Studia graeco-arabica
11/1
_______
2021
Editorial Board
Mohammad Ali Amir Moezzi, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Carmela Baffioni, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli
Sebastian Brock, Oriental Institute, Oxford
Charles Burnett, The Warburg Institute, London
Hans Daiber, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a. M.
Cristina D’Ancona, Università di Pisa
Thérèse-Anne Druart, The Catholic University of America, Washington
Gerhard Endress, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Richard Goulet, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
Steven Harvey, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem
Henri Hugonnard-Roche, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Remke Kruk, Universiteit Leiden
Concetta Luna, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
Alain-Philippe Segonds (†)
Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University, Milwaukee (WI)
Staff
Elisa Coda (Executive Editor), Cristina D’Ancona, Maria Fasciano, Issam Marjani, Cecilia Martini Bonadeo
Submissions
Submissions are invited in every area of the studies on the trasmission of philosophical and scientific texts from Classical Antiquity
to the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modern times. Papers in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish are published.
Prospective authors are invited to check the Guidelines on the website of the journal, and to address their proposals to the Editor in Chief.
Peer Review Criteria
Studia graeco-arabica follows a double-blind peer review process. Authors should avoid putting their names in headers or footers
or refer to themselves in the body or notes of the article; the title and abstract alone should appear on the first page of the submitted
article. All submitted articles are read by the editorial staff. Manuscripts judged to be of potential interest to our readership are sent
for formal review to at least one reviewer. Studia graeco-arabica does not release referees’ identities to authors or to other reviewers.
The journal is committed to rapid editorial decisions.
Subscription orders
Information on subscription rates for the print edition of Volume 11/1 and 11/2 (2021), claims and customer service: press@unipi.it.
Web site: http://learningroads.cfs.unipi.it/sga
Service Provider: Università di Pisa, ICT - Servizi di Rete Ateneo
ISSN 2281-2687 / ISSN 2239-012X (Online)
ISBN 978-88-3339-614-9 / ISBN 978-88-3339-615-6 (Online)
Registration at the law court of Pisa, 18/12, November 23, 2012.
Editor in Chief: Cristina D’Ancona (cristina.dancona@unipi.it)
Mailing address: Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere, via Pasquale Paoli 15, 56126 Pisa, Italia.
Italian Scientific Journals Ranking: A (ANVUR, Classe A)
Indexing and Abstracting; ERIH PLUS (SCH ESF); Index Islamicus (Brill Bibliographies); Scopus (Elsevier)
© Copyright 2021 by Pisa University Press Polo editoriale - Centro per l’innovazione e la diffusione della cultura
Università di Pisa
Piazza Torricelli 4 - 56126 Pisa
P. IVA 00286820501 · Codice Fiscale 80003670504
Tel.+39 050 2212056 · Fax +39 050 2212945
E-mail press@unipi.it · PEC cidic@pec.unipi.it
www.pisauniversitypress.it
Studia graeco-arabica. Vol. 1 (2011)-
. - Pisa : Pacini editore, 2011-
. – Annuale. Dal 2021: Pisa : Pisa university press.
180.05 (23.)
1. Filosofia araba - Periodici 2. Filosofia greca - Periodici
CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell’Università di Pisa
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the Publisher. The Publisher remains at the disposal of the
rightholders, and is ready to make up for unintentional omissions. Studia graeco-arabica cannot be held responsible for the scientific opinions of the
authors publishing in it.
Cover
Mašhad, Kitābḫāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 300, f. 1v; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1853, f. 186v
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism:
A Study and Analysis of the Trinitarian Florilegium
in MS British Library Add. 14532
Bishara Ebeid*
Abstract
This paper aims to study and analyse the Trinitarian doctrine of a Syriac Patristic florilegium of
Trinitarian content found in MS London, British Library, Add. 14532, in an attempt to understand
the reasons that led to its composition. It will include an analysis of the development of Miaphysite
metaphysics during the sixth and the seventh centuries, when the Miaphysites had to deal with various
internal controversies, and an analytical presentation of the florilegium and of its contents, with an
identification of the patristic quotations used by the compiler. The study of the theology and metaphysics
of this florilegium will go on to demonstrate that the Miaphysites, starting from their Christology and
the problems it created in their Trinitarian doctrine, formulated a metaphysical system based on a new
comprehension of “substance”, “hypostasis”, “property” and “monarchy” and developed what I call
“Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine”.
Introduction
The paradox of the Christian faith is to believe in one God and to affirm that this one
God is Triune. In Eastern Christianity, Trinitarian doctrine was a main topic of discussion
in three moments: 1) during the first four centuries and with a culmination in the fourth
century, when the Trinitarian dogma was first formulated; 2) in the sixth and early seventh
centuries, during the Christological controversies, when the question of Tritheism emerged
among Miaphysites, and 3) under Islamic rule, when Christians had to explain again that their
doctrine of Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism.
Whole libraries have been written on all these topics. With this paper, however, I aim
to highlight the long-term consequences of Tritheism in the Miaphysite church, which, for
reasons that still have to be determined, was still composing dogmatic patristic florilegia
against Tritheism under Abbasid rule. The present paper aims to study and analyse the
Trinitarian doctrine of a florilegium of Trinitarian content found in MS BL Add. 14532 and
in a number of other places, in an attempt to understand the theological reasons behind
its composition. This florilegium, like others, was composed and copied after the second
moment of Trinitarian debates mentioned above and used by Syriac and Arabic Christian
authors during the third phase.
I shall start by summarizing some major and well-known points of the early development
of Trinitarian dogma, based mainly on the Trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocian fathers.
*
This article resulted from research funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (GA No 758732 – FLOS. Florilegia Syriaca).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021 – ISSN 2281-2687 – ISSN 2239-012X (Online)
© Copyright 2021 Pisa University Press Polo editoriale CIDIC – doi: 10.12871/97888333961493
84 Bishara Ebeid
This summary is necessary to understand the subsequent developments during the following
phases of the Trinitarian controversies and will help the reader better understand the solutions
offered. Then, after a presentation of the florilegium and of its content, including an identification
of the patristic quotations used by the compiler, I shall analyse the theology and metaphysics
of the florilegium in relation to the Trinitarian discussions of the sixth and seventh centuries.
I shall demonstrate that the Trinitarian content of this florilegium has Miaphysite
Christology as its starting point and could therefore be called a Miaphysite Trinitarian
doctrine. In addition, it will be shown that this florilegium offers a new formulation and
synthesis of the metaphysical terms and concepts used by Miaphysites in their Christological
and Trinitarian doctrine. As such, it was used as a major building block of Miaphysite works
against Chalcedonians and Nestorians written during the eighth and ninth centuries, in
Syriac and Arabic. At the same time, the content of this florilegium should be seen as an
important reference for Miaphysite apologetic writings produced during the third phase of
Trinitarian debates, that is, with Muslim scholars.
1. The Cappadocians and the Establishment of the Trinitarian Dogma: A Short Summary
On the eve of Nicaea, Christian theologians sought to use metaphysical concepts to
explain the relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.1 The Council of
Nicaea established that the Son is true God (from) begotten of true God; generated by the
Father; of the same substance (consubstantial) as the Father “ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί”; and that
he is Creator. However, the Council did not clarify the difference between the metaphysical
terms “substance” (οὐσία) and “hypostasis” (ὑπόστασις), nor did it sufficiently explain what
consubstantiality means.2
The Cappadocian Fathers, Basil the Great (d. 379), Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390) and
Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), contributed a great deal to the clarification of the metaphysical
terminology (substance/οὐσία, nature/φύσις,3 hypostasis/ὑπόστασις, person/πρόσωπον and
consubstantial/ὁμοούσιον) in response to the challenges of Arians, Eunomians, Sabellians,
Pneumatomachians (Macedonians)4 and Apollinarists,5 who understood the same metaphysical
1
See M. Simonetti, La crisi Ariana nel IV secolo, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1975 (Studia
Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 11); B. Lonergan, The Way to Nicaea. The dialectical development of trinitarian theology,
Darton, Longman and Todd, London 1976.
2
See B. Studer, Dio Salvatore nei Padri della Chiesa. Trinità-Cristologia-Soteriologia, Borla, Roma 1986 (Cultura
Cristiana Antica, Studi, 6), pp. 150-5 and 158-9. For more on the doctrine of the Council see L. Ayres, Nicaea and
its Legacy. An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2004.
3
It must be noted that the term nature “φύσις” was not as frequently used by the Cappadocians as was the term
substance “ουσία”; both terms are used interchangeably in the work of the Cappadocian Amphilochius of Iconium,
see Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 205.
4
On all these heresies and their doctrines see M. Simonetti, Studi di Cristologia postnicena, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2006 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 98); F. Dünzl, A Brief History of the
Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Church, T&T Clark, New York 2007; H. Newman, The Arians of the Fourth
Century, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene OR 1996.
5
The Trinitarian doctrine of Apollinaris of Laodicea was characterized by a radical subordination in the
Trinity. On his Trinitarian doctrine see E. Mühlenberg, Apollinaris von Laodicea, Vandenhoek&Ruprecht,
Göttingen 1968 (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Band 23), pp. 230-7; on the accusations against
him see B. Ebeid, La Tunica di al-Masīḥ. La Cristologia delle grandi confessioni cristiane dell’Oriente nel X e XI
secolo, Valore Italiano-Edizione Orientalia Christiana, Roma 20192, pp. 250-5.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 85
terms in different ways.6 By resorting to the Aristotelian distinction7 between second and first
substance,8 and having as background Stoic interpretations of the Aristotelian categories,9 the
Cappadocians distinguished between the general or common, the “κοινόν”, and the particular
or specific, the “ἴδιον”. In this way the substance, an abstract reality, is the common and
general, and is not identified with the particular and singular, which is the hypostasis, the
concrete realization of the abstract.10 An analogy from the created world helped Basil clarify
his thought: the “common” element of all human beings is their nature, which is equal in each
one; the individuals belonging to this same common nature, however, are distinguished from
one another: each individual is the specific, or the particular of the same common nature.11
Participating in, and belonging to, the same nature and substance means consubstantiality.12
As a result, by applying this line of reasoning to his Trinitarian doctrine, Basil, with the
other Cappadocians, arrived at the formula “God is one substance (in) three hypostases”.13 It
must be noted that as far as created and material substances are concerned, each hypostasis
is considered as an individual, a single substance with its specific and determined qualities.
In the case of the uncreated God, however, and since the divine substance is simple and
immaterial, the divine hypostases cannot be considered as individuals, even if according to
Cappadocian thought hypostases are concrete substances. This was, as it were, one of the
main weak points of their metaphysical system.
If this doctrine was developed by Cappadocians in their response to the doctrines of
Arians, and especially Eunomians who did not accept that the Father and the Son participate
in the same substance, in defining orthodoxy against the challenge of Sabellians they had
to clarify the relationship between the terms hypostasis and person. In order to define the
Trinity against the doctrine of the Sabellians, Basil used the term πρόσωπον, but did not
understand it in the classical meaning of mask, used by Sabellius himself and his followers;
6
See Ph. Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution to the Trinitarian Doctrine. A Synthesis of Greek Paideia and the
Scriptural Worldview”, Phronema 25 (2010), pp. 57-83, here p. 59.
7
On the topic of distinctions in Basil and its relation to Aristotelian philosophy see A. Radde-Gallwitz, Basil
of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford
2009 (Oxford Early Christian Studies), pp. 122-42, where the author speaks of five kinds of distinctions in Basil
which are keys for understanding his thought: 1) ‘knowing that’ vs ‘knowing what’; 2) ‘knowing how’ vs ‘knowing
what’; 3) absolute vs relative terms; 4) common vs particular; and 5) positive vs negative terms.
8
It was Gregory of Nyssa who developed this Aristotelian distinction, see L. Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and
the Concept of Divine Persons, Oxford U.P.s, Oxford - New York 2005 (American Academy of Religion, Academy
Series); Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 204.
9
See S. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea. A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2007, pp. 45-56; There is still a discussion
among scholars as to whether Basil used Stoicism more than Aristotle in his Trinitarian definitions, see N. Jacobs, “On ‘Not Three Gods’-again: Can a Primary-Secondary Substance Reading of Ousia and Hypostasis Avoid
Tritheism?”, Modern Theology 24 (2008), pp. 331-58, here pp. 332-5.
10
See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), p. 63; Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea (above, n. 7),
pp. 132-7. On the abstract and concrete see Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 58-9.
11
See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 63-4.
12
See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 45-56, 67-74 and 76-82; Ch. A. Beeley, Gregory of
Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God. In Your Light We Shall See Light, Oxford U.P., Oxford - New
York 2008 (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), pp. 220-4. It must be noted that for the Cappadocians consubstantiality must be always seen with the monarchy of the Father; we will come back to this last topic in a while.
13
See Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), pp. 203-4; Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 222.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
86 Bishara Ebeid
he rather identified it with the term hypostasis.14 In this case the ὑπόστασις gives essence to
the general nature and manifests it perfectly in a particular and concrete nature; the πρόσωπον
personalizes the general nature and makes it determined, so that these two terms acquired
almost the same meaning and metaphysical function.15
It was also necessary to explain the relationship of the hypostases with the common substance,
and of the hypostases with one another. These questions were the result of the reflection on how
the three hypostases should not be considered as three deities. In fact, for the Cappadocians
the affirmation of one common nature in God and of three consubstantial hypostases was not
enough to demonstrate that Trinity is not tantamount to Tritheism. Therefore, the three divine
hypostases had to have one and unique cause “αἰτία”, principle “ἀρχή” and source “πηγή”,
not in a chronological, but in an ontological sense. For them, this cause is the same Father. In
this way, the Father, as hypostasis and essence,16 is the one who maintains the uniqueness in
the Trinity.17 He is the eternal cause of the eternal generation of the Son; he is also the eternal
cause of the eternal procession of the Spirit. The Father, then, is the cause of the Trinity being
a hypostasis and essence without being identified with the general substance, common to the
three divine hypostases. He, unlike the other two hypostases, is uncaused. He gives existence
to the other two divine hypostases, which are co-eternal to him, participate in the same divine
general substance, however, they are caused. For the Cappadocians, and especially for Gregory
of Nazianzus, the monarchy of the Father is, on the one hand, the cause and root of the unity of
the divine essence, and on the other, the reason for the distinct identities of the three hypostases.18
Therefore, consubstantiality cannot be understood without the monarchy of the Father. In fact,
it is the Father who fully conveys his divinity to the Son and the Spirit.19
To explain the relationship between substance and hypostasis, Basil develops the concept
of property “ἰδιότης” and idiom “ἰδίωμα”. The hypostasis of the unbegotten Father results
from the joining of the general divine substance to the property of unbegottenness; the
hypostasis of the Son, eternally begotten by the Father, results from the adding of the idiom
of the eternal begottenness to the same general substance; while the hypostasis of the Spirit,
eternally proceeding from the Father, results from the joining of the idiom and property of
the procession to the divine substance. Thus, the idiom has a metaphysical role distinct from
that of the hypostasis, but through it the hypostasis is recognized and distinct from the other
hypostases of the same common substance. In other words, idiom and property are related to
the hypostasis, while the hypostasis is related to the substance.20 This distinction was essential
in the polemic against the Eunomians, who identified the property with the substance and
hypostasis and affirmed that knowing that the property of the Father is different from that of
the Son reveals that their substances are different. In fact, Basil and the other Cappadocians
See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 82-92.
See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 62-6; L. Turcescu, “Prosōpon and Hypostasis in Basil
of Caesarea’s ‘Against Eunomius’ and the Epistles”, Vigiliae Christianae 51 (1997), pp. 374-95.
16
See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 212.
17
See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 66-7.
18
See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), pp. 201-17; Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above,
n. 9), pp. 67-74 and especially 96-8.
19
See Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus (above, n. 12), p. 206.
20
See S. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), p. 92.
14
15
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 87
also intended to highlight that the divine substance remains unknown and incomprehensible.21
In order to explain the relationship between the hypostases themselves as between cause
and caused, that is, the relationship between the monarchy of the Father, the co-eternity
of the hypostases and their consubstantiality, the Cappadocians developed the concept of
“relationship”, σχέσις.22 Thus, the Son, being begotten by the Father, is in relationship with
the Father, and this relationship is called “filiation”. The Spirit, proceeding from the Father,
is in relationship with him, and this relationship is called “procession”. As a consequence, the
Father is in relationship with the Son and the Spirit through his “paternity”. The relationship
is the distinctive character of the hypostasis (χαρακτήρ της ὑποστάσεως) or the ἰδίωμα of each
hypostasis, or also the mode of existence, τρόπος της ὑπάρξεως or ὑποστάσεως.23
Thus, the Cappadocians established a Christian metaphysical system, called by some
scholars like J. Zachhuber “Patristic Philosophy”, a system that can be summarized in the
following points, without, however, entering into detail on the differences between the singles
Cappadocians:24 1) substance, if conceived as a common and universal reality, cannot exist
without its instantiations; only the concrete realities are real, since they have their existence
through the hypostasis, or in other words the substance, which is an immanent reality, is
instantiated in its hypostases;25 2) the hypostases of the same substance are consubstantial
since they share the same substance and perfectly manifest the properties predicated of their
common substance; 3) each hypostasis has its own property and idiom that distinguishes it
from the other hypostases of the same substance; 4) a hypostasis can be considered as a single
substance, since it manifests the general and common substance concretely and perfectly, but
cannot be identified with the general substance; 5) in created and material beings hypostases
are individuals, while in uncreated beings, i.e. in the Godhead, and since divine substance is
immaterial and spiritual, hypostases are not seen as individuals; therefore 6) in Trinitarian
doctrine it is better to avoid calling the hypostases “single/particular substances”;26 7) the
21
On this topic see Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea (above, n. 7); T. Stepien – K. Kochańczyk-Bonińska,
Unknown God, Known in His Activities. Incomprehensibility of God during the Trinitarian Controversy of the 4th
Century, Peter Lang, Berlin 2018 (European studies in theology, philosophy and history of religions, 18).
22
See Kariatlis, “St Basil’s Contribution” (above, n. 6), pp. 67-8.
23
See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), pp. 59-67; Studer, Dio Salvatore (above, n. 2), p. 203.
24
For a detailed analysis of the Cappadocian metaphysics, the differences between the single Fathers etc. see
J. Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the
Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus, Oxford U.P., Oxford - New York 2020.
25
One must mention that Gregory of Nyssa’s position is quite different from his brother Basil since he, in his
highlighting the oneness of the substance, accepts, in some way, the existence of the common substance (realism)
refuting, in this manner, the risk of considering it as simple concept in mind (nominalism), for more details see C.
Erismann, L’ homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Age, J. Vrin, Paris, 2011,
pp. 149-85, and J. Zachhuber, “Universals in the Greek Church Fathers”, in R. Chiaradonna – G. Galluzzo (eds.),
Universals in Ancient Philosophy, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2013, pp. 425-70, especially pp. 436-47. See also
D. Krausmüller, “A Conceptualist Turn: The Ontological Status of Created Species in Late Greek Patristic Theology”, Scrinium 16 (2020), pp. 233-52.
26
On these topics in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, especially concerning the relationship between,
from one hand, the substance as universal and common and, from the other, the hypostases as particular substances, calling them as such, as well as concerning whether there is a distinction between substance and nature, see J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance, Brill, Leiden 2000 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 46); J. Zachhuber, “Once again: Gregory
of Nyssa on Universals”, Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005), pp. 75-98; R. Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
88 Bishara Ebeid
oneness of the divine substance, the monarchy of the Father, the consubstantiality of the
hypostases and the simplicity and immateriality of the divinity is what ensures unity in the
Godhead, which for the Cappadocians is the correct way to understand Monotheism;27 and
finally 8) on the one hand, substance and nature have the same meaning, and on the other
hand, hypostasis and person are identified as metaphysical principles.
2. Christological Controversies and Metaphysical Developments among the Miaphysites
This metaphysical system became part of their heritage for all Christians who accepted the
first two ecumenical councils of Nicaea and Constantinople. However, it created a problem
during the Christological controversies, when Christians tried to apply it to the explanation
of how humanity and divinity were united in Christ as one single subject.28
on Universals”, Vigiliae Christianae 56 (2002), pp. 372-410. See also D. Biriukov, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Teaching on Indivisible Monad and its Philosophical Context”, in M. Knezevic (ed.), Aristotle in Byzantium,
Sebastian Press, Alhambra, California 2020, pp. 87-100.
27
On the understating of Monotheism by the Cappadocian fathers see Jacobs, “On ‘Not Three Gods’” (above,
n. 9), pp. 342-51.
28
The second and third parts of Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24) are to be considered an analysis of how
the Cappadocian system became a problem during the Christological controversies. In addition, the work of
Grillmeier and Hainthaler gives the reader a very good overview of the Christological controversies and their historical context, see A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451),
A. R. Mowbray, London 19752; A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/I From the
Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604). Reception and Contradiction, The Development of the
Discussion about Chalcedon from 451 to the Beginning of the Reign of Justinian, A. R. Mowbray, London 1987;
A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/II From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to
Gregory the Great (590-604). The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century, A. R. Mowbray, London 1995,
A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/III From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to
Gregory the Great (590-604).The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2013;
A. Grillmeier – Th. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/IV From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to
Gregory the Great (590-604). The Churches of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia after 451, A. R. Mowbray,
London 1996. One might also see the following references to have a wider picture and idea: R.V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies. A study in the Christological Thought of the Schools of Alexandria and Antioch in the Early
History of Christian Doctrine, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London 1954; M. Simonetti, Studi di
Cristologia postnicena, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome 2006 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum,
98); L. Scipioni, Nestorio e il Concilio di Efeso: storia, dogma e critica, Vita e pensiero, Milan 1974 (Studia Patristica
Mediolanensia, 1); J. McGucking, St. Cyril of Alexandria. The Christological Controversy, its History, Theology and
Texts, Brill, Leiden-New York 1994; S. Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of
a Saint and of a Heretic, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2004 (Oxford Early Christian Studies); A. Munitiz – L. van Rompay
(eds.), After Chalcedon: Studies in Theology and Church History Offered to Professor Albert Van Roey for His
Seventieth Birthday, Peeters, Leuven 1985 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 18); W.H. C. Frend, The Rise of the
Monophysite Movement. Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries, Cambridge U.P.,
Cambridge 1972; W.A. Wigram, The Separation of the Monophysites, The Faith Press, London 1923; W. Witakowski,
“Syrian Monophysite Propaganda in the Fifth to Seventh Centuries”, in L. Rydén – J. O. Rosenqvist (eds.), Aspects of Late
Antiquity and Early Byzantium. Papers read at the Colloquium held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 31 May 5 June 1992, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Istanbul-Stockholm 1993 (Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul,
Transactions, 4), pp. 57-66; E. Hardy (ed.), Christology of the Later Fathers, Westminster John Knox Press,
Louisville 2006; M.R. Pecorara Maggi, Il processo a Calcedonia. Storia e interpretazione, Glossa, Milan 2006; R. Price
– M. Whitby (eds.), Chalcedon in Context. Church Councils, 400-700, Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2009 (Translated
Texts for Historians, Contexts, 1); W. Baum – D. Winkler, The Church of the East. A Concise History, Routledge,
London - New York 2003.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 89
Indeed, if one applies this system, and affirms that in Christ two natures are united, and since
these two natures are not abstract and universal realities, one implies that they are concrete
natures, that is, hypostases. In this case, Christ would be two hypostases, i.e. a duality of persons,
which destroys the oneness of the subject of Christ. As a result, the Cappadocian system had to
be modified. Chalcedonians, Miaphysites, and Nestorians29 developed different metaphysical
systems to solve the Christological question: Chalcedonians affirmed that Christ is two
substances/natures united in one hypostasis and one person;30 Miaphysites taught that Christ is
one substance/nature and one hypostasis/person and this unique substance/nature is from (or
composed of) two substances/natures;31 Nestorians, instead, said that Christ is two substances/
As I said elsewhere, see B. Ebeid, “Christology and Deification in the Church of the East. Mar Gewargis I, His
Synod and His Letter to Mina as a Polemic against Martyrius-Sahdona”, Cristianesimo nella Storia (Studies in History,
Theology and Exegesis) 38 (2017), pp. 729-84, here pp. 731-2, when I use the term “Nestorian Church” I mean the
Church of the East after 612, i.e. after applying the doctrine of the two hypostases (qnōmē) in its Christology. We
cannot say, in fact, that this Church had accepted a “Nestorian” Christology before the year 612. It is clear, however,
that such doctrine was not real Nestorianism, i.e. teaching two Christs and two Sons, but the texts of this Church
(like the document of the synod of 612), and some of its theologians (like Elias of Nisibis and ʿAbdīshōʿ bar Brīkhā),
adopted this title for themselves, making it a synonym of orthodoxy, and for this reason I use the term in this paper. It
must be said that there is a tendency today among scholars not to call this Church or its doctrine “Nestorian” due to
the negative connotation this term had over the centuries. For the Miaphysites, I accept the distinction scholars make
between Miaphysites, i.e. the Severians and moderate Monophysites, and the radical one, calling the latter Monophysites. It must be noted, however, that the texts of the Chalcedonian and Nestorian Churches did not distinguish clearly
between them as two different groups, always calling them by one technical term “Monophysites”.
30
With its doctrine the council of Chalcedon tried to reconcile the Christology of the Antiochians with that of
the Alexandrians, therefore as basis one might find Fathers from both traditions. On the Chalcedonian Christology
and its development one might read the following: R. Price – M. Gaddis (eds.), The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, 3
vols., Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2005 (Translated Texts for Historians 45); Price–Whitby (ed.), Chalcedon in Context
(above, n. 28); Pecorara Maggi, Il processo a Calcedonia (above, n. 28); P. Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon in the East,
451–553, Brill, Leiden 1979 (Studies in History of Christian Thought, 20); C. dell’Osso, Il calcedonismo. Leonzio
di Bisanzio, Edizioni “Vivere in”, Rome 2003 (Tradizione e vita, 13); B.E. Daley, ““A Richer Union”. Leontius of
Byzantium and the Relationship of the Human and Divine in Christ”, Studia Patristica 24 (1939), pp. 239-65; D.
Krausmüller, “Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon. The Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos”, Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011), pp. 484-513; D. Krausmüller, “Divine Self
Invention. Leontius of Jerusalem’s Reinterpretation of the Patristic Model of the Christian God”, Journal of Theological Studies 57 (2006), pp. 527-45; D. Krausmüller, “Leontius of Jerusalem. A Theologian of the Seventh Century”,
Journal of Theological Studies 52 (2001), pp. 637-57; C. Hovorun, Will, Action and Freedom. Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2008 (The Medieval Mediterranean Peoples, Economies and
Cultures, 400-1500, 77); H.U. von Balthasar, Massimo il Confessore. Liturgia Cosmica, Jaca Book, Milan 2001 (Già e
non ancora, 378); A. Louth, “John of Damascus and the Making of the Byzantine Theological Synthesis”, in J. Patrich
(ed.), The Sabaite Heritage in the Orthodox Church from the Fifth Century to the Present, Peeters and Department
Oosterse Studies, Leuven 2001 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 98), pp. 301-4; A. Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2002 (Oxford Early Christian Studies).
31
The Miaphysite Christology is based on the most important Miaphysite theologians, Cyril of Alexandria,
Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug, and Jacob of Sarug; on such Christology one might read: R. Chesnut, Three Monophysite Christologies. Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob of Sarug, Oxford U.P.,
Oxford 1976 (Oxford Theological Monographs); A. de Halleux, Philoxéne de Mabbog. sa vie, ses écrits, sa théologie,
Imprimerie orientaliste, Leuven 1963; H. Manoir de Juaye, Dogme et spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,
Vrin, Paris 1944 (Études de theéologie et d’histoire de la spiritualité, 2); M.A. Mathai, “The Concept of ‘Becoming’ in the Christology of Philoxenos of Mabbug”, The Harp 2 (1989), pp. 71-7; S. McKinion, Words, Imagery,
and Maystery of Christ. A Reconstruction of Cyril of Alexandria’s Christology, Brill, Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2000
(Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 55); B. Meunier, Le Christ de Cyrille d’Alexandrie. L’Humanité, le salut et la
29
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
90 Bishara Ebeid
natures, two hypostases and one person.32 It must be noted that some scholars today avoid
translating the Syriac term qnūmō ()ܩܢܘܡܐ, used by Syrians to translate the Greek ὑπόστασις,33
as “hypostasis”, leaving it transliterated.34 Even if such method is acceptable, I prefer to use
question monophysite, Beauchesne, Paris 1997 (Théologie Historique, 104); D. Michelson, The Practical Christology
of Philoxenos of Mabbug, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2014 (Oxford Early Christian Studies); L. Perrone, “Il “Dialogo
contro gli aftartodoceti” di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia”, Cristianesimo nella storia 1 (1980), pp. 41142; A.A. Luce, Monophysitism, Past and Present. A Study in Christology, Macmillan, London 1920; Ph.M. Forness,
Preaching Christology in the Roman Near East: A Study of Jacob of Serugh, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2018 (Oxford Early
Christian Studies); D. Michelson, “Philoxenos of Mabbug: A Cappadocian Theologian on the Banks of the Euphrates?”, in J. Kreiner – H. Reimitz (eds.), Motions of Late Antiquity: Essays on Religion, Politics, and Society in Honour
of Peter Brown, Brepols, Turnhout 2016 (Cultural Encounters in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 20), pp. 151-74;
I.R. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon. Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite, The Canterbury Press,
Norfolk 1988; V. C. Samuel, “Τhe Christology of Severus of Antioch”, Abba Salama 4 (1973), pp. 126-90.
32
The Nestorian Christology is based on the doctrine of the theologians of Antioch, such as Diodore of Tarsus,
Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius and some other Syriac theologians such as Narsai and Babai the Great; on their
Christological doctrine see C. Hay, “Antiochene Exegesis and Christology”, Australian Biblical Review 12 (1964),
pp. 10-23; J. Siemens, The Christology of Theodore of Tarsus. The Laterculus Malalianus and the Person and Work of
Christ, Brepols, Turnhout 2010 (Studia Traditionis Theologiae, 6); M. Anastos, “Nestorius was orthodox”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 16 (1962), pp. 119-40; R. Chesnut, “The two Prosopa in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heraclidis”, Journal of
Theological Studies 29 (1978), pp. 392-409; J. Dewart – E. McWilliam, “The Notion of ‘Person’ Underlying the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia”, Studia Patristica 12 (1975), pp. 199-207; R.A. Greer, “The Antiochene Christology of Diodore of Tarsus”, Journal of Theological Studies. New Series 17 (1966), pp. 327-41; R.A. Greer, “The Image
of God and the Prosopic Union in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heraclides”, in R. A. Norris (ed.), Lux in Luminae. Essays in
Honor of W.N. Pittenger, Seabury, New York 1966, pp. 46-61; L. Hodgson, “The Metaphysic of Nestorius”, Journal
of Theological Studies 19 (1917), pp. 46-55; H. Hovhannisyan, “On the Christological Teaching of Nestorius”, Etchmiadzin 2 (2015), pp. 15-28; F. McLeod, The Roles of Christ’s Humanity in Salvation. Insights from Theodore of Mopsuestia, The Catholic Univ. of America Press, Washington 2005; F. McLeod, “Theodore of Mopsuestia’s Understanding of Two Hypostaseis and Two Prosōpa Coinciding in One Common Prosōpon”, Journal of Early Christian Studies
18 (2010), pp. 393-424; L. Scipioni, Ricerche sulla cristologia del “Libro di Eraclide” di Nestorio. La formula teologica
e il suo contesto filosofico, Edizioni Universitarie, Freiburg 1957 (Paradosis, 11); B. Soro, “The Person and Teachings
of Nestorius of Constantinople with a Special Reference to his Condemnation at the Council of Ephesus”, Syriac
Dialogue, vol. III, Pro Oriente, Vienna 1998, pp. 67-91; A.R. Vine, An Approach to Christology: An Interpretation and
Development of Some Elements in the Metaphysic and Christology of Nestorius, Independent Press, London 1948.
However one must note that the Church of the East adopted a Nestorian Christology just at AD 612, see B. Ebeid,
“The Christology of the Church of the East. An Analysis of the Christological Statements and Professions of Faith of
the Official Synods of the Church of the East before A.D. 612”, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 82 (2016), pp. 353402; Ebeid, “Christology and Deification” (above, n. 29); S. Brock, “The Christology of the Church of the East”,
in D. Afinogenov – A. Muraviev (eds.), Traditions and Heritage of the Christian East, Izdatelstvo, Moscow 1996,
pp. 159-79; S. Brock, “The Christology of the Church of East in the Synods of the Fifth to Early Seventh Centuries:
Preliminary Considerations and Materials”, in G.D. Dragas – N.A. Nissiotis (eds.), Aksum-Thyateira: A Festschrift
for Archbishop Methodius of Thyateira and Great Britain, Thyateria House, Athens 1985, pp. 125-42; Y.P. Patros, “La
cristologia della Chiesa d’Oriente”, in E. Vergani – S. Chialà (eds.), Storia, Cristologia e tradizioni della Chiesa Siroorientale. Atti del 3° Incontro sull’Oriente Cristiano di tradizione siriaca Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14 maggio
2004, Centro Ambrosiano, Milano 2006, pp. 27-42; L. Abramowski, “Ein nestorianiscer Traktat bei Leontius von
Jerusalem”, in R. Lavenant (ed.), III Symposium Syriacum, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma
1983 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 221), pp. 43-55.
33
See Y.P. Patros, “La cristologia della Chiesa d’Oriente”, in E. Vergani – S. Chialà (eds.), Storia, Cristologia
e tradizioni della Chiesa Siro-orientale. Atti del 3° Incontro sull’Oriente Cristiano di tradizione siriaca Milano,
Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14 maggio 2004, Centro Ambrosiano, Milano 2006, pp. 27-42, here pp. 29-31.
34
See Brock, “The Christology of the Church of East in the Synods of the Fifth to Early Seventh Centuries”
(above, n. 32), p. 131; Baum and Winkler, The Church of the East (above, n. 28), p. 39.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 91
the English translation “hypostasis” also for the Syriac qnūmō ()ܩܢܘܡܐ, highlighting that
hypostasis, either in Greek as ὑπόστασις or in Syriac as ( ܩܢܘܡܐqnūmō) or even in Arabic
as ( أقنومuqnūm), was used as a technical term by all Christian confessions of the East with
different metaphysical meanings, especially in Christological doctrine.35
What is important for us in this paper is to outline the specificity of the metaphysical
development that occurred in the Miaphysite field, in order to understand the reasons for the
appearance of new Trinitarian controversies among them in the sixth and seventh centuries.
As mentioned above, the Miaphysites affirmed that Christ is one substance/nature and one
hypostasis/person, and that this unique substance/nature is from two substances/natures and
realities, divine and human; therefore, the one subject is also called composite substance/
nature. According to the metaphysics of the Cappadocians, an abstract substance cannot
exist, and only a concrete substance exists, i.e. the hypostasis. Christ really existed, he was
one subject and not two; he, however, was not just divine nor just human, but both realities
together, and therefore he was called the incarnate Logos of God. For Miaphysites, then, it
was vital that Christ be affirmed as one concrete substance/nature that really existed, that is,
a hypostasis/person. In this way they highlighted the oneness of subject. In addition, this one
substance/nature was special insofar as it was composed of two substances/natures, divine
and human. With the doctrine of the composition, Miaphysites highlighted and saved the
duality of the two components from which Christ derived.
The Cappadocians had distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person as
between general-common and particular-singular, and in their Trinitarian doctrine they had
avoided considering the three hypostases as three single substances, i.e. as three individuals.
Miaphysite Christology, however, did not make any clear distinction between substance/
nature and hypostasis/person; instead, it considered these two metaphysical categories as
almost synonymous.36 Once transposed back to the Trinitarian level, such a development
gave rise to two questions: 1) was the whole substance of the Trinity incarnated? 2) are the
three divine hypostases three substances?
3. Miaphysite Christology and the Controversy concerning Tritheism
Indeed, a new Trinitarian controversy did occur in the second half of the 6th century among
the Miaphysites in Syria. A group which relied on the works of the Alexandrian Miaphysite
John Philoponus (d. 570), who was considered by his opponents as the ‘heresiarch of the
Tritheists’,37 applied the metaphysical innovation discussed above, i.e. the identification of
See Ebeid, “Christology and Deification” (above, n. 29), p. 732.
According to Erismann, Miaphysites to avoid a duality of subjects in Christ, i.e. two hypostases/individuals, had highlighted the principle according to which ‘hypostasis’ is comprehended a ‘particular substance/nature’
and from this perspective one shall understand the identification they made between hypostasis and nature, see C.
Erismann, “Non Est Natura Sine Persona: The Issue of Uninstantiated Universals from Late Antiquity to the Early
Ages”, in M. Cameron – J. Marenbon, (eds.), Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 5001500, Brill, Leiden 2011, pp. 75-91, here pp. 81-2.
37
On John Philoponus see the following: G. Couvalis, “John Philoponus: Closeted Christian or Radical Intellectual?”, Modern Greek Studies 15 (2011), pp. 207-19; C. Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin”, Traditio 53 (2008), pp. 277-305; T. Hainthaler, “John Philoponos, Philosopher
and Theologian in Alexandria”, in Grillmeier-Hainthaler (eds.), Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/IV (above, n.
28), pp. 107-46; M.U. Lang, John Philoponus and the Controversies Over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Study
35
36
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
92 Bishara Ebeid
hypostasis/person and substance/nature, to the Trinitarian doctrine, with the result that the
three hypostases/persons38 were considered as three divine substances/natures. Therefore,
their opponents called them Tritheists. Tritheism began to spread not just in Syria, but also
in Constantinople and Alexandria, and the works of John Philoponus started to circulate in
Greek and in Syriac translation; all attempts at a reconciliation between the supporters and the
adversaries of the doctrine of the three substances failed.39 Thus, the controversy resulted in a
division between the Tritheists and the other Miaphysites.
Van Roey argues that the starting point of the Tritheists was purely philosophical
and that only later did they add patristic arguments.40 According to scholars such as van
Roey,41 Grillmeier,42 Hainthaler,43 and Lang,44 the Tritheists based their doctrine on certain
metaphysical and logical principles. Following the metaphysical system of the Cappadocians
as well as some Neoplatonic doctrines, they 1) considered the hypostasis as an individual
concrete substance/nature, and since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three hypostases, they
are consequently three concrete individual substances/natures; 2) the general substance is
and Translation of the Arbiter, Peeters, Leuven 2001 (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 47); J. Zachhuber, “Christology after Chalcedon and the Transformation of the Philosophical Tradition. Reflections on a Neglected Topic”, in M.
Knezevic (ed.), The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy, Sebastian Press, Alhambra CA 2015, pp. 103-27 (Contemporary
Christian Thought Series, 32); J. Zachhuber, “Personhood in Miaphysitism. Severus of Antioch and John Philoponus”, in A. Torrance – S. Paschalides (eds.), Personhood in the Byzantine Christian Tradition: Early, Medieval, and
Modern Perspectives, Routledge, New York 2018, pp. 29-43; H. Martin, “Jean Philopon et la controverse trithéite du
VIe siècle”, Studia Patristica 5 (1962), pp. 519-25; A. van Roey, “Les fragments trithéites de Jean Philopon”, Orientalia
Lovaniensia Periodica 11 (1980), pp. 135-63; Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 145-69.
38
It must be mentioned, as van Roey notes, that sometimes, for John Philoponus and his followers, hypostasis
does not mean just the common nature realized in an individual, but also the special properties that belong to an
individual, see R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum. Anti-Tritheist Dossier, Departement Oriëntalistiek, Leuven 1981 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 10), p. 27; see also the note by Hainthaler
who underlines that for Philoponus person (πρόσωπον) is sometimes distinguished by hypostasis acquiring the
meaning of relationship (σχέσις) of some to one another, see Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 120.
39
This controversy had three main phases: 1) it started in Syria with a certain John, a Miaphysite theologian
and a native of Apamea; 2) then John’s doctrine was endorsed by two bishops, Conon of Tarsus and Eugenius of
Isauria, and finally 3) it spread among Miaphysites in Syria, Egypt and even Constantinople. On Tritheisim see the
following: A. Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy in the Sixth Century and its Importance in Syriac Christology”,
in Grillmeier-Hainthaler (eds.), Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. II/III (above, n. 28), pp. 268-80; H. Martin, La
controverse trithéite dans l’Empire byzantin au VIe siècle, UCL, Leuven 1960; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter
of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 20-33; A. van Roey, “La controverse trithéite depuis la condemnation de Conon et
Eugène jusqu’à la conversion de l’évêque Elie”, in W.C. Delsman – J.T. Nelis – J.R.T.M. Peters – W.H.Ph. Römer –
S.A.S. van der Woude (eds.), Von Kanaan bis Kerala: Festschrift für Prof. Mag. Dr. J.P.M. van der Ploeg O.P. zur Vollendung des siebzigsten Lebensjahres am 4. Juli 1979 überreicht von Kollegen, Freunden und Schülern, Neukirchener
Verlag, Kevelaer 1982 (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 211), pp. 487-97; A. van Roey, “La controverse trithéite
jusqu’à l’excommunication de Conon et d’Eugène (557-569)”, Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 16 (1985), pp. 141-65.
40
See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 25. One must also mention the
opinion of U. M. Lang who maintains that Tritheists’ argumentations were based first on patristic material and
then on philosophical principles, see U.M. Lang, “Patristic Argument and the Use of Philosophy in the Tritheist
Controversy of the Sixth Century”, in D. Vincent Twomey – L. Ayres (eds.), The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the
Fathers of the Church. Proceedings of the Fourth International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999, Four Courts
Press, Dublin 2007 (Irish Theological Quarterly Monograph Series), pp. 79-99.
41
See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 25-33.
42
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 276-80.
43
See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), on his Christology pp. 112-31, on his Trinitarian doctrine pp. 131-8.
44
See Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 93
an abstract reality, it has no real existence and exists only in the mind;45 3) being supporters
of the Miaphysite Christological formula, i.e. of one nature from two, they considered the
one composite nature and hypostasis of Christ as different from those of the Father and
the Spirit; 4) therefore, it is not the whole Trinity that was incarnated, but only the Son, in
his individual nature, i.e. hypostasis; 5) with their doctrine they could avoid Sabellianism,
but they sacrificed the unity and oneness of the divine substance by introducing division;
6) therefore, for them, the unity in the Godhead is seen only in mental abstraction, i.e. at
the level of the general substance, which, however, has no real existence; 7) the three divine
hypostases and natures are three consubstantial divinities 8) since each of them is a concrete
“copy”46 of the general substance,47 each is “God in a different way”;48 9) consubstantiality,
then, occurs between individual substances, without taking into consideration the properties
of each substance-hypostasis;49 10) each concrete “copy” of the general substance differs from
the other “copy” on account of its own characteristics, i.e. idioms and properties; and finally
11) the different species or “copies” of this general divine substance are designated through the
addition of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’, i.e. the idioms and properties.50
4. The Miaphysite reactions against Tritheism
Tritheists were attacked and anathematized by the other Miaphysites from the outset.51
The most important reactions were those of Theodosius of Alexandria on the one hand and
of Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicum on the other, the latter two in turn being
engaged in reciprocal controversy.
4.1. The reaction of Theodosius of Alexandria
During the first phase of the controversy, the patriarch Theodosius of Alexandria (d. 567), who
was in exile in Constantinople, disagreed with the doctrine of the first Tritheists, but did not regard
it as a heresy. Although he believed that the point at stake was a disagreement about words and
concepts, he wrote a long treatise on the question known as De Trinitate.52 In his work Theodosius
45
On the universals in John Philoponos see Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 463-5.
The idea of a concrete “copy” of the general substance is developed by John in his Diaitetes seu Arbiter.
John, it seems, did not use a technical term that corresponds to “copy”; the latter term was used by Hainthaler,
“John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134. In chapters 16, 22, 23 and 24 of the Diaitetes one can find this idea eẍ ܗܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܕ ܐܝܬ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ
pressed in other terms, especially in the conclusion of chapter 24: “ܒܢܝܢܫܐ
̇
”, “For the nature of each single one of the human beings has the common
ܡܠܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܒܗ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ
̣
concept of the nature [ὁ τῆς φύσις λόγος κοινός] in the same way”, Iohannis Philoponi, Opuscula Monophysitica,
ed. A. Sanda, Beirut 1930, Syriac text p. 23. English translation is mine.
47
See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 134.
48
Ebied, van Roey and Wickham, Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 29. See also Lang, “Patristic Argument”
(above, n. 40), pp. 91-99.
49
As mentioned above for John Philoponus and his followers, hypostasis sometimes differs from the individual nature, which is a concrete copy of the general abstract reality without its special properties, therefore
hypostasis is considered an individual nature with proper characteristics, idioms and properties. This, in fact, is the
reason why, for Tritheists, consubstantiality can be between individual and concrete substances and not between
hypostases. For more details see Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 27-31.
50
See also the chapter dedicated on Philoponus’ doctrine in Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 145-69, esp. pp. 155-67.
51
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 268-276; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.),
Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 20-1.
52
This work is preserved only in Syriac translation, see J.B. Chabot (ed.), Documenta ad origines monophysi46
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
94 Bishara Ebeid
maintained that each divine hypostasis, when considered individually, is a certain substance and
nature.53 This statement kindled the opposition of a group known as the Condobaudites, who
affirmed that none of the three hypostases of the Trinity, if seen individually, can be considered as
a substance, and therefore it was the common divine nature and substance that was incarnated.54
Although this doctrine and that of Tritheism were condemned, Miaphysites continued to
look for reconciliation,55 but no agreement was reached and the Tritheists established their
own hierarchy.56 Very soon, however, they were divided into two groups, one following the
doctrine of John Philoponus on Resurrection, and the other, known as Cononites, rejecting it.57
Theodosius’ arguments against Tritheism were patristic and not philosophical, as Tritheist
arguments and principles were.58 Such a patristic approach proved insufficient and in the second
stage of the controversy, Peter and Damian had to formulate their arguments in a rational way,
even though the patristic material remained an important support.
4.2. The Reaction of Peter of Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria
The second important reaction against Tritheism came from two important Miaphysite
figures of the second half of the sixth century, namely Peter of Callinicum, the patriarch
of Antioch (d. 591), and Damian of Alexandria (d. 605), two friends who became enemies
because of the different Trinitarian doctrines they espoused in opposition to Tritheism.
This is not the place to mention the context of their reaction, and the development of the
controversy, which have already been studied in depth.59 What interests me here is to present
how each of them tried to respond to Tritheism and why they disagreed.
tarum illustrandas, Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, Leuven 1907,1933 (CSCO 17, 103, Syr. 17, 52); A. van Roey – P.
Allen, (eds.), Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 56).
53
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 270-1.
54
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), p. 271; Lang, “Patristic Argument” (above, n. 40), pp. 86-8.
55
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 272-4; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of
Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 20-5.
56
See Grillmeier, “The Tritheist Controversy” (above, n. 39), pp. 274-5; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of
Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 22.
57
See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 22-3.
58
See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), p. 33.
59
See Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 1-19, 34-43; R Y. Ebied – A. van Roey –
L.R. Wickham, “Introduction” to Petri Callinicensis Patriarchae Antiocheni, Tractatus contra Damianum, ed.
R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham, Vol. 1 , Leuven U.P., Turnhout - Leuven 1994 (Corpus Christianorum,
Series Graeca, 29), pp. vi-xxvi; R.Y. Ebied, “Peter of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria. The End of a Friendship”,
in R.H. Fischer (ed.), A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus. Studies in Early Christian Literature and Its Environment,
Primarily in the Syrian East, The Lutherian School of Theology, Chicago 1977, pp. 277-82; R.Y. Ebied, “Peter of
Callinicum and Damian of Alexandria: The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century”, Colloquium 15 (1982),
pp. 17-22; Id., “Peter of Callinicus and Damian of Alexandria. The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century”,
Parole de l’Orient 35 (2010), pp. 181-91; P. Allen, “Religious Conflict between Antioch and Alexandria c. 565630 CE”, in W. Mayer – B. Neil (eds.), Religious Conflict from Early Christianity to the Rise of Islam, Walter de
Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2013 (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, 121), pp. 187-99. See also Th. Hainthaler,
“The Christological Controversy on Proba and John Barbur”, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 56 (2004), pp.
155-70; A. van Roey, “Une controverse christologique sous le patriarcat de Pierre de Callinique”, in F. Graffin –
A. Guillaumont (eds.), Symposium Syriacum, 1976: célebré du 13 au 17 septembre 1976 au Centre Culturel “Les
Fontaines” de Chantilly (France), Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Rome 1978 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 205), pp. 349-57; Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 170-83.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 95
During the negotiations for a reconciliation between Miaphysites and Tritheists, Damian
wrote a work, known as Adversus Tritheitas, against certain chapters composed by some
Tritheists, which summarized their doctrine. Damian sent this work to his friend Peter
and asked for his opinion. Peter, however, found its doctrinal basis to be quite similar to
Sabellianism. He conveyed this to Damian, who in turn accused him of being an Eunomian
and a Tritheist. The controversy began and eventually led to a schism between Antioch
and Alexandria that ended years after the death of both patriarchs, in 616, when Damian’s
teachings were rejected by all Miaphysite churches.
The works written by Peter against Damian have survived only in Syriac translation and
unfortunately in partial form,60 while Damian’s work against the Tritheists and his letters to
Peter have not survived. What we have today are just those quotations that Peter culled from
them in his major three-volume work against the patriarch of Alexandria, known as Contra
Damianum. An analysis of these quotations and of other indirect sources helped scholars
reconstruct Damian’s doctrine.
Through this work of reconstruction scholars such as van Roey,61 Krausmüller62, and
Zachhuber63 presented the main metaphysical principles of Damian’s doctrine as follows: 1)
clear distinction between substance and hypostasis; 2) substance is the common and constituent
element of being and 3) it exists concretely and not only in the mind; 4) hypostases are
identified with the characteristic (also called hypostatic) properties; as a consequence, 5) there
is no distinction between “name” and “things”; 6) hypostases are distinct and incommunicable,
but 7) each becomes substantial through participation in the substance, i.e. the common and
constituent element of being, and 8) it consequently gains a substantial component; therefore,
9) it is not an abstract reality. In conclusion, Damian’s metaphysics works on two levels: that
of the substance and that of the hypostases-properties, where the hypostases, as substantial
properties, have their ontological origin in the substance as the ‘true’ one.
Applying these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine implies that 1) oneness in God is seen
in the oneness of the divine substance as an entity distinct from the three divine hypostases,
which are identified with three properties: 2) the hypostasis of the Father is the divine
unbegottenness-fatherhood, the hypostasis of the Son is the divine begottenness-sonship and
the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is the divine procession; thus, 3) the distinction between
hypostasis and substance and the identification of hypostasis and hypostatic property allow
Damian to avoid multiplying the constituent element of the Trinity, i.e. the substance. 4)
Even if hypostasis is distinct from substance, however, in reality it exists only insofar as it
For his letters and some other documents see R Ebied, van Roey and Wickham, Peter of Callinicum (above, n.
38); while for his main work against Damian see Petri Callinicensis Patriarchae Antiocheni, Tractatus Contra Damianum, ed. R.Y. Ebied – A. van Roey – L.R. Wickham, 4 Vols., Leuven U.., Turnhout - Leuven 1994, 1996, 1998, 2003
(Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 29, 32, 35 and 54). See also R.Y. Ebied – L.R. Wickham, “The Discourse of
Mar Peter Callinicus on the Crucifixion”, Journal of Theological Studies. New Series 26 (1975), pp. 23-37.
61
See A. van Roey, “Le traité contre les Trithéites (CPG 7245) de Damien d’Alexandrie”, in A. Schoors –
P. van Deun (eds.), Philohistôr: Miscellanea in Honorem Caroli Laga Septuagenarii, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia
Lovaniensia Analecta, 60), pp. 229-50; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham (eds.), Peter of Callinicum (above, n. 38), pp. 3443; Ebied-van Roey-Wickham, “Introduction” (above, n. 59), pp. xxii-xxvi.
62
See D. Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance: the Trinitarian Theology of Severus of Antioch
and Damian of Alexandria”, Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 12 (2018), pp. 15-29.
63
See Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 171-9.
60
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
96 Bishara Ebeid
participates in the substance, so that in the Trinity there are not two different constituent
elements; thus, 5) consubstantiality is interpreted in the light of the latter statement.
Damian supported his doctrine with patristic quotations, especially from Severus of Antioch
and Gregory of Nazianzus.64 In fact, as Krausmüller notes, Damian especially based himself
upon Severus of Antioch’s Trinitarian reflections as expressed in the Contra Grammaticum.65
Unfortunately, having no more than fragments from the work of Damian, we cannot know
how much he used the fathers, and how exactly he read and interpreted them. On the contrary
we know that Peter abundantly quoted the fathers, such as the Cappadocians, and those
Miaphysite authors who had developed the Miaphysite metaphysics in relation to Christology,
such as Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, and Theodosius of Alexandria. Peter used
these authorities in support of his doctrine, accusing Damian of incorrect reading of the fathers.66
Although we do not yet have a systematic study of Peter’s thought and Trinitarian doctrine
we can present his metaphysical system as follows:67 1) substance is the sum of all hypostases
belonging to its species; 2) each hypostasis participates in the sum of all hypostases, i.e. the
common substance; 3) the hypostases of the same common substance share the same attributes
of the substance, therefore they are consubstantial; 4) the substance, then, is participated and
shared while the hypostasis is the participant and sharer; 5) each hypostasis, however, has its
own characteristic property; 6) the characteristic property is the specific mode of being of each
hypostasis; 7) through its characteristic property, or hypostatic property, each hypostasis is
distinct from the other hypostases of the same common substance; therefore, 8) hypostasis is not
the substance itself nor the characteristic properties themselves; it is the individual, which includes
both aspects; and finally, 9) each hypostasis taken individually is considered as a particular
substance and nature, which manifests its consubstantiality through the attributes it shares with
the other hypostases of the same substance and species, while it manifests its particularity through
its own characteristic properties. Differently from Damian’s metaphysics, then, Peter’s solution
distinguishes three metaphysical levels: the substance, the hypostasis, and the property.
This tripartition allowed Peter to demonstrate that: 1) God is one in word and reality; 2)
oneness means that there is only one divine substance; 3) the divine substance is the sum of
the three divine hypostases; 3) these three hypostases are consubstantial since each shares in
the totality of the substance and Godhead; 4) each hypostasis differs from the others through
the characteristic property of the hypostasis or hypostatic property, i.e. unbegottennesfatherhood, begottenness-sonship and procession, which manifests the way each hypostasis
exists; 5) each hypostasis seen individually is a concrete substance with its own characteristic
property; therefore, 6) Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three complete and existing realities;
and finally, 7) it is God the Word alone who was incarnated, not the whole Trinity.
As Ebied notes, the disagreement between Damian and Peter was a real dilemma, and resorting
to patristic heritage on Trinity, used by both in a “genuinely puzzling way”, could not solve
See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 26.
In fact, the whole of Dirk Krausmüller’s paper “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62) sets out
to demonstrate this relationship between the Trinitarian doctrine of Severus and Damian.
66
On the use of the fathers by Peter see the following: R.Y. Ebied, “Quotations from the Works of St. Cyril of
Alexandria in Peter of Callinicus᾽ magnum opus Contra Damianum”, Collectanea Christiana Orientalia 13 (2016),
pp. 33-94; R.Y. Ebied, “Quotations from the Works of St. Severus of Antioch in Peter of Callinicus’ magnum opus Contra
Damianum”, in J. D’Alton – Y.N. Youssef (eds.), Severus of Antioch: His Life and Times, Brill, Leiden - Boston
2016 (Texts and Studies in Eastern Christianity, 7), pp. 65-123.
67
See also Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 179-81.
64
65
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 97
the problem.68 As mentioned above, the disagreement turned into a schism between the two
Miaphysite sees of Alexandria and Antioch, and although reconciliation was achieved after
the rejection of Damian’s doctrine, this does not mean that Damian’s metaphysical system,
i.e. his distinction between hypostasis and substance on the one hand and the identification
between hypostasis and property on the other, nor his particular reading of the patristic
Trinitarian doctrine, disappeared among Miaphysites.69
5. Tritheism, Damian’s Trinitarian Doctrine and other Christian Confessions
The Cappadocian metaphysical system was not the exclusive heritage of the Miaphysite
Church; it was a common tradition shared with the other Christian confessions, namely
Chalcedonians and East Syrians, who also applied it to Christology with analogous problems
and looked for solutions, as I have already explained.
Chalcedonians distinguished between substance/nature and hypostasis/person; they also
distinguished between natural characteristics and attributes, common to all hypostases of
the same nature/substance, and hypostatic properties and characteristics, proper to each
hypostasis. Such distinction, for example, was underlined, as Hainthaler pointed out, by the
Chalcedonian patriarch of Constantinople Eutychius in his polemical treatise against Tritheists
written between 568 and 577.70 The Chalcedonians’ starting point was also Christological.
In another text of the 8th century, the Epistula Apologetica written by the Miaphysite Eliya
to Leo, the syncellus of the Chalcedonian bishop of Harran, the Miaphysite author accuses
the Chalcedonians of identifying the hypostasis with its characteristic property.71 In fact,
this view of the Chalcedonian doctrine reflects the metaphysical developments that occurred
among Chalcedonians after Chalcedon, i.e. so-called neo-Chalcedonianism, especially those
authors who tried to give a metaphysical answer to the challenge of John Philoponus.72
It can be argued that Miaphysites saw a similarity between the doctrine of Damian and the
metaphysical developments of the Chalcedonian doctrine.
In addition, some East Syrian theologians such as Babai the Great (d. 628) had a metaphysical
background similar to that of John Philoponus. I mentioned above that Tritheists made no
See Ebied, “Peter of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria” (above, n. 59), p. 282.
It is interesting to mention that many Christian theologians, Miaphysites and others, used Damian’s identification
between hypostasis and property in their Trinitarian doctrine expressed and developed in response to Islamic accusations
of Tritheism, see R. Haddad, La Trinité divine chez les théologiens arabes 750-1050, Beauchesne, Paris 1985 (Beauchesne
Religions, 15); the part on Elias of Nisibis’ Trinitarian doctrine in Ebeid, La Tunica di al-Masīḥ (above, n. 5); see also the
introduction in Elias of Nisibis, Commentary on the Creed, ed. B. Ebeid, UCOPress CNERU-Èditiones de l’USJ
CEDRAC, Cordova - Beirut 2018 (Series Syro-Arabica, 9).
70
See Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), pp. 135-8.
71
See A. van Roey, “La lettre apologétique d’Élie à Léon, syncelle de l’évêque chalcédonien de Harran; une apologie
monophysite du VIIIe-IXe siècle”, Le Museon 57 (1944), pp. 1-52, here pp. 22-35; for more details on this work, its
author and its contents see U. Possekel, “Christological Debates in Eighth Century Harran. The Correspondence of
Leo of Harran and Eliya”, in M. Doerfler – E. Fiano – K. Smith, (eds.), Syriac Encounters. Papers from the Sixth North
American Syriac Symposium, Duke University, 26-29 June 2011, Peeters, Leuven - Paris - Bristol 2015, pp. 345-66.
72
See D. Krausmüller, “Under the Spell of John Philoponus: How Chalcedonian Theologians of the Late Patristic
Period Attempted to Safeguard the Oneness of God”, The Journal of Theological Studies 68 (2017), pp. 625-49; while on the
thought of neo-Chalcedonian authors and doctrines except the given references on Chalcedon see B. Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2012 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and Language, 113); see also C. dell’Osso, Cristo e Logos. Il Calcedonismo
del VI secolo in Oriente, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2010 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 118).
68
69
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
98 Bishara Ebeid
distinction between substance and hypostasis; however, they also affirmed that abstract reality,
i.e., the common and universal substance, exists only in the mind, while the existing reality is the
concrete copy of abstract reality. It was also noted that Tritheists sometimes called hypostases
the copy of abstract reality with its characteristic property. One might suppose that the approach
of John Philoponus and the Tritheists was not purely Aristotelian, but closer to that of some
Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle who developed the doctrine on the three states of
substance,73 and applied it into their Trinitarian and Christological doctrines.74 I think then,
that one might find some common points with the doctrine of the Nestorian Babai the Great,
who distinguishes between abstract reality, which he calls nature (ܟܝܢܐ, kyānā), concrete reality
without characteristic properties, which he calls hypostasis (ܩܢܘܡܐ, qnōmā), and concrete and
individualized reality, i.e. hypostasis with its characteristic properties, which he called person
(ܦܪܨܘܦܐ, parṣōpā).75 It can be argued, then, that Miaphysites could see a similarity between the
doctrine of Nestorians with that of John of Philoponus and his followers, thing that Chalcedonians,
like Leontius of Jerusalem, who also polemicized Tritheism and its followers, have also noted.76
I am not affirming a direct relationship or influence between Damian and the
Chalcedonians or between Tritheism and Babai’s thought. What I am trying to say is that
according to the Miaphysite metaphysical system such doctrines share common points,
and to polemicize them one might use the works written by Miaphysite tradition during
the controversy against Tritheism and against Damian. Even if Tritheism and Damian’s
doctrine did not completely disappear77 in the following century, i.e. before the advent of
Islam,78 the main concern for Miaphysites under Islam was not the divisions within their
own confession, but the debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians.
73
We mean the distinction between general substance, partial substance, and particular substance, for more details,
see L. Benakis, “The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thoughts”, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.),
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Norfolk 1982, pp. 75-86.
74
Already Hainthaler compared in one point John Philoponus and Leontius of Byzantium concerning their
use of this doctrine, see Hainthaler, “John Philoponos” (above, n. 37), p. 125. It must, however, be, mentioned that
Leontius of Byzantium followed this doctrine on substance and applied it also in his Christology, see Krausmüller,
“Making Sense” (above, n. 30). For the reception of the theory on the three states of the universal in Byzantium, see C. Erismann,
“The Trinity, Universals, and the Particular Substances: Philoponus and Rescelin”, Traditio 53 (2008), pp. 277-305, here 277-85.
75
For the metaphysical doctrine of Babai the Great and his trinitarian doctrine see B. Ebeid, “The Trinitarian doctrine of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib. An interpretation of Babai the Great’s metaphysical system in the world of Islam”,
Parole de l’Orient 44 (2018), pp. 93-131, here pp. 97-107. For more on Babai’s doctrine see L. Abramowski, “Babai
der Grosse. Christologische Probleme und ihre Lösungen”, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 41(1975), pp. 289-343;
L. Abramowski, “Die Christologie Babais des Grossen”, in Symposium Syriacum I, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Rome 1972 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 197), pp. 219-44.
76
In fact, Krausmüller had noted that also for the Chalcedonian Leontius of Jerusalem there is a similarity between
both Nestorians’ and Philoponos’ Trinitarian doctrines, see Krausmüller, “Under the Spell” (above, n. 72), pp. 639-41.
77
See J. Block, “Philoponian Monophysitism in South Arabia at the Advent of Islam with Implications
for the English Translation of ‘Thalātha’ in Qur’ān 4.171 and 5.73”, Journal of Islamic Studies 23 (2012), pp.
50-75. One also might mention the doctrine of an anti-Tritheist Trinitarian florilegium, copied centuries after
the controversy between Damian and Peter, which understands the common divine substance as Aristotle’s
first substance and identifies the hypostases with the properties, see G. Furlani, “Un florilegio antitriteistico
in lingua siriaca”, Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti IX, 8[83] (1924), pp. 661-77.
78
As Penn has demonstrated, the first writings of Syriac Christians on Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries do not
consider it new religion. They also reveal that their knowledge of Islamic doctrine was not deep, see M.Ph. Penn,
Envisioning Islam. Syriac Christians and Early Muslim World, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2015
(Divinations: Reading Late Ancient Religion).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 99
6. Composing and Copying Miaphysite Trinitarian Florilegia
During the first centuries of Islamic rule in the East, the Miaphysites started to compose and
copy different dogmatic florilegia on the Trinity and Christology based on patristic quotations
categorized in thematic order, divided in groups where each group has a specific title. Such
florilegia were probably used for the theological formation of West Syrian Christians.
The Trinitarian Florilegium on which the present paper focuses was composed neither to
oppose Tritheists nor against Damian’s doctrine. As mentioned above, and since it treats mainly
metaphysical topics, this and other florilegia were also important to prepare good theologians
that could debate with Chalcedonians and Nestorians. The fact that these florilegia were copied
during the first centuries of Islamic rule confirms that Miaphysites in that period still saw
Chalcedonians and Nestorians as their main adversaries. In addition, one might note that the
Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians composed in that period, firstly in
Syriac and then in Arabic, made a direct and indirect use of these florilegia.79
When Islam began to be felt as a real intellectual and religious threat, however, such florilegia
started also to be useful for Miaphysites in their apologetic works against Muslims who saw the
Christian Trinity as an expression of Tritheism and could not accept God’s incarnation. Though the
Church fathers were quoted directly in Miaphysite writings against Chalcedonians and Nestorians,
since all three of them shared a respect for the fathers as foundational authorities, the florilegia were
used indirectly and without mentioning the fathers in the Miaphysite Arabic writings against Islam.80
6.1. The Trinitarian Florilegium in BL Add. 14532
One of these dogmatic florilegia, which is Trinitarian in content, is found in the following
manuscripts of the British Library: Add. 14532, ff. 94vb-133va; Add.14533, ff. 73r-89r;
with some additions at the end in Add. 14538, ff.119v-133v; and with other additions at the
beginning and the end in Add.12155, ff. 2va-32va.81
A critical digital edition of this florilegium, with other florilegia, will soon be available online.82 In
this paper I shall study the florilegium according to Add. 1453283 and I shall present 1) the titles given
for each group of patristic quotations; 2) the fathers mentioned in each group, their quoted works and
an identification of these quotations; and 3) the main topics treated in these patristic quotations. After
this presentation I shall provide an analysis of the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium and study
the new understanding of the metaphysical terms and concepts that emerges from their juxtaposition.
79
See my forthcoming papers on Abū Rāʾiṭah al-Takrītī’s use of these patristic florilegia: “Miaphysite Syriac Patristic Florilegia and Theopaschisim: Abū Rāʾiṭah’s Defence of the Christological Trisagion Hymn”, Annali di Scienze
Religiose 14 (2021); “Patristic Tradition, Trinitarian Doctrine, and Metaphysics in Abū Rāʾiṭah al-Takrītīs Polemics
against the Melkites”, in Proceedings of the Colloquium Florilegia Syriaca, Brill, Leiden 2022.
80
I am preparing a paper on Abū Rāʾiṭah al-Takrītī’s use of the content of such florilegia in his writings in relation with
Islam, esp. on his understanding of the concept “hypostasis” and whether it can be identified with attribute or property.
81
See also A. van Roey, “Un florilège trinitaire syriaque tiré du Contra Damianum de Pierre de Callinique”,
Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 23 (1992), pp. 189-203.
82
See the website of the ERC-project FLOS, at https://www.unive.it/pag/40548/.
83
I have already checked the florilegium in the four given manuscripts; it is identical in Add. 14533 (with just
one small addition); in Add. 12155, however, this florilegium is found in ff. 13ra-23va, while the rest of the folios,
i.e. ff. 2ra-13ra and 23va-32va, contain additions that are not copied in Add. 14532 and 14533. I have noted that the
copyist of Add. 12155 follows another order for the patristic groups, and that in ff.13ra-32va there are some groups
that are not copied in the other manuscripts. It must be mentioned too that in Add. 14532 there is a missing folio and
I completed it through Add. 14533 and Add. 14538. Finally, it is worthy of note that the opinion of Wright, followed
by Furlani, according to which the Trinitarian florilegium in BL Add. 14532 is copied in ff. 94v-186r, is wrong, see
Furlani, “Un florilegio” (above, n. 77), p. 661 and footnote 3 on the same page.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
100 Bishara Ebeid
Syriac title
̈
̈
ܕܐܒܗܬܐ
ܬܚܘܝܬܐ
̇
̈
1
ܕܡܠܦܝܢ܆
ܩܕܝܫܐ
( 9 4 v b - ܘܟܝܢܐ
ܕܐܘܣܝܐ
97vb)84
ܕܬܠܝܬܝܘܬܐ ܩܕܝܫܬܐ
ܐܘ ܟܝܬ ܐܠܗܘܬܐ܆
̈ ܬܠܬܐ
ܩܢܘܡܐ ܕܐܒܐ
ܘܕܒܪܐ ܘܕܪܘܚܐ ܩܕܝܫܐ
̇
ܐܝܬܝܗ܆ ܘܠܘ ܡܕܡ
ܐܚܪܢܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܘ
ܟܝܬ ܐܠܗܘܬܐ܇ ܘܡܕܡ
̈
ܩܢܘܡܐ
ܐܚܪܢܐ
English translation
Demonstrations
of the holy fathers
who teach that the
substance and the
nature of the Holy
Trinity, which is
the Godhead, is the
three
hypostases
of the Father, the
Son, and the Holy
Spirit, and that the
substance is not
one thing, which is
the Godhead, and
the hypostases are
another thing
Fathers and their works
Bas. Caesar., De Fide85
Greg. Naz., In sanct. pascha et in
tardit.(or. 1)86
Greg. Naz., De Pace I (or. 6)87
Greg. Naz., In theophan.
(or. 38)88
Greg. Naz., De Spir. sancto (or.
31) 89
Greg. Naz., In Seipsum (or. 26)90
Greg. Naz., In Sancta lumina
(or. 39)91
(Ps.) Athan. Alex., De Incarn. et
contra Arianos92
(Ps.) Greg. Thaumaturgus
(=Apollinarius Laodicenus), De
Fide kata meros93
(Ps.) Ioh. Chrysost., De Sancta
trinitate seu de fide94
Epiph. Const., Panarion95
Cyril. Alex., De Adoratione et
cultu in spiritu et veritate 96
Sev. Antioch., Hom. cathedr. 4297
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad Euprax.98
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad Isid. com.99
Main topics
Father, Son and Holy
Spirit are the uncreated
nature, one Godhead, one
God, one power.
Trinity is one God.
The one Godhead is the
three and the three are the
one Godhead.
The oneness is according
to the concept (λόγος) of
the substance or Godhead.
The three are one, by
identity of substance and
divinity.
One substance and Godhead
in three hypostases.
The
hypostases
are
distinguished: no confusion
between the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit; the
Godhead is united on
account of the identity of
the substance.
84858687888990919293949596979899100
84
It must be noted that BL Add. 14532 and BL Add. 12155 follow a different numeration that depends on the
general numeration of the patristic quotations of all the florilegia that each manuscript contains, while BL Add.
14533 in this florilegium does not follow any numeration. BL Add. 14538 follows the same numeration we find in
BL Add. 14532 and probably it is a copy of it. Thus, the numeration followed here is mine.
85
PG 31, 465.22-42.
86
Two quotations: PG 35, 400.39-40 and PG 35, 401.1-7.
87
PG 35, 740.1-5.
88
PG 36, 320.18-28.
89
Section 33.12-17, Gregor von Nazianz. Die fünf theologischen Reden, ed. J. Barbel, Patmos-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1963.
90
PG 35, 1252.29-40.
91
Two quotations: PG 36, 345.39-49 and PG 36, 348.37-38.
92
Two quotations: PG 26, 1000.17-25 and PG 26, 1001.28-29.
93
Two quotations: Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule. Texte und Untersuchungen, ed. H. Lietzmann,
J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1904, p. 176.13-18 and p. 184.23-27.
94
PG 60. 767.34-768.2.
95
Two quotations: Epiphanius, Ancoratus und Panarion, ed. K. Holl, Vols. 3, Hinrichs, Leipzig 1933 (Die
griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, 37), p. 346.17-23 and p. 405.7-11.
96
PG 68, 412.42-55.
97
PO 36, 34.25-28.
98
Two quotations: PO 14, 12 and 14,13-14.
99
PO 12, 214.
100
Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century, ed. A. van Roey – P. Allen, Peeters, Leuven 1994 (Orientalia Lova-
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 101
2
ܕܗܘ ܟܕ
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝOn the fact that
̣
( 9 7 v b - ܚܢܢ
̣ܗܘ ܐܡܪܝܢwe say that the
99rb)
ܕܡܚܝܕ
ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝunited one and
ܘܬܠܬܐ
ܘܡܦܪܫ܁the separated one
ܘܚܕ.ܒܐܠܗܘܬܐ
ܚܕis the same, and
̣
̈
ܬܠܬܐ ܒܕܝܠܝܬܐ܁ ܘܕܚܕthat the three are
one
according
ܘܗܘ
̣ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܠܘ ܚܕ܆
̣
̇
to
Godhead
and
ܡܢܐ ܘܥܪܩ
̣ ܡܬ
̣ ܟܕ ̣ܗܘ
the
one
is
three
ܡܢ ܡܢܝܢܐ
according
to
properties and that
He is one and not
one, and that the
same is numbered
and escapes from
number
Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.),
Ep. 38101
Greg. Naz., De Spir. sancto (or.
31)102
Greg. Naz., De Pace III
(or. 23)103
Greg. Naz., In laudem Heronis
philosophi (or. 25)104
Greg.
Nys.,
Refutatio
confessionis Eunomii105
Greg. Nys., Oratio catechetica
magna106
Sev. Antioch., Hom. cathedr.
70107
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad presbyteros
et archimandritas Iohannem et
Iohannem et alios108
̇
3
Sev. Antioch., Contra
On
the
fact
that
one
ܥܠ ܗܝ ܕܚܕ ܩܢܘܡܐ
̇
( 9 9 r a - ܟܠܗ ܐܘܣܝܐ
impium Grammaticum109
hypostasis
is
not
the
ܠܘ
99rb)
whole
substance
and
ܘܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
Godhead
ܐܘܣܝܐ
̇
ܕܟܠܗ
4
ܕ ܐ ܠܗ ܘ ܬ ܐ ܆The whole substance Sev. Antioch., Contra
( 9 9 r b - ܬܠܝܬܝܘܬܐ ܩܕܝܫܬܐof the Godhead is impium Gramm.110
99vb)
Greg. Naz., In sanctum
ܐܝܬܝܗthe Holy Trinity
baptisma (or. 40)111
God paradoxically has in himself
both union and division.
For, as far as the concept
(λόγος) of substance is
concerned, God is one, but
inasmuch as the properties
indicative of hypostases are
concerned He is divided into
Father, Son and Holy Spirit:
inseparably divided and unconfusedly united.
The same thing (God) is both
numbered and avoids number.
The Trinity is numerable with
regard to the hypostases but it is
outside number because it is one
and the same substance.
Each hypostasis participates
perfectly in the common substance
but is not the whole substance.
Christ is one of the three divine
hypostases comprehended in the
substance of the Godhead. He
is not the whole Godhead and
substance, which comprehends
the three hypostases.
Father, Son and Holy Spirit
are the one Godhead.
The whole substance of the
Godhead, which is the Holy
Trinity, is not incarnate.
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108109 110 111
niensia Analecta, 56), p. 178.208-215; p. 208.179-186.
101
Two quotations: sections 4.87-91 and 5.5-7, Saint Basile, Lettres, ed. Y. Courtonne, I-III, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1957-1967.
102
Section 9.12-16, ed. Barbel.
103
PG 35, 1160.30-38.
104
PG 35, 1221.43-46.
105
Two quotations: sections 5.8-6.6 and 12.1-13.1, Gregorii Nysseni Opera, ed. W. Jaeger, Vol. 2.2, Brill, Leiden 1960.
106
Section 3.5-10, Grégoire de Nysse, Discours Catéchétique, ed. E. Mühlenberg, Cerf, Paris 2000 (Sources chrétiennes, 453).
107
PO 12, 18.9-19.11.
108
Two quotations: PO 12, 215 and 215-216.
109
Three quotations: Severi Antiocheni Liber contra impium grammaticum, oratio prima et secunda, ed. J. Lebon,
Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, Leuven 1938 (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), p. 163.1-5; p. 162.15-18 and p. 167.20-23.
110
Four quotations: ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), p. 172.20-22; p. 174.19-29; p. 212.15-21 and Severi Antiocheni Liber contra impium grammaticum, orationes pars prior, ed. J. Lebon, Secrétariat du CSCO, Leuven 1929
(CSCO 93, Syr. 45), p. 8.7-10.
111
PG 36,424.3-7.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
102 Bishara Ebeid
5
(99vb100rb)
ܕܡܫܘܬܦ
ܕܠܘ ܕܡܛܠ
̣
̈
ܩܢܘܡܐ
ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ
̇
ܟܠܗ
ܒܐܘܣܝܐ܇
ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
Antioch.,
The fact that each Sev.
impium
of the hypostases Contra
participates in the Grammaticum112
substance does not
mean it is the whole
substance
6
(100ra100rb)
ܕܡܫܬܘܬܦ
̣
.ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
̇
ܘܬܦܐ
ܕܡܫ
̣
̇
ܕܗܘ
ܩܢܘܡܐ
̇ܗܝ ܕܝܢ
ܐܘܣܝܐ
Antioch.,
What participates is Sev.
impium
the hypostasis, what Contra
is participated is the Grammaticum113
substance
ܥܠ ܕܐܠܗܐ ܐܒܐ܆On the fact that God
7
(100rb- ܘܐܠܗܐ ܒܪܐ ܘܡܠܬܐthe Father and God
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ܆
ܩܢܘܡܐthe Son and Word
101rb)
̇ ܘܠܘare hypostases, and
ܕܡܫܘܬܦ
ܘ
ܗ
̣
ܘܡܫܬܘܬܦnot the participated
and the participant
Bas. Caesar., Adv.
Eunomium114
Cyril.
Alex.,
Commentarii
in
Joannem115
Sev. Antioch., Ep.
ad Constantinum
e p i s c o p u m
Seleuciae Isauria116
Sev.
Antioch.,
Contra
impium
Grammaticum117
Sev. Antioch., Ep.
ad Maronem118
Each hypostasis, although it
participates fully in the substance,
is not the whole substance which
collectively comprises all the
hypostases.
God the Word is a hypostasis
and not a substance in the sense
of the common substance, even
if He possesses the Godhead’s
substance.
The common substance is the
participated, which holds all the
hypostases participating in it.
Even if each of the hypostases
participates in the substance it is not
called a substance in the sense of a
common substance, but a hypostasis.
The participant (sharer) is not
identified with the participated
(shared).
The hypostasis of the Son is
distinguished from the hypostasis
of the Father and of the Spirit.
The Father and Son and Spirit are
equal in divinity and Godhead.
Neither the Father, nor the Son
nor the Spirit are identified with
the common substance.
Even if the Son is begotten by the
Father, and the Spirit proceeds
from the Father, the latter is not
the common shared substance.
The hypostasis of the Son, who is
one of the three divine hypostases,
was incarnated; this means that He
was united to flesh with a rational
soul.
112 113 114 115 116 117 118
Two quotations: pp. 164.28-165.2 and p. 203.12-19, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
Ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), pp. 191.21-192.1.
114
PG 29, 621.23-31.
115
Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini In D. Joannis evangelium, ed. P.E. Pusey, I-III, E Typ.
Clarendoniano, Oxford 1872, vol. 1, p. 72.9-22.
116
The Sixth Book of the Selected Letters of Severus Patriarch of Antioch, ed. E.W Brooks, vol. I/p.1, London
1903, p. 6.2-9
117
Five quotations: p. 56.4-6; p. 56.13-16; pp. 147.27-148.6; p. 148.9-12 and p. 203.12-14, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
118
PO 12, 198.5-6.
112
113
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 103
ܥܠ ܕܐܘܢܡܝܘܣ܆On the fact
8
̈
ܐܠܘܣܝܣ
(101rb- ܗܠܝܢ
that Eunomius
̇
ܗܘܐ܆
ܕܐܡܪbelieved
102ra)
what
̈
̇
ܡܣܬܟܠ
ܩܢܘܡܐ
he
called
“ ܗܘܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܝܢs u b s t a n c e s ”
were hypostases
Greg. Nys., Contra
Eunomium119
Greg. Nys., Ad Eust. de
sancta trinitate120
Eunomius Cyz., quoted
in Bas. Caesar., Adv.
Eunomium121
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv.
Eunomium122
Sev. Antioch., Contra
impium Grammaticum123
Dam. Alex., Ep. prolixa
seu Apologia prima124
ܥܠ ܕܠܟܝܢܐ ܕܐܒܐOn the fact that
9
(102ra- ܐܘ ܕܒܪܐ܆ ܚܠܦit
sometimes
102vb) ܩܢܘܡܐ ܕܐܒܐ ܐܘhappens
that
ܕܒܪܐ܇ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝthe holy fathers
̇ interchange the
̈
ܐܒܗܬܐ
ܕܢܣܒܝܢ
̈
ܩܕܝܫܐ
nature of the
Father or of the
Son with the
hypostasis of the
Father or the Son
Cyril. Alex., Comm. in
Joannem125
Cyril. Alex., Quod unus
sit Christus126
Theod.
Alex.,
De
Trinitate127
Cyril. Alex., Apologia
xii anathematismorum
contra Theodoretum128
Sev.
Antioch.,
Contra
impium
Grammaticum129
Eunomius said that “begottenness”
is the name of the substance of the
Son. Consequently, he affirmed
three different substances for the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
They are, however, not three
substances, but three hypostases.
Hypostasis is a substance, but
not according the meaning and
definition of the “common
substance”. Severus proves it
through Basil, who says that the
“substance of the Son” means the
“hypostasis of the Son”, differently
from Eunomius’ understanding.
Damian refuses to consider
the hypostases as substances,
considering such doctrine as
Eunomian.
Cyril says that the Son is from the
“nature and the substance of the
Father” while Severus affirms that
the Son is from the “hypostasis of
the Father”.
Theodosius quotes Gregory of
Nazianzus to show that Gregory
calls the Father and the Son natures
and substances, and that the three
are one Godhead and nature.
119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129
119
Two quotations: Book 3, chapter 1, section 70.8-11 and section 68.1-3, Gregorii Nysseni Opera, ed.
W. Jaeger, voll. 1.1-2.2, Brill, Leiden 1960.
120
Section 6.11-15, Gregorii Nysseni Opera dogmatica minora, ed. F. Müller, vol. 1, Brill, Leiden 1958.
121
PG 29, 584.4-8.
122
Two quotations: PG 29, 588.17-26 and 589.8-11.
123
Cfr. p. 82.9-1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58), 5.
124
Lost in the Greek original.
125
Not identified in the original Greek.
126
Cyrille d’Alexandrie, Deux dialogues christologiques, ed. G.-M. de Durand, Cerf, Paris 1964 (Sources chrétiennes, 97),
p. 764.12-13.
127
Cfr. p. 168.26-23, ed. van Roey-Allen.
128
Two quotations: First quotation: Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, tome I, vol.1, part 6, ed. E. Schwartz,
De Gruyter Berlin-Leipzig 1960 (Collectio Vaticana 165-172), pp. 115.9-15; The second quotation is not identified.
129
Cfr. p. 63. 3-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
104 Bishara Ebeid
10
the
fact
ܥܠ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢOn
̈
(102vb- ܩܢܘܡܐ ܡܐ ܕܡܢܗ
that each of the
104ra)
:ܡܬܚܙܝܐ
ܘܠܗhypostases, of the
ܘܕܒܪܐ
ܕܐܒܐFather, of the Son,
.ܩܕܝܫܐ
ܘܕܪܘܚܐand of the Holy
̣
ܘܐܘܣܝܐ
ܐܠܗܐSpirit, when it is
̣
ܘܟܝܢܐ ܡܬܬܘܕܐ ܡܢseen by itself and
̈ ܐܒܗܬܐ
̈
for itself (that is
ܩܕܝܫܐ
regarded on its
own), is confessed
by the holy fathers
as God, substance,
and nature
Theod. Alex., De Trin.130
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv.
Eunomium131
Ioh. Chrysost., Hom. in
Joannem132
Theod. Alex., De Trin.133
Greg. Naz., De Spir.
sancto (or. 31)134
Theod. Alex., De Trin.135
11
(104ra)136
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv.
Eunomium137
Cyril. Alex., Thesaurus
de
sancta
consub.
trinit.138
Theod. Alex., De Trin.139
Bas.Caesar.,Adv..Eunomium140
Bas. Caesar., Contra Sabellianos
etAriumetAnomoeos141
Bas.Caesar.,Adv.Eunomi.142
(Ps.) Bas. Caesar., Contra
Anomoeos143
Greg.
Nyss.,
Contra
Eunomium.144
Greg.Naz.,DeFilioI(or.29)145
̇
ܐܝܬܝܗ ܐܠ
ܕܐܠOn the fact that
12
“ ܐܝܠܝܕܘܬܐunbegottenness”
(104vb- ܐܘ
ܐܝܠܝܕܘܬܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ܇or “begottenness”
106ra)
ܐܘ ܐܠܗܐare not substance
or God
The three hypostases are God
because of the monarchy,
and each of the three, if taken
separately, is also God because of
their consubstantiality.
The Word is a hypostatic (ܩܢܘܡܝܬܐ
/ ἐνυπόστατος) substance.
The hypostasis of the Word is called
substance by the holy fathers.
Each hypostasis is substance
because the substance is not
un-hypostatic and hypostasis is
not empty of substance and is
an existing thing – otherwise it
would be an accident.
A substance is acknowledged to
each of the divine hypostases.
This
substance
manifests
separately whatever is predicated
of the one Godhead as common
substance.
Affirming that the substance or God is
“unbegottennes” and “begottenness”
means different substances, which
destroys the consubstantiality and
introduces polytheism.
Since “unbegottennes” is opposite to
“begottenness”, considering them as two
substances is tantamount to teaching two
opposite gods, that is, Manicheism.
130 131 132 133 134 135136 137 138 139140141142143144145
Cfr. p. 172.39-50; p. 202.9-19, ed. van Roey-Allen.
Two quotations: PG 29, 524.43-525.9 and 605.21-28.
132
PG 59, 47.31-34.
133
Cfr. p. 162.75-81; p. 197.73-80, ed. van Roey-Allen.
134
Two quotations: sections 6.3-6 and 6.12-13, ed. Barbel.
135
Two quotations: p. 165.156-164; p. 200.154-161 and p. 166.198-167; p. 201.194-203, ed. van Roey-Allen.
136
In BL Add. 14532 the copyist gives a numeration without a title for this group of patristic quotations; however, in
both BL Add. 14533 and BL Add. 12155 there is no numeration or a given title and these patristic quotations belong to the
̇
previous group, i.e. no. 10 in our list. BL Add. 14538 gives it a number and title: “ܩܕܝܫܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܫܬܡܗ ܡܢ
ܕܐܦ ܪܘܚܐ
̣
̈ ” that is “That also the Holy Spirit is called nature by the doctors of the Church”, see folio
ܕܥܕܬܐ
ܠܦܢܐ
ܡ
123r.
̣
137
Two quotations: PG 29, 649.45-652.4 and 728.42-729.3.
138
PG 75, 592.37-43.
139
Cfr. p. 168.26-32 and p. 163.109-112; p, 198.108-111, ed. van Roey-Allen.
140
PG 29,512.15-22.
141
PG 31,605.43-52.
142
Two quotations: PG 29,520.23-28 and 29,520.40-521.5.
143
A. van Roey, “Une Homélie inédite contre les Anoméens attribuée à saint Basile de Césarée”, Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 28 (1997), 179-191, here pp. 189(149ra.32)-190(149rb.28).
144
Three quotations: book 1, sections 510.1-6; 512.1-8 and 514.3-515.1, ed. Jaeger.
145
Section 12.7-13, ed. Barbel..
130
131
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 105
̈
ܡܐ
ܩܢܘ
ܕOn the fact that
13
( 1 0 6 r a - ܕ ܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐthe
hypostases
ܩܕܝܫܬܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ
107rb)
of
the
Holy
̣
ܘܠܗܘܢ ܡܩ ̣ܝܡܝܢTrinity subsist by
themselves and
for
themselves
(i.e. καθ’ ἑαυτὰ)
The names are indicative of the
realities; the realities have full
proper being; so Father, Son and
Holy Spirit are existing realities.
Father, Son and Holy Spirit are
subsistent (ἐνυπόστατον, literally
“having a hypostasis” )ܩܢܘܡܝܐ.
Each hypostasis subsists in itself.
̈
ܕܕܝܠܝܬܐ
ܥܠ
14
̈
ܡܝܩܢܢܝܬ
(106vb- ܐ
ܐܠ
ܕܩܢܘܡܐ܆
107rb)
‘Begottenness’ and ‘unbegottenness’
are not things existing individually
and hypostatically, they are indicative
names (indicating properties) of the
hypostases.
They do not subsist on their own
but take up concrete existence only
in the subsisting hypostases to
which they pertain.
“Theunbegotten”and“thebegotten”
do not mean “unbegottenness” and
“begottenness”.
“The unbegotten” and “the
begotten” are properties subsisting
in individualized form, i.e. as
hypostases.
̈
ܡܢܗܝܢ
̈
ܡܩܝܡܢ
̈
ܘܠܗܝܢ
Bas. Caes., Ep. 210146
Epiph.
Constant.,
Ancoratus147
Greg. Nys., Contra
Eunomium148
Sev.
Antioch.,
Ep.
ad
Sergium
Grammaticum149
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad
presb. et archimandritas
Iohannem et Iohannem
et alios150
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad
Simum Scriniarium151
On the fact that Cyril. Alex., De sancta
the properties of trin. dialogi I-VII152
the hypostasis are
characteristics that
do not subsist by
themselves
and
for themselves (i.e.
καθ’ ἑαυτὰ)
̈ܙܢܝܐ
ܕܒܬܠܬܐOn the fact
15
̈
̇
ܝܕܥܝܢ
(1 0 7 rb- ܐܒܗܬܐ
that the fathers
̈ recognize
ܕܝܠܝܬܐ
108ra)
the
properties
in
three ways
Greg. Naz., Contra
Arianos et de seipso
(or. 33)153
Greg. Naz., De Filio I
(or. 29)154
Cyril. Alex., De Sancta
trinitate dialogi I-VII155
Greg. Naz., De Filio I (or.
29)156
146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156
Section 4.20-28, ed. Courtonne.
Chap. 6, sections 4-6, Epiphanius, Ancoratus und Panarion, ed. K. Holl, vol. 1, Leipzig 1915
(Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 25).
148
Book 3, chapter 1, section 94.1-9, ed. Jaeger.
149
Severi Antiocheni Orationes ad Nephalium, Eiusdem ac Sergii Grammatici, Epistulae mutuae, ed. J. Lebon,
Secrétariat du CSCO, Leuven 1949 (CSCO 119, Syr. 64), p. 125.27-31.
150
PO 12, 216.1-7.
151
PO 12, 195.3-5.
152
Three quotations: Cyrille d'Alexandrie, Dialogues sur la Trinité, ed. G.-M. de Durand, I-III., Cerf, Paris
1976-1978 (Sources chrétiennes 231, 237, 246), pp. 433.40-434.5; 434.37-39 and 421.25-36.
153
PG 36, 236.3-9.
154
Section 10.9-17, ed. Barbel.
155
Two quotations: 434.2-9 and 434.37-39, ed. de Durand.
156
Section 10.17-18, ed. Barbel.
146
147
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
106 Bishara Ebeid
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝ ܕܒܩܢܘܡܐOn the fact that
16
( 1 0 8 r a - : ܡܟܢܐ ܕܝܠܝܬܐthe
property
ܘܠܘܬܗ ܦܪܝܫܐis innate in the
110ra)
ܘ ܥܠܘ ܗ ܝhypostasis (i.e.
ܡܬܚܙܝܐ܇ ܘܠܗgets its name
ܘܠܗ
ܢܩܝܦܐ܇through
the
ܡܙ ܘ ܓܐ ܇h y p o s t a s i s ) ,
ܘ ܠܘ ܬ ܗand for it (for
ܡܬܬܘܣܦܐthe hypostasis),
the
property
is set aside, is
seen in it (in
the hypostasis),
follows it (the
hypostasis),
is
mixed with it (i.e.
is joined to the
hypostasis), and
is added to it (i.e.
is adjunct to the
hypostasis)
Cyril. Alex., De
sancta
trinitate
dialogi I-VII157
Sev.
Antioch.,
Contra additiones
Juliani158
Sev.
Antioch.,
Ep. ad Sergium
Grammaticum159
Sev.
Antioch.,
Contra
impium
Grammaticum160
Bas. Caesar., Ep.
210161
Bas. Caesar. (Greg.
Nys.), Ep. 38162
Greg. Nys., Adv.
Eunomium163
Bas. Caes., Adv.
Eunomium164
Sev. Antioch., Hom.
cathed. 109165
Greg. Nys., Adv.
Eunomium166
Cyril. Alex., De
Sancta trin. dialogi
I-VII167
“Unbegottenness” is to be reckoned as
something existing in the concept of the
hypostasis of God the Father. It belongs to
Him.
Property is not the hypostasis itself, but an
indicative name of the hypostasis.
There are properties for the whole Godhead
(common to all hypostases) such as invisibility,
impalpability and infinity.
Distinction between hypostasis and property.
Property is innate and present in each
hypostasis.
The hypostasis gets its name through the
property: fatherhood in the Father, sonship in the
Son, procession in the Spirit.
Even if the hypostases share the same common
substance, each hypostasis is distinguished
through a specific property: the Father remains
Father and not Son or Spirit, the Son remains
Son and not Father or Spirit, and the Holy Spirit
remains Holy Spirit and not Son or Father.
Property follows its hypostasis externally, i.e.
from outside: unbegottenness follows God
externally; what is outside God is not His
substance.
Property is seen in the hypostasis:
when we say “this one is begotten” or “this one
is not begotten”, by the subject of the sentence
we mean the substrate, while by the predicate we
mean what is viewed as pertaining to the substrate.
Property is mixed with the hypostasis: it is
inseparable from it.
Property is added to the hypostasis: distinction
between the common characteristics of the
substance-substrate and the added and innate
property of each hypostasis.
157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166167
Cfr. p. 434.30-37, ed. de Durand.
Sévère d’Antioche, La Polémique Antijulianiste, II, A: Le Contra Additiones Juliani, ed. R. Hespel, Secrétariat
du CSCO, Leuven 1968 (CSCO 295, Syr. 124), p. 84.1-6.
159
Cfr. pp. 86.24-87.1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 119, Syr. 64).
160
Two quotations: p. 170.9-12 and p. 64. 7-16, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
161
Section 5.28-34, ed. Courtonne.
162
Section 4.38-43, ed. Courtonne.
163
Three quotations: the first two are not identified; the thrid quotations: Book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12, ed. Jaeger.
164
Three quotations: PG 29, 640.23-27; 517.27-38 and 520.14-23.
165
PO 25, 747.6-748.5
166
Book 3, chapter 8, section 25.1-12, ed. Jaeger.
167
Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.
157
158
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 107
ܥܠ ܕܟܠ ܩܢܘܡܐ
17
On the fact that
ܕܝܠܝܬܗ
ܥܡevery
(110rahypostasis
ܘܕܟܠ. ܡܬܝܕܥis known with its
110rb)
ܩܢܘܡܐ ܒܐܘܣܝܐproperty, and every
ܕ ܐ ܠܗ ܘ ܬ ܐhypostasis
exists
ܥܡ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
̣
in the substance
ܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܕܝܠܗof the Godhead
with its distinctive
[character]
ܡܛܠOn the fact that
18
( 1 1 0 r b - ܕ ܡܠܘ ܬ ܘ ܬ ܐunion,
mixture,
ܘ ܡܙ ܘ ܓܘ ܬ ܐand
110vb)
connection
ܘ ܢܩܝܦܘ ܬ ܐ ܆are understood in
̈
̈
ܡܫܚܠܦܐ
ܒܙܢܝܐ
different ways
̈ܡܫܬܩܠܝܢ
̇
ܕܝܬܐ
ܥܠ
19
ܐܝܬ
( 1 1 0 v b - ܐܡܬܝ܆
̇
ܕܚܠܦ ܐܘܣܝܐ
112rb)
ܡܢ
ܡܫܬܩܐܠ
̣
̈ ܐܒܗܬܐ
̈
ܩܕܝܫܐ܆
ܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܐܡܬ ̣ܝ
ܕܚܠܦ ܚܕ ܩܢܘܡܐ
On
the
fact
that
sometimes
“existence” (ὕπαρξίς)
is understood by
the holy fathers as
“substance”
and
sometimes as “one
hypostasis”
Greg. Naz., De Dogmate Each hypostasis exists along
et constitut. episcop. (or. with its property in the
20) 168
substance of the Godhead.
Sev.
Antioch.,
Contra
impium
Grammaticum.169
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv. The meanings of union,
Eunomium170
mixture, and connection are
Bas. Caesar., In Principio different.
erat Verbum171
(Ps.) Athan. Alex., De
Salutari adventu Jesu
Christi
et
adversus
Apollinarium172
Athan. Alex., Ep. I ad
Serapionem173
Sev. Antioch., Contra
impium Grammaticum174
Sev. Antioch., Ep. ad
Simum Scriniarium175
Sev. Antioch., Contra
impium Grammaticum176
Bas. Caesar., In Principio
erat Verbum177
Cyril. Alex., Comm. in
Joannem178
The word “being” (essence)
can indicate the general
and common substance
when it is said without
determination, while with
determination and conjoined
with a particular distinction,
it indicates a hypostasis, that
is, a particular being.
168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178
PG 35, 1072.42-45.
Cfr. p. 169.13-16, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
170
Six quotations: PG 29, 588.33-44; 600.15-16; 600.24-27; 601.36-42; 605.30-39 and 625.7-10.
171
PG 31, 476.18-20.
172
PG 26, 1149.25-27.
173
PG 26, 596.15-21.
174
Three quotations: pp., 61.20-62.11; pp. 73.28-74.10 and p. 73.5-11 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
175
PO 12, 194.6-195.5.
176
Cfr. p. 76.24-27, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
177
PG 31, 477.42-46.
178
Cfr. p. 261. 14-17, ed. Pusey, vol. 2.
168
169
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
108 Bishara Ebeid
ܥܠ ܕܩܢܘܡܐ ̇ܗܘ
20
On the fact that
ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ܆the
(112rbhypostasis
̈
ܡܬܚܙܝܢ ܥܠܘܗܝ
ܟܕis
113ra)
substrate
̈
ܕܝܠܝܬܗ
(ὑποκείμενον) if
its properties are
seen on it
Bas. Caesar. (Greg. Nys.),
Ep. 38179
Bas. Caesar., Ep. 210180
Greg. Naz., De Dogmate et
constitutione episcoporum
(or. 20)181
Greg. Naz., De filio I (or.
29)182
Greg.
Nys.,
Contra
Eunomium183
ܐܚܪܢܐ
ܕܡܕܡOn the fact that
21
̇
( 1 1 3 r a - ܐܝܬܝܗ ܐܘܣܝܐ܆the substance is
ܐܚܪܢܐ
ܘܡܕܡone thing and
113va)
ܩܢܘܡܐthe hypostasis is
another thing
Sev. Antioch.s, Contra
impium Grammaticum184
Bas. Caesar., Ep. 236185
quoted in Sev. Antioch.,
Contra
impium
Grammaticum186
Cyrillus Alexandrinus, De
Sancta trin. dialogi I-VII187
̈ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ
ܩܢܘܡܐ
22
On
the
fact
( 1 1 3 v a - ܡܫܘܬܦ ܒܡܠܬܐ
that
each
of
̣
ܕܐܘܣܝܐ܆ ܘܒܓܘܐthe
113vb)
hypostases
ܕܐܘܣܝܐparticipates in the
concept (λόγος) of
the substance and
in the common
[concept] of the
substance
Sev. Antioch., Contra
impium Grammaticum188
Bas. Caesar., Ep. 214189
Sev. Antioch., Contra
impium Grammaticum190
Thinking of the hypostasis
does not mean thinking of
the substance indefinitely,
but delimiting the common
substance within a precise
reality, by means of the
properties appearing on it.
Hypostasis is a substrate, i.e.
a concretely existing reality,
with particular properties
that distinguish it from other
hypostases: how could the
Father be distinguished
from the Son without the
particular
property
of
fatherhood or of sonship?
The meaning of substance
is common and general
(κοινὸν), while the meaning
of hypostasis is particular
(καθ’ ἕκαστον).
The
difference
between
substance and hypostasis is that
substance is comprehensive
(περιεκτική) of each hypostasis
belonging to it.
Each hypostasis participates
in the concept (λόγος) of the
substance, that is, manifests
the common characteristics
of the substance to which
it belongs, and in addition
it manifests its particular
properties.
179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190
Section 3.1-12, ed. Courtonne.
Section 5.25-34, ed. Courtonne.
181
PG 35,1072.42-45.
182
Section 10.12-14, ed. Barbel.
183
Two quotations: book 3, chapter 5, section 56.7-12 and section 58.1-9, ed Jaeger.
184
Two quotations: pp. 210.23-211.2 and 211.22-212.10 ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
185
Section 6.1-3, ed. Courtonne.
186
Cfr. p. 67.7-10, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
187
Cfr. p. 408.31-33, ed. de Durand.
188
Cfr. pp. 160.17-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
189
Section 4.9-15, ed. Courtonne.
190
Cfr. p. 162.15-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
179
180
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 109
ܐ
ܒܡܠܬ
ܕ
Greg. Nys., Contra
Eunomium.191
Greg. Naz., In
Sancta lumina (or.
39)192
Greg. Nys., Refutatio
confessionis Eunomii193
On those things whose Greg. Nys., Ad
concept (λόγος) is other and Eust. de sancta
trinitate194
whose nature is different
Bas. Caesar. (Greg.
Nys.), Ep. 38195
On what the division of the Sev.
Antioch.s,
substance is
Contra
impium
Grammaticum196
23
On the fact that those
ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܚܕ
̣
(113vb[hypostases] that have [and
ܐ ܝܬ ܝܗ ܘܢparticipate in] the concept
114rb)
̈
ܫܘܝܝ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ
(λόγος) of the one substance
are equal in substance (i.e.
consubstantial)
ܕ ̇ܗ ܢܘ ܢ
24
( 1 1 4 r b - ܕܐܚܪܬܐ ܗܝ
ܡܠܬ ܗ ܘܢ ܆
114va)
ܢ
̣ ܘ ܟܝܢܗ ܘ
ܡܫܚܠܦܐ ܗܘ
ܗܘ
ܕܡܢܐ
25
ܦܘ
( 1 1 4 v a - ܠܓܐ
ܕܐܘܣܝܐ
114vb)
ܕܗܕܐ ܗܝ ̇ܗܝThat this is “not dividing and
26
̇
ܕܐܠnot cutting the substance”:
( 1 1 4 v b - ܢܦܠܓ
ܘܐܠ ܢܦܣܘܩunderstanding
115ra)
and
ܐܠܘܣܝܐ܆ ̇ܗܝpredicating the hypostases
̇
ܕܢܬܪܥܐ ܘܢܐܡܪ
as not different in all [their
̈
ܠܩܢܘܡܐ ܐܠnatural properties]
̈
ܡܫܚܠܦܐ
ܒܟܠܗܝܢ
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝ ܕܡܬܚܙܐ
27
( 1 1 5 r a - ܐܠܗܐ ܒܚܕܐ
ܐ ܘ ܣܝܐ
115va)
ܘ ܐ ܠܗ ܘ ܬ ܐ ܇
ܒܬܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ
̈
ܘܕܟܠ.ܩܢܘܡܐ
ܦܐ
ܦܪ ܨ ܘ
̣
ܡܐ
ܒܩܢܘ
ܫܪ ܝܪ ܐ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
On the fact that God is
seen in one substance and
[one] Godhead, but in
three hypostases, and that
each person exists in a true
hypostasis
The hypostases that participate
in the same concept (λόγος) of
substance have the same natural
characteristics in common but
are differentiated through their
particular properties.
If two things belong to different
substances, and thus manifest
different concepts (λόγοι) of
substance, this means that they are
different as to their nature.
Hypostases do not divide the
substance.
Even if each divine hypostasis, taken
separately, is called God, this does not
mean that the Godhead is divided.
Sev.
Antioch., We can affirm that the hypostases
Contra
impium do not divide the substance only
Grammaticum197 when they belong to the same
substance and manifest the same
concept (λόγος) of substance (i.e.,
common natural properties).
Sev.
Antioch.,
Hom.
cathed.
123198
Theod. Alex., De
Trin.199
Bas. Caesar., Ep.
210199
God is one, exists and is known in
one substance and three unconfused
hypostases.
Each of the three divine persons exists
in true hypostases.
Even if there are three hypostases,
God is one in substance and divinity
(i.e., in the concept of substance).
In the Trinity there is one
beginning, the Father, from whom
the Son and the Holy Spirit come.
191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200
Book 3, chapter 1, section 74.8-75.3, ed. Jaeger.
PG 36, 345.39-45.
193
Sections 5.8-6.2, ed. Jaeger.
194
Section 14.12-16, ed. Müller.
195
Section 3.26-30, ed. Courtonne.
196
Two quotations: p. 156.21-30 and p. 159.6-11, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
197
Cfr. p. 217.13-23, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
198
PO 29, 148.12-22.
199
Two quotations: pp. 152.126-153.130; p. 188.131-135 and p. 159.319-321; pp. 194.320-195.322, ed. van Roey-Allen.
200
Section 5.35-36, ed. Courtonne.
191
192
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
110 Bishara Ebeid
28
(115va)
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝ ܕܬܠܬܐ
̈
ܩܢܘܡܐ ܒܐܒܐ
ܘܒܒܪܐ ܘܒܪܘܚܐ
ܩܕܝܫܐ ܡܬܚܙܝܢ
Antioch.,
On the fact that three Sev.
impium
hypostases are seen in Contra
the Father, the Son, Grammaticum201
and the Holy Spirit
ܕ ܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐThat the Holy
29
(115vab) ܩܕܝܫܬܐ ܒܐܒܐTrinity is known in
ܡܬ ܝܕ ܥܐthe Father, in the
ܘܒܒܪܐ ܘܒܪܘܚܐ
Son, and in the Holy
̣
ܩܕܝܫܐSpirit
ܕ ܡܬ ܐ ܡ̈ܪ ܝܢThat “Father” and
30
“ ܐܒܐSon” are called “two
(115vb- ܘܒܪܐ
ܬ̈ܪܝܢ ܣܘܥ̈ܪܢܐthings” (πράγματα)
116ra)
Cyril.
Comm.
Joannem202
Alex.,
in
Alex. Alex., Hom.
festalis 7203
Greg. Nys., Contra
Eunomium204
31
(116ra)
ܕ ܡܬ ܐ ܡ̈ܪ ܝܢThat “Father” and Greg. Nys., Contra
ܘܒܪܐ
“ ܐܒܐSon” are called Eunomium205
“ ܬ̈ܪܝܢ ܕܣ ̣ܝܡܝܢtwo
substrates”
32
(116ra)
ܕܡܬܐܡ̈ܪܝܢ ܐܒܐ
ܘܒܪܐ ܘܪܘܚܐ
ܕܩܘܕܫܐ ܬܠܬܐ
̣
ܕܣ ̣ܝܡܝܢ
(ὑποκείμένα)
That
“Father”, Sev.
Antioch.,
“Son”, and “Holy C o n t r a
Spirit” are called Felicissimum206
three
substrates
(ὑποκειμένα)
ܕܐܠ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܚܕThat “one substrate”
33
(116rb- ( ܕܣܝܡ ܡܛܠ ܐܒܐὑποκειμένον) is not
ܘܒܪܐ ܘܪܘܚܐpredicated of the
116va)
ܩܕܝܫܐFather, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit
34
(116va)
ܕܐܠ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܚܕ
ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܐܠܒܐ
ܘܠܒܪܐ ܘܠܪܘܚܐ
ܩܕܝܫܐ
Bas. Caesar., Ep.
214207
Bas. Caesar., In
Principio
erat
Verbum208
That we do not say the Bas. Caesar., Ep.
Father and the Son and 210209
the Holy Spirit “one
thing” (πρᾶγμα)
There is one common substance of
the Godhead and three hypostases
particularly, which are seen as definite
and unconfused in the Father, in the Son,
and in the Holy Spirt.
There is one Holy Trinity known in the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
God is not divided; He is simple, even
if the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit are numbered.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
are called things and names.
The Father is the cause of the Son.
Time cannot be applied to the eternal
and uncreated divine substance.
The Father and the Son are two
substrates and they are united as to
nature.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit are three hypostases and three
substrates.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
exist in three separate and unconfused
hypostases.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
are three hypostases and three persons,
therefore they are three substrates and
not one substrate.
This does not mean that they are dissimilar
with regard to substance (ἀνόμοια).
Affirming that the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit are one thing, that is
one hypostasis, means rejecting the
economy of salvation realized by the
Son and the role of the Spirit in it.
201 202 203 204 205 206207208209
Cfr. p. 66.9-18, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
Not identified in the original Greek.
203
Analecta Sacra Patrum Antenicaenorum ex Codicibus Orientalibus: Syriac and Armenian Fragments of AnteNicene Writings, ed. J.-P.-P. Martin, Ex Publico Galliarum Typographeo, Paris 1983, p. 199.
204
Book 1, section 377.1-8, ed. Jaeger.
205
Book 1, section 498.1-2, ed. Jaeger.
206
Preserved just in Syriac in Petri Callinicensis Contra Damianum, Vol. 2, Chapter IX, 284-290, ed. Ebied-van
Roey -Wickham.
207
Two quotations: sections 3.14-18 and 3.29-33, ed. Courtonne.
208
PG 31, 479.32-39.
209
Section 3.15-21, ed. Courtonne.
201
202
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 111
35
(116vab)
̇
̈
ܕܒܙܒܢܝܢ
ܕܗܝ
On what is often Bas. Caesar., De Sometimes in Scripture the preposition
̈ܣܓܝܐܢ ܣ ̣ܝܡܐposited instead of Spiritu sancto210
ἐν is used instead of μετὰ and sometimes
̇
ܚܠܦ ܗܝ ܕܥܡthe [preposition]
instead of σύν.
36
(116vb)
ܕܡܩܝܡܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ
Antioch., Godhead is one substance that consists
The
substance Sev.
̣
̈ ܒܬܠܬܐ
ܩܢܘܡܐ
consists in three Ep. ad Isidorum in three hypostases.
“with” (σύν)
ܕܢܘܕܐ
ܕܙܕܩ
37
( 1 1 6 v b - ܠܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐ
ܚܕܐ
ܩܕܝܫܬܐ
117ra)
ܐܘܣܝܐ ܒܡܠܬܐ
̇
ܘܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ
38
(117rab)
̈
ܐܒܗܬܐ
ܕܡܘܕܝܢ
ܚܕ ܐܠܗܐ ܘܚܕܐ
ܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܘܚܕܐ
ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܪܢܐܝܬ
ܠܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐ
ܩܕܝܫܬܐ
ܕܫܡܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ
39
( 1 1 7 r b - ܡܪܢܐܝܬ ܡܚܘܝܢܐ
̣
ܕܫܘܘܕܥܐ
ܗܘ
117va)
ܓܘܢܝܐ
40
(117vab)
ܕ ܡܪ ܢܐ ܝܬ
ܒܪܐ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
ܐܠܗܐ܁ ܝܕܝܥܐ
ܘܐܒܐ ܘܪܘܚܐ
ܕܝܢ
̣
ܕܩܕܝܫܐ
hypostases
It is necessary
to confess the
Holy Trinity as
one substance in
word and reality
Comitem211
(Ps.) Athan. Alex.,
De Fide212
Cyril. Alex., De
Sancta trin. dialogi
I-VII213
The substance of the Holy Trinity is
acknowledged as one both in thought
and reality.
It is one substance because of the unity
of nature and of being identical in every
natural aspect.
Therefore, the Son is acknowledged to
be consubstantial with the Father and
the Holy Spirit.
Greg.
Nys.
,
Ad
The divine nature is one, therefore the
That the fathers
confess
the Ablabium quod non Trinity is one God and one Godhead.
Holy
Trinity sint tres dii214
eminently as one
God and one
Godhead
and
one substance
Antioch., The Fathers sometimes interchange the
That the name Sev.
impium terms hypostasis and substance.
of
substance Contra
In this case, and especially in Christological
is mainly an Grammaticum215
contexts, “substance” does not indicate
indicator
of
the general meaning comprehending a
the
common
plurality of hypostases but the individual
meaning
meaning of a concretely existing thing.
That the Son is Greg. Naz., De Filio I Whatever shares in a concept is called by
the same name.
God in a proper (or. 29)216
The Son shares the concept of Godhead
sense; but this is
(the common meaning of the substance)
evident for the
with the Father therefore He is called
Father and the
God, not by homonymity and sheer
Holy Spirit, too
participation in an appellation, but in a
proper sense and in reality.
210 211 212 213 214 215216
Chapter 25, section 58.5-14, Basile de Césaré, Sur le Saint-Esprit, ed. B. Pruche, Cerf, Paris 1968 (Sources
chrétiennes,17 bis.).
211
PO 12, 213.6-8.
212
Not preserved in the original Greek.
213
Cfr. p. 641.6-11, ed. de Durand.
214
Section 57.8-13, ed. Müller.
215
Cfr. p. 218.11-24, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
216
Sections 13.12-14.5, ed. Barbel.
210
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
112 Bishara Ebeid
̈
ܡܚܘܝܢܐ
̈
ܕܙܢܝܐ
41
That the indicative
ܕ ܕ ܝܠܝܘ ܬ ܐ ܆modes of the
(118raܐ
ܠܡܠܬproperty
118va)
will
ܕܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ ܐܠ
̣
not
damage
the
̇
ܘܕܠܒܪ.ܡܣܓܦܝܢ
condition
of
ܐܘܣܝܐ
ܡܢsimplicity
[of
̈
̈ ܡܬܢܣܒܢ
ܕܝܠܝܬܐ
God] and that
̈
ܡܝܩܢܢܝܬܐthe characteristic
properties
are
understood outside
of the substance
ܝܠܝܕܘܬܐ ܐܠ
ܕܐܠThat the “Not42
̣
̇
(118vab) ܣܟ ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝܐbegottenness” is not the
ܕܐܠܗܐ ܐܒܐ܆substance of God the
ܐܐܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܐܠFather at all, but only a
ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܡܫܘܕܥܐpredicate that means, for
ܠܗܠܝܢ ܕܫܡܥ ̣ܝܢthose who hear, that the
ܐܬܝܠܕ ܐܒܐ
̣ ܕܐܠFather was not begotten
ܕܠܘ ̣ܗܢܘܢ ܟܕThat those which
43
̈
̇ܗܢܘܢare indicators and
(118vb- ܠܚܕܕܐ
119va)220 ܐ ܝܬ ܝܗ ܘ ܢthose which are
ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܫܘܕܥܝܢindicated,
and
ܘ ܡܫܬ ܘ ܕ ܥܝܢ ܇those which are
ܘ ܕ ܡܝܩܝܢܝܢdepicted and those
ܘ ܡܬ ܝܩܝܢܢ ܇which depict, and
ܘ ܡܘ ܕ ܥܝܢthose which enable
ܘܡܬܝܕܥܝܢto be known and
those which are
known, are not the
same things
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv. The characteristics and properties with
Eunomium217
which God is described, like light,
Petrus Callinic., Contra goodness etc., are understood outside of
the substance; therefore, God is simple
Damian.218
and not composite.
The same is applied to the properties of
the hypostases, but not to the hypostases
themselves. Therefore, those who
acknowledge the characteristic properties of
the hypostases as hypostases must say that
the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit are
not light, life or goodness at all, but merely
accompany the light, being understood
outside of the substance
Cyril . Alex., De Sancta Unbegottenness does not indicate the
trin. dialogi I-VII219
Father’s substance; it is a word that
indicates His not having been begotten
as an appropriate concept and property
concerning God the Father, not the
substance itself of God.
Bas. Caesar., Adv. Eunom.221
Bas. Caesar. (Greg.Nys.),
Ep. 38 222
Bas. Caesar., Ep. 210 223
Greg. Naz., In Sancta
lumina (or. 39 224
Greg.Nys.,ContraEunom.225
Greg.Nys.,Ref.conf.Eunom.226
Cyril. Alex., Thesaurus de
sancta consubst.trin.227
Sev. Antioch., Hom. cath. 21228
Theod. Alex., De Trin.229
Names are indicative of substances
and are not themselves substance.
Amongst the names of God, some are
indicative of what belongs to Him and
others of what does not belong to Him.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
have the same nature and share in the one
Godhead; therefore, they share the name
“God” that indicates the divine reality.
They have, however, different proper
names, which indicate different definite
and complete realities.
217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229
PG 29, 640.18-641.2.
Vol. 1, Chapter VI. 364-372, ed. Ebied – van Roey – Wickham.
219
Cfr. p. 433.20-28, ed. de Durand.
220
Because of a missing folio in BL Add. 14532 this group of quotations is integrated through the other manuscripts, precisely BL Add. 14533, f. 83rv; BL Add. 14538, f. 128rv and BL Add. 12155, f. 17v.
221
Two quotations: PG 29, 681.40-41 and 533.40-45.
222
Two quotations: sections 3.2-8 and 3.17-22, ed. Courtonne.
223
Section 4.20-31, ed. Courtonne.
224
PG 36, 348.7-19.
225
Book 3, chapter 1, section 87.3-88.4, ed. Jaeger.
226
Section 14.6-13, ed. Jaeger.
227
Four quotations: PG 75, 28.23-24; 36.27-31; 321.22-30 and 609.8-13.
228
PO 37, 70.32-72.2.
229
Cfr. pp. 152.116-153.129; p. 188.122-135, ed. van Roey-Allen.
217
218
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 113
̣ܡܬܪܢܐ
44
ܥܠ
(119vab)
ܕܐܠThat no accident is to be Cyr. Alex., De Accidents or things naturally present in
ܓܕܫܐthought of in God
Sancta trinitate the substances of certain things, are not
ܐܠܗܐ
dialogi I-VII230 conceived as existing on their own as
distinct and individual beings but they are
rather seen as belonging to the substances
of existent things, or in them.
No accident is to be thought of in God.
Cyr.
Alex.,
De
The Father is not God because of His
That the Father is not God
insofar as He is Father; it is Sancta trinitate being Father and the Son is not God
evident that this is not so for dialogi I-VII231 because of His being Son.
His Son either
̇ ܕܐܒܐ ܠܘ
ܒܗܝ
̣
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
ܕܐܒܐ
̣
ܝܕܝܥܐ
ܐܠܗܐ܁
̣
ܒܪܐ
ܕܐܦܐܠ
ܕܝܠܗ
̇ܢܛܪܝܢܢ
ܕܐܝܟܢOn how we preserve the
46
(12 0 rb- ܬ ܘ ܕ ܝܬ ܐconfession of one God
ܐܠܗܐ
ܕܚܕand of three hypostases
121va)
ܘ ܕ ܬ ܠܬ ܐ
̈
ܩܢܘܡܐ
45
(119vb120rb)
̇
ܡܣܬܟܠ
ܕܐܝܟܢ
47
ܒܣܝܠܝܘ
(12 1 v a - ܣ
ܠܓܘܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ
122b)
ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ
48
̈
(12 2 rb- ܩܢܘܡܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ
̇
ܒܗ ܗܝ ܕܓܘܐ
122vb)
̇
ܘܗܝ ܕܡܢ ܓܘܐ܆
ܘܡܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ
̇
ܒܗ܆
ܕܡܟܢܐ
ܙܕܩ
ܘܕܐܝܟܢ
̈
ܕܢܣ ̣ܬܟܠܢ
Greg.
Naz.,
De Dogmate et
const. episcop.
(or. 20)232
Theod. Alex., De
Trin.233
Bas.
Caesar.,
Ep. 236234
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv. Eunomium235
On how Basil conceives Bas. Caesar., Adv.
of the community of the Eunomium236
substance (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς
οὐσίας)
Antioch.,
That each of the Sev.
hypostases has in itself Contra impium
the community and Grammaticum237
that which is from the
community and from
the substance by which
it is denominated, and
on how they must be
conceived of
Distinction between substance and
hypostasis.
One substance and three hypostases are
professed in the Godhead.
The hypostases are unconfused,
they differ through the properties of
fatherhood, sonship and procession.
Unity in God is maintained because of the
one common and shared substance. Unity in
God is not divided through the hypostases.
The three divine hypostases share the same
substance; therefore, the characteristics of
the divine nature, such as light, goodness
etc. can be said of all three.
Even if it possesses its particular
properties, each hypostasis manifests the
common substance to which belongs.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
are three hypostases of the Godhead.
They manifest the common divine
substance, so that each is called God.
Each one in its specificity, however, is not
identified with the substance that includes
all the divine hypostases.
230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
Cfr. p. 421.13-25, ed. de Durand.
Cfr. p. 640.10-30, ed. de Durand.
232
PG 35, 1072.42-1073.15.
233
Cfr. p. 154.163-170; pp. 189.165-190.171, ed. van Roey-Allen.
234
Section 6.1-22, ed. Courtonne.
235
PG 29, 637.21-44.
236
Two quotations: PG 29, 556.1-30 and 629.12-30.
237
Two quotations: p. 157.17-30 and pp. 165.22-166.1, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
230
231
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
114 Bishara Ebeid
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝ ܕܐܝܬOn the fact that Sev.
Antioch.,
49
impium
(122vb- ܐܝܟܐ ܕܠܫܘܘܕܥܐsometimes substance Contra
ܘ
ܐand Godhead receive Grammaticum238
123ra) ܣܝܐ
̇ ܘܐܠܗܘܬܐ
ܢܣܒܝܢ
a meaning
ܠܡ
ܕܐܠܘIf the difference is
50
̇
(123rab) ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܗܘ ܕܡܢnot placed from
ܠܒܪ ܐܠ ܣܝܡ܆ ܐܠoutside, the nature
ܟܝܢܐ
̇ܡܬܦܠܓis not divided into a
ܠܬܪܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܒܐduality of Father and
ܘܕܗܘ
ܘܕܒܪܐ܁Son, and the nature
̣
ܟܝܢܐ ܡ݀ܬܪܘܚis expanding [by the
properties of the
hypostases]
Cyril.
Alex.,
Thesaurus de sancta
consubstantiali
trinitate239
Cyril. Alex., De
Sancta
trinitate
dialogi I-VII240
̣ܡܨܝܐ
ܕܐܠIt is not possible to Bas. Caesar., Adv.
51
ܣܘ
ܕunderstand the proper Eunomium241
(123rb- ܟܐܠ
ܕܝܠܢܝܐconcept of “Father”
123va) ܕܐܒܐ
̣ܢ ̇ܣܒ܇
ܘܕܒܪܐand of “Son” without
ܕܐܠ ܬܘܣܦܬܐaddition of properties
̈
ܕܕܝܠܝܬܐ
ܕܐܒܐ
ܕܐܠܗܘܬܗThat the divinity of Athan. Alex., Oratio I
̣
52
ܿ
ܐܝܬܝܗ
ܕܒܪܐthe Father is that of contra Arianos242
(123va124r)
the Son
Athan.
Alexa.,
Oratio III contra
Arianos243
Bas. Caesar., Contra
Sabellianos et Arium
et Anomoeos244
ܕܚܕܐ ̇ܗܝ ܐܠܗܘܬܐThat the divinity of the Cyril. Alex., Comm.
53
ܕܐܒܐ ܘܒܪܐFather and of the Son is one in Joannem245
(124ra)
The hypostases are based in the
substance and are included in the
general meaning; therefore, they
share to the same degree what is
perceived to be within the common
meaning of substance.
The substance and the general meaning
are inclusive of the hypostases.
In God, the substance and general
meaning is the Godhead.
The divine nature is simple and not
composite, and is expanded by the
properties and the distinction of
persons and names.
Each hypostasis shares the same
nature; the difference between
hypostases is not in nature but
outside of nature, therefore the
nature is not divided into a duality
of Father and Son.
The concepts of “Father” and
“Son” can be real only through
the addition of the property
of
“unbgottenness”
and
“begottenness” to the substance.
The Father is God and the Son is
God, but they are not two gods
because they are not dissimilar with
regard to substance.
The Father and the Son share in the
same divinity.
One and the same divinity is in the
Father and in the Son.
238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245
Five quotations: p. 160.12-17; p. 162.15-18; p. 156.11-14; p. 157.5-8 and p. 162.24-30, ed. Lebon (CSCO 111, Syr. 58).
PG 75, 141.29-36.
240
Cfr. p. 641.6-14, ed. de Durand.
241
PG 29, 640.11-17.
242
Section 60, subsection 5.5-section 61, subsection 1.1-6, Athanasius, Werke, Band I. Die dogmatischen Schriften, Erster Teil, 2. Lieferung, ed. K. Metzler – K. Savvidis, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1998.
243
Section 23, subsection 5, Athanasius, Werke, Band I. Die dogmatischen Schriften, Erster Teil, 3. Lieferung,
ed. K. Metzler – K. Savvidis, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2000.
244
Two quotations: PG 31, 605.10-17 and 605.40-44.
245
Not identified in the original Greek.
238
239
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 115
ܡܣܐܠ
ܕThat
̣
54
Eunomius
(124ra- ܐ ܘ ܢܡܝܘ ܣrepudiated
the
ܠܓܘ ܢܝܘ ܬ ܐcommunity
124va)
of
ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܐܒܐsubstance of Father
ܘܕܒܪܐand Son
̇
ܕܙܕܩ ܕܠܟܠ ܚܕ
55
It is necessary to
̈
ܡܢconfess each one of
(124va- ܩܢܘܡܐ
ܕ ܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐthe hypostases of
125rb)
̣ܐ
ܝܫܬ
ܩܕthe Holy Trinity
ܐܘܣܝܝܐ܁ ܢܘܕܐas
substantial
(ἐνούσιος)
ܕܒܟܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝThat each of the
56
̈
(125ra- ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܩܢܘܡܐhypostases of the
ܕ ܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐHoly Trinity is God
125vb)
ܩܕܝܫܬܐ ܐܠܗܐ܆by nature, and not by
. ܘܠܘ ܒܫܘܬܦܘܬܐparticipation. Indeed,
ܓܝܪ
ܗܕܐthe latter thing is said
̣
ܒ̈ܪܝܬܐ
ܥܠof the creatures
ܡܬܐܡܪܐ
Greg. Nys., Contra Teaching that “unbegottenness”
Eunomium246
and “begottenness” indicate the
Dam.
Alex.,
Adv. substance means that there are
different substances in God, one for
Tritheitas247
the Father and another for the Son,
and still another for the Holy Spirit.
Affirming different substances is
tantamount to polytheism. Only
by affirming the community of
substance of the three hypostases
does one destroy polytheism.
Bas.
Caesar.,
Adv. ‘Unsubstantial’ (ἀνούσιος, ܐܠ
Eunom.248
)ܐܘܣܝܝܐand ‘non-subsistent’
̇ )ܐܠmean a
Athan. Alex., Tomus ad (ἀνυπόστατος, ܡܩܝܡܐ
non-existent nature.
Antiochenos249
Cyril.
Alex., ‘Substantial’ (ἐνούσιος, )ܐܘܣܝܝܐ
Commentarii
in and ‘subsistent’ (ἐνυπόστατος,
Joannem250
)ܩܢܘܡܝܐmean an existing
hypostasis.
The Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit truly exist,
therefore they are subsistent and
substantial.
Insofar
as
the
Son
is
consubstantial with the Father,
he has his being in the Father and
with the Father.
Athan. Alex., Ep. ad
episcopos Aegypti et
Libyae251
Theoph.
Alex.,
Ep.
festalis prima252
Cyril. Alex., Thesaurus de
sancta et consubstantiali
trinitate253
Christ is God by nature and not
by participation.
The Holy Spirit is holy by
nature. Rational creatures can
have holiness by participation.
The Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit are God by nature
and not by participation.
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253
Two quotations: book 1, sections 479.1-7 and 483.6-484.2, ed. Jaeger.
Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinicensis Contra Damianum, vol. 3, chapter XXX, 328-335, ed. Ebied-van
Roey-Wickham.
248
Two quotations: PG 29, 749.16-22 and 713.24-31.
249
Section 5, subsection 4.1-9, Athanasius: Werke, Zweiter Band. Die “Apologien”, 8. Lieferung, ed. H. C. Brennecke –
U. Heil – A. von Stockhausen, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2006.
250
Cfr. vol. II, pp. 47.24-48.8, ed. Pusey.
251
Section 13, subsection 3, ed. Hansen-Metzler-Savvidis.
252
Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.
253
Three quotations: PG 75, 137.22-25; 137.27-32 and 528.33-39.
246
247
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
116 Bishara Ebeid
̇
ܕܗܝ
ܡܟܣܢܘܬܐ
̣
57
ܕܡܝܢܐ܇
ܕܐܡܪ
̣
(125vb- ܕܐܠ ̇ܥ̈ܪܩܝܢ ܡܢ
̈
127va) ܕܬܠܝܬܝ
̈ܪܫܝܢܐ
̈
̇ܗܢܘܢ
.ܐܠܗܐ
ܕܗܘ ܐܠܗܐ ܠܟܠ
̣
̈
ܩܢܘܡܐ
ܚܕ ܡܢ
ܐܡܪܝܢ
Refutation of what
Damian said, that those
who say that each of
the hypostases is God
do not escape from
the accusation of being
Tritheists
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝܕܠܐܠܝܠܝܕܘܬܐOn the fact that Damian
58
(127va- ܟܕ ܡܫܘܬܦ ܠܡconfesses
the
“non128rb) ܒܐܘܣܝܐ܆ ܐܘܣܝܐbegottenness”,
since
it
ܘܟܝܢܐ ܘܐܠܗܐ
̣
participates
in
the
substance,
as
̇ ̇ܡܘܕܐ ܕܡܝܢܐ܁
ܒܗ
substance, nature and God, and
ܒܕܡܘܬܐܘܠܝܠܝܕܘܬܐ
similarlythe“begottenness”and
ܘܠܢܦܘܩܘܬܐ
the“procession”
ܕ ܠܕ ̈ܝܠܝܬ ܐThat Damian confesses
59
̈
(128rb- ܡܝܩܝܢܝܬܐ ܗܢܘ
the
characteristic
ܕܝܢproperties,
128vb) ܐܒܗܘܬܐ
i.e.
ܐܘ
“ ܘܒܪܘܬܐ܇f a t h e r h o o d ” ,
ܝܠܝܕܘܬܐ
“ ܐܠsonship”,
or
“ ܘ ܝܠܝܕ ܘ ܬ ܐu n b e g o t t e n n e s s ”
ܘ ܢܦܘ ܩܘ ܬ ܐand
“begottenness”
ܕܡܝܢܐ
̇ܡܘܕܐand “procession”, as
̈
ܡܐ
ܩܢܘ
hypostases of the Holy
ܕ ܬ ܠܝܬ ܝܘ ܬ ܐTrinity
ܩܕܝܫܬܐ
Greg. Naz., De Spiritu
sancto (or. 31)254
Epiph.Constant.,Panarion255
Cyril.Alex.,Comm.inJoan.256
Cyril.
Alex.,
Contra
DiodorumetTheodorum257
Cyril. Alex., Thesaurus
de sancta consubst. trin.258
Sev.Antioch.,Hom.cath.259
Sev.Antioch.,Ep.adVictor.260
Petr. Callinic. Contra Dam.261
Dam. Alex., Adv.
Tritheitas262
Dam.
Alex.,
Ep.
prolixa seu Apologia
prima263
Dam. Alex., Adversus
Tritheitas264
Dam.
Alex.,
Ep.
prolixa seu Apologia
prima265
The Spirit is God, since He is called
Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ etc.
The Spirit is God since it proceeds
from the Father.
Christ is God by nature.
He is God from God and became
flesh.
Christ is called the likeness of God.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit are truly God, Life and Light
by nature and not metaphorically or
by grace or participation.
“Property” is called “hypostasis” when
̇
it subsists (ܡܩܝܡܐ
) in the substance.
Properties are not natures but belong to
the nature, i.e. they participate fully in
the substance. However, each propertyhypostasis is named “nature” because it
participates fully in the nature.
“Properties”, if seen in the common
substance, are called “hypostases”
and are considered as realities.
The Father, being the Father and not the
Son or the Holy Spirit, has the unique
characteristic of the fatherhood which
is called his “hypostasis” or “property”;
the same is applied to the Son and to
the Holy Spirit. Property is a hypostasis
̇
when it subsists (ܡܩܝܡܐ
) in the
substance and has reality in the common.
Property is substantial ( )ܐܘܣܝܝܬܐsince it
fully participates in the substance and is not
an aggregate of substance and property.
254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265
Section 29.12-14, ed. Barbel.
Cfr. p. 518.23-26, ed. Holl, vol. 3.
256
Two quotations: the first one not identified in the original Greek; the second: pp.700.24-701.3, ed. Pusey.
257
Cfr. p. 498, ed. Pusey.
258
PG 75, 609.50-612.2.
259
PO 8, 353.1-8.
260
PO 14, 120.
261
Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, chapter XXXVIII. 153-160, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
262
Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XXXIX.31-37; 38-43 and
44-49, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
263
Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XXXIX.50-59; 59-66 and
67-72, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
264
Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 2, Chap. I.44-50, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
265
Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 2, Chap. I.116-123; 125-130 and 130137, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
254
255
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 117
ܥܠ ̇ܗܝ ܕܡܕܡ
60
On the fact
ܐ ܚܪ ܢܐthat
(128vbDamian
ܡܘܕܐ ܕܡܝܢܐconfesses
129va)
the
ܐܠ ܘ ܣܝܐsubstance of the
ܕ ܐ ܠܗ ܘ ܬ ܐ ܆Godhead to be
ܘܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐsomething, and
̈
ܗ ̣ܢܘ.ܠܩܢܘܡܐ
the hypostases
ܐܠܒܐ
ܕܝܢsomething else,
ܘܠܒܪܐ ܘܠܪܘܚܐ
̣
i.e. Father, Son,
ܩܕܝܫܐand Holy Spirit
ܥܠ ܕܩܢܘܡܐOn the fact that
61
(129va- ܐܝܟ ܫܘܘܕܥܐthe hypostasis as
130vb) ܕܝܠܗ ܐܘ ܟܝܬto its signification
( ܐܝܟ ܡܠܬܗ܆meaning), i.e. its
ܐܠ ܐܝܬܘܗܝconcept, is not at
ܐܝܟ
ܣܟall substance or
̇ nature or God,
ܕܨܒܐ ܪܘܫܥܐ
: ܕ ܕ ܡܝܢܐas
Damian’s
ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܘimpiety wants
ܐܘ
ܟܝܢܐ
ܐܠܗܐ
Dam.
Alex.,
Adv.Tritheitas266
Dam.
Alex.,
Ep.
prolixa
seu Apologia
prima267
Dam.
Alex.,
Adv.Tritheitas268
Dam.
Alex.,
Ep.
prolixa
seu Apologia
prima269
Petr. Callinic.,
Contra Dam.270
The fact that the divine nature is “seen in three
persons” and that the three properties “subsist in
the divine substance” implies that the concept of
“property” or “person” is one thing and “nature”
or “substance” another thing.
The characteristic properties, when seen in the
substance, subsist as three perfect persons and
̈
three hypostases; they are substantial ()ܐܘܣܝܝܐ
but not substances, otherwise the three hypostases
would be three gods.
Damian’s doctrine
Each hypostasis is named, and is, substance not by
its own signification but because it participates in the
common nature.
Distinction between what “substance and nature in
the full sense” is, and what has been called “nature in a
metaphorical sense”.
“Father” and “Son” are names that do not indicate
the substance but are exclusively indicative of
properties. However, since the substance of the
Godhead in the full sense belongs to the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them is in the
full sense both God and substance, as being truly
substantial()ܐܘܣܝܝܐ.
Peter’s doctrine
Unbegottenness, begottenness or procession are
neither called ‘substance’ or ‘God’ nor are substance
and God by participating in the substance and
Godhead.
If “hypostasis” is identified with “property” it cannot
be considered substance or nature.
The fact that Damian teaches that the properties,
recognized as hypostases, are one thing in their own
concept (λόγος) and the substance of Godhead is
another thing; and that he also teaches that each of
the properties is not God or substance or nature in its
own concept, means that he does not truly think of
the three hypostases as ‘God’, ‘substance’ or ‘nature’.
266 267 268 269 270
Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XL.30-37 and 39-53,
ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
267
Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XL.55-62 and 75-87, ed. Ebied-van
Roey-Wickham
268
Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XLI.61-75 and 77-81, ed. Ebied-van
Roey-Wickham
269
Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XLI.84-97, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
270
Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XLVI.51-78, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
266
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
118 Bishara Ebeid
ܙܕܩ
ܕܐܝܟܢ
62
̇ How it is necessary
̇
ܠܗܝ
ܕܢܣܬܟܠ
(130vbto understand what
ܕܐܡܪ ܕܡܝܢܐ
̣
131ra)
Damian said regarding
ܡܛܘܠ ܐܘܣܝܐthe substance, that
ܐܚܪܝܢ
ܕܡܕܡit is something
̇
ܐܝܬܝܗ ܒܡܠܬܐ
different in its concept;
̇
ܕܝܠܗ܇ ܐܘ ܡܛܘܠ
or regarding the
ܩܢܘܡܐ ܕܠܝܬܘܗܝhypostasis, that it is not
ܐܘܣܝܐsubstance
ܕܐܠܗܐ
ܥܠOn the fact that
63
ܐܒܐ܆Damian does not
(131rb- ܠܘ
131va) ܩܢܘܡܐ ܒܠܚܘܕunderstand God
̇
ܡܣܬܟܠ ܕܡܝܢܐ
the Father only as
hypostasis
P e t r u s
Callinic.,
C o n t r a
Dam.271
ܕ ܐܠ ܒܗ ܘ ܬ ܐThat
64
Damian
̇
ܕcelebrates
(131va- ܡܟܢܐ
the
132va) “ ܒܐ ܠܗ ܘ ܬ ܐ ܆f a t h e r h o o d ” ,
ܐܠܗܐ ܐܒܐthat is named in
̇ the Godhead, as
ܡܫܒܚ ܕܡܝܢܐ
God the Father
Dam. Alex.,
Apologia
secunda273
Dam. Alex.,
Ep.
per
Gerontium
allata274
Petr. Callinic.,
C o n t r a
Dam.275
Dam. Alex.,
Ep. prolixa
seu Apologia
prima272
Damian’s doctrine
Distinction between “the concept (λόγος) of nature or
substance” that indicates the natures and substances
in themselves, and “the concept of hypostasis” that
indicates the hypostases themselves.
Peter’s doctrine
If the hypostasis does not indicate the substance
in its own concept, it cannot be indicative of
substance either in full sense or metaphorically.
“God the Father” means the common joined to the
property, it is not a simple hypostasis but a substantial
( )ܐܘܣܝܝܐhypostasis: saying “God” indicates the
substance and the common; the denomination “Father”
indicates the hypostasis and the property of the prosopon.
The substance is never unhypostastic ()ܐܠ ̇ܡܩܝܡܬܐ,
nor is the hypostasis unsubstantial ()ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ.
God the Father is both participant and participated,
i.e. He is a substantial hypostasis and not simply the
characterstic of a hypostasis.
Therefore, one must distinguish the meanings of
substance and hypostasis in the full sense that is,
one must separate hypostasis from substance and
maintain their meanings unconfused.
Damian’s doctrine
“Fatherhood” or “unbegottenness” are not separated from
the Godhead, i.e. do not subsist on their own apart from
the substance. “Fatherhood” is substantial in the Godhead
since it is joined to the substance. “Fatherhood” indicates
the property-hypostasis; “God the Father” indicates the
substantial property-hypostasis existing in the Godhead.
Hypostasis is the participant; substance is the
participated
“God the Father” is a substantial hypostasis and
not simply a hypostasis.
Peter’s doctrine
Rejection of the identification of property and
hypostasis made by Damian.
271 272 273 274 275
271
Three quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XXXVI.207-212; 213-223
and 231-240, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 3, Chap. XXXII.21-30 and 31-36, ed.
Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
273
Two quotations: preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 3, Chap. XXXII.152-156 and 157163, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham. The Apologia secunda is a letter sent to Peter of Callinicum through Zachariah
at Paralos (Epistula per Zachariam allata): Peter was waiting to meet Damian.
274
Preserved in Syriac in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 3, chapter XXXII.166-170, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
275
Two quotations in Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 2, chapter I.138-166 and 166-173, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
272
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 119
65
(132va)
ܙܕܩ
ܕܐܝܟܢ
ܟܠ
ܢܣܬ
ܕ
̈
ܠܡܐܠ ܕܩܕܝܫܐ
ܐ ܘ ܣܛܬ ܝܣ
ܐܦܣܩܦܐ ܘܡܛܠ
̈
̈
ܓܘܢܝܐ
ܫܡܗܐ
̈
̈
ܘܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܕܩܢܘܡܐ
ܕܬܠܝܬܝܘܬܐ
How
it
is
necessary
to
understand the
words of Saint
Eustathius
the
Bishop
regarding the
common and
particular
names of the
hypostases of
the Trinity
E u s t .
Antioch., Adv.
Photinum276
Petr. Callinic.,
Contra Dam.277
Eustathius’ doctrine
The person is one thing and the nature is
another thing.
If the name ‘God’ were indicative of the
person, saying “three persons” would
mean “three Gods”.
Properties belong to natures and indicate
natures but are not natures, therefore, one
cannot say “three gods” or “three natures”,
but “one nature of three persons”.
“Father”, “Son” and “Holy Spirit” indicate
the persons and not the common nature,
otherwise the persons would be confused.
“God” indicates the common nature and
not the persons, otherwise one would
affirm “three gods”.
Peter’s understanding/interpretation
Eustathius does not define the Godhead
as one thing and the hypostases of the
Godhead as another thing (as Damian and
others do).
Eustathius says that the name ‘God’ is not
indicative of a distinct person.
Some of the names are common, some
proper: the common ones show the
invariableness of the substance, the proper
ones characterize the properties of the
hypostases.
“Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirt” are
proper to each hypostasis, whereas ‘God’
and ‘Lord’ are common.
276 277
6.2. Analysis of the Content of the Florilegium
An examination of the titles shows that the florilegium deals with the following main
metaphysical topics, related to the Trinitarian doctrine: 1) the relationship between substance
and hypostasis; 2) the relationship between hypostasis and property; and 3) the relationship
between substance, hypostasis, and property. That the compiler of the florilegium had to deal
once again with these topics was, I believe, the consequence of the metaphysical dilemma
created during the controversy between Damian and Peter, which had not been resolved with
the reconciliation after the schism between Alexandria and Antioch.
This dilemma can be seen as a predictable consequence of Severus of Antioch’s Trinitarian
reflections in his Contra Grammaticum. One might note that both Peter and Damian considered
the Contra Grammaticum as a basic work for their polemic. In that work, Severus tried to resolve
the two above-mentioned questions that Miaphysite Christology had elicited, namely, 1) Was the
whole substance of Trinity incarnated? 2) Are the three divine hypostases three substances?
276
277
Two quotations: Not preserved in the original Greek.
Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 4, Chap. XL.187-234, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
120 Bishara Ebeid
Severus, as Krausmüller notes,278 1) rejects the notion of immanent universal; 2) he makes
no clear distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance, that
is, “common (λόγος) concept” and “sum total of all hypostases”; 3) he defines substance
just as the sum total of all hypostases; 4) he considers the hypostases as equated with the
properties; 5) for him, properties gain their substantial component through participation
in a common substance; 6) this common substance, finally, is located above the hypostases
and thus different from them.279 This system was rather unclear. In fact, as Zachhuber notes,
Severus was dangerously close from one hand, to suggest that the substance is quantitatively
divided between its hypostases, and from the other, to assert that the hypostases are only
subsisting properties.280 Both Miaphysite patriarchs, Damian and Peter, tried to modify
Severus’ system so that it could be useful for their anti-Tritheistic polemics, each of them,
taking and developing a different part of Severus’ system. In fact, they had divergent
understandings of Severus’ system, even if it seems that on some points they agree.
Damian, as again Krausmüller notes,281 affirmed the reality and concreteness of the
common substance. It seems that, to polemicize against the Tritheists’ consideration of
the non-existence of the universals, in his doctrine there is no mention of the idea that the
particular substance is the concreteness of the abstract reality. He, then, did not take into
consideration Severus’ concept of substance as the sum total of hypostases. He identified
property with hypostasis and affirmed that properties gain their substantial component
through participation in a common substance. Peter, by contrast, considered the common
substance as the sum total of all hypostases; he could therefore affirm that since the substance
is what each hypostasis shares and has in common, the hypostases participate in this sum total
of all hypostases and thus gain their substantial component. In addition, although he affirmed
that each hypostasis is a particular substance, he was not interested in clarifying whether the
substances in the hypostases could be counted or not.282
This florilegium, then, tries to resolve this metaphysical dilemma, adopting a clear
position against Damian and, as mentioned above, rejecting his doctrine. Even so, we
cannot affirm that the compiler of this florilegium totally shared Peter’s position, since he
tried to modify it, resolving the questions that Peter’s system had left open. In order to
do this, the compiler read Peters’ Contra Damianum and Severus’ Contra Grammaticum283
with a critical eye and made a new synthesis based on patristic doctrine and authority.
Now let us analyze the metaphysical system underlying the Trinitarian doctrine
of this florilegium.
See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 29.
For the relationship between substance as common and hypostasis as particular in Severus’ thought, see also
Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 458-62.
280
See Zachhuber, The Rise (above, n. 24), pp. 133-9.
281
See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 29.
282
See Krausmüller, “Properties Participating in Substance” (above, n. 62), p. 27. See also Zachhuber, The Rise
(above, n. 24), p. 181.
283
I think that the main source of this florilegium is Peter’s Contra Damianum. However, some material, especially from a doctrinal point of view, come, at least indirectly, from Severus’ Contra Grammaticum. I aim to prepare a
study on the relationship between the patristic quotations in the Trinitarian florilegium and those in Peter’s Contra
Damianum, affirming and continuing what already van Roey had sustained, see van Roey, “Un florilège” (above, n. 81).
278
279
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 121
Relationship between substance and hypostasis
For the relationship between substance and hypostasis the compiler mainly follows the
Cappadocian distinction between common and particular (cfr. nos. 21 and 47 where the name
of Basil appears in the title): the substance coincides with what is common and participated
(cfr. nos. 6, 39, 47, 52, 53); it is an abstract reality, i.e. it does not exist in itself; therefore, it is
not considered as a substrate or a thing (cfr. nos. 33, 34); it consists of and exists in hypostases
(cfr. no. 36). Consequently, the hypostases are the concrete substances; each is subsistent, i.e.
exists in itself and for itself (cfr. nos. 10, 13); they are considered substrates (cfr. nos. 20, 31, 32)
and things (cfr. no. 30). Since the hypostases share in the same common substance, they are
called consubstantial (cfr. no. 6 where the compiler mainly follows Basil’s understanding of
consubstantiality, and nos. 47, 52, 53, 22, 23). As a result, substance is also considered the sum
total of all hypostases (cfr. nos. 1, 4), and from this point of view it is one and escapes from
number while the numbered are the hypostases themselves (cfr. no. 2). Even if the hypostases
are numbered this does not mean that their being numbered divides the substance (cfr. nos. 25,
26). This means that the substance is identified with the sum total of its hypostases; therefore,
it could not be affirmed, on the one hand, that the substance is one thing and its hypostases are
another (cfr. nos. 1, 4), while on the other hand one hypostasis is not the whole substance, i.e.
the sum total of the hypostases (cfr. nos. 3, 5).284 However, a hypostasis, if seen individually,
is a concrete substance, and since it participates in the common substance, is from it and of
it, it is called by the name of its general substance and is characterized through its natural
characters and attributes (cfr. nos. 9, 10, 13, 19, 40, 48). This does not mean that each hypostasis
is denominated with the name of its substance by participation, but by nature, that is, since
it is really and concretely substance (cfr. no. 56). As a consequence, one can understand why
some fathers interchanged nature, essence, or substance on the one hand, and hypostasis on
the other (cfr. nos. 9, 19). In fact, hypostasis is not empty of substance but substantial, that
is, it participates in and shares the common substance and through this participation gains
its substantial component – it possesses all the characteristics of the concept (λόγος) of the
substance to which it belongs (cfr. nos. 55, 56). The substantiality of the hypostases, finally, is
the basis of their consubstantiality, since they share and manifest the same concept (λόγος) of
the substance (cfr. nos. 23, 55).
It is clear that the florilegium has as basis the Neoplatonic doctrine of collective universal, where species
gets two meanings, a predicable concept (universal concept) and an extramental collection of particulars, for the
Neoplatonic doctrine see. Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa” (above, n. 26), pp. 374-80. Note that the florilegium, explaining the relationship between substance and hypostasis, as will be cleared through my analysis, cannot accept
the idea that the substance, being collective, is divided into its particulars (like the Neoplatonic doctrine), since as
common and participated remains indivisible. Such doctrine is seen, in some way, in Gregory of Nyssa’s teaching,
in regards see, Zachhuber, Human Nature (above, n. 26), pp. pp. 61-118, especially pp. 64-70; Zachhuber, “Once
again” (above, n. 26), pp. 75-98; Zachhuber, “Universals” (above, n. 25), pp. 444-5, 447. See also H. Cherniss, “The
Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa”, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 11 (1930), pp. 1-92,
here p. 33; R.M. Hubner, Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der
‘physischen’ Erlosungslehre, Brill, Leiden 1974, pp. 83-7; D. Balàs, “Plenitudo humanitatis: The Unity of Human
Nature in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa”, in D. F. Winslow (ed.), Disciplina Nostra: Essays in Memory of Robert F. Evans, Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, Cambridge 1979 (Patristic monograph series, 6), pp. 115-31, here p.
119-21. This opinion, however, was rejected by Cross, “Gregory of Nyssa” (above, n. 26), pp. 372-410. Personally,
I agree with the opinion of Zachhuber which I find more articulated.
284
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
122 Bishara Ebeid
Relationship between hypostasis and property
Also, for the relationship between hypostasis and property the compiler relied on the
Cappadocian doctrine on idiomata, which affirms that without the property added to the
substance, a hypostasis cannot be recognized as distinct and particular (cfr. no. 51 where the
compiler quotes only Basil as reference). However, our florilegium puts more emphasis, on
the one hand, on the distinction between property and hypostasis and on the fact that they
cannot be identified, since predicator and predicated are different things (cfr. nos. 15, 42, 43,
59, 64); on the other hand, it emphasizes the fact that hypostasis and property are united and
cannot be separated (cfr. no. 16), since a hypostasis without property does not exist and is not a
substrate, and a hypostasis gets its particular name precisely through its property (cfr. nos. 16,
20). Property, then, is the distinctive character of each hypostasis (cfr. no. 17); it belongs to the
hypostasis, is united and mixed with it, but without any confusion (cfr. nos. 18, 35 where the
compiler tries to show that union and mixture do not mean confusion). Finally, if the hypostasis
subsists, property exists only in the hypostasis, and is then not subsistent in itself (cfr. n. 14).
Relationship between substance, hypostasis and property
As for the relationship between substance, hypostasis and property, the compiler is very
careful to highlight that for each hypostasis to have its own property does not imply that the
property is mixed with the substance itself, i.e. with the substantial component. Even if it
belongs to the hypostasis, property should be understood and seen outside of the substance,
i.e. outside of the constituent element (cfr. no. 41). Property does not define the substance but
the hypostasis, and the hypostasis is not the substance because of the property (cfr. nos. 45,
58). Therefore, the hypostasis gets its particular name through its property, and its substantial
name, i.e. its natural name, through its substance (cfr. no. 65).
Other metaphysical principles
Differently from Severus, the compiler of the florilegium makes a clear distinction between
the intensional and the extensional meaning of substance. Indeed, this is clear in the title of
group no. 22: “On the fact that each one of the hypostases participates in the concept (λόγος)
of the substance and in the common [concept (λόγος)] of the substance”. Here the compiler
quotes from Severus’ Contra Grammaticum and Basil’s Epistula 214. One can then maintain
that the concept of the substance (melltō d-ʾūsīya, )ܡܠܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐis the sum total of the
hypostases, as already theorized by Severus, which is elsewhere called “the whole substance”
̇ ) (cfr. nos. 3,4,5); while the common concept of the substance (ὁ τῆς
(kūllōh ʾūsīya, ܟܠܗ ܐܘܣܝܐ
οὐσίας λόγος κοινός, melltō d-ʾūsīya gawōnītō, ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ
)ܡܠܬܐ, an expression that
̣
comes from Basil, is the substantial component, i.e. the natural properties that are manifested
equally in each hypostasis belonging to a certain substance, or, in other words, the constituent
element of the substance. In this case, the compiler agrees with Severus’ and not with Peter’s
position, making the distinction between the two meanings of substance clearer.
In addition, it is clear that the compiler rejects Damian’s doctrine on the concreteness
and reality of the common substance, supporting, instead, Peter’s understanding of abstract
and concrete realities, clearly expressed in groups nos. 57-64. The key-concepts one should
highlight in these groups are the following: substantial (ἐνούσιος, ʾūsīyōyō, )ܐܘܣܝܝܐ,
un-substantial (ἀνούσιος, lō ʾūsīyōyō, )ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ, hypostatic/subsistent, i.e. existent
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 123
(ἐνυπόστατος, mqaymō, ̇ܡܩܝܡܐ, qnūmōyō, )ܩܢܘܡܝܐand un-hypostatic/un-subsistent
(inexistent) (ἀνυπόστατος, lō mqaymō, )ܐܠ ̇ܡܩܝܡܐ.285
An existing, real, and concrete substance must be ἐνυπόστατος,286 which means that it
must exist in a hypostasis (cfr. 29, 36) otherwise it is inexistent (ἀνυπόστατος, lō mqaymō,
)ܐܠ ̇ܡܩܝܡܐ, that is, without hypostasis and existence. It is notable that both adjectives can
describe substances, and that both Syriac terms, qnūmōyō ( )ܩܢܘܡܝܐand mqaymō ()ܡܩܝܡܐ,
are considered here as synonymous. A hypostatic, qnūmōyō ()ܩܢܘܡܝܐ, substance means an
existent and subsistent substance, mqaymō ()ܡܩܝܡܐ, that is, ἐνυπόστατος or existing in a
hypostasis. Therefore, a hypostasis cannot be empty of substance, it can be only substantial
(ἐνούσιος, ʾūsīyōyō, )ܐܘܣܝܝܐ, that is, it possesses the substantial component. Consequently,
an un-substantial (ἀνούσιος, lō ʾūsīyōyō, )ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐhypostasis cannot exist. Both terms,
substantial and un-substantial, are adjectives for hypostases. As in the case of ἐνυπόστατος
and ἀνυπόστατος, the prefixes ἐν- and ἀν- in ἐνούσιος and ἀνούσιος must be understood
as “within” and “without” respectively. The Syriac uses the adjective formulated from the
substantive (i.e. with the addition yō, )ܝܐto translate the Greek ἐν, while to express the
Greek ἀν, it uses the negation with “non” (lō, )ܐܠadded to the same adjective. Just in the
case of hypostatic and subsistent the Syriac used another term as synonymous to qnūmōyō
()ܩܢܘܡܝܐ, the participle mqaymō ()ܡܩܝܡܐ, to express the idea of existing.
The concept of participation (μετοχή, šawtōpūtō, )ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐin our florilegium must
also be discussed. Although it comes from the Cappadocian doctrine, we cannot affirm that
it is used in the same sense as by the Cappadocians, since substance has both an intensional
and an extensional meaning. Our compiler, following Peter of Callinicum, affirms that each
hypostasis participates in the substance as a common concept (λόγος) and as the sum total
of the hypostases; this does not mean that each hypostasis is the whole substance (cfr. no.
22). I think, however, that the compiler understands the meaning of participation differently
from Peter. Since each substance exists perfectly in each hypostasis, this implies that the
hypostasis is substance by nature, possessing all the natural characteristics of the common
substance. Participation, in this case, means a perfect and equal share in the same common
substance with the other hypostases: i.e., the hypostases possess and manifest the common
natural characteristics of the substance perfectly and equally to each other. Therefore, the
substance is all its hypostases together (sum total), it exists perfectly in each of its hypostases,
while the hypostasis is by nature the substance (i.e., the common substance exists within it
being its constituent element), but it is not the whole substance (which is the sum total of
That these Syriac terms translate the Greek ones can be evinced from the comparison between the Syriac
translation of some quotations from the Greek fathers in our florilegium and their original Greek text (when
it exists). Compare for example the Greek original text of Basil’s Adversus Eunomium (PG 29, 749.16-22)
in chapter n. 55 of the florilegium and its Syriac translation: “Πάλιν ἀγέννητον ἀνούσιον νοοῦμεν τὸ μηδαμῆ
285
μηδαμῶς ὄν. Εἶπέ τις ἀνούσιον, ὑπόστασιν ἀνεῖλε καὶ οὐσίας ὕπαρξιν. Ἀνούσιον, καὶ ἀνυπόστατον, τὴν μὴ
ὑπάρχουσαν μήτε οὖσαν ὅλως σημαίνει φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον λέγων τις, τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν
̇ ܬܘܒ ܐܠ ܝܠܝܕܐ ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ
οὐσίαν ἐδήλωσε”, ܐܡܪ ܐܢܫ
. ̇ܗܘ ܕܣܟ ܠܓܡܪ ܐܠ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.ܡܣܬܟܠܝܢܢ
̣
̇
̇
ܡܩܝܡܐ܆ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܐܠ ܫܟܝܚ܇
ܘܠܝܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ܁ ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܐܠ
ܥܩ ̣ܪ
̣ ̇ ܐܠ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ܁ ܠܩܢܘܡܐ
̇
̇
̇
̇
ܐܘܣܝܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܡܩܝܡܐ ܟܕ ܐܡܪ ܐܢܫ܆ ܠܩܢܘܡܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܫܘܕܥ.ܡܫܘܕܥ
ܘܕܐܠ ܠܓܡܪ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
For their meaning in some Chalcedonian authors see C. Erismann, “A World of Hypostases: John of Damascus’
Rethinking of Aristotle’s Categorical Ontology”, Studia Patristica 50 (2011), pp. 269-87.
286
On this term and its use in Christian authors see Gleede, The Development (above, n. 72).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
124 Bishara Ebeid
the hypostases), and it is by participation that it shares the same common substance (i.e., the
common constituent element) with the other hypostases.
Thus, one can now understand why, for our florilegium, the common substance is
called “shared/participated” (mšawtap, ܡܫܘܬܦ
̣ ) and the hypostasis “sharer/participant”
(meštawtap, ;)ܡܫܬܘܬܦand secondly, it is now clear how the concept of participation is
related to substantiality, that is, to the hypostases gaining the substantial component, and
to consubstantiality, that is, to the hypostases sharing and manifesting the same common
substance perfectly and equally. Finally, it is evident that, if one follows this line of thought,
affirming that each hypostasis is a substance does not imply a multiplication of the constituent
element of the substance, which remains one according to its λόγος or concept.
This is the reason why the compiler, following Peter, rejects Damian’s affirmation
according to which property is substantial. Such a rejection is a consequence of the refusal
to identify property with hypostasis, a doctrine affirmed by Damian, who to some extent
follows Severus’ ideas on this matter. Indeed, a careful reading of the titles of groups nos. 61,
62 and 63 leads to recognition that the intention of the compiler is to underline that Damian’s
understanding of these concepts is wrong.
In addition, it is worth noting the use of the terms “substrate” (ὑποκείμενον, sīmō, )ܣܝܡܐ
and “thing” (πρᾶγμα, sūʿrōnō, )ܣܘܥܪܢܐas synonyms for “hypostasis” in our florilegium
(cfr. nos. 30, 31, 32). These terms were used in the Cappadocian Trinitarian doctrine (cfr. the
Cappadocian quotations in the same groups nos. 30, 31, 32, 33), probably through a Stoic
influence: a substrate was considered the substance with its particular property, that is,
hypostatic and subsistent, or, in other words, a qualified substrate.287 However, they used the
term “substrate” also, under Aristotelian influence and Stoic understanding, to indicate the
common substance in the sense of an unqualified substrate (qualitiless substrate), that is, the
constituent element of the substance, which cannot be comprehended or described.288 Basil
applied this meaning to Christ, calling him one in substrate and one substance, thus indicating
his divinity as a simple and incomposite nature.289 Our florilegium, however, refuses to use the
term substrate for the common substance, preferring to understand it only as a qualified single
substance, that is, as a subsistent hypostasis, an existing concrete nature (cfr. no. 33), following
Peter’s polemic against Damian’s understanding of substrate as the common substance.290
Finally, I would like to highlight one important consequence of these innovations in
the understanding of the Trinitarian doctrine: in our florilegium there is no mention of the
relationship between the hypostases of the Trinity. For the Cappadocians, as mentioned
above, the doctrine on the monarchy of the Father was essential. In fact, besides the oneness
of the divine substance, the consideration of the Father as the unique cause of the Trinity,
See Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology (above, n. 9), p. 47 and pp. 49-50.
See Jacobs, “on ‘Not Three Gods’” (above, n. 9), p. 334. See also D. Biriukov, “The Principle of Individuation in Contra Eunomium 2, 4 by Basil of Caesarea and its Philosophical and Theological Context”, Scrinium 12
(2016), pp. 215-43, here pp. 228-34; to be mentioned that Biriukov does not see in Basil the Stoic use of substrate as
the singular and qualified substance, cfr. p. 239.
289
See for example Basil’s use of the term substrate which is different from the later use during the Christological controversies. In fact, his use of the term substrate is linked with his understanding of substance and hypostasis
related to his anti-Eunomian polemic, see M. Delcogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names.
Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Brill, LeidenBoston 2010 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 103), p. 141.
290
See chapter 10 of Book 2, see Petri Callinic., Contra Dam., vol. 2, chapter X, ed. Ebied-van Roey-Wickham.
287
288
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 125
and of the Son and the Holy Spirit as co-eternally caused, was the basis of the Cappadocian
understanding of monotheism. Our florilegium does not simply avoid mentioning this
doctrine, but as other Miaphysite anti-Tritheistic texts,291 rejects it. Indeed, in group no. 7, it is
affirmed that the relationship between Father and Son is not that between a cause and a caused
effect (participated/shared and participant/sharer). Such a statement must be understood in
light of the meaning taken up in the florilegium by the terms substance (common concept and
sum total), participation, substantiality and consubstantiality. One substantial hypostasis, in
our case the Father, cannot be considered as the cause of the other two, since they share in the
same substance (common meaning=consubstantiality) and are all together the same substance
(sum total), otherwise, the cause would be considered another substance, and the Trinity
would become “Tetrade”, a doctrine which some Chalcedonians, like Anastasius of Sinai,
proposed into their attempt to challenge John Philoponus’ Tritheism.292
Application of these principles to the Trinitarian doctrine
With this in mind, we can now summarize the Trinitarian doctrine of this florilegium as
follows: 1) The Holy Trinity is one God, one substance and one Godhead in word and reality;
2) God is the three hypostases; 3) the Godhead exists in three hypostases; 4) God is seen and
recognized in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 5) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
are one God, three substantial divine hypostases, equal in substance, that is, consubstantial;
therefore 6) the divinity of the Father is the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, all
three share the same divinity. 7) Each hypostasis, taken individually, is considered as substance,
substrate and thing; therefore 8) each is called God in the full sense; 9) this does not mean
division within the Godhead, since the substance, i.e. the constituent element in the Trinity is
one and the same in the three hypostases; 10) thus, affirming three hypostases, and each one
as a substance, does not imply Tritheism. 11) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not
divine because of the property joined to each, namely fatherhood, sonship, and procession,
but because they share in the same Godhead; 12) without these characteristic properties each
hypostasis cannot be recognized as a distinct and particular reality. 13) The properties in the
Godhead, even if they can be conceived outside of the substance, and although they belong to,
and exist in, the hypostases, cannot be considered as accidents. 14) The oneness of the Trinity is
to be found in the common substance, the one constituent element, not in the cause identified
with the Father; in other words, we have here a “monarchy of the substance”.293
The florilegium as a metaphysical position against Chalcedonians and Nestorians
The importance of this florilegium lies not only in its Trinitarian doctrine, but also in its
reformulation of the metaphysical principles used to express the Trinitarian and Christological
dogmas. One of the main aims of this florilegium was to create a metaphysical system
through which Miaphysites could answer the accusations of Chalcedonians and Nestorians,
by resolving some metaphysical weaknesses.
291
Some texts, written after the anti-Tritheistic work of Theodosius of Alexandria and probably before the
compilation of our florilegium, edited and translated by G. Furlani, reject to understand the relationship between
the divine hypostases as cause and caused, see PO 14, pp. 716-17, 748.
292
See Krausmüller, “Under the Spell” (above, n. 72), pp. 641-3.
293
The same idea one might find in the Syriac anti-Tritheistic texts in PO 14, pp. 673-766 (above, n. 291).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
126 Bishara Ebeid
What leads me to this conclusion is the mention, in the titles of the florilegium, of the
names of two “heresiarchs”, namely, Damian and Eunomius. Why mention them? Were there,
at the time when the florilegium was composed, followers of their doctrines? There is no
historical evidence for their existence; I am rather inclined to think that behind the mention
of the names of Damian and Eunomius one might recognize a link between their doctrines
and those of Chalcedonians and Nestorians, as I shall explain in the following paragraphs.
As I said above, Miaphysites had probably seen a Chalcedonian influence in the doctrine
of Damian, at least on the metaphysical level. Behind the polemic against Damian in this
florilegium one may therefore read an anti-Chalcedonian polemic. Such a hypothesis helps
us to better understand the accusations made against Damian, of whose work we possess
only a small number of fragments. Indeed, Chalcedonians made a metaphysical distinction
between nature-substance and hypostasis-person; they developed a new understanding of the
concept of hypostasis, which was quite different from that of the Cappadocians. Therefore,
the polemics in groups nos. 1, 2 60, and 61, for instance, could be understood as antiChalcedonian. Miaphysites rejected the Chalcedonian understanding of hypostasis, accusing
them of identifying it with the characteristic property. Such an accusation can be read behind
all polemics of the florilegium concerning this topic, as for example in nos. 42, 43, 58, 59.
In addition, the appearance of the term ἐνυπόστατος in more than one title (cfr. nos. 13,
14), and not just in patristic quotations, may be another proof of this hypothesis. Such term,
with all the other technical terms explained above (an-hypostatic, substantial etc.), was a
key concept in the metaphysical development of neo-Chalcedonianism, through which
Chalcedonians had tried to resolve the Christological question regarding the existence of two
natures in one hypostasis. For neo-Chalcedonians, this term was not understood according
to its Trinitarian use by previous generations, but according to their new understanding
of hypostasis.294 Our florilegium, then, although it treats the Trinitarian dogma, basically
deals with metaphysics, and offers a new understanding of the term “hypostatic/subsistent”
(ἐνυπόστατος). While using it mainly in Trinitarian doctrine, the compiler presupposes its
application to Miaphysite Christology: the one composite nature from two is one subsistent
reality, one hypostasis, having divinity and humanity as its substantial components. These
components, however, are not two subsistent realities: through the new understanding of
participation, substantiality, and consubstantiality, this one subsistent reality of Christ is
consubstantial with humanity since it participates in the common human substance, and at
the same time it is not all the hypostases of humanity; while through the participation in
the common divine nature, it is consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, without
affirming that all the Trinity was incarnated.
For the same reason, the florilegium understands the term substrate (ὑποκείμενον, sīmō,
)ܣܝܡܐonly as the hypostasis with its property, that is, as a qualified single substance, and
not as the unqualified common substance. Affirming that the three hypostases are three
substrates, and, on the other hand, that Christ is one substrate, means that it is not the
common substance that was incarnated, and that divinity and humanity in Christ are not
two substances or substrates. Consequently, one might say that this Trinitarian florilegium
294
See the references given on neo-Chalcedonism above in footnotes 30 and 72; for the use of the term
ἐνυπόστατος and its relation to other technical terms among (neo-)Chalcedonians, see Gleede, The Development
(above, n. 72), pp. 45-181 and especially Erismann, “A World of Hypostases” (above, n. 285).
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
Metaphysics of Trinity in Graeco-Syriac Miaphysitism 127
was essential to resolve the open questions Miaphyiste Christology had raised, without
causing, at least from a Miaphysite perspective, troubles in the Trinitarian doctrine.
The same can be said of the polemics against Eunomius. He was accused, as mentioned
above, of having taught three different substances in the Godhead, affirming that the property
was indicative of the substance, and that therefore the three hypostases, the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit, were three different substances. Eunomians were also accused of being
Tritheists.295 In fact, one of the arguments Damian had put forward in his anti-Tritheistic
polemic was that Tritheism is Eunomianism (cfr. the quotation from Damian in group no. 8).
Damian, as we saw above, also accused Peter of being Eunomian and Tritheist, since Peter
considered each hypostasis, individually taken, as a substance. Why, then, does the compiler
of the florilegium mention Eunomius twice in his titles (cfr. nos. 8, 54)? I do not think that
he is defending Peter from the accusations of Damian. It is likelier that the name of Eunomius
hides the Nestorian doctrine.
As already mentioned, Miaphysites could easily see a similarity between Nestorianism and
Tritheism. Nestorians, in fact, were accused of being Tritheists because they put considerable
stress on the individuality of the hypostases.296 Their metaphysical system, at least that of Babai
and his followers, was understood as divisive. Here one should note the role played in our
florilegium by the polemic against teachings that introduce divisions into the Godhead or
claim that the three hypostases divide the divine substance (cfr. nos. 25, 26). Such teachings call
consubstantiality into question, another typical polemical motif against Eunomius’ doctrine
(cfr. no. 54), which might be also read in an anti-Nestorian key.
Another important element that can demonstrate how the compiler takes a stance against
the Nestorian doctrine, especially of Babai, is the title of no. 27: “On the fact that God is
seen in one substance and [one] Godhead, but in three hypostases, and that each person
exists in a true hypostasis”. The term “person” (parṣūpō, )ܦܪܨܘܦܐ, even if it recurs in many
patristic quotations in the florilegium, appears in no other title. It must be noted, firstly, that
the statement “each person exists in a true hypostasis” comes from the quotation of Basil’s
Epistle 210 in the same group, no. 27. As already noted by Turcescu, in this letter, contrasting
Sabellius’ understanding of the term person (πρόσωπον) as mask, Basil underlines that if
one wants to call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit “persons” (πρόσωπα), one needs
to clarify that these persons really exist (ἐν ὑποστάσει ἀληθινῇ ὑπάρχον). Consequently,
in this letter Basil understands hypostasis as a subsistent reality.297 The compiler, I would
argue, uses Basil’s quotation and doctrine to contrast the Nestorian position regarding the
term “person”. In fact, for Babai each hypostasis is distinguished through its “person”
(parṣōpā, )ܦܪܨܘܦܐ. In this case, “person” is identified with the particular property, and
distinguished from the hypostasis, which is a single nature without particular properties.
Moreover, according to Babai’s doctrine persons belong to hypostases, but can be given
and received.298 Our compiler, then, is taking an opposite stance here. Although he also
identifies the person (parṣōpā, )ܦܪܨܘܦܐwith the particular property, or with the name
See A. Kazhdan, “Tritheism”, in AA. VV., The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. 3, Oxford U.P., New
York-Oxford 1991, p. 2121.
296
See Kazhdan, “Tritheism” (above, n. 295), p. 2121.
297
See Turcescu, “Prosōpon and Hypostasis” (above, n. 15), p. 391.
298
See Ebeid, “The Trinitarian doctrine” (above, n. 75), pp. 98-107.
295
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021
128 Bishara Ebeid
of the hypostasis, for him the person exists in and within the hypostasis, and as property
it is united to the hypostasis, but without being confused with the substance, i.e. with
the constituent element. This means that persons cannot be given or received, as Babai
affirms, otherwise they could be understood as masks, and thus reminiscent of the Sabellian
understanding of person.
What, finally, confirms this my hypothesis is the version of the florilegium in
BL Add. 12155. In fact, the last chapter (fol. 32va) has the title On the anxiety of the Romans
and the Easterners concerning the name of “substance” and [the names] of ‘hypostases’ and
̈
̈ ܘܕܡܕܢܚܝܐ܇ ܡܛܠ ܫܡܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ
‘persons’ (ܘܕܩܢܘܡܐ
ܡܛܠ ܦܘܫܟܐ ܕܠܘܬ ̈ܚܕܕܐ ܕ̈ܪܗܘܡܝܐ
)ܘܕܦ̈ܪܨܘܦܐ.This title, then, demonstrates that the main opponents for this florilegium are
the Chalcedonians and the Nestorians because of their errant use and understanding of the
metaphysical concepts of “substance”, “hypostasis”, and “person”.
Conclusion
With this paper I have tried to understand the theological reasons that led Syriac Miaphysites
to produce Trinitarian florilegia and to copy them during the first centuries of Islamic rule
in the Middle East. It has been noted that the Cappadocian metaphysical system could not
function perfectly when applied to the Miaphysite Christological doctrine. Miaphysites,
affirming that Christ is one nature and hypostasis, had identified these two metaphysical
categories with one another. Such identification resulted into two essential Christological
questions: was the whole substance of Trinity incarnated? Are the three divine hypostases
three substances? Severus of Antioch had already started reflecting on the understanding of
the terms “substance” and “hypostasis” in Christology and Trinitarian doctrine; however, he
did not provide a final answer.
The same metaphysical innovation, once applied to Trinitarian doctrine, created other
problems to the Miaphysite church. It was the reason behind the Tritheistic controversy
among Miaphysites during the sixth century. The attempts of some anti-Tritheistic
figures, especially Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicum, evidenced a dilemma on
how to understand and use the metaphysical terms which were at stake, not only in the
anti-Tritheistic controversy but also in the Christological polemics against Nestorians
and Chalcedonians.
To respond to these new challenges, Miaphysites had to develop a unified metaphysical
system to be used in their Christology and in their Trinitarian doctrine, so that the latter could
not be understood as Tritheism. It is in this light that we have to understand the composition
of the Trinitarian florilegium, based on the patristic tradition of the Miaphyiste Church: the
Cappadocians, Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, Theodosius of Alexandria, and Peter
of Callinicum.
The florilegium tries to make a new metaphysical synthesis between Severus of Antioch’s
reflections in his Contra Grammaticum and Peter of Callinicum’s Contra Damianum. Even
though it is Trinitarian in content, the main aim of the florilegium is metaphysical. In fact, the
reformulation of the Trinitarian doctrine has its starting point in the Miaphysite Christology:
therefore, it does not represent the traditional Cappadocian Trinitarian teaching, but a
“Miaphysite Trinitarian doctrine”. Such a synthesis was an instrument to prove that the
Miaphysite Christology implied no risk for Trinitarian dogma.
Studia graeco-arabica 11.1 / 2021