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Harald Wiltsche and Philipp Berghofer (eds) Phenomenological Approaches to Physics
Husserl's Phenomenology of Scientific PracticeIn this paper I will interpret and discuss Husserl's approach to exact sciences focusing especially on Ideas I (1913), Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), and Crisis (the 1930s). This development shows that: 1) Husserl's phenomenology is primarily a method (rather than a metaphysical thesis); 2) the method is context-dependent and hence it is not tied to any particular philosophical approach to mathematics or physics; 3) it emphasizes practice in a manner that anticipates more recent philosophical analyses of the scientific practice; and finally 4) its aim is to reveal the metaphysical commitments of scientists, rather than to formulate an argument for any particular metaphysical position. All this conforms to the views of contemporary naturalists in philosophy of science. They hold that philosophers should approach sciences as they are, and hence take the scientific practices as the starting point of the philosophical investigations (as opposed to earlier a priori reflection of what sciences should be like). Accordingly, the paper argues that Husserl's approach anticipates the naturalistic turn in philosophy of science: he did not engage in building models about what science should be like, instead he described the scientific practice and the normative goals that guide it. However, the task of transcendental phenomenology is to provide a critique of scientific practice as it is. Looked at from the Husserlian point of view, this is what contemporary naturalists are missing, and hence their approach remains philosophically naïve. The paper thus argues that phenomenology provides tools that allow naturalist philosophers of science to make their approach critical and critically philosophical, while retaining the basic naturalist commitments not to accept appeals to the mysterious and to approach sciences as they are.
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) is widely regarded as the founder of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy of consciousness. Phenomena do not simply exist for phenomenology, but appear as something, according to the intentionality of consciousness, which links subject and object. Referring to intentionality as the ‘shibboleth of phenomenology’, contemporary phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels explains that it simply means “that something shows itself as something, that something is meant, given, understood, or treated in a certain way… The formula something as something means that something (actual, possible, or impossible) is linked to something else (a sense, a meaning) and is at the same time separated from it”(2011, p. 21). Something appears as close or distant, strange or familiar, in memory, in taste or touch, or in plain view. A plurality of meanings arise according to one’s position, interest, and context and in keeping with spatiotemporal, intersubjective, and (im)material structures. As Husserl observed, such structures, in turn, can be said to represent ‘regional ontologies’ for various disciplines for phenomenological investigation.
This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception. Contributors include: Amanda Taylor Aiken Shaun Gallagher Aaron Harrison Andrew Inkpin Joel Krueger Chris McCarroll David Morris Jack Reynolds Richard Sebold Marilyn Stendera Michela Summa John Sutton Michael Wheeler
Phenomenology + Pedagogy
Phenomenology, Lived Experience: Taking a Measure of the TopicSociedad (buenos Aires)
Phenomenology and the Social Sciences: a story with no beginning2007 •
SUMMARY The relation between phenomenology and social sciences has gone through various stages. In phenomenological philosophy, its outstanding landmarks can be found in: a) the counterpoint that Husserl posited for the different sciences and his mounting interest in social sciences, b) the reinforcement of this line of thought by his followers -Schutz and Merleau-Ponty, for example-, and c) the radicalization of "non-intentional phenomenology" produced by Levinas and Henry. In the ambit of social sciences, Schutz has been acknowledged to have been first in trying to establish the connection between both disciplines by broaching the phenomenology of the natural attitude understood as phenomenological psychology, thus freeing social sciences from the rule of philosophy because. From this perspective, they do not stem from it but from the life-world, a space that can be accessed by the methodology of social research, however restrictedly because it ends subdued to methodolog...
BSP Annual Conference 2017: Phenomenology: Theory and Practice University of Brighton, Mon 11th - Wed 13th September 2017 Abstract This paper will address a problem in the life of method for phenomenology as it arises in Husserl and Fink. It will raise the question: “How can we phenomenologists live phenomenologically?” The discussion regarding the life of phenomenology will have three parts: (1) First, we shall examine the phenomenological reduction whereby the phenomenologist “puts himself out of action”, dislocates from the world and refrains from living in it. However, the phenomenologizing “onlooker” must also remain located in mundane life and continue to live in the world it constitutes. Fink conceives this paradox of mundane participation in terms of a split in transcendence which cleaves constitution into two disparate regions: the phenomenologizing “I” is itself constituted alongside but differentiated from the world. This divided constitution means the transcendental ego has an indeterminable origin and location with respect to the life-world; it forms an impossible “gap in the cosmos”. (2) Next, we reconsider the phenomenologizing paradox as something inescapably bound to life and living, i.e. where the theory and practice of phenomenology lives-on regardless of its dislocation from the life-world. Consequently, we look at the event of the phenomenologizing “I” in Husserl’s idea phenomenology and ask: “What is the living status or original life of absolute consciousness?” But here we find a more radical dislocation of the ego, not just from the time of world, but as already separated from the original phenomenon of temporalizing life: the transcendental ego set in position to present life as something alien and new; life becomes mere evidence for world-constitution. (3) Finally, we look to the life of this dislocation and its determination as a living aporia in life of experience and close with a call to reformulate the intentional life of theory and practice in phenomenology in terms of a radical correlation of living and unliving phenomena.
in Tarozzi, M. & Mortari, L. (2010) Phenomenology and Human Science Research Today
Mortari, L. & Tarozzi, M. Phenomenology as Philosophy of Research: An Introductory EssayAcademia Green Energy
Uniting science, policy, and industry for a greener world: unveiling the path of Academia Green Energy2023 •
Building the House of Wisdom. Sergii Bulgakov and Contemporary Theology: New Approaches and Interpretations
‘Sergii Bulgakov’s Chalcedonian Ontology and the Problem of Human Freedom’ in Barbara Hallensleben, Regula M. Zwahlen, Aristotle Papanikolaou and Pantelis Kalaitzidis, eds., Building the House of Wisdom. Sergii Bulgakov and Contemporary Theology (Münster: Aschendorff, 2024), 381-408--Gallaher.2024 •
2024 •
Revista Eletrônica Acervo Saúde
O “gibi” como instrumento à promoção da saúde e prevenção do abuso de drogas: relato de experiência de residentes multiprofissionais em Saúde da Família2019 •
Proceedings of the 19th Conference on Computer Aided Architectural Design Research in Asia (CAADRIA)
Evolving Lego2014 •
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Special issue on “drones as enablers of novel services: operational and technology challenges”2021 •
Coordination Chemistry Reviews
The history of the discovery of the molybdenum cofactor and novel aspects of its biosynthesis in bacteria2011 •