STUDIA
ECOLOGIAE
ET
BIOETHICAE
2020, 18, 5: 125-135
ISSN 1733-1218
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21697/seb.2020.18.5.11
The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics*
Debata na temat koncepcji osoby w bioetyce
Grzegorz Hołub
Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Academy of Theology in Krakow, Poland
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0312-3693 • grzegorz.holub@upjp2.edu.pl
Abstract: This article endeavours to sketch the debate about the concept of a person in the realm of bioethics. Initially, it sets out
three understandings of the issue, namely the concept of a person in naturalistic philosophy, in the current of communitarianism
and in one of the humanistic positions. The analysis of these approaches lead to the conclusion that a human person is perceived
either as an empirical and psychological entity or as a free subjectivity creating him/herself. This thesis provides stimulation for
further research. In order to avoid a kind of dualism in the perception of a person stemming from the stances outlined above, the
personalistic approach is developed. This points out that a human being should be depicted as one indivisible entity unifying in
itself more strictly its self, a subjective aspect of the person, with nature-body aspect which is an objective facet of being human.
Given this personalistic perspective, a person comes out as an embodied subjectivity formed by the unique personal act of existence. In this article, such a concept of a person is argued as a vital support in the complex field of bioethical dilemmas.
Keywords: person, naturalism, communitarianism, humanism, personalism
Streszczenie: W artykule podjęto próbę naszkicowania debaty w dziedzinie bioetyki dotyczącej pojęcia osoby. Wstępnie przedstawiono
trzy rozumienia problemu: koncepcję osoby w filozofii naturalistycznej, we współczesnym komunitaryzmie i w jednym ze stanowisk
humanistycznych. Analiza tych propozycjo prowadzi do wniosku, że osoba postrzegana jest jako byt empiryczny i psychologiczny lub jako
wolny, tworzący siebie podmiot. Stwierdzenie to prowadzi do dalszych badań. W celu uniknięcia pewnego dualizmu w percepcji osoby
zakorzenionego we wskazanych wyżej stanowiskach rozwinięte zostaje podejście personalistyczne. Podkreśla się w nim, że osobę należy
rozumieć jako niepodzielną całość, łączącą w sobie jaźń – subiektywny aspekt osoby, z naturalno-cielesną stroną, która jest obiektywnym
aspektem bytu ludzkiego. W ujęciu personalistycznym osoba jawi się jako wcielona subiektywność utworzona przez akt osobowego istnienia. W artykule takie rozumienie osoby przedstawione jest jako istotne dla rozwiązywania złożonych problemów bioetycznych.
Słowa kluczowe: osoba, naturalizm, komunitaryzm, humanizm, personalizm
Introduction
The development of contemporary bioethical thought is dominated by the tendency
to abandon any systematic analysis and focus on particular problems. This is largely
due to the pragmatic belief that bioethics
should deal with resolution of particular
cases rather than development of theories
of ethics. This view is favoured in American thought in general and in casuistry
in particular (Smith 2000, 283). It appears
that Albert R. Jonsen captured this well
when he said that, “Medical care concerns
specific cases. As it deals with the disease
and treatment of individuals suffering
from specific diseases. Philosophers and
*
This article was originally published in Polish as
Hołub, Grzegorz. 2005. “Debata na temat koncepcji osoby w bioetyce.” Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae
3: 187-201. The translation of the article into English
was financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland as part of the activities
promoting science - Decision No. 676/P-DUN/2019 of
2 April 2019. Translation made by GROY Translations.
Grzegorz Hołub
theologians, involved in medical care, initially tried to refer to standard ethical theories in the analysis of problems arising during therapy. However, they finally admitted
that they were discussing cases, not theories. And this has led to the need to develop
an approach that puts a specific problem at
the centre of analysis, and not a general ethical theory” (Jonsen 1995, 348).
However, further development of bioethics has shown dubious validity of this
belief. It transpired that many of the specific problems that arise in the process of
therapy cannot be solved if there is no reference to a broader understanding of certain fundamental concepts. One of these
key terms is the concept of the person
(Doran 1989, 38)1. This is due to the fact
that all research undertaken by bioethics
actually centres around the problems of
human life2. Hence the understanding of
human uniqueness and singularity has become a truly urgent requirement.
Many contemporary bioethicists have
taken on the task of rethinking the issues
related to human personal life. In the
course of this process, some fundamental
trends in the formulation of the concept of
the person have emerged. Following Sirkku K. Hellsten’s analysis, three fundamental approaches can be identified: the naturalistic, communitarian, and humanistic
concept (Hellsten 2000, 516-517). As it
will be more apparent in subsequent sections of this article, these approaches will
only be a starting point in the search for
more complete solutions.
1. The Naturalistic Concept of the Person
The naturalistic approach is based on the
basic dichotomy, in which there is a distinction between a human being and
1
This view is supported by the opinion presented
by Mary B. Mahowald in The Encyclopedia of Bioethics, who - apart from the material understanding of
the concept of the person - said that “(...) the concept
of person is of great significance to a variety of issues
in contemporary bioethics” (Mahowald 1995, 1940).
2
This view functions within the framework of
bioethics understood as a more limited reflection
on the issues of life, somewhat abstracted from the
problems inherent to environmental ethics.
126
a person3. The concept of human being, i.e.
human - in the view of the representatives
of this school of thought - has only a descriptive relation to particular members of
the human race. The concept of the person, on the other hand, has a special value
because he or she is a living being who is
characterised by being aware and able to
make choices. This understanding of human is derived from the thought of English empiricism, and particularly from the
definition given by John Locke. He stated
that the term person stands for “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as itself.
(...) and by this every one is to himself that
which he calls self ” (Locke 1955, 471).
In modern naturalistic currents similar definitions can be found as well.
Sometimes they are simply repetitions of
Locke’s definition, but sometimes they indicate additional qualities that clarify the
understanding of person as a concept. The
contemporary empiricist Derek A. Parfit
stated that “to be a person, a being must
be self-conscious, aware of its identity and
its continued existence over time” (Parfit
1984, 202). Another thinker, John Harris,
in a similar fashion asserted that: “A person will thus be any individual capable of
valuing its own life. Such a being will - as
further noted by Harris - at the very least,
be able to conceive of itself as an independent centre of consciousness, existing
over time with a future that is capable of
envisaging and wishing to experience”
(Harris 1983, 225).
Peter Singer, following the same line
of thought, pointed out that many animal
species, especially mammals, should then
also be considered as persons. He believes
that animals can be shown to be conscious
of their own existence over time and capable of reasoning (Singer 1994, 182).
Therefore, “[the] membership of the species
3
Eike-Henner Kluge, a Canadian philosopher,
justified this distinction as follows: identification of
humanity and personhood is ethically suspect. Humanity is a biological concept defined in terms of
genetic makeup. Personhood is ethical (...) (Magnet
and Kluge 1995, 166).
The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics
Homo sapiens- in the view of this thinker does not entitle a being to better treatment
than a being at a similar mental level who
is a member of a different species” (Singer
1993, 212).
Singer also pointed out an additional criterion of personhood which is the ability
to experience pain and suffering. This criterion slightly extends the understanding
of person, pointing to an additional aspect
apart from the one concerning consciousness and volition. A being who has such
characteristics - in the view of this philosopher - should also be considered a person, because this concept, i.e. personhood,
cannot be limited only by descriptive factors (self-awareness, freedom). Singer attempted to prove that the fact of experiencing suffering reveals additionally that
the term ‘person’ carries with it a certain
moral standing (Singer 1994, 182).
Another naturalistic thinker, Michael
Tooley, pointed out that the term person
should be presented as a descriptive and
not evaluative term (Tooley 1983, 35). In
other words, the point is to show a person
in the light of such properties that ignore
his or her axiological and moral character. Thus, in order to consider a being as
a person, he/she must have the following
qualifications: the ability to predict his/her
own future, the ability to understand oneself (the concept of the existing subject of
experience and other mental states), being
oneself (being an existing subject of experience), the ability to self-consciousness,
having self-awareness (at ones disposal)
(Tooley 1973, 59-60).
One of the pioneers of contemporary
bioethics, Joseph Fletcher, presented as
many as 15 different attributes that must
be possessed by a being in order to be
a person. It indicates such qualities as:
minimum intelligence, self-awareness,
self-control, sense (perception) of time,
sense of the future, sense of the past, ability to enter into relationships with others,
care for others, ability to communicate,
control over one’s own existence (aspect
of freedom), ability to have an interest
(curiosity), ability to make changes and
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changeability, having a balance between
rationality and feelings, having identity,
uniqueness, cortex functioning (Fletcher
1979, 12-16).
The presented elements of the description of person can be arranged by pointing out a few important aspects. The first
- and it would appear the most important
- aspect are the factors related to awareness and thinking processes. The second
group includes elements related to free
will, choice and autonomy. The third one
stresses the importance of issues related to
the functioning of the nervous system (experiencing pain).
The naturalistic concept of the person
leads to certain consequences. Given its
assumptions, not only those who belong
to the human race should be regarded as
persons, as Singer particularly emphasises. Beings who can be shown to have some
sort of rational ability and self-awareness,
and who are capable of feeling pain, should
also be treated as persons in line with this
approach. By reversing this view, it must be
stated that human beings, who do not currently have these abilities, may not qualify as
persons4. Here, for example, Singer pointed
to people in a coma or in a vegetative state,
individuals with severe disabilities, with
partial loss of cerebral functions, embryos
or even newborns (Singer 1993, 175-217).
The distinction of person and human is
a central argument in naturalism. As Hellsten writes, if we treat humanity rather
than personhood as such a central criterion then we are in danger of succumbing to
speciesism on the basis of a tautology that
“‘the life of human beings has a special value merely because it is human life” (Hellsten 2000, 518). As Hellsten continues, this
tautology is problematic for the naturalists
4
In this context, of particular significance are the
words of Singer, who said: “When I think of myself
as the person I now am, I realise that I did not come
into existence until some time after my birth, but
only some time after that. At birth I had no sense of
the future and no experiences which I can now remember as ‘mine’. It is the beginning of the life of the
person, rather than of the physical organism, that is
crucial so far as the right to life is concerned” (Kuhse
and Singer 1985, 133).
Grzegorz Hołub
to justify because they firmly reject appealing to any ‘higher truths’ (such as God’s
will or the inner purposes of nature), and
want to present their arguments exclusively on a rational, empirical and secular basis
(Hellsten 2000, 518).
2. Communitarianism on Person
The view of a person in a communitarian
perspective is dominated by opinions contrary to those of naturalism. This is a break
with atomistic individualism, which is
characteristic of empirical definitions. The
implementation of this idea is done by
shifting the emphasis from person in relation to itself, to person in its relation to
a community.
One of the leading proponents of this
school of thought, Mark Kuczewski, stated that: “The communitarian view of the
person sees the self as constituted by social roles, communal practices, and shared
deliberative exchanges” (Kuczewski 2000,
182). This definition is closely related to the
assumption that a person is always rooted
in some community. Considering oneself “is
inseparable from understanding oneself as
a person (...) who is a member of that family,
community or nation, who is also the bearer of that history, who is the son or daughter
of that revolution, who is finally a citizen of
that republic” (Sandel 1982, 179).
The communitarian concept of a person
does not therefore regard them as an individual “I”. According to Hellsten, “Value
and the will of an individual human being continues to be recognized by others,
as the self-conscious ‘I’ no longer exists”
(Hellsten 2000, 526). Individual features
such as the body (and its functions) or the
continuity of mental processes, which naturalistic concept considered to be constitutive elements, do not have a conclusive
status in the opinion of communitarian
thinkers. As Kuczewski states, “a person
goes through all these stages, developing
personal preferences and acquiring values.
(...)The supporting role of the community in this process of self-discovery is part
(component) of this process almost as essential as the only (unique) constellation
128
of attributes and feelings of an individual”
(Kuczewski 1994, 44).
This sociological (community function-dependent) understanding of personhood means that a person is identified
with the identity of an existing individual
rather than with some internal attribute,
a property that one possesses permanently or only during certain periods of life.
Continuity of personal identity is embedded in broadly understood social relations
which, in the end, are the guarantee and
security of personal status of individual
people, members of the community. The
consequence of this approach is that it is
not awareness-, volitional- and neurological factors that are the criterion for personal life, but the continuity of certain
communities. Subsequently, this means
that, for example, the fact of losing one’s
self-awareness or even death does not deprive an individual of their personal status
if the community to which they previously
belonged still exists (Hellsten 2000, 526).
However, this communitarian view of
the person does not resolve all the issues
that have emerged in the naturalistic current. If someone has never become a conscious member of a particular community
because of, for example, developmental
anomaly, that person is almost automatically deprived of their personal status of existence. This is particularly true for individuals
who have never had their nervous system
properly formed. Another issue of this concept is the quality of relations within certain communities. It is not clear whether
individuals who have poor relations with
the community or who exist outside these
formal environments should be considered
as person (Hellsten 2000, 526). It concerns
people living in some kind of isolation, including the homeless, the poor and people
with alternative lifestyles.
The communitarian understanding of
a person – as Hellsten criticises – is not
really much different from a naturalistic
approach. In empirical thinking, the quality of the functioning of the nervous system, which guaranteed the ability of consciousness and free will, was considered an
The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics
essential criterion for personal life. Communitarianism still uses the same kind of
measure, despite the contrary statements
by the thinkers of this current. According
to Hellsten, “the communitarians see an
individual’s personhood valuable as long
as his or her community is there to identify them as a valuable moral agent; That is,
as long as he or she is remembered by their
community” (Hellsten 2000, 527). Therefore, the emphasis is shifted from individual consciousness, which is characteristic
of naturalistic thought, to collective consciousness. The loss of collective memory
(consciousness) that may occur in a given
community is then tantamount to the loss
of personal status of community members.
H. T. Engelhardt is a thinker who demonstrates the connection between naturalism
and communitarianism in a specific way.
He is the bioethicist who, by accepting the
characteristics of the person presented by
naturalism, adds an additional social understanding of the term. In his concept
of laic bioethics, he points to a two-way
understanding of a person. On the one
hand, a person is a being who has a properly formed nervous system and thus has
self-awareness and the ability to make
choices (current persons, moral agents).
On the other hand – and this is a new understanding of the concept – Engelhardt
refers to a person as someone who obtains this status by virtue of the decisions
of a community of current people. This
bioethicist relates this understanding of
personality to human beings who do not
yet have a properly formed intellectual and
volitional power (embryos, newborns and
young children), or to those who have already lost that power, as a result of accidents or the ageing process.
Under naturalistic criteria, these beings
do not have the status of being a person,
but because of their importance to persons
in the strict sense, they acquire this status
(Engelhardt 1988, 175). This means that
the community of current persons in a way
gives personal meaning to those who, by
virtue of biological or psychological mechanisms, are not entitled to this status. This
129
may be for example due to the importance of this “pre-personal” life for current
people5 or for relations between them.
Therefore, the concept demonstrates how
a naturalistic approach to a person can be
coherent with sociological and communitarian understanding.
At this level of analysis, some important
conclusions are being imposed. Despite
Jonsen’s declaration of abandoning general
theories in favour of particular issues, we
note that bioethics is not capable of completely abandoning general yet relevant
concepts. An example is an issue discussed
in this paper of a person who constantly intrigues a significant group of outstanding
bioethics. The second conclusion concerns
the methodology for the approach to the
concept of the person. The declared desire
of empirical thinkers to escape from ‘higher truths’ (such as God’s will or nature’s inner purpose) does not end in eliminating
them, but in changing the form in which
they are present. It may be observed that if
a person is not analysed in a transcendental aspect, or in the light of the most general ontological arguments, then the person is considered from the point of view
of empirical or sociological sciences. This
means that a new type of ‘higher truths’
is being replaced by what was previously
considered to be ‘higher truths’, only this
time these truths reflect more contemporary thinking tendencies.
The third conclusion concerns the concept of the person described in detail in this
paper. Viewing the naturalist and communitarian concept in a broader perspective as
a single project, it must be stated that this is
a kind of methodological error. It is based
on the fact that naturalists and communitarians “confuse the concept of personality,
as something that is variable and non-essential with the concept of the person, which is
5
Engelhard states in his main work that: “if a human embryo is of a higher moral status than an
animal at a similar level of development, (...) it is
because of the importance of this life for the woman who conceived it, or for other people interested in this life, or for the future person who may be
formed” (Engelhardt 1996, 255).
Grzegorz Hołub
invariable and essential” (Doran 1989, 41).
In other words, there is an identification of
personality in the psychological sense (personality) with personality in the philosophical and ontic sense (personhood).
Due to the impossibility of abandoning
the general issue in bioethical analyses,
which is connected with the necessity of
using universal truths (“higher truths”),
and due to the tendency to psychologise
fundamental philosophical concepts, it
is necessary to return unequivocally to
strictly understood philosophical analyses
of the concept of a person discussed in this
paper. Such an attempt was made by the
German bioethicist L. Honnefelder.
3. Towards humanistic concepts
Honnefelder based his analysis on I. Kant.
He questioned the thesis that the assessment of who has the status of a person and
who is deprived of it depends on the selected characteristics. In his opinion, it is difficult to explain why particular aspects of
human existence have an intrinsic, moral
value and are applied as normative criteria
in determining whether or not someone
is a person and others are ignored. That is
why Honnefelder proposes that the whole
analysis process should not be applied to
the individual as a member of the species,
rather to humans as a moral subject (Honnefelder 1996, 144).
This is associated with an unequivocal
rejection of the division between human
being and person, which is favoured by
naturalists. Being recognised as a human
being is equivalent to being a criterion
for a moral subject. Hence, Honnefelder
strongly supports the thesis that “being
a person and belonging to the human species are considered inseparable” (Honnefelder 1996, 144). This type of thought
follows Kant’s line of reasoning. The philosopher, speaking of the ethical implications of this perception of humans, states
in a second imperative: “Act in such a way
that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but
always at the same time as an end” (Kant
130
1984, 62). Thus, this categorical imperative
of reason confirms that humanity is inseparably connected to the person, constituting a moral entity which is an end in itself.
Honnefelder defines a person as a moral subject, who is defined not only beyond
a naturalistic (biological) perspective, but
also beyond metaphysical considerations.
The idea is to refer to the concept of a person as a practical concept, which is not
culled from metaphysics but has its own
and original meaning (Honnefelder 1996,
146). Then the person is seen as an “entity
who is able to determine their own goals
and can take responsibility for their own
realization”; in other words, it refers to the
person as “a human being, to whom an unrestricted list of mental and material predictions that implicate each other may be
applied” (Honnefelder 1996, 156).
Honnefelder’s proposal is radically different from naturalistic approaches. This is primarily the result of viewing a person from
the point of view of European continental
philosophy, or more specifically from the
point of view of German philosophy. In this
perspective, man is seen more in the light
of the peak possibilities and achievements
inherent in his existence. This approach is
contrary to the one that functions in English-language thought, where the human
being is defined in terms of his or her minimum potential and activity.
However, it seems that this concept tends
to spiritualise the human person to some
extent by departing from empirical thinking. This suspicion results from the fact that
man is perceived as an autonomous centre
which, by the power of its mental capacity,
defines itself, its goals. However, the question of human corporeality remains questionable. It seems that the moral agent-person creates his or her own goals, including
those related to the functioning of the human body. In bioethics, the function of human corporeality (the positive function of
human corporeality) is an extremely important issue6. Hence, this concept, which may
6
Doucet draws attention to this in the context of
all bioethics, saying: “One critical and prophetic task
for ethics is to reintegrate the body into our vision
The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics
seem slightly controversial, provides stimulation for further, more adequate descriptions of the human person.
4. Personalistic bioethics about a person
Within the framework of the personalistic approach, there are several positions
that use the concept of a person. Strictly
speaking, the term cannot be regarded as
a single concept appropriate for the broadly defined field of experimental sciences7.
Therefore, it seems that the common view
shared by personalist philosophers is that
“a predicate such as a ‘person’ (...) is not an
empirical or scientific concept, and therefore is not of a descriptive nature but it
rather constitutes a predicate of a moral,
ontological and metaphysical nature (Bellino 1995, 93)8. A review of some of the anthropological proposals that are specific
to such a perception of human life should
point out the reasons behind it.
It seems that the most classical understanding of a person in bioethics, which
follows this line of thinking, is the one
used by E. Sgreccia. In his opinion, “for
bioethics, a human person is a fundamental value, a criterion of discernment and an
objective of moral action” (Sgreccia 1998,
96). In his main work, this thinker states
that “the focus of the notion of a person is
to define the person within the reality that
forms him or her, beyond the very consciousness that is characteristic of all perof the human being and of the subject of research”
(Doucet 2001, 127).
7
Referring to C. Vigna’s view, Bellino points out
that no descriptive statements - characteristic of experimental sciences - such as ‘x is conscious’, ‘x suffers’, ‘x is happy’, logically suggest that ‘x is a person’
(Bellino 1997, 106).
8
Palazzani confirms this thesis by stating that “the
recognition of the personal status of a human being means the ability to say something more about
a human than is indicated by the set of empirical
characteristics of a human being itself. The actual identification of human existence with a person
expresses, on a philosophical and anthropological
level, a human’s own character and their constitutive features. Thanks to that, the foundation of their
values and rights as well as the objective foundation
of their duty to respect and protect can be identified
in the last resort (Palazzani 1996, 220).
131
sons and beyond the expressive possibilities that each individual person acquires in
the process of maturation” (Sgreccia 1991,
78). This statement quite clearly suggests
that by defining the concept of a person,
Sgreccia wants to use tools appropriate for
metaphysical analyses.
When presenting his understanding
of a person, Sgreccia evokes the idea of
Boethius as a necessary starting point for
a proper understanding of this essential
notion. Boethius (5th-6th century) formulated the definition of a person in the
context of Christological disputes. In his
work De duabus naturis et una persona
Christi, he provided the following definition: persona est rationalis nature individua substantia. In this definition, three
basic elements characterising a person can
be distinguished: a person is a substance,
a unique (individual) being, and a person
possesses a rational nature.
The substantiality of a person indicates
their real existence. Sgreccia defines this
aspect of personal life as follows: “A person is (...) a real being (prime matter in
Aristotle’s terminology), a particular existence which concretises a general and abstract kind of being (secondary matter) in
a single individual. Existence indicates the
existence of a person in and by themselves,
by virtue of their own act of existence”
(Sgreccia 1995, 191).
The individual character of a person’s
existence defines him or her as a unique
being, which stands out from other people through his or her corporeality. Here,
Sgreccia points to corporeality as the moment of materialisation of form (la materializzazione della forma); on the other hand,
corporeality is seen as giving existence to
the essence (lexenzializzazione dell’essenza) and as the moment when corporeality is
the incarnation of the spirit (l’incarnazione
dello spirit) (Sgreccia 1995, 191).
The rational nature of a person allows
them to approach the world rationally,
which is expressed in the possibility of making generalisations, abstractions, creating
projects and grasping the sense of things.
As Sgreccia notes, the human person not
Grzegorz Hołub
only possesses active rationality, but above
all, it is its nature to be personal. This means
that when a person does not exhibit active
rational acts, for example due to their health
condition, this does not mean a loss of rationality. Acts are merely a manifestation of
rational nature but they do not exhaust it
(Sgreccia 1995, 191).
The classical concept of a person presented by E. Sgreccia departs radically from the
understanding of this category presented
by the naturalists, and significantly extends
the understanding of this concept in relation to Honnefelder’s proposal. The basic
differentiating element of this project is the
tendency to describe the human person in
an integral way as an indivisible whole. It is
expressed in describing a human being using the ontic term of a substance that possesses a rational nature.
This approach is close to other personalistic thinkers. One of them is W. E. May,
who clearly opposes these two tendencies
(naturalistic and idealistic), emphasising
the integral belonging of the human body
to the essence of being a person. He states
that “life is not one of many processes; it
is not a process that can be compared to
breathing, feeling, choosing, speaking and
so on. A person’s life cannot really be distinguished from the true reality of the person: it permeates all its elements (parts)
and activities (actions). The human person is more than the human body, but the
human person’s body is an integral part of
being a person. When this body dies, the
person dies” (May 1998, 48).
This statement leads to a thesis that
very clearly strikes both at naturalistic
and idealistic thinking about the person.
May points out that the basic human activity, the activity of a person, is not possessing, but fulfilling one’s existence (May
1998, 48). In more general terms, it can be
said that a resist reference to corporeality,
whether by defining it as the exclusive domain of empirical processes or by making
it the exclusive subject of creative activity,
is excluded. In this perspective, corporeality is not something that a person has and
can dispose of as a thing (also by treating
132
the body as a purely biological reality). The
human body has an inner personal value
- it is a constitutive element of a person,
an external (but not separated, heteronomous) manifestation of personal life.
The attribution of inner, personal value
to human corporeality is closely linked to
the indication of its inner purpose. For if
it is not a sub-personal reality, governed
solely by biological processes, then corporeality, as a constitutive element of a person, has its own internal goals, which at
the same time constitute the goals of personal life, goals of the person. It is only in
this context that one can understand the
distinction between “possession” and “fulfilment” presented above. Corporeality is
not an object to be possessed; it participates in human fulfilment.
Indicating the unity of the physical and
spiritual aspect of a person constitutes
a clear opposition to the dualism functioning in modern bioethics: a person is
consciousness and freedom, or a person
is corporeality with a whole range of empirical processes constituting it9. Demonstrating that this alternative is disastrous
for bioethics is the aim of the philosophical considerations of German personalist
R. Speamann. He is trying to show that
there is a close convergence between the
concept of the person and the concept of
human. He says: “There can only be one
criterion for being a person: biological
belonging to the human race. Therefore,
the beginning and end of a person’s existence cannot be separated from the beginning and end of human life. If ‘someone’
exists, he or she has existed since this individual human organism came to existence and will continue to exist as long as
this organism is alive. A person’s being is
the life of a human. (...) A person is a human being, not a characteristic of a human being” (Spaemann 2001, 305). This
last thesis refers to the above-mentioned
May’s thought. A person is not a feature
9
This issue is addressed in more detail by B. Chyrowicz, who described and analysed this problem as
the separation of nature from the person (Chyrowicz 2000, 227).
The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics
or a thing that can be defined by verbs
such as acquiring, losing, disposing of,
improving or deteriorating (depleting).
All of these qualifiers concern personal
qualities, in a psychological rather than
a philosophical sense. The human being
invariably enjoys the status of a person
as long as he or she is human. But being
human, being “somebody,” is a radically
different way of life than in the case of
things, as being “something”.
The idea of the Polish personalist and
phenomenologist K. Wojtyła can be used
to express this thesis. He explicitly indicates that “man is objectively “somebody”
- and this is what separates him from the
rest of the beings of the visible world,
which objectively are always “something”.
This simple, elementary distinction hides
a deep gap that divides the world of people and things (Wojtyła 1986, 24)10. Undoubtedly, this theory refers to a peculiar
intuition of man, which makes him into
a being that cannot be reduced to other
beings. For if everything that exists can be
judged in terms of acquisition, loss, disposition, improvement or deterioration, then
in relation to a person it seems clearly inadequate; referring the above to a person
is acceptable at most in a figurative sense,
or when very specific aspects of human life
are taken into account (e.g. personality can
be improved in the psychological sense
(i.e. personality traits)). The description
of philosophically11 understood personality in qualitative and quantitative terms
clearly goes against the intuitive sense
10
Another personalist-phenomenologist, referring
to this important distinction and evoking the subjective experience of himself, asks: “Can we say that
although we experience ourselves as immersed in
the world of the things around us, perhaps even “as
one” with them, we as individuals are in fact not one
with anything; we are ourselves, rather than anybody
else, in an incommunicable way; and that this subjective self-experience (of ourselves as immersed in the
world of things), in states of distraction, is contrary
to who we really are as people?” (Crosby 1993, 402).
11
In English, this distinction is indicated by two
different terms: personhood - a person in the philosophical sense, personality - a person as a psychologically understood personality.
133
of greatness and uniqueness of a human
person. Referring to analogous thinking,
it can be argued that this intuition is well
expressed by the principle of the excluded middle. There is no intermediate state
between being a person and a non-personal being. It is impossible to just partly
be a person, or be a person more or less
intensely. The idea of describing a person
by pointing out the gradation of becoming
should also be excluded. If one can even
talk about the gradualness of becoming, it
is only in the epistemic sense, not in the
ontic sense, indicating the stage of a person’s becoming. In brief, it can be said that
if something came into existence, it has existed from the beginning either as a person
or as a non-personal being.
Conclusions: a person in bioethical analysis
Several of the presented proposals for describing human beings confirm that this
problem is still important and it would be
difficult to talk about ending the discussion
on this issue. As it was pointed out in the
introduction, its importance is primarily
due to the fact that most of the bioethical
problems concern humans. Therefore, any
attempt to solve particular issues refers
openly or implicitly to some sort of understanding of the human-person.
The concepts outlined are based on various personality criteria (person-hood). On
the one hand, the criteria related to the
functioning of the neuro-cerebral system
are indicated, which are the basis for the
somatic occurrence of individual or, consequently, collective consciousness. This
group also includes factors that determine
the autonomy of an individual. They are
generally of an empirical nature: they indicate at most the psychosomatic aspects
of a person12. On the other hand, the criterion of moral subjectivity of a person is
indicated. This approach, in turn, goes the
other way and has a tendency to spiritualise the human-person (man as an autocreative spirit).
12
Teichman describes this way of looking at
a person as a brains-plus-nervous-system concept
(Teichman 1985, 176).
Grzegorz Hołub
The position that seems to be a more
appropriate solution to this problem in
bioethics is personalism. It recognises the
individual as an incarnate entity. Thus, the
touchstone that decides about the personal life is not empirical and psychological
or spiritualistic factors; it is rather an act
of existence specific to a given person. It
forms all the rich phenomena of spiritual
and subjective life and permeates those inherent in corporeality. The personal act of
existence makes corporeality participate
in personal life, becoming an inseparable
aspect of the person. Thus, corporeality in this perspective - is not merely a biological organism or material, an object for the
creative function of the mind.
The last of the presented positions,
which can be described as ontological personalism, is very helpful in solving even
complicated moral cases in the medical
environment. In order to avoid reducing
human life to some selected, individual
characteristics, on the one hand, or making its value dependent on, sometimes
extremely complicated, processes or institutional procedures (Viafora 1993, 34),
on the other hand, it is necessary to have
a clear intuition of a person, which has
the right theoretic (metaphysical and anthropological) foundation. The use of the
integral concept of a person, proposed by
ontological personalism helps to organise
the theoretical assumptions with which
one enters into the maze of practical actions and procedures, as well as to shape
an approach in which the person is at the
centre of the therapeutic action.
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