HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies
ISSN: (Online) 2072-8050, (Print) 0259-9422
Page 1 of 6
Original Research
Constructive-critical realism as a philosophy
of science and religion
Author:
Andreas Losch1,2,3
Affiliations:
1
Institute for Hermeneutics,
Faculty of Theology, University
of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Institute for Systematic
Theology, Faculty of
Theology, University of Bern,
Switzerland
2
Department of Systematic
and Historical Theology,
Faculty of Theology and
Religion, University of
Pretoria, Pretoria,
South Africa
3
Research Project Registration:
Project Leader: J. Buitendag
Project Number: 2402343
Description:
This research is part of
the research project,
‘Understanding Reality
(Theology and Nature)’,
directed by Prof. Dr Johan
Buitendag, Department of
Systematic and Historical
Theology, Faculty of
Theology and Religion,
University of Pretoria.
Corresponding author:
Andreas Losch,
andreaslosch@web.de
Dates:
Received: 13 May 2022
Accepted: 09 July 2022
Published: 19 Aug. 2022
How to cite this article:
Losch, A., 2022,
‘Constructive-critical realism
as a philosophy of science
and religion’, HTS Teologiese
Studies/Theological Studies
78(2), a7742. https://doi.
org/10.4102/hts.v78i2.7742
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Although highly disputed, critical realism (in Ian G. Barbour’s style) is widely known as
a tool to relate science and religion. Sympathising with an even more stringent
hermeneutical approach, Andreas Losch had argued for a modification of critical realism
into the so-called constructive-critical realism to give humanities with its constructive
role of the subject due weight in any discussion on how to bridge the apparent gulf
between the disciplines. So far, his constructive-critical realism has mainly been developed
theologically. This paper will evaluate whether constructive-critical realism is suitable as
a philosophy of both science and religion and an appropriate basis for the science and
religion discourse. In his original account of the critical realist philosophy of science,
Barbour discussed and modified agreement with data, coherence, scope and fertility as
criteria for good science, and for religion as well. The article discusses each of the criteria
in how far Barbour does justice to the relevant concept, both in science and religion, and
it will ask how to eventually modify the criteria for a maybe more sustainable bridge
between science and religion, drawing on the idea of constructive-critical realism. Niels
Henrik Gregersen’s contextual coherence theory will play a significant role in this regard.
The conclusion suggests a deeper meaning of the fertility criterium, embracing ethical
fruitfulness as well. As constructive-critical realism fully acknowledges the importance
of the role of the knower in the process of knowing, it leads us from pure epistemology
into ethics.
Contribution: (1) The science and religion debate, inspired by critical realism, is identified
as mainly theological discourse about the influence of science on religion; (2) the analysis of
truth criteria in Losch’s constructive-critical version of realism proposes an emphasis on
correspondence in science and coherence in the humanities; and (3) the deeper meaning of
the criterium of fertility in this philosophical stance is highlighted, including ethical
fruitfulness.
Keywords: critical realism; constructive-critical realism; criteria; contextual coherence; science;
religion; epistemology; ethics; Anthropocene.
Introduction
Critical realism has long been, and somehow still is, the most prominent epistemological stance
in the science and religion discourse, at least in the Anglo-American sphere (Losch 2009; Van
Kooten Niekerk 1998). Developed and promoted by three scientist-theologians (first Ian G.
Barbour, then followed by Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne), it gained further traction
through its adoption and modification by Alister E. McGrath, who added the heritage of Roy
Bhaskar to the mix (Bhaskar 1979; McGrath 2006; cf. Losch 2009). Its contemporary popularity
is partly because of its wide range of uses, like in Bruce McCormack’s interpretation of Karl
Barth’s theology (McCormack 1995) and N.T. Wright’s application to New Testament studies
(cf. Losch 2016).
The concept has also been criticised, especially in its application on theology and religion
(McMullin 1985). This critique provided, Andreas Losch has – originally based on John
Polkinghorne’s account of the concept – argued early on for its modification into a more
differentiated stance he called ‘constructive-critical realism’ (Losch 2005, 2010, 2018a), giving the
humanities due weight within the epistemological concept (see also Buitendag 2011; Russell
2014). We will follow these discussions and (1) begin the argument in this article with focusing on
the criteria of truth and assessing them in the classical version of critical realism, both regarding its
Copyright: © 2022. The Author. Licensee: AOSIS. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License.
Note: Special Collection: Theology and Nature, sub-edited by Johan Buitendag (University of Pretoria).
http://www.hts.org.za
Open Access
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application on science and (2) on religion. We continue with
(3) a discussion of the nature of the science and religion
discourse and (4) examine an alternative approach, contextual
coherency theory and (5) its relation to realism, before we (6)
deal with what the truth criteria would mean for the
constructive-critical realism proposed by Losch. Finally, we
will (7) go beyond purely epistemological questions and ask
if these philosophical considerations do not necessarily
embark us on a journey into ethics, too – which leads to (8) an
acknowledgement of the importance of environmentalism in
the Anthropocene, which can also be justified on the ground
of the constructive-critical realism discussed.
What is truth, according to science?
Barbour’s critical realism deals with this most classic question
in considering several competing theories of truth and
granting each of them their individual moment of truth. We
will review the different theories here, following Barbour’s
evaluations for a start.1
The most traditional view of truth is the correspondence view
of truth: that ‘a proposition is true if it corresponds to reality’
(Barbour 1997:109). When it rains, it is true to say so. In
science, agreement with data would be the equivalent criterion.2
According to Barbour, this classical realist proposition is not
wrong, but needs to be qualified, as in today’s science, not
everything can be directly observed. Access to reality is often
indirect; you need tools to measure data and this way, all data
are theory-laden.3 In his portrayal of the structure of science,
he therefore envisions sorts of a hermeneutical circle, where
not only observational data have their impact on theories,
but those theoretical concepts also influence observation and
data in turn.4
The alternative coherence view ‘says that a set of propositions
is true if it is comprehensive and internally coherent’ (Barbour
1997:109), which does fit the theory aspect of science. Also,
the scope of the theory plays a role. Unfortunately, ‘there may
be more than one internally coherent set of theories in a given
domain’ (Barbour 1997:110) and reality – consider quantum
physics – ‘maybe more paradoxical and less logical than
rationalists assume’ (Barbour 1997:110). As it seems, Barbour
is slightly critical of the coherence view.
Finally, there is the pragmatic approach to truth, which
considers theories that work in practice, so it evaluates their
1.The sources of Barbour’s presentations in these regards are somewhat opaque.
Religion and Science, which we follow here, is an extended version of Barbour
(1990), the text and the footnotes related to our considerations are probably
identical in the two editions. The first chapter note (in both versions) tells us that
‘several sections of this chapter are revisions or summaries of portions of two
earlier books’, referring to Barbour (1966) and Barbour (1974), where ‘the original
passages are identified in the notes’, Barbour (1997:340). In the books mentioned,
Barbour, however, does not provide a similar overview of theories as in the more
recent book we use here. In his early Issues in Science and Religion he orients
himself with Nagel (1961), Margenau (1950) and Northrop (1947), amongst others.
2.The classical source for correspondence theory is certainly Tarski (1956). As being
said, Barbour does not reveal the exact souce of his presentation.
3.Here Barbour explicitely refers to Quine (1963).
4.Cf. the presentation of Barbour’s view of science in Losch (2018b).
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Original Research
fruitfulness and suggestiveness. Barbour considers Kuhn’s
famous account of scientific theory as problem-solving
endeavour within these parameters. Fertility is indeed
important, he says, but ‘whether an idea “works” or is
“useful” remains vague unless these concepts are further
specified by other criteria’ (Barbour 1997:110). Again, he
takes the approach with a pinch of salt.
Barbour’s conclusion on the issue of truth is hence dominated
by the traditional realist stance, according to which the
meaning of truth is correspondence with reality. His approach
is, however, a critical realist approach, insofar as the other
criteria count to some degree as well. A plenitude of criteria
need to be assessed to judge on the truth question: not only
agreement with data, but because all data are theory-laden,
coherence and scope of theories do play a role, and finally
their fertility is important.
This mix of truth criteria with an emphasis on correspondence
seems to make sense, at least in science. How does Barbour
apply these considerations on religion, then?
Truth in religion and theology
We start again with a consideration of the first and most
essential criterium for any sort of realism, which is
correspondence. It would probably be hard to deny that truth
as an idea of correspondence to a Divine reality does play a
role in most religions, too; there is a cognitive component to
all sorts of beliefs. Nevertheless, Barbour’s and his successors’
transfer of critical realism from science to religion5 is a move
that has been challenged, for example, by Ernan McMullin
(Losch 2010:407–409; McMullin 1985).
Barbour argues that religious ‘data’ are made up of individual
religious experiences and communal story and ritual, which
he admits being ‘much more theory-laden than in the case of
science’ (Barbour 1997:113). So, logically, coherence, scope
and fertility play an even more important role. ‘As it appears,
Barbour is able to creatively modify his set of criteria for the
sake of religion. Still, the standard of rationality employed is
the natural scientific one’, says Losch. Hence, he would
remain ‘doubtful as to whether it was a wise decision not to
rethink the criteria in light of social and human sciences at
all’ (Losch 2010:403).
Therefore, it can also make sense to even reassess the general
idea of critical realism and to apply a more differentiated
model to the relation of religion and science; this is why
Losch developed ‘constructive-critical realism’, as he states
(Losch 2005, 2018a). In this substantial modification of
Barbour’s critical realism, the divergent disciplines are
considered in a way that conforms to their particular method
(a Torrencean idea). Following the hermeneutic tradition, the
role of the subject in social sciences and particularly in
5.Robert John Russell (2014) called this the ‘bridge’ between the disciplines: ‘With
these arguments in place, Barbour was prepared to make his crucial, methodological
claim that, in my term, “bridges” science and religion: the basic structure of religion
is similar to that of science in some respects, though it differs at several crucial
points’.
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humanities is not only more instructive to research than in
the natural sciences, but also the object of study is itself
symbolically structured and culturally coded. For Barbour’s
original approach, this would eventually be integrated in the
increased ‘theory-ladeness’ of data, but it makes sense to
point out that the ‘data’ itself is of another quality here.6
As theology certainly belongs to an area close to humanities
(if to any Wissenschaft), there are therefore double hermeneutics
in place. While the role of the subject is to be regarded
critically in natural sciences, in humanities, it plays a much
more constructive and constituting role; here, the personal
element even ‘structures the social reality under
“observation”’ (Losch 2005:282–283). Following this, we do
not employ only one standard theory of science on everything
in science and religion, as Barbour does, but allow for an
internal differentiation of theory according to disciplines
considered. Of course, we still have an overarching
framework – which may be necessary to bridge science and
religion – but at least it is a more differentiated one. In some
sense, Losch’s idea of a constructive-critical realism is really
uni-versal because it both considers the one reality we live in
and the many aspects of it we experience.
If we go on with this, what does this now mean regarding
theories of truth and their criteria? How does constructivecritical realism influence them, especially their application on
the domain of religion?
Before we come to these questions, let us reflect a moment on
the nature of the science and religion discourse.
About the science and religion
discourse
I am convinced we are somewhat misguided by Barbour’s
approach, as (being a scientist-theologian) in my view, he
did not take into account properly that the science and
religion discourse is not a discourse with two equals. In
truth, it is a theological or sometimes maybe philosophical
discourse about the influence of science on religion, not a
scientific one at all. Therefore, even when sticking to some
sort of critical realism in the form of a constructive-critical
realism as an overarching theory and universal epistemology,
the science and religion discourse itself clearly belongs into
the domain of the humanities, where we said the constructive
role of subjectivity is dominant. In terms of the criteria
Barbour listed, coherence, scope and also fruitfulness therefore
play a highly important role.
I hence would also employ a somewhat critical stance
towards Niels Henrik Gregersen’s take that the science and
religion discourse’s nature would be transdisciplinary
(Gregersen 1998:186). I, however, agree with Gregersen’s
position that the relation of science and theology within this
dialogue is asymmetrical, which is simply because of the
necessary naturalism intrinsic to the scientific method
6.Further development to differentiate between the approaches of the social sciences
and of the humanities is needed in Losch’s approach, admittedly.
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Original Research
(see also Losch 2018b). An inspiration of science through
theological thought is rare (although possible, cf. Losch 2022).
Contextual coherence
Although the whole Barbourian idea to approach the issue of
truth from the angle of a philosophy of (natural) science may
be difficult, we must assess the possible criteria he mentioned.
The two criteria of coherence and fruitfulness we highlighted
are considered in Niels Henrik Gregersen’s contextual
coherence theory. From the perspective of the science and
theology discourse actually taking place, such a contextual
coherence theory could make more sense, as the discourse is
situated within the theological field. Let us therefore have a
look at what the contextual coherence theory claims.
Like the theories of science Barbour mentions, contextual
coherence theory was originally developed for taking a fair
account of ongoing scientific activities. Gregersen builds on
philosopher Nicholas Rescher (Gregersen 1998:190; Rescher
1973, 1992), who like Barbour denies a sharp distinction
between theory and data, ‘since all our experiential data are
mediated through our cognitive systems’ (Gregersen
1998:191). Rescher also differs from a foundationalist
approach like the well-known covering law model (also
called Hempel–Oppenheimer model) is one.7 Data
nevertheless plays an important role, i.e., in the form of
experience: ‘coherence does not only mean inner logical
consistency between propositions’, it indicates ‘a systemic
ordering of contextual propositions that have grown out of
experience’ (Gregersen 1998:193).
The self-consistency that Rescher aims for hence is only one
aspect of his approach. There is also a pragmatic emphasis on
experience or data, resulting in the ‘stunning’ title of his
efforts: ‘Pragmatic Idealism’ (Gregersen 1998:190). Both
aspects are co-developing in Rescher’s analysis, establishing
a twofold cycle. First, there is the theoretical cycle, ‘which
controls the intellectual consistency of the conceptual
schemes’. Then, we also have an applicative cycle ‘in which the
evidences for pragmatic utility and fertility with respect to
further research has to be shown’ (Gregersen 1998:193). Both
cycles support each other, resulting in an ‘inbuilt evolutionary
dimension … The trials and errors of nature have their
parallels in the domain of epistemology’ (Gregersen
1998:194). Knowledge advances similar to how nature
progresses.
In some sense, Rescher’s cyclical approach as portrayed by
Gregersen appears similar to Barbour’s hermeneutical circle.
Although it is meant to be a theory about science, coherence
theory’s strong emphasis on coherence in the interpretation
of data may nevertheless be born out of the philosophical
context in which contextual coherence theory itself was born,
which is more closely aligned with humanities than science.
This seems to be the area where it fits most. As the science
and religion discourse belongs into this field too, I think we
7.For a list of main differences see Gregersen (1998:192–193).
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can embrace contextual coherence theory as an appropriate
description for the discourse itself.
And what about realism?
Accepting this leads us to the question what to make out of
Losch’s approach of constructive critical realism, particularly
regarding its approximation to a correspondence view
expressed by the fact that its qualified noun is still some sort
of ‘realism’. After first embracing it, it might appear outdated,
but on a second look, it could make sense to keep it. Even
within his adoption of contextual coherence theory, Gregersen
does support that ‘truth involves some sort of correspondence’
(Gregersen 1998:199). This is one aspect of any metaphysical
realism.8 Likewise, the originator of the coherence theory,
Nicholas Rescher, supports metaphysical realism (Rescher
1992:275) too. We have seen how correspondence to
experienced data does play a role in his approach.
Therefore, some sort of a qualified realism in Barbour’s terms
still makes sense. More promising than Barbour’s ‘one size
fits all’ approach, however, might be developing a theory of
truth that is corresponding to a specific disciplinary domain.
The question how to connect these competing theories of
truth into sorts of a metatheory to acknowledge the unity of
our world is where the idea of constructive-critical realism
seems to make sense.
In our context this would mean – while acknowledging the
respective moment of truth of all the approaches to the
subject matter – to emphasise the correspondence aspect in
science and a coherence view in theology and religion. While
Barbour’s critical realism is eventually a good approximation
for what is going on in science, Gregersen’s contextual
coherence theory might be more applicable in humanities.
Now, both claim their theories to be equally valid for both
domains, and maybe that is problematic. While Barbour has
a science view of things, Gregersen’s approach is dominated
by a more hermeneutic angle in his theory choice.
A philosophy of science and religion would, however, because
of the nature of that discourse, be mainly situated in the
theological domain and hence favour a coherence theory, as
laid out by Gregersen, for instance. Therefore, the criteria of
truth in constructive critical realism need to be coherence,
scope and fertility for the humanities, while sticking to the
emphasis on correspondence in science. Now, that is similar
to what Barbour said, but we know better now why it has to
be the case.
Interim summary
We have considered truth criteria regarding their role in
constructive-critical realism. The basic idea of the stance to
differentiate between the divergent domains of science and
humanities makes sense, especially when situating theology
and religion in the latter, more hermeneutically oriented,
8.To be exact, it is the third aspect of metaphysical realism Hilary Putnam mentions in
an outline of his internal realism (Putnam 1990:30; Gregersen 1998:198–199).
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Original Research
field. The quality of the data is different here, as the data itself
is symbolically structured, culturally coded and ‘double
hermeneutics’ are in place (Losch 2005).
While Barbour’s emphasis on correspondence in science still
seems to be justified, his highlight on the other criteria
(coherence, scope and fruitfulness) in religion makes sense. So
in these regards, Barbour also lives up to the challenges a
constructive-critical realism demands, and we don’t need to
modify this approach regarding truth criteria. We can,
however, also use contextual coherence theory to describe
this aspect. We just should be aware that the science and
religion discourse itself belongs within theology; hence, the
constructive dimension of the role of the subject is strong
here, and that is why coherence, scope and fertility are indeed
the most important truth criteria. This is laid out in an
exemplary way by contextual coherence theory, which seems
therefore appropriate to adopt in humanities and hence in
the science and religion discourse as well. Losch’s
constructive-critical realism in fact also allows and demands
such a shift of emphasis in this academic domain. While
sticking close to a critical realism in science, it remains the
most universal approach to knowledge available at time. In
an age marked by ‘two cultures’ (Snow 1959), this quest for
unity of our ‘one world’ (Polkinghorne 1987) remains
essential.
Beyond epistemology
Both critical realism and contextual coherence theory have
been developed at the example of science, although in the first
case by a scientist-turned-theologian (Barbour), and in
coherence theory’s case by somebody trained within the
mathematical and philosophical community (Rescher). Now,
we stated that the main difference between science and the
field of humanities is the ‘personal’ character of the object of
research, its symbolic structure. We compared that aspect in
this article to another quality of data. This different quality,
however, leads to another decisive difference, which we
called ‘double hermeneutics’, a stronger reciprocity between
the knower and the known. While one has to consider
critically the influence of the knower (and their gender, too,
cf. Russell 2014) already in science, in social sciences (cf. their
concept of ‘bias’) and humanities it becomes crucial to the
research itself.
Even more, we also witness a new kind of fruitfulness emerging
as an eventual additional truth criterium. When the important
role of the knower in research is acknowledged, any kind of
research automatically receives an ethical dimension because
it somewhat becomes a personal decision, too. Such an
epistemology includes ethics. The ideal of objectivity is then
only one value at stake here, though still an important one.
Michael Polanyi already differentiated between the concepts
of verification for scientific endeavours and validation for the
field of religion,9 as Losch put it (2005):
9.He also included mathematics here (Polanyi 2003:202).
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[B]oth are an acknowledgement of a commitment: they claim the
presence of something real and external to the speaker. The
structure of commitment remains unchanged, but its depth
becomes greater; when we pass from verification to validation,
we rely increasingly on internal rather than external evidence.
(p. 280)
In Polanyi’s terms, the new kind of fruitfulness criterium in
religion we just introduced is sort of a personal validation,
then. This underlines the importance of the conclusions
regarding the acknowledgement of a personal and ethical
dimension in any epistemology, which Losch’s constructive
critical realism rightfully advocates:
‘Constructive-critical realism recalls the ethical standards for
adequately constructing cultural systems’ (Losch 2005:285).
Outlook: into the Anthropocene
Our conclusions lead us further into ethical thinking. It has
been observed that realism-oriented approaches are more
prone to support environmentalism, as this epistemological
stance recognises more strongly our embeddedness in nature
than nominalist (or constructivist) positions do (Hübner
1995:95). Constructive-critical realism, adopting and
modifying Hefner’s idea of human beings as created cocreators (Hefner 1993; Losch 2005:283–285) seems to preserve
this orientation – crucial in times of climate change – while
acknowledging the important role of cultural construction
and ethical decisions in the process of knowing. In some
sense, this is also the cognitive move made when calling the
current geological age the ‘Anthropocene’: as we are
obviously part of nature, our decisions and actions have an
impact on reality, which is not only under observation but
subject to change. Nature is itself increasingly culturally
coded, so to say. ‘Human activities are exerting increasing
impacts on the environment on all scales, in many ways
outcompeting natural processes’ (Crutzen 2006).
The new kind of fruitfulness advocated here then should not
mean pragmatic productivity only. As Losch (2005) stated, it
presents:
[A]n ethical task to distinguish the quality of the fruits, and to
judge the goodness of our fruits we need a purpose that counts.
According to constructive-critical realism, this is humankind’s
purpose to shape nature in cooperation with God and with the
means of culture toward increasing realization of freedom in
relationship. (p. 285)
He later modified his statement insofar that it is now
‘humankind’s purpose to shape nature in creative and
responsible participation in God’s creation and with the means of
culture towards increasing realization of freedom in
relationship’ (Losch 2019:263, italics mine). ‘Participation in
God’s creation’ is an expression that makes much sense in the
era of the Anthropocene. The aim of ‘freedom in relationship’
can be underwritten, but these days it is our relationship to
Earth and rootedness in this common ground, which is most
endangered. Planet Earth is the basis of our freedom in
this cosmos. Supporting constructive-critical realism could
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Original Research
therefore be a welcome acknowledgement of our increasing
entanglement with nature and responsibility for our thoughts
and deeds in the Anthropocene.
Conclusion
In this paper, the science and religion debate, inspired by
critical realism, is identified as mainly theological discourse
about the influence of science on religion. Within that
discourse, the analysis of truth criteria in Losch’s constructivecritical version of realism proposes an emphasis on
correspondence in science and coherence in the social sciences
and the humanities (including theology), while the differences
between these academic disciplines need to be discussed
further. Regarding truth criteria of constructive-critical
realism, the deeper meaning of the criterium of fertility in this
philosophical stance was also highlighted, including ethical
fruitfulness.
Acknowledgements
Competing interests
The author declares that they have no financial or personal
relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them
in writing this article.
Author’s contributions
A.L. is the sole author of this article.
Ethical considerations
This article followed all ethical standards for research without
direct contact with human or animal subjects.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding
agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data
were created or analysed in this study.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of any affiliated agency of the author.
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