Working with the Russians
DONALD N. JENSEN
M
uch has been written about Russian president Vladimir Putin's alliance with
the United States since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Putin was the
first foreign leader to call President Bush on the day of the tragedy. He followed
that with an extraordinary series of actions that, for now at least, have amounted
to a wholesale reorientation of Russian foreign policy.1 Although problems
remain, in less than a year Washington and Moscow have made rapid progress
toward settling their differences: on counterterrorism; on missile defenses and
other issues that are a legacy of the cold war; in establishing a framework for
NATO-Russia security relations; and on expanding energy ties. In some ways
U.S.-Russia relations are today closer than between Washington and some of its
European allies.
The key issue is whether Moscow's change of direction marks a strategic shift
in Russia's relationships with the United States or whether it is a short-term change
that will quickly lose momentum because of countervailing pressures. 1 believe
that it is too early to know. In this article 1 argue, however, that permanently embedding Russia in a set of strategically beneficial relationships with the West is more
likely to be successful if care is paid to the process of Russian foreign policymaking. In that process, a wide variety of elite actors-each with their own foreign policy agenda and points of access to the system-battle for influence.
Russian Foreign Policies
Vladimir Putin's foreign policy has two main components: a drive to use Western resources to modernize Russia; and the fight against international terrorism,
which he sees as the main challenge to the country's security.2 However, Putin's
goals are not necessarily shared by all segments of Russia's elite.
To get what he wants on a particular issue Putin must assemble effective coalitions from among the key elite centers of power: the federal bureaucracy, the military, the intelligence cervices, big business, and regional leaders. His task is made
even more difficult because each of these centers is criss-crossed by different policy priorities, shifting political alliances, and widely disparate points of access to
the system. As Celeste Wallander has written:
Donald N. Jensen is director of communications, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
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224 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA
Rather than asking what foreign policy is under Putin, one should ask on what polit¡cal coalition does Putin rely, and what are their priorities, resources, interests and
ideas. Rather than asking what are Russia's geostrategic interests in the Caspian,
one should ask what are its array of interests in the Caspian, which institutions control policy toward the region, and how influential is the Caspian priority as opposed
to, for example, Russian hopes to join the World Trade Organization.3
The way that these foreign policy actors interact can be explained by examining the perceived costs and benefits of a proposed policy.4 By costs is meant any
burden, monetary or nonmonetary, that someone must bear, or thinks he must
bear, if the policy is adopted. An example of a foreign policy that imposes costs
would be one that forced the Russian nuclear industry to end its relationship with
Iran. Benefits are any satisfaction, monetary or otherwise, that someone will
enjoy if a policy is adopted. A foreign policy that brought a benefit would be one
that attracted Western investment te) Russian industry. However, one of the problems in analyzing Russian foreign policymaking is that it is not always easy to
discover all the important players who participate in policy formulation or how
they see the costs and benefits of a proposed policy.
Viewed in this way, the key issues between the United States and Russia fall
into four general categories:
Majoritarian policies, which promise costs and benefits that will be distributed among large number of groups, or society at large, with no one group feeling intensely about the issue. Examples include the general pursuit of better relations with the United States or inte]Lligence cooperation with Washington. Before
the 11 September tragedies, U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, an example of a majoritarian policy, included joint pressure to force the Taliban to change
its policies on terrorism and narcotics, agreement on UN sanctions, and participation ¡ti a bilateral working group to address the threat of terrorism from
Afghanistan. Since few people have direct stake in the outcome of majoritarian
policies, interest group activity is low, and policy formulation and implementation largely take place in formal institutions such as the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Such policies also give the Russian president significant discretion to
decide as he wishes.
lnterest group policies promise benefitsfor relatively small, identifiable groups
and impone costs on different, equally identifiable groups. An example is Russia's
possible entry into the World Trade Organization. Although Putin has long spoken
optimistically about his country joining the WTO in 2003 or 2004 and Russian
industries welcome membership, opposition to entry from other segments of Russian business has forced Moscow to drop talk of an entry target date. Those businesses oppose the increased competition from European firms that WTO membership would bring. The formal structures of foreign policymaking are only one
of several places where the struggle over interest group policies takes place, since
potentially affected groups can use money, personal ties to government officials,
or the media they control to lobby for their preferred outcome. In such policies,
Putin often acts as an arbiter among competing group to settle disputes.
Client policies provide benefits to an identifiable group, with the costs of those
Working with the Russians 225
policies spread widely. An example of this kind of policy is Russia's economic
ties with Iraq, which provide economic benefits to firms such as Lukoil, Tatneft,
Slavneft, and Zarubezhneft. Those ties come with a cost to Russia-strained ties
with the United States, which has wanted to limit their activity in Iraq. Moreover,
those firms have in the past sought the lifting of UN sanctions on Baghdad. These
ties are spread over the entire country, not only focused on a few powerful groups.
They are thus difficult to change. As with interest group politics, client politics
often play out outside the formal structures of government. Thus, in order to protect its favored position in Iraq, Lukoil or Tatneft cultivates strategically placed
patrons in the government, including in government ministries sympathetic to its
cause, the Duma, and the Presidential Administration. In client politics, Putin's
ability to get what he wants is also limited.
Entrepreneurial policies, a fourth set of issues, promise distributed benefits
such as peace, prosperity, or reformfor sociely a whole, but impose and concentrate costs on an identifiable part of the Russian elite. Nonproliferation agreements that limit the spread of nuclear technology (in the name of national security, a distributed benefit) and are resisted by those firms and government
ministries who sell nuclear technology would be entrepreneurial if Putin campaigned in favor of them in the name of some greater national interests. Since the
beneficiaries of such policies tend to be the public at large and the generally passive Russian public has little incentive to press for its interests, one would expect
that the better organized opponents of such policies would usually win. This is
not always the case. To overcome the resistance, a policy "entrepreneur" can act
on behalf of the public at large by using emotional or symbolic appeals to achieve
what rational self-interest cannot. In such policies the mass media or the president can play a key role, since key journalists can articulate the powerful images
and slogans in favor of their point of view and Putin is seen to represent the entire
country. Boris Yeltsin often acted as a policy entrepreneur when he pushed privatization or the freeing of prices in the early 1990s. Vladimir Putin has been far
less willing to do so. He would probably have to act as a policy entrepreneur if
he sought to end the war in Chechnya. Although Russia would have a better international reputation if the war ended, Putin would have to overwhelm the
entrenched business and military interests that profit from continuing the war.
Lessons Learned
An issue-by-issue analysis suggests three conclusions about the role of domestic
politics on Russian foreign policy.
First, Putin's ability to get what he wants is often severely limited. Even on
those issues he cares about deeply, Putin must build a coalition. Moreover, he has
the time and willingness to battle opponents only on issues he believes are most
important.
Putin has the most clout on majoritarian issues such as convincing Russian
elites to go along with U.S. plans for strategic missile defense, since few Russian
elites, even the military, care deeply enough to organize for or against a particular result. But on key issues such as Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq, where
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DEMOKRATIZATSIYA
entrenched domestic lobbies have a strong interest in the status quo, there is
intense resistance to change. Despite his considerable formal presidential power,
Putin cannot easily alter Russia's economic relationships with those two countries. On interest group issues such as WTO accession, Putin acts as an arbiter
among competing interests, so far without concrete success. According to some
sources, Putin postponed military reform in exchange for securing the military's
acquiescence to the latest round of NATO expansion.
Second, economic issues occupy a central place in Russia's foreign policy agenda. Russia exports large quantities of oil, gas, steel, precious metals, fertilizer, and
timber, mostly to the West. At the same time, it exports manufactured products,
mainly arms and nuclear technology, to China, India, Iran,
the
Middle East, and Africa.
"The bilateral agenda focuses as
The
Russian president has had
never before on business questions, as
to balance the demands of the
W ashington seeks economic incentives to get Russia to change its inter national behavior."
military/industrial lobby with
those of the financial and natural resource sectors, each with
allies in the Duma, the Presidential Administration, and the
government ministries and
agencies with which they
work. Even Russia's assistance to the United States in the war on terrorism has an
economic dimension: Russia intends to build a deep-water port at Murmansk, from
which it could export oil to the United States (a project that would convey benefits to a few well-connected dornestic oil companies). The costs of an improved
port-millions of dollars of government expenditures-are widely distributed.
Finally, Russian foreign policy involves a far wider array of informal actors
than the similar process in the U.S. system. Russian political institutions, despite
Putin's pledge to "strengthen the state," are comparatively weak. Foreign policy
decision making and implementation often take place far from the Russian Foreign Ministry, often in the Presidential Administration, which has extensive ties
to Russian business.
The Bush Russia Policy
U.S. policy toward Russia has been conducted at many levels: direct contacts
between the two presidents and their closest advisers; cooperation by U.S. agencies-NASA, the FAA, the FBI, Commerce, and many others engaged in the substantive work on the bilateral agenda-and traditional, direct diplomatic relations
between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. embassy in Moscow with the
Russian Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, the sprawling, informal system of Russian foreign policy machinery presents significant problems for Washington. First,
since the rule of law in is weak, implementation of any policy is difficult. The
Russian bureaucracy is often corrupt and beyond the control of the Kremlin. Second, Russian political institutions are weak, and the distinction between public and
Working with the Russians 227
private activity is blurred. Finally, several Washington policy initiatives would alter
longstanding client or interest group policies that are difficult to change.
The Bush administration's policy toward Russia makes some headway toward
addressing these problems. In contrast to the Clinton administration, which gave
the domestic transformation of Russia the highest priority, the current administration today de-emphasizes that goal. Instead, its ties with Moscow, as with many
other countries, are largely determined by the extent to which they can help the
United States achieve broader foreign policy goals, such as halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, greater energy independence, victory in
Afghanistan, or the development of a missile defense system. While the Bush
administration does not ignore the need for Russia's democratic development, it
tends to view that transformation as a process that may be beyond the capacity
of the United States to influence and that may take many years to complete. The
career experience of many Bush administration officials in big business, moreover, enables the United States to be especially concerned with the commercial
issues that are key feature of Putin's foreign policy.
Thus, the bilateral agenda focuses as never before on business questions, as
Washington seeks economic incentives to get Russia to change its international
behavior. On Iraq, the Bush administration has moved to allay what many experts
believe is Russia's major concern: that its economic ties-including oil contracta
and debt repayment-will continue even if Saddam Hussein is overthrown.' In
addition, press reports suggest that the Bush administration may have reached a
gentleman's agreement with Russia to maintain oil at about $21 per barrel to allay
Moscow's concerns that the fall of Saddam and an influx of Western firms into
the country could lead to a collapse of oil prices. Other noteworthy moves include
an Export-Impon Bank promise to guarantee loans for rebuilding Russia's oil production infrastructure and the first U.S.-Russia energy summit, which took place
in Houston last October and featured business executives and government officials from both countries. Nor are the U.S. efforts limited to the energy sector. In
October, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, an international agency of thirty-one nations including the United States, removed Russia from
an international black list of about a dozen countries with inadequate monitoring
of money laundering, a move widely leen as partly a political gesture to President Putin.
Despite those steps, some U.S. initiatives that may disadvantage key Russian
interest groups have so far been unsuccessful. Moscow has reportedly resisted a
lucrative U.S. deal in exchange for Russia's halting construction of a nuclear reactor in Iran. According to press reports, the United States has told Russia that if it
cuts off all avenues of nuclear proliferation to Iran, the Bush administration would
work to lift restrictions on the import of spent nuclear material to Russia. Russia
believes it can make billions of dollars by storing and reprocessing radioactive
material from around the world, but it has so far been blocked by the United
States.5 Meanwhile, the implementation of production-sharing agreements in the
oil industry has been stymied by the reluctance of many Russian oil barons to
cede management of domestic oil fields to foreign competitors.
228 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA
As it seeks to consolidate Russia's turn toward the West, the Bush administration can continue to make progress by calibrating its dealings with Moscow
with the realities of Russian domestic politics. That will involve careful identification of key players on a given issue, devising a set of incentives that will induce
the players to change their behavior toward a desired outcome, and aboye all, realizing that Putin is not the leader "firmly in charge" as he is often portrayed in the
West. As during Soviet times, Moscow's foreign policy is both more and less than
it appears.
NOTES
1. Jessica T. Mathews, "September 11, One Year Later: A World of Change" Policy
Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Special Edition 18, 3.
2. L. Shevtsova, "Onward-and Westward?" Moscow Times, 25 November 2002.
3. C. A. Wallander, "The International Relations of the Post-Soviet States: Global Parameters and Domestic Determinants." Unpublished paper, 2002, 29.
4. See generally, D. N. Jensen, "How Russia is Ruled -1998," Demokratizatsiya 7,
no. 3 (Summer 1999): 341-69; J. Q. Wilson, A merican Government: Institutions and Policies (Lexington, Ma.: D.C. Heath, 1980), Part IV
5. Costs and benefits are what people believe them to be, whether or not such perceptions are accurate.
6. Those firms in recent years controlled one-third of the oil export market in that
country.
7. Iraq owes Russia approximately $12 billion, including interest. Russia has a $3.5
billion, 23-year deal with Iraq to rehabilitate Iraq¡ oilfields, including the rich West Qurna
deposit. Saddam's government has already announced that it is inclined to favor Russia,
rather than France or other contenders, for development rights to other major oil fields.
8. P. Baker, "Russia Resists Ending Iran Project," W ashington Post, 22 October 2002.