In this chapter, the points of intellectual consonance between Jane Addams and John Dewey are explored, specifically their (1) shared belief that philosophy is a method, (2) parallel commitments to philosophical pragmatism and (3) similar convictions that philosophy should serve to address social problems. Also highlighted are points of divergence in their thinking, particularly their positions on U.S. entry into World War I and, more generally, the value of social conflict. Finally, the chapter concludes with what the author believes is Addams's and Dewey's most significant joint contribution to the contemporary philosophical landscape: a vision of practically engaged pragmatism.

ABSTRACT John Dewey calls Ralph Waldo Emerson "The Philosopher of Democracy" in an essay of the same title (1903/1977). In making his case that Emerson is a philosopher, Dewey acknowledges that some (including Emerson himself) might be inclined to see him as a poet rather than a philosopher. Dewey goes on to discuss the difference between the poet and the philosopher. The poet is maker rather than reflector. The poet discerns and uncovers rather than analyzes and classifies. The poet evidences a "natural attitude" where the philosopher relies on reasons for believing. However, the distinction is not hard and fast; in Emerson's case at least, one can be both poet and philosopher. Dewey's description of Emerson as poet and philosopher of democracy holds, I suggest, for Jane Addams as well, but it is, perhaps ironically, as poet that Addams impacted the philosophy of John Dewey. Addams is unquestionably a maker of democratic community and pragmatic education; Dewey is just as unquestionably a reflector. Through her work at Hull House, Addams discerned the shape of democracy as a mode of associated living and uncovered the outlines of an experimental approach to knowledge and understanding; Dewey analyzed and classified the social, psychological and educational processes Addams lived. As I will demonstrate below, Addams's "natural attitude" brought Dewey up short in a situation in which he could, by his own admission, only rely on reason. In this essay, I claim that Dewey became Dewey in the last decade of the nineteenth century and that Jane Addams was present as poet to his philosopher. When I say that Dewey became Dewey, I mean that he let go of religious practice and theological language, focused a conception of democracy as a mode of associated living, shifted from Hegelian dialectic to pragmatic experimentalism, acknowledged the relational nature of the self and found a way to think about thinking rooted in human action, thus acknowledging the unity of human experience. Dewey's interaction with Addams, again by his own admission, forced a reconsideration of his thinking, a reconstruction that led to the very elements (noted above) that have rendered Deweyan thought useful to us in the early twenty-first century. I make my case by focusing here on just one significant instance documented in Dewey's correspondence and described—in various ways—in contemporary Dewey biographies. Jane Addams was not, of course, the only one who shaped Dewey's thinking in this period. His wife Alice, his colleague George Herbert Mead, the idealist T. H. Green, the antidemocratic political theorist Sir Henry Maines, and "weirdo" Franklin Ford headline a list of others whose relations with Dewey were influential, positively or negatively. What seems clear to me, however, is that Dewey was searching for a way to instantiate his thinking about democracy, about Christianity and about experimentalism. His involvement in the ill-advised Thought News episode can be read as part of this search. But it was at Hull House in the company of Jane Addams that Dewey found what he was looking for. My "text" for this essay comes from two letters John Dewey sent to his wife Alice in October, 1894 describing a conversation he had with Jane Addams after she participated in a program at the University of Chicago regarding the proposed University Settlement House. In what follows, I offer a detailed rendering of that correspondence, analyze the way this incident is represented in the biographies penned by Robert Westbrook (1991), Steven Rockefeller (1991), Alan Ryan (1995) and Jay Martin (2003), and then claim a "poetic" role for Jane Addams in influencing Dewey's philosophy. On Sunday, October 7, 1894, a meeting was held at the University of Chicago to promote the University Settlement House. Jane Addams spoke regarding the point of philanthropy as practiced in the settlement house. John Dewey was present (Levine 2005). On Tuesday, October 9, 1894, Dewey noted in a letter to wife Alice that he had just finished preparing a talk on Epictetus to be delivered at Hull House that evening. He went on to describe the meeting at the University two days prior: I came near forgetting the chief thing that's happened since I wrote...

Aim. The aim of this study is to analyse and evaluate two versions of the theory of liberalism which emerged within the philosophical tradition of pragmatism: Richard Rorty's "ironic liberalism" and John Dewey's "renascent liberalism." Methods. The study is based on: 1) comparative analysis, which shows the differences and points of contact between Dewey's classical pragmatism and Rorty's neo-pragmatism, in particular between different versions of their liberal theories; 2) critical analysis, which made it possible to identify the shortcomings and advantages in the arguments of the above-mentioned philosophers. Results. The author analysed Rorty's and Dewey's theories of liberalism in relation to their theories of reality, human specificity, and ethics. In this way, the specific liberal views of these American philosophers on such issues as the relationship between private and public, the main goals of politics, and the values of the social order were explicated. It allowed offering a thorough critique of Rorty's "ironic liberalism," and supporting of Dewey's "renascent liberalism." Conclusion. While Dewey saw the mission of liberalism in enabling individuals to improve their experience, Rorty insisted on the need for a liberal policy of providing the basic conditions for individual self-creation. The main disadvantage of Rorty's neo-pragmatism, and, in particular, "ironic liberalism," was the exclusion from the philosophy of the modifying tools of human behaviour, which were expressed by the concepts of "good" or "virtue," in Dewey's "renascent liberalism." This circumstance necessitates a return from Rorty back to Dewey in the discussions on pragmatic liberalism.

As a specialist in John Dewey studies, Larry A. Hickman has made and continues to make contributions to the development of Dewey’s philosophy. This new collection of papers from more than three decades of work is his latest approach defending and extending Dewey's classical pragmatism.