble rousing and violent rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire at one extreme, to the quiet back-room deals of the postdictatorial (and post conflict) nouveux riche of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria at the other, these systems are the real heirs to the West African dictators. And the modus operandi of these ringmasters is much more slippery than the - by now quaint - in-your-face defiance of the last of the Big Men. Whilst we railed at Robert Mugabe and Faure Gnassingbe, a new generation of African Princes14 have been quietly and cleverly managing the process of democratic change in their interests, all the time ensuring that they retain the minimum language and rituals of democratic governance through sovereign institutions to keep the population, and - perhaps more importantly - the international community, off their backs. The goal of these oligarchs is less overtly egotistical - but no less ambitious - than their dictatorial forebears. By and large, they wish to maximise their profits while they can – and protect their inheritance. They do this in the old fashioned way: by subverting the sovereign (the state), capturing economic resources in the wake of the strong man and then using overt support for populist agendas15, and covert patronage or violence, to ground, expand and protect their empires. In the process they compete with other oligarchs – and that competition is itself inherently instable and often manifested in violence. In the immediate post-dictatorial period the most successful of the new order have not been interested in gaining political power per se, and certainly not in ‘running’ the state, but rather in using these routes to establish monopolies over high-return revenue sources. Their longer-term political aims are also less obvious – essentially to ensure that any new political authorities (and state security services) remain weak and thus compliant with their continuing hegemony, or - at absolute minimum - to let them keep and enjoy their gains. So, despite their lack of (to Westerners) ideological agendas16, these oligarchs still pose a threat to peace and security, and a monumental obstacle to our concepts of nation building, democratic governance and social and economic development. Firstly, they have proven willing to defy state sovereignty and encourage instability in order to capture and hold on to monopolies over wealth and power. More importantly, some of the new oligarchs have shown no direct interest in sustaining the state as an entity beyond its usefulness to their continued aggrandisement; to the point - in the Niger Delta, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, for example - where political paralysis or even civil war has served as a more profitable state of affairs. Secondly, during peaceful transitions they have proven willing to cleverly evade or sabotage political and economic programmes that strengthen the state, deepen popular democracy, create and re-invest common-wealth or deliver social improvement – where these would interfere with further unfettered personal wealth generation. Perhaps the key to understanding West Africa’s predicament is the lack of interest among the leaderships of states to regulate such behaviour in the interests of national sovereignty, stability or social improvement17. Obviously, West African oligarchies do not represent the wishes of all the people of the region. An opposition of sorts does exist. On occasions, the educated middle classes have attempted to hold government to account – particularly through civil society organisations. But opposition is more often manifested in the ‘youth’ problem – an indignation at being left out of the flagrant consumption and good times enjoyed by the oligarchs and their entourages (or a desire to obtain the same privileges) – and the consequent absence of opportunity for excluded people in West Africa. This is, however, not a manifestation of an alternative political ideology18, but a desire for a slice of the action. This report will highlight these trends in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, and provide some ideas on how the United Kingdom can enhance peace and security through encouraging and deepening democratic transformation, promoting demobilisation and security sector reform. Democratic Transition – The Weakest Link Machiavelli lived in the times of the condottieri – mercenary bands19 hired by political leaders in place of standing forces. The condottieri were famously fickle – often making deals with enemy forces behind their paymaster’s backs and either making precipitous withdrawals when faced with a determined adversary, or taking over and sacking the very cities they were contracted to defend. During the 1990s, the process of sub-contracting security and revenue collection to private individuals in West Africa has had similar outcomes. Prior to the Mano River conflicts of the 1990s, the dictatorial rulers of these countries had developed systems of parallel and informal governance that sidelined and hollowed-out state institutions, and subcontracted the management of state security and revenue resources to an informal group of presidential associates20. This led to the eventual collapse of state bureaucracies and security services21. While less complete or catastrophic, similar processes were underway in Nigeria and beginning to emerge in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. Deliberately cutting off the oxygen supply for institutional government in favour of an informally sub-contracted - mercenary - oligarchy had four purposes: • To maximise the dictator’s personal profits from state resources and minimise re-investment in government services • To counter the threat to dictators from military hierarchies (an anti-coup strategy) • To reward and pacify powerful interest groups (who, in return, would administer sections of the national territory and infrastructure on behalf of the head of state) • To weaken successor governments such that the dictator’s heirs and associates could protect their inheritance in perpetuity. Inadvertently, this process led to three other distinct effects: a) the development of an informal privatised, potentially instable, yet lucrative oligarchic precedent as an alternative to centralised institutional government – where sovereignty is shared out through a web of selfregulating and self-financing fiefs rather than through a constitutional set of sovereign, publicly funded and state-controlled institutions; b) the weakening of state authority and institutions to a point where the state can no longer maintain a monopoly over violence, collect revenues or administer territory22 – that capacity being abdicated to the aforesaid private-enterprises; and c) the potential for unregulated violent competition for emerging economic opportunities – a state of affairs that has resulted in violent civil unrest (in Nigeria) and sometimes civil war (in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and - more recently – in Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire). After a decade of disengagement, the international response to this deliberate erosion of state sovereignty and institutions, and resulting wars, altered significantly at the turn of the century. A combination of factors (a post-Rwandan genocide recognition of the dubious morality of disengagement from African conflict, and the resurgent post 9/11 global security agenda, for example) has encouraged a new phase of robust external intervention in failed states – one that began in West Africa. The objective of intervention has been to broker and police peacesettlements that aim to restore a normative sovereign state - and its monopoly over violence - and introduce democratically accountable political systems. Nevertheless, It is important to recognise that - however much we may wish it to be so - the current push to re-create sovereign, publicly funded and accountable institutional states - and democratise moribund political systems - in West Africa is not an internally driven process. It has been adopted as a condition for obtaining international security guarantees (in Sierra Leone, for example), avoiding military defeat (in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia23) and obtaining international recognition (or avoiding punitive sanctions) and resources24 (in Guinea-Bissau, Togo and post-Abacha Nigeria, for example). Hoods in the Woods – Privateer Oligarchy in Liberia “Men nearly always follow in the tracks made by others and proceed in their affairs by imitation” Niccolò Machiavelli, 1513 Nowhere is the ascendancy of privateer politics more transparent than Liberia. One new factor in 2005 is a wave of gangsterism and political violence. There is a climate of fear among the international staff of aid agencies in Monrovia25 – the factions have been emboldened to use threats and political violence to get their own way - and are succeeding - despite the presence of a huge (in relative terms) peacekeeping force. This does not bode well for the future. Monrovia’s current oligarchy is called the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), set up under the terms of an agreement26 - unique among peace settlements – not only to share power but also divvy up control of the government’s revenue generating assets between the warring parties27. While the peace settlement also stipulates that NTGL members will forfeit control of these assets once a legitimate government is elected (and cannot stand for election), it is hard to imagine the factions continuing to support the peace-process if they are required to relinquish economic power in October. Recently it has become clear that the NTGL members have been milking these assets solely for personal benefit - and have amassed fortunes. They continue to protect their stranglehold over state revenues with far more commitment than has ever been put into restoring state sovereignty. In the past few months’ factions have resorted to mafia tactics - threats and actual violence28 - to hold on to control of these institutions. The European Commission recently conducted audits29 of the major state fiscal and revenue generating agencies – the Central Bank of Liberia, the Port of Monrovia, Robertsfield International Airport, the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, the Liberian Petroleum Corporation and the Forestry Development Authority. The auditors faced obstruction throughout the process. The Commission is worried that publishing the results may lead to threats or violence against those who sponsored the process and aided the auditors, and have restricted distribution of the findings. These findings are, of course, explosive - revealing that NTGL members run government agencies as personal fiefdoms – in effect treating state institutions (and their assets and revenues) as private property revealing a cynical lack of commitment to the restoration of state sovereignty, promoting private networks to the detriment of the constitutional state. For example, a transitional government member is reported to have sold a stockpile of 100,000 tons of iron ore at Buchannan port to Chinese interests through a Lebanese intermediary for a reported $10/ton, when the market price was $40/ton. The EC audit of the Liberian Petroleum Corporation (LPC) reveals that the Director, Eli Snow – an uncle of Charles Taylor - is authorised to both set the tariffs charged to fuel importers and set the tariff paid to the central bank – pocketing the difference. The audit also reveals that LPC recently received an undeclared payment of $25 million from an international oil trader for the use of LPC strategic storage facilities (LPC has no functioning strategic storage capacity!). More likely a payment to establish an importation monopoly30. Also NTGL recently attempted to let a contact to a shady newly formed company - with no history of diamond trading - for the sole rights to export Liberian diamonds, something that was thwarted by the UN at the last moment. These are a few of the stories recounted during my recent visit to Monrovia. This is unsurprising, Charles Taylor ran the economy in exactly the same manner, except it was he, rather than a peace settlement, that brokered the distribution of concessions among oligarchs31. Indeed one could surmise that the factions have weighed the opportunity-cost of war against that of subscribing to the peaceful division of economic assets, and have chosen the latter (and the benefits of international aid and urban living) in the short term. However, if they are denied these assets one can expect a swift return to warlordism. A vision of the future was recently provided by George Dueh, Speaker of the National Legislature32 when he was suspended for corruption after exposure of his misuse of National Transitional Legislature (donor) funds33. Dueh is a prime mover in LURD. After his sacking he immediately left Monrovia to join the large body of LURD fighters occupying Guthrie rubber plantation (close to the LURD stronghold of Tubmanburg about an hour’s drive from the Capital). There he is once again engaged in gangsterism, running the plantation as a private fief, beyond the reach of UN peacekeepers. It is clear that Dueh viewed the position of Speaker not as a political responsibility, but as an economic opportunity. His commitment to nation building went only so far as it continued to provide him with a substantial income. Denied that opportunity, he has returned to the forest and the gun. It would be optimistic to think that his is an isolated viewpoint. The profligacy of the NTGL oligarchs has also had an influence on provincial commanders – they have begun to copy their leaders. Divisions that were beginning to develop between NTGL members and rural commanders have become more pronounced (although the Dueh affair suggests that this is not as acute as some imagine). Nevertheless, rural commanders are demanding a slice of the action34 – witness recent concentrations of militia in Guthrie plantation, Sappo National Park and the LAC rubber concession, and the ready recruitment of mercenaries by Chucky Taylor for Cote d’Ivoire35. Perhaps NTGL are shrewd enough to informally sanction these activities to pacify their erstwhile foot soldiers? The MonroviaTubmanburg-Lofa-Guinea border-trading network36 is now fully controlled by LURD and its sympathisers in Conakry, and border trade is reported to be brisk37. There has also been a significant return of Mandingo traders to Lofa County, which they now consider to be ‘safe’ due to an effective UNMIL presence (and the absence of Taylorite militia). This expansion of informal commerce – despite its ‘illicit’ nature - does undoubtedly provide employment and knock-on benefits to ordinary people (even if they have to endure the occasional bout of forced labour) - and this lends legitimacy to non-state governance, despite a complete absence of local administration or service provision. To overthrow oligarchy and forestall a return to warlordism will be a daunting task. The immediate priority is to ensure that the democratic process functions effectively, denying power to the factions while ensuring that any attempt to subvert or wreck the process is dealt with robustly. Right now the country is still run by warlords – albeit peacefully. Constitutional state sovereignty is yet to emerge. The transition from ‘official oligarchy’ to democratic nation state can go one of two ways: A legitimate government, concerned with re-establishing a constitutional sovereign state is elected. Through their continued monopoly on violence (UNMIL can prevent open warfare, not gangster intimidation) the factions attempt to coerce the new authority into allowing them to hold on to their economic monopolies – by keeping government weak such that it cannot uphold state sovereignty (and denying the state revenues). Probably some warlords will do deals with individuals in the new government and a hybrid administration will emerge – one or more factions may attempt to operate outside government, re-creating regional fiefs. Government will require significant and astute support from UNMIL to impose constitutional authority and uphold law and order – some violence is expected development will be difficult. A government of faction proxies, which acts to prevent the development of a sovereign state and foster the oligarchic system. Over time new oligarchs will emerge from within this government – using their role as gatekeeper to international resources to develop their positions. Conflict between competing oligarchs is inevitable. A return to a form of ‘Taylorland’38 is likely; development will be put on hold. Clearly the first option is preferable, and thus a focus on the political process leading up to the elections should be an international priority. However, UNMIL will need to provide considerable and courageous support to the new government to face down the factions and impose law and order. Demobilisation of the core combatants and security sector reform in particular will be critical. Wresting control of economic resources from the factions will be a difficult but necessary step – and one that will probably not be easy. Even so the chances of success are probably no more than 50:50. The second option is likely to lead straight back to conflict and continue to destabilise the region. Charles Taylor Liberia has been the innovator throughout the evolution of non-state oligarchies in West Africa. And the system, as it evolved in the late 1990s - under the Presidency of Charles Taylor - was the most extreme and pernicious form of privateer governance in West Africa – albeit one that has had profound influence across the sub-region. What influence does Taylor continue to exert in Liberia and beyond? Most Liberians believe Taylor is still the spider at the centre of a criminal web. Taylor was able to establish and run his ‘Taylorland’ warlord enterprise long before he became President. The Presidency was useful –not least because it brought him control of the Port of Monrovia – and a degree of legitimacy that opened up new opportunities – but it was not essential. Taylor is a master at adaptation – and there is no reason why he could not be (and perhaps already is) running his military-commercial enterprise from a less exposed (and therefore safer) standpoint – not unlike Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria. Taylor retains influence over all of the NTGL leaders and a number of the presidential candidates in one-way or another (many of the LURD commanders began their career with Taylor’s forces or in alliance with Taylor, despite current opposition to the former President). It has also been reported that many influential Liberians have visited Taylor in Calabar and an ECOWAS employee told me that he has met a known Taylor courier on a flight from Accra to Monrovia, travelling on a false passport ‘to do business’39. The continued presence of Taylor’s henchmen - the State Security Service - at the Executive mansion points to Taylor holding considerably influence over NTGL chairman Gyude Bryant. Taylor is also known to retain financial interests in Liberia, Lonestar, Liberia’s main mobile phone operator, for example. And Snow’s control of LPC40 indicates that he did not completely miss out on the post peace settlement41 division of the spoils. The Taylor faction (perhaps through his wife - who continues to live in Monrovia) retains considerable military potential too. Taylor’s other militias – the Special Operations Division and Anti Terrorist Unit - are not yet demobilised, and other so-called Government of Liberia (GoL) militiamen (and women) are also occupying concessions in the Southern logging regions (and perhaps re-starting logging operations into Cote d’Ivoire?). Recent reports of Taylor clandestinely visiting Ouagadougou may be related to conflict in Cote d’Ivoire42 (if true – I believe it highly unlikely that Taylor would risk travelling outside Nigeria, ‘though his ‘couriers’ certainly do). The reported presence of Chucky Taylor in Zwedru last year is also supports this prognosis – selling mercenaries and arms to both sides would be a Taylor speciality, perhaps in return for logging rights in Western Cote d’Ivoire or deals to ship timber through Abidjan or Mali. Taylor has links to both sides in Cote d’Ivoire – through his ethnic and possibly financial ties with Gbago and historical links to government in Burkina Faso (Burkina supported his 1989 uprising in Liberia). Taylor has had cordial relationships with France (once supporters) and Nigeria (through deals made with Babangida in 19967). Nigeria’s reluctance to expose Taylor to trial points to collusion at some level – or at least a desire not to set a precedent for West African heads of state to be prosecuted for war crimes. In the West African canon, the charismatic and unapologetic Taylor may be considered by some a model “Prince”43: it is not beyond the realms of possibility that some in Nigerian government circles might find his brand of piratical entrepreneurship attractive (its methods are mirrored in the Niger Delta) and his clandestine networks useful. The shadow of Taylor still hangs over Liberia and West Africa. International pressure to get him in front of the Special Court recognises his continued influence in the region and potential for gerrymandering during the Liberian elections. One certainty is that he will be playing politics in Liberia in the run-up to the election, if only to safeguard his assets. His desired outcome will surely be a slice of power by proxy, at least sufficient to re-establish control over logging concessions in the Cote d’Ivoire border counties? Elections Elections alone are no guarantee of positive change in the piratical economy of Liberia – but they are an important step. Technically, the election process is moving ahead well. Over 4,000 registration staff had been recruited by the time the registration of electors began on 25th April. The 64 national assembly seats will be allocated on the basis of the registration results (two per county and the remainder allocated pro rata) – the deeply flawed 1996 allocation will not be used. UNMIL’s technical support unit to the National Elections Committee (NEC) seems, unlike some components of the mission, to have developed a realistic and comprehensive plan based on lessons learned elsewhere, and be well led by able and experienced elections specialists. NEC is also supported by IFES, and NDI and IRI44 are working with political parties. There are some concerns over the absence of independent observation of the registration process – and arrangements for international observation of the October elections are yet to be made. 100,000 or so IDPs are expected to still be in camps at the time of elections. Transferable voting is a technical possibility, but may require a change in electoral law. Refugees who return after registration are also unlikely to be enfranchised. Of greater concern is the political commitment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia to standing down after elections. Despite a ban on transitional government members standing for election, Henry Supawood (a Cabinet Minister) has put himself up as a presidential candidate. USAID believe he is a stalking horse for Bryant. Some donors think NTGL might attempt to create instability in the runup in the hope that elections will be postponed. April’s orchestrated price hikes for imported rice, the staple foodstuff, were probably set-off in a move to disrupt the voter registration process (and almost certainly instigated by transitional government oligarchs), ‘though the UN effectively stepped in to prevent hoarding by importers this time. The UN peacekeeping mission45 has reported incidents of intimidation during registration. Further intimidation can be expected during the elections. The World Bank suggested providing training to the UN’s military observers46 to enable them to identify intimidation, and also to ensure that the newly trained civil police are both deployed and properly funded at the time of elections47 UNMIL election specialists identified a key requirement to define the role UNMIL and CIVPOL formed units during the elections, and also a requirement to provide training for domestic election observers through CSOs. Where are the Militia? During 2004 the former warring factions engaged fixed the disarmament and demobilisation registration process. As a result it was heavily oversubscribed48. It is almost certain that many of the participants had not been combatants (or even hangers on) 49. There is no doubt that faction commanders (who controlled the process through NCDDR) benefited through informal taxation of demobilisation benefits50. There is also no doubt that the expansion of the programme - and the additional costs involved - to 103,00051 (from a planning figure of 38,00052) has seriously compromised the ability of UNMIL to finance and deliver reintegration programmes53. Some donors think that many of this caseload where ‘ghost’ combatants54. - i.e. persons who went through disarmament multiple times using a series of false names. Only 26,000 weapons were collected from this caseload. ICRC believed that most of the heavy weapons were either, i) send by LURD back to Guinea Forestiere where their ‘Rangers’ unit is based, with the blessing of President Conte, or ii) returned them to Cote d’Ivoire, to the FANCI (Army), who, with Gbagbo’s blessing, had ‘lent’ them to MODEL forces55. Some analysts thought that ‘core combatants’ long term fighters would not be, nor were likely to be – demobilised at all. Thereby enabling the commanders to retain a private military structure ready to re-institute and defend the privatised system of governance once the UN peacekeeping force is wound down. Current evidence points more firmly towards the truth of this assertion and donors in Liberia have subsequently raised this problem as a major criticism of the process. • Despite the demobilisation process, a further 8,000 “Armed Forces of Liberia” (former soldiers many of whom became militiamen) are estimated to be in barracks in Monrovia and are demanding pensions before they will demobilise56; • The Special Security Service (Taylor bodyguard) remain armed and in control of the executive mansion; • LURD militia remain in control of Guthrie rubber plantation and the Port of Monrovia (they are openly armed in Guthrie, and probably have weapons cached in the port57) – 1,000 or more58. The port of Liberia is operating with impunity outside international maritime law (operations are not observed by UN peacekeepers), and may well be importing arms or other proscribed goods; • The Special Operations Division (a 500 strong Taylor militia) recently asked to be included (and were accepted) in the DDRR programme – after the process had been completed (they are probably short of cash); • The Anti-Terrorist Unit (another Taylor militia) has yet to demobilise; • A number of MODEL militia units have taken refuge in Sappo National Park (a principle logging area) and the LAC rubber concession (former bauxite mine). It is reported that illegal logging has restarted59 but timber is now being moved across the border into Cote d’Ivoire to avoid observation by UN forces in Buchannan. It was also reported to me in Cote d’Ivoire that arms had been shipped from Liberia into Western districts60. Significant re-recruitment (and presumably re-arming) of Liberian mercenaries is now taking place in Eastern and Southern Liberia for the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. Chucky Taylor (absconded and indicted son of Charles) was reported to have visited Zwedru61 in May 2004 and offered $100 cash upfront for each new recruit. Two Ivorian military officers were also reported to have recently visited in Zwedru on the same mission, and MODEL commanders are said to be involved in the recruitment of children for militias in Cote d’Ivoire62. I was told in Zwedru that ‘disarmed and demobilised’ militia still kept in contact with ‘respected’ (feared?) commanders, and were ready to re-arm at short notice. The UN announced in April that Sierra Leonean mercenaries had been intercepted en route to Cote d’Ivoire. Far from disarming and demobilising the combatants, it seems clear that the real hoods are still in the woods. Armed violence in Liberia has undoubtedly tailed off since completion of the UN sponsored disarmament and demobilisation programme. The October rioting in Monrovia, while violent, did not employ firearms63: According to UNDP this is a positive impact of the collection of weapons. Yet core combatant’s access to weapons is unlikely to have been affected by the disarmament process, as few heavy weapons (machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars) were handed in, and at least one faction are still openly bearing arms (LURD in Guthrie rubber plantation). The UN’s disarmament process has been heavily criticised by international donors and NGOs alike64: • the caseload was far too large, included many non-combatants and ‘ghost’ combatants; • the most notorious militia groups were not disarmed; • commanders received over generous and special treatment – reenforcing rather than breaking down command and control over ex-combatants; • lists for disarmament were not drawn up and verified before disarmament (possession of a weapon or ammunition was the only criteria for entry into the programme – and, even so, only 25% of those enrolled handed in a weapon); • some commanders were able to ‘informally tax’ ex-combatants benefits; • payment of travel and subsistence allowances ($300-cash) to child combatants had led to exploitation; • UN planning and policy making on disarmament and demobilisation was neither evidence-based, nor consultative and felt ‘ad hoc’. The EC delegate has suggested that an external evaluation of the Liberian disarmament process is undertaken, to reveal the truth and hold the UN to account65. It seems clear that the timings and demobilisation package articulated in the comprehensive peace agreement are also culpable, although planning and technical implementation was undoubtedly hurried and poorly executed. An oft-quoted assertion among aid workers in Liberia is that the 1997 Taylor Presidency (and subsequent return to conflict in 1999) was caused by a failure of the re-integration process after the first attempt at disarmament in 1996. The logic works this way: reintegration completes the process of demobilisation, by breaking down command structures and providing alternative employment and lifestyle options for ex-combatants. Taking the combatants and weapons out of the system, and providing viable alternatives to violence minimizes the likelihood of a return to conflict. Yet reintegration is a technical solution to political problem. The political economy of Liberia’s oligarchs primarily seeks to colonise, control and maximise returns from economic activity – that is the purpose of its politics. Thus any economic activity that an ex-combatant is ‘reintegrated’ into remains ultimately part of the very system that required combatants at the outset. Put simply; farmers, traders, mechanics and combatants are all working for the same master and are all required in equal measure. The purpose of violence is to expand, regulate and protect warlord economies – it is used to colonise business opportunities (often wresting them from weak states) intimidate rivals; enforce leadership decisions, drive down costs and collect rents. In so doing, violence opens up and exploits new markets for arms, mercenaries, drugs and other illicit goods. The military command system cannot be broken up if the political economy that requires that command system in the first instance is not broken up too. While the deployment of UN peacekeepers has prevented open violence between combatant groups, they have not established law and order (not were they expected to). Warlords still require enforcers, protection rackets and other less visible forms of coercion to expand, manage and protect their enterprises. The alternative logic of this argument is that Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (and RR in particular) can only succeed if the political world in which it takes place has changed too. In Liberia this is clearly not the case. Despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UN peace support operation, the political economy of Liberia is still founded on private economic fiefdoms, in which powerful individuals hold sovereignty, not a constitutional state. In Liberia the UN needs to get the politics right before placing significant hopes in the transformational powers of reintegration and rehabilitation programmes. It is perhaps no co-incidence that most ex-combatants chose education or vocational training options during demobilisation. At first glance education and training offers a means of escape from a warlord economy. Education is also an urban activity – offering a chance to get to the bright lights, where most work is to be found during a peace support operation66. But education also has the potential to keep former militia units together and, perhaps more prosaically, most ex-coms take a short term view and are more interested in the stipend they receive from a training course - a hot meal and a bed for the night. While reintegration remains important, transformation of the politics and the economy is the prerequisite to long-term stability in Liberia. Catching Pirates: Recommendations for the UK The key 1990’s political innovation in West Africa was the illiberal and oligarchic system of privateer governance67 epitomised by the arch practitioner Charles Taylor68. This system remains attractive to those whose interest in politics remains a focus on personal power, status and wealth. Despite massive donor investment in disarmament and demobilisation, many of those who championed this system remain prominent in West African politics and form a strong element within both government and opposition in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Cote d’Ivoire69 and Nigeria – indeed elements of the system remain alive and well, if better hidden, across the region. Nowhere is the ascendancy of privateer politics more transparent than Liberia. Despite international intervention, the political economy of Liberia is still founded on private economic fiefdoms, in which powerful individuals hold sovereignty, not the constitutional state. The UK should use its influence to ensure that the international community works to get the politics right, before placing significant hopes in the transformational powers of re-integration and rehabilitation programmes, This can being in Liberia by specifically; • Outlawing Privateer Oligarchy. UK can help ensure that the EC audits are properly followed up, and appropriate action taken by the UN mission, including ensuring that state institutions cease to function as the private fiefs of transitional government members. Regional and international engagement will be required, and the Mano River Union, ECOWAS and the AU should be part of this process. • Putting Charles Taylor before the Special Court. Charles Taylor remains a ringleader and role model for many. The UK should corral international pressure to get Taylor before the Special Court. Influence with Nigeria is key. • Enforcing law and order. The UN peacekeeping mission is effective, but requires the resources to ensure that civil police are properly deployed. UNMIL should work to ensure that their command and control is not colonised by the oligarchs. The UK should use its influence to ensure that this process is complete before the elections take place in October. • Demobilising core combatants and security sector reform. Without effective demobilisation and security sector reform, sovereignty remains with the oligarchs. And despite an electoral process, it will be difficult to wrest it back in the absence of an effective state controlled security and law enforcement apparatus to enforce constitutional compliance. • Preventing electoral fraud. In the run-up to elections, consider providing funds for in-service training for UN military observers70 to enable them to identify and prevent voter intimidation, and to provide training for domestic election observers.. • Engaging with the UN Secretary General’s new Special Representative for Liberia to advocate considerable and courageous support from the UN to the new government to face down militia factions and impose law and order after the elections. Of equal concern are the regional and international connections between these oligarchies – and their economic and paramilitary structures. Non-state political economies can and do take on global dimensions71. In some West African countries, international intervention has served to drive these systems underground – at least temporarily – but not to eradicate them. It will be a major challenge to ensure that they are not allowed to re-emerge in the wake of the disarmament and demobilisation, post conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, state-building and democratisation processes currently heavily supported by the international community across the region72. James Fennell 11 He was also a civil servant – Secretary to the Military Committee of the Republic of Florence, before the Medici’s overthrew the Republic and incarcerated him – and to whom, with considerable irony, he is probably referring. 2 Colloquial term for the oligarchs who broker power in Nigeria. 3 Ghana and Senegal chief among them – though neither are immune from Oligarchy. 4 I use the term criminal in a fairly subjective sense (in that these enterprises operate in violation of international law – something that few, if any, states implement fully). Such people often do not themselves consider their actions illegal – as they fall within the legitimate canons of West Africa’s political and cultural heritage. It is easy to forget that in most West African states the law was not interpreted as a universal set of rules and responsibilities, but as a tool of authority – with, first and foremost, a duty to serve those in power. 5 The most topical international parallel is, of course, Russia: (although Putin’s crusade against Russia’s oligarchs is probably more properly defined as a conflict between re-emergent dictatorship and oligarchy, where neither party has much interest in popular democracy). 6 Pre-colonial Africa functioned like renaissance Italy or pre-Peace of Westphalia Germany: politicoeconomic nodes – the Ashanti Kingdom, Republic of Florence etc. - within loose [borderless] ethnoreligious groupings. That political tradition is still strong. 7 Where a syndicate of oligarchs runs the state – Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia for example - there is, of course, an inherent contradiction. 8 Mary Wollstonecraft’s ‘Vindication of the Rights of Women’ is yet to be achieved. 9 And perhaps 100 million lives were lost in the process – most of them in the name of the ‘people’. 10 I presented this assertion to a group of Ivorian academics and West African diplomats in Abidjan – it was not contested. 11 Given the opportunity, human experience indicates, oligarchs would emerge anywhere. 12 Who had no need to hide their politics when - in their Cold war heydays - they were tacitly approved of by Western or Soviet patrons. 13 Incidentally, implicit in this analysis is an acknowledgement of the positive impact of international coercive measures such as sanctions against named individuals. 14 Often, in fact, re-incarnations of the old generation: Ibrahim Babangida, for example. 15 In particular the politics of fear – especially when used to inflame ethnic or religious difference as a cause for concern. 16 Post-classical political ideology is a relatively new, European-enlightenment concept – as indeed is the nation state. Old-fashioned Machiavellian personal politics – the politics of power, money and status, are much more universal and enduring. We often forget - in our own mono-ideological times – that, to those confronted with them, the technocratic principles of liberal-democracy often appear profoundly abstract and unworldly concepts. 17 Nigeria – with a higher conflict related body count than the rest of West Africa combined, is, nevertheless, able to sustain a functioning oligarchic state – and has not, until recently, courted the same degree of international intervention as more fragile states such as Liberia or Sierra Leone. 18 As some, notably Paul Richards, have asserted [for example, see “Fighting for the Rainforest” 1996 (African Issues)]. For an alternative view see Lansana Gberie’s forthcoming book : “Sierra Leone Destruction and Resurgence” May 2005 (Hurst) 19 Mostly English and French armed bands seeking fortune after demobilisation at the end of the Hundred Years War. 20 See William Reno: “Warlord Politics and African States” 1998 (Reinner) 21 By 1987 the Sierra Leone armed forces were reduced to 2,000 poorly equipped and paid men, while key presidential associates were allowed to retain much more powerful private militias to protect their interests (in Reno). 22 Reno records that state revenues from diamond extraction (30% of total state income, and 70% of foreign currency earnings) declined from around $200 million/annum in the 1960s to $0.1 million in 1987. The president’s and his associates’ private earnings accounted for the difference. 23 While Cote d’Iviore had held democratic elections before the rebellion of 2001, the majority of international observers discredited them. In Liberia in 2003 the US/EU-backed ECOWAS intervention force threatened to remove all of the major factions from power. 24 In particular, to avoid personal sanctions that might threaten an individual’s offshore wealth and ability to enjoy it. 25 This was a key issue raided on the first day of the mission by EC staff. 26 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 27 For example, the LURD faction was given control of the Port of Monrovia, MODEL control of the Port of Buchannan, Taylor’s relatives retained control of the Liberian Petroleum Corporation etc. 28 In January 2005 a British employee of Bureau Veritas, a French company working for the bureau of maritime affairs, was given 48 hours to leave the country after he objected to BMA’s demands for kickbacks during contract re-negotiation. The Chairman of NTGL, Gyude Bryant, did nothing to prevent this blatant intimidation. 29 Ernst & Young’s Brussels office and Moore Stephens of London conducted the audits. 30 Personal communication with EC staff. 31 Taylor’s methods would be familiar to a number of British colonial pioneers, Robert Clive’s Calcutta and Henry Morgan’s Port Royale were both founded on similar buccaneering principles – the licensing of privateers (private individuals to whom national sovereignty has been delegated for specific tasks). 32 Dueh was `suspended along with the vice Speaker and the chairs of two committees after an investigation into corruption in the transitional legislature. An ECOWAS anti-corruption delegation has subsequently been brought in to investigate the conduct of the NTGL. 33 The legislature currently comprises non-elected faction appointees 34 They do not, however, seem to want to change the system, rather find ways that they can compete more effectively for its spoils. 35 See below for a more detailed description of these trends 36 Taylor once claimed that he wanted to make Liberia the Hong Kong of West Africa – he was referring to the Monrovia-Guinea trading axis - a system that allows tariff-free, no questions asked, goods to enter Liberia cheaply and then be on-shipped to the ‘illegal’ border markets in Lofa country & Guinea Forestiere – from whence they can reach anywhere in the region (the system’s economic efficiency comes from its low-cost base (most of the porterage was done by ‘enslaving’ the peasantry, for example), non-bureaucratic form and reliance on non-state informal trading networks – smugglers to you and me). Hong Kong was of course developed in the teeth of Chinese opposition and founded on controlling the opium trade – so the parallels are perhaps greater than one might at first imagine. 37 Michael Tinne (EC Livelihoods Consultant) 38 Reno’s term for Taylor’s non-territorial gangster-state. 39 The courier was resident in Ghana. He suggested his business was ‘money laundering’. 40 Interestingly MOSOP recently informed me that Taylor was also consorting with Nigerian oil traders – perhaps linked to LPC deals? 41 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 42 Speculatively, he might even have been asked to intervene with Burkina to help get Ouatarra and Gbago to agree on a way forward. 43 Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun no doubt had their admirers too. 44 National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. 45 Fritz (technical support unit) 46 Military Observers – they are the only UN element deployed within reach of most of the 2,500 polling stations. 47 Giovianna 48 See James Fennell: RCA DDR Paper (Draft), May 2004. 49 ICRC reported whole families – mum, dad and the kids - queuing up for disarmament in Lofa county. 50 Steve Ursino - UNDP Country Director - pers comm. 51 Intelligence based estimates of the combatant caseload range from 15,000 (Fennell) to 20,000 (ICRC) 52 ICRC estimated that no more than 25,000 actual combatants were present in Liberia in 2003. I estimated 15,000 in 2004. It is not clear how the UNMIL planning figure was derived. 53 It is not just a question of finance – there is simply not enough internal institutional capacity in Liberia to accommodate all 103,000 participants in re-integration programmes (UNDP pers. comm.) 54 Chris Gabellle – DFID/EC Governance Programme – pers comm. 55 Stocker –pers. comm. 56 US Embassy estimates. 57 Since UNMIL’s writ does not run to the port, this is difficult to verify – but likely. UNMIL have been talking about launching a series of operations to take control of Guthrie plantation and the Port of Monrovia from LURD. 58 ICRC (Stocker) felt that UNMIL need a ‘dirty deal’ to persuade LURD to leave Guthrie – that a robust interpretation of their chapter VII mandate in Guthrie would lead to significant loss of life (on both sides) 59 We heard this from a variety of sources (Geoff Rudd EC Delegate & David Lelliot, for example). 60 Alan Doss, Deputy SRSG (Cote d’ivoire) & Stocker - ICRC for example. 61 We spoke to a Liberian DAI employee in Zwedru who claimed to have attended the meeting held by Chucky Taylor, although he could not be precise about the date when pressed. 62 Kearney (UNICEF), Stocker (ICRC), Tubman (DAI). 63 An alternative view is that open use of weapons would invite a tougher response from UNMIL 64 Note: this was not a trust fund activity; UNMIL had overall design responsibility for the D1 programme. 65 The EC (Ingerstedt) said that this was required to understand i) decision-making process behind the increase in the caseload – especially the inclusion of a category of ‘others’, ii) the logic behind UNMIL’s policy to provide TSA to children, and iii) why the core combatant groups had not been included in DDRR. 66 Many ex-combatants get involved in petty trading & prostitution in the service of the international aid operation (UNICEF) 67 Mark Duffield “Global Governance and the New Wars: the merging of development and security” 2001, charts the evolution of these new forms of political system. 68 See Global Witness: ‘Taylor Made’: 2001, for an excellent description of the 1996-2003 Taylor-run oligarchic system in Liberia, based around the sub-contracting of governance to a variety of heavily armed private enterprises – port operators, logging companies, diamond & drugs smugglers, traders in fuel, arms and manufactured goods. 69 And both have strong links with the oligarchs of Nigeria. 70 Military Observers – they are the only UN element deployed within reach of most of the 2,500 polling stations. 71 Drugs cartels and oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, the trade in conflict diamonds and Taylor’s 72 The failure of the 1996-7 process to prevent Taylor from obtaining the presidency, and developing an oligarchic non-institutional state sets a dangerous precedent. Stagnation and corruption in the GOSL and the NTGL do not bode well for the future.