Writing Knowledge in the Soul: Orality,
Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry
LAWRENCE J. HATAB
Old Dominion University
Abstract: In this essay I take up Plato’s critique of poetry, which has little to do with
epistemology and representational imitation, but rather the powerful effects that poetic
performances can have on audiences, enthralling them with vivid image-worlds and
blocking the powers of critical reflection. By focusing on the perceived psychological
dangers of poetry in performance and reception, I want to suggest that Plato’s critique
was caught up in the larger story of momentous shifts in the Greek world, turning on
the rise of literacy and its far-reaching effects in modifying the original and persisting
oral character of Greek culture. The story of Plato’s Republic in certain ways suggests
something essential for comprehending the development of philosophy in Greece
(and in any culture, I would add): that philosophy, as we understand it, would not have
been possible apart from the skills and mental transformations stemming from education in reading and writing; and that primary features of oral language and practice
were a significant barrier to the development of philosophical rationality (and also
a worthy competitor for cultural status and authority). Accordingly, I go on to argue
that the critique of writing in the Phaedrus is neither a defense or orality per se, nor a
dismissal of writing, but rather a defense of a literate soul over against orality and the
indiscriminate exposure of written texts to unworthy readers.
I
n my 1990 book, Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths, I examined the
complex relationships between muthos and logos in Greek thought, from Homer
to Aristotle. Inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, my aim was to challenge the
“progressive” view that philosophical reason displaced and corrected the early
Greek dependence on myth and poetry. Myths never disappeared in Greek thought,
not even in philosophy, and the supposed “correction” was in many respects
rigged according to extra-mythical assumptions that suppressed the kind of truth
presented in mythopoetic disclosure. Plato, of course, was a central figure in my
© 2007. Epoché, Volume 11, Issue 2 (Spring 2007). ISSN 1085-1968.
319–332
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analysis, especially because of his ambiguous battle with the poets and poetry. I
made brief mention of how the rise of literacy functioned in the development of
philosophy and its implicit shift from the oral base of Greek poetry. Since 1990 I
have become convinced that the transition from orality to discourse informed by
writing and reading can be seen as the guiding thread throughout the rich history
of Greek myth and philosophy. In this essay, I want to retrieve my discussion of
Plato, now with a sharper focus on the orality-literacy question.
Plato and Myth
Greek philosophy was born as a departure from traditional forms of understanding in myth and poetry. Although never completely breaking with tradition,
philosophical modes of rationality began to contest the stories of gods and heroes
that shaped the early Greek world. This contest reached a climax in the dialogues
of Plato. Yet Plato’s frequent deployment of myths and the narrative form of his
writings significantly complicate the story at hand. So much so that some interpreters challenge the standard reading of Plato as a staunch opponent of myth
and poetry and a proponent of fixed metaphysical doctrines.1 I believe that Plato
was serious in his deployment of myth, which provided a vital supplement to
rational analysis, and even served to delimit the reach and results of philosophical thought. Yet I also believe that Plato was serious when he targeted poetry and
myth as obstacles to philosophical wisdom. Am I confused?
The critique of poetry in the Republic had nothing to do with “aesthetics” or a
censorship of “the arts.” Greek poetry was not an “art form” but a world-disclosive
source of meaning for the Greeks, and in Plato’s day epic and tragic poetry were
still primary vehicles for cultural bearings and education. Plato’s critique had to
do with truth, the transmission of cultural values, and pedagogical authority. He
was waging a momentous diaphora, or contest (607b), against established meanings on behalf of new standards of truth and morality. So Plato’s philosophy was
not averse to myth and poetry per se—since the dialogues were often informed
by such things—but to traditional myth and poetry.
Plato’s critique of traditional poetry was fundamental because it challenged
both the material and formal elements at the heart of epic narratives and tragic
drama. The material element can be summed up as the depiction of a tragic worldview; the formal element can be located in the psychological features of poetry’s
composition, performance, and reception—each of which involved forces that
surpassed conscious control and blocked critical reflection. For Plato, the formal
and material essence of traditional poetry represented a powerful, ingrained,
cultural barrier that had to be overcome to clear the ground for two new ideals:
rational inquiry and an overarching justice governing the world and the soul.
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry
321
Epic and tragic poetry presented a world that is unstable, unpredictable, mysterious, and fatally ruinous of human possibilities. Here mortality is the baseline
limit of life and death is portrayed as repulsive in its darkness (Republic 386–392).
The poets tell “false stories” (pseudeis muthous), where heroes come to grief and
surrender to powerful emotions, where the gods act immorally, fight each other,
cause evil and ruin, punish the innocent, change form, disguise themselves, and lie
(377–386). One thinks of Oedipus as the paradigm case of tragic life: a noble man
faced with a terrible fate, who resists out of moral motives, and yet in this very resistance actualizes his fate.2 One might also think of Socrates in this vein, a man who
compares himself to a tragic hero (Phaedo 115a), and who is destroyed following
a divine calling to practice philosophy. The Republic displays a wealth of meanings,
but I think that the dialogue is essentially an anti-tragic muthos (a term applied
to the account of the polis at 376d). The full course of the dialogue can be called a
narrative about the possibility and desirability of a just life in a world that resists
justice.3 That the poets and their tragic stories figure prominently at both ends of
the dialogue cannot be an accident. Traditional myths were fully expressive of the
obstacles blocking the path of Socrates’ mission. Plato wants to tell a better story
than the poets, one that can overcome the possible tragedy of a just life. And one
cannot help but remember the fate of Socrates, whose death at the hands of Athens
would be tragic without the kind of rectification suggested in the Republic.
The formal element in Plato’s critique concerns the psychological structure
of poetic production, performance, and reception. The traditional view was that
poets were inspired receptacles for the sacred power of the Muses, a “revelation”
more than a “creation” (see the Prologue to Hesiod’s Theogony 98–108). Plato
agreed that a poet is “not in his senses but is like a fountain giving free course to
the water that keeps flowing on” (Laws 719c). This matter of absorption in a force
beyond the conscious mind was also implicated in the objections to mimēsis in
the Republic. In Greek, mimēsis referred not only to representational likeness but
also to psychological identification in poetic performance and audience reception,
where actors, reciters, and listeners were “taken over” by the poetic imagery and its
emotional force.4 References to mimēsis in acting and spoken performance can be
found in Ion 533–537, and Sophist 267.5 What really mattered to Plato in the Republic was not mimetic representation, because the example of painting is described
as merely an analogy for the genuine matter of concern, mimetic identification
with poetic language (603c). And Socrates confesses (605c) that even the “best of
us” can become enchanted by poetry and swept away by the pleasure of empathic
union with the sufferings of tragic characters—an effect that ruins the “manly”
ideal of silencing and mastering grief (605e). In Books 2 and 3, the censoring of
poetry was qualified and seemed restricted to the context of educating children.
But later, poetry’s power threatens the reflective mental control of sophisticated
adults as well, and for this reason all mimetic poetry (epic and tragic) are to be
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banned from the ideal polis (595a). The only forms of poetry permitted are hymns
to the gods and songs praising good men (607a–b).6
With the focus on the perceived psychological dangers of poetry in performance and reception, I want to suggest that Plato’s critique was caught up in the
larger story of momentous shifts in the Greek world, turning on the rise of literacy
and its far-reaching effects in modifying the original and persisting oral character
of Greek culture. The story of Plato’s Republic in certain ways suggests something
essential for comprehending the development of philosophy in Greece (and in
any culture, I would add): that philosophy, as we understand it, would not have
been possible apart from the skills and mental transformations stemming from
education in reading and writing; and that primary features of oral language and
practice were a significant barrier to the development of philosophical rationality
(and also a worthy competitor for cultural status and authority).7
Orality and Literacy
Writing is far from simply the transfer of spoken words to graphic signs. If it were,
we could not account for the far greater difficulty in learning to read and write,
compared to natural language acquisition. There are many different ways to distinguish the nature and effects of writing from language confined to oral speech.8
Oral language is primarily the province of hearing sounds, while writing turns to
the seeing of words in a material medium. Accordingly, oral speech is exclusively
temporal and memorial; the passing of sounds means that memory is the only
source of preservation. Writing provides a material presence for words and a fixed
structure of spatial relations, so that now language can “stand” as a permanent
reference for memory and inspection. Because of the malleability of memory, oral
speech, especially in poetic performance, is inevitably modified in each re-telling,
while writing permits the repetition of a fixed content for each reading.
Oral language lives through embodied speech and reception, where tone,
gesture, rhythm, emphasis, and facial expressions are essential to disclosive effects. Writing transforms language into disembodied graphic signs composed
of alphabetic lines, which provides a disengagement from the animated milieu
of conversation and face to face speech. For this reason orality is infused with
existential contexts of lived scenarios, both in the content of poetic narratives and
the specific circumstance of poetic performances before particular audiences.
Written language becomes decontextualized in this respect. Partly because of the
embodied, sensuous character of oral speech and the need to “draw” audiences
to the temporal flux of language in immediate circumstances,“artistic” elements
of enchanting imagery, rhythm, and musicality are essential to oral performance
and reception.9 With writing, the text persists right before one’s eyes, lessening
the need for an emotional lure and creating the space for detached attention.
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Writing makes possible a wide array of reflective practices that are essential for
philosophical thinking and that at best are unlikely to arise or flourish in an oral
culture. While orality is constrained by immediate performances and the limited
power of memory, writing offers a fixed text that can be revisited and critically
scanned, which opens up attention to structured relationships, signs of consistency and inconsistency, and especially the shape of a whole text organized into
parts. In this way the sense of a formal structure distinct from content is drawn
out of language for the first time.10 The range of intellectual discoveries in Greek
thought—from mathematics to analytical atomism to metaphysics—cannot be
understood apart from graphic and alphabetic figuration.11
Most remarkable, I think, is the capacity for abstraction that emerges from
writing. Oral speech is thoroughly concrete in its embodied milieu, the specific
contexts of speech acts, the sensuous imagery, and the direct immersion in immediate descriptions and references. In the conversion of speech into written
words, the graphics of alphabetic lines creates a radically different presence. The
visual markings that make up t-r-e-e are utterly arbitrary in the sense of being
nothing like the voiced word in its context of use. Instead of talking about trees in
concrete situations, we now see this talk separated from contexts, and what we see
is not a tree but a visual object utterly unlike a tree or any other sensuous thing
in experience. But a link with actual speech acts is retained, and once reading
and writing become second nature, we develop a new way of accessing the world
through the nonsensuous visual presence of alphabetic lines. I want to suggest
that the power of abstraction emerges by way of this technological transformation of speech. The written word “tree” itself has no concrete features other than
its “abstract” graphic form in a material medium. And as Bruno Snell has argued,
the function of the definite article in Greek language made it possible to create
abstract substantives out of concrete nouns, adjectives, and verbs: not “Look at
the tree over there,” but “the tree,” everything that makes up “treeness” in general;
and “justice” as “the just,” that which is just in general, where the modifier “just”
is converted into a subject of modification (ta dikē). 12 Is it the visual graphics of
writing that creates a “concrete universal,” an accessible presence stripped of all
specificity, which nevertheless points back to specific instances now “re-formed”
in abstract terms? If true, this would help explain something that has always
puzzled me: Plato and Aristotle deployed terms with original meanings of visual
perception—idea, eidos, theōria—to denote conceptual forms and powers of
intelligibility that presumably exceed or transcend sense perception—cf. Republic
507b: the true being of each thing is its idea, which is thought (noeisthai) but not
seen (horasthai). In Plato’s dialogues, a sensuous eidos can provide an analogical
gateway to philosophical reflection, as in frequent references to craft, but a true
eidos can only be ascertained by a qualitatively different kind of intellectual “vision.” We might well wonder what Aristotle meant when he said that nonmaterial
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form is a “look disclosed in speech” (to eidos to kata ton logon) (Physics 193a31).
Was it the written word that made possible the abstract “look” of ideas and the
revolutionary construction of the “mind’s eye”?13
The questions at hand suggest a tempting provocation: that the philosophical
deployment of vision words to render abstract concepts was not a case of mere
metaphorical transfer from visual sensation, but rather a new kind of actual
vision of the abstract lines of meaning-laden written words. Since literacy provided such radically new openings for thought, Greek philosophers were likely
so enthralled by these new possibilities as to be less prone to reflexive awareness
of the graphic medium at work in philosophical thinking. Yet there are hints of
such awareness, as we will see.
Plato and the Written Word
One thing is clear: Plato was a brilliant philosophical writer. And given the preceding analysis it seems evident that literacy played a crucial role in the development
of philosophy. Yet Plato’s dialogues exhibit an ambiguity about writing and its
value relative to living speech. For one thing the dialogue form represents a kind
of writing that retains the milieu of conversation as its subject.14 Also the Phaedrus
contains a specific critique of writing, which I will get to shortly. I think Plato does
give a certain priority to living dialogue, but recalling his concerns about the effects of poetry, the dialogical ideal is not a defense or retrieval of orality per se.
The kind of philosophical dialogue promoted by Plato requires, I think, literate
participants. And there are a number of references to writing in the dialogues
that lead me to this view.
Yet again, the picture is not entirely clear. In the Republic, there is no specific
mention of educating citizens in reading and writing. There is a consensus, though,
that the composition of the Republic and the establishment of Plato’s Academy were
close together in time.15 The Academy certainly used books for instruction, but it
should be mentioned that in Plato’s day the common practice was to read books
aloud to an audience, rather than reading in private; yet silent reading was in fact
practiced at the time.16 At the same time, mathematical education, so important
to Plato, required the careful study and analysis of graphic representations.17 As
far as the dialogues are concerned, it is in the Laws that reading and writing are
specifically mandated for education (810–813).
One other effect of writing should be introduced: the capacity for individualized and internalized reflection made possible by books, which are portable
and separable from public speech acts that are socially informed and externally
directed. Adding my previous point about the abstract “look” of written words,
which permits the reflective alteration of language into new conceptual forms,
perhaps certain passages in the dialogues can be clarified by way of the connections between reading, abstraction, and internalization.
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry
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In the Philebus (38e–39b), memory and perception are compared to writing (graphein) words (logos) in the soul. Knowledge is written in the soul in the
manner of a book (biblion). This account is preceded by the picture of a solitary
soul, and its self-possession of thought prior to verbalizing aloud to others in
spoken conversations. This fits many references in the dialogues to the soul’s
interior possession of ideas. The Theaetetus (189e–190a) describes thinking as
the soul’s logos and conversation (dialegesthai) with itself, a logos not spoken aloud
to another person, but “silently to itself ” (sigē pros auton). And in the Protagoras
(347c–348e), Socrates advocates the self-sufficiency of relying on one’s own voice
in a conversation. In general terms, given that selfhood in epic poetry showed
itself to be externalized, decentralized, and subjected to fate,18 Plato advances a
complete departure from this complex by describing the soul in terms of internality, unity, and self-mastery (Republic 443c–e).
This leads me to think that Plato’s dialectical model of philosophy is not radically dialogical (in the sense of an irreducible intersubjective practice), that good
results and participation in a conversation involve the importing or possession
of reflective insight, something made possible by the technology and practice
of writing (which would explain the metaphorical use of writing to describe
knowledge in the soul).19
The Phaedrus, of course, complicates my argument because of its overt
criticism of writing in favor of living speech. But let’s look carefully at the text.
Early on, Socrates confesses to preferring life in the city because he “loves learning” (philomathēs), which cannot be found in the country. He can be coaxed to
leave the city if lured by logous en bibliois, “discourse in books” (230d–e). When
Socrates tries to compete with Lysias’s written speech about love, he does poorly
and regrets his performance: he slipped into poetic modes of speech and ecstatic
states of mind, in part because of enchantment at the physical presence of the
beautiful Phaedrus (234d, 238e). The move to cover his head attests to Socrates’
worry about the effects of embodied speech (and anticipates the later picture of
the soul needing to control the force of the body). The implication here is that
pure orality cannot be the solution to the coming concerns about writing.
Writing is not intrinsically problematic, but it is capable of serving deceptive
rhetorical practices (267a ff.). In fact books on speeches provide guidance for the
proper structure and function of speech writing (266d), which should possess
the dunamis to “guide the soul” (271c–d). And the story about King Thamus and
the god Theuth with respect to writing is prefaced by the task of discerning good
from bad writing (274b).
Then comes the critique of writing (274 e ff.), which is called a pharmakon
(with ambiguous connotations of a potion, a medicine, and a poison). A reliance
on writing diminishes the skills of memory, and most importantly, writing involves
“external” signs belonging to others rather than an internal possession. Writing
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provides only the appearance of wisdom since it is external to the direct access
to knowledge. Once written down, words become dead and mute; they cannot
answer questions or defend themselves. Moreover, recorded words can circulate
everywhere, indiscriminately to the able and unable alike.20
In an interesting passage, the logos (word or speech) that is superior to writing
is “written” (graphetai) in the soul of the learner, and can both defend itself and distinguish proper from improper recipients (276a). Here we also hear of the contrast
between the inferior“sowing”of words by pen and ink and a superior form of dialectic,
which plants and sows in the soul the words of knowledge that can also be reproduced
in others (this seems less like a “dialogue” and more like an “infusion”).21
Then the proper writing of speeches is described as being concerned with
truth and deploying the procedures of definition, analysis, division, and collection
(all literate skills, it seems to me).22 Something like Plato’s dialogues themselves
would seem to be exemplary here, and indeed philosophy is associated with the
best kind of written logos (277b–278e). Any writing for “public” speeches is not
worthy of serious attention. What is worthy are words “truly written in the soul,”
marked by a “clear and perfect” internal understanding of goodness and justice,
which then becomes ready for planting in other souls (278a–b).23 A case can be
made that Plato’s dialogues were not meant to be “published” in our sense of the
term (for an open market of readers), but rather were used for the pedagogical
purpose of philosophical education in the Academy, where the texts were recited,
read, studied, and discussed, with the aim of continuing intellectual exploration
and composition.24 This might provide telling clues about why the dialogues
exhibit an open and “unfinished” character.
I think that the ambiguous treatment of writing in the Phaedrus can be sorted
out by way of the tension between written texts themselves and the intellectual
effects made possible by literacy. The dialogue raises the problem of the detachability of written words from the milieu of lived speech. But this does not amount
to a defense or retrieval of oral language per se, given the persistent criticisms
in several dialogues of the oral power of poetry and political rhetoric to overwhelm the mind (and Socrates’ own confession of the failure of his oration in
the Phaedrus). Rather, it seems to me that the critique of writing amounts to the
defense of the knowing literate soul over against 1) the stand-alone character of
a written text, apart from the living reality of knowledge, and 2) the sterility of
writing when not originating from, or addressed to, those select souls who possess or are capable of possessing knowledge.
The complex question of the written word in relation to genuine knowledge—and of the status of the written dialogues—can perhaps be illuminated
by attention to the Seventh Letter. The distance between writing and the original
experience of living thought can mark the difference between an author’s authentic
vision of reality and its transmission into and by a written text, which is judged
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry
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deficient in two senses: 1) public dissemination permits access for unworthy
readers; 2) even worthy readers cannot fathom the full vision of reality inevitably concealed by written expression. The Phaedrus clearly speaks to the first
deficiency: A written book is helpless without its “father” (the author) when it is
released to the public and misused or reviled by the wrong kind of readers (275e).
The second deficiency is implicitly at issue, I think, in the Phaedrus but is clearly
explicated in the Seventh Letter. There Plato tells us that his teachings cannot be
captured in written texts (341–342). Words are insufficient for conveying genuine
knowledge that “flashes” in the soul after sustained discussion between teacher
and student (341d). In the five steps of discovery (342), the soul’s knowledge of
true objects is beyond both words and images (a cited example of an image is the
visual figure of a circle). No wise person would express his deepest thoughts in
words, in either spoken words or especially the “unchangeable” form of written
words (343). So language as such cannot do justice to true knowledge. Verbal
names (and their extension in definitions) are arbitrary and variable signs that
do not convey the eternal nature of true objects. Even the fixed form of written
signs does not provide sufficient firmness or certainty (343b: mēden hikanōs
bebaiōs) because graphic lines are tainted by matter and thus they mislead the
soul with a false permanence.25
The danger of putting thoughts into words and writing is as follows: confining
knowledge to the misplaced concreteness of defective images and verbal forms
permits endless disputation about the different aspects and permutations of the
“relative” nature of specified signs and their reciprocal heterogeneity. Such disputes
are falsely assumed to engage the “soul of the writer” (hē psuchē tou grapsantos:
343d). Nevertheless, genuine knowledge can emerge from earnest instruction in
language and writing, but only with a leap beyond language that flashes in the soul,
and only in the chastened milieu of intimate teacher-student exchanges, not the
unseemly arena of envy and discord in a public readership. What is most serious
and worthy in someone’s work cannot be found in books but in the treasured domain of the soul,“stored in the fairest place he possesses” (ketai de pou en chōra
tē kallistē tō toutou: 344c). Knowledge cannot be fully realized in vocal utterances
(phōnais) or in physical figures (sōmatōn schēmasin) but in souls (342c).
In closing, let me try to sort out the complicated relationships between language,
writing, and knowledge in Plato’s texts by way of the following summary claims:
1) Traditional poetry and its oral reception are obstacles to genuine knowledge.
2) Knowledge can be gained through philosophical methods made possible by literacy. 3) Philosophical education proceeds through conversations between literate
participants. 4) Such conversations can be represented and facilitated by written
dialogues. 5) In the process of philosophical education, knowledge can dawn in the
soul, an illumination prepared by, but leaping beyond, rational discourse. 6) The
living process of discovery and the intrinsic limits of language are appropriately
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presented in dialogues that are “open” in both form and content, and that partly
deploy mythopoetic supplements to, and constraints on, rational discourse. 7)
Philosophical dialogues are primarily geared toward pedagogy, and are suitable
only for the right kind of audience, one that is capable of philosophical learning and
attuned with humility and reverence for the transcendent aims of philosophy. 8)
Written texts must be protected from the misuses and abuses that follow indiscriminate publication, and thus must be restricted to the proper milieu of instruction.
9) Genuine knowledge is made possible by literate dialogue but is consummated
in the leap of the soul’s “inward vision” that cannot be directly communicated. 10)
Philosophical writing embodies a complex set of forces that both displaces and
transforms traditional poetic language, in the direction of a rational discourse that
breaks out into an “inspired,” receptive vision (the difference between poetry and
philosophy is that poetry begins in inspiration and philosophy end in it).
In this rich array of forces, writing exhibits an essential ambiguity in being
both 1) an empowerment of philosophy over the impediment of oral poetry, and
2) an impediment to the ultimate aims of philosophy. Such ambiguity may help us
understand the way in which writing is both critiqued and sustained in the Phaedrus: the move from knowledge written on the page and performed on the stage
of public debate to the “invisible vision” of knowledge written in the soul. I read this
metaphorical transformation of writing as sustaining the power of literacy while
warning against the limitations and drawbacks of written texts as such. Rather
than a division between writing and something altogether different, we may have
here a distinction between written texts and literate knowledge, which I think is
shown in Phaedrus 276a: The written word is an image (eidōlon) of the true word
(logos), the “living and breathing word” characterized as “knowledge written in
the soul of the learner” (epistēmēs graphetai en tē tou manthanontas psuchē).
The true word is called the “legitimate brother” of the “bastard” written word (the
word apart from its father/author) and as having a “more powerful nature.” The
distinction here between (written) image and genuine (written) reality suggests
that “writing in the soul” is not merely a metaphor, but, as I would put it, an irreducible metaphor that embodies the distinction between written words as such and
the power of literacy in its intellectual effects and capacities for new discoveries.
Within this story of philosophical writing there is shown the specter of
philosophy’s Other, the phono-ecstatics of original orality, which we literates have
lost, and which cannot be called “phono-centric” because no “center” is given in
a life that is no more than world-disclosive transactional speech acts passing in
time and preserved only through the fragile power of memory.Yet even in a literate
culture, a modified orality persists as the disclosive life of social speech practice,
which precedes and haunts reflection, and which the first great philosophical
writer wrestled with in dialogues that both reformed primary orality and warned
against the “dead letters” of philosophical texts.26
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NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Among several important studies in this vein, see two works by John Sallis: Being
and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996); and Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1999). See also Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the
Platonic Dialogues (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).
See my discussion of tragic poetry in Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths (Chicago: Open Court, 1990), chap. 5.
The internal virtue of justice is defended by Socrates against Thrasymachus and the
cynical implications of the Gyges myth (Books 1–2). The long digression about the
polis is meant to clarify the picture of a just soul and its advantages, and the digression unfolds to meet the daunting task posed to Socrates in Book 2: Prove not only
that the just man is worthy but happier than the unjust man, that he will flourish
in some way—and this in terms of the toughest case imaginable, pitting the unjust
man thought by everyone to be just against the just man thought by everyone to
be unjust (361). This task is reiterated as the purpose of the entire conversation in
Book 10 (612). And the rectification myth of Er (616–18) performs the climax of
Socrates’ project. Immortality serves an essential function in overcoming the limits
on rationality and justice in earthly life. Homer’s depiction of Odysseus is in many
ways a stark contrast to Platonic hopes. He is a heterogeneous character, called polutropos, a man of “many ways” (Odyssey I, 1), and his capacity for deceptive cunning
(mētis) is frequently celebrated (XIII, 295ff.). And most notably, Odysseus turns down
Calypso’s offer of immortality (V, 203ff.), preferring his homecoming that includes old
age and death. Indeed, the opening of the story (I, 59) tells us that Odysseus “yearns
to die” (thaneein himeretai). And it should be noted that Odysseus makes his choice
after having witnessed the grim reality of Hades described in Book XI. Given this
picture of heroic finitude, it is telling that the myth of Er has Odysseus recanting his
Homeric persona, choosing for his next embodiment the quiet, unaccomplished life
of a private individual (Republic 620C).
See Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 1–33; and Raymond A. Prier, Thauma Idesthai (Gainesville: Florida State
University Press, 1989), 169–79.
In the Ion (533), the power (dunamis) of poetry is depicted as a chain of magnetic
rings, which transmit a compelling force of attraction from the Muses to poets to
audiences.
It should be noted that epic poetry itself recognized the enchanting power of poetic
speech (e.g., Iliad IX.186–89 and Odyssey XI.334); and its danger for mortals was
vividly portrayed in the episode of the Sirens (Odyssey XII), whose song brings death
rather than life by causing men to forget their vital tasks. The Sirens can be seen to
embody the sheer static power of poetic enchantment without its role of engendering memory. The Sirens, then, are a demonic divergence from the Muses and their
cultural function of establishing and sustaining stories for future appropriations
of a memorable past (cf. Iliad VI.357–58). See Charles Segal, Singers, Heroes, and
Gods in the Odyssey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 100ff. The central
330
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Lawrence J. Hatab
problem of mimetic identification is that critical reflection is incommensurate with
the “captivating” language of poetry. Any reflective stance would ruin the force of
poetic communication. The hymns and songs permitted in the Republic are ethically beneficial, and so their mimetic effects are worthy and need not be subjected
to critical reflection.
In recent years there has been an enormous amount of scholarship on the question
of orality and literacy, and particularly in the context of ancient Greek culture. For
some representative studies, see two works by Eric A. Havelock: Preface to Plato
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) and The Muse Learns to Write
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Kevin Robb, Literacy and Paideia in
Ancient Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Rosalind Thomas, Literacy
and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Harvey
Yunis, ed., Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (New York:
Routledge, 2002). Greece has the distinction of being a special laboratory case, because
it developed the intellectual vocabulary of literacy that served to shape succeeding
cultures, and this development occurred internal to a society that was originally oral
and that experienced first hand the tensions and transitions attaching to the emergence of literacy out on oral background. See Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write,
chap. 9. An important precedent for my analysis is P. Christopher Smith,“Orality and
Writing: Plato’s Phaedrus and the Pharmakon Revisited,” in Between Philosophy and
Poetry: Writing Rhythm History, ed. Massimo Verdiccio and Robert Burch (New York:
Continuum, 2002), 73–89.
I will focus on only a few areas that can fit my purposes in this essay; and in this brief
discussion I am forced to simplify distinctions that in reality exhibit much overlapping complexity.
In Homer, for example, poetry is presumed to convey knowledge and truth together
with emotional pleasure (Iliad II.484–58; IX.186–89; Odyssey XII.188).
Perhaps the first reference to a written text as an organic whole is found in the Phraedrus 264c.
See Kevin Robb, ed., Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy (La Salle, Ill.:
Monist Library of Philosophy, 1983).
See Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Harper
and Row, 1960), chap. 10.
See Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write, 111. When I pose typical philosophical questions in class—say, What is courage?—if students have any initial mental image,
is it likely to be the graphic word “courage,” even if I don’t write it on the board? In
preliterate Greece, if courage were being considered it would likely involve scenes of
action informed by traditional poetic stories about heroic exemplars. A sensuous eidos
can provide an analogical reference for philosophical reflection (as with examples
of craft) but it cannot fully suffice. Writing may also permit the transformation of
ordinary Greek words into technical terms because of the abstract difference between
script and spoken uses. An example is ousia as “property” and “being” (the beginning
of the Meno shows both senses deployed).
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry
331
14. The setting at the start of the Theaetetus is rich with a remarkable ambiguity: Euclides
wrote down the logos of a conversation, which is then read aloud to the group—so
here we have a written dialogue portraying a conversation that turns to the reading/reciting of a written text that recorded a dialogical conversation (whew!).
15. Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, 232. The Protagoras, presumably earlier
than the Republic, mentions the learning of letters in education (325c ff.).
16. See Jesper Svenbro,“The Interior Voice: On the Invention of Silent Reading,” in Nothing
to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, eds. John J. Winkler and
Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 366–84. Svenbro
also discusses scriptio continua, the absence of word spacing in Greek written texts,
which shows that books were intended primarily for oral recitation (because here
the ear would pick up word differentiation more than the eye). Even silent reading
can occupy a grey zone of “hearing with the eyes.” This complicates my suggestion
that written words created new visual objects that aided abstraction and reflection.
Nevertheless, learning to write—by first learning letters and then writing words
down—can serve my analysis, because the learning and the act of writing must
involve piecemeal attention to the different words; and presumably people did not
vocalize letters and words when writing them out. So despite the oral use of books in
the Academy, there remains a way to speak of silent visual attention to words, which
could square with Plato’s depiction of a silent comprehension of the logos associated
with writing (in the Philebus and Theaetetus). Incidentally, in the Phaedo 97c, Socrates
tells of having heard a recitation of a book by Anaxagoras, and then eagerly attaining
a copy and rapidly reading it himself (presumably in silence).
17. In the Meno, just before the instruction of the slave boy, Socrates discusses the graphic
example of a geometrical figure (schēma), defined as the limit (peras) of a solid (76a).
Before he talks with the boy, Socrates asks if he speaks Greek, and he then draws a square
figure in the sand (82b). The boy’s difficulty with the problem of doubling the figure’s area
is that he merely supposes (oietai) the answer by doubling the sides (82e). Socrates tells
him to visually point out the line rather than “reckon” (arithmein) the answer. Socrates
then draws the diagonal line (grammē) that will show the boy the answer.
18. See my analysis in Myth and Philosophy, 72–88.
19. In On the Soul, Aristotle uses the same metaphor. In the account of nous as the potential
for thinking forms, Aristotle says that what is potentially in the mind is “in the same
way that letters are on a tablet that bears no actual writing; this is just what happens
in the mind” (430a1–2). Then after including the soul in processes of making akin
to technē forming matter, Aristotle says that the soul is both a receptive “becoming
all things” and an active “making all things” (430a10); and that the soul is like a hand
in being an instrument (organon) that employs instruments: nous is a form (eidos)
that employs forms (eidōn) (432a1). So the mind both receives intelligible forms
without sensible matter (429a15) and activates intelligible form, and this twofold
process is compared with technē (430a13). Would it be too much a stretch to detect
here a tacit reference to the receptive and active techniques of reading and writing?
20. Plato’s point about question and answer presumably reflects a pedagogical program:
“Why do you believe X?” not only prepares the defense of beliefs but the teaching of
knowledge by way of personal discovery. But it would be wrong to think that earlier
332
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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poetic forms were barren of pedagogical intent and effects. The exemplary function of
narrative accounts of the deeds and dispositions of heroic figures surely entails a teaching program: “How does one do X?” is just as much an instruction as “What is X?”
For discussions of the shifts from oral to written practices pertaining to cultural
education, see Jesper Svenbro, Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 9; and
Jennifer Wise, Dionysus Writes: The Invention of Theater in Ancient Greece (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 1.
Smith notes and discusses how literacy functions in the background of this judgment: At 264c, the organic order of a speech is needful of a “bodily” structure that is
written out (gegrammena) in order to delineate proper relationships. Also, in Philebus
18b–d, Theuth reappears as the one who distinguishes and organizes the forms of
vocal elements into a system of their combinations and differences; such structure
must involve a passage from sonic elements to graphic letters, because the knowledge involved is called technē grammatikē and its possessor is called a grammatikos
(“Orality and Writing,” 79–80, 85–86).
The soul’s inward possession of knowledge seems essential to counteract the conditioning power of poetry, where the effects of poetic mimēsis settle into the very
nature of a person, in body, speech, and thought (Republic 395).
See Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, 235ff. According to Robb, Aristotle’s
Lyceum was the first recognizable school dedicated to reading, analyzing, amassing, and
composing written texts; the Academy was in transition from an oral to a literate focus. In
the Laws (811d–e), after traditional poetry and texts are deemed harmful for education,
the kind of discussions presently conducted—and “all our other (like) discourses”—are
deemed worthy and should be written down for instructional purposes.
This point is clarified in the discussion of the graphic image of a circle, which has
physical features that conflict with the true meaning of the idea (it can be “rubbed
out” and it “everywhere touches a straight line” in likewise being composed of “points”
and so it is mixed with an opposite nature).
I have deliberately left out a discussion of Derrida’s work on this topic, postponing it
for a time until I have sorted out what I want to draw from the Greek material, before
addressing Derrida’s important and influential treatments (always a daunting task for
me, I confess). Smith’s essay, “Orality and Writing,” is right, I think, in showing how
the kind of analysis advanced in my study would call for a revision of Derrida’s claims
about Plato’s apparent displacement of writing on behalf of a grounding “voice.”