The Anaphor Agreement Effect and Georgian Anaphors*
Nino Amiridze
Abstract
Standard Binding Theory does not give a straightforward account for
the subject anaphor gap. Rizzi’s (1990) Anaphor Agreement Effect and its
modified version (Woolford (1999)) were designed to account for that gap.
The paper deals with Georgian anaphors representing counter-examples for
both versions of the Anaphor Agreement Effect. It argues that the
explanation for the presence of subject anaphors in Georgian can be given
neither within Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) “Reflexivity” framework as it
was previously suggested in Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) and
Everaert (2001) for Greek and Georgian. In fact there is more than only the
internal structure of anaphors and the related anaphoric properties responsible
for the existence of subject anaphors.
1. Anaphor Agreement Effect explaining a gap in the paradigm of anaphors
Rizzi (1990) offers evidence from Italian and Icelandic to argue that anaphors that are in
agreement with the verbal complex are ungrammatical. The Icelandic data in (1a) and
the Italian example in (2a) illustrate that when an anaphor is marked by nominative and,
thus, triggers agreement like any nominative NP does in these languages, the sentences
are ungrammatical. But if the anaphors are marked by a case other than nominative (i.e.,
*
I am grateful to Martin Everaert for his help on every stage of writing this paper. I
have benefited from comments from Rusudan Asatiani, Olivier Bonami, Patricia
Cabredo-Hofherr, Peter Cole, Gabriela Hermon, Torsten Leuschner, Lea Nash, Eric
Reuland, Kakhi Sakhltkhutsishvili, Kevin Tuite. I would also like to thank Xabier
Artiagoitia and Itziar Laka for their help with Basque data and also everyone who
participated in the discussion on Basque subject anaphors during December 2001 on the
Basque linguistics e-list. This research was made possible through a grant of the Utrecht
institute of Linguistics OTS in the context of the Language in Use project.
1
accusative in (1b) and genitive in (2b)) and, thus, do not trigger agreement the sentences
are grammatical:
(1) a. *Siggai telur aδ SIGi
Sigga
elski
María.
[Icelandic, Maling (1984)]
thinks that REFL-NOM loves-SUBJ Maria-ACC
“Sigga thinks that he loves Maria.”
b. Siggai telur aδ
María
elski
SIGi.
Sigga thinks that Maria-NOM loves-SUBJ REFL-ACC
“Sigga thinks that Maria loves him.”
(2) a. *A loroi
interessano solo se stessii.
[Italian, Rizzi (1990)]
to them.DAT interest.3PL only REFL.3PL.NOM
“They’re only interested in themselves.”
b. A loro
importa solo di se stessi.
to them.DAT matters only of REFL.3PL.GEN
“They only matter to themselves.”
Rizzi (1990) argues that what precludes a nominative anaphor is the presence of
agreement and formulates a generalization which “holds quite systematically in natural
languages” the following way:
(3)
The Anaphor Agreement principle
Anaphors do not occur in syntactic positions construed with agreement
The anaphor in (1a) is a subject and the sentence is ungrammatical while the same
anaphor in object position (cf. (1b)) is fully grammatical. This must not give us a wrong
idea that there are certain positions (i.e., object position) associated with anaphors
where they can appear as opposed to other positions where one can never find anaphors.
Rizzi (1990) gives instances of anaphors appearing as subjects (cf. (4)) and whenever
they do they never trigger agreement with the finite verb:
(4)
Hún sagdi aδ
she said
sig
vantadi
peninga.
[Icelandic, Maling (1984)]
that REFL-ACC lack-SUBJ money
“She said that she lacked money.”
If an anaphor does trigger agreement, as is always the case for the subject position in
languages like English, Italian and Icelandic, and is sometimes the case for an object
2
position (cf. (2a)), the sentences are ungrammatical. Therefore, not the subject/nonsubject status of an anaphor is crucial but the presence/absence of agreement (Rizzi
1990: 33).
In order to explain the incompatibility of anaphors and agreement, Rizzi (1990)
(following Picallo (1985)) claims that the agreement affix, assumed to be pronominal
(Chomsky (1981)), and the anaphor will clash whenever forming a chain. Both members
of the chain are never able to satisfy binding conditions simultaneously. The agreement
being pronominal is subject to the Principle B and requires to be locally free while the
anaphor has to satisfy principle A and requires to be locally bound. Under these
considerations agreeing anaphors are correctly predicted to be ungrammatical.
Since anaphors are incompatible with agreement, (subject) anaphors in the absence
of agreement should be grammatical (unless blocked by other aspects of the binding
theory) (Chinese, Korean, Malayalam, Khmer, Thai, Vietnamese, etc.), as predicted by
the principle. The languages lacking agreement completely are a support for the
hypothesis since they allow subject anaphors:
(5)
Zhangsan shuo ziji
hui lai.
[Chinese, Huang (1982)]
Zhangsan said himself will come
“Zhangsan said he will come.”
2. Modified Anaphor Agreement Effect
2.1 Languages with object agreement
The Anaphor agreement principle implies not only that subject anaphors are
ungrammatical but that object anaphors will also be excluded in languages with object
agreement (Woolford (1999)). Data from object agreement languages support this
prediction. These languages show that the normal object agreement cannot be used
when the object is an anaphor. Some of them behave like, for instance, Swahili where
anaphors can only trigger anaphoric agreement (cf. (6a)) but not the normal object
agreement (cf. (6b)) while others, like Inuit, employ intransitive constructions reflecting
only subject agreement for expressing reflexivity (cf. (7)):
(6) a. Ahmed a-na-ji-penda
mwenyewe.
[Swahili, Vitale (1981)]
Ahmed 3SUBJ-PRES-REFL-love himself (emphatic reflexive)
“Ahmed loves himself.”
3
b. *Ahmed a-na-m-penda
Ahmed
mwenyewe.
3SUBJ-PRES-3OBJ-love himself (emphatic reflexive)
“Ahmed loves himself.”
(7) a. *Hansiupi immii
asap-puq.
[Inuit, Bok-Bennema (1991)]
Hansi.ERG himself.ABS wash-IND.3SG.3SG.
“Hansi washed himself.”
b. Asap-puq.
wash- IND.3 SG
“He washed himself.”
Woolford (1999) argues that if a language still allows agreement triggered by an
anaphor, like the languages with object agreement do, then the agreement will
exclusively be special - not normal object agreement characteristic to these languages
but a special anaphoric form of agreement (cf. (6a)). Woolford (1999) thus modifies
Rizzi’s principle as follows:
(8)
The Anaphor Agreement Effect (modified)
Anaphors do not occur in syntactic positions construed with agreement unless the
agreement is anaphoric.
2.2 Some counter-examples
As Woolford (1999) notes, there are counter-examples to the modified version of the
principle as formulated in (8). There are languages with object agreement that still have
object anaphors, such as Tamil, Modern Greek, Albanian, Jacaltec, Salayarese and
Georgian. Woolford (1999) tries to show that, for different reasons, the languages in
question are not real counter-examples. She argues that, for instance, in Georgian the
features of the agreement morpheme do not match those of the anaphor and the
agreement is default form of agreement (thus, in the technical sense, no agreement).
For instance, a reflexive phrase in Georgian always triggers 3rd person agreement
even when it is bound by 1st or 2nd person antecedent (cf. (9)). Thus, only the possessor
within the reflexive NP is coindexed with the antecedent while the agreement between the
object NP and the verb is triggered by the whole phrase:
4
(9)
(me)
čem-s
I.NOM my-DAT
tav-s
vakeb.
head-DAT
I.praise.him1
[Georgian, Harris (1981)]
“I praise myself.”
Woolford (1999) groups Albanian and Georgian together as using a default agreement
strategy to avoid the violation of the Anaphor Agreement effect. In Albanian, like in
Georgian, the anaphors trigger 3rd person agreement whatever the person of the
antecedent:
(10) a. Vetja
më
dhimset.
[Albanian, Hubbard (1985)]
REFL.NOM CL.1SG.DAT feel-sorry-for.3SG.PRES.NONACTIVE
“I feel sorry for myself.”
b. Dritës
i
Drita.DAT
dhimset
vetja.
CL.3SG.DAT
pity.3SG.PAST.NONACTIVE
[Albanian, Massey (1990)]
REFL.NOM
“Drita pities herself.”
Woolford (1999) argues that the subject-verb agreement relation in (10) is a
manifestation of “default” agreement, and that such agreement does not count for the
Anaphor Agreement principle because the agreement morpheme is an inert slot filler,
not indicating actual agreement.
According to Woolford (1999), Greek uses a different strategy to avoid the
Anaphor Agreement effect. In Greek a reflexive NP consist of a definite determiner
(i.e., ton (cf. (11)), a possessor (mu) and a head (eafton) and triggers some kind of nonanaphoric agreement (the accusative, masculine, singular clitic ton), contrary to the
predictions of the both versions of the Anaphor Agreement Effect (cf. (3), (8)):
(11)
Egho ton
xero ton
eafton
mu.
I
know DET.ACC.MASC.SG
REFL
POSS.GEN.1SG
CL.ACC.MASC.SG
“I know myself.”
[Greek, Iatridou (1988)]
But following Iatridou’s (1988) analysis, the element that agrees with the antecedent is,
1
Unless otherwise required, in the glosses only masculine singular forms
(he/him/his) will be given; i.e., a verb form like vk′lav “I kill him/her/it/them”, will be
glossed simply as “I kill him” for reasons of space.
5
in fact, the embedded possessive. Woolford (1999), thus, argues that the Greek case is
no counter-example for the Anaphor Agreement Effect. In (11) not the anaphor (mu) is
doubled by a clitic but the whole NP (ton eafton mu).
Although the way the verbal complex agrees with subjects/objects is different in
Georgian and Greek (person marking vs. clitic doubling) they both employ the same
mechanism with regard to the reflexive NP—the whole phrase gets doubled in Greek
(cf. (11)) / marked (in Georgian (cf.(9)) but not the possessive.
The agreement mechanism remains the same irrespective of whether we adopt
the same treatment of Georgian possessors as embedded anaphors and thus put
Georgian into the same group as Greek according to the coindexing below:
(9′)
[(me)]i [čem-si tav-sj]j vakeb.
(11′)
[Egho]i tonj xero [ton eaftonj mui]j.
We could also argue that Greek employs, in fact, the same “default agreement” strategy
as Georgian. In both languages the whole reflexive phrase (but not its possessive) is in
an agreement relation with the verbal complex (clitic in the case of Greek and a person
marker in the case of Georgian). We could call the agreement a default agreement in the
sense that these agreement markers are constant and do not vary with regard to the
person feature of the antecedent. For instance, in Greek the clitic “triggered” by the
reflexive with the 1st person antecedent in (11) will be the same Accusative, Masculine,
Singular as the clitic triggered by the reflexive with 3rd person, feminine antecedent in
(12):
(12)
I
Maria ton
DEF.NOM.FEM.SG
Maria
thavmazi
ton
CL(ACC.MASC.SG)
admires
DET.ACC.MASC.SG
eafton tis.
REFL
[Greek, Iatridou (1988)]
POSS.GEN.FEM.SG
“Maria admires herself.”
The same holds for Georgian, the reflexive phrase with 1st person antecedent (cf.
(9)) will trigger the same agreement as the reflexive with 2nd (cf. (13a)) or 3rd person
6
antecedent (cf. (13b))2:
(13) a. šen
šen-s
tav-s
akeb.
you.NOM your-DAT head-DAT you.praise.him
“You praise yourself.”
b. is
tavis
tav-s
akebs.
he.NOM POSS.REFL head-DAT he.praises.him
“He praises himself.”
3. Does Georgian have default agreement?
I will show that there is no reason to assume that Georgian has a default agreement
strategy. If the language had the strategy, default agreement would hold only in the
cases where the phrase šen-s tav-s is a reflexive like it is in (13). Although (14) shows
that the same phrase also triggers 3rd person agreement when used non-anaphorically:
(14)
(me) sark′e- ši šen-s
tav-s
vxedav, t′an-s
I.NOM mirror-in your-DAT head-DAT I.see.it
k′i
body-DAT while/but
- vera.
cannot
“I see your head in the mirror, but I cannot see the body.”
Therefore, the agreement is regular, triggered by the phi-feature specification of the
head of the phrase tav-: 3rd person, singular. It is clear that not the anaphoric status of the
phrase is responsible for triggering the 3rd person agreement in (9), (13) but the referential
properties of the whole phrase, namely the person feature (3rd) of the head of the phrase
(tav-). The fact that the agreement both in Greek and Georgian is always 3rd person
singular irrespective of the phi-features of the antecedent is due to the morphosyntactic
2
Greek and Georgian reflexive constructions are also treated alike by Everaert
(2001) calling them “inalienable possession anaphors” (cf. Anagnostopoulou and
Everaert (1999)). Everaert (2001) argues that the possessive itself could not be called an
anaphor (for the Binding Theory), only the combination of the possessive and the head
noun have anaphoric properties. Following Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) who
showed that “α is an anaphor” is not equivalent to “α agrees with its antecedent”
Everaert (2001) argues that the element that agrees with an antecedent as a result of an
anaphoric relation should be distinguished from the anaphoric element itself.
7
properties of the specific type of anaphoric expressions these languages use not to their
referential (anaphoric) status (cf. Everaert (2001)).
Therefore, Georgian still remains a counter-example for the Anaphor Agreement
Effect. The language has object agreement and also object anaphors which trigger neither
anaphoric agreement, nor default agreement but normal object agreement, contrary to the
Anaphor Agreement Effect (cf. (3)) or its modified version (cf. (8)).
Observe that Georgian not only allows agreeing object anaphors but also agreeing
anaphors in subject position, contrary to what Woolford (1999) claims. In discussing
Georgian data Woolford (1999) mentions that the language does not allow subject
anaphors and relates their ungrammaticality to the fact that Georgian allows “default”
agreement in the construction where the anaphor is an object but not in the construction
where it is a subject (Woolford (1999):272). However, certain verbs in Georgian do not
show the usual subject-object asymmetry for binding (cf. (15a) vs. (15b)) and the reflexive
phrase in subject position is perfectly grammatical with them (cf. (15a)):
(15) a. šen-ma
tav-ma
gac′ama
(šen).
[Amiridze and Everaert (2000)]
your-ERG head-ERG he.tormented.you you.NOM
“It was yourself who tormented you / made you suffer.”
b. šen
you.ERG
ac′ame
šen-i
tav-i.
you.tormented.him your-NOM head-NOM
“You tormented yourself.”; “You made yourself suffer.”
4. Alternative explanations
4.1 Binding Theory and the Anaphor Agreement effect
It has been established that standard Binding Theory does not give a straightforward
account for the nominative/subject anaphor gap. Rizzi’s hypothesis and its modified
version (Woolford (1999)) were designed to account for that gap. However, the
Georgian reflexive expression is a problem for both the original Anaphor Agreement
Effect (Rizzi (1990)) and its modified version (Woolford (1999)) since the expression does
trigger a regular agreement (not a default one as argued by Woolford (1999)) and contrary
to both versions can appear as an object (cf. (15b)) and even as a subject (cf. (15a)).
4.2 Explanations within the “Reflexivity” framework
In Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) an explanation is given for the fact that Greek
8
allows a nominative/subject anaphor with certain verbs. Treatment of the Georgian data
through the reflexivity framework (cf. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999)) also
seems to be possible. Let us, therefore, look into their analysis in some detail.
Their explanation is formulated within the Reinhart and Reuland (1993)
“Reflexivity” framework. In the Reflexivity framework, binding is not directly about
the relative distribution of anaphors vs. pronominals but about reflexive predicates:3
(16) a. A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive.
b. A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked.
Unlike standard Binding Theory, in Reflexivity the configurational effects of anaphora
are not attributed to the Binding Conditions – which do not refer to the notion ccommand - but to the Condition on Chain Formation which is given in (17)4:
(17) a. Condition on A-chain
A maximal A-chain (α1,..,=αn) contains exactly one link—α1—which is +R.
b. An NP is +R iff it carries full specification for phi-features (number, gender,
person) and structural Case.
In Reinhart and Reuland’s view, every lexical element is subject to A-chain formation
under the conditions set out in (17).
The chain condition interacts with the reflexivity conditions, and in the example
3
The notions reflexive marking and reflexive predicate are defined in (i):
(i) a. A predicate (of P) is reflexive-marked iff either P is lexically reflexive or one of
P's arguments is a SELF-anaphor;.
b. A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed.
4
The definition is based on the notion of Generalized chain condition as defined in
(i):
(i) C=(α1,...,αn) is a chain iff C is the maximal sequence such that
(i) there is an index i such that for all j, 1≤j≤n, αj carries that index, and
(ii) for all j, 1≤j<n αj governs αj+1
9
below I will explain how. Nominative Anaphors are excluded by the Chain Condition
(17a) under the assumption that anaphors are typically -R. To illustrate this, consider the
examples in (18):
(18) a. The mani pleases himselfi.
b. *Himselfi pleases the mani.
(19) a. [(the man)i (+R), himselfi (-R)]
b. [himselfi (-R), the mani (+R)]
In (18) the predicates are both reflexive and reflexive-marked satisfying (16a,b). In
other words, as far as the reflexivity conditions in (16) are concerned both (18a) and
(18b) are grammatical. The ungrammaticality of (18b) is due to a violation of the
Condition on A-chains: in (19b) the head of the chain is -R since the English anaphor
himself is not fully specified for phi-features (cf. (17b)).
So let us turn the argumentation around. If in a language (18b) would be
grammatical, the chain condition, apparently, has not been violated. But that is only
possible if the anaphor is marked (+R). Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) claim
that this is the case in Greek. O eaftos tu is headed by a noun (eaftos) which acts as a
SELF-element while, at the same time, it is fully specified for phi-features ([masc],[3pers],inflected for [numb/case]), thus being +R. In fact Anagnostopoulou and Everaert
(1999) argue that such an anaphor has the structure of an inalienable possession NP.
(20) a. [O eaftosj tui]j ton
The self
his
CL.ACC
provlimatizi [ton Petro]i.
puzzle-3SG
the Petros.ACC
“Himself puzzles Petros.”
b. [(O eaftos tui)j (+R)] [(ton Petro)i (+R)]
In (20) there can be no violation of the chain condition because the two coindexed
elements tu and ton Petro do not form an A-chain (cf. (20b).
5. How Georgian tavis- tav- fits the typology of reflexive NPs
5.1 The relevance of the form of the anaphor
In (21) the predicate is both reflexive and reflexive-marked satisfying Binding
10
conditions A and B. Neither Chain condition is violated there since given the structure
of the anaphor there is no chain formation in Georgian - the two coindexed elements
tavis- and president- do not form an A-chain:
[tavis-mai tav-maj]j ixsna
(21)
POSS.REFL-ERG
[p′rezident′-i]i.
head-ERG
he.saved.him
president-NOM
“The president was out of the hard situation only because of himself (his past
doings, personal charm, etc.)”
Therefore, analogically to Greek (cf. Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999)) we could
argue that subject anaphors are allowed in Georgian thanks to their structure and
properties as [+SELF,+R] elements which are able to escape Chain Formation due to
their internal structure. However, it is not clear how it is possible that the same type of
anaphor, for instance, in Georgian with the same ability to escape the chain formation is
grammatical in subject position only with some verbs (cf. (15a), (21)) and not with
others (cf. (22)):
(22)
*tavis-ma
tav-ma
daxat′a
POSS.REFL-ERG REFL-ERG
k′ac-i.
he.drew.him man-NOM
“Himself drew the man.”
The same is true for the languages with the same type of anaphor, for instance, Greek
and Basque where only some verbs allow reflexives as subjects (for Greek cf. (20a) vs.
(23) and for Basque cf. (24a, b) vs. (24c)):
(23)
*Ton eafto tu
the
tu
REFL POSS.ACC CL.DAT
aresi
o
Petros.5
[Greek]
like-3SG DEF Petros.NOM
“Himself likes Petros.”
5
aresi is a subject experiencer verb (cf. (Anagnostopoulou (1999)) taking a dative
experiencer as a subject and a nominative theme as an object. Thus, the anaphor in (23)
is the subject argument of the verb.
11
(24) a. Niri batez ere neure
I.DAT
above
buru-a-k
ematen dit beldurra.6
all
my.own head-DET-ERG
[Basque]
giveAUX
“Above all it is myself that causes me fear.”
b. Egunotan,
neure
buru-a-k
kezkatzen
nau.
day.DET.in my.own head-DET-ERG worry.HAB me.has.it
“These days, my(own)self worries me.”
c. *Neure buru-a-k
ikusi nau
ni.
my.own head-DET-ERG seen me.has.it I
“Myself has seen me.”
If only the structure of an anaphor matters (enabling to escape the chain formation) then
the anaphors in these languages (or in any language with the same type of anaphor)
have to be grammatical in any position (subject or object position) in any context
irrespective of the verb semantic class. While the data shows that this is not the case in
either of the languages. As Georgian (cf. (32)), Greek (cf. (20a)) and Basque data (cf.
(24b)) suggest anaphoric expressions are allowed in subject position with object
experiencer verbs while neither of the languages have reflexives as subjects with, for
instance, subject experiencer verbs (cf. (25), (23), (26)):
(25)
*tavis
tav-s
POSS.REFL head-DAT
uqvars
ivane. 7
[Georgian]
he.loves.him Ivane.NOM
“Himself loves Ivane”
(26)
*Bere buru-a-k
her
Miren
maite du.
head-DET-ERG Miren.ABS love
[Basque, Itziar Laka, p.c.]
has
“Herself loves Miren.”
Therefore, I conclude that it is not (only) the structure of the anaphor which is
responsible for the grammaticality of subject anaphors.
6
(24a) is taken from Hualde and de Urbina (in press) and (24b), (24c) are from
I.Laka’s Basque Grammar Page.
7
Georgian subject experiencer verbs take a dative experiencer as a subject and a
nominative theme as an object. The reflexive in (25) is the subject argument of the
corresponding verb.
12
fear
5.2 Reciprocals as subjects in Georgian
If the form of an anaphor (“inalienable possession” type (cf. Anagnostopoulou and
Everaert (1999)) matters we should expect the reciprocals to be barred from subject
positions since they have a different structure (i.e., they are not of the “inalienable
possession” type, cf. (27)) than reflexives in Georgian:
(27) a. ertmanet-i
[Modern Georgian]
RECIPROCAL-NOM
“each other”
b. ert-man-ert-i
[Middle Georgian]
one-ERG-one-NOM
“each other”
For Basque (cf. (29) taken from Hualde and de Urbina (in press)) and Greek (cf. (30a))
this prediction is borne out. However, Georgian, allows reciprocals as subjects (cf.
(28a))8:
(28) a. ertmanet-i
RECIPROCAL-NOM
gvaocebs
[Georgian]
čven.
it.surprises.us we.DAT
“We are surprised by (something related to) each other.”
b. čven
vaocebt
ertmanet-s.
we.NOM we.surprise.them RECIPROCAL-DAT
“We surprise each other.”
(29) a. *Jon-i eta Miren-i bat-a
Jon-DATand Miren-DAT
beste-a-k
ematen die beldurra.
one.DET
other-DET-ERG give
AUX
[Basque]
fear
“One another cause Jon and Miren fear.”
b. *Jon
eta Miren
bat-a
beste-a-k
kezkatzen ditu.
Jon.ABS and Miren.ABS one-DET other-DET-ERG worry
AUX
“One another worry Jon and Miren.”
(30) a. *O enas ton allo anisixun to Yani kje ti Maria. 9
The one the other worry
[Greek]
the Yanis and the Maria
“Each other worry Yanis and Maria.”
8
Tuite (1998) also mentions the phenomenon.
9
I am grateful to Alexis Dimitriadis for the Greek sentences in (30).
13
b. O Yanis kje i
Maria anisixuno
The Yanis and the Maria worry
enas ton allo.
the one the other
“Yanis and Maria worry each other.”
All this might suggest that there is not a simple primitive concept anaphor and the
distinction between reflexives and reciprocals has to be made (for the similar view cf.
also Everaert (2000)) just like it is made for different types of reflexives (Reinhart and
Reuland (1991, 1993), Safir (1996), Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999)).
If we accept this, we should distinguish between reflexives and reciprocals and
agree that in the distribution of the subject reflexives their form is a relevant factor:
(31)
If a language has a subject anaphor, the anaphor will be “non-pronominal”. i.e.
its form (structure, properties) is relevant (Anagnostopoulou and Everaert
(1999)).
This is in accordance with the data since all the languages reported in the literature
having subject reflexives have non-pronominal anaphors (Basque (cf. (24), (26)),
Modern Greek (cf. (11), (12), (20a), (23)), Dargwa (Kibrik (1997)), Nepali (Bickel and
Yadava (2000)), Albanian (cf. (10) and also Hubbard (1985), K. Williams (1988)), Toba
Batak (Schachter (1984), Cole and Hermon (in preparation)).
Although it is not clear and requires a cross-linguistic examination whether the
reverse is also the case - whether languages having non-pronominal anaphors always
show the phenomenon of subject anaphors. If the answer is “yes”, then the reason of
having subject anaphors could lie in their structure. If not then either the structure of the
anaphor is not relevant at all or there is also something else apart from the structure
which needs further investigation.
6. The relevance of the verb classes allowing anaphors in subject position
My hypothesis, still to be made more precise, is that it is not the structure of the anaphor
but the semantic/structural properties of the classes of verbs that make it possible for
reflexives to appear as subjects. No matter what the structure of the anaphor is, whether
it is an inalienable type reflexive or non-inalienable type reciprocal, it can surface as a
subject only with verbs of certain characteristics.
14
At least Georgian data shows that only causatives, both morphological (cf. Asatiani
(1982), Boeder (1989)) and lexical (cf. Amiridze and Everaert (2000))10 are able to take
reflexives as subjects. Apart from causatives any object experiencer predicate being
treated as causative constructions (Pesetsky (1995)) can also take both reflexives (cf.
(32)) and reciprocals (cf. (28a)) as subjects:
(32)
[tavis-mai tav-maj]j gaaoca
[k′ac-i]i.
POSS.REFL-ERG
he.surprised.him
head-ERG
[Georgian]
man-NOM
“The man got surprised only because of something related to himself.”
It is noteworthy that none of the subject experiencer verbs are able to have reflexive (cf.
(25) or reciprocal subject (cf. (33)):
(33)
*ertmanet-s
sz′ult
ivane
RECIPROCAL-DAT they.hate.them
da meri.
[Georgian]
Ivane.NOMand Meri.NOM
“Each other hate Ivane and Meri.”
The same is true for Greek and Basque. In both languages reflexive phrases appear as
subjects only with object experiencer verbs while the subject experiencer verbs are
ungrammatical
with
reflexive
subjects
(cf.
(34a)
vs.
(34b)
(taken
from
Anagnostopoulou (1999)) for Greek and (24b) vs. (26) for Basque):
(34) a. Tin Maria
tin
DEF Maria.ACCCL-ACC
provlimatizi/enoxli/anisihi
puzzles/bothers/worries
o
eaftos
tis.[Greek]
DEF REFL-NOM her
“Maria is puzzled/bothered/worried with/at/by herself.”
b. *Tin Maria
DEF
den tin
thavmazi/aghapai o eaftos
Maria.ACC not CL-ACC admires/likes
tis.
DEF REFL-NOM
her
“Herself doesn’t admire/like Mary.”
7. Summary
10
Here “lexical” causative refers to those transitive verbs which can be interpreted
as “cause-to-Intransitive” no matter whether they have morphological causative
marking or not.
15
According to Rizzi’s (1990) Anaphor Agreement Effect, anaphors do not occur in
syntactic positions construed with agreement. And if they do the agreement is
exclusively either anaphoric or “default” (cf. Woolford (1999)).
The present paper argues that Georgian represents a counter-example for both
versions of the principle. It shows that the agreement triggered by anaphors in Georgian
is neither anaphoric nor default but normal person agreement.
The paper tries to show that apart from agreeing object anaphors Georgian also
allows agreeing anaphors in subject position with certain verbs / verb readings. It argues
that it is not sufficient to relate the distribution and the form of the anaphors in subject
position. Rather it seems necessary to take into the consideration the verb classes allowing
the phenomenon.
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