BIOETHICA 2/2015 STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI BIOETHICA 2/2015 EDITORIAL BOARD OF STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI BIOETHICA ED)TOR)AL OFF)CE: 8th Avram )ancu Street, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Phone: + 0 0 00 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Professor Ştefan )LOA)E, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania DEPUTY CHIEF EDITOR: Senior Lecturer Maria ALUAŞ, )uliu (a ieganu University of Medicine and Pharmacy & Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania EDITORIAL BOARD: Rosamond R(ODES, Mount Sinay University, New York, US Professor Mark C(ERRY, Rice University, (ouston, Texas, US Professor Adriano PESS)NA, Sacred (eart Catholic University, Milan, )taly Assoc. Professor Ryan NAS(, The Ohio State University Center for Bioethics and Medical (umanities, Columbus, Ohio, US Professor John BRECK, St. Sergius Orthodox Theological )nstitute in Paris, France and Director of the Saint Silouan Retreat Center on Wadmalaw )sland, South Carolina, USA Professor (ans SC(WARZ, Faculty of Protestant Theology, Regensburg, Germany )PS Prof. Dr. Andrei ANDRE)CU , Metropolitan of Cluj, Maramureş and Sălaj, Romania PS Vasile SOMEŞANUL, Vicar Bishop, Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac and Cluj, Romania Professor )oan C()R)LĂ, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Professor Nicolae COMAN, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Professor Octavian POPESCU, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Professor Adrian PĂTRU , Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Professor Mircea-Gelu BUTA, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Senior Lecturer Cezar LOG)N, )uliu (a ieganu University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Professor Željko KALUĐEROV)Ć, University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad, Serbia Assoc. Professor Dejan DONEV, Centre for integrative bioethics, Kumanovo, R. Macedonia Assoc. Professor Visky BÉLA, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Assoc. Professor Liviu J)T)ANU, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Assoc. Professor Călin SĂPLĂCAN, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Assoc. Professor Liviu Marius (AROSA, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania http://bioetica.orth.ro/ www.studia.ubbcluj.ro YEAR MONTH ISSUE Volume 60 (LX) 2015 DECEMBER 2 STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI BIOETHICA 2 STUDIA UBB EDITORIAL OFFICE: B.P. (asdeu no. Phone + 0 0 , 00 Cluj-Napoca, Romania, CU PRINS – C O NT ENT – S O MM AI RE – I N HALT Editorial: MAR)A ALUAȘ, Bioethics at the )ntersection of a Complex New Reality / Bioetica la intersecția unei noi și complexe realități ................................................................ STU DI I MAGDALENA )ORGA, LASZLO-ZOLTAN SZTANKOVSZKY, CAMEL)A SOPONARU, BEATR)CE-GABR)ELA )OAN, Ethical )ssues in Drug Prescribing Practices in Romania. Opinions of the Pharmaceutical Representatives / Probleme etice în practicile prescrierii medicamentelor în România. Opinii ale reprezentanților farmaceutici............................................................................................................................................ SOR)N (OST)UC, )ONUT NEGO), OCTAV)AN BUDA, AL)N MOLDOVEANU, M)(AELA (OST)UC, Avicenna’s Canon of Medicine. Research Methodology and Ethics / Canonul Medicinei de Avicenna. Metodologia şi etica cercetării............................................ ŽELJKO KALUĐEROV)Ć, Animal Protection and Welfare / Protecția animalelor și starea de bine ......................................................................................................................................... ADR)AN MĂGD)C), The Person, a Meaningful Notion in Bioethics. A Philosophical and Theological Approach / Persoana, o noţiune cu tâlc pentru bioetică. O abordare filosofico-teologică ............................................................................................................................... DEJAN DONEV, Ethical Approaches in Research Practice / Abordări etice în practica cercetării .................................................................................................................................................. CAMEL)A SOPONARU, SUZANA SEMEN)UC, BEATR)CE-GABR)ELA )OAN, MAGDALENA )ORGA, The Representation of Disease among the Roma Population in NorthEastern Romania / Reprezentarea bolii în rândul populației rome din regiunea de nord-est a României....................................................................................................................... ANTOANELA NAAJ), Ethical Aspects of Using Biospecimens in Research / Aspecte etice privind folosirea probelor biologice în cercetare .......................................................... 8 JELENA DOTL)C, V)DA JEREM)C, Research Misconduct in Medical Sciences / Conduita greșită în cercetarea medicală ........................................................................................................ MAR)A ALUAȘ, Slovakia Forced Sterilization on Rroma Women Practices. An Ethical Case Analyze / Practici de sterilizare forțată a femeilor de etnie romă în Slovacia. O analiză etică ...................................................................................................................................... 0 INTE RVIU - I NT E RVIEW MAR)A ALUAȘ, Master’s Degree Program in Bioetics )nterview with )oan Alexandru Beldean, MA in Bioethics at Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA, done by Maria Aluaș ....................................................................................................................... REC E NZIE – BOOK R E VI EW (ans Kung, La mort heureuse, trad. Jean-Louis Schegel, Editions du Seuil, Seuil, 0 )UL)U-MAR)US MORAR)U ........................................................................................................... INDICAŢII PENTRU AUTORI ............................................................................................ INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS......................................................................................... STUD)A UBB B)OET()CA, LX, , 0 RECOMMENDED C)TAT)ON p. - THE PERSON, A MEANINGFUL NOTION IN BIOETHICS. A PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL APPROACH ADRIAN MĂGDICI1 REZUMAT. Persoana, o noţiune cu tâlc pentru bioetică. O abordare filosofico-teologică. Noțiunea contemporană de persoană, golită de fundamentul ontologic și axată pe fragilul atribut al raționalității, în loc să le fie de folos ființelor umane lipsite de apărare, tinde să devină mai degrabă o subtilă unealtă eugenetică. În alte cuvinte, pe măsură ce dezinteresul față de dimensiunea metafizică a omului crește, granița dintre bioetică și thanatoetică devine din ce în ce mai lichidă, iar idea de persoană tot mai șubredă. Scopul reflexiei noastre, așadar, este acela de a încerca să redescoperim contextul originar în care s-a afirmat noțiunea de persoană și, prin urmare, sensul meta-fizic al persoanei, indispensabil pentru o antropologie sănătoasă și pentru o bioetică genuină. Cuvinte-cheie: persoană, bioetică, concepţie despre viaţă, materialism, hilemorfism, meta-fizică, teologie, Dumnezeu ABSTRACT. The contemporary notion of person, devoid of ontological basis and built on the fragile characteristic of rationality, is not useful in defending defenceless human beings. )nstead, it rather tends to become a subtle eugenic tool. )n other words, the less we are interested in the metaphysical aspect of human life, the more fluid becomes the boundary between bioethics and what we may call thanato-ethics, while the concept of person gets flimsier than ever. The goal of the following reflections is therefore to try to rediscover the original context which allowed full expression of the notion of person and, consequently, to rediscover the meta-physical sense of the human person, which is imperative for a healthy anthropology and a genuine bioethics. Keywords: person, bioethics, worldview, materialism, hylomorphism, meta-physics, theology, God Assistant lecturer, PhD., The Franciscan Roman-Catholic Theological Institute, Faculty of Pastoral Theology, Roman (NT), Romania. Email: adypellegrino@yahoo.it ADR)AN MĂGD)C) Introduction The word tâlc is defined in any Romanian language dictionary in terms such as: meaning , sense , purpose , significance , but also through the phrase profound, hidden meaning , which opens way to the meaning of mystery. As for the Romanian adverbial phrase cu tâlc, one of its meanings is that of allusion , which, in turn, refers to what cannot be directly understood, to what can be sensed only when it appears into a certain context. Thus, the purpose of this paper’s title is to remind us that, on one hand, the person is a fundamental notion for anthropological reflection and that, on the other hand, the mystery surrounding this notion requires sustained effort to clarify its essence by rediscovering the original context in which it was affirmed: Christian theology Ratzinger 0, . The Origin of the Concept of Person Promoted by Contemporary Society Contemporary society, characterized by an unquenched thirst for consumption Schwartz 00 , 0and thus attracted in a dizzying chase after novelty, tends to perceive reality – objects, living beings, even human persons – as the results of fleeting accidents, like ripples crossing the global oceans. Entities seem so inconsistent that people feel dissolved Levi-Strauss , , lost in anonymity within a fluid world Bauman 000, 0,a world where the liquid modern tyranny of the moment’, with its precept of carpe diem seems to replace the traditional memento mori Bauman 00 , 0 . The world view fostered by a specific society inevitably includes a certain view on the human person, which, in its turn, will determine the type of bioethics adopted in everyday life. This means that ethical norms are the fruit of a specific conception of man, and every conception of man is the fruit of a specific conception of reality, of existence in its totality Rovighi , . Yet, the ultimate purpose of the world does not present itself as immediately accessible to our mind, but it remains somehow outside the world itself Wittgenstein 00 , , requiring, in order to be understood, a hermeneutics similar to the one proposed by St Paul: At present we see indistinctly, as in a mirror, but then face to face 1 Cor : . Man, therefore, as long as he is endowed with the capacity to reflect upon himself, is bound to have a worldview, but the worldview he fosters implies a choice Delumeau THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( 00 , 8; Nagel 0 , - , - , a choice which will lead, as underlined above, to outlining a certain concept of human person and of bioethics. The religious man, no matter the historical context of his life, always believes that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world . The profane man, on the contrary, refuses all appeal to transcendence . (e makes himself, and he only makes himself completely in proportion as he desacralizes himself and the world Eliade , 0 - 0 . The de-sacralisation of the person gained momentum in the th century, when the person was redefined on empirical basis: To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, ) think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it; it being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive Locke 80 , . David (ume, an empirical philosopher and adept of radical scepticism, deepened the de-ontologization of the person by advancing a doubt on the existence of the subject, the classical receptacle of experiences: When ) enter most intimately into what ) call myself, ) always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. ) never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception (ume , . The same philosopher considered that our idea of any mind is only that of particular perceptions without the notion of anything we call substance, either simple or compound id. 00 , . (ume was certainly wrong, since our idea of a mind’ if by a mind’ we mean, as (ume usually does, a person, or a self is not an idea only of particular perceptions’ , but it is an idea of that which loves or hates, and of that which feels cold or warm […] . Therefore, our perceptions are not entities in their own right; they are accidents’ Chisholm , , requiring support Farris 0 , , which means an individual substance of rational nature Boezio , . Yet, modern thinking has laid the basis of a mostly psychological (arris 00 , - 0; Rechlin 008, , phenomenological and analytical concept of the person Chisholm , ,a vision which will deeply influence contemporary anthropology Parfit 8 and especially bioethics Fornero 00 , 8 -8 . On the other hand, the 8th century, which brings affirmation of human rights, also sees a re-sacralisation of the person and this change in ADR)AN MĂGD)C) perceiving the sacred led to a reformation of the penal system Joas 0 , 8 . Sociologist Émile Durkheim, a zealous defender of human rights and universal human dignity, wrote: The human person, whose definition serves as the touchstone according to which good must be distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred, in what one might call the ritual sense of the word. )t has something of that transcendental majesty which the churches of all times have given to their gods. )t is conceived as being invested with that mysterious property which creates an empty space around holy objects, which keeps them away from profane contacts and which draws them away from ordinary life. And it is exactly this feature which induces the respect of which it is the object Durkheim , . Nevertheless, afterwards, while modern empiric thought turned into positivism and neo-positivism, the person was again under attack, torn down from the pedestal of metaphysics and thrown directly on the dissection table of scientific reasoning. Thus, right after the Second World War, country delegates who, at the initiative of the United Nations, laid the foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted the meta-language of a universal secular order Arieli 00 , 8 , with the purpose of avoiding disagreement on metaphysical and religious issues and obtaining consensus from peoples and cultures from all over the world. As the basis of human rights, they established dignity, an ambiguous and discriminatory Kantian concept Schroeder 0 0, which, unlike the other two proposed – God and natural law Pizzorni 00 , 8 – reflects an ethical vision Kant , 0 rather than an ontological position Glendon , - . The shudder of horror produced by the atrocities of the Second World War indeed required speeding the process of adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but, as it seemed impossible to reach a theoretical agreement, a practical one was preferred, which aimed at a practical outcome [international cooperation]. Philosopher Jacques Maritain, who had the leading role in drafting the Declaration, remembers: At one of the meetings of a UNESCO National Commission where (uman Rights were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. Yes’, they said, we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why’. That why’ is where the argument begins Maritain 8, i . Therefore, despite its powerful moral implications, the concept of dignity is elusive, lacks solid theoretical foundation Di Pietro & Moltisanti 00 , and some bioethicists consider it useless in medical practice 8 THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( Macklin 00 , . But we shouldn’t forget that ideas in our mind can be like a machete in the hand of a man lost in the jungle: they can help us survive and advance towards the light; they are an expression of our perseverance and strength. Finding among the flimsy words of human language a suitable concept to justify our faith in man’s inalienable value is not only a matter of etymology, but of applied sense. )n other words, why, unlike other living beings, we, humans, are so convinced we have dignity? Brungardt 0 , And the answer is, of course, none other than this: Because we are human persons. But what is the person, this paradoxical reality Mouroux , 0 , considered so sublime that it deserves to be infinitely worthier than any other entity in the whole universe Baumann 00 , , while others consider it so earthly and subject to the vicissitudes of the evolutionary process that is hardly distinguishable from other animals like monkeys or dolphins? DeGrazia 00 , ; White 00 , - 8 Materialist thinkers Dennett , ; see Lund 0 , and BonJour 0 0, , don’t see any difference – at least not an essential one – between the death of a man and that of an animal, because the death of a person is the death of an organism . )n other words, the permanent end of consciousness, of intentionality, and of subjectivity is literally an organic disintegration of the person . Thinking differently is to be dualistic Van (ooft 00 , . And, if one wishes to avoid being labelled like that, one must consider human beings from a strictly empirical point of view, assimilating it with a biological thing Boklage 0 0, of the species Homo sapiens [ biological person ], an entity which, in order to be granted the statute of a psychological person , needs a functioning brain and an intellectually and morally conscious mind Feldman , - 0 . And, taking into account that the Lockean definition of the person has become axiomatic for science (arris 00 , ; M“ller 0 , 8 , most bioethicists and medical researchers think that embryos, foetuses, anencephalics and those in a persistent vegetative state are not, or at least not anymore, persons, because they haven’t formed their cerebral structures yet, or because these structures are insufficient, or because they have suffered irreparable damage to their cerebral cortex, which has made them irreversibly lose their cognitive capacity. But based on what principle can science decide whether a being is a person, since science is only one system of investigation within that larger arena of human study of nature, persons, and society ? Tauber 00 , And who can guarantee that the Lockean definition of the person is correct? Butler 0 , ; Reid 008, - 8; Paterson 008, - ADR)AN MĂGD)C) The contemporary concept of the person Beauchamp , , just like the one of dignity Thiel 0 0, ; Warnock 8 , , is used in a variety of contexts Gregersen 000, , seeming somehow adjustable to the different requisitions of the philosophical pluralism which characterizes the bioethical debate . The thorny aspect of this flexibility however, is that the notion of person, having been separated from its roots, is assigned today many roles which endanger its intuitive and original potential , which has paradoxically led to using it against’ man himself Palazzani 00 , . On the other hand, when shedding light on the person, one of the biggest temptations of contemporary man is to try and get the deep meaning of the concept by analytical methodology or through a strictly scientific approach, as if solving the mystery depended more on the propriety of terms or empirical knowledge than on reflecting about the inner aspect of the beings in question Skrbina 0 , 0 . Actually, the emphasis must be on the meta-physical origin of the person Sesbo“é 00 , , and the analytical and/or scientific method should come second, as it is only logical that its value will be determined by the answer somebody gives to the first question mentioned above Weisstub & Thomasma 00 , . That is why we have preferred to postpone the traditional etymological analysis we should have begun with, but now we shall try and undertake this task. The Mysterious Etymology of the Person-concept The origins of this concept remain mysterious despite the numerous attempts to elucidate it Milano , . First, in Ancient Greece, while the idea of person had not appeared yet, they used generic terms like ις [someone] or ἄ θ ς [man] to refer to the human being. When they wanted to be more specific, they used words like σῶ α [body], [soul] and θ ός [vital breath]; these principles make the actual human being Nédoncelle 8, and – as shown in the (omeric poems – they also guarantee a double existence for the human being: one visible and limited, based on body [σῶ α] and vital breath [θυ ός], the other invisible and immortal, based on υ , which is subsisting soul Rohde , . Then came another term that was given priority: όσ , which means face. )t is worth mentioning that this term will also be granted the meaning of mask, which was initially used in religious rituals and then on the stage, thus allowing both actors and participants to the sacred ceremonies to re-animate 0 THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( [personify] those who could not express themselves as real flesh-and-bone persons. Ancient Romans also referred to the human being with generic words such as is [he, that one], homo [man], caput [individual], but also with terms like corpus [body], anima [soul] etc. Yet, unlike the Greek όσ , the Latin term of persona [mask] – which is instrumental to our analysis – is much more difficult to define from an etymological point of view, as it has seen a much more complicated semantic evolution Nédoncelle 8, 8 . )n the nd century AD, Latin scholar Aulus Gellius, following in the footsteps of grammarian Gavius Bassus and his De Origine Vocabulorum [a work now lost], considered that the term of persona was derived from the verb personare, since the mask [persona] entirely covers the face of the wearer and only lets the voice out thorough a single opening, the one in front of the mouth, which makes the voice clearer and more resounding Aulus , . There were other etymologies proposed later, although most of them are debatable, for instance the definition from Papias the Lombard’s glossary [ th century], persona dicitur quia per se sonat, or the one from grammarian Pacidus’ glossary [ th century], also mentioned by Thomas Aquinas, persona eo quod per se una est, or Giulio Cesare della Scala’s hypothesis [ 8 8] according to which persoana comes from ι-σῶ α, in Latin circum-corpus, a phrase meaning around the body Nédoncelle 8, 8 . Finally, one of the most plausible hypotheses regarding the origin of the term persona seems to be the one leading to ΦΕΡΣϒ [Phersu], an Etruscan word written next to a representation of a masked dancing individual on a fresco from the grave named Tomba degli Auguri, discovered in the )talian region of Corneto-Tarquinia Milano , . This mysterious character, Phersu, most probably an Etruscan god of the dead, has led to persona, the mask Romans wore during the ceremonies for the dead [imagines mortuorum or animorum] Ribas Alba 0 , . As a matter of fact, persona was not only the mask worn by the actors in the ceremony, but also a supportrepresentation of the deceased’s soul Barcelo 0 , 08 . Is Bioethics a Meaningful Notion for the Person? )n the Introduction, when we explained the purpose of the title chosen for this article, we purposefully mentioned that one of the meanings of the Romanian adverbial/adjectival phrase cu tâlc is that of in allusion ADR)AN MĂGD)C) to/alluding , referring to something that cannot be fully understood outside of a certain context. That is why, before trying to see how the notion of person is meaningful [cu tâlc] for bioethics, we could wonder what really is the meaning of bioethics and whether bioethics is a meaningful notion for the person. A few decades have passed since moral philosophers and medical science researchers realized that ethics, if not incarnated within bioethics, , 8 , risking to remains an arid and abstract reflection Arras contradict its original essence, its ethos, its abode, dwelling place (eidegger 8, . (eidegger, reviving an anecdote mentioned by Aristotle, tells how some strangers who had wanted very much to meet the famous (eraclitus were totally disappointed when they saw him warming up by a baker’s oven just like ordinary people. They expected to find him lost in cogitation, detached of bodily needs. But the philosopher, aware of the people’s expectations, did not feel embarrassed, but invited them to join him, saying: (ere too the gods come to presence ibid., 0 . Ethos therefore is revealing because, if we take into account the fact that the (eraclitean universe is divine, the value of each of its entities arises from its very ontological structure, just like the dignity of each human springs from one’s own α , which is one’s own divine feature. Actually, (eraclitus, also named The Obscure, would concentrate his own anthropological vision in an aphorism formed by only three words: ἦθ ς ἀ θ ὠ ι δα , the man’s abode is his own soul/conscience Robb 8 , - 0. Neo-positivism, though, adopting the so-called (ume’s law see (ume , , has established that morality cannot be deduced from empirical reality Moore 0 , - 0 and, although positivist ideology has collapsed, science still uses this old rule. This state of facts owes to the world vision shared by most of today’s scientists Larson 8, – it is called philosophical naturalism – and on its basis notions like person, dignity or the meaning of life are considered mere fictions, impossible to categorize from an empirical point of view and without relation whatsoever with a hypothetical transcendent origin Mitchell et al. 00 , - . But ethics embodied in bioethics is living proof that our real abode , the biosphere, is related to ethos. From this point of view, ethos is the laborious harmony between micro- and macro-symbiosis, a harmony imposing respect as it is our own harmony, too, the vital space and under-layer of human existence Kauffman 008, . Therefore, the conception saying that facts cannot convey values is groundless Mac)ntyre 00 , 8- 0 ; on the contrary, the simple fact that the biosphere is a complex network of symbiotic relations does represent, beyond all human considerations, a value in itself, because it guarantees life for all biological entities Mashe , - . The simple fact THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( that we come into the world with the yuck factor Caulfield & Chapman 00 , 0 incorporated and therefore we intuitively feel disgusted by torture, homicide and so on is revelatory enough proof that morality isn’t a superficial feature of our world Copan 008, . We are also convinced that, to be able to fulfil its purpose, especially when the human person is reduced to its biological aspect, bioethics needs a robust meta-bioethical foundation, not only through more cohesive interdisciplinarity, but also from a meta-physical point of view Russo 00 , . And the Boethian concept of person subscribes to this very meta-physical point of view Marenbon 00 , . The Meta-physical Concept of Person and Its Relevance for Bioethics The classical definition of the person by Boethius – naturae rationalis individua substantia [individual substance of rational nature] – since it does not take into account the human being, having as purpose to clarify some aspects of the Trinity Forrest 00 , ; Buchanan , and of Christology, ignores man’s corporality De Monticelli 00 , - . St Thomas Aquinas realizes that the Boethian definition lacks any reference to corporality and, wanting to fight the spiritualist trend of his own age, amends it: For person in general signifies the individual substance of a rational nature. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to person in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person Summa Theologiae, ), q. , a. co . A few pages before in his Summa, St Thomas mentions: The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance […]; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it ibid., ), q. , a. ad . St Thomas’ thinking, though, can leave us perplexed Quinn 00 , 888 : if it is true that the soul, after a man’s death, is neither hypostasis [individual substance], nor person [individual substance of rational nature], then what is it? )s it an attribute, an accident? Amerini 00 , ; Kenny 00 , 8 Can an attribute subsist without any individuality/consistency/substantiality ADR)AN MĂGD)C) whatsoever? Oaklander 00 , 8 )f the soul separated from the body is neither person, nor individual substance, then what are those who, according to Catholic doctrine, still have need of purification to enter into the happiness of heaven ? CCCC 00 , no 0 )n this case, there are two possibilities: either the human soul possesses a special intellect Wippel 00 , - 0 – different from the synaptic one LeDoux 00 – and therefore it is personal meta-physical conscience Spencer 0 , 8 which allows it to subsist after death Eben 0 , 8 [even if normally it exists as a human person], or it has no individuality – no personality and, in this case, it disintegrates together with the deceased’s body Kenny 00 , 8 . The only way to solve this dilemma is to admit that the separated soul is essentially a person [ minimal-person (elm 8, ], similar to bodiless intellectual beings [God and the angels] Marenbon 00 , , and that, in this hypostasis, it tends to regain what is essential to its humanity. Actually, in a document of the Holy Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, St Thomas Aquinas’ hylomorphic definition of the person is challenged: Temporal life lived in this world is not identified with the person. The person possesses a level of life that is more profound and that cannot end SCDF , no . Human person is certainly, as it results from different theological affirmations Giovanni P )) 8 , no - ; CCC 00 , no , a dual unity, but this duality actually does not concern those who belong to the person genus [God, angels] Murphy 008, ; McArdle 00 , , but rather one of its species , the human one Lund 00 , . Therefore, from an anthropological point of view, dual is not the person, but the man, who, in addition to his natural biopsychological configuration, is also supernaturally imbued by a meta-physical ego whom we shall name personal immortal soul Masset 8 , , . Both science [through discoveries confirming evolution] and faith [thanks to Christology] force us to consider human individuals from different perspectives, one natural, due to man’s bio-psychological configuration, and one supernatural, taking into account his immortal soul. Therefore, when we say human person, we refer to an entity which is part of the human biopsychological species, is inclined to develop a spatial-temporal mind [conscience] Corradini 008, 0 - 0 ; (olmes 00 , and, from the very first moment of its activation in a human sense, has been endowed with an immortal metaphysical ego. The two aspects, material [bio-psychological] and spiritual [metaphysical] see Possenti 0 , 8; Zimmerman 0 , 8; Casey 0 , ; Lewis 00 , forces us to keep our distance from Tomist anthropology see Summa Theologiae, ))-)), q. , a. , ad ; Blazquez 8 , 8 , 8 , 0 . The first motive of our reticence regarding Tomist doctrine of the rational-immortal-configurator soul Eberl 00 , , 8- owes to the fact that THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( this, if we seriously consider the phenomenon of evolution, should evolve together with the matter that it configures (asker 0 , 0 , a hypothesis which has not been accepted by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church Giovanni P )) 00 , . The second reason for our reticence to Tomist hylomorphism is related to Christology. Different magisterial documents show that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light Paolo V) 8 , no ; CDF 0 , no . )n the incarnate Word there must be something which is also in us Sesbo“é 00 , , , and finding that something should enlighten us. Just like the incarnate Word, through (is humanity, is the visible hypostasis of the invisible God [one of the (oly Trinity’s Persons], just the same, or in any case similarly, the human being, through one’s [bio-psychological] body, is the visible hypostasis of the immortal personal soul, which is invisible; and this truth becomes ever more obvious when we take into account the fact that at its roots, the notion of person is imbued with theology Palazzani 8, ; Zizioulas , . Therefore, by the incarnation of the Word, God – as unlikely as it may seem Nagel 0 , – knows all the vicissitudes of natural order despite the fact that, being part of the eternal communion between the (oly Trinity’s Persons, is not governed by natural law, thus suggesting that the person is not an essentially hylomorphic [informed matter] or empirical reality. An example as conclusive as is possible in this direction is the definition of the person made by theologian Richard de Saint-Victor – divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia – incommunicable existence of divine nature De Saint-Victor 8, 8 – a definition which reflects a profound meta-physical intuition. But this intuition has not been accordingly valued by Christians: Scholastic theology developed categories of existence out of this contribution given by Christian faith to the human mind. )ts defect was that it limited these categories to Christology and to the doctrine of the Trinity […]. This seems to me also the limit of St. Thomas in the matter, namely, that within theology he operates, with Richard of St. Victor, on the level of existence, but treats the whole thing as a theological exception, as it were. )n philosophy […] he remains faithful to the different approach of pre-Christian philosophy Ratzinger 0, . Thus, if the Persons of the (oly Trinity and especially that of the incarnated Word are considered as theological exceptions , which do not tell anything in relation to our meta-physical status, and similarly, if the Person of the eternal incarnated Word – Who has become a human individual from the moment of conception – does not say anything about our human individuality, then by what else could the incarnate Word illuminate us? ADR)AN MĂGD)C) )n our opinion, the person – and Christology confirms this – is not an immanent naturalistic category Caspar , 08, but a meta-physical ego Mauss 8, 8 . )n fact, from a historical point of view, we have not started from the idea of man to get to that of human person and divine person , but, on the contrary, we have started from the idea of divine person to establish the parameters of the human person and, therefore to see whether these parameters are still compatible with those that science uses about man today Bertagna 00 , - . Paradoxically, the hylomorphic concept of person, although it was founded by St Thomas Aquinas to fight the spiritualists who despised the body, due to some Aristotelian inadvertences M“ller , - ; Gardel 0 , , has today become an argument for philosophers and bioethicists willing to justify various crimes against human being, especially against those human beings who are either in an incipient or in a final stage of their existence Glannon 000, - . Conclusion The hylomorphic concept of the person, subordinated to Aristotle’s philosophy and therefore the fruit of an immanent vision Wojtyla 8, 080 , is an affront to human dignity Shostak 00 , . )n the context of contemporary physics and biology, hylomorphism is rather an outdated attempt to describe a complex variety of entities – with their gradual transition-evolution from pure materiality to more and more bio-logical specifications – through a cliché like the concept of form Shields 00 , ; Williams 00 , and through a disturbing procession of vitalist souls Dupre 00 , ; Mariani 00 , 8; Bennett 0 0, ; Amerini 00 , - 8 . And, since the origin of the modern crisis of the concept person’ lies in the crisis of Christianity and of traditional metaphysics Zaborowski 0 0, 8 , the rediscovery of the forgotten sense of the person can only be done by destroying the zoological understanding of the human person (ousset 00 , 8 . We should not, therefore, confuse the metaphysics of the world, in which man takes part as a biological individual Mauron 00 , 8, with the supernatural meta-physics in which the person takes part Bonaventura 0 , , . )f we accept a two-layered ontology, similar to the one which governs Christology, many bioethical thorny issues could be solved much more easily. That is why, in our opinion, the meta-physical concept of person is much more desirable than the hylomorphic one, since it is much easier to manipulate the latter in bioethical debates. THE PERSON, A MEAN)NGFUL NOT)ON )N B)OET()CS. A P()LOSOP()CAL AND T(EOLOG)CAL APPROAC( BIBLIOGRAPHY Amerini, Fabrizio 00 , Tommaso d’Aquino. Origine e fine della vita umana, Pisa: Edizioni ETS. Arieli, Yehoshua 00 , On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and (is Rights , in D. Kretzmer, E. 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