This art icle was downloaded by: [ 86.101.5.29] On: 29 May 2014, At : 10: 58 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ cnap20 Hegemonic, regional, minority and language policy in Subcarpathia: a historical overview and the presentday situation a Ist ván Csernicskó & Vikt ória Ferenc b a Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpat hian Hungarian Inst it ut e, Beregszász/ Berehovo, Ukraine b Doct oral Programme of Applied Linguist ics, Universit y of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary Published online: 27 May 2014. To cite this article: Ist ván Csernicskó & Vikt ória Ferenc (2014) Hegemonic, regional, minorit y and language policy in Subcarpat hia: a hist orical overview and t he present -day sit uat ion, Nat ionalit ies Papers: The Journal of Nat ionalism and Et hnicit y, 42: 3, 399-425, DOI: 10. 1080/ 00905992. 2013. 867933 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 00905992. 2013. 867933 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions Nationalities Papers, 2014 Vol. 42, No. 3, 399–425, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.867933 Hegemonic, regional, minority and language policy in Subcarpathia: a historical overview and the present-day situation István Csernicskóa* and Viktória Ferencb a Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, Beregszász/Berehovo, Ukraine; bDoctoral Programme of Applied Linguistics, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 (Received 27 March 2013; accepted 10 November 2013) During the twentieth century the region of Subcarpathia belonged to several different states: the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia, the independent CarpathoUkraine, the Hungarian Kingdom, the Soviet Union and finally to Ukraine. Today it borders four member states of the European Union (Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania), and due to its history several ethnicities and languages, religions and cultures live side by side in this region. However, as a consequence of the different language and minority policies in Subcarpathia, we cannot find a common language that everybody knows regardless of age, gender, education, religion or place of residence. The lack of a lingua franca makes dialogue between ethnicities difficult, sometimes even impossible. In this article we outline the main features of the regional, minority and language policies of the different states that existed at the various historical stages. We believe that the in-depth analysis of the history of this region can help find a model that could be useful not only in the region but also in the wider context of similarly multinational, linguistically diverse, culturally colorful territories in the Carpathian Basin and states in East-Central Europe. Keywords: Subcarpathia region; language policy; ethnic minority; multilingualism Introduction During the twentieth century the territory of the present-day region of Subcarpathia belonged to several different states: the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia, the independent Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hungarian Kingdom, the Soviet Union and finally to Ukraine. All the different states pursued ethnic and minority policies toward the region with the aim of maintaining power relations. In this article, alongside with providing a historical perspective of ethnic and language policy of the various ruling states toward Subcarpathia, the present-day ethnic and linguistic situation in the region will also be discussed. The last 150-year history of the region and the series of hegemonic minority regimes experienced by its population have an effect on the current-day situation as well. Minorities living in the territory even today almost completely lack the minority rights protection which exists in European states. Minority autonomy and rights have only been respected for geopolitical reasons previously, and as a historical heritage there is a monolingual attitude among policy-makers also at the present time. The multilingualism of society is not regarded as an advantage, different ethnicities do not learn each other’s *Corresponding author. Email: csistvan@kmf.uz.ua © 2014 Association for the Study of Nationalities Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 400 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc languages, and this causes problems for transnational communication between language groups. Multilingualism in the region is, in fact, a series of situations of separate monolingualism. Some of the minorities living in the region organize themselves successfully; however, such forms of minority self-governance like cultural or territorial autonomy are not part of social thinking which is mainly rooted in the state’s dismissive attitude. Rusyns constitute the largest minority in the region; however, their situation is quite controversial, since they have to fight for their mere recognition nowadays. The Ukrainian state and the societal discourse initiated by it do not recognize Rusyns as a separate nation and the language they speak as a separate language. While the law on national minorities in Ukraine guarantees citizens’ right to freely choose their national identity, Rusyn was not an option as a nationality during the latest census in 2001. This violates the liberal view that individuals have the right to free identification and the right to use their own language. The largest officially recognized minority group of the region is Hungarians. The Hungarian minority is small in size; however, the state of Hungary is an important neighbor for Ukraine in its contacts with the EU. More than 90% of Ukraine’s Hungarians are concentrated in this westernmost administrative region of the country, Subcarpathia. The proportion of Hungarians is 12% in Subcarpathia, while at the national level it is only 0.3%. The language of the Hungarian minority is one of the 13 languages to which Ukraine extended the scope of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Hungarians in Subcarpathia have cultural and educational institutions as well as two political parties organized on an ethnicity basis. Despite the representation of the Hungarians in the political sphere, the Ukrainian state rejects any kind of ambitions on the part of Hungarians toward political or territorial autonomy, as has been made evident by the sabotage of the establishment of an independent Hungarian electoral district recently.1 The rights of the Hungarian minority are individual rights and not accorded on a territorial basis. This article argues for the idea that the romantic nation state pursued by Ukraine should be replaced by thinking which is based on recognizing the importance of linguistic diversity and the rights to use one’s own language. When we analyze the relevant events of language, education and minority policy in the twentieth century in Subcarpathia, it becomes obvious that, in the longer run, strengthening the region’s autonomy can provide an opportunity to normalize linguistic and ethnic relations and to stimulate a dialogue between cultures. This complex situation, burdened with historic injuries, can be surmounted if the right to use one’s mother tongue is handled by politicians outside the framework of majority–minority relations: its foundation should be that every person (regardless of whether they are members of the majority or the minority) has the right to use their own language, because these are linguistic human rights, so the possibility to use one’s mother tongue is not merely “an additional” minority right. The geographical position and the outlined history of Subcarpathia Some of the borders of the present-day Subcarpathia are natural, some are artificial (see Figure 1). From the geographical point of view, the territory borders on the Carpathian Mountains in the northeast, and the river Tisza in the south. This natural border separates Ukraine and Poland (33 kilometers) and constitutes a part of the Ukrainian–Romanian border, too. This natural border separates the region from two other neighboring administrative regions of Ukraine: the county of Lviv (85 km) and the county of Ivano-Frankivsk (180 Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 401 Figure 1. The present-day Subcarpathia (marked as Transcarpathia) in Ukraine. km). Both the Ukrainian–Slovak border (98 km) and the Ukrainian–Hungarian border (135 km) were drawn artificially. A shorter part of the Ukrainian–Romanian border was also formed artificially (Molnár 2009, 107). According to historians, in the formation of artificial borders railway networks had played the most important part (Botlik 2005, 2008). The territory of the county of Subcarpathia is 12,800 km2 (Baranyi 2009, 19). A century ago the administrative region known today as Transcarpathia/Subcarpathia did not exist either as a geographical or as a geopolitical unit. It had belonged to several states during the twentieth century and had been known by various names (see Table 1). Until 1918 Hungary’s Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros counties made up a larger territory than the present-day Subcarpathia. In 1918 – during the period of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – the People’s Republic of Hungary passed a law on the autonomy of Rusyns in Hungary and called it Ruska Craina (literally meaning “Rusyn country”). The northern parts of the historical Hungary, the Slovak and Rusyn territories (together with a Hungarian population of considerable size), were annexed to Czechoslovakia under the peace treaties of Saint Germain and Trianon, in 1919 and 1920. From then on the official name of the territories of Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros counties annexed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia became Podkarpatská Rus (literally meaning “Subcarpathian Rus”). In the everyday Hungarian language use Rusinsko was also used besides Podkarpatska Rus, and then in the 1930s the expression Subcarpathia became more and more used, referring to the whole region. By the First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) Hungarian-populated territories annexed from Czechoslovakia by Hungary administratively were given back to the counties to which they had belonged to in the period before the Treaty of Trianon. On 15 March 1939, after the declaration of the independent Slovak Republic, Podkarpatska Rus, with Khust as its administrative center, proclaimed its independence under the name Carpathian Ukraine (Карпатська Україна in the Ukrainian original). This small state, however, was not long-lived. The very same day of 15 March, the Hungarian 402 Table 1. The status of the region between 1867 and 2011. Period Name of the region The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 1867–1918 Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, Máramaros counties People’s Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian Soviet Republic 1918–1919 Ruska Craina (25 December 1918); Hucul Republic (8 January 1919); Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, Máramaros counties (the first) Czechoslovak 1919–1938 Republic, (the second) CzechSlovak Republic 1938–1939 Podkarpatska Rus (Podkarpatská Rus) Carpathian Ukraine Podkarpatská Rus (Podkarpatská Rus, Подкарпатська Русь) 14–15 March 1939 Carpathian Ukraine (Карпатська Україна) Hungarian Kingdom 1939–1944 Subcarpathian Province (Kárpátaljai Kormányzóság) Transcarpathian Ukraine Transcarpathian Ukraine (Закарпатська Україна) The Soviet Union 26 November 1944–22 January 1946 1946–1991 Ukraine Since 1991 Transcarpathian county(Закарпатская область) Transcarpathian county (Закарпатська область) Status of the region In geographical and administrative sense it was not a unified region, but four counties of the Hungarian Kingdom, a member state of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy The autonomy of the region named Ruska Craina was not realized practically. The Hucul Republic referred to the eastern part of the country; however, the Romanian Army brought it to an end after a short time In reality the region was not an independent administrative unit Autonomy existed in theory; its sphere of authority was restricted It was an autonomous territory within the federal Czechoslovakia Declared itself as an independent state, however it was not recognized internationally The territory was ruled by a “temporary” central directive until the granting of the autonomous status (however, Rusyn autonomy was not realized) It was a temporary state without international recognition It was a simple administrative region within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic without any kind of autonomy It is a simple administrative region within the independent Ukraine without any kind of autonomy Sources: Bárdi et al. (2011), Fedinec (2002), Vehes and Fedinec (2010), Panchuk et al. (2008) and Vehes et al. (2011). I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 State affiliation Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 403 Army took military action to reoccupy its former territories and succeeded to occupy it in three days. The annexed territory became a new administrative unit, the Subcarpathian Province (Kárpátaljai Kormányzóság in the Hungarian original). In the autumn of 1944 the region was liberated by the Soviet Red Army. Behind the passing front a quasi-state was established, existing a few months only and called Transcarpathian Ukraine (Закарпатська Україна in the Ukrainian original). As a consequence of the 1945 Soviet–Czechoslovak agreement, in 1946 the region became a part of the Soviet Union, forming a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Its name, Закарпатская область “Transcarpathian county” was newly formed, following the political center’s geographical viewpoint and attaching “oblast” (meaning county) to it. The name literally means to the territory beyond the Carpathian Mountains. The region was the USSR’s western most district, its western gate. From this time on it was obligatory to refer to the region as Transcarpathia in any language. Ukraine, which gained its independence in 1991, thus, inherited the region from the Soviet Union. The name Закарпатська область “Transcarpathian county” was inherited as well. In everyday language the accepted name in Ukrainian is Закарпаття “Transcarpathia;” however, the local population of the region refers to it as Підкарпаття “Subcarpathia.”2 The population of the region From the ethnic, linguistic and denominational points of view the region has a mixed population. Ukrainian/Rusyn, Hungarian and Romanian ethnic groups are the most significant in number (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Ethnic map of Subcarpathia according to the 2001 census. Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 404 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Rusyns/Ukrainians make up the absolute majority in the region. Until 1945 the majority population was referred to as Rusyns, Ruthenians and Hungarian-Russians.3 Rusyns originate from the eastern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains; however, they have been living in the territory of the present-day Subcarpathia for several hundred years. Their identity, distinct from Ukrainians’, and the development of their own literary language were strongly supported by Hungary’s minority and language policy in the twentieth century. The usage of the ethnonym Ukrainians became more frequent only in the 1930s. After 1945 the Soviet Union prohibited the usage of the ethnonym Rusyn and banned the Greek Catholic church, which played an important role in preserving the community’s identity. The Soviet authorities explained the annexation of Subcarpathia to the Soviet Union as the “reunification” of the ancient Ukrainian land, therefore the local Slavic inhabitants were declared Ukrainian, and their language a dialect of the Ukrainian language.4 This view is shared by present-day Ukrainian politicians too: officially they do not recognize either the existence of the Rusyn ethnic group or the Rusyn language. Thus, the Slavic inhabitants of Subcarpathia were registered as Rusyns until the middle of the twentieth century and then as Ukrainians in the database of the Soviet and Ukrainian censuses (see Table 2). According to the latest, 2001 census Rusyn was declared as a nationality by 10,090 people (about 1% of all Subcarpathian Ukrainians), of which 6724 (66.6%) people also chose Rusyn as their native language (Iltio 2003; Kuzio 2005). Nevertheless, the data cannot be taken as authoritative because in the census questionnaire “Rusyn” was not listed as an option among nationalities, which obviously influenced people in making their choices. The contradiction of the situation is well described by the fact that while Rusyn is not officially recognized as a minority in Ukraine, several Rusyn organizations are still registered lawfully, Rusyn language and culture are taught in Sunday schools, and there are monuments and memorial plaques all across the territory dedicated to significant representatives of the Rusyn nation. Moreover, in 2005 a Rusyn Scientific and Scholarly Center was opened in Uzhgorod, which set out a professional journal titled Руснацький світ [Rusyn world]. In addition, Rusyn encyclopedias, dictionaries, grammars and readers and a newspaper in Rusyn language are also being published. Rusyn ethnic and cultural organizations have turned to the government several times asking to recognize Rusyn as a separate nation and a separate language. The Organization of Subcarpathian Rusyns (established in 1990) has demanded the recognition of Rusyns and asked for autonomy to former Podcarpatska Rus on the example of Switzerland. The argumentation of those who favor the recognition of Rusyns as a separate nation is strengthened by the fact that Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Croatia, as well as the USA and Canada recognize Rusyn as a separate nation and language (Magocsi 2011). On 1 May 2007 the Subcarpathian County Council passed Resolution 241 recognizing the Rusyn nation as a separate nation within the territory of Subcarpathia. However, if we have a closer look at the Ukrainian legislative system it becomes clear that in Ukraine any of the existing institutions have not the scope of authority to decide on the existence of a nation. International law, international declarations ratified by Ukraine (Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the Framework Convention and Paragraph 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the country’s interior law (Law on National Minorities in Ukraine) declare that every person belonging to a national minority has the right of free identification. Thus, choosing one’s identity is a right that should not be limited by the state (see Bauring 2008, 64). Rusyns Ukrainians Hungarians Russians Germans Romanians (Czecho)slovaks Jews Roma people Other 1880 1900 1910 1921 1930 1941 59.80 58.91 55.54 60.79 60.80 58.81 25.47 28.18 30.66 18.13 15.93 27.41 7.59 1.86 1.96 9.43 1.88 1.30 10.54 1.90 1.05 1.57 1.74 3.21 13.08 4.73 12.51 3.32 0.28 0.31 3.23 4.29 1.55 1.83 0.80 9.25 0.14 0.19 1959 1970 1979 1989 2001 74.60 15.89 3.22 0.38 1.99 1.34 1.32 0.54 0.72 76.42 14.37 3.33 0.40 2.22 0.97 1.03 0.56 0.71 77.75 13.71 3.61 0.32 2.35 0.77 0.33 0.48 0.67 78.41 12.50 3.97 0.28 2.37 0.59 0.21 0.97 0.69 80.51 12.08 2.47 0.29 2.56 0.45 0.04 1.12 0.48 Nationalities Papers Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Table 2. Changes of ethnic and national relations in the territory of the present-day Subcarpathia in % (1880–2001). Sources: Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények (1902), Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi (1998), Kárpátalja településeinek nemzetiségi (anyanyelvi) adatai (1996) and Iltio (2003). 405 Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 406 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Concerning the question of the Rusyn language, its codification is still going on; however, experts believe that factors like the negative attitude of certain political circles in Ukraine, the central government’s fear of a functioning regional literary microlanguage in the young state and the lack of the agreement on the part of the believers of this microlanguage could make the process difficult (Káprály and Pop 2001, 429). Others explain the lack of the codified version of the Rusyn language with historical reasons (Fedynyšynec’ 1996, 18). In addition, influential regional political support, which could effectively aid the cause of the Rusyn movement, is also missing. The current political intolerance experienced in the country is also an embarrassing factor. The recognition of Rusyns as a national minority and the question of the independent Rusyn language are not matters of scholarly or legal declaration, but political questions (Káprály and Pop 2001, 429; Kloss 1967a; Trudgill 1992, 2001). This has been demonstrated by the case of Ukrainian MP Oleksandr Holub, who turned to the Parliament of Ukraine with an initiative on setting out a resolution, which would recognize the Rusyn state as a nation separate from Ukrainian. The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations discussed the issue in February 2012. As was announced on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament),5 the committee rejected Holub’s initiative outright. The justification enclosed to the decision showed several inconsistencies: first it remarks that, according to international and national legal norms, the free choice and confession of one’s nationality is a private right of a citizen. Then it rejects the deputy’s proposal concerning the recognition of Rusyn as a separate nation referring to the official academic discourse which denies that Rusyn can be taken as a separate nation. Thus, everybody has the right to choose one’s identity and confess it; however, the state can overwrite it based on the opinion of the National Academy of Sciences. Moving on to the issue of the ethnic composition of the territory, Hungarians make up the largest (officially recognized) minority group. They live mainly in the southern part of the region. This minority group is the most organized one: they have a wide and extensive institutional network. In several kindergartens and more than a hundred schools the language of instruction is Hungarian. Some university degree programs also use Hungarian as a language of instruction. There is an independent Hungarian College in Berehovo (the Hungarian name of the town is Beregszász) established in 1996 and one of the faculties of the Uzhgorod National University has also had Hungarian degree programs since 2008 (Beregszászi et al. 2001; Orosz 2005, 2007). Two Hungarian political parties, several civic associations, cultural centers, libraries and scientific and scholarly organizations also exist. Newspapers are published in Hungarian at both national and regional levels, and literary journals and many books are published in Hungarian. Websites also function in Hungarian; Hungarian programs are popular on the county’s TV channel and radio as well. The Hungarian theatre in Berehovo is well known across the territory. In addition to fulfilling their religious tasks, Reformed, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches also support Hungarian institutions. All of this means that the Hungarian language in Subcarpathia is used in many domains of language use, it is not limited to the private sphere. Hungarian language schools in Ukraine are maintained by the Ukrainian state; however, renovation, building construction, equipment and modernization are primarily carried out with the help of financial help from abroad, especially from Hungary. Institutions established by the denominations are not supported by the state, thus their functioning is possible only with the help of Hungary’s support. Preserving the prestige of Hungarian medium education is more and more difficult due to the educational policy of the Ukrainian state nowadays. Therefore, many parents choose majority schools for their children. In sum, the Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 407 Hungarian language is present in many spheres of social life; however, favorable conditions are not guaranteed by law. Hungarian political representation is not strong enough to get into the Ukrainian Parliament and to champion the cause of Hungarian minority protection. Subcarpathia has other nationalities within its population; however, their numbers are quite small. The majority of the Romanian community live in some settlements alongside the Romanian–Ukrainian border. Russians appeared in the region after the Second World War as a result of the Soviet migration policy. The number of Germans, who had settled in the region mainly during the eighteenth century, became insignificant by today. The number of Slovaks is also small. They live in the western part of the region, mainly in the town of Uzhgorod and in its surroundings. Censuses taken in historical Hungary did not indicate Jews as a separate ethnic group; they were listed as Hungarians and Germans on the basis of their native language. Until their mass deportation in 1944, they were present in large numbers in the cities; however, today hardly any of them are left. Experts estimate the number of the Roma population significantly above what it appears in the statistical data, making up, in reality, approximately 2.5% of the total population of Subcarpathia. Ethnic and regional policy in the territory of the present-day Subcarpathia Every state to which the region belonged during the twentieth century made promises to develop some kind of autonomy in order to maintain the status quo (see Tables 1 and 3). However, explicitly in order to maintain the status quo, the practical realization of the promises never took place. After its defeat in the First World War, in 1918, Hungary offered autonomy to the region under the name Ruska Craina. However, by the time this could be realized, the territory had been annexed to the newly established Czechoslovak Republic. This newly formed state was given the territory under the terms that it would prove the region-wide autonomy. However, the first government of the autonomous territory was formed only in 1938. The autonomy was realized only when the Second World War approached and Europe’s political borders were redrawn according to the new power relations. In 1939 the international political situation resulted in an autonomy which led to the declaration of Carpathian-Ukraine’s independence – which turned out to be extremely short-lived, existing literally only a few hours. Changing the ethnic make-up of the territory was an important aim of the central political elite’s politics regarding Subcarpathia. After it was given the region in 1918, Czechoslovakia re-settled Czech and Slovak officials and soldiers in large numbers in the region. At the same time, many old-time Subcarpathian inhabitants were not given the Czechoslovak citizenship. In the southern part of the territory, inside the ethnically homogeneous Hungarian territories several Slavic settlements were established (see Figure 3). These ethno-political steps put the region’s indigenous population at a disadvantage because the implementation of the linguistic and ethnic rights was defined at the 20% threshold for minorities. In 1939 March, in a short military action the Hungarian army annexed the whole territory of Subcarpathia to Hungary and annulled the mini state of Carpathian Ukraine, which declared its independence at the same time. The territory belonged to Hungary only until 1944. The Hungarian government formed a special administrative unit here (called Subcarpathian Province); however, it decided against the establishment of the autonomous unit of Subcarpathian Vojvodina. The year 1944 is a tragic one in the history of Subcarpathia. Pressured by Nazi Germany, in the spring and summer of 1944 the Hungarian authorities first ordered the 408 Table 3. The promise and realization of autonomy in different historical periods. The promise of autonomy The Austro-Hungarian The planned autonomy is Ruska Monarchy (1867– Craina 1918) Czechoslovakia (1918– The planned autonomy is 1939) Podkarpatska Rus Carpathian Ukraine (1939) Hungarian Kingdom (1938/39–1944) The Soviet Union (1945–1991) Ukraine (since 1991) The practical realization of the autonomy In reality it did not function Violent intervention into the region’s linguistic, ethnic and national relations During the twentieth century such kind of politics was not characteristic in the region In reality it did not function. At the end of The settlement of Czech and Slovak officials, 1938, before the First Vienna Award, at the establishing Czech colonies (settlements) in the time of establishing the Second framework of the land reform. Many Czechoslovak Republic, Prague gave Subcarpathian people were refused citizenship permission to implement autonomy The independence process in this There were no claims for autonomy in the small Such kind of politics was not characteristic in the small and short-lived state could and short-lived state short-lived state happen due to the autonomy movement The planned autonomy is It was not realized Many Subcarpathian people were refused Subcarpathian Voivodina citizenship. Settling Hungarian officials, intellectuals. Deportation of local Jews (Holocaust). Giving political support to the concept of independent Rusyn ethnic group and language Despite the federal structure of the In comparison to Russians, Ukrainians in the Settlement of Russian and other nationality officials, state it was strongly centralized USSR had restricted practical rights both intellectuals, experts and soldiers. The from the linguistic and ethnic points of views deportation of Hungarian and the German men, making the Rusyn ethnic group and language disappear administratively. The registration of Romanians as Moldavians The population of Subcarpathia Despite the referendum in 1991 it was not Ukraine does not maintain politics in this direction. voted positively to the autonomy realized The existence of the Rusyn ethnic group and of the region in a referendum in language are not recognized by Ukraine 1991 Sources: Vehes and Fedinec (2010) and Panchuk et al. (2008). I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 State Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 409 Figure 3. Czech colonies in Subcarpathia. Source: Vehes and Fedinec (2010, 65). Jewish population into ghettos, and then deported them to concentration camps. According to different sources, 85,000 people, three-quarters of the Subcarpathian Jewish community, were deported (Stark 2010, 191–221). In the autumn of 1944, preparing the region to join the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army deported Subcarpathian Hungarian men between the ages of 8 and 50 and the local German population to Stalinist camps. In experts’ estimations 40,000–60,000 ethnic Hungarian and German people were taken to camps by the Soviet authorities, approximately 20,000–25,000 of them never to return from there (Botlik and Dupka 1991, 1993; Zseliczky 1993). The Soviet Union influenced the ethnic composition of the region in other ways as well. After the Second World War, Russians, Ukrainians and representatives of other Soviet nationalities were settled in Subcarpathia. Rusyn as a nationality became outlawed; Rusyns were registered obligatorily as Ukrainians. Subcarpathia’s Romanians were declared to be Moldavians administratively – as a consequence of which the Romanian community of the region did not appear as a national minority living next to the neighboring Romania. Until the fall of the communism Subcarpathia’s Romanians appeared in statistics as members of the Soviet community of the newly established Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (in the territory of Bessarabia, annexed from Romania). In the Soviet Union the self-determination of the 15-member republics and the autonomous republics was restricted as well. Everything was ruled by the Communist Party and from Moscow. The strongly centralized Soviet Union suppressed attempts aimed at establishing autonomy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the independent Ukraine inherited the territory of Subcarpathia. In the independent Ukraine the idea of declaring the Subcarpathian autonomy arose too. The local population’s supportive intention was made evident in the referendum on 1 December 1991, when 78% of the voters voted for the autonomy. In the Hungarianpopulated district of Berehovo, an additional question appeared on the ballot about whether voters were for establishing an ethnic Hungarian autonomous district with Berehovo as its Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 410 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc center, and 81.4% of the voters voted for the Hungarian autonomous region. However, Kyiv disregarded the results of the regional referendums. The elections showed that the claim to autonomy is still present among the Subcarpathian people; however, it also became apparent that the ambitions on the part of the Rusyns/Ukrainians and Hungarians were similar: both ethnic groups claimed autonomy, but not a shared one. After the Ukrainian state began to foster centralization and strengthened its positions, all kinds of autonomy ambitions were regarded as anti-constitutional, a separatist criminal act against the state’s territorial integrity and security, and the center refused to enter into a dialogue on this issue. By today the situation has not changed much: the Rusyns’ movement for their mere recognition in Subcarpathia has been rejected exactly for the reason that it could violate the unity of the young Ukrainian state and nation. The official discourse treats Rusyns as Ukrainians. Some of the experts find the Rusyns’ movement obviously rooted in politics and as being the sight of provincial nationalism (e.g. Baleha 2003, 2010; Majboroda 1999; Myshanych 1999; Panchuk 1995; Pipash 2011, 2012), their ambitions as separatism violating the integrity of Ukraine (e.g. Myshanych 1999; Pipash 2012; Savojs’ka 2011, 291; Shevchuk and Trach 2009, 101; Zan 2010a, 2010b), and see Rusyns themselves as a pseudo-minority (e.g. Marchuk 2011; Nahorna 2008, 310; Yevtux et al. 2003, 92). Another indication of the central power’s dismissive attitude toward the issue of the autonomy can be found in the letter written by the head of the State Committee on Nationality and Migration Questions to the deputy prime minister (dated 7 October 1996) in which he proposed alternatives for solving the problems of “Ukrainian-Rusyns” (українцірусини). The letter is about an action plan, which was developed by the above-mentioned authority on the government’s order.6 According to the document, Ukrainian state authorities as well as foreign representations should make it obvious that Subcarpathia’s autonomy is without any prospects from ethnic, cultural and administrative viewpoints – and, thus, any kind of locally initiated referendum should be avoided on this issue. One of the tasks refers to an assignment given to authoritative bodies to prove that Rusyns do not exist. The region was/is not an organic or integral part of any of the states to which it has belonged: it constituted a peripheral part of every state, situated far from all capitals from which the territory was ruled during the twentieth century. Despite this, the political elites of the capitals had made decisions on the local peoples’ fates, lives and autonomy instead of the local population. When the region belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the Rusyns were divided into several counties, and were not dealt as not an organic whole. Its annex to Czechoslovakia cannot be explained either with ethnic, historical, cultural, or with linguistic arguments. The Czechoslovak state formed after the First World War was given the territory due to strategic reasons: the region served as a direct connection between the allied Czechoslovakia and Romania. Both Czechoslovakia and Romania were interested in weakening Hungary. There was a territorial debate between Poland and Czechoslovakia, therefore Hungary and Poland shared the common interest of weakening Czechoslovakia. The Polish government strongly supported Hungary’s ambition to get back Subcarpathia (Podcarpatska Rus) from Czechoslovakia. After the Second World War II, the Soviet Union annexed the territory for strategic reasons, too. The Soviet propaganda proclaimed that the Slavic populations on both sides of the Carpathians share the same ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity and used this as grounds for annexing the territories. That is why the ethonym Rusyn had to be Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 411 prohibited. However, the belonging of Galician and Subcarpathian Ukrainians does not give grounds to the annexation of the southern Hungarian-populated part of the territory to the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became independent within the borders of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1991 it inherited the territories which were annexed by the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. Again, the ethnic, ethnographic and linguistic connection of Ukrainians living on either side of the Carpathians, and the small and short-lived state of “Carpathian Ukraine” established in 1939, served as a “legal ground” of the inheritance. However, the almost exclusively Hungarian-populated southern strip of the region differs from the other territories of the region from ethnic, ethnographic, cultural, denominational and linguistic points of view, too. The authority of neither Podkarpatska Rus nor of Carpathian Ukraine and the Subcarpathian Province was extended to this territory. Despite that under the impact of foreign and internal affairs over and above the region Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine as well decided besides centralization instead of autonomy, offered hegemony instead of regionalism for Subcarpathia (see Table 3). The case of Subcarpathia demonstrates that a policy which neglects the needs and possibilities of local people can be successful. In the past almost 150 years the regional language and educational policy of the different power states was guided by the goal of strengthening the power positions of the majority elite. Every state makes promises for the development of some kind of autonomy; however, the population of the region has never experienced real autonomy. Decisions concerning the region’s future, the existence or non-existence, development or oppression of local people, languages, cultures and denominations were made typically not by the local people but by the political elites living in distant capitals. Today ambitions aimed at autonomy are rejected and marked as separatist crimes against the integrity of the state. Language and education policy in the territory of the present-day Subcarpathia Kloss (1967b, 15) distinguishes the following five stages in discussing the status of languages: (1) The language is official in country-wide measures. (2) It is the official language of a larger regional unit (area, district, land, etc.). (3) Minority language use permitted by authority in public education, public advertisements, though the minority language does not have an official status. (4) Tolerance toward the language in the private sphere (in the press, church and private schools, etc.). (5) Prohibition of the language. There are such cases when the existence of a language is not recognized. We take this as the sixth stage (6). In the last 110 years the state language changed six times in the region. Four different languages fulfilled this function: Hungarian (twice – until 1918, and between 1938 and 1944), “Czechoslovak” (between 1918 and 1938), Ukrainian (in 1939, and since 1991) and Russian (between 1945 and 1991). The Rusyn language had official status twice in the region: between 1918 and 1938 in Czechoslovakia it was official in addition to the Czech language, and between 1939 and 1944 in Hungary in addition to Hungarian. If we consider Rusyns as an independent nation and Rusyn as an independent language, then we have to realize that the language of the majority group of the region has never had the status of state language here. Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 412 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc The existence of the independent Rusyn language was not recognized by the Soviet Union and nor has it been recognized by the Ukrainian state. Between 1939 and 1944 in the Subcarpathia that was part of Hungary the Rusyn language (called “magyarorosz” or “угроруська,” that is “Hungarian-Russian” according to the contemporary wording) enjoyed support and Ukrainian was prohibited by the authorities. Between 1938 and 1944 the Hungarian state endeavored to strengthen the national identity of the Rusyns through considerable political, ethnic and financial support. The aim of such Hungarian policy was to strength the identity of the local Slavic population, which differed from the other Slavic nations (Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks and Poles). A central part of the policy was the standardization and codification of the Rusyn dialect and the possibility to use the Rusyn in official functions (see Table 4). The language policy of a state determines which languages will be present in education and what position they will occupy. When the state language changed in the course of the history of the region, the obligatorily taught languages in school education also changed. Table 5 attempts to summarize which language or languages were taught as obligatory in the different historical periods. In addition to the obligatorily taught state language in the period between 1918 and 1944, the region’s majority language, the Rusyn, was also taught. During the existence of the Soviet Union, teaching Ukrainian was not obligatory in schools where the medium of instruction was a language other than Ukrainian. In the past 150 years, between 1867 and 2011, the Rusyn language was obligatory for every schoolchild for 24 years, the Hungarian language for 23, Ukrainian for 21, and “Czechoslovak” for 19 years. In Subcarpathian schools Russian was taught for the longest time: 45 years (see Figure 4). Changing from the obligatory teaching of one language to another always involved a transition period. For a while (even for a number of years) there were no suitably trained teachers; curricula, course books and teaching aids were missing. The generation who had already finished school did not get any organized possibility to learn the new state language. In this way, for example, those who left school before 1990 in the Soviet Union and had not attended a Ukrainian-medium school did not learn Ukrainian language at all during their school education. Ukraine, which has been independent since 1991, still has not created all the necessary conditions for the state language to be taught in minority schools (Beregszászi and Csernicskó 2009; Csernicskó 1998, 2005; Csernicskó and Orosz 1999; Csernicskó and Ferenc 2009, 2010; Melnyk and Csernicskó 2010b). It is characteristic of the language policy in the region that every state endeavored to strengthen the position of its own state language in the territory. The language of the local majority (Rusyn) was used as official only between the two world wars. In other periods the state language itself filled a part of the (only one) official language, too. Even though in the Soviet period, when Subcarpathia belonged to the USSR, the Ukrainian language also had official status, this role remained symbolic. In every historical period the state language policy came short on offering a comforting settlement of the status of minority languages. In every period, education was seen as one of the most important means of extending the functions of the state language. Every state recognized the multilingual and multi-ethnic character of the region. However, in all cases the state tried to develop asymmetrical bilingualism in the territory. A peculiarity of this type of bilingualism is that learning the state language is obligatory for minorities living in the territory, but the linguistic group which is in the power does not have to learn any of the minority languages. Only the period between 1939 and 1944 can be seen as an exception, when authorities required officials to learn and use the language of the local majority (Rusyn) (see Table 6). Rusyn The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918) (the first) Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) (the second) Czech-Slovak Republic (1938–1939) Carpathian Ukraine (1939) Hungarian Kingdom (1938/ 39–1944) The Soviet Union (1945– 1991) Ukraine (since 1991) Ukrainian 3. – 2. (Podkarpatska Rus) Hungarian Russian Czechoslovak Romanian 3 4. 4. 3. 1. State language 3. 3 3. 4. 2. (Podkarpatska Rus) 3. 3 – 2. (Committee of Transcarpathian Province) 6. 1. State language 5. 3. 1. State language – 4. 1. State language 1. State language 4. 4. 2. (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) 3. 3. 3. 1. State language (from 1989) 3. 1. State language (its status not codified by law) 3. 3. 3. 6. 3. 4. 4. Nationalities Papers Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Table 4. The status of larger languages used in Subcarpathia in different historical periods based on Kloss’ classification (1967b). Sources: Nádor (2002), Csernicskó (1998) and Melnyk and Csernicskó (2010c, 631). 413 414 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Table 5. Languages taught as obligatory in the region during the 20th century. Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 State language, taught as obligatory Regional official language, taught as obligatory Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918) Czechoslovakia (1918–1939) Hungarian Kingdom (1939–1944) Soviet Union (1945–1991) Hungarian Russian9 – Ukraine (since 1991) Ukrainian – “Czechoslovak” (Czech) Hungarian – Foreign languages taught Latin, German Rusyn Latin Rusyn Latin Choice of English, German, or French Choice of English, German, or French Source: Melnyk and Csernicskó (2010c, 637). Figure 4. Comparison of the periods when certain languages were taught as obligatory in schools (1867–2011). Source: Melnyk and Csernicskó (2010c) As a consequence of such language and educational policy, today there is no common language in Subcarpathia: there is not one single language which – independently of education, place and nationality – everybody in the region knows. This was also true at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century, and it is still true at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the early twentieth century in Hungary’s Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros counties the majority of the population did not speak the state language. As the figures of the 2001 census show, Ukrainian is clearly the most widespread language in Subcarpathia: 82.57% of the population, or more than one million people speak it. However, 17.43% of the Subcarpathian population – that is, more than 200,000 people – do not speak Ukrainian. In the period between the two latest censuses, 1989 and 2001, the ratio of people who could speak exclusively their mother tongue (and not Table 6. Characteristic features of the language policies of the different states. Insistent spread of the majority/ state language Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918) Czechoslovakia (1918–1939) Gradual strengthening of the positions of the Hungarian language Moderate strengthening of the positions of the “Czechoslovak” language Carpathian Ukraine (1939) Hungarian Kingdom (1938/ 39–1944) Strengthening the situation of the Ukrainian language Strengthening the state language status of the Hungarian language Soviet Union (1945–1991) Forcing the use of Russian language as “the language of international communication” (язык межнационального общения) Gradual strengthening of the state language status of the Ukrainian language, extending its sphere of applicability Ukraine (since 1991) The usage of minority languages in official status Only Hungarian (and German) was used as official language Rusyn was obligatory in official language use. Other minority languages could be used where the ratio of minority was above 20% The state had only one official language, Ukrainian Hungarian-Russian (i.e. Rusyn) language was obligatorily used as official language in administration and in offices In the territory of the USSR it was possible to use the Ukrainian language besides Russian In those territories where national minorities made up the majority besides the state language the use of the mother tongue is also permitted. However, the country has only one state and official language, Ukrainian Insistent spread of the state language in education Insistent spread of the Hungarian language in the sphere of education (e.g. Lex Apponyi) Teaching Czechoslovak language was obligatory, but the right to study in one’s mother tongue worked as well Type of the developing bilingualism Asymmetrical Asymmetrical The medium of education was the Asymmetrical Ukrainian language There were schools where the Symmetrical: it was medium was minority obligatory to learn the local languages, however, authorities Slavic population’s spread Hungarian medium language for Hungarian education gradually officials, executives, officers and teachers There were schools with Asymmetrical instruction in minority languages, however, the government supported Russian medium education In the beginning the minority Asymmetrical school system developed rapidly, however, recently the strengthening of the status of the state language is characteristic in education 415 Sources: Csernicskó (2010), Fedinec and Csernicskó (2010) and Melnyk and Csernicskó (2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Nationalities Papers Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 States 416 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc Table 7. The ratio of state language speakers in the total population of the region based on census data (in %). In 1910 In 1989 State language Hungarian Spoken (%) Ung Bereg Ugocsa Máramaros 48.6 63.5 59.1 24.1 In 2001 State language Spoken (%) State language Spoken (%) Russian 58.8 Ukrainian 82.6 Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Table 8. Language knowledge of the population of Subcarpathia on the basis of the censuses of 1989 and 2001 (in %). Spoken as mother tongue Spoken as a second language Total proportion of speakers Proportion of those who cannot speak it Languages In 1989 In 2001 In 1989 In 2001 In 1989 In 2001 In 1989 In 2001 Ukrainian Hungarian Russian 78.10 13.38 4.99 81.00 12.65 2.90 3.86 1.00 53.79 1.57 3.08 2.62 81.96 14.39 58.78 82.57 15.74 5.52 18.04 85.61 41.22 17.43 84.26 94.48 Figure 5. The proportion of people speaking exclusively their mother tongue in Subcarpathia in case of different nationalities based on censuses of 1989 and 2001 (in %). speak any other languages) did not decrease but increased instead (see Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 5). The same was true in all historical periods: the ratio of monolingual speakers was always highest among the ethnic group which was in power. However, the state language of the given period has always been used by many people. Nationalities Papers 417 Language situation in Ukraine In accordance with the Constitution, Ukraine is de jure a monolingual state (see Beregszászi and Csernicskó 2009; Csernicskó 2005; Csernicskó and Ferenc 2009, 2010; Melnyk and Csernicskó 2010d). However, Ukraine is de facto bi- or multilingual. Some experts (Arel and Khmelko 1996; Khmelko 2004) maintain that Ukraine’s population is made up of three linguistic and/or ethnic groups: (1) Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (about 40–45% of the country’s population). (2) Russian-speaking Ukrainians (about 30–34% of the country’s population). (3) Russian-speaking Russians (about 20%). Other sources, like the 2001 national census (which focused not only on the Ukrainian and Russian populations, but also on other smaller linguistic groups) divided the country’s population into the following groups on the basis of people’s native languages: Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 (1) People who speak Ukrainian as their native language, including: (a) Ukrainians (by nationality) whose native language is Ukrainian (85% of those who claimed to be Ukrainian). (b) Russians whose native language is Ukrainian (4% of those who claimed to be Russian). (c) National minorities whose native language is Ukrainian (e.g. 71% of the Poles and 42% of the Slovaks who live in Ukraine). (2) People who speak Russian as their native language, including: (a) Russians whose native language is Russian (96% of those who claimed to be Russian). (b) Ukrainians whose native language is Russian (15% of Ukrainians). (c) National minorities whose native language is Russian (e.g. 62% of the Byelorussians). (3) (4) National minorities whose ethnicity and native language are the same (e.g. 95% of the Hungarians and 92% of the Romanians). National minorities who speak the native language of another minority group (e.g. in Subcarpathia 62% of the Roma consider Hungarian to be their native language, this group constitutes 18% of all Roma in Ukraine; cf. Braun, Csernicskó and Molnár 2010, 24–25). Nearly half of the country’s population use the Russian language in everyday interactions, 30% of them have Ukrainian as their mother tongue (Besters-Dilger 2008, 2009; Majboroda et al. 2008; Masenko 2010; Vorona and Shulha 2007). There are considerable differences between the ratio of Ukrainians and Russians in concrete administrative regions, too. From a linguistic perspective we can find gaps between the regions of Ukraine (Arel and Khmelko 1996; Khmelko and Wilson 1998; Kulyk 2008). These gaps have political dimensions, too. On the occasion of presidential elections in 2004 and 2010 (and on every occasion of country-wide elections) Ukraine practically split into two parts. In general, the mainly Ukrainian-speaking western, northern and central regions stand for one political power, and the Russian dominant eastern and southern parts stand for the other (Melnyk and Csernicskó 2010d, 72–78). 418 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc The political situation of Ukraine is explosive and unstable, governments follow each other in quick succession. In the 450-member Parliament the majority often depends on a few votes. The language question has already been a campaign topic at the very first election and remained important up to the present (Kulyk 2008; Zaremba and Rymarenko 2008a). As a result of the explosive campaigns, which treated the language issue in an exceptional way, a paradoxical situation developed concerning the evaluation of the situation and status of languages. Sociological studies proved that in the clearly Ukrainian-dominant western part of the country people are afraid of the possibility of the Russian language becoming the second state language, which would threaten Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian language and nation would be imperiled. Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 It can be stated that the survival of the Ukrainian state depends on the real introduction of the Ukrainian language in every sphere of the state and social life. In the present circumstances language is the guarantee of the national security, territorial unity, the national identity and the historical memory of the people. (Yushchenko 2010, 1) In the almost exclusively Russian-speaking south and east, people think that it is Ukranifying politics that endangers the Russian language and identity of the Russians living in Ukraine (see Zaremba and Rymarenko 2008b, 276). This complex linguistic and political situation has to be handled by the Ukrainian politics. The political powers, whatever position they have during election campaigns on the language issue, later try to balance between the linguistically split regions of the country. After winning the elections they do not stick to realizing their promises (Kulyk 2008, 53–54). This tactic was followed by the first president of the independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk as well, who successfully managed to maintain his position during the transition from the communist system. Kravchuk did not urge Ukrainification; however, he gave several positions to the national elite, which showed considerable achievements in widening the usage of the Ukrainian language in the public administration. President Leonid Kuchma was the master of the same politics during his 10-year-long mandate. In the campaign of the presidential election of 1994, in contrast with Kravchuk, Kuchma won the election with the promise of strengthening connections with Russia and giving official status to the Russian language. In the 1999 presidential election Kuchma faced the Russophile communist Petro Simonenko, at which time he proclaimed that Ukraine should have only one state and official language, Ukrainian. After the Orange Revolution of 2004, the most important aim of the Ukrainian language policy became the practical securing of state language status for the Ukrainian language. The political attempt was to solve the tension between the de jure situation (Ukraine is a monolingual state) and the de facto situation (the majority of the population speak more than one language). However, in the eastern and southern regions of the country (where the Russian language is dominant) the national politics provoked resistance. As a result, in the 2010 presidential election the “orange” elite was overthrown. Yanukovich won the election, who in his campaign promised to address the status of the Russian language. However, when he came to power, he quickly realized that if he kept on strengthening the status of the Russian language, he would evoke the opposition of the western and northern regions. In a short time he gave up the idea of making the Russian language the second state language in Ukraine. But in order to live up to his voters’ expectations, his supporting political party, the Party of Regions, submitted a draft of a language law to the Parliament which would ensure the official status of the Russian language practically in the whole territory of the state. However, the Parliament had not Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 Nationalities Papers 419 dealt with the draft due to the protest of the Ukrainian nationalists. Thus, the status quo remained: the Ukrainian language is the only one state language in Ukraine, but Russian has dominance in several regions of the country and is dominant also in popular culture and media. In August 2011 government politicians submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a new draft for settling linguistic relations. The law was passed under scandalous conditions (during one of the parliamentary sessions a fist fight broke out). The language law would make the official use of minority languages7 obligatory in every administrative unit where speakers of the language in question reach a 10% threshold. According to analysts, the law primarily favors Russian. Russian could become a regional language in the whole territory of Ukraine and in 13 administrative units (the capital Kyiv, the Crimean Autonomous Republic, the city of Sevastopol and in 10 counties) of the total of 27. Alongside with this only the Crimean Tatar language (in the Crimean Autonomous Republic), Romanian (in Chernivtsi County) and Hungarian (in Subcarpathia) could get regional language status at the county level. Speakers of factually endangered languages (e.g. Karaim and Krymchak) in theory cannot facilitate possibilities offered by the new law, because their proportion in the local population does not reach the 10% threshold in any of the administrative units.8 It is still an open question how the Rusyns can practice their rights, since they are not at present recognized as a separate nation by Ukraine and their language is regarded as a dialect of Ukrainian. As we can see, the language issue in Ukraine is highly polarized and emotionally loaded. The political power which wants to change the present-day status quo inevitably has to confront half of the country in every case. It is not accidental that before the new language law was passed in Ukraine no law was passed in the last 15 years which directly focused on the status of minorities or languages. The ratification of two international documents was the only exception (the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages). Summary Today Subcarpathia borders four member states of the European Union (Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania) and it finds itself within the borders of Ukraine, an extensive state with 46 million inhabitants. Due to its history, several ethnicities and languages (Ukrainian, Rusyn, Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak and Roma), several denominations and religions (Orthodox Christian, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic, Protestant and Jewish) and many cultures have lived side by side here. The region lies on the border between western and eastern Christian civilization and culture, belongs to the European border region, and is included in the Eastern Partnership as well. However, the territory is completely lacking minority right supporting regimes, which is deeply rooted in the historical heritage of the region. As the consequence of the ethnic and language policy the region experienced during the last 150 years, when minority autonomy and rights have only been respected for geopolitical reasons, there is a monolingual attitude among present-day policy-makers as well, and they do not respect the multilingual situation in society. We are completely aware of the fact that minority protection within the EU is not perfect; however, Subcarpathia has a monolingual, hegemonic minority rights regime which needs to be improved and brought closer to meeting European norms. Every time the change of the power went together with the change of the political, economic, ideological and language policy discourses as well. The changing language policy Downloaded by [86.101.5.29] at 10:58 29 May 2014 420 I. Csernicskó and V. Ferenc also changed which language(s) can appear in school education and in what function (as a subject only or as medium of instruction). However, the political elite in power did not offer the additive type of bilingualism for the population of the ethnically, culturally, religiously and linguistically colorful region but the subtractive type of it. The kind of language policy which supports only the use of the majority language does not lead to speakers’ multilingualism and does not help maintain linguistic diversity. A consequence of this kind of regional, cultural, nationality and language policy is that today in Subcarpathia we cannot find a common language that everybody knows regardless of age, gender, education, religion or place of residence. The lack of a lingua franca makes the dialogue between ethnicities difficult, sometimes even impossible. In the present-day situation the largest minority group of Subcarpathia, Rusyns, are not even recognized; the group is registered as an ethnographic group of Ukrainians. This violates the internationally approved view that individuals have the right to free identification and to the use of their own language. Since the end of the Second World War, no ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural conflicts have flared up in the region. However, this is not the result of the state’s ethnic, linguistic and regional policy, but the merit of local people’s tolerance. However, in the future peace and safety can be provided only through the promotion of linguistic and cultural diversity, the support of minority rights, and giving up the model of the romantic nation state. Notes 1. The news in the local media: http://karpatinfo.net/hetilap/nem-lesz-magyar-valasztokorzetkarpataljan and Kinga Gál, Hungarian EP member remarks on the topic: http://galkinga.hu/hir/ kisebbsegellenes_az_ukran_valasztokeruleti_dontes 2. The usage of the name of Transcarpathia vs. Subcarpathia (in Ukrainian Закарпаття vs. Підкарпаття, in Hungarian Kárpátontúl vs. Kárpátalja) indicates a geographical and/or political viewpoint at the same time. Viewed from Moscow and Kyiv, the region is situated beyond the Carpathian Mountains, which is why Ukrainians and Russians use the name Transcarpathia (Закарпаття in Ukrainian, and Kárpátontúl in Hungarian). Viewed from Budapest and Prague, and from the point of view of the local population, it is situated at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, which gives it the name Subcarpathia (Підкарпаття in Ukrainian, and Kárpátalja in Hungarian). The name used for the region is not unified in the international literature either. In the English language the terms Subcarpathia and Transcarpathia exist side by side. In the German language most frequently the terms Karpato-Ukraine and Transkarpatien are used. Papers in French mostly refer to it as Ukraine Subcarpathique. Karpato-Ukraine reflects the political reality for the most part; however, the raison d’etre of Subkarpatien as a historical term is considered indisputable. Without any political engagement we decided to use the term Subcarpathia in this article. 3. For further information, see e.g. Dickinson 2010; Kuzio 2005; Lane 2001; Magocsi 1993, 1996; Nekvapil 2007. 4. See, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Opinion on Ukraine.Кримські студії, Інформаційний бюлетень 19–20 (1–2), 2003, p. 164. 5. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_2?pf3516=7242&skl=7 6. No. 17626/34. dated on 5 September 1996. 7. 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