Fragile Cities: Fundamentals of Urban Life in East and Southern Africa

Published*in*Bryceson,*D.F.*and*D.*Potts*(eds)*2006.*African*Urban*Economies:* Viability,*Vitality*or*Vitiation.*Basingstoke*UK:*Palgrave*Macmillan.*pp.*3J38* makers sought to curb urban demographic growth that was viewed as economically draining Chapter 1 Sub-Saharan Africa the role of exporting natural resources and agricultural products from its Fragile Cities: Fundamentals of Urban Life in East and Southern Africa* DEBORAH FAHY BRYCESON and socially destabilizing in the context of an international division of labour which accorded abundant land expanse. Uncertainty about the foundations of African urban economies contributes to scepticism about the economic advantage of urban growth. This chapter and the one that follows provide an overview of the foundational supports and dynamics of African apex city The towns are so many electric transformers. They increase tension, accelerate the rhythm of exchange and ceaselessly stir up men’s lives….Towns are also oppressive, parasitical formations….This town-country confrontation is the first and longest class struggle history has known. We should not pass censure or take sides: these parasitic towns also embodied the intelligence, risk, progress, and modernity towards which the world was slowly moving….To the rather unwieldy body of the state they lent their irreplaceable vitality. They were the accelerators of all historical time. Which does not mean that they did not make men suffer throughout the centuries, including the men who lived in them. (Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800, 1967:373) economies, highlighting pertinent findings from the book’s in-depth East and Southern African case studies (Chapters 4 through 13). Before considering what sustains urban economic life, there is the problem of distinguishing what is understood by the term urban. In this chapter, urban areas are defined, before discussing their fragility as places to live and work in. The pre-colonial and colonial origins of cities in the region and key post-colonial processes of economic, demographic and social transformation are reviewed. The constraints and opportunities posed by the cities’ social and productive service infrastructure are outlined with respect to their influence on economic growth. Chapter 2 explores the cities’ sources of economic sustainability over the past 25 years and the character of livelihood experimentation that has ensued. The housing market, as Too often the ambiguities of early European urbanization are overlooked and early modern city growth is portrayed as the embodiment of Western economic and political progress and a model for the developing world today. It is in this light that Western donors have viewed the combination of urban demographic growth with economic malaise in Sub-Saharan Africa as perverse and attributable to urban political elites’ misguided policies and practices. SubSaharan Africa’s urbanization trend, amidst the doldrums of the last quarter of a century, is indeed puzzling. This book seeks to disentangle and contextualize the tenuous character of urban African economic life over the last half of the twentieth century. African urban populations have expanded in the absence of industrialization and national economic growth. While it is true that increasing urban populations inevitably expand livelihood activities and labour force participation, few would argue that there is a an internal engine of growth and class differentiation, is discussed from the perspective of landlords and tenants. Chapter 3 follows with an in-depth analysis of urban demography revealed by recent census data. The case studies, spanning Chapters 4 through 13, are grouped into three parts: ‘city economies in the making’, ‘urban livelihoods and social dynamics’ and ‘urban welfare, housing and infrastructure’. All of the case study authors have spent years researching their respective cities, which is reflected in their intricate portraits of individual cities and analyses of forces shaping their urban economies. In so doing, the economic vulnerabilities and vistas of these cities emerge very clearly. Finally, in light of the urban case study material, the last chapter of this book concludes with an analysis of the apex cities’ positioning vis-à-vis their respective hinterlands, national urban hierarchies, regional ties and global interfaces. synergy between urban demographic and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa generally. Quite the contrary, for much of the twentieth century colonial and post-colonial policy Urban Essentials Delineating Urban Settlements * I would like to thank David Satterthwaite of the International Institute for the Environment and Development (IIED) for his help in obtaining the latest urban population statistics from the United Each country has its own definition of urban areas and the variation in definitions and the fuzziness of administrative versus operative boundaries is a problem that is not unique to Sub Nations Population Division. 2 Saharan Africa. The most easily observable criteria for distinguishing rural and urban areas unit primarily characterized by savannah environments interspersed with well-watered are population scale and density, although the differences are relative rather than absolute. In highlands and arid deserts. They share a common coastline along the Indian Ocean stretching countries of extremely low population density, a settlement of 5,000 people may be classified round to the South Atlantic Ocean. as urban whereas elsewhere such a settlement would be considered a rural village. Indeed Historically, the East African Rift Valley has been a migration corridor, notably for over the past millennium Africa has been the world’s most sparsely populated continent. Bantu people travelling in a southerly direction from the northwest, circumventing the Congo Much of the literature on the pre-colonial history of African cities has defined urban in Forest. The majority of countries in this region were subject to British colonialism with the settings and scales that would elsewhere be deemed rural. exception of Angola and Mozambique that were under Portuguese rule, Burundi and Rwanda To avoid controversy regarding what is and is not urban, we focus on those cities that that were colonized by the Belgians and Somalia and, for a short time Ethiopia, that were are over half a million in population or represent urban primacy and are at or near the top of under Italian colonial rule. Thus, it can be argued that East and Southern Africa (ESA) the national urban hierarchy in demographic size and political influence in their respective constitutes a cohesive geographical region with similar political histories upon which to countries. They display essential urban characteristics notably regarding population identify trends and patterns.1 characteristics: ESA has experienced moderate levels of urbanization relative to West Africa’s more • relatively concentrated population density; advanced and the Sahel’s least developed urbanization (Figure 1.1). Over the past 50 years • settlement size that exhibits spatial heterogeneity and large numbers making social large city growth rates have followed a similar pattern throughout the continent with and economic interaction impersonal in nature, extending beyond the circle of one’s extremely rapid growth at the outset tapering thereafter (Figure 1.2), although there has been immediate family, neighbours and friends; and some differentiation with the highest large city growth in East Africa and lowest in Southern • social heterogeneity of the population in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and class Africa (Figure 1.2). differences. Locationally they offer: • spatial coherence of settlement with an internal network of roads and communications as well as productive and social service infrastructure; and • favoured external transport and communication connections to other urban and rural areas. Economically, they represent: • the convergence of productive economies of scale with the proximity of large numbers of consumers; and • economic diversity, a relatively wide range of occupational pursuits and availability of commodities and services. East and Southern Africa’s Apex Cities Given the enormity of the continent and the economic, political and cultural diversity of over 50 nation-states, our focus is limited to the East and Southern African regions. The countries of East and Southern African display wide variation as well but they form a continuous land 1 We are omitting the islands of Madagascar, Mauritius and Comores because they are not part of the same contiguous land mass and have historically distinct ethnic populations and cultural influences that would complicate the analysis. 3 4 Figure 1.1 West Africa: Abidjan, Abuja, Accra, Bangui, Banjul, Bissau, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Doula, Freetown, Ibadan, Kinshasa, Kumasi, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Lubumbashi, Monrovia, Niamey, Ogbomosho, Porto Novo, Yaoundé Urban Population as Percentage of National Total, 1960-2003 Within the context of world urbanization, ESA represents low levels of urbanization, 45 40 but has been experiencing relatively rapid urban growth2 over the past five decades, 35 particularly in the large cities of East Africa. We are primarily interested in the apex cities of 30 each country’s urban hierarchy. Apex cities are defined here as the national capital cities % 25 20 Southern Africa and/or cities of over 1 million.3 In South Africa, the urban hierarchy is not characterized by a 15 East Africa single apex. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, all of roughly the same size, form triple Sahel 10 West Africa peaks. 5 SSA 0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 Year Fragility of African Cities Source: World Development Indicators, 2004 All cities whatever their size, and in common with rural settlements, must function to fulfil urban residents’ daily basic needs provisioning. Cities are biological as well as demographic Figure 1.2 and economic units. They represent colonies of people who require minimum levels of food, Average Population Growth Rates of Major African Cities by Region water, sanitation, health and security to remain alive. Without attainment of these basic requirements, cities can rapidly disintegrate. Basic needs provisioning is especially problematic for impoverished urban Annual Growth Rate (%) 30 25 Sahel populations. A population’s material requirements can exceed the city’s product and service West Africa supply response as a result of economic constraints, lack of settlement organization and/or 20 East Africa 15 inadequate political governance. There are a number of telling signs of urban residents Southern Africa reaching the limits of urban basic needs provisioning or what might best be termed ‘urban 10 economic carrying capacity’ when they: 5 • resort to urban farming proximate to their homes or elsewhere in the city or its 0 outskirts; 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 • engage in circular migration rotating their residence between rural or urban, notably Decade circular migration to avail themselves of rural livelihoods and support networks; or Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003 * These are unweighted regional averages. Cities included in the growth rate calculations are: Southern Africa: Bulawayo, Cape Town, Chitungwiza, Durban, East Rand, Gaborone, Harare, Johannesburg, Lilongwe, Luanda, Lusaka, Maputo, Maseru, Mbabane, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Sasolburg, West Rand, Windhoek East Africa: Addis Ababa, Asmara, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Kigali, Mogadishu, Mwanza, Nairobi Sahel: Bamako, Khartoum, Laayoune, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, 2 Satterthwaite (2003) points to the profusion of relatively new large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, but a preponderance of the developing world’s largest cities are in Asia. Urban growth rates are currently especially high in cities attracting international investment, notably in China and South East Asia. 3 Jacobs (1969: 129) sees city growth not just as the demographic enlargement of towns but rather ‘a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of its economy, starting from little or nothing more than its initial export work and the suppliers to that work.’ 5 6 • choose to live in peri-urban areas where they can pursue both urban and rural … cities in Africa are not serving as engines of growth and structural transformation. livelihoods readily from their homes without having to commute between rural and Instead they are part of the cause and a major symptom of the economic and social urban occupational options. crises that have enveloped the continent. (World Bank 2000: 130) Most colonial cities in East and Southern Africa were posited on circular migration. Urban Demographic Growth versus Economic Performance After independence, full-time urban residence became the general norm, only to erode later Is the pessimism of the World Bank warranted? Do we know enough about urban growth as the economic carrying capacity of cities declined during the 1980s. This was reflected in processes in the short, medium and long term to judge? For decades, urban areas have been decreasing income earnings and purchasing power that undermined the affordability of basic of marginal interest in African studies. Urban studies were a novelty during the 1960s when housing and food requirements. low levels of urbanization prevailed in East and Southern Africa with the exception of South City life has often been precarious for the individual and in aggregate this has imparted Africa (Leslie 1963, Mitchell 1969). As urbanization rates accelerated, the gross imbalance fragility to African cities as economic units, which is reflected in the population’s variable between rural and urban research became increasingly myopic, skewed heavily by donor resort to circular migration. In the post-colonial period, the level of circular migration in ESA preference (Stren 1994). Western donor agencies followed in the footsteps of colonial cities relates to a gamut of material constraints and lifestyle choices which straddle the rural governments in favouring ‘farm first’ policies. Rural welfare needs were recognized while and urban continuum including: the extent of rural landlessness, the relative merits of urban urban needs were discounted or ignored. Recent poverty studies now afford a profuse as opposed to rural schooling, the existence of second and third generation urban-dwellers documentation of urban poverty but, statistically, absolute poverty levels are still considered and their declining attachment to the countryside, the rural/urban incidence of HIV/AIDS and to be greater in rural areas, no doubt influenced by the difficulties of comparing urban and the apportioning of care for sufferers between rural and urban-based extended families. These rural standards of living given the higher proportion of non-commoditized goods and services will be explored later in this chapter and illustrated in the case study chapters. consumed in rural areas (Rakodi 1997, Jones and Nelson 1999, Satterthwaite and Tacoli Over the last decade, the analytical focus has been primarily on micro-level urban 2002). production and consumption, notably household livelihood strategies. Rural-urban linkages The urban studies that now exist span several social science disciplines with no one have been viewed as an important aspect of urban as well as rural livelihood strategies, discipline offering a compelling analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of especially during duress (Jamal and Weeks 1993, Potts 1995 and 1997, Kruger 1998, Smit urban societies and economies. Inter-disciplinary, as opposed to multi-disciplinary, efforts 1998, Tacoli 2003, Bah et al. 2003). While affording valuable insights, these studies have would be best placed to fill this void. In the meantime, while donor agencies and national analytical limits. Most represent a diffuse micro-level perspective that generates a wealth of governments are becoming more sensitive to urban issues, urban planning and design are empirical detail on coping processes and welfare outcomes in rural areas but we are still desperately weak and directionless Investment cutbacks in urban infrastructure have left unclear about aggregate outcomes for urban areas (Bryceson 2002). How are urban African cities in a general state of dilapidation. The severe lack of reliable statistical data4 landscapes and occupational trajectories being moulded as a consequence? How is the city and documentation of economic activity in African cities, given negligent record-keeping, a responding as an economic unit? lack of statistical collation and the vast expansion of an unregistered, unmonitored informal The World Bank and other donor agencies have portrayed African cities largely in negative terms over the last 30 years. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) sector, compounds the general myopia of academics and policy makers regarding urban economies. Urban economies are readily observed and experienced but not easily measured, implemented during the 1980s were premised on eliminating ‘urban bias’. In the post-SAP period as the World Bank has generally promoted urban areas as a dynamizing force for 4 national economic growth, African cities are seen as the exception: Potts elaborates on the pitfalls of using census data for urban analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 3. 7 8 analyzed or understood. Instead, academics have fixated on the phenomenon of urban essentialist perspective overlooks the ubiquity of patron-client relations in the early urban demographic growth and its potentially dire consequences. history of other continents, notably Europe, as will be argued in Chapter 14 (Bryceson Much store has been placed in the so-called demographic transition in developing 2000a). countries from high fertility and mortality rates through to far lower equilibrium fertility and The root of the word ‘politics’ and the Greek word for city are one and the same, mortality rates. The transition is associated with increasing educational attainment and polis. Cities through time have evinced networks of patron-client relations that were linked occupational orientation away from agriculture and urbanization. Is there an associated urban to, but distinct from, those prevailing in the countryside. In the wake of the Black Death and demographic transition that traces changing levels of urban in-migration and declining levels the disintegration of feudal estates in Europe, cities held out the prospects of political and of urban fertility and mortality? Montgomery et al. (2003: 81) use the term the ‘urban economic autonomy for labourers accustomed to servile duty to a manor. In a curious twist of transition’ to refer to rapid urban growth rates involving historically unprecedented numbers history, African cities today are seen as headquarters of corrupt government holding back of people, at generally lower levels of per capita income than took place in the world’s economic growth and good governance. To what extent does that tally with the actual current urbanized and industrialized world during its urbanization. Interestingly, the rate of historical record in Sub-Saharan Africa? increase in the urban percentage of national populations today does not exceed that of the already urbanized industrial world a century or more ago. By 2025 more than half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is expected to be living in Sub-Saharan African Cities of the Past: Nodes of Power for the Interplay of States and Markets urban areas. Already 45 per cent of national populations in West Africa are urban (Figure This section considers the pre-colonial roots of urban economies in light of recent historical 1.1). In Chapter 3 Deborah Potts provides a detailed analysis of urban growth in ESA based work, tracing African urban origins before turning to their colonial trajectories. on recent census data. As Potts stresses, urban population growth rates are high but they are in fact declining or stagnating in most places. Apex cities generally register slower growth Pre-colonial Foundations than more recent smaller settlements (Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2001). As the Much of the general literature on ancient cities emphasizes their extractive nature. Three urbanization process matures within a developing national economy, urban primacy becomes historical models are salient: theocratic city-states, imperial city-states, and feudal walled less pronounced. cities. The former are seen as forbidding citadels of wealth and political power dominated by Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia have experienced similar rates of a priestly class6 commanding compliance if not awe from the immediate urban population, urbanization, one accompanied by economic stagnation, the other by growth. Rather than the surrounding population, and long-distance trading networks. More secular cities, attempting to find relationships between demographic and economic growth, it may prove exemplified by Rome, were based on imperial trade and taxation with distribution centralized more fruitful and a useful starting point to consider apex urban economies vis-à-vis their in the urban capital in an extreme form of urban bias and spatial inequality. The medieval national political economies. In the countries under review, their national economies have walled cities of Europe represent a smaller scale and more decentralized urban system. been dominated by agrarian production, with the major exception of Southern Africa’s Nonetheless, medieval city walls were more than symbolic. Outsiders had access to the cities’ mining economies.5 The perceived malfunctioning of African urban economies is often markets but not their services. Feudal serfdom rooted rural dwellers in the countryside tilling viewed as a derivative of patron-client networks and ‘traditional’ kinship rooted ultimately in the land. Africa’s rural peasantries (Bayart et al. 1999, Chabal and Deloz 1999). This cultural Where do African pre-colonial cities fit in these three roughly sketched urban models? Historians have recently turned their attention to Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban past 5 Zambia’s and South Africa’s national economies have historically been premised on mining and Zimbabwe has had a mixed economy of mining, industry, capitalized large-scale settler agriculture 6 and small-scale African peasant agriculture. cities of central Mexico and the Andean cities. 9 This is especially the case with regard to urban settlements of Mesopotamia, the Mayan and Aztec 10 arguing that African cities were varied in their physical forms and social and economic the island city of Zanzibar attracted successive waves of Arab, Chinese,7 Indian, Portuguese, functions (Anderson and Rathbone 2000, Burton 2002). To some extent, Buganda, the site of Dutch and French traders who found them useful entrepots for the export of luxury goods, presentday Kampala, combined all three models. It was the headquarters of a powerful notably ivory and gold, and later slaves (Jenkins, Rakodi and Marchal, Chapters 4, 5 and 9, kingship that had extended its domain over a densely populated, fertile agrarian area and Sheriff 2002). Unlike upcountry trading settlements, these coastal towns did not have the experimented with religion to gain greater leverage. It was also an important trading site, same logistical problems of supplying adequate amounts of food for a fluctuating population; outfitting caravans travelling to and from the East African coast (Reid and Medard 2002). visiting trading vessels could provision food and other necessities. In Mombasa, slave Pre-colonial urban settlements in East and Southern Africa are difficult to characterize plantations were established adjacent to the town to produce staple foods for the urban but four main types can be discerned. First, there were cities commanding religious awe. The population and for export. Security, however, was a perennial problem. Mombasa was ancient holy city of Aksum in Ethiopia is a prime example, although its decline was apparent heavily fortified and Mogadishu was eventually overrun by looting Somali clans. to visitors in the later 18th century (Burton 2002a citing Pankhurst 1985). Second, At the time of colonial penetration, African cities were relatively small and environmental border settlements centrifugally spread out along a river or coastline, or unremarkable, with some notable exceptions.8 They tended to be the loci of trading capital between two contrasting natural environments like savannah and forest or lowlands and and food supplies for the surrounding countryside. The essence of urban comparative mountains, facilitating the exchange of goods and services between two zones. As advantage – the concentration of labour and capital in a confined space - remained settlements, they marked a gradation from rural to urban, with populations of approximately problematic and the existence of urban settlements was inherently fragile, rising and falling 20,000 to 30,000 people that generally lacked rigid political or economic stratification. with trading empires and food supply fluctuations. Instead they were likely to be governed by conventional ritual and joking relationships between neighbours or other groups who regularly encountered each other for purposes of Colonial Trajectories trade. Unlike West Africa and the Sahel, where the major cities evolved from strategic ports and the Third, and more centripetally, the war-ravaged citadels of the slave-trading economy caravan-trading centres of old, East and Southern Africa’s cities are mostly colonial in origin tended to attract larger populations, gathered for defence. Thornton (2000) describes Mbanza and physical layout. The siting of capital cities was critical to the colonial economy. Colonial Kongo, in what is now Angola, as a dense core settlement of 10,000, with 40,000 people governments, especially the British, promulgated strict boundaries between rural and urban living in the immediate surroundings. These settlements were demographically unstable with space and standards of living. Indirect rule in the countryside was premised on interpretations a fluctuating number of soldiers who were vital to the physical security of the population, but of African customary law that ordained an African sense of belonging rooted in rural villages placed heavy demands on local food production capacity. (Mamdani 2000). While there was little in their policies to encourage urban diversity and Interestingly, although urban settlements differed in their degree of decentralization dynamism, urban areas were accorded significant entrepot and administrative functions in the versus centralization and fluid egalitarian versus more rigid hierarchical social structures, raw material export activities of national economies based on agricultural and mineral they shared the tendency towards being highly ephemeral as settlements. The former was production. subject to natural vagaries of flooding, drought, pestilence as well as openness to attack. The latter, despite its citadel position and troops, was under constant threat of attack by rival slave-trading factions and rarely left a lasting urban mark on the landscape. The fourth city type arose in the context of foreign contact. Mogadishu, Mombasa and Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques), three of the cities covered in this volume, are very old th, settlements dating roughly back to the 10 century. Situated on the Indian Ocean, they and 7 Malindi (also Brava and Juba), indicating a better knowledge of the contours of the East African coastline than European documents of the time (Wheatley 1975). 8 11 Records of Chinese expeditions to the East African coast in the 15th century describe Mogadishu and The notable exceptions were the Sahelian towns with their origins in the long-distance caravan trade. 12 Northern Rhodesia because of its location on the main north-south railway line near the • City Sites Most cities designated as colonial capitals were ports or upcountry sites located on important transport arteries. Historically important ports like Luanda, Mogadishu, Mombasa and Maputo were chosen as capitals, while other ports of antiquity such as Sofala and Kilwa were passed over. Dar es Salaam, a relatively new deep-water port developed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, was favoured over the older port of Bagamoyo (Sutton 1970). Railroad networks, however, were key to the siting of colonial capital cities. Railroads built during the late 19th and early 20th century were a physical extension of the European scramble for Africa, establishing enduring territorial claims and major infrastructural investment for the fledging colonial governments.9 In East and Southern Africa, only Burundi and Rwanda had no rail links. Railroads were central to the colonial export strategies of landlocked countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. While rail lines in West Africa emanated from the port into the interior without inter-connecting lines, in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania some semblance of a fanned network took shape, but was still nothing in comparison with the denser inter-connecting network of Southern Africa. All of the colonial capitals of this region were on the rail line, with the exception of Mogadishu and Kigali, cities with hinterlands geographical centre of the country and its closer proximity to the Copperbelt. Other capitals took root as administrative and service supports to mining enterprise. Johannesburg, founded in 1886, was a mining settlement situated on the rocky gold-rich hills of the Witwatersrand (Katz 1997). Harare (formerly Salisbury) was sited adjacent to gold mines and good farmland. Kigali’s establishment appears to have lacked the strategic significance of most of the other capitals. It was originally part of German East Africa (present-day Ruanda, Burundi and Tanzania). After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the colony was split into Tanganyika under the British and Ruanda-Urundi under the Belgians. Kigali, a European mission settlement within the Tutsi-ruled kingdom of Ruanda, became the capital of Ruanda-Urundi (McDow 1997a). Kampala had strong tribal kingdom associations as well, being adjacent to the headquarters of the Buganda kingdom (Nuwagaba, Chapter 6). This was originally conceived as a political advantage by the British colonial government keen to put the policy of indirect rule to the test. Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, has been omitted from this discussion because Botswana (then Bechuanaland) was administered by the South African government from generating limited exportable goods. Djibouti illustrates the importance of territorial claim through railway building more than any other city. In 1887, the French founded the city in an attempt to counter the influence of the British presence in Aden and to take advantage of the railway construction in Mafikeng in South Africa until the country’s independence in 1966. Coalescing out of dust, Gaborone’s big bang appearance came with house building for 5,000 people shortly before independence (Selolwane, Chapter 12). On the rail-line connecting South Africa with the interior of Ethiopia with its terminus at Addis Ababa (Hannan 1997).10 Addis Ababa had Zimbabwe, Gaborone’s site conformed to the rail node criterion, although by the 1960s roads been established just a year earlier in 1886.11 Nairobi, which started life as a railway workers were starting to supercede rail as conduits for commodity and passenger transport in many encampment, quickly replaced Mombasa as the capital of Kenya amidst the consolidation of countries. European settler interests. Nairobi became the gateway to the ‘White Highlands’ (now the Kenya Highlands). Decades later in 1935, Lusaka replaced Livingstone as the capital of • Racial Delineation of Town and Countryside Colonial cities were designed to exclude Africans (O’Connor 1983). East and Southern African cities were destined to become laboratories of highly controlled experiments in racial 9 Most railways were speculative and rarely managed to pay for themselves given the low volume of separation. The European colonial experience in the Americas and Asia in the 16th to 18th freight and passengers that they carried, creating heavy debts for colonial governments. centuries was the foundation upon which ‘divide and rule’ through ethnic allegiances and 10 antipathies and above all racial stereotyping was fine-tuned as a British colonial method of The rocky inhospitable hinterland surrounding Djibouti contributed to rapid urbanization, making Djibouti the most urbanized country in East Africa with roughly 60 per cent of its population now living in Djibouti City. 11 governance. Urban dwellers were residentially and occupationally delineated by race. Much of The city was reportedly established by Emperor Menelik to please his wife who favoured the local East Africa had been the site of an Arab slave trade that viciously trampled on people’s hot mineral springs as treatment for her rheumatism. 13 14 personal freedom and human dignity, threatening their lives and tearing families and other than to engage in a circular migration pattern commuting between urban dormitories communities apart. This remained a living memory for many despite the manumission of and rural farms on a weekly, monthly or even annual basis (Schlyter, Chapter 11). In th slaves in several British colonies during the first decade of the 20 century (Rakodi, Chapter Johannesburg, apartheid policies took the region’s urban racial separatism to its logical 5,). The mobility and residential controls imposed on Africans during the colonial period extreme - an elaborate bureaucratic system of dehumanizing racial oppression. This had the must be viewed against the legacy of African slavery. effect of severely restricting the black African population of Johannesburg (Potts, Chapter 3). th Indian merchants had been trading on the coast for decades from the late 18 century When Lusaka became the capital of Northern Rhodesia, it was designed, planned and and the Asian presence became more pronounced after colonial administrations imported built on the entirely European model of a garden city (Myers 2003). Decades later in post- Asian coolie labour for railroad construction (Sheriff 1987). Many Asian labourers decided colonial Malawi, President Banda’s grand design for his new capital, Lilongwe, extended the not to return to India, became traders and, joined by their wives, resided in the capital city or garden concept to that of an urban woodland, offering enormous low-density plots for the the small administrative towns that dotted the countryside. new African elite and European donor community in stark contrast with crowded high- The African capitals of this period were small in population and area, built to be density areas for the African urban poor (Potts 1985). Gaborone, Botswana’s new planned aesthetically pleasing to European tastes, the ‘city as civilization’ trope that Jenkins (Chapter capital, however, bucked the colonial legacy by avoiding rigid racial and class zoning 4) describes for late 19th century Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). African housing – where (Selolwane, Chapter 12). it was provided - was physically separated from Asian and European neighbourhoods by a The Lusophone countries were different. In Maputo and Luanda, racial zoning was less cordon sanitaire, a large open no-man’s land that was expected to prevent the spread of by physical design and more by Africans’ inferior legal status which largely precluded the disease, crime and civil unrest.12 African housing was scantily supplied, of far lower standard possibility of them residing in more affluent and visually pleasing neighbourhoods. Their than Asian and European housing and designed to be temporary housing for male ‘bachelors’ growing relegation to unplanned and non-regulated informal settlements around Maputo who would ultimately return to their respective rural homelands. This reached its nadir in dates back to the 1930s, a situation that British colonialism endeavoured to avoid. Southern Africa, notably in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia with hostel In Kampala, two very different land-tenure systems were juxtaposed during the accommodation offering male workers little privacy or sense of self-worth. Grim residential colonial period, namely, crown land administered by the colonial government and Mungo circumstances and monotonous daily routines underlined the imperative of returning to their administered by the Kabaka (king) of the Buganda under Uganda’s system of indirect rule rural homes. (Nuwagaba, Chapter 6). This duality was unwieldy for the rationalization of urban land use Jenkins (Chapter 4) describes how male migrants came to Lourenço Marques for and housing standards. Mailo land, subject to a curious convergence of the long-term profit- forced labour, domestic service or on their way to the mines and farms of South Africa. driven interests of Bugandan landlords with the immediate desperate needs for shelter of Africans were not allowed to own land. The immigration of poor white Portuguese during the large numbers of urban poor, is now generating appalling over-crowded slum conditions. 1960s reinforced the attitude of urban exclusion towards Africans at a time when other countries in the region were achieving national independence. On Mombasa Island, the old • Colonial Fears of Detribalization elites monopolized the land but Africans were allowed to own land on the mainland, which Much has been written about the lengths that colonial governments went to install chiefs led to far higher African land ownership (26 per cent) at independence compared with willing to be compliant mediators between the colonial government and local people. This Nairobi (2 per cent). In Harare, bans on African home ownership left men with few options proved exceptionally difficult in many rural areas (Bryceson 1990, Feierman 1990), but it was virtually impossible in urban areas given the entirely different life styles, occupations, 12 Interestingly the exception to this general pattern was South Africa where a large poor white population and some mixing of races existed. The segregation of African housing was a later event settlement patterns and above all heterogeneous populations of urban as opposed to rural areas. At the time of accelerated growth towards critical urban population densities, there. 15 16 Europeanization of space through the annexation of tribal land was the norm, as Jenkins municipal authorities in Maputo were simply unprepared for the 1950s migration boom and (Chapter 4) describes for Maputo. Local chiefs’ powers were progressively delimited, continued to turn a blind eye to the spread of a sprawling African canico (reed) city with marginalized and delegitimized in the eyes of an African population hailing from a multitude outlying market gardens that contrasted starkly with the compact European cement city. of different tribal backgrounds (Burton 2002b). Ethnicity became the disruptor rather than the Post-Colonial Apex Cities, 1960-2010 facilitator of systems of local authority. Colonial and municipal governments held firmly to the policy that Africans’ residence African nationalism gave impetus to urban growth. South Africa’s apartheid policy formally in urban areas was temporary and they were destined to return to the traditional discipline and tried to contain both with its imposition of urban influx control, keeping an iron hand on harmony of their rural native authorities. Viewed as innocents in the urban environment, political protest. As Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (Chapter 10) demonstrate, South African Africans’ village origins, it was argued, had not prepared them for monetized urban government-imposed controls against urban migration succeeded in lowering urban economies that required careful budgeting and financial savvy. Thus, in addition to the spatial population growth down to between one and two per cent during the apartheid decades of the delimitations of African housing, attempts were made to supervise the daily rhythm of 1960s to the mid-1980s as opposed to 4 per cent before and after this period. African urban life. Housing was designed primarily to accommodate single men who were National independence and urban growth surges came in waves elsewhere. The subjected to highly regimented work and leisure time activities. Known as the ‘Durban earliest brought independence to several states in East Africa freed from the colonial rule of system’, many municipalities operated community halls where beer with a regulated low Great Britain, Belgium and Italy.14 The mid-1970s witnessed a second wave when the alcohol content was sold. This aimed at generating revenue for African services within the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola gained independence and Djibouti gained 13 municipality and controlling alcohol consumption levels. As Gewald (2002) documents for independence from France. Finally, the Southern African countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia Windhoek during the 1930s, the system was prone to backfiring. Municipal officials faced and South Africa were last to achieve African-led governments and shed racial separatism in disgruntled customers who heartedly disliked the weak beer and transferred their custom to 1980, 1990 and 1994 respectively. Ethiopia had escaped European colonial domination,15 but illegal brewers and distillers. nonetheless had barriers to urban migration under the imperial government of Haile Selassie After World War II, urban populations ballooned and the deficiencies of colonial and the subsequent socialist government of Mengistu that was finally overthrown in 1991. governance escalated. Employers and government alike began questioning the viability of the The growth-enhancing impact of national independence and mass politics is evident bachelor wage system as labour strikes hit some of the port cities (Iliffe 1979, Cooper 1987). in the expanding populations of the larger apex cities shown in Figure 1.3. Gaborone, being a Civil disobedience, spawned by the acute need for housing surfaced in the burgeoning purpose-built capital city, reflects the impetus of national independence more than any other. squatter areas. The introduction of wage levels adequate to cover the basic needs of a worker Its growth in the 1960s averaged 24 per cent, slowing to 13 per cent in the 1970s, 8 per cent and his family, the so-called ‘family wage’, spread. Growing appreciation of the destabilizing in the 1980s and dropping to 3.4 per cent in the 1990s. impact of the urban political awakening spurred municipal governments to expand African housing and improve urban infrastructure as Colonial Development and Welfare Funds became available. However, such up-scaling faced capacity limitations in economies still 14 recovering from wartime material shortages. Nairobi’s housing schemes during the 1950s Tanzania 1961, Kenya, and Uganda 1962, Burundi and Rwanda 1962 (from Belgium), Malawi and The first wave of newly independent countries during the 1960s was: Somalia 1960 (from Italy); encountered corrupt practices and poor construction standards on the part of European Zambia 1964, Botswana and Lesotho 1966, and Swaziland 1968 (from Great Britain). The second administrators and Asian contractors (Anderson 2002). Jenkins (Chapter 4) observes that wave came in the 1970s: Angola and Mozambique 1975 (from Portugal) and Djibouti 1977 (from France); and the last wave of Southern African states who relinquished their apartheid policies 13 It was also intended to avert the need for higher income white taxpayers to pay for black African through the attainment of African-led governments followed during the 1980s and early 1990s. 15 urban services. 17 Ethiopia however was subject to brief occupation by Italy between 1935 and 1941. 18 Figure 1.3 The influence of war on urban population growth shows highly variable outcomes. In Uganda, Kampala barely grew in size during the protracted years of Amin’s bloody reign of Large East & Southern African City Populations power in the 1970s (Nuwagaba, Chapter 6). So too, Maputo’s rate of growth declined during Mozambique’s liberation war in the early 1970s in part due to the exodus of Portuguese 4000 3500 3000 Population ('000) expatriates fleeing the political insecurity and slowdown in economic investment (Jenkins, Addis Ababa Cape Town Dar es Salaam Durban Harare Jo'burg Kampala Luanda Lusaka Maputo Mogadishu Nairobi 2500 2000 Chapter 4). By contrast, in Zimbabwe’s liberation war during the 1970s, rural people’s insecurity and loss of livelihood led them to flock to Harare, overwhelming the influx controls that the government had erected (Schlyter, Chapter 11). In Angola and Somalia, the apex cities of Luanda and Mogadishu spiralled under the pressures of war. Fierce fighting in upcountry rural areas dispossessed people of their livelihoods and sense of security causing them to flee the city. The protracted civil war in Angola catalyzed urban migration to Luanda on a massive scale with an estimated 2.3 million residents in 1995 largely cut off from the rural hinterland both politically and economically – an entirely donor-dependent island in a sea of military upheaval (Caldera 1997, Robson 2001). In the aftermath of civil war and ethnic genocide in Rwanda, Kigali’s population has 1500 spiralled. Despite the fact that war raged in Mogadishu, people nonetheless fled rural conflict zones for the refuge of the city where they rightly surmised international donor assistance 1000 would be more readily available. In Somalia’s clan-based civil war Marchal (Chapter 9) identifies the aspirations of urban migrants to Mogadishu seeking survival through anonymity 500 in the city, hoping to gain access to basic food supplies and other necessities supplied by foreign donors from Mogadishu. 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Early Post-Independence Years: Urban Bias or Minimum Security? In retrospect, the1960s and early 1970s were undoubtedly the halcyon days of East African city life full of economic and social promise as cities swelled with men, accompanied by their Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2004 wives and children, finding formal sector jobs. As first-generation urban dwellers, many enjoyed urban livelihood and residential opportunities that later cohorts were denied. Even in Various tendencies tempering urban growth were however present. In the ex-Portuguese the Southern African settler-ruled countries, this cohort, who faced the humiliation of pass colonies, whites migrated back to Portugal in large numbers after independence but African laws and other racial discrimination, nonetheless established an urban foothold and an in-migration was so pronounced that Maputo’s growth continued (Jenkins, Chapter 4). advantageous position relative to later migrants. During the 1980s depressed urban economies lost some of their pulling power, as will be Urban labour aristocracy (Arrighi 1973) and urban bias theorists (Lipton 1977 and discussed by Potts in Chapter 3, whereas during the 1990s AIDS lowered urban growth, Bates 1981) argued that these fledging urban populations were inordinately advantaged, especially in the large cities where people of sexually active ages were heavily concentrated. draining the countryside of investment, youthful energy and education, while failing to 19 20 compensate by providing urban-provisioned service and infrastructure to support the supplement household consumption with farming activities because most urban councils development of the majority of the national population still farming in the countryside. Sah banned urban agriculture on public health grounds.17 People surveyed at the time remarked and Stiglitz (1992) viewed urban bias critically as an ideological or normative label deployed that the commoditization of city life was difficult to live with, bemoaning that even frequently without sufficient detailed empirical investigation of actual distributional and household water supplies cost money (Bryceson 1980). productivity consequences arising from relative subsidy and taxation levels between rural and Formal jobs frequently included housing at subsidized rent levels. This provision urban areas. W.A. Lewis (1978) adopted a historical perspective, arguing that urbanization declined progressively over time as the formal employment sector expanded. In effect, was a concomitant of economic development and nations undergoing rapid urbanization were housing availability became a new form of influx control where governments were serious 16 almost inevitably debtor nations given the high costs of building urban infrastructure. about implementing their anti-squatter policies. Urban households, during the 1960s and early 1970s, were comparatively secure with The extensive government investment in low-cost site and service housing in the family wage serving as their economic anchor in the city. The establishment of a Gaborone was exceptional. In Maputo some enlightened site and service schemes coupled minimum wage at a level considered sufficient to support a worker and his immediate family with improvements in legal land rights gave a small portion of African households a firmer was a landmark in the development of East African cities. Colonial-enforced bachelor wage foothold in the urban housing market, and this was again taken up in the 1980s by the new earnings had necessitated male circular migration, locationally dividing families and municipal government. Generally, urban housing in most East African countries was circumscribing the enjoyment of family life (Nelson, Chapter 8). Urban migrants coming of increasingly characterized by severe overcrowding. age just after independence by contrast experienced rising wage levels and job availability in In addition to the security of minimum wages, urban dwellers in countries like urban areas as nation-states embarked on their quest for economic development (Amis, Tanzanian and Mozambique amongst others were recipient to food subsidies through the Chapter 7). operation of single-channel parastatal marketing systems which kept staple food prices, Hitherto the bachelor wage system had often predisposed urban job allocation towards notably that of maize flour, at affordable levels in the 1970s (Bryceson 1985 and 1987, the indigenous ethnic groups of the town unless low population densities of the surrounding O’Laughlin 1996). In the years immediately after the oil crisis both countries had campaigns area or extremely low literacy levels associated with the absence of missionary education to rusticate what were deemed to be surplus populations at a time when many people were tilted labour recruitment in the direction of non-indigenous tribes. Rakodi (Chapter 5) records unable to find formal employment or had lost their jobs (Jenkins, Chapter 4). Kampalans, on how the local labour bias was increasingly contested by Mombasa’s upcountry work force in the other hand, had not been availed urban food subsidies. They ate a highly varied range of the 1940s spurred by earlier European land alienation in the Kenyan Highlands and labour- staple foods with heavy reliance on plantains and root crops. Urban agriculture became an union formation culminating in the granting of family wages. African urban labour forces important lifeline for the population during the troubled Amin era of the 1970s (Maxwell became multi-ethnic. 1995). During the financially-constrained decades that followed, Kampalans’ urban First-generation urban migrant families contended with the sharp contrasts between agricultural efforts were mirrored by other East African and later Southern African apex city urban and rural lifestyles. The economic self-sufficiency of the household unit was foregone residents trying to make ends meet (Drakakis-Smith 1992, Mlozi 1996, Mwangi and Foeken in urban residence. Wives accompanying their husbands to the towns were usually not able to 1996, Mbiba 2000). 16 W.A. Lewis (1978) argued: ‘In the nineteenth the distinction between the European lenders and the rich borrowers turned on differences in rates of urbanization. Those whose urban populations were growing by less than 3 percent per annum (France 1.0, England 1.8, and German 2.5) loaned, and those whose urban populations were growing by more than 3 percent per annum (Australia 3.5, 17 United States 3.7, Canada 3.9, Argentina 5.3) borrowed.’ could afford a breeding ground for mosquitoes. 21 The cultivation of food crops in urban areas was considered to create stagnant pools of water that 22 Thus, during the immediate post-independence years national employment, housing and food-marketing policies of national governments helped to keep urban poverty at bay.18 However, the role played by urban government requires further consideration. treasure-trove for personal enrichment on the part of officials entrusted with urban development. As the years passed, inattention to urban government in East Africa slid into years of structural adjustment cutbacks, the drying-up of urban development and maintenance Lacuna or Labyrinth: Urban Policy, Planning and Government budgets, demoralized municipal councils, overlapping responsibilities and confusion between Urban populations had expectations of improved livelihoods and living standards after municipal and provincial governments and a lack of planning and funding, as described by independence, but escalating numbers made it difficult for urban infrastructural provisioning Rakodi (Chapter 5) for Mombasa. In this setting, the municipal council often attracted people in the form of water and electricity supplies, sanitation, roads and transport to keep pace. who saw local politics as a route to personal enrichment. Mombasa’s council reflected Were urban governments up to the task? While this question must be posed on a city-by-city Kenya’s patronage-style government. The corruption of Dar es Salaam’s elected councillors basis, there are nonetheless two clear trajectories: first, the countries where urban government became so glaring that the national government eventually disbanded the council in 1996 and lacked leadership and urban planning capability. These ‘lacuna city governments’ were often appointed better educated, more bureaucratically minded people to a City Commission which corrupt as well as ineffective. Many of the East African case study cities fall into this enhanced administrative performance and gained the approval of the population at large category. The second set of countries with ‘labyrinth urban governments’ had a maze of (Ngware, Chapter 13). administrative bodies and laws focused on planning and controlling urban space and In Maputo, municipal government was subsumed to central state control in the 15 economic activities which were epitomized by South Africa and later by other apartheid- years immediately following independence creating a marked lack of focus on urban issues in leaning Southern African countries. national policy. The first ten-year national development plan skewed the limited urban The lacuna in East African urban governments could be often traced back to the resource allocation towards the expanding government administrative class rather than the colonial governments’ imposition of traditional authorities that were antithetical to the ethnic wider population (Jenkins, Chapter 4). Beyond their infrastructural needs, de facto and occupational diversity of urban dwellers. Frequently African urban migrants had neither withdrawal of the state from urban development was taking place. Frelimo, the country’s sole political allegiance nor cultural affinity with the traditional rulers of the town. Post-colonial political party, attempted to inculcate new political and social values and counter the governments faced the dilemma of making municipal government politically legitimate and economic sabotage of Renamo with the formation of grupos dinamizadores at neighbourhood effective for service delivery but national government-stated concerns of the 1960s were level (Jenkins 2001). However, as these groups became increasingly administrative local primarily rural biased in many countries. Peasant farmers, rather than urban dwellers, arms of the state they met with general apathy. After the constitutional changes in the 1990s, constituted the popular masses who had propelled the national leaders into power and their elected local authorities, autonomous of central control were eventually established but agricultural production was designated as the engine of national economic growth (Bryceson usually lacked any overall vision of city development. Some local authority officials in fact 2000b). It was their needs for basic education, health and water services that were prioritized became notorious for the misuse of their position for profiteering in illegal land sales by populist-based post-colonial states. Urban dwellers were deemed to be privileged at the (Jenkins, Chapter 4). expense of rural farmers, as described by Jenkins (Chapter 4) for socialist Mozambique. Nuwagaba (Chapter 6) highlights the anomalous situation of Kampala which has Given national state supremacy in the heady days of development following the first wave of shouldered two systems of urban government. Roughly 60 per cent of land in Kampala independence, many East African governments nationalized urban land, which had the future continues to be under mailo tenure and ultimately subject to the Bugandan tribal leadership of potential of providing an unambiguous foundation for urban planning or alternatively, a the Kabaka. Mailo land is not amenable to the enforcement of basic building and sanitation regulations let alone urban planning as urban technocrats and politicians work at cross 18 Certainly in the 1960s and 1970s the standard view was that East African cities did not approach purposes. The gulf between politicians’ vote-seeking acquiescence to the flouting of building the poverty levels of many Asian cities. 23 24 regulations, and urban technocrats’ insistence on demanding standards in the face of abject during the 1980s, South African urban pass laws were gradually being phased out, being too poverty has undermined the possibility of realistic urban planning. financially and politically costly to administer (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, Chapter 10). By far the most chaotic urban administrative scenario has been that of Mogadishu where neither national nor local municipal government has effectively operated for more than two decades. Marchal (Chapter 9) charts the deepening graft, corruption and ethnic favouratism of Siad Barre during the 1970s and 1980s. After he was deposed, clan-based warlords carved the city into spheres of influence ruled on the basis of fear of external enemies rather than mutual well-being of the city’s population as a whole. In stark contrast to the lacuna urban governments cited above, the labyrinth urban governments hail from a tradition of apartheid urban control involving elaborate spatial planning and social engineering underlined by clearly perceived economic and political Helping or Hindering: Urban Social and Productive Service Infrastructure The fragility of the apex cities in Southern and especially East Africa is intimately tied to the their perforated infrastructures that failed to keep up with urban population growth and became very dilapidated during the economic crisis years of the 1980s and 1990s. This section indicates how urban economic infrastructure coalesced then collapsed during the post-colonial era. Failure to respond in a timely fashion to changing infrastructural requirements was at the heart of the problem. The following sub-sections deal with various infrastructural constraints in turn. imperatives of the nation-state. The ‘big brother’ connotations of control after independence have not been necessarily politically overbearing nor detrimental to the welfare of the mass of the urban poor. Gaborone is illustrative; having started as a ‘brown field’ site for the Botswanan capital, it has been consciously planned from the outset (Selolwane, Chapter 12). In Gaborone’s spatial planning, the principals of racial separation were roundly rejected. The city was built to accommodate African households of a wide income spectrum in mixedincome neighbourhoods. Investments in low-cost site and service housing were substantial from the outset although continually falling short of demand. Botswana’s relatively small population and its diamond wealth were the foundations of a virtuous cycle of urban infrastructure provisioning and good governance. Since independence in 1966, the Botswanan government has implemented eight economic plans that have generously accommodated urban infrastructural investment. In South Africa and Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 19790s, the tensions of increasing urbanization pressures were met with apartheid-style spatial planning. African population flows to urban areas were deflected to outlying townships necessitating long commutes between home and work. This was dramatically illustrated by the construction of Chitungwiza, an enormous dormitory city for African labourers, 25 miles from Harare by Southern Rhodesia’s UDI government (Schlyter, Chapter 11). De jure racial separateness in urban planning was rejected by the subsequent Mugabe government but Harare’s new lowincome townships of Kuwadzana and Budiriro in the southwest and Hatcliffe in the north became outlying locations with primarily black populations. The class divide implicit in these townships perpetuated de facto racial separation (Bryceson and Mbara 2003). Meanwhile, Water, Sanitation and Public Health Inadequacy of water and sanitation has been particularly pronounced in East Africa throughout the post-independence period. Reliance on donor funding for the major infrastructural costs of water sourcing and extending supply to new urban neighbourhoods of growing cities came early. Demand continually outstrips supply with patchy coverage inclined towards high-income neighbourhoods. In Dar es Salaam it is estimated that in a city of roughly 2.5 million people only 98,000 homes has a direct water connection (Action Aid International 2004). Consequently, there are frequent water shortages and huge differences in personal consumption of water between neighbourhoods within the cities. In the low-income areas, water-related diseases like scabies and dysentery fester along with the risk of cholera epidemics. Amis (Chapter 7) reports Nairobi families using only four or five litres a day per capita, far short of the 13 litres considered to be the daily minimum necessary for human survival. Sanitation in many urban squatter slums is deplorable. In Nairobi and Kampala, slum dwellers resort to wrap and throw plastic-bagged refuse jokingly, called ‘flying toilets’. In addition to the shortfalls of city water supply, community-initiated water schemes are rarely able to meet local demand (Ngware, Chapter 13). The common assumption that urban dwellers’ enjoy better health than rural dwellers does not apply to the urban poor, who rarely have the locational position and purchasing power to access adequate urban sanitation and health facilities. Outstripping the public health threats posed by cholera and other water-borne diseases, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has engulfed East and Southern Africa, registering higher prevalence than anywhere else in the 25 26 world (Figure 1.4).19 HIV infection that surfaced during the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Figure 1.4 apex cities, is now manifest in high AIDS mortality rates and heightened susceptibility to tuberculosis and other infections. Urban prevalence rates are roughly twice as high as rural rates. Clearly for the foreseeable future AIDS is the biggest threat to urban survival for the apex city populations, particularly given that it is a long-wave phenomenon in which death sets in train further crises of orphanhood and serious shortfalls in household welfare. Most heartening is the decline in HIV prevalence in Kampala where adult prevalence peaked at 29.5 per cent in 1992 and declined to 11.25 per cent in 2000 (UNAIDS 2004). 19 Recorded HIV prevalence rates in women in the prime years of susceptibility, 25-29 years of age, are very high in the worst affected countries of the region, e.g. Swaziland 33.9 %, Zimbabwe 40.1 % and Botswana 55.6% (UNAIDS 2002). 27 28 Educational Infrastructure many Southern African cities where municipal governments were better placed to invest in In the immediate post-colonial period, educational attainment was seen as a passport to urban jobs. As Nelson (Chapter 8) documents, urban dwellers can no longer expect to obtain jobs, yet parents continue to place huge store in educating their children. During the structural adjustment period, state expenditures on education plummeted necessitating parents to meet the costs of escalating school fees and ancillary expenses such as uniforms and books. Nelson describes how Nairobi’s middle-class extended families have risen to the investment challenge. Older siblings are expected to help finance the education of younger siblings, often postponing marriage and having their own children. In poorer households, children’s school attendance declined during the 1990s and only began to recover with the abolition of school the extension and maintenance of road networks, the main urban transport problem was the inordinate distances the poor daily travelled from their homes in outlying townships to work in the city’s central business district. When economic circumstances grew tougher, their ability to pay daily bus fares was reduced. Commonly, they were forced to walk to work, extending their working day by several hours (Bryceson et al. 2003). For example, Harare’s experience of rising international oil prices in 2003 had a knock-on effect on urban bus fares throughout the region. A surge in bicycle commuting was recorded (Bryceson and Mbara 2003). However, in some cases, the distances were too far and the poor’s livelihood options were thereby reduced as is illustrated in Schlyter’s case study of Esther in Harare’s satellite settlement, Chitungwiza (Chapter 11). fees.20 Good telecommunications can lessen demand for surface transport. In many East A further testimony to the urban drive for educational investment is reflected in the proliferation of language schools, primary and secondary schools and the three universities that have been established in Mogadishu over the 1990s. Marchal (Chapter 9) sees these as enhancing human capital and, more importantly in the setting of war-torn Mogadishu, African cities the landline telephone networks were exceptionally poor. In this context, the spread of mobile phone usage epicentered in the apex cities from the late-1990s onwards, was a major communications breakthrough.21 Marchal (Chapter 9) recounts how mobile phones marked an important departure for communications in Mogadishu. However the absence of boosting morale. any government acting to standardize and regulate mobile phone infrastructure has resulted in Electricity, Transport and Communications massive confusion and duplication of consumer investment in telephone options. In many cities, a fluctuating electricity supply and sporadic blackouts became common during the 1980s. Business establishments and high-income households have tried to avert Nature of Infrastructure Provisioning: Public, Private, or Community? the inconvenience of blackouts by investing in gas-fuelled generators. The insistent hum of The presupposition that utilities such as water, electricity, transport and telecommunications these generators is now an intrusive feature of life in many apex cities. Meanwhile, the should be government provisioned dates back to the colonial period. In many cases, the privatization of public utilities and the introduction of metered charges have put electricity original investment in the post-colonial network was public but in the absence of strong beyond the reach of vast numbers of the poor. In South Africa, low-income neighbourhoods municipal government, maintenance deteriorated and network expansion was impeded by have organized political demonstrations around this issue. public authorities as economic crisis conditions and declining tax revenues set in. Parastatals Transport infrastructure within the cities has proved problematic in two ways. First, in were blamed for the inadequacies and supply disruptions. East African cities, SAP cutbacks and the ineffectiveness of municipal governments led to a Enterprising individuals sought an immediate solution by tapping into city grids of lack of maintenance of existing city roads and prevented road network extensions from electricity supply or water pipes, creating spaghetti-type networks that generally decreased keeping pace with the physical expansion of the city. As a result, the worst roads in the the adequacy and efficiency of supply to everyone in the network (Mhamba and Titus 2001). country were often located in the capital city where vehicle loads were heaviest. Second, in Community responses emerged more slowly but were far more viable; borne of problem- 20 21 Somewhat ironically, this policy was prompted by the World Bank’s poverty-alleviation policies Bryceson et al. (2003) found that mobile phone ownership in Kampala exceeded that of Harare, that essentially addressed the damage done by the preceding World Bank-enforced social service cost- which was attributed to the fact that Harare had a reasonable landline system whereas Kampala’s cutting exercises of the SAP era that had insisted on parents’ payment of school fees. residents had limited recourse to telephones prior to the spread of mobile phones. 29 30 sharing that coalesced into either informal neighbourhood self-help groups or more formalized community-based organizations (CBOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Smit 2001, Robson 2001). Ngware’s (Chapter 13) description of the Tabata Development Fund (TDF) in Dar es Salaam was initially catalyzed by the public nuisance of a nearby city dump. It evolved into a CBO, which attracted public funding, donor finance and an international award recognizing its community achievement. However, its success in eliciting outside funding for the community threatened civic participation and was not helped by the fact that residents became increasingly aware that some, notably the more affluent, were benefiting more than others. Political interests based on differentiation by class and residential entry cohort were rife. The telling signs were that the TDF’s leadership avoided referendums on key issues and continually delayed calling elections in the hope of prolonging their reign of power. Urban Sustenance: Social Harmony and Political Security Over the last 50 years, East and Southern Africa, perhaps more than any other part of the world, has seen social strife and political insecurity challenge the integrity and durability of the apex cities. National conflict and civil war have afflicted the majority of the countries in the region: Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Short of national conflict, acute political tensions have caused urban riots in: Nairobi over race, Lusaka over staple food pricing and Maseru during coup attempts. Only a small minority of apex cities have enjoyed tranquil conditions over the past halfcentury. These circumstances are not surprising given the region’s historical legacy. Centuries of social mayhem, ethnic strife and household dislocation caused by the 19th century slave trade, subsequent racially discriminating colonial policies and reliance on low-paid temporary Rakodi (Chapter 5) shows how clientelist relations of an exclusive nature based on ethnic distrust saddled infrastructural development in Mombasa. In Gaborone, greater levels of trust, common purpose and financial capability gave impetus to successful public/private partnerships (Selolwane, Chapter 12). To ease the city’s housing shortage, the government allowed private infrastructural development beginning in 1979. During the 1990s, acknowledging that economic distortions caused by government controls needed to be addressed, it started injecting capital from diamond earnings into the private sector. An open dialogue between the government and private entrepreneurs has given the latter an migrant labour. Layer upon layer of injustice and bitterness between races, ethnic groups and local communities smoulder. The resentments are likely to be most acutely felt amongst the politically aware, dense populations of the apex cities. Just as the East African Rift Valley runs through the area from north to south, a fault line of social unease lends deep fragility to urban life throughout this region. These historical sores combine with the insecurities of relatively recent urbanites who retain identification with their rural birthplaces. In these contexts, the demographic balance between migrants and indigents of the city is economically and politically contestable. opportunity to voice their concerns about foreign competition and government red tape. During the 1990s, urban public utilities, notably electricity and water, under pressure Ethnic Friction and Violence of donor conditionality, were increasingly not only privatized but also sold to foreign multinational firms. Dar es Salaam’s water supply is illustrative. The profit-making concerns of the international consortium now supplying water to the city collides with the water requirements of poor urbanites. Water rates have risen and those domestic consumers who cannot pay or have illegal connections are having their water supplies cut (Action Aid 2004). In Mogadishu, without a national or municipal government, public/private partnerships were inconceivable. Instead Mogadishu witnessed radical privatization as Somalia’s overseas migrants started returning to the city in the 1990s with investment capital. They invested in utilities such as small electricity plants, mobile phone services and radio and In spite of the racially charged history of the region, several of the apex cities have longestablished multi-ethnic and multi-racial traditions. Cape Town was a liberal, multi-racial city under British rule between 1806 and 1910, but was undermined by the implementation of South Africa’s apartheid policies. There is a tendency for cities of ethnic harmony to have a shared language. In Cape Town, the coloured population is numerically dominant. The city’s most common language is Afrikaans which is spoken by roughly half of the population as a first language with another quarter speaking primarily English and the remaining quarter being bilingual (McDow 1997b). In most other Southern African cities there is less language cohesion. Johannesburg has a proliferation of African languages spoken by the populace with TV networks. English serving as the lingua franca and the commonly shared language of the educated. 31 32 In East Africa, ethnicity is now more likely than race to be a source of tension. The review by Montgomery et al. (2003) of urban patterns in the developing world argues Mombasa is the notable exception. Rakodi (Chapter 5) documents the sense of superiority of that intra-urban income differentiation tends to be far greater than inter-urban differentiation. Arab over African culture even though Arabs now constitute only about 5 per cent of the Apex cities represent economically jarring contrasts between rich and poor. Recent poverty population. Arabs, Asians and Europeans, 12 per cent of urban residents, are believed to studies indicate that the divides are expanding rather than contracting and significantly they monopolize the city’s wealth and employment opportunities. Dar es Salaam presents a are ‘in your face’ differences. The urban poor have daily visible confirmation of their radically different ethnic balance. It is a Swahili coastal city with enormous ethnic variety economic disadvantage relative to the middle and upper classes vis-à-vis housing, transport reflecting Tanzania’s profusion of over 100 different tribes. The indigenous African and access to social services. Large segments of the population in the apex cities live below population, the Zaramo, are not politically or economically dominant, which precludes the poverty line (Amis, Chapter 7). Economic liberalization and the encouragement of direct resentment from migrant populations. Kiswahili, the lingua franca, spoken by all of the foreign investment have accentuated the divide. The conspicuous consumption evidenced by African population and a large percentage of the Asian and European population has played a apex cities’ elite housing and shopping mall boom during the economic liberalization of the vital role in the ethnic harmony of the city. 1990s has generated social unease and rising crime levels, sometimes threatening the very The numerical dominance and superior local asset control of the city’s indigenous existence of the elite classes.22 In Mogadishu, Marchal (Chapter 9) reports that the middle tribe can be a source of tension as exemplified by the Buganda of Kampala, the Kikuyu of class vanished during the war, most fleeing for their lives, forced to abandon their property Nairobi and the Amhara of Addis Ababa. In some instances, the advantages of the local tribe and possessions. In Southern Africa, the white middle classes have gradually dwindled are retracted when national leadership is secured by someone from a competing tribe, as through emigration, citing rising crime levels as one of the main reasons for their departure. illustrated by the Kikuyu of Nairobi when Moi, a Kalenjin, took power. In other cases, the Crime is considered to be a major deterrent to direct foreign investment in South Africa. ruling elite in the capital are resented precisely because they are not local and yet wield great power, illustrated by the Tutsi elite concentrated in Bujumbura who constitute only 14 per cent of the population relative to 85 per cent who are Hutu. Mogadishu is one of the most ethnically homogenous cities in the region. Clan rather Law and Order Uniquely, Mogadishu provides an example of an African apex city that has operated in the than ethnicity per se has been the divisive force. During the 1980s, increasing clan absence of municipal and national government. Marchal (Chapter 9) documents how local polarization took place under the behest of President Siad Barre who showed blatant clan people and foreigners are commonly at risk of kidnapping, vehicle hijacking and loss of life. partiality during the heavy influx of migrants to the city who were fleeing the Ogaden war Protection services, offered by clan-based militias, have become an unavoidable precaution to (Marchal, Chapter 9). Amongst the immigrants those deemed to be ‘allies’ were allowed to ensure life and protect property, but have raised the costs of movement and economic settle in the city whereas ‘opponents’ were left in the shanty towns outside the city. As a transactions. An oligopolistic economy has prevailed with price wars sometimes ending in result, different clans concentrated in clusters in different urban neighbourhoods throughout armed clashes. In the absence of a national currency and the sporadic appearance of the urban sprawl of Mogadishu. Thereafter, warlords headquartered in the city used clan counterfeit international money, investors have taken it upon themselves to offer informal politics to divide, rule and kill. In the early 1990s, the city witnessed the massacre of an banking services. The lack of a government regulatory body and quality standards opened the estimated 50,000 people and the near genocide of the Darod clan. General Aidad, positioned floodgates to the importation of cheap out-of-date drugs and food that local merchants in the southern part of the city, encouraged a clan coalition that enhanced his power and profited from. strategic territorial control over the city’s port and airport. 22 While there is a profusion of literature on urban crime in South Africa extending to Southern Africa, very little has been written on crime and urbanization in East Africa. One notable exception is Class Divides and Crime Obudho and Owuor 1994. 33 34 Young gun-toting youth acted on behalf of warlords headquartered in the city as well as clan elders. Ironically the clan elders’ authority was often underwritten by well-meaning donors anxious to re-establish the rule of law. As the civil war dragged on, ordinary city generations’ lifestyles and values do not necessarily reflect, and often ignore or even reject, rural perspectives. Infrastructural inadequacies are rife in the apex cities under review, especially in East residents lost confidence in their clan elders and grew weary of the conflation of private and Africa. They stand in the way of the smooth pursuit of livelihoods of high, medium and low- public conflicts (Marchal, Chapter 9). Public disapproval and intolerance of the lawlessness income households and discourage domestic and direct foreign investment in enterprise. began to be met with crystallization of order and respect for life and property. City residents While post-independent national governments intended overseeing the development of a preferred what they called urban ‘civilized’ behaviour to that of the gun-toting youth reer functioning urban infrastructure, most were hard-hit by the international oil crisis and the baadiyo (rustics from the countryside). debt crisis that followed. Donor support for urban infrastructural development has been Ngware (Chapter 13) observed a similar phenomenon of growing social consensus amongst the residents of Tabata in Dar es Salaam. Recognizing the threat of crime and public lukewarm given their historical preference for rural development programmes. The third major fragility is that of political, social and demographic instability is a disorder in their midst, they formed a multi-ethnic, grassroots anti-crime neighbourhood legacy of the fraught racial and ethnic history of the region, combined with the newness of watch. people’s urban identity. One would be hard pressed to find another area of the world that has been exposed to so much social and political engineering in the form of the colonial three-tier Conclusion racial/occupational system, bachelor circular migration and the consequent lack of household Despite their size and demographic growth, the apex cities of East and Southern Africa are exceptionally fragile settlements and population concentrations. It has been argued in this chapter that the foundations of city life are extremely flimsy. The three main fragilities that challenge urban sustenance at present are: first, the relative newness of permanent African urban residence; second, the inadequacies of urban physical and social infrastructure; and third, a relative lack of social coherence and political order. During the colonial period, cities in this region were not intended for permanent African settlement. A circular labour migration system based on bachelor rather than family wages prevailed in most of the capital cities, which was overturned gradually in country after country from the late 1940s onwards. In South Africa, the apartheid system prolonged the racial zoning of Africans by race, space and occupation, being finally toppled in the early 1990s. The impermanence and open-endedness of African residence in cities and the recourse to rural livelihood activities, leisure-time pursuits and aspirations have characterized the apex cities for several decades and have, in some cases, been strengthened by urban economic crises and the need to straddle urban and rural resource bases. Now, however, second and third-generation urban dwellers are accounting for rising proportions of the populations in apex cities, marking a departure from the strong rural-urban ties of the first generation (Parkin 1975, Macmillan 1996). As Nelson (Chapter 8) documents, the subsequent unity. Post-independent African governments in the 1960s and 1970s established family wages and urban family residence but this policy achievement was thwarted by the economic crises that ensued quickly thereafter. The HIV/AIDS crisis has become most entrenched in the countries of the region that were most deeply involved in male circular migration and an ‘away-from-home’ male sub-culture of heavy drinking and prostitution. Coping with AIDS and the struggle for urban sustenance has fallen now primarily on urban households themselves. Schlyter (Chapter 11) and Nelson (Chapter 8) document how urban households have sought to achieve viable livelihoods and raise children in a caring way despite inordinate resource and time constraints. The political instability of the region and the fragility of the apex cities centre on the question of what social units offer a basis for social cohesiveness amidst social diversity. During the colonial period, the main unit of social cohesion and political control was the tribe (Bank 2002). Circular migration and bachelor wages proved a strain not only on reproductive couples but households generally, which were split between urban and rural components. In the absence of coherent households and cohesive tribes, Africans’ social experience of the early cities mainly revolved around male bonding at the workplace and during their leisure pastimes. In the urban context, tribes often proved to be an ultimately destabilizing rather than stabilizing social unit. When family wage policies were introduced in the immediate post-independence era, it appeared that social cohesion was following the Western model of 35 36 occupational/residential identity through one’s workplace and neighbourhood. Housing References provision was attached to many jobs. This model however never had a chance of being Action Aid International (2004) Turning off the Taps: Donor Conditionality and Water cemented. Economic crisis and the rapid erosion of formal wage employment and its Privitisation in Dar es Salaam, London, Action Aid, http://www.actionaid.org.uk. replacement with highly competitive informal economies, have left households and Anderson, D.M. and R. 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