Military Interventions in Civil Wars

Routledge Studies in Conflict, Security and Development MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND ARMS TRADE Kamil C. Klosek Military Interventions in Civil Wars This book examines the motivations of military interventions in civil wars, with a focus on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and arms trade. The book assumes a state-centric view of international relations, whereby states remain the dominant actors on the world stage. It breaks away from the conventional wisdom that military interventions for economic interests are a product of domestic corporate lobbying and instead argues that states intervene to protect (but not advance) existing corporate investments for national strategic interests. The work further introduces new concepts of military interventions – proxy interventions and indirect interventions – which are determined by arms trade relationships between the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and recipient countries and utilizes insights from principal-agent theory, whereby the permanent members of the UNSC delegate military interventions in civil wars to other countries. The book concludes by examining the transformative effect of FDI on the willingness of a state to intervene militarily in a civil war, focusing on the case of China in Sub-Saharan Africa. Provided that the current positive trends in FDI and arms trade persist, we are likely to see more and not fewer military interventions in the future. This book will be of much interest to students of civil wars, military interventions, security studies, and International Relations. Kamil C. Klosek is a postdoctoral researcher at the Peace Research Center Prague, Charles University, Czech Republic. Routledge Studies in Conflict, Security and Development Designed to meet the needs of researchers, teachers and policy makers in this area, this series publishes books of new, innovative research into the connections between conflict, security and development processes. The series encourages a multidisciplinary approach to the links between these thematic issues, including the nature of conflict itself and the underlying conflict drivers, the underlying characteristics and drivers of insecurity, and the effects and use of development strategies in post-conflict environments and how that relates to broader peacebuilding strategies. Series Editors: Paul Jackson, University of Birmingham, and Mark Sedra, University of Waterloo Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries The Evolution of a Model Mark Sedra Rethinking the Security-Development Nexus Organised Crime in Post-Conflict States Sasha Jesperson The Politics of Peacebuilding Emerging Actors and Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected States Safal Ghimire Military Interventions in Civil Wars The Role of Foreign Direct Investments and Arms Trade Kamil C. Klosek For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Studies-in-Conflict-Security-and-Development/book-series/CSD Military Interventions in Civil Wars The Role of Foreign Direct Investments and Arms Trade Kamil C. Klosek First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Kamil C. Klosek The right of Kamil C. Klosek to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Klosek, Kamil Christoph, 1990- author. Title: Military interventions in civil wars : the role of foreign direct investments and the arms trade / Kamil Christoph Klosek. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2022. | Series: Routledge studies in conflict, security and development | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021017094 (print) | LCCN 2021017095 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367753405 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367753412 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003162087 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Civil war‐‐Economic aspects. | Investments, Foreign‐‐Political aspects. | Arms transfers. | Intervention (International law) | China‐‐Foreign economic relations‐‐Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan‐‐Foreign economic relations‐‐China. Classification: LCC HB195 .K57 2022 (print) | LCC HB195 (ebook) | DDC 338.4/3355‐‐dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021017094 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021017095 ISBN: 978-0-367-75340-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-75341-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-16208-7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003162087 Typeset in Times New Roman by MPS Limited, Dehradun Contents List of tables List of figures Acknowledgments List of abbreviations vi vii viii x 1 Introduction 1 2 Understanding military interventions in civil wars 23 3 Foreign direct investments and military interventions 44 4 The role of arms trade in proxy interventions 77 5 Indirect interventions in civil wars 105 6 The transformative power of investments 129 Index 151 Tables 3.1 Descriptive statistics for discrete variables. Time period 2001–2009 3.2 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables. Time period 2001–2009 3.3 Logistic regression of military intervention incidence 3.4 Logistic regression of military intervention onset 4.1 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 4.2 Descriptive statistics for discrete variables 4.3 Frequency table of interventions by agents 4.4 Correlation of arms trade values between P-5 members 4.5 Logit Regression of unilateral military interventions by agents (incidence) 4.6 Logit Regression of unilateral military interventions by agents (onset) 5.1 Indirect interventions between 1975 and 2009 57 57 59 63 87 88 89 91 92 95 108 Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 Trends in civil wars and military interventions FDI inflow into fragile and conflict-affected countries Arms trade patterns between 1950 and 2017 Predicted probabilities for military interventions conditional on FDI instock and democratic regime type Predicted probabilities for military interventions conditional on arms trade and democratic regime type Categorization of military interventions in civil wars by the degree of involvement from the perspective of the principal Boxplots indicating the proportion of arms trade supplied by principals to agents Effect of principal’s interest in a civil war on the probability of a unilateral intervention by an agent Effect of arms trade dependence on the probability of a unilateral intervention by an agent Effect of UNSC membership on agent intervention (the United States as baseline) Juxtaposing indirect interventions between proxy and coalitional interventions 11 13 14 65 65 79 90 97 98 98 106 Acknowledgments Research connected to this book began at the end of 2015, when I first engaged in the topic of military interventions in civil wars as a doctoral student. Over the past six years, there have been many different and improved versions thanks to feedback and help of colleagues working at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague and thanks to support from colleagues abroad. First and foremost, I want to thank my former supervisor Tomáš Karásek whose advice over four years was invaluable for the whole research endeavor. Colleagues from the Department of Security Studies and the Department of International Relations commented on several versions of each chapter. I owe a great debt to Vojtěch Bahenský, with whom I had countless debates on the strengths and weaknesses of earlier versions of the book. Also, Michal Parízek, Jan Karlas, Jan Kofroň, Jakub Tesař, Běla Plechanovová, and Vít Střítecký contributed with their insights. During my doctoral program, I received financial support from the Grant Agency of Charles University, which contributed to my project on “Foreign Interventions into Civil Wars: The Role of Business Interests as the motivating factor for third state intervention” (project No. 712218) in the years 2018 and 2019. Moreover, the Deutscher Akademischer Auslandsdienst (German Academic Exchange Service) granted a one-year scholarship, the “Jahrestipendium für Doktoranden,” which lasted from 01.08.2016 until 31.08.2017 and allowed me to focus on the research project. My further gratitude goes to Daniela Nascimento from the University of Coimbra and Gerald Schneider from the University of Konstanz, who provided me with extensive comments and thoughts on the whole manuscript at the end of my doctoral studies. During my time as visiting researcher at the University of Coimbra, Ricardo Sousa from the University of Lisbon evaluated an earlier version of the chapter about foreign direct investments and provided crucial comments. Further, during the AFK-Kolloquium 2017/EuPRA and AFK Joint Conference in Schwerte (Germany), I met Tony Makayu, who supported me in conducting research in Uganda. Great thanks also go to Kaweesi Edward Silvestre from the Makerere University for his suggestions on the study of Ugandan politics. Acknowledgments ix From the year 2019 onwards, I extended my research in my work as a postdoctoral researcher at the Peace Research Institute in Prague, which is situated at the Department of Security Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences (Charles University). Here, many thanks go to Michal Smetana, Jan Ludvík, Ondřej Rosendorf, Paja Bláhová, and again to Vojtěch Bahenský. I also want to thank Davit Petrosyan for his comments on earlier versions of the third and fourth chapters. Further, I want to thank Marie Němečková, and Kryštof Kučmáš for organizational help related to the book. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň from the Institute of International Relations provided me with great insights on the topic of foreign aid. Lastly, I acknowledge support from the Charles University Research Center program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague/ Faculty of Social Sciences). Abbreviations AFRICOM BIT BRI CAR CINC CNPC COW DPOC DRC EITI EU FDI GNPOC IDP IMF IR LNA LRA MID MINUSCA United States Africa Command Bilateral Investment Treaty Belt-and-Road Initiative Central African Republic Composite Indicator of National Capability China National Petroleum Corporation Correlates of War Dar Petroleum Operating Company Democratic Republic of Congo Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative European Union Foreign Direct Investments Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Internally Displaced People International Monetary Fund International Relations Libyan National Army Lord Resistance Army Militarized Interstate Disputes Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MNC Multinational Corporations MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad ODA Official Development Assistance OFDI Outward FDI OPIC Overseas Private Investment Cooperation P-5 Five permanent members of the UNSC PA Principal-Agent PMSC Private Military Security Contractors SAP Structural Adjustment Program SDGs Sustainable Development Goals Abbreviations SIPRI SPLA SPLM-IO TIV UCDP UN UNCTAD UNSC UNMISS UPDF WTO Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Sudanese People’s Liberation Army SPLM in Opposition Trend Indicator Value Upsala Conflict Data Program United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Security Council UN Mission in South Sudan Ugandan Patriotic Defense Forces World Trade Organization xi 1 Introduction Which factors contribute to a state’s decision to intervene militarily in a civil war? In May 2005, the President of Germany and former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Horst Köhler, was sitting in a plane on his way back to Germany after a brief visit of German troops in Masar-I-Sharif in Afghanistan. A journalist asked Köhler about his views concerning the domestic political discourse and the justification of military interventions abroad. Köhler responded that a country of Germany’s size ought to use military power to maintain free trading routes and support regional stability in cases when disruptions threaten its economic interests.1 Ten days later, Köhler announced his resignation. During those ten days, critiques from government and opposition alike commented that Köhler’s statements were unconstitutional and contradicted Germany’s rationale to deploy soldiers abroad only for security reasons but not for economic interests. Just a couple of years later, Germany participated in one of the largest maritime missions at the Horn of Africa to protect trading routes against Somali pirates. The Somali Civil War, which had lasted since the 1990s, was hardly of geostrategic concern for most countries in the world. This mindset swiftly changed in the 2000s, when Somali piracy surged and jeopardized international maritime routes near the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. Faced with increasing insurance premiums for shipping and risks for the safe passage of goods between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions.2 Germany joined the naval mission Combined Task Force 151 under the leadership of the United States to curb Somali pirates and protect merchant ships. Participating states also included Spain, Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Singapore, and Thailand. Additionally, countries such as China and Russia, independently but cooperatively, operated against pirates, while the European Union (EU) created its own naval mission, Atalanta. The missions had no intentions to solve the causes of the Somali Civil War and instead solely dealt with its economic consequences on international trade. How can we explain this apparent contradiction between the negative public reaction to Köhler’s economic justification of military operations and DOI: 10.4324/9781003162087-1 2 Introduction Germany’s subsequent participation in a global naval mission designed to protect its national and economic interests? In brief, this book provides two arguments to address the apparent paradox of adverse public sentiment on military interventions and policymakers’ contradictory decision-making. The first argument relates to the use of military power to protect, but not advance, economic interests abroad, while the second argument directs attention to the existence of proxy interventions when great powers harness smaller powers to intervene in civil wars. Central to the argumentation is the role played by foreign direct investments (FDI) and arms trade. Existing FDI in a civil war country induces risk-prone behavior for the purpose of protection. At the same time, arms trade between a permanent member (P-5) of the UNSC and an arms recipient creates a relationship that increases the recipient country’s likelihood to intervene in civil wars on behalf of the arms exporting country. Both FDI and arms trade entail a transformative effect on the propensity to intervene militarily in a civil war. The Combined-Task Force mission represents a trend where the primary reasoning behind the protection of private economic interests shifted from interstate to intrastate conflicts. Until the Hague Conference in 1907, it was a recognized practice of the United States and European states to support domestic private creditors when foreign countries defaulted on their outstanding debts.3 France intervened militarily in Mexico in 1838 (and again in 1861 together with Spain and Great Britain) to collect arrears on behalf of privateers. In 1902, Great Britain and Germany intervened in Venezuela with the consent of the Roosevelt administration for the same reason.4 However, with the conclusion of the second Hague Conference, European powers renounced military interventions and focused on diplomatic instruments. Finnemore describes it thus: ‘’Creditors and capital markets generally have developed more elaborate methods of collateralizing, rescheduling, and collecting foreign loans. But states seeking to collect foreign debts no longer consider military force an option.”5 After the Second World War, the international community has experienced new challenges with the proliferation of intrastate conflicts and their consequences for economic well-being. Collier et al.6 find that countries experiencing civil wars undergo a substantial decline in GDP per capita, and Kibiris7 shows that internal violence entails lasting effects on educational attainment. The term “conflict trap” has become a catchword to denote the harmful effects of long-lasting and intensive civil wars for post-conflict recovery. One corollary of domestic fighting is the destruction of property financed by international investors. As observed by Collier et al.:8 “during the war rebel forces target physical infrastructure as part of their strategy. The main targets are the enemy’s communication and support lines, such as telecommunications, airports, ports, roads, and bridges. In addition to this strategic destruction of key infrastructure, rebels and government soldiers loot and destroy housing, schools, and health facilities.” Introduction 3 Infrastructure projects, telecommunication networks, or natural resources extraction sites in conflict-affected countries are frequently funded by international investors as the lack of available capital in poor states requires an inflow of FDIs.9 Therefore, corporations with investments in unstable regions face the unpredictability of the security of their assets either through destruction or expropriation,10 as well as a decline in available human capital to maintain business due to internal armed unrest.11 Firms with direct exposure to such violence are forced to relocate their movable investments.12 This observation raises the following two questions. First: considering the steady rise of FDI to developing countries since the first half of the 1990s, can we observe an increased willingness of states to protect private investors’ investments at risk using military means? Second: are increasing levels of economic and military interdependencies between states affecting the propensity to intervene militarily in civil wars? The theme of this book As both questions indicate, this book’s theme concerns the factors that increase the propensity of a state to intervene militarily in a civil war. The term “military intervention” in this book not only encompasses the participation of a country with combat forces, but also includes financial, logistic, intelligence, or other types of indirect support to a conflict actor. The book contributes to current debates concerned with economic factors behind military interventions as well as debates interested in the delegation of interventions to other actors such as in coalition interventions or in interventions providing support to rebel groups. With regards to economic factors, previous studies have concentrated on the role of natural resources, trade, and FDI flows, and obtained mixed results. Chapter 3 expands our insights by examining the role of corporate investments from a state-centric13 perspective in contrast to the generally more prominent (but frequently uncorroborated) domestic-level explanations. Further, in the past decade several studies have transcended the straightforward bilateral focus on military interventions and engaged in analyzing coalition interventions whereby great powers assume leadership over intervention missions14 and assemble so-called “coalitions of the willing.” Other studies have shown that third states frequently support rebel groups in civil wars to avoid direct military confrontation.15 In both research strands, researchers investigate the possibility to delegate military interventions in part or their entirety to other actors. Chapters 4 and 5 broaden our knowledge in this discourse by introducing the concepts of proxy interventions and indirect interventions as alternatives to coalition interventions and rebel support. Central to this discussion is an examination of existing FDI instock16 the arms trade. Consequently, the book pursues two arguments. The first argument is that FDI serves essential economic and political functions for home countries.17 Since states are aware of the strategic benefits of FDI, 4 Introduction they exhibit a higher propensity to use military instruments to protect existing investments in host countries that experience internal armed unrest. This proposition centers on the introduction of a neglected actor in International Relations (IR) theory, namely multinational corporations (MNCs). From a state-centric perspective, states possess independent agency and derive their interests based on autonomous calculations regarding their position within the international system. Multinational corporations inform states’ interests as they contribute to political goals as defined by governments. Such goals can, for instance, relate to the export or import of natural resources but also be guided by objectives such as full employment. Both host and home governments perceive FDI by corporate actors as advantageous as well as hazardous. The following discussion illustrates the political nature of corporate investments. From the perspective of host countries, FDI inflow (excluding portfolio capital inflow and loans) increases investment and saving rates,18 allows for the transfer of technology,19 and leads to acquiring managerial skills by the local workforce.20 At the same time, FDI is the least volatile capital investment type compared to alternative financial instruments such as portfolio investments with positive effects on economic growth.21 Hence, in recent times developing countries have actively engaged in the promotion of foreign capital to their countries through bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as through membership in international organizations or membership in sector-specific initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Furthermore, post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in developing and conflict-affected countries are strongly guided by measures to increase corporate investments to alleviate the detrimental consequences of poverty on political stability. Chapter 6 engages in a deeper discussion of these factors. Notwithstanding these potential economic benefits of FDI inflow, states also enact laws and regulations to monitor and control FDI flows into their countries. During the First World War, assets possessed by German nationals or American citizens with a German family background were seized based on the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) in the United States.22 Further, the United States has enacted several statutes overtime to gather information on FDI inflow, such as the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act or the Foreign Direct Investment and International Financial Data Improvements Act.23 Additional statutory restrictions bar unhindered foreign investments in industries like shipping, aircraft, mining, and energy. In 1988, against the backdrop of Japanese investments in the US manufacturing sector, the US Congress enacted the Exon-Florio Amendment with the discretion that the President can prohibit the acquisition of US corporations by foreign-owned firms on national security grounds. President Reagan expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to scrutinize investments and to advise the President on their political and Introduction 24 5 security-related consequences for the United States. Concerned about Chinese investments in the United States, the Trump administration further extended the monitoring capabilities of CIFUS into domains like critical infrastructure and critical technologies with the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA).25 Apart of the United States, other countries also view FDI as a potential threat to their national interests. Historically, many developing countries pursued “import-substitution” policies to protect their markets against foreign competitors and foreign ownership.26 Nowadays, the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index27 finds that countries such as Algeria, Indonesia, and China put disproportionally high burdens on corporate investments.28 Entrance to China’s domestic market remains heavily regulated, with restrictions on foreign ownership, preconditions to share intellectual property, and mandatory joint ventures for MNCs entering the Chinese market.29 Corporate investments are restricted or barred in sectors listed on “negative lists.” Even OECD countries with comparatively open markets turn to FDI restrictions for political reasons. In 2018, Germany issued its first veto against a foreign (Chinese) company’s bid to purchase a German manufacturer due to the fear of technology transfer.30 The European Union enacted a FDI screening regulation in 2019 to counter “[…] a threat to the security or public order of more than one Member State, or when an investment could undermine a project or programme of interest to the whole EU,”31 while NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence declared in its report Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat that Huawei’s delivery and control of 5G technology “must be assessed in the broader geopolitical context.”32 While states engage in the protection of their markets on political and security grounds, states also foster outward FDI (OFDI) to achieve political objectives. From the home country’s perspective, FDI can serve political and strategic goals. Yao et al.33 find that Chinese FDI performs two critical functions for the Chinese economy. First, Chinese FDI is linked with the ambition to create stable supply chains of natural resources and raw materials for further manufacturing or energy production. Second, investments in foreign companies facilitate the transfer of intellectual property and technology back to China. Luo et al.34 list seven different mechanisms of how states can support OFDI. China’s “going abroad” policy35 includes providing favorable tax breaks, reduced red tape, and support through lowinterest credit provided by the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China conditional upon following the Chinese government guidelines on target sectors and policies. Similarly, the United States has promoted OFDI through instruments such as risk insurance and co-finance schemes provided by the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC) when the investments align with US national security and foreign policy goals.36 Intending to raise economic standards in Africa and reduce migration flows, the European 6 Introduction Union fosters development and investment initiatives between both continents,37 such as the EU–Africa Business Forum. By the end of 2020, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development38 (UNCTAD) registered approximately 3,000 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Treaties with Investment Provision (TIPs) designed to foster OFDI through legal protection.39 Both the protection of own markets and the encouragement of OFDI underscore the fundamental political dimension that FDI occupies in state-tostate relations. Investments by MNCs in foreign countries serve idiosyncratic political objectives such as access to natural resources, wealth maximization, full employment, and raising of foreign currency.40 Home countries, therefore, retain an interest in protecting “their” FDI. Chapter 3 argues that this logic can be extended to the occurrence of civil wars due to the destructive nature of internal armed warfare and its long-term negative economic ramifications for the host country and subsequently for MNCs. From the angle of behavioral economics, Prospect Theory41 informs us that risk-prone behavior is more likely when individuals face potential losses (in contrast to risk-averse behavior for potential gains) even when the overall expected benefit does not justify such actions. For instance, during the Cold War great powers have frequently intervened militarily in civil wars to prevent changes in the status quo despite that the outcomes of the civil wars were largely ineffective to alter the global balance-of-power.42 The book argues that the existence of investments in conflict countries factors into the decision-making process of governments to use military power due to a fear of loss. Existing FDI in a civil war country should positively affect a home government’s willingness to intervene alongside additional push and pull factors identified by literature on military interventions. Such complementary factors can be ethnic and ideological linkages between intervener and a conflict actor,43 refugee streams,44 or spillover effects.45 Prior findings have indicated that economic interests can motivate a state to intervene when natural resources such as oil46 and diamonds47 are located in the civil war country. Similarly, high bilateral trade volume appears to increase a state’s propensity to intervene militarily in a civil war.48 The second central argument of the book is that the P-5 at the UNSC (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) sometimes abstain from military interventions in civil wars and resort to help from other states. Military interventions in civil wars are costly and entail risks for the intervening country. Hence, there is a tendency to delegate interventions to reduce potential costs. This reliance on other states for military purposes is a preferred instrument by great powers, which assemble coalition interventions, such as those in Iraq in 2003 or Afghanistan in 2001, to share military and financial burdens.49 The reasons for the delegation of interventions are multifaceted. For instance, great powers’ interventions can elicit counter-interventions by rivaling states,50 even in peripheral countries.51 Military interventions also incur domestic audience costs when Introduction 7 missions fail or the public disagrees with the political objectives of the government.52 Lastly, countries at a great physical distance from civil wars experience a decrease in power projection capabilities, which can render an intervention difficult or even unfeasible.53 Proponents of the “offshore balancing” doctrine strongly advocate abstaining from distant intra-regional conflict dynamics and harness allies in the regions instead.54 From a principal–agent (PA) perspective, the P-5 act as principals and harness other states as agents. This proposition pronounces a hierarchical power structure within the international community and emphasizes the role that great powers occupy. The P-5 are in a distinct position due to their military capabilities and institutional leverage. All five member states are among the militarily most powerful countries in the world (measured by the Composite Indicator of National Capability)55 and have displayed military activities across the globe in the past.56 On the one hand, their position in the UNSC allows them to veto resolutions condemning their agents for military interventions in civil wars. On the other hand, membership in the P-5 confers agenda-setting control protracting or even dropping discussions about the behavior of conflict actors.57 Therefore, this book argues that the phenomenon of military interventions in civil wars must include an examination of proxy intervention and indirect interventions. In proxy interventions, the principal abstains from the intervention itself. In contrast, in an indirect intervention, the principal supports the agents with logistics, financial support, and/or intelligence but does not commit to the intervention with military personnel or boots on the ground. For instance, the United States pressured Belgium to send military personnel to quell a rebellion in Eastern Congo in 1964, while the United States abstained from participation with ground forces but provided military support. By November 1964, American aircraft transported over 500 Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville.58 A Similar conceptual relationship has already been investigated in the case of third-state rebel patronage when states utilize non-state actors for their interests in a civil war.59 Further, the chapter argues that the best approximation of the PA relationship is through the analysis of investments in the defense sector. The P-5 are major arms exporting countries, and the supply and demand of arms create an unequal dependency between the arms recipient on the arms supplier. Arms supply ameliorates two fundamental problems in a PA relationship, namely adverse selection and agency slack.60 In the former case, principals cannot be sure about their agents’ true motivation as there always exists an information asymmetry favoring the agent. In the latter case, principals are aware that agents might pursue their interests or invest only a minimum of their resources to achieve the principal’s objectives. Arms trade affects both problems due to several reasons. First, arms suppliers are selective in their choice of recipients. Arms supplies are generally provided to countries that share similar foreign policy objectives with the supplier or do not contradict foreign policy preferences.61 Second, 8 Introduction arms supplies can enable military interventions in the first place. Military interventions themselves are cost-intensive endeavors that can necessitate tanks, aircraft, arms, and ammunition for soldiers on the ground. By providing arms to a recipient, the latter is enabled to implement military interventions. Third, military hardware requires maintenance and training.62 The higher the technological sophistication, the more the agent is dependent on future deliveries of spare parts and training of military personnel and engineers. Lastly, arms suppliers can credibly sanction agents and withhold arms exports when arms recipients violate the core security interests of arms providers, thereby ameliorating agency slack.63 For instance, the Soviet Union was an ally of Siad Barre’s socialist regime in Somalia but turned to Ethiopia in the wake of the power grab by the revolutionary and Communist Derg. When Somalia attacked Ethiopia in the Somali-populated Ogaden region, the Soviet Union ceased all military arms transfers to Somalia as Somalia’s military intervention contradicted Soviet core foreign policy interests in the Horn of Africa.64 In turn, the United States terminated defense contracts and military aid to Ethiopia after the Derg became more closely affiliated with the Soviet Union and cooperated with Somalia after the Ogaden War showcasing a strong case of Realpolitik.65 Results reveal that higher arms trade dependence of agents on a principal positively correlates with the probability of military interventions in civil wars (excluding any military participation on the side of the principal, i.e. coalition intervention). This effect is most substantial for Russia and China, while weakest for the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the higher the interest of a principal in a civil war, the less likely it is for the principal to resort to an agent. This finding corresponds to studies on coalitional interventions whereby higher perceived time urgency decreases the willingness to search for partners.66 Increasing physical distance between the principal and the civil war country also positively affects the probability of an intervention by an agent. Further, several military interventions conceptually conform to the indirect intervention framework according to which the principal provides indirect military support, and the agent provides combat forces on the ground. For instance, the Moroccan intervention in Zaire in 1977 was logistically and financially supported by the United States (and France).67 Such interventions are strongly influenced by the political and defense relationship between the principal and the agent. Illustrative cases: Belgian-Congo and Oman The following descriptions of two military interventions serve as an illustration of the book’s two central arguments. After Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960, it soon drifted into disarray. Independence occurred rapidly, and the new political leadership under Patrice Lumumba was unprepared to govern over the whole territory or to face mutinies by the Introduction 68 9 local armed forces. Katanga, the most affluent province with an abundance of natural resources, attempted to secede and become an independent political entity. Belgium initially supported the independence movement financially as well as with military means. This position contradicted the stance of the United Nations, which approved a peacekeeping mission to engage against the secessionists. Belgium’s behavior further opposed American interests. The United States was wary of the image it would convey to newly independent states in Africa and Asia when NATO allies and former colonial powers would use military force in countries recently granted independence. The USA was furhter concerned that the Soviet Union would occupy a leading role in the decolonization process.69 Hence, the question arises why did Belgium become so selective in its support to the Katangese secessionist movement and why did Belgium not uphold the territorial integrity of the new Congolese state although facing resistance by the United States and the broader international community? Belgium’s relationship with Katanga was primarily based on economic ties in the natural resource sector and the protection of existing white settlements in the region. During colonization, King Leopold established trade links between Katanga and Belgium by inviting corporations to invest in the resource-rich region. One month before Congolese independence, Belgium transferred all state-owned enterprises into private ownership.70 When Congo declared independence, the mines in Katanga were already controlled and exploited by the British-Belgian joint venture Union Minière du Haut Katanga. In total, around 70 percent of the Congolese economy was under the authority of Société Générale de Belgique and affiliates.71 Hence, capital investments and business interests both played a role in inducing Belgian policymakers to remain in Katanga and support the local independence movement of Tshombe.72 For the Belgian state, it became unacceptable to risk the corporate investments that were at stake after the election of president Lumumba, who fiercely opposed Belgian presence in the Congo. For Belgian business actors with investments in Katanga, it was of paramount importance to avoid losing their privileges in the natural resources sector. As stated by Hoskyns: “The mutiny of the Force Publique, and the resulting chaos combined with Lumumba’s refusal to call Belgian troops changed the situation completely. Those Europeans who had opposed secession now saw it as the only way of effectively restoring law and order and safeguarding Belgian investment in Katanga”.73 The Belgian case in Congo constitutes a telling case when existing FDI was in jeopardy due to ongoing internal unrest and fear of expropriation. The following case exemplifies, in turn, the triangular relationship between the actual intervener (agent), the civil war country, and a member of the P-5 (principal) related to the second argument of the book on the delegation of military interventions. During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, Oman experienced a rebellion against Sultan Said bin Taimur’s rule and later his successor and son Qaboos bin Said.74 The 10 Introduction uprising was identified as a communist threat to the Arabian Peninsula and dragged the United Kingdom and the United States into the conflict. Whereas the Soviet Union and China supported the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) and later its successor, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), which openly proclaimed adherence to socialist thought and was perceived as operating according to Mao’s Little Red Book, the US and UK saw their direct interests best served in the preservation of the monarchic rule. Therefore, both countries became, to a varying degree, engaged in the counter-insurgency operation. The UK had vested interests in Oman due to its geostrategic location as a gateway for Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Iranian oil shipments. Besides, Oman and the United Kingdom were bound by historical ties. The British operated a military base in Oman and deployed military advisors as well as the Royal Air Force and the British Army to support the counter-insurgency efforts. In contrast, the USA became mainly involved in 1975 with the shipment of arms and counterinsurgency technology only. One of the reasons for the victory over the insurgents was the military intervention by Iran, then ruled by the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who maintained a close relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom.75 The UK government’s fear of disapproval of the British combat involvement by its domestic constituency due to financial and reputational costs as well as the potential casualties and its fear of international condemnation, especially in the wake of the emergence of Arab nationalism, prevented the UK from becoming more intensively engaged in the civil war.76 The entrance of Iran with over 4,000 soldiers, who fought on behalf of the Sultanate and the British and American interests, relieved the burden. It proved to be the decisive military tipping point during the civil war in favor of the monarchy. As remarked by the commander of the Anglo–Omani forces, Major-General Kenneth Perkins: “without effective use of the Iranians [and other allied] manpower and logistic support, the war would inevitably drag into a stalemate.”77 While the Iranian intervention was driven by varying motives, including security concerns and the use of Oman as a testing ground for its armed forces, without British and US military supplies in the form of arms and training, as well as the political approval of both countries, the intervention could not have taken place. The United States used its diplomatic clout to facilitate the deployment of Iranian military personnel in Oman.78 Furthermore, Iran became one of the primary recipients of US and UK arms supplies. As observed by McGlinchey: “According to American estimates, Iran made a transition from a relatively weak client state under a US Cold War security umbrella into an emerging partner of America during the Johnson years.”79 Iran, identified here as the agent, carried out those military incursions and investments which the United Kingdom was unable, and the USA unwilling, to commit. Introduction 11 In summary, we have seen in the first example that Belgium’s motivation to intervene in post-independence Congo was strongly influenced by the existence of FDI in the Katanga region, while the second case exemplified how a state (Iran) viewed its interests in an intervention not per se in the outcome of the civil war, but rather intervened due to its relationship with the United Kingdom and USA. Current trends in FDI and arms trade The book comes at a time when internal armed unrest has remained prevalent in the world and FDI, as well as arms trade sales, have increased over the past decades. Using data from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset80 shows that civil wars81 have become a global phenomenon (see Figure 1.1). At the same time, military interventions in countries with civil wars have followed suit. Using data between 1975 and 2009 from the External Support Dataset82 reveals that approximately 82 percent of all civil war countries experienced military interventions on their territory on average each year. According to the dataset’s definition of interventions, both governments and rebel groups can be beneficiaries. Types of interventions range from direct participation with boots on the ground by the intervening state to indirect support providing weapons, intelligence, logistic, money, or training, as well Figure 1.1 Trends in civil wars and civil war countries subject to military interventions. Source: UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset; UCDP External Support Dataset. 12 Introduction as granting access to one’s territory to at least one conflict actor. Figure 1.1 visualizes the correlation83 between increases and decreases in the number of civil wars and the number of countries with civil wars being subject to military interventions. Overall, considering the comparatively high levels of internal insurgencies and the apparent willingness of states to alter civil war dynamics using military power it is of paramount importance to understand the key motivational drivers behind past and potentially future military interventions. Unilateral military interventions can have severe consequences on the duration of a civil war. Protracted conflicts are associated with the destruction of economic assets, infrastructure, loss of lives, and a decrease in well-being measured in GDP per capita. In the past two decades, scholars have shown that military interventions can prolong conflicts when they are biased and when several states intervene on different sides of the conflict,84 particularly when the interventions establish a stalemate between the conflict actors.85 Further, the presence of outside military interveners with their own agenda increases the set of actors necessary to strike a negotiated peace settlement and hence decreases the range of mutually accepted outcomes.86 This effect appears to be strongest when rebel groups are indirectly (e.g., through financial flows) supported by outside states, as such support introduces uncertainty about the strength of the rebel group from the government’s perspective.87 Despite the risks associated with armed conflict, FDI to low-income countries and to such countries that face internal political instability or even conflict is steadily rising. Data from the World Bank on net FDI inflows88 show a substantial increase of FDIs into poor and fragile89 countries since the 1990s (see Figure 1.2). Developing countries foster this trend by creating a more favorable business climate through trade liberalization policies, privatization policies, and a reduction in bureaucratic obstacles.90 Additionally, a host of bilateral and multilateral initiatives promote corporate investments to the least developed countries, for example, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China, the EU-Africa Business Forum, and the G20 Compact with Africa initiative (CwA). Considering the general trend for an increase in corporate investments, particularly against the backdrop of meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nations, the effects of FDI on military interventions might become even more pronounced in the future. Nevertheless, one major challenge for the positive trend in FDI inflows relates to the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The World Investment Report 202091 notes that, on the one hand, FDI will experience a sharp decline in 2020, and it is uncertain whether it will bounce back. Notwithstanding, the authors of the report note, on the other hand, that several countries engaged in an even more intense promotion of FDI inflows to counterbalance the adverse economic effects of lockdowns. Introduction 13 Figure 1.2 FDI inflow into fragile and conflict-affected countries. Source: World Bank (2020) For the Reference section: World Bank. 2020. “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$).” The World Bank Group. Accessed January 31, 2021. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD. It remains to be seen what the long-term impact of the pandemic on FDI patterns will be in the future. Considering the linkage between military interventions and FDI, research has shown that military interventions are not associated with increased bilateral FDI outflows92 to a target country. In her book Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, Aydin finds no statistical support for an effect of FDI outflow on military interventions into civil wars.93 States do not intervene in a civil war to promote new investments during armed conflict. In contrast to Aydin, this book argues that states intervene to protect already existing investments in countries fighting civil wars. Chapter 3 discusses in more detail the consequences of investments into conflict countries. Especially greenfield investments can tie investors to countries without the opportunity to move economic assets outside a civil war area in a short period. While FDI has been growing since the 1990s, we can observe a similar trend for arms trade since the first half of the 2000s. Figure 1.3 shows trade data from the Arms Transfers Database provided by the Stockholm 14 Introduction Figure 1.3 Arms trade patterns between 1950 and 2017. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).94 SIPRI developed the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) to measure the volume of “[...] actual deliveries of major conventional weapons.”95 The TIV is assigned in larger numbers for cost-intensive and technologically sophisticated arms like aircraft, artillery, submarines, or tanks. Cumulative annual bilateral arms trade data96 for 163 states97 from 1960 until 2017 indicate a rising trend for the past 15 years, thereby approaching levels that were characteristic for the late 1970s and 1980s when arms trade was at its global peak. The promotion of arms trade by supplying countries is generally assumed to contribute to their economic and security-related interests.98 The turning point after the substantial decline in the 1990s appears to have been caused by events in 2001 (most notably the commencing global War on Terror) when security considerations became once again primary drivers behind arms sales.99 Network analysis has shown that the arms export market is primarily dominated by a few exporters with an extensive network of clients, which is characteristic of a “hub-and-spokes” relationship. The leading exporting countries are all but one (Germany) permanent members of the UNSC.100 Because of the high levels of FDI to politically unstable countries and an increasing trend of arms supplies since the early 2000s coinciding with growing numbers of civil wars, it is crucial to understand their impact on the motivation of states to intervene militarily. As this book argues, existing FDI assets in civil war countries increase a state’s willingness to intervene, while extensive arms trade between the P-5 and their clients creates unidirectional dependencies. The P-5 can rely on a large network of agents that can carry out military interventions and pursue objects that intersect with the principal’s interests. If the current trends persist (COVID-19 notwithstanding and everything else remaining equal), we should experience higher rates of military interventions in civil wars in the future. Introduction 15 Structure of this book The book consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 engages with research on civil wars and discusses our current understanding of the drivers behind military interventions from a theoretical standpoint. It discusses the dimensions of the current international system relevant to understanding military interventions in civil wars, including the concepts of sovereignty and legal justification. The chapter then argues how, from a state-centric perspective, economic factors contribute to the motivation to intervene. Theoretical deductions in Chapters 3 to 5 build upon the discussion in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on the effect of existing FDI in the civil war country as well as natural resources and arms trade. Four hypotheses are presented and quantitatively tested on a dataset spanning from 2001 to 2009. Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of proxy interventions, and it also provides four hypotheses on the role of arms trade in proxy interventions and statistically tests those on a dataset containing civil wars and military interventions recorded from 1975 until 2009. Chapter 5 examines the concept of indirect interventions. It first presents a sample of military interventions that match the category of indirect interventions and then conducts case studies analysis on the Moroccan intervention against Katangese secessionists in Zaire in 1977 and the Ugandan intervention against the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in 2009 to illuminate the triangular relationship behind the intervening countries and the United States as their principal. Chapter 6 completes the book with a discussion of findings on FDI and formulates policy implications for countries engaging in OFDI and arms trade. Notes 1 Strohmeier and Wittlinger (2010). 2 Riddervold (2014). 3 See Finnemore (2003), who provides a detailed account of the influence of conference participants in establishing a legal justification for military interventions in the Hague conference of 1907. 4 Ibid., 28–30. 5 Ibid., 46. 6 Collier et al. (2003). 7 Kibris (2015). 8 Collier et al. 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