Dr. Erika Harris School of Politics and Communication Studies Roxby Building University of Liverpool Liverpool L69 7ZT Tel: 0151 794 2901 Email: E.Harris@liverpool.ac.uk This is a work in progress. Please take into account when quoting. CEEISA, Tartu, 25-27 June ‘Reflecting on a wider Europe and beyond: norms, rights and interests’ ‘Moving politics beyond the state? Hungarian minority in Slovakia’ The paper is based on a British Academy founded research project (SG – 37978) ‘The changing context of minority politics: The impact of European integration on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia’ June 2004-June 2005. Abstract Whilst elaborating identity formation in the new European space theoretically, the empirical focus of this paper is on the changing relations between majorities and minorities, in Central Europe generally and in Slovakia and Hungary specifically. The argument holds that the meaning of ‘the nation’, the state and territory is being transformed and that there is a discernable shift from politics at the state level to regions and with that a change in identity formation vis-à-vis new institutions and geographies. The question is whether this shift is accompanied by the emergence of ethno-regions, meaning political/geographic entities beyond and ‘across’ state level. The contradictions of democracy-identity relationship within the state and proposition that democracy may need ‘rescuing’ from beyond the state, are followed by a number of hypotheses about politics beyond the state which are then tested against recent survey conducted among the Hungarian minority in Slovakia-Hungarian border regions. This evidence supports the main thesis of this contribution: the EU creates unprecedented prospects to move politics beyond the state and in the process, remove some challenges to democracy within the state. Dr. Erika Harris specializes in the politics of contemporary Eastern and Central Europe with particular emphasis on the interrelationship between democratisation, nationalism and European integration. She is the author of Nationalism and Democratisation Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia (2002) and Democracy in the New Europe (forthcoming August 2006, Palgrave). Her new research focuses on the impact of European integration on the relationship between majorities and minorities in the new member states. She is also in the process of writing a book about Nationalism: Theories and Cases (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) which seeks to critically assess the standard theories of nationalism in international relations. Ethno-political relations in post-Communism It is not a revelation that the controversy of nationalism lies in the fact that the nation-state is hardly ever a single nation state and that most states comprise of more than one national group, thus are actually non-nation-sates J. Migdal ‘State-building and the non-nation-state’ The Journal of International Affairs 58:1, 2004, pp. 17-46., but that in nearly all cases one national group assumes the dominant position in the distribution of cultural values – thus forming a majority and determining the official culture of the state. Non-conformation or self-definition as a separate cultural entity from the official culture of the state constitutes a minority. The modern state has for a long time rested on social and cultural homogeneity, hence the perception that unity means homogeneity. In multinational (multiethnic or multicultural) states the process of homogenisation can be conflicting, mostly due to the assumption by the dominant nation and its nation-building elites that the state is their own nation-state which implies the exclusion of other cultures from ownership of the state R. Brubakers (1996) Nationalism reframed Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 103. Too much emphasis on nation-building tends to inhibit internal integration of national groups within the state and aggravate the relationship between majority and minorities. By the same token, taken into a larger context of the EU, we can argue that too much insistence on national identity inhibits political integration of the new European polity. The ethno-political relations within the state reflect the fundamental challenge of democracy. The notions of popular sovereignty and participation from below, rights, expectations and the protection of interests are not democratic principles only; they are also principles of nationalism which too is rooted in the idea that all political authority stems from ‘the people’. The main overlap - ‘the people’ – is however also the main point of contention: whilst the cultural contents of ‘the people’ is not the main concern of democratic process, the main principle of nationalism is that it should be its own people who are in charge of this process. Postcommunist transitions to democracy brought this interplay of democracy and nationalism into a sharp focus E.Harris Nationalism and Democratisation Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia, Ashgate, 2002; G.Nodia in L.Diamond and M.Plattner, Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; G.Nodia ‘How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?’ Journal of Democracy, 17, pp.15-29; M. Beisinger ‘How Nationalism Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the Tides and Cycles of Nationalist Contention’, Social Research 63, pp. 97-146; M. Mann ‘A political theory of nationalism and its excesses’ in Notions of Nationalism. Budapest, Central European Press, 1995; theoretically and politically. If postcommunist transitions showed that the link between identity and democracy can be very close, the Yugoslav conflict freed us of any doubts that they could be divorced from each other – with all dramatic consequences of that relationship S.Ramet (2002) Balkan Babel, Boulder Colorado; M.Mann (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy, Cambridge, CUP.. First stage: postcommunist nationalism Enough has been said and written about the salience of nationalism in transition from communism to democracy. To sum up: the mobilisation of ethno-territorial character as an integral part of democratisation dominated the transition to such an extent that some states, i.e. Czechoslovakia (Yugoslavia and of course, the Soviet Union) could not withstand its force and disintegrated; the states that had a tradition of independent statehood to fall back on, i.e. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, managed (for reasons too complex to discuss here) to sustain the democratisation process without being ‘derailed’ into postcommunist nationalism, as was the case with Slovakia; in all cases, however, we observed ‘state nationalism’ of the dominant national groups and a threat to minorities, in some cases a subjugation of minorities (i.e. Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia) The most obvious example here would be Serbia. I omit it because the intensity of postcommunist nationalism in Serbia was exacerbated by a particularly vicious form of resistance to democracy by the old leadership; whilst others and Slovak national(istic) elites in particular sought a national alternative to democracy within some form of ‘procedural’ democracy, Serbian nationalists of early 1990’s sought the return to authoritarianism.. The mobilisation of one group leads to the politicisation of another group’s identity and that to the increase of populist discourse on both sides. The dominant group may appear increasingly more threatening and that may lead to the involvement of ethnic kin state across the borders. Depending on historical experience this dynamic sends a ripple of fear back and forth and whilst gathering momentum radicalises politics to a dangerous and at times explosive potential. Elites, for all their exploitation of identity in terms of political capital are not wholly responsible for this dynamic – they could not succeed without building on the foundations of historical memory which is easily invoked when pointing to new insecurities. Regions of historical and ethnic complexity (mutually dependent factors) are particularly prone to this dynamic which has been well formalised by Rogers Brubaker’s theory of ‘triadic nexus’ R.Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, CUP, 1996.. In his attempt to explain the rise of ‘new nationalism’ in postcommunist Europe he identified an interlocking dynamic between ‘nationalising’ nationalism of newly independent states, autonomist nationalism of national minorities and the trans-border nationalism of the ‘external homelands’ to which they belong by shared ethnicity, but not their citizenship. The role of the ‘external homeland’ in any analysis of majority-minority relationship in Central Europe is crucial. Slovakia and Hungary (and Romania and Hungary) have been prime examples of this dynamic; each government and opposition at various times in their political fortunes and misfortunes relied on historical events to mobilise their respective groups. Notwithstanding the inventiveness and the applicability of the ‘triadic’ paradigm, it does belong to an era of early stages of postcommunist transitions to democracy and does no longer reflect the situation on the ground. The model is and always was incomplete on two levels. First, it portrays identities as essentialists and divorced from the institutional processes within the state. As will be argued below, when it comes to interethnic relations within any one state, the focus should be on policies of the state which tend to change in response to domestic and international factors. The accession negotiations for the EU membership illustrated this dynamic in a particularly sharp light. Majority-minority relationships are fluid and depend on many variables: the policies of the residence state, the political, historical and socio-economic position of the minority, the political environment in the ‘external’ homeland and international position of both. Claims that minorities make vis-à-vis their residence and ethnic kin states vary, usually according to historical legacy and the future calculations. The latter is possibly weightier than the formal. Since the establishment of democracy, the main objective of the Central European states has been European integration. It must be argued that the exclusion of the EU as the fourth actor in the majority-minority-homelands equation is a particularly striking limitation of Brubaker’s theory. The second stage: ‘Europeanisation’ and the deepening of democracy The early years of postcommunism could be characterised by the simultaneity of identity as an accompaniment of democratisation at best, or the subordination of the democratisation process to ‘national’ issues at worse (as exemplified by Slovakia and more dramatically by the ex-Yugoslav republics). The second stage of postcommunism became characterised by the intensification of the democratisation from beyond the state through the process of ‘Europeanisation’. This is where we are at now and slowly moving towards yet another stage of which more below. The ‘Europeanisation’ stage signifies a considerable improvement in interethnic relations within and between the states in Central European region. It also signifies something of a democratic consolidation and a commitment to democracy, practiced and exercised at various levels – national, subnational and beyond the state at the EU level; moreover, exercised in tandem with many states within this large and de-territorialized political entity. As with all transitions, this stage too is prone to different levels of success, stagnation or even regression. ‘Europeanisation’, is taken to mean a process of transformation of the domestic structures of a state by European frameworks, norms and rules. This process necessitates a series of adaptations by national and sub-national actors to economic, social and political changes originating at the European level. Some mediated through the institutions of the European Union by the way of implementation of EU rules and policies in, and this must be stressed, an otherwise little changed domestic arena, others not. Domestic structures entail the formal institutions of the state and its national legal system and administration, but also the perception and public discourse about national and ethnic identity and the meaning of citizenship, the role of the state and political traditions. The latter is the focus of this paper. Evidence shows that in states with a significant ethnic division and the presence of ethnic parties, i.e. Slovakia, ‘Europeanisation’ affected the structure of political competition in a way which, in turn, bears directly on the relationship between national groups within the state and hence, less directly, on the perceptions about national identity and its changing function within the new European framework. E.Harris ‘Europeanisation of Slovakia’ Comparative European Poltics 2:2, 2004, pp. 185-211. ‘Europeanisation’ does not just add another dimension to the discussion about the politics of the state, but changes the debate about the available solutions to political problems. ‘Europeanisation’ is a very broad and much overused concept SEE: Börzel, T. ‘Shaping an Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to Europeanisation’ Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No 2/2003; E.Harris ‘Europeanisation of Slovakia’ Comparative European Poltics 2:2, 2004, pp. 185-211; Olsen, J.‘ The Many Faces of Europeanization’ Arena Working Papers WP ½, 2002; Radaelli, C. ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change’ European Online Papers 4(8), 2000.. In the present context its relevance is limited to the exploration of its significance for the majority-minority relationship in newly integrated states and confined the highlighting of a number of points: Democratisation and ‘Europeanisation’ are overlapping processes, in fact, in the latter years of accession negotiations they have become mutually dependent. Laffan B.Laffan, ‘The European Union Polity: a Union of Regulative, Normative and Cognitive Pillars’ Journal of European Public Policy 8:5: 709-727, 2001. argues that the EU is a social construction that is being grafted on to the nation-state. Significance of this can hardly be overestimated, in cases where ‘Europeanisation’ follows soon after the relatively recent establishment of independent statehood and where there are many still unresolved issues concerning nationhood and minorities For the impact of the EU’s enlargement on national policies in Central Europe see P. Vermeersch, 'Minority Policy in Central Europe: Exploring the Impact of the EU’s Enlargement Strategy’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3(2): 3-19., as I argue below. Laffan further identifies three pillars of the EU as an institutional field – regulative, normative and cognitive. The latter, a product of social subjectivity encompasses meanings, perceptions and symbols through which identity and social reality are constructed. This is the focus of this article. ‘Europeanisation’ raises new questions about the purpose and meaning of national identity in the context of European integration. Questions concern mainly, the exclusivity of national identity which hitherto reinforced the project of the nation-state, and hence, the capacity of national identity to offer a contribution towards the reinforcement of the European political project in the area of identity which it so obviously lacks. The evolution of identity politics in Central Europe is marked by a degree of ambivalence toward the EU, typically during the ‘Europeanisation’ stage. This is understandable given the speed and a certain inevitability of the accession. Depending on one’s point of view, it is also somewhat risky for further developments within the EU. The third stage – ‘transnational identity’ – which is expected to follow will depend on the progress of the EU over the next few years. To avoid the teleology, progress signifies, deepening of democracy within states and beyond them at every level as my conclusion will argue. The Slovak-Hungarian relationship The relatively high level of ethnic heterogeneity makes the position of minorities one of the most important socio-political issues in Slovakia 14-18%of the population declares itself to be other than Slovak. Slovakia thus counts as one of the most ethnically heterogeneous countries in Europe. With the exception of the ex-Soviet Republics, Slovakia is in the 4.place after: Macedonia, Spain and Croatia. (Dostál in M. Kollár,. and G. Mesežnikov(ed). Slovensko 2000, Bratislava: IVO, 2000). . It must be stressed immediately, that it is also the only Central European state with an ethnic party, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (henceforth, the SMK or the Hungarian Coalition) in the government since 1998. Due to the combination of historical significance of Hungary and the political weight of the Hungarian minority at the centre of Slovak politics, the national question in Slovakia is largely exemplified by this interethnic relationship above any other. The exaggerated importance of the Slovak – Hungarian relationship (for both sides, incidentally) reflects a number of historical facts and their mutually incompatible interpretations, as well as very contemporary problems. Two of the most significant historical markers round which Slovak national identity has been historically constructed are the Hungarian and Czech nations. Since Slovakia’s independence, the perceptions about the relationship between the nation, the state and democracy are all focused on the Hungarian minority which, as it were, represents Hungary in the Slovak national consciousness. When it comes to Hungarian state, their ethnic kin (whether in Slovakia or in Romania) seems to take on a similar role - an extension of the Hungarian state and thus, a subject of the Hungarian national consciousness, particularly its pre-occupation with the post-World War I. arrangements by which these minorities were ‘lost’ to Hungary. Moreover, the incorporation of the representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia’s power structures symbolises, simultaneously, a maturing or a regressing democracy, it is a sign of rising or waning nationalism, but also, an important criterion by which Slovakia’s admission into the EU was assessed. The nationalistic slant of the Mečiar administration was one of the reasons for the initial rejection of Slovakia from the first wave of entrants into the EU. This was the period of the implementation of a discriminatory State Language Law (1995), the negative reforms in the provision of cultural subsidies and unsuccessful efforts to enforce Slovak education into Hungarian schools. The post-1998 administrations succeeded in creating a better framework for the resolution of minority issues E.Harris ,2004., despite many political crises, permanent frictions and mutual misgivings about broken promises – from all sides, including the Hungarian Coalition. Since 2002 elections the position of the SMK in the government is very strong with 20 seats in the Parliament and three ministries (agriculture, environment and development) as well as the Deputy Prime-Minister for Human Rights, Minorities and the European Integration, and the First Deputy Speaker of the Parliament. Admittedly, the abundance of anti-minority rhetoric which accompanied the pre-2002 election campaign did not appear to have impressed the voters; it is to be hoped that the current wave of inter-party ethnic haggling which is already appearing at the onset of the new pre-election campaign in Slovakia (2006) will be equally ineffective in their aim to destabilise the Slovak-Hungarian relationship An anti-SMK coalition has been declared by some Slovak parties for the purpose of regional elections in Nitra regional parliament where the Hungarian Coalition currently has the majority ( SME, 11.6. 2005). Similarly, the SMK is apparently exerting some pressure on their own voters to vote for their candidates in preference to Slovak candidates in local councils in mixed regions. For the role of ethnic parties see also K.Chandra ‘Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability’ Perspectives on Politics 3:2, 2005, p.235-251.. On the other hand, the readiness with which ethnicity re-emerges as a political tool every time political elites vie for voters’ attention should tell us something about the entrenchment of ethnic division in political practice. Despite the positive shifts in minority policies, politically the Slovak-Hungarian relationship remains tense. The absence of constitutional changes which would guarantee the continuation of this shift questions Slovakia’s ability to deal with minority issues to the satisfaction of the Hungarian minority. No actual laws that would address some outstanding problems have been passed in the Parliament, with the exception of the Minority Language Law (1999) which brought changes to the much-criticised Language Law (1995) For details see E.Harris, 2002 and E. Harris, 2004., and enabled the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages The main post-Cold War agreements on minority rights are: the 1990 Copenhagen Documents (‘the respect for and protection of minorities’) and the 1995 Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.. The Hungarian SMK rejected the new parliamentary law on the use of minority languages because it did not deem it adequate, whilst the opposition abstained from voting for the opposite reason, but the law was passed anyway. Many other issues remain open, i.e. the change to the preamble of the Constitution (1992) which refers to ‘the Slovak nation’, thus implicitly excluding minorities from the ‘ownership’ of the state For details E.Harris, 2002, p.115-119., as well as other demands concerning the constitutional guarantees, the boundaries of administrative districts and legally and emotionally complex issue of the revocation of Beneš Decrees This refers to the post WWII. Czechoslovak President Beneš’s degrees on the basis of which the confiscation of Hungarian properties in Slovakia and the expulsions of the 3 million Sudeten German minority from the Czech lands was legally justified. The Hungarian and the Czech minorities were accused of being ‘collectively guilty’ of the collaboration with the enemy. None of these degrees have been actually revoked and there are no restitutions for the confiscated Hungarian properties available under the current Slovak legislation. . All in all, the Hungarian representatives, during nearly 8 years in government achieved a number of minor compromises on some issues, but no significant victories. However, despite the regular disagreements the assessment of the SMK’s influence on the democratic process is overall very positive E.Harris, 2004 and K. Krause, ‘Slovakia’s Second Transition’, Journal of Democracy 14:2,2003,pp.65-79., particularly by the Slovak political parties. Interestingly, there is an observable and rising dissatisfaction with the political representation of the Hungarian minority by the minority itself. The reasons are many. The following sections are informed by interviews ( see below) Interviews conducted in June 2005, for the list of interviewees see Appendix above.. First is the lack of choice whereby the minority is now represented by this one party only which is actually an amalgam of 5 different political parties who have all abandoned their individual aims in favour of all-Hungarian representation. Whilst this may have served the electoral purposes of the 1998 elections when Mečiar’s government increased the electoral threshold in an attempt to minimize the opposition, the SMK is now often accused by more liberal and left orientated wings of the minority of short-sighted policies and the maintenance of ethnic tension rather than the resolution of economic problems. The 13-20% unemployment in the Southern, overwhelmingly Hungarian region, has been mentioned by all interviewed and largely blamed on communist neglect and Mečiar’s nationalizing policies, but also the inability of the SMK to attract more investment. More to the point: ‘the Hungarian Coalition is a conservative party and that is not what this region needs – identity rhetoric is a replacement of the real issue’(Oravec, the Mayor of Štúrovo). On the other hand, ‘there is no alternative to the SMK in the current climate’ (Tóth, The Director of the Forum Minority Research Institute, Šamorín). It should be noted that ‘the increased concern for socio-economic issues rather than ethnic ones’, particularly by the minority elites is ‘a positive development’ towards de-ethnicisation of the Slovak-Hungarian relations( Pál Csáky, Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Minorities and European Integration ). ‘Europeanisation’ and Minorities The national question claimed a prominent position in political life in all postcommunist states – due to either historical or recent developments. ‘Europeanisation’ also meant the adoption of minority legislation in line with European norms L.Tesser, ‘ Geopolitics of Tolerance: Minority Rights Under EU Expansion in East/Central Europe’ East European Politics and Societies 17:3, 2003, pp.483-532. and on the whole national elites adopted them as a part of the EU’s political conditionality attached to their accession. It would be however naïve to assume that the formal adoption and even implementation would guarantee an instant change in the majority-minority relationships. Not only are these relationships a result of long-standing historical processes, but the internationalisation of the minority issues left national elite with little choice, but to proceed with rigorous minority policies, often ahead of domestic developments. A degree of political cynicism associated with minority rights must not be underestimated. Whilst Slovakia would have been probably less inclined to adopt the European Charter on Minority Languages, Hungary with a significant number of ‘kin’ abroad supported extensive minority protection. Simultaneously though, whilst both Slovakia and Hungary were in the process of accession negotiations with the EU, Hungary also adopted controversial legislation on Legal status of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries (Krajanský Zákon, Status law, 2001) extending ‘partial’ citizenship rights to their minorities (with the exception of Austria) For details see M.Stewart, (2002) ‘The Hungarian Status law: a new form of transnational politcs?, WPTC -02-09, Department of Anthropology, UCL, London.. This legislation, after cautions criticism by the EU (Venice Commission,2002 ) was eventually changed within the limits of international law and within what was considered good neighbourly relationship between Slovakia and Hungary. Whilst the majority of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia admit to some symbolic value of the Status Law (concessions for cultural and educational venues in Hungary for students and pensioners), the truth is that the membership in the EU makes the law and its benefits, particularly in the area of employment, de facto redundant. Nevertheless, the frictions caused by this process only exacerbated a historically delicate relationship between the two nations and emphasized the durability of ethnicity as an electoral tool. Most representatives of the Hungarian minority that were interviewed in the present context of this paper, considered the Status Law a political manipulation, orchestrated by the Hungarian Right for the purpose of its waning pre-election campaign and aided by the most nationalistic wing of the Hungarian Coalition and regretted that the Coalition let itself to be drawn into it. On both sides nationalist elites appear resistant to the fact that the Hungarian minority is precisely that – a minority in a neighbouring state. The Hungarian nationalist elites refuse to accept that its ethnic kin is also a citizen of another state, whilst in Slovakia the Status law was often depicted as another attempt to reassert the greater Hungary (the same reaction occurred in Romania which is a residence state of the largest Hungarian minority in Europe). Both reactions seem to be exaggerated and backward looking. On the other hand, it is worth considering whether a politically integrated Europe is not, unwittingly, reinvigorating ethnicity through, as it were, back door. The erosion of the nation-state’s ability to endorse the civic affiliations, particularly in the newly independent states where the postcommunist nationalist mobilisation has not subsided yet, could lead to the strengthening of ethnic ties rather than establishment of a larger political community. The architect of the Status Law and the ex- Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, endorsed this sentiment when he claimed that ‘from the Hungarian point of view, the EU is a possibility to unify the Hungarian nation without the modification of borders’ (RFE/RL, 17.10.2003). It is obvious that in a Central European context nationalism remains an active, even if latent force that can be easily mobilised at national levels and that shifting the focus from the national to the European level may give these historically inspired identities less opportunity to dominate the political process. According to some representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, since the accession ‘the minority feels a greater sense of trust and the interethnic relations are improving as they have been for the last seven years’, because the EU ‘offers a degree of stability’ (Fridrich Nagy, Deputy Mayor and the Member of the Regional Parliament, Dunajská Streda). When it comes to the construction of identities economic issues should not be underestimated for identities are ‘formed and reformed in everyday life’ (Fridrich Nagy). Where the employment opportunities have been increased and where there are more Slovaks moving into the Hungarian areas, as for example near the capitol Bratislava, often due to the rising property prices in the capitol, the communities are becoming less ethnically divided (Fridrich Nagy). By the same token, European integration promises the possibilities of exchange of labour resources between Hungary and Slovakia; the relative lack of labour force on the Hungarian side of the border, may be set of against the high unemployment on the Slovak side (Edit Bauer) in which case the Hungarian communities will become less dependent on the Slovak state and add to the overall ‘aim of the regional regeneration by the EU to equalise economic life throughout the whole region’ (László Nagy, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, National minorities and Position of Women). The role of the EU as a guarantor of stability and a mediating factor in interstate and interethnic relations is therefore crucial. Hence, Brubaker’s triadic relationship between ‘nationalising’ nationalism of newly independent states, autonomist nationalism of minorities and the trans-border nationalism of the ‘external homelands’ appears now somewhat static and less convincing. The ‘triadic nexus’ is in need of the supplementation by a fourth party - the EU – who has become a kind of mediator and a safety net in the evolving relationship between national groups within the Central European region C.Lord and E. Harris, Democracy in the New Europe (chpt.5), Palgrave, forthcoming 2006.. Third stage: ‘Transnationalism’ and the changing context of identity politics The membership of the EU may not yet define personal identities, but it increasingly defines state’s identity; it has become a constitutive feature of statehood T.Risse,R.Herrmann, and M.Brewer (2004) Transnational Identities,.,Rowman &Littlefield, p.263 and defines social and institutional space within which states act. This is where we left the second ‘Europeanisation’ stage of identity politics – the internal integration of national groups within the state, thus, the intensification of liberal, democratic and civic values from within and partially from beyond the state. At this stage, it is not clear how this affects personal identity of European citizen and how strongly this bonds people to the EU and its institutions – possibly more than the strictly intergovernmental approach to the EU suggests and less than pro-integration elites would like to claim. The EU Constitution fiasco following the French and Dutch referenda (Spring 2005) amply demonstrated two crucial facts of current European politics: a) a degree of ambivalence towards the EU and b) identity, institutions and geography are mutually interdependent and whilst identity is slow in changing, it is, at all times, reflective of the experience of institutions and socialisation within them – rejection of the current form of integration not withstanding. No matter how small the impact of the EU on identity construction is (not the subject here), it is nevertheless clear that the EU must be considered an integral part of domestic politics in its member states. This is even more the case in the new member states where the evolution of new party politics has been very tightly connected to European integration. ‘Europeanisation’ changes institutions and actors and alters the relationship between majorities and minorities. This leads to politics of ‘transnationalism’ - that is a form of affiliation that is less defined by the relationship of the individual to the state citizenship and more by the solidarity based on other factors, i.e. region, or ethnic kin, but not seeking the exclusive control of this territory of residence. ‘Transnationalism’ defies the conventional meaning of the state and does not fit easily into the existing state dependent theories of integration, nationalism or democratisation. It is often referred to as ‘new regionalism’, that is ‘self-rule based on territory but without the exclusive territorial control over territory as implied by the classical nationalist doctrine’ M.Keating ‘European Integration and nationalities Question’ Politics and Society 32:3, 2004, pp.367-388, p. 373 and The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, Edward Elgar, 1998, by the same author.. In the context of this paper one ought to be aware of a delicate difference between sub-state regionalism, i.e. Scotland, Wales and regionalism in Central Europe, which usually denotes an ethno-region, that is a territory on two sides of the state border based on ethnic kinship. This is the reason why in this paper term ‘transnationalism’ appears to be more suitable. That too with some reservations; we could be actually looking at a border region, thus at trans-state, or trans-border identity, but that leaves out the overwhelmingly ethnic content of the affiliation. Ethno-regionalism comes nearer the mark, but gives a false impression of ethnic homogeneity in these territories which is not always the case. The impact of these developments can, at this stage, provide only some tentative suggestions. I shall continue with a series of interrelated hypotheses which, I argue, will characterise the third –‘ transnational’ stage of identity politics in Central Europe. The main challenge of the accession is the reformulation of the meaning of the nation, the state and territory both perceptually and in reality. The state’s sharing of competencies with Brussels diminishes the role of the nation as the dominant owner of the state with intended consequences for minorities whose position should become less threatened and more secure in political and practical terms. European integration, if it is to continue on its intended path of civilising and democratising the European continent, changes the traditional meaning of borders. Borders, far from the assumed clarity of purpose to delimit one society from the other signify something of a paradox. In terms of identity they are deemed to offer inclusion and cohesion; politically, they are a physical expression of sovereignty and they symbolise a completion of the project of the nation-state as well as delimit the state’s territorial and institutional reach. Yet, historically, borders, particularly in Central Europe, have been subject to a constant renegotiation, always producing overlapping and contradictory ethnic zones E.Balibar, We, the People of Europe? ,Princeton University Press, 2004., leading, more often than not, to increased insecurity, ethnic and social divisions, exclusion and political conflict. The question of civilisational borders within European democracies between citizens of ‘in’ and ‘out’ states and between more accepted and less accepted peoples of Europe is another issue all together which needs to be analysed within politics of tolerance, recognition, multiculturalism and democracy generally. Within the EU borders ‘take on new significance’ G.Delanty ( 2006) ‘Borders in a Changing Europe:An analysis of recent trends’ , forthcoming Comparative European Politics 4:2.. Again, rather paradoxically, the significance is actually in their absence. The new ‘lack of borders’, particularly in the region where borders were associated with historical animosity or/and communist army check points, this constitutes one of the most profound changes in the history of the Central European region with tremendous consequences for majorities-minorities relationships, interstate relations and identity formation as we understand them in a more traditional nation-state-dependent context. This is probably best expressed in words of a Slovak MEP (SMK) Edit Bauer: ‘No borders as such! It is an historic moment of unforeseen circumstances’. New arrangements increase the trans-border cooperation which reinvigorates the kinship identity and produces the rise of ethno-regions. Here the story becomes rather complex and adds to the surplus of speculations in the absence of sufficient empirical evidence. One story is becoming clear: the blurring of boundaries between national, international and regional. There is a fluidity of spaces within which politics are conducted and that logically, leads to the fluidity of affiliations and varied consequences. Slovak –Hungarian relationship: an empirical investigation The empirical research has been conducted in Slovakia in the period June 2004-June 2005. The survey took place in June 2006. As has been suggested, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship embodies a number of factors that are of supreme importance in the investigation of changing relations between national groups: the strong cultural, historical and political ties between the Hungarian minority and Hungary and their strong political position in the newly integrated Slovakia. For this reason, the border regions of Southern and Eastern Slovakia offer a perfect opportunity to investigate the above propositions which form the organising framework of the following survey. This ethnographic survey tried to capture perceptions about politics and identity among the members of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, a year after the EU accession. The micro-sample of 110 people is of course too small to represent more than a 500 000 member community. On the other hand, the respondents have been chosen in a way that can be viewed as representative of the Hungarian minority. These were: 47 lower six-form students of two Gymnasia with the Hungarian as the language of instruction in the predominantly Hungarian border city of Štúrovo in the South of the country and in the capitol Bratislava. The further 63 respondents were: teachers and council workers in Štúrovo, employees, librarians and others visiting or working at the Forum Institute (Institute for minorities) in Šamorín which is a mixed town near Bratislava, a number of MP’s of the Hungarian Coalition and a few representatives of the Hungarian minority in the city of Košice in the East of the country (also attached to the Forum Institute). Geographically, Štúrovo is the nearest to the Hungarian border, in fact shares the Danube river with the Hungarian city of Esztergom (one place prior to the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918 following the Trianon agreements); in recent times, both cities are joined by a restored bridge, open to crossing with a minimal border control. Šamorín is also near the border, but nearer to Bratislava with a more mixed population. Both towns belong to what is called Žitný Ostrov (Wheat Island, after the predominantly agrarian nature of the Southern region also called the Hungarian belt). Košice, in the East, has a strong Hungarian presence that goes back to the Austro-Hungarian empire and to the Hungarian annexation of Eastern Slovakia during the WWII. Since 1945 the Hungarian presence in Košice has been decreasing. The capitol Bratislava is historically a multiethnic city near the Austrian and Hungarian borders. As will become apparent, the geographical position is important for reasons associated with the economy and the influence of the ‘motherland’ Hungary. Table 1. On the scale 05, do you feel that Slovakia’s membership in the EU has altered the relationship between Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority? (0- not at all, 5-significantly) A) politically 0-3 (not) 4-5 (significantly) Comments All regions and ages 100 10 the most used category: 3 B) economically 0-3 4-5 Comments All regions and ages 90 20 the most used category: 3 Table 2. In terms of your identity, which of the following categories do you feel most comfortable with? In order of relevance: 1-most relevant, 2- relevant, 3 rather relevant, 4- less relevant, 5- not relevant. N.B. You can tick more than one category. Category 0-3 (relevant) 4-5 (not relevant) Comments Hungarian living in Slovakia 93 Most ‘rather relevant’ Slovak of Hungarian background 1 Hungarian (no state affiliation) 83 2 This probably in reference to a ‘no’ dual nationality referendum about the extension of citizenship to ethnic Hungarians from abroad which has disappointed many Hungarians in Slovakia Slovak (state affiliation) European (ethnically Hungarian) 87 European 5 Other Table 3. In terms of political activity (i.e. local politics and national politics), are you most interested in: your locality/region, the Slovak capitol Bratislava, the Hungarian capitol Budapest, or Brussels? In order of importance 1-most important, 2- important, 3- less important, 4- not important. Place of interest 1-2 Important 3-4 Less important Comment Štúrovo Bratislava/ Šamorín Košice Štúrovo Bratislava/ Šamorín Košice L Locality/region 45 51 Bratislava 23 46 Budapest 31 19 16 Further from the Hungarian border Budapest appears less important Brussels 21 31 9 Table 4. On scale 05 has EU membership affected your sense of security in terms: (0-not at all, 5-significantly) All regions and ages 0-2 (no) 3 4-5 (yes) Comment Politically 66 22 22 economically 83 14 13 Culturally 70 25 15 There is a definite improvement in the sense of security Table 5. Do you think that developments in your region have a long-term influence on the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary? Yes/possibly Don’t know Not really Comment All regions and Ages 98 12 Encouragingly self-explanatory Analysis The above survey is not a sociological study, but seeks to give an impression of issues that could be considered relevant to identity politics of a politically and geographically concentrated minority in a state where national issues remain high on the political agenda. A number of classifications are in order. First, a minority in the Central European context denotes usually an historical minority (autochthonous), who have resided in the same territory for generations, but their state affiliations have changed due to historical processes, i.e. the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the consequent establishment of new states. This is very different to Western Europe, where minority usually refers to immigration (‘new minorities’, as they are called in Slovakia). Both types of minorities face specific problems and require specific legislative arrangements for their resolution. Second, the Hungarian minority is concentrated in certain areas of the country which they feel should form a coherent administrative district. This is particularly the case with the Southern border region (Žitný Ostrov). This region is, however, divided between two administrative districts (Trnava and Nitra) with two major consequences for political competition. a) the dissatisfaction of the Hungarian minority who feel that administrative regions (VÚC, Všeobecné úcelové celky) have been drawn according to a principle of ‘diminishing Hungarian influence’ (MEP [SMK] Edith Bauer) in the areas with an overwhelmingly Hungarian population The creation of all Hungarian district remains one of the unfulfilled demand of the Hungarian Coalition. For details see E.Harris, 2004 and comments of the above interviewees. . In this respect, they lack ethnic and geographic coherence that ethno-regions would suggest. b) political competition between parties at the state level tends to ‘migrate’ into the regions. The best example is indeed the declaration of an ‘anti-SMK’ coalition between a number of Slovak parties for the regional elections (see note 18). There is only one Hungarian party, but a number of Slovak political parties who are always willing to mobilise on the purportedly excessive Hungarian influence in the mixed regions. This is even more so now, when the Hungarian Coalition is fighting many battles. First, as a governmental party within a fractious coalition (to which fractiousness it often contributes), against a strong opposition; second, an ethnic party in the first post-accession election when its presence in the government is no longer considered a foreign policy issue connected to successful European integration; and finally, it is struggling to reconcile the growing ideological and socio-economic chasms within its own electorate. What do the results of the above survey tell us about the latest stage of postcommunist transition - ‘transnationalism’? The identity of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is overwhelmingly ethnic: some 84% of respondents view themselves primarily as a ‘Hungarian living in Slovakia’. This is further confirmed by the 80 % response to ‘European, but ethnically Hungarian’ (table 2). Interesting about this is that political affiliation appears to be rather European (80%) than Slovak and that the Slovak state is viewed strictly as a place of residence (75%). When, however, compared to results of political interest, Europe is in third place after locality (the majority of respondents) and the national level (Bratislava) (table 3.) The external homeland, that is Budapest, takes precedence over the national level only in Štúrovo which is geographically nearest to the Hungarian border. The further away from the border, or nearer Bratislava (where the locality is actually the capital), Budapest ceases to be important. This says probably more about the influence of the media than about where political interest lie. The most important finding here is that locality/region carries the weight of political interest and engagement. In this respect we are looking clearly at regionalisation of the Hungarian minority within the EU context. In order to make a more meaningful statement about the relation of ‘Europeanisation’ and regionalisation among other national groups, whether in Slovakia (or elsewhere), one would have to conduct a similar survey among the Slovak population in mixed and mostly Slovak regions. In the absence of such a comparative survey, a degree of cautiousness is required when claiming the emergence of an ethno-region in the Southern ‘Hungarian belt’ between Slovakia and Hungary. On the other hand, there is no denying that the Hungarian minority’s cultural and political life takes place in their region and that European identity takes precedence over Slovak territorial one. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. State affiliation is marginalised in favour of ethnic affiliation, either for historical reasons, or as a reflection of actual daily existence. Whilst the Slovak state is accepted, it is being supplemented by the EU which appears to offer an acceptable political identity – this is consistent with beliefs that historical minorities in Eastern/Central Europe prefer larger less ‘national’ political units The Hungarian minority was always opposed to Slovak independence which was one of the reasons for tensions in post-independent Slovakia. See E.Harris, 2002. and that ‘Europeanisation’ opens different political spaces and opportunities within which national groups operate. Here again, it would be beneficial to conduct a survey on the ‘other side of the border’ to gain a deeper understanding of how Hungarian citizens feel about their border region and where their affiliations lie – I contend that ‘Europeanisation’ means different things to minorities than it does to dominant national groups within ‘their’ national states. Just as important is the finding of the fifth question concerning the relationship between regional developments and a long-term influence on the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary whereby 90% of respondents believe it to be positive. If democratisation is also about peaceful coexistence among national groups, then there could not be a more convincing argument, if more were needed, that ‘transnationalism’, open borders, and politics decentralised beyond the dominance of the nation-state are a way forward. This must be even more so is the conflict ridden areas which when all said and done, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship, for all its tensions, is not. ‘The old region in the new form’ Words borrowed from László Őllős, President of the Forum Institute in Šamorín.: a conclusion History of Central Europe produced divergent accounts of identity politics within the post-communist and ‘Europeanisation‘ stages of the democratisation processes. These are now nearing the end and the context of identity politics has dramatically changed. Interests and identities are shaped and affected by a rights granting and economy regulating entity, that is the state and the EU. Even though we are dealing with identity formation, the unit of analysis is not the cultural nation/ethnic group, but the policies and institutions that affect these identities. Transnationalism affects the meanings associated with the nation, the state, the borders and citizenship and produces a plethora of contradictions, challenges and difficulties. It also creates unprecedented prospects to move politics beyond the state and ’rescue’ J.Habermas (1992) ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’ Praxis International 12:1, pp.1-19 and by the same author (2001) Postnational Constellation: Political essays, Cambridge: MIT Press. democracy and the relationship between national groups from its confines. Minorities are about memory, identity and solidarity; border regions in Central Europe are all those, but they are also spaces where memories can be transcended, identities multiplied and transformed and where democracy, governance and European integration are played out. Democracy, in view of the fact that its traditional home – the state – is being challenged for its repeated failing to produce a lasting reconciliation between identity groups, needs a novel shape. The assertion of border regions may be the first instance where the EU project can be truly tested by shifting the context of majority- minority relationship beyond the nation-state. The intention here has been twofold: to highlight the potential for further research into the relationship between ‘Europeanisation’ and minorities and defend European ‘transnationalism’ as a way forward towards the construction of stable political communities. Appendix: Interviews conducted in June 2005: Pál Csáky: Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Minorities and European Integration (SMK) Kornélia Csala: The Director of ‘Hungarian Cultural Home’, a civil society cultural organisation in Košice, Edit Bauer: MEP (SMK) Mária Kulcsár: Head of the office of the Hungarian Information Center, the Forum Institute, Košice, László Nagy: Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and the Position of Women (SMK) Fridrich Nagy: Deputy Mayor, Dunajská Streda and Member of the regional parliament(Trnavska Župa) László Őllős: President of the Forum Institute,Šamorín. Ján Oravec: Mayor of Štúrovo Károly Tóth: The Director of the Forum Minority Research Institute, Šamorín Notes: PAGE 2