DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
DP16262
The Power of Open-Mouth Policies
Vadym Lepetyuk, Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar and
John B. Taylor
MONETARY ECONOMICS AND FLUCTUATIONS
ISSN 0265-8003
The Power of Open-Mouth Policies
Vadym Lepetyuk, Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar and John B. Taylor
Discussion Paper DP16262
Published 15 June 2021
Submitted 15 June 2021
Centre for Economic Policy Research
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Copyright: Vadym Lepetyuk, Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar and John B. Taylor
The Power of Open-Mouth Policies
Abstract
Central bank's announcements about future monetary policy make economic agents to react
before the announced policy takes place. We evaluate the anticipation effects of such
announcements in the context of a realistic dynamic economic model of central banking. In our
experiments, we consider temporary and permanent anticipated changes in policy rules including
changes in inflation target, natural rate of interest and Taylor-rule coefficients, as well as
anticipated switches from inflation targeting to price-level targeting and average inflation targeting.
We show that the studied nonrecurrent news shocks about future policies have sizable anticipation
effects on the economy. Our methodological contribution is to develop a novel perturbation-based
framework for constructing nonstationary solutions to economic models with nonrecurrent news
shocks.
JEL Classification: C61, C63, C68, E31, E52
Keywords: news shocks, turnpike theorem, time-dependent models, nonstationary models,
Unbalanced growth, time-varying parameters, Regime switches, monetary policies, Price-Level
Targeting, Average Inflation Targeting
Vadym Lepetyuk - lepetyuk@gmail.com
Bank of Canada
Lilia Maliar - lmaliar@gc.cuny.edu
The Graduate Center, CUNY, CEPR and CEPR
Serguei Maliar - smaliar@scu.edu
Santa Clara University
John B. Taylor - johntayl@stanford.edu
Stanford University
Acknowledgements
Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar acknowledge financial support from the NSF grants SES-1949413 and SES-1949430, respectively.
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The Power of Open-Mouth Policies
Vadym Lepetyuk, Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar and John B. Taylor
June 14, 2021
Abstract
Central banks’ announcements about future monetary policy make economic agents to react before
the announced policy takes place. We evaluate the anticipation e¤ects of such announcements in the
context of a realistic dynamic economic model of central banking. In our experiments, we consider temporary and permanent anticipated changes in policy rules including changes in in‡ation target, natural
rate of interest and Taylor-rule coe¢cients, as well as anticipated switches from in‡ation targeting to
price-level targeting and average in‡ation targeting. We show that the studied nonrecurrent news shocks
about future policies have sizable anticipation e¤ects on the economy. Our methodological contribution
is to develop a novel perturbation-based framework for constructing nonstationary solutions to economic
models with nonrecurrent news shocks.
JEL classi…cation: C61, C63, C68, E31, E52
Key Words: news shocks; turnpike theorem; time-dependent models; nonstationary models; unbalanced growth; time-varying parameters; regime switches; monetary policies; price-level targeting;
average in‡ation targeting
Corresponding author: Serguei Maliar, maliars@stanford.edu. Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar acknowledge …nancial
support from the NSF grants SES-1949413 and SES-1949430, respectively. The views expressed in this paper are solely those
of the authors and may di¤er from o¢cial Bank of Canada views. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank
of Canada.
1
1
Introduction
Central banks increasingly rely on communication to implement their monetary policy. Through their
communication to the public, the monetary authorities indicate their future intentions as well as their
views of the future states of the economy. For example, a central bank may promise to …x its interest
rate for a certain number of periods before normalizing its policy (forward guidance) or it may announce
a future change in the in‡ation target. Understanding the e¤ects of communication is essential from the
policy evaluation perspective.
In this paper, we assess the e¤ects of central bank communication by analyzing several monetary policies
that are conjectured in the literature to be welfare improving. The studied policies include one-time and
gradual anticipated changes in economic policies, as well as more complex scenarios in which various
monetary policies happen with some probabilities. A distinctive feature of our model with communication
is that the agents react to the news of a policy change even when the new policy will not take e¤ect until
a later date. We …nd that such anticipation e¤ects can be very large.
Our analysis is carried out in a realistically calibrated prototypical central banking model, a smaller
replica of the Terms of Trade Model (ToTEM) used by the Bank of Canada for projection and policy
analysis. Importantly, our “baby” ToTEM follows the full size ToTEM model as close as possible and
generates very similar impulse response functions; see Dorich et al. (2013), and Lepetyuk, Maliar and
Maliar (2020, henceforth, LMM) for a description of the ToTEM and “baby” ToTEM models, respectively.
The policy experiments we consider include: (1) a gradual decline in the natural rate of interest;
(2) a gradual change in the in‡ation target that happens in the future either with certainty or with some
probability; (3) normalization of monetary policy regarding future nominal interest rates, when the economy
is initially at a zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates; (4) a switch to a more aggressive Taylor
rule; (5) a switch to price-level targeting instead of in‡ation targeting; (6) a switch to average in‡ation
targeting instead of in‡ation targeting.
Our …ndings are as follows: (1) Being fully anticipated by agents, a gradual decline in the natural rate
of interest of one percent over consecutive …ve years leads to a substantial (more than 1 percent) expansion
of output over the whole period. (2) Postponing an increase in the in‡ation target by one year has a large
(nearly 50%) increase in output over the transition to a new steady state. Even if the announced policy
is implemented with some probability, there are still substantial anticipation e¤ects both before and after
uncertainty is resolved. (3) When an economy is at ZLB on nominal interest rates, the central bank uses
policy announcements (forward guidance) about its future return to the standard interest rate rule to direct
the economy’s transition out of ZLB. The more it postpones such a return to the standard rule, the larger
is output expansion over the transition; an initial jump in output is however invariant to the horizon of this
forward guidance policy. Therefore, this experiment informs policy makers on optimal horizons of monetary
policy normalizations after ZLB periods. (4) Nevertheless, a more aggressive (but realistic) behavior of the
central bank toward targeting in‡ation and output is not translated into important anticipatory e¤ects on
the side of economic agents. (5) Switching from in‡ation-level targeting to price-level targeting has smaller
impacts with larger implementation lags. Price-level targeting was argued in the literature to be welfare
improving. Therefore, a central bank that waits to implement the new policy in practice loses time, and
the economy does not get earlier bene…ts from higher output. (6) Finally, a switch to average in‡ation
targeting also has modest anticipation e¤ects; this is because average in‡ation targeting is in a middle
ground between in‡ation targeting and price-level targeting. In sum, our analysis shows that the model’s
implications about the importance of anticipation e¤ects depend on a speci…c experiment considered: there
are substantial policy anticipation e¤ects present in our experiments (1)–(3), but such e¤ects are relatively
small in experiments (4)–(6).
On the methodological side, we argue that announcements about future economic conditions and policies can be modeled as non-recurrent news shocks. Such news shocks represent a challenge to economic
dynamics because they result in time-dependent optimal decision rules that change from one period to another. Conventional perturbation methods cannot be used for analyzing the anticipatory e¤ects since they
2
are designed for constructing time-invariant (stationary) solutions. We modify the conventional perturbation framework to facilitate the construction of a sequence of time-dependent decision functions following
the turnpike analysis; see Maliar, Maliar, Taylor and Tsener (2020, henceforth, MMTT) for a discussion
and review of related literature. Our perturbation method is comparable in accuracy to a global projection
method developed in MMTT (2020), but it is tractable in problems with much higher dimensionality,
such as large-scale central-banking models. Our ubiquitous software is written using the popular Dynare
platform combined with user-friendly MATLAB interface and can be easily adapted to other applications
the reader might be interested in.
There is a literature that studies economic models with recurrent news shocks; in particular, there is a
perturbation-based method by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) that can analyze the anticipatory e¤ects
by augmenting the state space to include future shocks. In their analysis, news shocks follow a stationary
Markov process and, hence, the resulting solution is stationary (time-invariant). In contrast, our future
shocks are nonrecurrent, which leads to time-dependent decision rules. We view the two approaches as
complementary: for example, our method can be used to study a pre-determined one-time accession or
exit of a new member to the EU, while Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s (2012) method can be used to study
countries that access and exit the EU with some stationary probability distribution. Quantitatively, we
…nd that the two methods lead to very di¤erent solutions in some of the examples considered.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the large-scale central banking model
and presents our perturbation methodology for analyzing anticipatory e¤ects. Section 3 analyzes our six
policy experiments and presents comparison results with news shocks framework, and, …nally, Section 4
concludes.
2
Methodology
In this section, we present a central banking model and outline the methodology of our numerical analysis.
2.1
The model
Nowadays, the central banks, leading international organizations and government agencies, use largescale macroeconomic models for projection and policy analysis. A prominent example is the Terms of
Trade Economic Model (ToTEM) of the Bank of Canada. That model includes several types of utilitymaximizing consumers, several pro…t-maximizing production sectors, monetary and …scal authorities, as
well as a foreign sector. ToTEM is huge: it contains 356 equations and unknowns, including 215 state
variables; see Dorich et al. (2013).
In the paper, we consider a scaled-down version of ToTEM developed by LMM (2020). Like the fullscale model, the “baby” ToTEM (in short, bToTEM) is a small open-economy model. It features multiple
new-Keynesian Phillips curves – one due to sticky prices in domestic production, one due to sticky wages
and one due to sticky import prices. We incorporate the rule-of-thumb price settlers in line with Galí and
Gertler (1999). We assume quadratic adjustment costs of investment and convex costs of capital utilization
to generate more realistic model’s performance, in particular, with respect to monetary-policy transmission.
The international trade consists of exporting domestic consumption goods and commodities and importing
foreign goods for domestic production. Even though bToTEM is much smaller than ToTEM (it has only
47 equations and unknowns, including 21 state variables) it generates realistic impulse-responses of the
Canadian economy to shocks, which are very similar to those produced by the full scale ToTEM model;
see LMM (2020) for comparison results.
Final-good production. Final consumption goods are produced in two stages. In the …rst stage, intermediate goods are produced competitively using labor, capital, commodities and imports. In the second
stage, …nal goods are aggregated from di¤erentiated goods that are each produced by a monopolistically
competitive …rm from the intermediate goods and from the …nal goods. The …nal goods can be consumed
3
by households. They can also be transformed using linear technologies into other types of goods, namely,
investment goods and noncommodity exports goods.
In the …rst production stage, a representative perfectly competitive …rm produces an intermediate good
by solving the following pro…t maximization problem:
max
fZtg ;Ztn ;Lt ;Kt ;It ;COMtd ;Mt ;ut ;dt g
s.t. Ztg =
1
l (At Lt )
E0
1
X
R0;t Ptz Ztn
Pti It
Wt Lt
Ptcom COMtd
Ptm Mt
t=0
+
k (ut Kt
1
1)
log At = 'a log At
1
Kt = (1
1
+
com
+ (1
d t ) Kt
'a ) log A +
1
It
It 1
i
2
+
m (Mt )
a
t;
1
1
;
(1)
(2)
+ It ;
(ut 1)
dt = d0 + de
Ztn = Ztg
COMtd
(3)
;
(4)
2
1
It ;
(5)
where Ztg and Ztn are gross production and net (of adjustment costs) production of …nal goods; Lt , Kt , It
COMtd , Mt , ut and dt are labor, capital, investment, commodity inputs, imports, capital utilization and
depreciation rate, respectively; At is the level of labor-augmenting technology; at is a normally distributed
variable, and 'a is an autocorrelation coe¢cient. The …rm discounts nominal payo¤s according to household’s stochastic discount factor Rt;t+j = j ( t+j = t ) (Pt =Pt+j ), where t is the household’s marginal
utility of consumption, and Pt is the …nal good price. Investment goods and noncommodity exports are
assumed to be produced from the …nal goods according to linear technology, Pti = i Pt and Ptnc = x Pt ,
where Pti and Ptnc are the price of investment goods and noncommodity exports goods, respectively.
In the second stage of production, monopolistically competitive …rms produce a continuum of di¤erentiated good. Then, these di¤erentiated goods are aggregated into the …nal good by an aggregating …rm
that solves the following cost minimization problem
Z 1
min
Pit Zit di
fZit g 0
s.t. Zt =
Z
1
"
" 1
" 1
"
Zit di
0
;
where Zt and Pit are given; Zit is a di¤erentiated good i, The cost minimization implies the following
demand function for the di¤erentiated good i:
Zit =
Pit
Pt
"
Zt ;
with Pt
Z
0
1
Pit1 " di
1
1 "
:
Each di¤erentiated good is produced from the intermediate goods and from the …nal goods using technology
featuring perfect complementarity,
Zitn
Z mi
Zit = min
;
(6)
; it
1 sm sm
where Zitn is an intermediate good and Zitmi is a …nal good input, and sm is a Leontief parameter.
There are two types of the monopolistically competitive …rms producing di¤erentiated goods: ruleof-thumb …rms of measure ! and forward-looking …rms of measure 1 !. Both rule-of-thumb …rms and
forward-looking …rms index their price to the in‡ation target t with probability as Pit = t Pi;t 1 . The
4
rule-of-thumb …rms partially index their price to lagged in‡ation and target in‡ation with probability 1
Pit = (
t 1)
( t )1
Pi;t
1:
(7)
Forward-looking …rms choose their prices Pt with probability 1
the price remains e¤ective
max Et
Pt
1
X
j
Rt;t+j
j=0
j
Y
t+k Pt
Zi;t+j
s.t. Zi;t+j =
Qj
k=1
!
t+k Pt
k=1
to maximize pro…ts generated when
z
sm ) Pt+j
Zi;t+j
(1
Pt+j
,
sm Pt+j Zi;t+j
!
(8)
"
Zt+j :
The production in the …rst stage Ztn and that in the second stages Zt are related via price dispersion
t,
Ztn
where
t
R1
0
=
Z
0
Pit
Pt
1
Zitn di
"
= (1
sm )
Z
1
Zit di = (1
sm )
0
Z
1
0
"
Pit
Pt
Zt di = (1
sm )
t Zt ;
(9)
di.
Production of commodities. Commodities are produced by a domestic …rm using …nal goods and land
as inputs. They are sold domestically or exported to the rest of the world. The domestic …rm solves
max
Ztcom ;COMt
fPtcom COMt
s.t. COMt = (Ztcom )sz (At F )1
sz
Pt Ztcom g
com
2
Ztcom
Ztcom
1
2
1
Ztcom ;
(10)
where Ztcom is the …nal good input, and F is a …xed production factor, which may be considered as land.
Similar to production of …nal goods, the commodity producers incur quadratic adjustment costs when they
adjust the level of …nal good input. The commodities are sold domestically or exported to the rest of the
world, COMt = COMtd + Xtcom . They are sold at the world price adjusted by the nominal exchange rate,
Ptcom = et Ptcomf , where et is the nominal exchange rate (i.e., domestic price of a unit of foreign currency),
and Ptcomf is the world commodity price; in real terms, the latter price is given by pcom
= st pcomf
,
t
t
comf
comf
f
com
com
where pt
Pt =Pt and pt
Pt
=Pt are domestic and foreign relative prices of commodities,
f
respectively, Pt is the foreign consumption price level, and st = et Ptf =Pt is the real exchange rate.
Production of imports. The representative perfectly competitive …rm produces the …nal imported
good Mt from a continuum of intermediate imported goods Mit and solves the following cost-minimization
problem,
Z 1
Pitm Mit di
min
fMit g 0
s.t. Mt =
Z
0
1
"m 1
"m
Mit
"m
"m 1
di
;
where Mit is an intermediate imported good i. The demand for an intermediate imported good i is given
by
1
Z 1
1 "m
Pitm "m
m 1 "m
m
(Pit )
di
:
Mt ; with Pt
Mit =
Ptm
0
5
Prices of the intermediate imported goods are sticky in a similar way as the prices of the di¤erentiated
…nal goods. A measure ! m of the importers follows the rule-of-thumb pricing, and the others are forward
looking. The optimizing forward-looking importers choose the price Ptm in order to maximize pro…ts
generated when the price remains e¤ective
!
j
1
X
Y
mf
j
m
max
Et
( m ) Rt;t+j
et+j Pt+j Mi;t+j
t+k Pt Mi;t+j
m
Pt
j=0
k=1
Qj
m
k=1 t+k Pt
m
Pt+j
Mi;t+j =
!
"m
Mt+j ;
where Ptmf is the price of imports in the foreign currency. All importers face the same marginal cost given
by the foreign price of imports.
Households. Households maximize the lifetime utility by choosing holdings of domestic and foreigncurrency denominated bonds, labor and consumption, and they are subject to habits in consumption. Each
household supplies a variety of di¤erentiated labor service to the labor market, which is monopolistically
competitive. The representative household of type h solves the following utility-maximization problem:
Bt
et Btf
s.t. Pt Ct +
+
Rt R f 1 +
t
f
t
Z
+1
(1
) 1
dh
(Lht )
exp
Ct 1
(1 + ) 0
Z 1
f
Wht Lht dh + t ;
= Bt 1 + et Bt 1 +
log
c
t
= 'c log
max
Ct ;Lht ;Bt ;Btf
E0
1
X
1
t
1
t=0
Ct
c
t
;
(11)
0
c
t 1
c
t;
+
(12)
where Ct , Lht , Bt , Btf are consumption of …nal goods, labor service of type h, holdings of domestic and
foreign-currency denominated bonds, respectively; Ct is the aggregate consumption, taken by the household
as given; 2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor; and are the utility-function parameters; ct is a
consumption demand shock, ct is a normally distributed variable, and 'c is an autocorrelation coe¢cient;
Rt and Rtf are domestic and foreign nominal interest rate, respectively; ft is the risk premium on the
foreign interest rate; Wht is the nominal wage of labor of type h; t is pro…ts paid by the …rms. The
representative household supplies a variety of di¤erentiated labor service to the labor market, which is
monopolistically competitive.
Labor packer.
A labor packer aggregates di¤erentiated labor services by solving
Z 1
Wht Lht dh
min
fLht g 0
s.t. Lt =
Z
0
1
"w 1
"w
Lht
"w
"w 1
;
dh
where Lt is aggregated labor demanded by …rms in the …rst stage of production. Cost minimization of the
labor packer implies the following demand for individual labor:
Lht =
Wht
Wt
"w
Lt ;
with Wt
Z
0
6
1
1 "w
dh
Wht
1
1 "w
:
(13)
Labor unions. Labor unions set wages. There are two types of labor unions: rule-of-thumb unions of
measure ! w and forward-looking unions of measure 1 ! w . Within each type, with probability w the
labor unions index their wage to the in‡ation target t as follows Wit = Wi;t 1 . The rule-of-thumb unions
that do not index their wage in the current period follow the rule
w
t 1
Wit =
w
( t )1
w
Wi;t
1:
(14)
A forward-looking unions that do not index its wage solves
maxEt
Wt
1
X
(
1
j
w)
Ct+j
1
j=0
Ct+j
1
Qj
k=1
s.t. Lh;t+j =
Pt+j Ct+j =
exp
j
Y
t+k Wt
Wt+j
t+k Wt
(1
)
(1 + )
! "w
Lh;t+j dh +
Z
1
+1
(Lht+j )
dh
0
c
t+j
(15)
Lt+j ;
(16)
t+j ;
(17)
k=1
where
t+j
includes terms in budget constraints (11) other than Ct+j and Lh;t+j .
Monetary authority.
Rt =
The central bank uses a Taylor rule to set the short-term nominal interest rate,
r Rt 1
+ (1
r)
R+
(
t)
t
+
Y
log Yt
log Yt
+
r
t;
(18)
where r measures the degree of smoothing of the interest rate; R is the nominal neutral interest rate;
measures a response to the in‡ation gap; t is the in‡ation target; Y measures a response to the output
gap; Yt is potential output; rt is an interest rate shock following a process
r
t
= 'r
r
t 1
+
r
t;
where rt is a normally distributed variable, and 'r is an autocorrelation coe¢cient. Potential output
changes with productivity according to
log Yt = 'z log Yt
1
+ (1
'z ) log
At Y
A
:
Foreign demand for noncommodity exports. By analogy with the demand for imports, the foreign
demand function for noncommodity exports is assumed to be
Xtnc =
f
Ptnc
et Ptf
!
where Ptnc is a domestic price of noncommodity exports;
terms, we have
st
Xtnc = f
pnc
t
Balance of payments.
Ztf ;
f
(19)
is the demand-function parameter. In real
Ztf :
(20)
The balance of payments in nominal terms is given by
et Btf
Rtf
1+
f
t
et Btf
1
= Ptnc Xtnc + Ptcom Xtcom
7
Ptm Mt ;
(21)
where Btf is domestic holdings of foreign-currency denominated bonds, and Rtf is the nominal interest rate
et Btf
f
t+1 Pt Y
on the bonds. By normalizing the bonds holdings as bft
becomes
bft
rtf
1+
f
t
bft
1
, the balance of payments in real terms
st
1
Xtcom
= (pnc
X nc + pcom
t
st 1
Y t t
pm
t Mt ) ;
(22)
where rtf is the real interest rate on the foreign-currency denominated bonds.
Rest-of-the-world economy. The rest of the world is speci…ed by three exogenous processes that,
respectively, describe the evolution of foreign output Ztf , the foreign real interest rate rtf , and the foreign
commodity price pcomf
,
t
log Ztf
= 'zf log Ztf
log rtf
= 'rf log rtf
'rf log r +
=
1
log pcomf
t
1
+ 1
1+ 1
'comf log pcomf
t 1 +
'zf log Z f +
zf
t ;
rf
t ;
comf
'comf log p
(23)
(24)
+
comf
;
t
(25)
comf
rf
are normally distributed random variables, and 'Zf , 'rf and 'comf are autocorwhere zf
t , t and t
relation coe¢cients.
We impose an augmented uncovered interest rate parity condition
2
0
11 { 3
f
f
R
1
+
t
t
6
7
A
et = Et 4(et 1 ){ @et+1
(26)
5:
Rt
Uncovered interest rate parity.
Stationarity condition for the open-economy model. The risk premium
of foreign assets
f
f
bft ;
t =& b
f
t
is a decreasing function
(27)
where bf is the steady state level of the normalized bond holdings. This assumption ensures a decreasing
rate of return to foreign assets.
Summary of the model’s variables. For each period t, there are the following four types of variables
in this model: 47 endogenous (or non-predetermined) variables,
8
9
w ; F w ; F m; F m; q ; ; s ;
F1t ; F2t ; F1t
<
=
2t
1t
2t t t t
m
z
Lt ; Kt ; It ; COMtd ; Mt ; ut ; dt ; Ztg ; Ztn ; Zt ; Ct ; Yt ; t ; rmct ; t ; m
yt
;
t ; t ; p t ; R t ; p t ; wt ;
:
w ; Y ; pcom ; pnc ; pmf ; py ; ;
M P Kt ; Rtk ; pit ; ft ; bft ; Xtnc ; Xtcom ; COMt ; Ztcom ; w
;
w
;
t t
t
t
t
t
t
t
w ; F w g, fF m ; F m g are supplementary variables in Phillips curves for prices, wages and
where fF1t ; F2t g, fF1t
2t
1t
2t
imports, respectively; qt is Tobin’s q; rmct and M P Kt are real marginal cost and marginal productivity of
y
capital, respectively; pnc
t and pt are prices of noncommodity goods and output, respectively; 15 endogenous
state variables
n
o
w
m
m
com f
yt 1
Ct 1 ; Rt 1 ; st 1 ; t 1 ; t 1 ; wt 1 ; w
t 1 ; t 1 ; pt 1 ; t 1 ; It 1 ; Zt 1 ; bt 1 ; Yt 1; Kt 1 ;
8
w , pm , m are wage in‡ation, wage dispersion, and price and in‡ation of imports; 19
where w
t 1,
t 1
t 1
t 1
endogenous forward variables
+
yt+1
w ;Fw ;Fm ;Fm ;
F1t+1 ; F2t+1 ; F1t+1
2t+1
1t+1
2t+1 t+1 ; qt+1 ; ut+1 ; It+1 ;
com
w ; pcom ; pz ; M P K
Zt+1 ; t+1 ; t+1 ; m
;
t+1 ; st+1
t+1
t+1 t+1
t+1
and 6 exogenous state variables
zt
n
At ;
R c comf f
; rt ; Ztf
t ; t ; pt
o
;
:
In Appendix A, we describe our calibration procedure, which closely follows the calibration of the full scale
ToTEM model.
2.2
Methodology of our numerical analysis
LMM (2020) analyze conventional time-invariant (stationary) solutions to our model.1 Here, we construct
novel time-dependent (nonstationary) solutions to the model. We consider announcements about economic
policies that will be implemented at some future dates (non-recurrent news shock) and analyze a reaction
of economic agents to such announcements. Assuming that we are at t = 0 and that a given policy will
be implemented at T > 0, we obtain a sequence of optimal decision functions for periods t = 0; 1; :::; T
that characterize anticipatory e¤ects (obviously, the optimal decision functions will depend on how far
the economy is from the moment the policy is introduced). Below, we outline our perturbation-based
framework for analyzing economies with non-recurrent news shocks.
Let us consider an in…nite-horizon nonstationary equilibrium problem in which a solution is characterized by a set of equilibrium conditions for t = 0; 1; : : : ;
Et G t y t
+
1 ; yt ; yt+1 ; zt ; zt+1
zt+1 = Zt (zt ;
= 0;
t+1 ) ;
(28)
(29)
where z0 ; y 1 is given; Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at
t; zt 2 Rdz is a vector of exogenous state variables at t; Zt is a time-dependent law of motion for zt ;
yt 2 Rdy is a vector of endogenous variables; yt 1 2 Rdym is a vector of endogenous (random) state
+
variables at t; yt+1
2 Rdyp is a vector of endogenous forward variables at t; t+1 2 Rd is a vector of
shocks; Gt is a continuously di¤erentiable vector function. Note that the latter function is time-dependent
because the model is nonstationary (due to, for example, time-dependent parameters in policy rules,
production function, utility function). A solution is given by a set of time-dependent equilibrium functions
yt = Yt zt ; yt 1 that satisfy (28), (29) in the relevant area of the state space.
Our perturbation analysis proceeds in the following two steps:
Step I: solving a T -period stationary economy. Assume that in a very remote period T , the economy
becomes stationary, i.e., Gt ( ) = G ( ) and Zt ( ) = Z ( ) for all t
T . Therefore, the system (28), (29)
becomes
Et G yt
+
1 ; yt ; yt+1 ; zt ; zt+1
zt+1 = Z (zt ;
t+1 ) :
Solving (30), (31) allows us to …nd the solution yT = YbT zT ; yT
1
= 0;
(30)
(31)
1
.
LLM (2020) compare perturbation solutions with more accurate global projection solutions constructed using deep learning
analysis. That paper …nds that high order perturbation solutions are su¢ciently accurate in the bToTEM model. Since our
nonstationary analysis is more costly, we limit attention to perturbation solutions only.
9
Step II: constructing a function path. Using a T -period solution yT = YbT zT ; yT 1 as a terminal
condition, iterate backward for T
1; :::; 1 on the corresponding equilibrium conditions to construct a
sequence (path) of time-dependent value and decision functions fYT 1 ( ) ; :::; Y1 ( )g. For example, for
period t, the system on which we iterate backward is
Et G t yt
+
1 ; yt ; Yt+1
zt+1 ; yt
zt+1 = Zt (zt ;
; zt ; zt+1
= 0;
t+1 ) ;
Here, we solve for today’s endogenous variables yt , given tomorrow’s functions zt+1 = Zt (zt ; t+1 ) and
+
+
+
zt+1 ; yt is a subset of functions Yt+1 zt+1 ; yt .
zt+1 ; yt , where Yt+1
= Yt+1
yt+1
In both steps, we use perturbation to …nd numerical approximations of the decision functions. For our
central banking model, the variables zt , yt , yt , yt+ are de…ned in Section 2.1.
In general, nonstationary models like ours have no deterministic steady state, so it is unclear around
what point(s) decision rules must be approximated. To deal with this issue, we can augment the model’s
equations with a time-varying growth rates xt that capture how much endogenous state variables grow
from period t to t + 1 due to the time trend or the parameter change. We can …rst assume that growth
rates f xt gTt=1 are given and then …nd those growth rates iteratively. (Note that growth rates should not
be the same for all variables).
One objective of this paper is to make the proposed perturbation framework ubiquitous and portable
to other applications. To this purpose, we show how to construct time-dependent decision functions using
Dynare. To explain how to solve a nonstationary model in Dynare, let’s …rst consider a standard secondorder perturbation solution to a stationary model around a deterministic steady state (v; 0),
g (v; )
g (v; 0) + gx (v; 0) (v
|
{z
1
v) + gxx (v; 0) (v
} |2
1st-order perturbation solution
1
v)2 + g
2
{z
2nd-order terms
(v; 0)
2
;
}
(32)
where g (v; ) is a decision function to be approximated; v = (x; z) is a vector of endogenous and exogenous
state variables; is a perturbation parameter that scales volatility of shocks; (v; 0) is a deterministic steady
state; g (v; 0), gx (v; 0) and gxx (v; 0) are, respectively, steady state values, Jacobian and Hessian matrices
of g; (v v) is a deviation from a steady state; (v v)2
(v v) (v v) is a tensor product of the
deviations. Three observations are in order: First, a constant term of the policy function is given by
g (v; 0) + 21 g (v; 0) 2 and hence, is a¤ected by variances of shocks. Second, the …rst-order perturbation
solution does not depend on the degree of volatility , i.e., g (v; 0) = 0. Finally, the term g x (v; 0) is
omitted as well because it is equal to zero; see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
In Step I, a Taylor expansion of the policy functions in a stationary model is found around the deterministic steady state v of the model. In Step II, we consider two alternative options. The …rst option is to
…nd solutions for vt+1 and vt around vt and vt 1 , respectively, such that vt = vt 1 vt ; in Dynare, it can be
implemented by coding vt and vt+1 using the same variable names. The other option is to consider vt+1 and
vt perturbed around vt and vt 1 , respectively, such that vt = vt 1 v;t 1 , where v;t 1 is a time-dependent
growth rate; in Dynare, it can be implemented by coding vt and vt+1 with di¤erent variable names.
In Appendix A, we illustrate our methodology of constructing time-dependent perturbation solutions
by using a toy example of a neoclassical stochastic growth model with labor augmenting technological
progress. A useful property of that model is balanced growth which allows us to construct an accurate
reference solution. We use such a solution for accessing accuracy of our perturbation solutions which we
obtain without relying on the property of balanced growth. In particular, we show how to iteratively
construct time-dependent growth rates. In the main text, we apply the proposed methodology for the
analysis of our large-scale open-economy model.
10
3
Analyzing nonstationary news shocks
In this section, we show a series of policy experiments in which we consider anticipated changes in one
or several model’s parameters. In all the …gures, the variables are shown in percentage deviations from
the initial risky steady state, except for the interest rate and the in‡ation rate, which are both shown in
percentage point deviations from the risky steady state and expressed in annualized terms.2
3.1
A decline in the real neutral interest rate
Some future changes in economic environment could be envisioned by the public. A central bank’s announcements could play a signi…cant role by revealing information not just about its policy, but also about
a central bank’s assessment of the economic outlook. In particular, Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) argue
that Fed announcements contain information about the path of the natural rate. In this experiment, we
model an anticipated gradual decline in the natural rate of interest. Namely, we assume that initial value
of the real neutral interest rate is 3 percent and that it starts to go down to 2 percent gradually over 20
quarters. To model a decrease in the neutral rate, we exploit the fact that in steady state, this rate is
equal to the inverse of the discount factor, and we translate the assumed decrease in the neutral interest
rate into an increase in the discount factor.
Empirical evidence indicates that long-term rates declined from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s,
increased until the late 1980s, and declined again from that point on; see, e.g., Yi and Zhang (2019).
Moreover, such a decline is not related to the Great Recession. The factors that are responsible for
declining long-run rates include lower TFP growth, lower working-age population growth, long-run trends
in marginal productivity of capital and risk premium. With this experiment, we investigate how a gradual
reduction in the real interest rate captured by an increase in the discount factor a¤ects the economy.
0
Nominal Interest Rate
Inflation
0
Output
-0.5
-0.02
0.5
-0.04
0
-0.5
-1
-1
10
2
Exchange Rate
0
1
20
30
40
-0.06
10
Consumption
20
30
-0.5
40
Investment
0
4
1.5
-1.5
10
20
30
40
Commodity Export
-1
-0.2
-2
-0.4
0
-3
1
10
20
30
40
Imports
1.5
0
2
0.5
1
10
20
30
40
0
40
-0.6
10
20
30
40
10
Capital
20
30
40
10
Labour
0.6
0
20
30
40
Real Interest Rate
0.4
-0.5
0.2
0
30
-4
3
1
20
Noncommodity Export
2
0.5
10
0
3
1
-2
0
10
20
30
-0.2
40
-1
10
20
30
40
10
20
30
40
Figure 1: A gradual decline in the real neutral interest rate
As it is seen from Figure 1, a long-run gradual decrease in the real interest rate results in the corresponding gradual increase in consumption, investment, labor, capital, and imports. For example, investment
2
By risky steady state, we mean a state to which a stochastic economy converges in the absence of exogenous shocks.
11
increases by 5 percent at the peak. Because of signi…cantly higher investment and labor, output grows
by more than 1 percent. The changes in in‡ation are so small that the nominal and real interest rates
behave almost identically. The anticipation e¤ects are the largest in the commodity export and exchange
rate which fall by 2 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively, when it became known that the real neutral
interest rate will gradually decrease. The results of this experiment indicate that recent trends in the real
rate of interest are bene…cial for growth. Note that we arrive at this result by assuming that the decline in
the natural rate is caused by people becoming more impatient. However, if the decline is caused by other
factors, our conclusion might not go through.
3.2
A change in the in‡ation target
In this experiment, we consider a change in the in‡ation target that appears in the Taylor rule (18). In
particular, we assume that the central bank announces in advance that it will increase the in‡ation target t
and that everyone considers the announcement to be fully credible. Why is it a relevant policy experiment?
During the Great Recession of 2007–2009, central bank’s nominal policy rates across a number of countries
fell to a ZLB on nominal interest rates. There is ample literature arguing that the in‡ation target is a good
policy instrument for dealing with ZLB episodes. For example, Summers (1991) and Fischer (1996) suggest
to keep an in‡ation target as high as 2 or 3 percent if the economy hits ZLB. Krugman (1998) proposes to
use a 4 percent in‡ation target in the Japanese economy to deal with persisting de‡ation. Furthermore,
Blanchard, Dell’Arriccia and Mauro (2010), Williams (2009) and Ball (2013) argue that a higher in‡ation
target would have prevented the interest rate from falling to the ZLB.
In Canada, in‡ation-targeting framework was adopted in 1991, and since 1995, the in‡ation target was
maintained at the level of 2 percent. The in‡ation target is reviewed and renewed every …ve years. In
particular, the last review was in October of 2016, when the Bank of Canada decided to keep the target
at the same level; this renewal covers the period from January 1st, 2017 to December 31st, 2021. There
are two types of possible anticipation e¤ects here. First, we would have had a policy implementation lag
leading to anticipation e¤ects if the Bank of Canada decided to change the target in October 2016. Second,
in spite of the fact that the in‡ation target was not changed in 2016, anticipation e¤ects were still present
as there were some chances that it would be changed given that Canada was close to the ZLB at that time
and policymakers were seriously discussing this possibility.
Figure 2 displays dynamics of the main model’s variables. We present the results for the method
that …nds a perturbation solution obtained around a deterministic steady state (labeled as Method 2 in
Appendix B; our sensitivity results for other methods predict similar patterns of behavior).
We consider two cases: …rst, at t = 1, the central bank makes an announcement that starting from
t = 1, it will gradually increase the in‡ation target t from 2 percent to 3 percent during a period of 8
quarters, and second, the same change takes place but starting from t = 5 (i.e., in one year); the in‡ation
target remains at the new (higher) level after it is reached.
When the in‡ation-target change begins at t = 1, in‡ation follows the same pattern as the target. What
is the reason for such behavior of in‡ation? In our experiment, we assume full credibility of the in‡ationtarget policy. In‡ation repeats the pattern of the in‡ation target because agents determining the behavior
of in‡ation are mainly non-optimizers who index their price by in‡ation target. As a result, the nominal
interest rate gradually increases over the …rst …fteen periods by 1 percent, and it stays at the new level
forever (see Figure 2; note that the real neutral rate is the same as before). Following the announcement,
output, investment and commodity exports jump up, and over the transition, the economy experiences
an investment- and export-driven growth with the peak increase of output of 0:2 percent. Output begins
to descend toward its original level after one year. Consequently, there is only a temporary expansionary
e¤ect on the economy due to a higher in‡ation target.
When the in‡ation-target change is delayed for one year, the variables behave qualitatively similar. One
visible di¤erence from the previous case is that most variables in the …gure experience larger increases at
the peak (the exchange rate and noncommodity export are exceptions). Therefore, it pays for the central
bank to announce this type of policy in advance as output increases more during the transition. The
12
Nominal Interest Rate
Inflation
1
1
Output
Exchange Rate
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.15
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.05
0
5
10
15
0
20
Consumption
0.15
10
15
20
5
Investment
1
0.2
10
15
20
Commodity Export
0.4
0.5
0.1
5
10
15
-0.5
20
Imports
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.15
5
10
15
Capital
0.2
0.1
0.1
0
5
10
15
20
Labour
0.4
10
15
20
Noncommodity Export
-0.1
0.1
0.3
5
10
15
20
Real Interest Rate
0
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
0
20
5
0.3
0
0.05
0
0
0
5
-0.1
0.1
0.05
0.1
-0.2
0
0
5
10
15
0
20
5
10
15
20
5
effective immediately
10
15
20
-0.3
5
10
15
20
announced one year in advance
Figure 2: A gradual increase in the in‡ation target
Average
Maximum
Rt
4:66
4:30
t
5:25
5:17
Yt
4:09
4:03
Ct
4:47
4:38
It
5:11
5:03
Xtnc
4:10
4:08
Xtcom
3:17
3:13
Mt
5:10
4:98
Lt
4:42
4:37
Kt
5:91
5:84
Table 1: Residuals in the model’s equations on the simulated path, log10 units. Rt , t , Yt , Ct , It , Xtnc ,
Xtcom , Mt , Lt , Kt are the nominal interest rate, in‡ation, output, consumption, investment, noncommodity
export, commodity export, imports, labor and capital, respectively.
larger jumps in such variables as output, consumption, investment, capital are entirely due to anticipatory
e¤ects. That is, agents expect the real interest rate to be lower in the near future, and they accumulate
more capital in advance of the more favorable environment which has positive e¤ects on the economy’s
output today.
Table 1 contains the mean and maximum residuals in the model’s equations used for computing the
corresponding variables in the table. As we can see, the maximum residuals range between 10 3:13 and
10 5:84 , i.e., between :07 percent and :0001 percent, which are very low.3 For the remaining experiments,
the residuals in equations are of similar size so our solutions are very accurate (to save on space, these
residuals are not reported).
In the second experiment, we model a probabilistic setting in which agents rationally expect that the
in‡ation target might change to two possible levels with some probabilities. Speci…cally, we assume that
there is a 50-percent chance that starting from t = 5 the in‡ation target t gradually increases from 2 to 3
percent during 8 quarters; otherwise, the in‡ation target remains the same. Our computational method is
easy to adapt to modeling more sophisticated anticipation scenarios like one considered in that experiment.
When computing policies in period t = 4, we explicitly use the Dynare macro language to set the period 4
3
In LMM (2020), we reported larger residuals when the economy was hit by a large negative demand shock and the ELB
was reached.
13
expectation functions to be equal to the weighted sums of expectations over the two possible realizations
in period t = 5.
Nominal Interest Rate
1
1
0.5
0.5
Inflation
Output
5
10
15
20
5
Consumption
0.2
0.6
0.15
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.05
0
0
0
0
0.2
10
15
20
-0.2
5
Investment
0.4
10
15
20
0.2
0.2
0.05
0
0.1
-0.2
10
15
20
Imports
0.4
Noncommodity Export
0
10
15
20
-0.1
5
Capital
10
15
20
Labour
0.4
0.2
15
20
-0.1
0.1
0.05
10
Real Interest Rate
0
0.1
0.2
5
0.1
0.3
0.1
20
0.2
0
5
0.15
0.3
15
0.1
0.1
5
10
0.3
0.4
0
5
Commodity Export
0.6
0.15
Exchange Rate
-0.2
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
-0.3
5
10
15
20
5
no change in the inflation target
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
a higher inflation target
Figure 3: A gradual increase in the in‡ation target (50% probability)
This experiment is plotted in Figure 3. There are two alternative transition paths di¤ering from
period 5 onwards, one per each scenario, i.e., with and without an increase in t . Similar to the previous
experiment, in‡ation mimics the behavior of the in‡ation target: it gradually rises to the new steady state
level. Starting from the risky steady state at t = 1, all the variables experience mild increases, which are
due to anticipatory e¤ects on the side of economic agents. Once it becomes known whether the target will
go up or not, all the variables quickly return to the original steady state if the target does not increase, and
they experience a more pronounced hump-shape behavior and return to a new steady state if the target
increases. In Appendix B, we extend the latter experiment to vary the probability of switching to a higher
in‡ation target at t = 5, namely, it is either 25 percent or 75 percent (instead of 50 percent). As those
…gures show, in case of no in‡ation-target change, the transition back to the old steady state is signi…cantly
faster for the 25-percent case than for the 75-percent case.
3.3
Monetary policy normalization
During the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the nominal interest rate hit the ZLB. As a result, central banks
could not rely on Taylor rules to conduct their monetary policy and resorted to forward guidance – an
unconventional monetary policy consisting in announcing future interest-rate changes. As emphasized by
the literature, central bank’s communication of the policy-rate’s future path is the main channel through
which forward guidance policy a¤ects the economy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) demonstrate that a
central bank’s promises to keep low interest rates for longer periods helps alleviate negative consequences
of binding ZLB. As agents expect future interest rates to be lower than in the absence of forward guidance,
they increase today’s investment and consumption, which stimulates today’s economy. Campbell et al.
(2012) name this form of forward guidance Odyssean. Another form is Delphic forward guidance: a central
14
bank may have better information about the state of the shocks that hit the economy, and it communicates
a forecasted path of policy rates.4 In the Odyssean case, future intentions are known, while in the Delphic
case, forward guidance is implied – agents do not know its exact duration.
In this paper, we assume that the central bank uses forward guidance to convey a policy change when
lifting o¤ from an e¤ective lower bound (ELB) on the bank’s policy rates. In particular, we assume that
initially the economy is at ELB and at t = 1 the central bank announces that it will keep the interest rate
at that level for T periods and afterwards it will return to the standard Taylor rule (18). To model the
central bank’s policy at the ELB periods, we assume that the nominal interest rate is given by
Rt = Relb ;
where Relb is the ELB. When the interest-rate policy is normalized after T periods, the Taylor rule’s
coe¢cients return back to normal values, and the policy is described by the rule (18).
Figure 4 presents the results for this experiment when the solutions are approximated around a deterministic steady state. The change in the interest rate rule announced at t = 1 is anticipated by agents. We
compare three cases, depending on whether the interest-rate policy returns to normal (i) in one quarter
(T = 1), (ii) in one year (T = 4), (iii) in two years (T = 8). In all the cases, the initial interest rate is
below its risky steady state, however, it eventually returns to the steady state.
Nominal Interest Rate
0
Inflation
0.1
Output
0.4
0.3
0.05
-0.5
Exchange Rate
1.5
1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0
-1
5
10
15
20
Consumption
0.3
0
0
5
10
15
20
5
Investment
0.6
10
15
20
Commodity Export
5
0.6
10
15
20
Noncommodity Export
1
0.2
0.5
0
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
-0.5
0
10
15
20
Imports
5
0.4
10
15
20
5
Capital
0.4
0.6
0
0
-1
5
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.1
0
15
20
5
Labour
0.6
0.3
10
10
15
20
Real Interest Rate
0
-0.5
0.2
0
0
5
10
15
20
-0.2
5
10
15
effective one quarter
20
-1
5
effective one year
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
effective two years
Figure 4: Forward guidance
When the policy is announced, the exchange rate, in‡ation, and the real variables jump up above the
steady state. Local currency depreciation makes domestic exports more competitive, which leads to an
increase in exports of both commodities and noncommodity goods. Domestic …rms bene…t from increased
sales, which leads to immediate increases in output, labor, investment and capital. On the other hand, as
households work more, they demand more of imported goods, so that imports go up as well. Evidently, an
4
Marinkov (2020) argues that during the ZLB period, agents may misjudge a central bank’s reaction function and bias
their expectations. In this case, the central bank may want to use forward guidance as a guiding tool to correct agents’ beliefs.
15
output increase is the largest when the announced policy is kept for the longest horizon of eight periods.
The peak increase in output is 70 percent higher than the one for the forward guidance horizon of four
quarters. The di¤erences in output dynamics across the considered cases are only present over the transition
but not in the initial period – in all three cases, an initial output jump is of equal size. The dependence
of the initial reaction in output on the horizon of the forward guidance policy is known in the literature
as a forward guidance puzzle. Even though there is no such dependence in the …gure, we do still see that
the policy horizon matters for the total e¤ect on output: it reacts more if the policy change is postponed
further away in the future.
Our above experiment adds to the discussion on central bank’s communication strategy. After the
Great Recession of 2007–2009, when the economic conditions improved, an important policy question was
how and when to normalize the monetary policy, where normalizing means switching back to some Taylor
rule; see Yellen (2015). In particular, the following questions arose after the end of the crisis: (1) Should
the central bank normalize policy now or later? (2) Should the central bank do it gradually or all at once?
(3) Should the regime shift be announced in advance? (4) Should the policy normalization be time or
state dependent? All these questions are hard to address in the context of conventional stationary new
Keynesian framework because by de…nition a monetary policy normalization is a nonstationary change.
Nevertheless, the technique developed in this paper enables us to study these questions easily. In our above
experiment, we compare the economy’s behavior under policies that di¤er in horizon of return to normal
values, which corresponds to questions (1) and (3). We conclude that there are gains from announcing a
future lift-o¤ in advance and we quantify these gains for di¤erent durations of forward guidance. Similarly,
questions (2) and (4) can be answered using our techniques; we leave them for future research.
An e¤ective commitment to keep the interest rate at the ELB implies that the rate should be kept
at this low level longer than a Taylor rule would imply. In particular, during the COVID-19 pandemic,
the interest rates reached ZLB across a number of developed economics. In the U.S., the Fed has already
announced that it expects to keep its benchmark interest rate pinned near zero through 2023.5 Taylor
(2021) argues that the Taylor rules considered by the Fed in the February 2021 Monetary Policy Report
imply that the federal fund rate should be higher than the actual zero level and that the Fed “should now
engage in a strategy or rule in which people and markets understand that it would raise the policy interest
rate if economic growth increases and in‡ation rises as they are now forecast to do.” Our above analysis,
however, plays up the importance of commitment to the announced policy on which hinges the desired
monetary expansion.
3.4
Switching to a more aggressive Taylor rule
In this experiment, we consider a one-time change in the sensitivity of the policy rate to in‡ation and
the output gap in the Taylor rule (18), as measured by
and Y , respectively.6 It di¤ers from previous
experiments, in which the anticipated changes in the model’s parameters are gradual. Figure 5 plots the
economy’s responses to two-time increases in either
or Y or both, relative to benchmark parameterization. Note that this change in the coe¢cient values is quite large relative to what a central bank would
typically consider. Switching to more aggressive Taylor rules is anticipated at t = 1 but occurs at t = 2,
so that there are immediate anticipatory e¤ects in all the model’s variables.
As we can see, both policies – a higher
and a higher Y – are in‡ationary. However, a double
increase in the sensitivity to in‡ation
is more e¤ective in expanding the economy: output, consumption,
investment, capital, labor are visibly higher both at peak and in the new steady state than in the old
steady state; commodity production slightly drops, which is related a lower commodity exports. A double
increase in the sensitivity to the output gap has more modest e¤ects however. When there is a stronger
response to both in‡ation and the output gap, the quantitative expressions of the e¤ects are roughly in
between the other two cases. That is, given that there is a trade o¤ between in‡ation and the output gap in
5
See https://apnews.com/9b9a335a1ce05d69fc97a1d6197371ab
For example, Taylor (1999) argues that the Taylor rule with
advocated in Taylor (1993) when
= 0:5 and Y = 0:5.
6
16
= 0:5 and
Y
= 1 is more reasonable than the one
0.02
Nominal Interest Rate
10
0.01
10-3
Inflation
Exchange Rate
0.06
8
0
Output
0.06
0.04
0.04
6
-0.01
0.02
4
0.02
-0.02
2
10
0.15
20
30
40
Consumption
0.15
0.05
0.1
0
0.05
-0.05
20
30
40
10
Investment
0.2
0.1
0.1
0
10
20
30
40
Imports
0.15
0
0
10
20
30
40
Commodity Export
20
30
0.02
-0.1
0.01
20
30
40
Labour
10
0.06
0.02
0.04
0
0.02
-0.02
0.06
0.1
40
0
10
Capital
0.08
30
Noncommodity Export
0
40
20
0.03
-0.2
10
10
20
30
40
Real Interest Rate
0.04
0.05
0.02
0
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
stronger response to inflation gap
30
40
-0.04
10
20
stronger response to output gap
30
40
10
20
30
40
stronger response to both
Figure 5: A switch to more aggressive Taylor rules
the policy rule, responding stronger to the output gap undoes the e¤ects of stronger responses to in‡ation.
Overall, total e¤ects are not quantitatively important in our experiment: switching to a signi…cantly more
aggressive Taylor rule has only minor e¤ects on the economy’s behavior when the economy is not hit by
any shocks.
3.5
Switching from in‡ation targeting to price-level targeting
Since the seminal paper of Svensson (1999), the literature argues that price-level targeting is a “free lunch”
in a sense that it positively a¤ects a short-run trade o¤ between in‡ation and output variability (namely, it
reduces in‡ation variability without an increase in output variability); see Hatcher and Minford (2016) and
Ambler (2009) for surveys. Bernanke (2017) proposes to use a temporary price-level target when short-term
interest rates are at (or near) ZLB. When ZLB prevents policymakers from providing adequate stimulus,
in‡ation is below target. Price-level-targeting policymakers compensate for periods of low in‡ation below
target by following a temporary surge in in‡ation The Bank of Canada has seriously considered the use of
price-level targeting; see Kahn (2009) and Bank of Canada (2011).
We …rst consider a scenario, in which central bank switches from the standard Taylor rule (18) targeting
in‡ation to the one targeting a price-level gap,
Rt =
r Rt 1
+ (1
r)
R+
log Pt
log Pt +
Y
log Yt
log Yt
+
r
t;
(33)
where Pt is the actual price level, and Pt is the target price level that grows at the rate of in‡ation target
Pt = Pt 1 t . Therefore, price-level targeting does not suggest that policymakers pursue a constant price
level but set a target for the price level that rises over time.
An in‡ation-targeting central bank does not pay attention to temporary changes in in‡ation as long
as in‡ation comes back to target after some time (“lets bygones to be bygones”). In contrast, price-leveltargeting central bank aims at reversing temporary deviations of in‡ation from target each time it misses
17
it (e.g., a central bank increases in‡ation when in‡ation falls below target). As a result, under in‡ation
targeting, an in‡ation shock permanently shifts price path to a di¤erent level, while under price-leveltargeting, any movement in in‡ation above target is matched with an equal and opposite movement in
in‡ation below target, so that the economy goes along a predetermined price path. Consequentially, with
in‡ation targeting, agents will face a considerable amount of uncertainty about the future price level (the
central bank treats past target misses as bygones and returns in‡ation to the target level gradually, without
taking into account any impact on the price level), while with price-level targeting, agents will be much
more con…dent on where the prices will be in the future, even with a positive average in‡ation.
0.08
Nominal Interest Rate
0.06
Inflation
0.04
Output
Exchange Rate
0.15
0.15
0.03
0.1
0.1
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.01
0
5
10
15
20
Consumption
0.2
0
5
15
20
0
5
Investment
0.6
0.15
10
0.2
10
15
20
Commodity Export
0.15
0.4
0.1
5
0.06
10
15
20
Noncommodity Export
0.04
0.1
0.2
0.05
0
0
5
10
15
20
Imports
0.3
0
5
0.1
0
10
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
Labour
0.2
5
0.06
0.15
0.15
0.04
0.1
0.1
0.02
0.05
0.05
0
0
5
0
5
Capital
0.2
0.2
0.02
0.05
0
5
10
15
20
15
20
Real Interest Rate
-0.02
5
effective immediately
10
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
announced one year in advance
Figure 6: A switch to price-level targeting
In Figure 6, we present the results for two policy experiments in which the policy change becomes
e¤ective either immediately (at t = 1) or in one year after being announced (at t = 5). The new interestrate rule is associated with higher steady state levels for all the model’s variables in the …gure. Therefore,
switching to price-level targeting has expansionary e¤ects on the economy. Moreover, for all of the variables
(except of the nominal interest rate), the immediately implemented policy gives larger bene…ts than the
policy announced one year in advance. That is, if the central bank postpones to implement the switch,
the economy reaches the new steady state almost at the same time as the immediate policy, but over the
transition the e¤ects are smaller.
In the next experiment, we shock the economy, so that there appears a large output gap. In particular,
we consider a permanent negative demand shock – a decrease in foreign demand, modeled as a negative
innovation in the random-walk process for this shock. (A version of this experiment with a permanent
decrease in productivity is presented in Appendix B.) In response, the central bank can either continue
using a policy rule with in‡ation targeting or can switch to price-level targeting, which, as we saw, leads
to higher steady state output. As a result, switching to price-level targeting can be viewed as an attempt
to revive the economy.
Figure 7 presents the results of this experiment when the switch is either implemented immediately or
is delayed for one year (but it is still announced today). As we see, there is barely any di¤erence between
18
-0.2
Nominal Interest Rate
Inflation
0.05
Output
Exchange Rate
3.5
0
-0.4
0
-0.6
-0.8
-1
20
30
10
Consumption
20
30
10
Investment
10
1
0.4
0.5
8
0.2
0
6
0
-0.5
4
10
20
30
Imports
20
30
Commodity Export
10
-9.2
20
30
Noncommodity Export
-9.3
-9.4
-9.5
-9.6
-1
-0.2
2.5
-1
-0.1
10
0.6
3
-0.5
-0.05
2
10
20
30
10
Capital
1
20
30
Labour
0
10
-0.2
20
30
Real Interest Rate
-1
-0.5
-0.4
-1
-0.6
-1.5
-0.8
0.5
-1.5
-2
0
10
20
30
inflation targeting
-2
10
20
30
-1
10
change to price level targeting
20
30
10
20
30
change to price level targeting announced one year in advance
Figure 7: A negative foreign demand shock and a switch to price-level targeting
the immediate and delayed changes in monetary policy for such variables as commodities and commodity
export. For all other variables, the immediate policy change has larger impacts than the delayed policy
change, which is in line with the previous experiment in Figure 6. Therefore, the anticipation e¤ects work
in the direction of softening the e¤ects of the negative demand shock, with impulse responses lying between
the cases of no-change and immediate change. In particular, the dynamics of the nominal interest rate is
smoother in case of anticipated policy, which leads to smoother behavior of the remaining variables. The
initial impact on the economy is signi…cant, e.g., output and labor fall by 1 and 1.5 percent in the three
scenarios considered. With no switch in monetary policy, output recovers a bit but its new steady state
is still below old steady state. With the policy switch, output is nearly the same as before the shock,
and consumption is even higher. Note that each considered policy implies that the central bank tightens
monetary policy, even in the economic downturn.
3.6
Switching from in‡ation targeting to average in‡ation targeting
On August 27th 2020, the Fed’s Chair Jeromy Powell announced that Fed will switch from in‡ation
targeting to average in‡ation targeting; see Powell (2020). However, as was stated by Richard Clarida,
during his presentation at the Hoover Economic Policy Working Group on January 13, 2021, one month
prior to that, there was evidence that Fed would introduce that framework, and as a result, there were
substantial anticipatory price moves in the U.S. economy.
In our experiment, we consider a switch from the in‡ation-targeting Taylor rule (18) to a rule that
incorporates an average of the past in‡ation (including the actual in‡ation),
0
2
3
1
M
X
1
@
4
Rt = r Rt 1 + (1
log Yt 5 + rt :
(34)
t j
t A + Y log Yt
r) R +
M +1
j=0
19
The policy of average in‡ation targeting shares many of the properties of price-level targeting. As
was suggested by the previous literature, average in‡ation targeting is a middle ground between pricelevel targeting and in‡ation targeting; see Nessén and Vestin (2005). Under average in‡ation targeting, a
central bank reacts to a deviation of today’s in‡ation averaged with previous in‡ation from target in‡ation.
For example, if the in‡ation target is 2 percent, the averaging window is 3 years, and after consistently
archiving 2 percent in‡ation in the past, in the most recent year, in‡ation deviates to 3 percent, the central
bank will aim to achieve policy-induced in‡ation of 1 percent in the next year. As a result, in‡ation will
oscillate around average in‡ation target and the average in‡ation target is achieved on average. The price
level will stay close to its trend, even though the level will sometimes deviate from the …xed trend.
0.06
Nominal Interest Rate
Inflation
0.014
10
10-3
Output
0.07
0.012
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.06
5
0.05
0.008
0
10
15
20
5
Consumption
0
0.04
0
0.006
5
Exchange Rate
0.08
10
15
20
5
Investment
0.3
10
15
20
Commodity Export
5
0.03
10
15
20
Noncommodity Export
0.02
-0.02
0.015
-0.04
0.01
-0.06
0.2
0.025
0.1
0.02
0.005
-0.08
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10-3
Imports
0.01
10
15
20
Capital
0.015
5
15
20
Labour
0.025
0
10
0.04
10
15
20
Real Interest Rate
0.03
0.02
0
0.02
0.015
-5
5
0.01
-0.01
0.01
0
-10
-0.02
5
10
15
20
0.005
5
10
15
20
5
effective immediately
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
announced one year in advance
Figure 8: A switch to average in‡ation targeting
Figure 8 displays the results for two cases: one is when the switch happens immediately and the other
when it is implemented with a lag of one year after it was announced. Amano et al. (2020) study optimal
history dependence under average in‡ation targeting in the context of the standard new Keynesian model
accounting for the ELB, and they …nd that optimal M ranges from 2 to 8. We assume M = 8 which is the
largest number of lags found by Amano et al. (2020).
It turns out that this policy change has very modest anticipation e¤ects on the economy in the absence
of any shocks. In fact, when the policy becomes e¤ective immediately, there are larger responses in such
variables as output, labor, imports, and noncommodity exports. That is, reacting to average in‡ation
rather than in‡ation smooths out dynamics to a new steady state. Therefore, we would not expect the
economy to experience any drastic changes in the course of transition to average in‡ation targeting.
4
Recurrent versus non-recurrent news shocks
News shocks had been analyzed in several papers, including Barro and King (1984), Beaudry and Portier
(2006, 2007), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). In particular, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) introduce a
tractable perturbation-based framework for solving models with recurrent news shocks. In their analysis,
20
news shocks follow a stationary Markov process and happen with a …xed periodicity and time horizon.
As a result, models with recurrent news shocks have stationary time-invariant Markov solutions. An
interesting question is how our nonstationary solutions constructed under the assumption of non-recurrent
news shocks compare to stationary solutions constructed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s (2012) method
under the assumption of recurrent shocks.
To study this question, we consider a version of the experiment of Section 3.4 in which the central
bank switches to a more aggressive Taylor rule; namely, we assume that the sensitivity to in‡ation
in
the Taylor rule (18) is doubled relative to its benchmark value: the change is announced at t = 1 and
implemented at t = 2. The assumption of non-recurrent shocks provides a natural way of modeling this
scenario. Namely, we construct a stationary solution for period t = 2 and we …nd a solution for period
t = 1 that matches a given terminal condition (decision rule) constructed for period t = 2.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) does not specify how their perturbation method can be used for
analyzing non-recurrent anticipated shocks like the one we describe above. We tried out two ways of
adapting periodic news shocks to our experiment: First, we consider a unit-root process for ;t , i.e.,
. In this speci…cation, the shock innovation, "t captures
;t =
;t 1 + "t 1 , in which initially
;0 =
news that become known at period t and that have a direct impact at t + 1. In our experiment, "1 =
at
period t = 1, and at all other periods the shock innovation is zero. It implies that ;1 =
and ;t = 2
for all t 2. Second, we consider the news shock to be temporary, i.e., ;t =
+ "t 1 . In that case, we
get ;2 = 2 in period t = 2 and ;t =
in all other periods.
Figure 9 compares the second-order perturbation solutions constructed by our method with those
produced by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s (2012) method. The volatility of the news shock is assumed to be
zero, so the initial risky steady state is the same for all three solutions. The following observations are in
order: First, it appears that our solution with non-recurrent shocks is situated in between the two recurrent
news-shock solutions. Second, both our solution and permanent recurrent news-shock solution converge to
new (although di¤erent) risky steady states, while the temporary recurrent news-shock solution converges
to the old steady state, given the temporary nature of the shock. Third, in the three cases, all the variables
behave in qualitatively similar manner: a more aggressive central bank leads to an increase in in‡ation
and a decrease in nominal and real interest rates, which raises output, investment, capital and imports.
Fourth, the gap between our solution and permanent news shock solution depends on the initial condition:
we observe in our sensitivity experiments (these experiments are not reported) that the gap is smaller if
we start below steady state. This is because the anticipation e¤ects are mixed up with upward-sloping
transition dynamics. Finally, the di¤erence between the two solutions with recurrent news shocks and our
second-order perturbation solution comes from the di¤erences in slopes of the decision rules (like the term
gxx (v; 0) in (32)). If we were to consider the …rst-order perturbation, the economy would remain at the
deterministic steady state in the two recurrent news-shock solutions but not in our solution.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the permanent recurrent news-shock approach predicts
dramatically larger e¤ects associated with the switch to a more aggressive Taylor rule than our approach
(except for consumption). This is true both for the anticipation e¤ects and for di¤erences in steady states.
For example, anticipation e¤ects in investment are …ve times larger at peak for the recurrent news shocks
than for our perturbation solutions. We conclude that, the two approaches may lead to very di¤erent
results: the recurrent news-shock approach signi…cantly overstates the importance of anticipated e¤ects.
This is because we assume a unit-root process for ;t , which implies that once a news shock happens,
its e¤ects will persist forever. With an autoregressive process for ;t , the e¤ect of news shocks critically
depend on the stochastic process assumed.
There is a simple intuition on why the solutions with non-recurrent news shock di¤er from those
produced by assuming recurrent Markov news shocks. In the former case, the agent’s decision rule is
constructed to be the best response to a given deterministic sequence of news shocks and in the latter case,
it is constructed to be the best response to the given Markov stationary process. With recurrent shock,
the response to news is determined not only by the news itself but also by the properties of the Markov
stationary process that is assumed for constructing the solution, which is not the case in our analysis with
21
0.2
Nominal Interest Rate
Inflation
0.1
Output
Exchange Rate
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.15
0.05
0.2
0.1
0
0.1
0.05
-0.1
10
20
30
40
50
60
Consumption
0.15
0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
10
Investment
1
20
30
40
50
60
Commodity Export
10
0.15
20
30
40
50
60
Noncommodity Export
1
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.05
0.05
0
0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Imports
0.4
10
20
30
40
50
60
10
Capital
0.4
20
30
40
50
60
Labour
0.4
10
0.3
0.3
0.05
0.2
0.2
0.2
0
0.1
0.1
0.1
-0.05
0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
10
20
P-EFP
30
40
50
60
10
news shock, permanent
20
30
40
50
60
-0.1
30
10
20
30
news shock, temporary
Figure 9: A switch to a more aggressive Taylor rule at t = 2 announced at t = 1.
non-recurrent shocks.
22
40
50
60
Real Interest Rate
0.1
0.3
20
40
50
60
5
Conclusion
The literature recognizes that private sector’s expectations are important for policy outcomes and central
banks use the open mouth policies to anchor the expectations. However, little work has been done on
evaluating the e¤ects of the open mouth policy within a DSGE framework. This paper …lls in this gap. We
…nd that the anticipation e¤ects are the strongest for such time dependent economic policies as a gradual
change in the natural rate of interest, policy-rate normalization in the aftermath of the ZLB crisis, and a
gradual change in the in‡ation target level. The other time dependent policy changes like a switch to a
more aggressive policy rate rule, a switch to price-level or average in‡ation targeting lead to more modest
anticipation e¤ects.
Our methodology is not limited to central-banking models. Many economic policies are announced
ahead of being implemented. For instance, changes to taxes, tari¤s, minimum wage, pension reforms,
Social Security are frequently signed into law well before they are put in practice. Other notable examples
include an announcement about a new member state’s accession to the European Union (EU) or a member
state’s exit from the EU (i.e., Brexit), an announcement of the outcome of presidential elections before
the new elected president comes to power. Our perturbation-based framework for solving, calibrating,
simulating and estimating of parameters provides a simple and tractable way of analyzing nonrecurrent
transitions associated with such policy changes. Literally, our analysis makes it possible to construct a
model-consistent path of real-world economies.
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[8] Taylor, J.,(2021). The optimal reentry to a monetary policy strategy. Manuscript.
[9] Williams, J., (2009). Heeding Daedalus: optimal in‡ation and the zero lower bound. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity 2, 1-37.
[10] Yellen, J., (2015). Normalizing monetary policy: prospects and perspectives. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Speech.
[11] Yi, K. and J. Zhang (2017). Understanding global trends in long-run real interest rates. Economic
Perspectives 41(2).
Appendix A
In this section, we illustrate the implementation of perturbation-based method on a toy example – a
neoclassical stochastic growth model with labor augmenting technological progress. We consider a version
of the model that allows for balanced growth. To solve this model, we proceed as if growth was unbalanced,
and then compare our solutions to those obtained by an accurate projection method that solves detrended
(stationary) model.
25
The growth model with labor-augmenting technological progress. We consider the following
neoclassical stochastic growth model with labor augmenting technological progress:
#
"1
X
t
u (ct )
(35)
max 1 E0
fct ;kt+1 gt=0
t=0
s.t. ct + kt+1 = (1
) kt + zt f (kt ; At ) ;
ln zt+1 = ln zt + "t+1 , "t+1
N (0; 1) ;
(36)
(37)
where (k0 ; z0 ) is given; Et is an operator of conditional expectation; ct
0 and kt
0 are consumption
and capital, respectively; At = A0 tA is labor augmenting technological progress with the rate A 1; u
and f are utility and production functions, respectively; and 2 (0; 1); 2 [0; 1]; 2 ( 1; 1); 2 (0; 1).
Discussion. Why cannot we solve a nonstationary model with conventional solution methods? For
(35)–(37), the Euler equations is given by
u (ct ) = Et u0 (ct+1 ) (1
+ zt+1 fk (kt+1 ; At+1 )) :
The mainstream of economic literature considers stationary models. We can make our model stationary
by setting at At = A for all t. The solution to such model is characterized by time-invariant (stationary)
decision functions. Conventional solution methods iterate on the Euler equation until a …xed-point decision
function for consumption ct = C (kt ; zt ) is found.7 However, if At grows over time, then the optimal
decision function changes over time Ct ( ) 6= Ct+1 ( ), then there is no …xed-point solution C ( ) so that
the conventional methods are not applicable. Under additional restrictions on preferences and technology,
the model with labor augmenting progress has balanced growth and can be converted into stationary; see
King et al. (1988). We will not focus on this special case but will approximate a sequence (path) of
time-dependent functions fC0 ( ) ; C1 ( ) ; :::g.
In doing this, we exploit a turnpike theorem; see Majumdar and Zilcha (1987) and Mitra and Nyarko
(1991) for examples of turnpike theorems for nonstationary models. A turnpike theorem studies the
convergence of …nite-horizon economies to in…nite horizon economies as the time horizon increases. For
this model, the turnpike theorem is proven in MMTT (2020). Two important consequences of the turnpike
theorem help us compute solutions in the nonstationary economy: First, the in…nite- and …nite-horizon
solutions follow closely one another for a long time and diverge only when the economy approaches to a
terminal condition. Second, two terminal conditions kT = k 0 and kT = k 00 that are close to the solution to
nonstationary model make the …nite-horizon path closer to the in…nite-horizon path. The former allows
us to approximate in…nite-horizon solutions by …nite-horizon solutions, while the latter tells us that it is
important to select a good terminal condition, the one close to the in…nite-horizon equilibrium path.
To implement the perturbation procedure described in the main text, in Step I, we construct a stationary
(time-invariant) model of period T and construct the corresponding Markov decision rule for consumption
CT ( ), and in Step II, we use CT to iterate backward on Euler equations in order to construct a sequence
(path) of time-dependent value and decision functions fCT 1 ( ) ; CT 2 ( ) ; :::; C0 ( )g, respectively. As a
…nal step, we check the turnpike theorem by verifying that the constructed …nite-horizon solution for initial
periods converges periodwise to a limiting fC0 ( ) ; C1 ( ) ; :::; C ( )g as time horizon T increases, where
is the …nal time period in which we want the solution to be accurate. We elaborate on Steps I and II in
details below.
First of all note that the model with growth has no natural steady state. To deal with this issue, we
introduce time-varying growth rates of capital kt that capture how much this state variable grows from
period t to t + 1 due to the time trend or the parameter change.
7
Solution to the growth model could equally well be expressed by a decision function for next period capital kt+1 = K (kt ; zt ).
26
Step I: Solving for terminal decision functions. In Step I, we aim to construct stationary Markov
terminal condition in the form of a decision function for consumption cT = CT (kT ; zT ) which is as close as
possible to unknown decision function of the in…nite horizon model. We assume balanced growth kT =
cT = A , and feed the resulting two equations to a Dynare perturbation. Assuming cT = CT (kT ; zT ) and
cT +1 = CT (kT +1 ; zT +1 ), we obtain the usual stationary solution to
u0 (cT ) = ET u0 (cT +1
cT = (1
A ) (1
+ zT +1 fk (kT +1
) kT + zT f (kT ; AT )
kT +1
A ; AT A ))
;
A:
Unless A = 1, the model does not have a balanced growth and our approximation does not coincide with
the in…nite horizon solution at T . But the turnpike theorem implies that the speci…c terminal condition
assumed at T does not a¤ect signi…cantly the solution up to provided that
T . There are ways of
8
constructing more accurate terminal conditions at additional costs.
Step II: Finding a path of decision functions. In Step II, we start from the constructed terminal
condition for T and proceed backward to compute the path of the decision functions for t = T 1; T 2; :::; 0
by iterating backward on
u0 (ct ) = Et u0 (Ct+1 (kt+1 ; zt+1 )) (1
kt+1 = (1
+ zt+1 fk (kt+1 ; At+1 )) ;
) kt + zt f (kt ; At )
ct :
(38)
(39)
In particular, for period T 1, given cT = CT (kT ; zT ), Dynare produces the decision function for cT 1 =
CT 1 (kT 1 ; zT 1 ), in period T 2, given cT 1 = CT 1 (kT 1 ; zT 1 ) we …nd cT 2 = CT 2 (kT 2 ; zT 2 ) and
so on until the entire solution path is constructed.
Perturbation solutions we construct are obtained around a deterministic growth path. We consider
…ve alternative methods for constructing such a path. We either assume some exogenous growth rates
or precompute the growth rates endogenously by shutting down uncertainty in the model. Also, our
methods di¤er in a way the policy functions are speci…ed. In particular, for each deterministic growthpath speci…cation, we have two versions of the algorithm: one in which a next-period policy function takes
into account the volatility of uncertainty , and the other in which it does not setting = 0. Why might
we want to handle the volatility di¤erently? Perturbation policy functions of second and higher orders of
approximation are not passing in general through a deterministic steady state of the model. Even in the
balanced growth model, if true policy functions for period t + 1 are combined with the model’s equations
written for period t, the deterministic steady state would not be a solution of the deterministic version of
the combined system of equations. This feature can be overcome by recognizing explicitly that Ct+1 ( )
depends on and by setting to zero when computing the deterministic steady state.
Methods 1 and 2. Methods 1 and 2 …nd local approximations of today’s consumption policy function
Ct (kt ; zt ) in period t from equations (38) and (39) given the next-period function Ct+1 (kt+1 ; zt+1 ). The
di¤erence between the two methods lies only in the point around which the local approximation is taken
and it is related to our implementation in Dynare.
In period t, Method 1 …nds local approximation around a point (kt ; 1) that solves the following system
of two equations for ct and kt :
u0 (ct ) = u0 (Ct+1 (kt ; 1)) [1
kt = (1
+ fk (kt ; At+1 )] ;
) kt + f (kt ; At )
ct :
(40)
(41)
8
MMTT (2020) o¤er an alternative way of constructing a terminal condition. Namely, they assume that the solution is
stationary in periods T; T + 1 and T + 2 provided that it is adjusted to growth. This gives 4 equations (Euler equation and
constraint) for T and T + 1, which can be solved with respect to steady state kT , cT and growth rates kT and cT .
27
Here today’s and tomorrow’s capital are the same and equal to kt because we assume that the growth rate
of capital is one.
To understand Method 2, recall that the consumption decision function obtained by perturbation
depends on the uncertainty parameter and is given by Ct+1 (:; :; ) in period t + 1; see (32) for a general
representation.9 In Method 2, we perturb around a point that is computed taking Ct+1 (:; :; ) without the
e¤ect of uncertainty, = 0; this approach is similar to …nding a deterministic steady state …rst (as = 0).
In other words, the approximation is conducted around a point kty ; 1 that solves the following system of
two equations for cyt and kty
h
u0 (cyt ) = u0 (Ct+1 kty ; 1; 0 ) 1
kty = (1
+ fk kty ; At+1
) kty + f kty ; At
cyt :
i
;
(42)
(43)
Evidently, the …rst-order perturbation solutions obtained by Method 1 and 2 are identical, as such
solutions do not depend on uncertainty.10
Methods 3 and 4. These two methods explicitly account for time-varying growth rates f kt gTt=1
(recall that for both Methods 1 and 2 we assume that growth rates are equal to unity). Similarly to the
latter methods, our Methods 3 and 4 di¤er in points around which we …nd Taylor’s expansions and parallel
to Methods 1 and 2, respectively. To construct a path of growth rates f kt gTt=1 , both Methods 3 and 4
solve a deterministic version of the model. Namely, we shut down uncertainty by assuming zt = 1 for all t,
set c~T +1 and k~T +1 equal to the steady state of the stationary model in the terminal period, and solve the
following system of equations:11
+ f k~t+1 ; At+1
u0 (~
ct ) = u0 (~
ct+1 ) 1
k~t+1 = (1
) k~t + f k~t ; At
n
oT
, we compute the growth rates as
Given the solution k~t+1
f
t=1
T
kt gt=1
;
c~t :
kt
= k~t+1 =k~t . Both Methods 3 and 4 take
as given.
In period t, Method 3 perturbs the solution around a point (kt ; 1) that solves for kt and ct the following
system of two equations:
u0 (ct ) = u0 (Ct+1 (
kt kt
Note that a variable kt+1 is replaced by
= (1
kt kt
kt kt ; 1))(1
+f(
) kt + f (kt ; At )
kt kt ; At+1 ) ;
(44)
ct :
(45)
meaning that we take into account growth when computing
the point of approximation. In turn, Method 4 …nds a perturbation solution around a point kty ; 1; 0 and
…nds cyt and kty by solving
u0 (cyt ) = u0 (Ct+1
y
kt kt
= (1
y
kt kt ; 1; 0
)1
+f
) kty + f kty ; At
y
kt kt ; At+1
;
(46)
cyt :
(47)
9
Note that the dependence of Ct+1 (kt ; 1) on is implicit in Method 1, i.e., we mean Ct+1 (kt ; 1; ) there.
Note, however, that higher-order approximations will di¤er between the two methods not only because the intercepts
associated with uncertainty are distinct (equal to C ;t+1 (kt ; 1) 2 and C ;t+1 kty ; 1; 0 2 for Method 1 and Method 2,
10
respectively) but also because the points around we approximate di¤er.
11
To implement this step in Dynare, we just solve a system of equations backward in terms of variables
28
n
o
~t .
c~t ; k
Method 5. Method 5 is close to Method 3, but the path for growth rates is computed iteratively. We
T
begin by exogenously …xing the path k;t t=1 and obtaining the policy functions for a stochastic version
of the model; this is similar to Method 3. As a next step, we simulate the model with the realized values
of shocks which are set to zero, we compute the growth rates of capital over this simulated path, and we
obtain the policy functions for a stochastic version of the model. We can repeat this step as many times
as necessary. We do not o¤er any counterpart of Method 5 (i.e., Method 6) that corrects for volatility as
it is the case of the methods above because the stochastic growth path is computed in a stochastic version
of the model, in which the growth path is obtained endogenously.
Numerical results. In this section, we present the results of our numerical analysis. We assume the
standard utility and production functions:
u (c) =
c1
1
1
;
f (k; A) = A1
k :
For all the experiments, we …x the parameters f ; ; ; g at the following values:
= 0:36;
= 0:99;
We vary the values of the remaining parameters f ;
following values:
= 5;
" = 0:03;
= 0:025;
";
A ; T g;
A
= 1:01;
= 0:95:
in the benchmark case, we set them to the
T = 200:
We simulate the model’s solution for di¤erent values of the terminal date T . For all simulations, we use
the same initial condition (k0 ; z0 ) and the same sequence of productivity shocks fzt gTt=1 .
To see whether our perturbation-based method computes accurate solutions, we obtain an (almost)
exact solution by exploiting the property of balanced growth. For this purpose, we …rst introduce laboraugmenting technical change into the model, then derive the …rst-order conditions, and …nally, detrend
them. The resulting stationary model is solved by a very accurate standard projection method with
Smolyak grid, third-order polynomial approximation, and 10-node Gauss-Hermite quadrature (the maximum residuals in the model’s equations are of order 10 9 in log10 units). We compare the simulated
series generated by such a projection method with those of our perturbation method on a …xed sequence
of shocks of length T .
In Table 2, we report absolute unit-free mean and maximum di¤erences between our approximate and
balanced growth (“exact”) solutions (in log10 units) on a simulated path [0; T ] with T 2 f50; 100; 150; 175; 200g.
We consider both, …rst- and second-order approximations.
As is evident from the table, the …rst-order perturbation solutions are signi…cantly less accurate than
the second-order solutions; the di¤erence between the two can reach two orders of magnitude. However, in
terms of running times (both solution and simulation), the two solutions are roughly comparable. It is not
faster to obtain a …rst- than second-order solution because each perturbation step takes just few seconds
and the largest share of time is spent on …nding di¤erent decision rules for each period. For second-order
approximations, the most basic method, Method 1, yields very accurate solutions: the mean di¤erence
from the exact solution is at most 1 percent across the considered simulation lengths, while the maximum
di¤erence reaches 1:5 percent. The ranking of the methods in terms of accuracy varies with time horizon
T . For example, for T = 200, Method 1 is the least accurate method, followed by Method 2, and then
by Methods 4 and 3 (we look at the maximum errors). However, the ranking between Methods 2 and 4
reverses when the other T s in the table are considered. Methods 3 and 5 are about the same in terms of
accuracy and they are the most accurate.
Figure 10 plots our …rst- and second-order solutions for capital of the nonstationary model (produced
by Method 5), as well as the exact solution of the balanced growth model (produced by the standard projection method); the left panel displays the growing solutions, while the right panel contains the detrended
29
Method 1
First-order solution
Errors, in log10 units
Horizon
Mean
[0; 50]
-1.41
-1.24
[0; 100]
[0; 150]
-1.14
-1.07
[0; 175]
[0; 200]
-1.04
Running time, in seconds
Solution
161.57
Simulation
0.0387
Second-order solution
Errors, in log10 units
Horizon
Mean Max
[0; 50]
-2.28 -2.03
[0; 100]
-2.12 -1.90
[0; 150]
-2.05 -1.80
[0; 175]
-2.00 -1.71
-2.04 -1.71
[0; 200]
Running time, in seconds
Solution
167.99
Simulation
0.0256
Method 2
Method 3
Max
-1.13
-0.97
-0.77
-0.58
-0.58
Mean
-1.50
-1.33
-1.25
-1.22
-1.19
157.60
0.0275
Mean
-2.83
-2.77
-2.75
-2.71
-2.61
Max
-2.53
-2.53
-2.53
-2.15
-1.79
294.28
0.0346
Mean
-3.48
-3.30
-3.26
-3.14
-3.07
167.18
0.0249
Max
-2.95
-2.93
-2.88
-2.23
-2.23
308.87
0.0326
Method 4
Max
-1.22
-1.11
-1.08
-0.94
-0.94
Method 5
Mean
-1.53
-1.35
-1.27
-1.23
-1.20
288.03
0.0293
Mean
-2.79
-2.46
-2.33
-2.38
-2.43
Max
-2.24
-2.05
-2.03
-2.03
-2.03
Max
-1.23
-1.12
-1.08
-0.97
-0.97
317.38
0.0271
Mean
-3.51
-3.30
-3.26
-3.14
-3.09
296.46
0.0312
Max
-2.92
-2.91
-2.88
-2.23
-2.23
337.60
0.0348
Notes: Mean and Max are, respectively, the average and maximum of absolute di¤erence between the P-EFP and exact
solutions (in log10 units) on a stochastic simulation of 200 observations.
Table 2: Di¤erence of a simulated solution path from the balanced growth path in log10 units
30
Comparison of solutions
80
Comparison of detrended solutions
Nonstationary, order 1
Nonstationary, order 2
Balanced growth
70
12
60
Detrended capital
Growing capital
11
50
40
30
10
9
8
20
7
10
0
50
100
150
200
0
time
50
100
150
200
time
Figure 10: Comparison of the nonstationary P-EFP solutions computed by Method 5 and the balanced
growth solution
solutions. One striking feature of our solutions is that its second-order approximation is virtually identical
to the exact solution (blue and yellow lines coincide). In turn, the …rst-order solution is a visible upward
shift of the other two solutions, and therefore, can imply substantial inaccuracy.
An important question is: How does our perturbation solutions compare to the existing methods that
can solve nonstationary models?
In Table 3, we make a comparison of our perturbation method to three other methods, an extended
path method of Fair and Taylor (1983) method, a naive method and a global EFP method of Maliar et al.
(2020). Fair and Taylor’s (1983) method solves for a path of variables and not functions (as our method
does). A naive method …nds a di¤erent solution for each period t under the assumption that the t-period
level of technology prevails in each subsequent period. For each of the methods, we use T = 200 in the
solution procedure, and we simulate the model for T 2 f50; 100; 150; 175; 200g.
As is seen from the table, among the three alternative methods, the ranking of the methods is always
the same: the naive method is the least accurate and the global EFP is the most accurate, with Fair and
Taylor’s (1983) method being in between. The latter reaches a notorious accuracy of 0:0001 percent for
T = 50; the residuals increase to 3:5% for T = 200. The main …nding in the table is that for T = 175 our
second-order method is almost as accurate as third-degree solution obtained with the global EFP method,
and for T = 200, the second-order solution overpasses the third-degree global EFP solution by a half order
of magnitude. Moreover, our perturbation solution is not only more accurate for longer T but also much
faster. This is because of perturbation used as a basis of the method.
Appendix B
In this section, we present sensitivity experiments.
A gradual increase in in‡ation target implemented with probability. In Figures 11 and 12, we
present the supplementary experiments for Section 3.2. Namely, we consider two experiments that are
parallel to the one in Figure 3, where a gradual increase in the in‡ation target happens with probability
31
Table 3: Comparison of the P-EFP to the other methods
Fair-Taylor (1983)
Naive
Global EFP
P-EFP
method
method
Type of approximation
path
path
3rd order
1st order 2nd order
Maximum errors, in log10 units
[0; 50]
-1.29
[0; 100]
-1.18
[0; 150]
-1.14
-1.14
[0; 175]
[0; 200]
-1.14
-1.04
-0.92
-0.89
-0.89
-0.89
-6.35
-4.76
-3.22
-2.47
-1.51
-1.27
-1.11
-1.07
-0.94
-0.94
-2.24
-2.05
-2.03
-2.03
-2.03
Running time, in seconds
Solution
Simulation
Total
28.9
2.6
31.5
199.4
0.0244
199.4
317.4
0.0271
317.4
337.6
0.0348
337.6
1.2(+4)
1.2(+4)
Note: Maximum errors are the maximum of the absolute di¤erence between the given and exact solutions (in log10 units) on
a stochastic simulation of T observations.
of 50 percent. In Figures 11 and 12, such a gradual change occurs with probabilities 75 and 25 percent,
respectively. As is seen from the …gures, a larger probability of implementing a higher in‡ation target
leads to slightly larger expansionary e¤ects on output, consumption, investment, and commodity exports.
Although the qualitative patterns are the same, the anticipation e¤ects (changes up to the …fth period
when the actual change takes place) are visibly larger with 75 percent probability than with 25 percent
probability.
A negative supply shock and a switch to price-level targeting. In Figure 7, we focus on a switch to
price-level targeting after a negative foreign demand shock. Here, we present a supplementary experiment
for Section 3.5. namely, we consider a negative supply shock instead.
32
Interest Rate
Inflation
1
1
Output
0.4
0.15
0.5
0.5
5
10
15
20
Consumption
0.2
5
10
15
0.2
0.05
0
20
-0.2
5
Investment
1
0.15
0.1
0
0
0
0.4
10
15
20
Commodity Export
0.3
0.5
0.1
Exchange Rate
0.6
0.2
5
0.2
10
15
20
Noncommodity Export
0.1
0.2
0
0.05
0
-0.5
5
10
15
20
0
5
Imports
0.4
0
0.1
10
15
20
-0.1
5
Capital
15
20
Labour
0.4
0.15
10
0.1
20
0.2
0.1
0.05
0.1
15
0.3
0.2
0.2
10
Commodities
0.4
0.3
0.3
5
0.1
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
5
no change in the inflation target
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
a higher inflation target
Figure 11: A gradual increase in the in‡ation target (75% probability)
Interest Rate
Inflation
1
1
Output
0.2
Exchange Rate
0.6
0.15
0.4
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.05
0
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
5
Consumption
0.2
10
15
20
5
Investment
10
15
20
Commodity Export
5
0.6
0.4
0.15
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.05
0
0.1
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
Imports
0.4
5
10
15
20
15
20
Noncommodity Export
-0.1
5
Capital
0.15
0.3
10
10
15
20
Labour
0.4
5
10
15
20
Commodities
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.05
0.1
0.1
0
0
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
5
no change in the inflation target
10
15
20
5
a higher inflation target
Figure 12: A gradual increase in the in‡ation target (25% probability)
33
10
15
20
0.3
Nominal Interest Rate
0.2
Inflation
Output
0.04
-0.2
0.03
-0.3
0.02
-0.4
0.01
-0.5
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
0.1
0
0
10
0
20
30
Consumption
-0.5
-0.6
10
20
30
-0.6
10
Investment
0
-0.4
Exchange Rate
20
30
10
Commodity Export
20
30
Noncommodity Export
-0.1
-0.6
-0.2
-0.5
-0.15
-0.8
-0.4
-1
-1
-0.2
-0.6
-1.2
10
20
30
10
Imports
20
30
10
Capital
0
20
30
Labour
0.4
10
0.3
20
30
Real Interest Rate
0
-0.1
-0.2
0.2
0.2
-0.4
0
0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.6
10
20
30
inflation targeting
0
-0.2
10
20
30
10
change to price level targeting
20
30
10
change to price level targeting announced one year in advance
Figure 13: A negative supply shock and a switch to price-level targeting
34
20
30
Online appendix
For the reader’s convenience, we provide a description of the calibration procedure, which is similar to
LMM (2020).
5.1
Calibration
The model contains 61 parameters to be calibrated. Whenever possible, we use the same values of parameters in the scaled-down model as those in the full-scale model, and we choose the remaining parameters
to reproduce a selected set of observations from the Canadian time series data. In particular, our calibration procedure targets the ratios of six nominal variables to nominal GDP Pty Yt , namely, consumption
Pt Ct , investment Pti It , noncommodity export Ptnc Xtnc , commodity export Ptcom Xtcom , import Ptm Mt , total
commodities Ptcom COMt , and labor input Wt Lt . Furthermore, we calibrate the persistence of shocks so
that the standard deviations of the selected bToTEM variables coincide with those of the corresponding
ToTEM variables, namely, those of domestic nominal interest rate Rt , productivity At , foreign demand
Ztf , foreign commodity price pcomf
, and foreign interest rate rtf . The parameters choice is summarized in
t
Tables 4 and 5 below.
Parameter
Rates
– real interest rate
– discount factor
– in‡ation target
– nominal interest rate
– ELB on the nominal interest rate
Output production
– CES elasticity of substitution
– CES labor share parameter
– CES capital share parameter
– CES commodity share parameter
– CES import share parameter
– investment adjustment cost
– …xed depreciation rate
– variable depreciation rate
– depreciation semielasticity
– real investment price
– real noncommodity export price
– labor productivity
Price setting parameters for consumption
– probability of indexation
– RT indexation to past in‡ation
– RT share
– elasticity of substitution of consumption goods
– Leontie¤ technology parameter
Price setting parameters for imports
– probability of indexation
– RT indexation to past in‡ation
– RT share
– elasticity of substitution of imports
Price setting parameters for wages
– probability of indexation
35
Symbol
Value
Source
r
1.0076
0.9925
1.005
1.0126
1.0076
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
…xed
A
0.5
0.249
0.575
0.0015
0.0287
20
0.0054
0.0261
4.0931
1.2698
1.143
100
ToTEM
calibrated
calibrated
calibrated
calibrated
calibrated
ToTEM
ToTEM
calibrated
ToTEM
ToTEM
normalization
!
"
sm
0.75
0.0576
0.4819
11
0.6
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
0.8635
0.7358
0.3
4.4
ToTEM
ToTEM
ToTEM
0.5901
ToTEM
R
Relb
l
k
com
m
i
d0
d
i
x
m
m
!m
"m
w
w
– RT indexation to past in‡ation
0.1087
ToTEM
– RT share
!w
0.6896
ToTEM
– elasticity of substitution of labor service
"w
1.5
ToTEM
Household utility
– consumption habit
0.9396
ToTEM
– consumption elasticity of substitution
0.8775
ToTEM
– wage elasticity of labor supply
0.0704
ToTEM
Monetary policy
– interest rate persistence parameter
0.83
ToTEM
r
– interest rate response to in‡ation gap
4.12
ToTEM
– interest rate response to output gap
0.4
ToTEM
y
Other
k
– capital premium
0.0674
calibrated
– exchange rate persistence parameter
{
0.1585
ToTEM
– foreign commodity price
pcomf
1.6591
ToTEM
– foreign import price
pmf
1.294
ToTEM
– risk premium response to debt
&
0.0083
calibrated
f
– export scale factor
18.3113 calibrated
– foreign demand elasticity
0.4
calibrated
– elasticity in commodity production
sz
0.8
calibrated
– land
F
0.1559
calibrated
– share of other components of output
0.7651
calibrated
z
– share of other components of GDP
0.311
calibrated
y
– adjustment cost in commodity production
16
calibrated
com
– persistence of potential GDP
'z
0.75
calibrated
Table 4: Calibrated parameters in endogenous model’s equations
Parameter
Shock persistence
– persistence of interest rate shock
– persistence of productivity shock
– persistence of consumption demand shock
– persistence of foreign output shock
– persistence of foreign commodity price shock
– persistence of foreign interest rate shock
Shock volatility
– standard deviation of interest rate shock
– standard deviation of productivity shock
– standard deviation of consumption demand shock
– standard deviation of foreign output shock
– standard deviation of foreign commodity price shock
– standard deviation of foreign interest rate shock
Table 5: Calibrated parameters in exogenous
36
Symbol
Value
Source
'r
'a
'c
'zf
'comf
'rf
0.25
0.9
0
0.9
0.87
0.88
ToTEM
…xed
…xed
…xed
calibrated
calibrated
0.0006
0.0067
a
0.0001
c
0.0085
zf
0.0796
comf
0.0020
rf
model’s equations
r
calibrated
calibrated
…xed
calibrated
calibrated
calibrated