REViEWS 99 Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009 (296 pp., iSBN 978–0–19–955844–5 [hb]) Book Vii of aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics contains two discussions, one of morally undesirable behaviour apart from vice (lack of control, sotness, self-control and resistance) in chapters 1 to 10, and another of the nature of pleasure in chapters 11 to 14. he volume containing the proceedings of the 17th Symposium aristotelicum dedicated to these two discussions is splendid. it contains an introduction and a collection of essays written (mostly) by highly renowned experts in the ield, many of which are authors of important books on aristotle’s ethics or theory of action. almost each essay is approximately 30 pages long and provides a thorough and detailed account of a given section of the seventh book of aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. anybody working on these passages in the future will ind these detailed, almost line by line, section-commentaries either an indispensable aid or a serious challenge to deal with. and this outstanding quality is precisely what we expect from proceedings of a Symposium aristotelicum. however, already the editor’s preface leaves little doubt about what one may regard as the book’s ‘problem’: the 14 chapters of NE Vii do not contain a single and continuous argumentation, but two diferent and rather disconnected discussions. hus there is no intrinsic unity to NE Vii and this in turn holds true also for this volume. Carlo Natali, the editor, takes the bull by the horns and addresses the problem right at the beginning of his introduction. he says that the two discussions were put into one book for reasons external to their content, namely that they were too short to ill a whole scroll of papyrus (p. 1). But he then tries to make a case for the book’s unity nonetheless. he argues for a certain ‘family resemblance’ between ‘method and content’ of the two discussions (p. 2). With the former Natali means the similarities that stem from the deployment of the so-called ‘dialectical method’ in both discussions. But it seems that the way in which this method is deployed in both discussions presents diferences which are somewhat blurred by the thesis of methodological resemblance: whereas aristotle’s discussion of the diiculties raised in connection with akratic behaviour does seem to result 100 REViEWS in a substantial explanation of the phenomenon, the discussion of pleasure does not ofer a similar systematic treatment of its subject matter. its main occupation seems to be the refutation of rival theses, not to provide the last word about the nature of pleasure (indeed, it does not even bother to provide us with a coherent and comprehensible account of pleasure). Natali’s argumentation for resemblance in content seems more compelling. Pleasure, and especially the typology of pleasures contained in NE Vii.11–14, do ater all play an important role in the discussion of akratic behaviour as well, and Natali is entirely justiied in pointing this out. But again, an objector could say that this is but an instance of the general importance of pleasure and pain for aristotle’s ethics (which proves to be extremely important not only in book Vii, but throughout his ethical works), not something that speciically connects the two discussions contained in book Vii. however this may be, on any hypothesis so far uttered, there seems to be no intrinsic unity between the two discussions. Why then making it the subject matter of a Symposium? it almost seems as if the Symposium’s recent policy to focus on certain pieces of texts rather than on determinate philosophical questions manoeuvred it into a kind of Systemzwang. Why uniting commentaries on two disconnected discussions in one single volume? Would it not have been better to discuss, for instance, the two diferent passages on pleasure contained in the NE (books Vii and X)? Or to juxtapose the two discussions of akratic behaviour contained in the NE and in the Magna Moralia? i shall go through the chapters of this ine volume one by one. in the introduction, Carlo Natali starts out with a very brief and concise overview that aptly locates NE Vii in the overall structure of the Nicomachean Ethics. Natali is obviously committed to a moderate unitarian view of the work which he tries to understand as a more or less single and coherent argumentation, without therefore neglecting the textual and philosophical puzzles presented to us by the text such as it stands. his seems to be a very healthy approach to the NE. John Cooper’s chapter on NE Vii.1–2 is a masterful introduction to the argument in chapters 3–10. he discusses the context and the ‘dialectical method’ with which aristotle approaches the subject, including an overview of the puzzles raised in it. his is helpful, especially since so much ink has been spilled on what people take to be ‘the’ problem of akrasia in NE Vii.3, and this oten without even considering its dialectical and ethical context. Cooper’s remarks are good remedy against this. We will have occasion to return to the issue. Beyond structuring and contextualizing the argument, Cooper puts a strong emphasis on the thesis that the akratic agent is introduced REViEWS 101 by aristotle as a stable character, a sort of person, who is ‘prone to act on a recurrent basis’ (p. 11) and whose way of acting is a ‘settled disposition’ (p. 12). his is a very interesting observation. however, it provokes the following question (which may be directed more to aristotle than to Cooper). it seems that one important diference between full-blown virtue and vice on the one hand, and akrasia and self-control on the other, is that the latter, even though they certainly do denote recurring patterns of behaviour, as pointed out by Cooper, are less stable than the former. aristotle says that the ‘weak’ akratic is half wicked (hemiponeros) and that he can be cured, whereas the vicious (akolastos) cannot (1150a21f., cf. 1152a15f.; see also Tieleman’s contribution). Doesn’t this instability (compared to full blown virtue and vice) point to a more fundamental diference between these two groups of moral state? i ind it diicult to imagine a person who habitually fails to do what seems right to him or her without at some point getting used to precisely this constant failing such that at some point the person stops to seriously feel regret about this. But aristotle says that all akratic agents feel regret about what they have done (1150b30f.). isn’t it reasonable, then, to think of ‘weak’ akrasia, unlike full-blown virtue and vice, as a somehow intrinsically transient state? and wouldn’t one have to think that then, on aristotle’s own theory, a person who habitually acts in akratic fashion would develop, even if slowly, into the direction to wickedness? (True, aristotle does talk of akratic behaviour dia ethismos [1152a29], but this is surely not referring to habitually acting acratically, i.e. against one’s own better previous judgement, but to habitually doing the things that one should not do). he next chapter deals with NE Vii.3’s discussion of the puzzle concerning ‘weak’ akratic behaviour in which an agent acts against his own previous better judgement. here, it must be said that David Charles’s treatment of the problem on 30 pages is much too short, given its notorious diiculty and Charles’s elaborate take on it. Presumably, this is due to yet another Systemzwang of the volume resulting from editorial considerations concerning the average length of written contributions. his would be particularly regrettable, since Charles is deinitely a great authority in the ield and the volume of the Symposium aristotelicum would have been a good occasion for a full exposition of his mature thoughts on the matter. Charles obviously has many interesting things to say about NE Vii.3. he proposes a highly elaborate, ambitious, and philosophically interesting solution (which, as he says, goes back to Walter Burley). But unfortunately, Burley’s account has implications which Charles’s 30 pages were not suicient to persuade me to accept. Essentially, the account is this. (i) he ‘weak’ akratēs knows 102 REViEWS the ‘good’ conclusion of the practical syllogism (PS), but fails to act on it. (ii) he reason for this is that his knowledge of the conclusion is not full knowledge (comparable to knowledge embedded in a ‘body of knowledge’), but knowledge of another and inferior kind. (iii) aristotle, in NE Vii, does not spell out the failure of what sort of knowledge this is, but elsewhere he does (e.g. in De Anima iii.7). So far this seems a promising and prima facie philosophically attractive interpretation, especially since attributing awareness of the ‘good’ conclusion would be one way of allowing for genuine mental conlict on the side of the akratic agent (unlike what Charles labels the ‘standard interpretation’, which usually ties awareness of the ‘good’ conclusion to acting accordingly). But it also provokes questions which, as i said above, it presumably is impossible to address properly on as few as 30 pages: in arguing for (i) Charles proposes to take ‘protasis’ to mean ‘proposition’, not ‘premiss’ (and this not only occasionally or exceptionally in NE Vii.3, 1147b9, but throughout the corpus). he argues extensively – and very resourcefully – for this claim, yet the only advantage of the proposal i can see is that it would allow us to accept his interpretation of 1147b9. he big disadvantage is of course that it would leave aristotle’s syllogistics without a term for ‘premiss’, while there already seems to exist a term for ‘proposition’ or ‘statement’, namely ‘logos’. accordingly, Charles has to say that the ‘premiss’meaning of ‘protasis’ in NE Vii.3 and elsewhere (including the Analytics) can and should be grasped from the context (p. 67f.). his arguments are based on passages in which ‘protasis’ occurs outside an immediate syllogistic context. Charles argues that it does not make sense to talk of premisses outside such a context (p. 67). his is reasonable enough, but don’t we (or some of us) sometimes talk of premisses in a loose or lexible way as well, i.e. without an immediate syllogistic context? and couldn’t aristotle occasionally do the same? and even if ‘protasis’ sometimes is best translated as ‘proposition’, then this need not imply that it cannot mean ‘premiss’ elsewhere. also, shouldn’t the claim according to which ‘protasis’ generally means ‘proposition’, but can and should be rendered ‘premiss’ in syllogistic contexts, make us rather expect the meaning of ‘premiss’ in NE Vii 3 which, ater all, is a sort of syllogistic context (even if only ‘practical’)? Furthermore, to attribute awareness of the ‘good’ conclusion of the PS to the akratic agent in the way it is done by Burley disconnects the conclusion of the PS from the ensuing action. accordingly, Charles argues that in the causal history of akratic action desire becomes operative ater the conclusion is drawn and changes the course of events such that epithumia prevails (p. 54f.). here the question is whether a conception of the PS in which the conclusion is not identical with the action (or the REViEWS 103 beginning of the action) is still able to serve as a causal explanation of action (note also the conlict with De Motu 7, 701a12, 20, which says twice that the conclusion of the PS is an action). Such a conception of the PS certainly deprives us of the physically interesting part of the causal history of akratic action, namely that part in which we are told how thought translates into motion. in which sense can such a PS still plausibly be regarded an explanation of the phusikôs kind (cf. 1147a24)? On Charles’s and Burley’s account, the PS seems not explanatory of action, but of a resolve to act in accordance with the command of practical reason. But if that is the case, in which way would the PS in NE Vii.3 add to the state of afairs described earlier in NE (in 1136b7–9) where the akratic agent is said to have the right boulēsis before the onset of his akratic afection (cf. 1150b19–21 and 1151a25f.)? if desire can intervene even ater the conclusion of the PS, why bringing in the PS in the irst place? Moreover, the causal explanation of the akratic’s action ofered by Charles crucially involves the concept of ‘acceptance of the conclusion’ (p. 55) which is not mentioned in the text. Can we take this addition to aristotle’s causal explanation of action for granted? Furthermore, in which way does the Burley account, which explains akratic action by way of an intervention of sensual desire, show that the weak akratēs acts ‘somehow due to the agency of reason and opinion’ (hypo logou pôs kai doxês, 1147a35f.) which rather seems to suggest some sort of self-deceit? Regarding (ii), the thesis according to which the akratic agent does not fully know the good conclusion of the PS (is not ‘rationally convinced’ because he doesn’t know it as part of a body of knowledge) raises the question whether this is in conlict with NE 1146b24–31 where it is said that akratic action ‘is as problematic when agents have unhesitating opinion as when they have knowledge’ (p. 44)? in the light of Charles’s concept of ‘rational conviction’ a discussion of NE 1147a11–24, the passage in which aristotle (twice) identiies the knowledge of the akratic agent with the knowledge of the drunkard would be desirable (cf. also 1152a15). it is unfortunate that the volume does not contain a translation of this passage. (iii) in order to account for the kind of knowledge failure of the akratic agent Charles proposes a ‘third way’ between a two component theory (belief and desire) and an intellectualist account. according to this ‘third way’ aristotle has a distinctive concept of ‘practical knowledge’ which is neither desire nor intellect, but a sui generis desire/intellect state (p. 65). his is most interesting. But an immediate question would be how the text of NE Vii is capable of supporting such a thesis. For, on a naïve reading, the text rather seems to pointedly oppose desire and intellect (cf. e.g. the crucial passages in 104 REViEWS 1147a33f. and b2f.). also, given that NE Vii.3 argues against Socrates’ thesis according to which knowledge is suicient for acting accordingly, one would like to know in which way exactly Charles’ thesis is supposed to be diferent from Socrates’ suggestion. if Charles is right and aristotle thinks that there is a sui generis kind of practical knowledge, then aristotle would think that one cannot know in the ‘third way’ kind of knowing without acting accordingly (analogously to Socrates). But supposing that this is the case, wouldn’t the argument in NE Vii.3 make this point in a very awkward fashion? hendrik Lorenz’ treatment of NE Vii.4, where plain and qualiied akrasia are distinguished, is very thorough both philosophically and philologically. Regarding philology, Lorenz bases his account on Cook Wilson who found that the chapter contains two diferent versions of basically the same argument (version a and B). all is very well argued, but one may ask why one should follow Lorenz also in his adoption of Cook Wilson’s hypercritical speculation according to which version B was originally composed to replace version a (which is supposed to be ‘earlier’). he diferences in content between a and B meticulously noted by Lorenz do not, i think, suice to justify this thesis. here is no contradiction between a and B, and B could thus still be taken to simply giving a more detailed account of an issue which was raised in a in a more cursory fashion. Chapters 5 and 6 of the NE deal with beastliness, irascibility and akrasia. Carlo Natali leads us through the text in a very careful manner and adds a useful synoptic overview of diferent kinds of character traits to be avoided in aristotle. But what i ind most valuable in his contribution is not the discussions of details (philosophical or textual). it is rather a general philosophical comment Natali ventures to make at the end of his chapter. it concerns the relation of our ethical point of view with aristotle’s take on questions of moral evaluation, and especially of the evaluation of ethically relevant dispositions (hexeis). it is, i think, worth quoting Natali’s main observation: ‘it seems to me that aristotle does not yet have at his disposal the idea of a deinite separation between a moral evaluation of the hexeis in the strict sense, and a psychological evaluation, “functionalist” or of “social assessment”: he considers the phenomenon of evil in its entire complexity, physical, social, and anthropological, without assuming a moral point of view autonomous and uninterested in the other ones.’also, Natali’s evaluation of the following observation is worthy of note: ‘…in aristotle the language of ethics retains much of the complexity which it has in the real world, and which it loses when the idea of a moral point of view is established’ (p. 127f.). his is, i think, very important and well said. REViEWS 105 Before i move to the next chapter, i would like to take issue with Natali on a minor detail which does not at all afect his overall argument. it concerns the interpretation of the ‘practical syllogism’ in aristotle’s argumentation for the thesis that akrasia of the irascible kind is less blameworthy than akrasia through sensual desire in 1149a24–b3. Natali takes the PS to be consisting literally of two premisses which are entertained by logos (p. 117) Unfortunately, the shortcomings of this literal interpretation do not become easily apparent, since Natali splits the relevant passage into two parts. he trouble i have with the literal interpretation is that the PS in NE Vii.6 must be meant to explain also the (usually) overhasty action of dogs (kunes, 1149a28, cf. the explanatory men gar in 1149a32). his, i think, makes it very likely, if not unavoidable, that aristotle is using the PS as an analogy here, i.e. not as a syllogism in the literal sense. his is conirmed by the ‘hôsper’ in 1149a33: ‘as if it (i.e. the thumos) was syllogizing’ which implies that thymos is not syllogizing in a literal way. Chris Bobonich’s commentary on NE Vii.7 is to a large extent busy with defending the coherence of the chapter against hypercritic attacks of the Cook Wilson kind (successfully, i think). it is somewhat less smooth reading than the previous chapters because Bobonich prefers to present us with interpretative options and argumentative strategies rather than to state his own interpretation directly. Occasionally, he also inds fault with aristotle’s positions, e.g. with aristotle’s insistence that moderation, self-indulgence and related character states are primarily related to the pleasures of touch. Bobonich inds this ‘implausibly narrow’ (p. 136). ‘Why deny,’ he asks, ‘that the obese glutton bent on the lavour of Big Macs or a person devoted to the pleasures of (visual or perhaps auditory) pornography is self-indulgent?’ (p. 133). But aristotle would not deny this! he would presumably say that the glutton and the devotee of pornography do indeed feel pleasure in either smelling Big Macs or watching pornography; what he would deny is that they do so qua smelling or qua watching and he would claim instead that they do feel pleasure in smelling or watching ultimately because of the haptic qualities of their preferred objects. and this, it seems to me, is to the advantage of aristotle’s theory, because it captures important features of our concept of self-indulgence. For instance, neither the Greeks nor we would call a lover of sounds (other than the aforementioned sounds connected to the pleasures of touch) a self-indulgent person. at the same time, aristotle’s theory is perfectly able to associate all kinds of experience (visual, auditory or whatever) with the haptic pleasures of food, drink and sex relevant for moderation, akratic behaviour or self-indulgence. it is curious that Bobonich 106 REViEWS even quotes passages in which aristotle explains such visual or auditory pleasures precisely as indirect haptic pleasures (i.e. as ‘kata sumbebēkos’ related to sound etc., p.134f., but without mentioning that aristotle in these passages is eager to explain the pleasantness of these perceptions by way of mental anticipation of the haptic sensation). But Bobonich is not satisied with this, because, as he says ‘one might ind them [i.e. the indirect haptic pleasures of aristotle] worthwhile under the guise of the pleasant even if nothing further came from them’ (p. 136). his, i think, is not particularly charitable to aristotle’s theory. he commentary of NE Vii.8–9 (up to 1151b22) by Sarah Broadie is to be praised for its clear language and lucid analyses of the text and the aporiai the text is meant to solve. as Broadie consistently relates her interpretations to interesting superordinate questions of and to aristotle’s ethical theory, her treatment of the passage is philosophically rewarding. Besides a commentary on the passage, she provides us with interesting short discussions of the question of free will and the possibility of moral improvement, ethical intellectualism, the signiicance of the agent’s retrospective attitudes (regret) for moral responsibility and other relevant discussions. he most important among them, it seems to me, is the comparison she makes between what ‘our’ and what aristotle’s conception of akrasia are. Broadie points out that we conceive of akratic behaviour primarily as ‘abandoning one’s decision’, viz. ‘contradicting the better judgement’ no matter whether the judgement abandoned is ethically praise- or blameworthy, whereas aristotle, at least in NE Vii.8–9, seems concerned with ‘ethical switching and ethical sameness’ (p. 172), i.e. the question of contradicting one’s moral resolve. his is an important diference in focus and Broadie is surely right in emphasizing it. She is also right in observing that, in NE Vii.3, the question of how it is possible to behave in a way which contradicts one’s better judgement, is ‘obviously of central importance for aristotle too’. But here, it would have been interesting to go a bit further and ask why and how this is the case. i mean the question of whether aristotle in NE Vii.3 really has the same interest in akratic behaviour as modern philosophers of action typically have. For, if we follow Broadie’s argumentation, the weak akratēs presents a problem for aristotle which seems diferent from what modern philosophers of action see in it in an important way: if his problem is not the possibility of abandoning one’s rational decision (whatever its moral content), but only the possibility of abandoning one’s moral resolve, then what seems to be at stake in NE Vii.3 is not the big question of rationality in human action as such, but a more narrow problem. Discussing this issue further would certainly lead REViEWS 107 us astray, but it seems that it would be worth inquiring whether aristotle, in his explanation of the weak akratēs’ action in NE Vii.3, really does have the intention to solve a problem for his own theory of human action (cf. e.g. his claim that ‘each of the parts’, i.e. logos and epithumia, is capable of moving the agent in 1147a35 which seems quite trivial a statement in the language of aristotle’s theory of animal motion). and it would also be interesting to ask for the credentials modern philosophers of action have for including aristotle in the group of those who are committed to the Socratic claim according to which full rational insight that course of action a is better than course of action B is suicient for an agent to act accordingly (EE 1216b3–25 and similar passages do not suggest this). in this respect, i.e. in respect of the question of whether ‘our’ interest in the phenomenon of akrasia is diferent from aristotle’s, Teun Tieleman’s comment on the inal passage on akrasia (1151b23–1152a36) is very instructive as well. his comment brings out clearly the therapeutic aspect of aristotle’s treatment of this phenomenon. he points out that aristotle conceives of the weak akratēs as a person that, in spite of being responsible for his action, is in need of therapy. he or she needs to be cured. and this cure, as Tieleman does not fail to point out, is not a cognitive, but a behavioural therapy. he akratēs has to change his or her habits and this is achieved not by way of intellectual instruction, but by habituation. Tieleman calls our attention also to other important contexts of aristotle’s treatment of akrasia not only in his ethical theory, but also in relation to Plato. With this he provides a most useful inale to the treatment of deviant ethical behaviour, i.e. lack of control, sotness, self-control and resistance, which is the subject-matter of NE Vii. aristotle’s subsequent discussion of pleasure or, to be more precise, of the goodness of pleasure, is not connected to the previous part of the book in any obvious way, and Dorothea Frede’s commentary makes no efort to conceal this lack of internal coherence of book Vii. apart from guiding us through the intricate structure of aristotle’s treatment and response to the anti-hedonist arguments both generally for the rest of book Vii and speciically for chapters 10 to 12, she discusses the frustrating fact that aristotle does not bother himself with providing an intelligible and coherent account of his own conception of pleasure in book Vii, but prefers to give us unconnected bits and pieces which hardly suice for a serious reconstruction. Frede, besides tidying up the dialectical chaos of the arguments, provides a clear account of what she calls the ‘conundrum’ of aristotle’s conception of pleasure, namely the diiculty of integrating his two diferent conceptions of pleasure at work in the NE into his own and positive account of pleasure. 108 REViEWS Surely much will hang here on the way in which we conceive of the two diferent conceptions. Frede conceives of them as follows. ‘adjectival’ pleasures are the ‘physical’ pleasures e.g. of the kind of which the temperate person abstains, whereas ‘adverbial’ pleasures are the ‘moral’ pleasures which form an integral part of, e.g., the action of the virtuous person. he adjectival pleasures, according to Frede, are the ‘subject matter’ of some (but not all!) of the virtues of character, whereas the adverbial pleasures are neither their subject matter, nor their goal. he ‘conundrum’ of aristotle’s conception of pleasure, according to Frede, consists precisely in inding a way to integrate these two types of pleasure connected to goodness and badness of character into aristotle’s conception of pleasure in NE Vii as an unimpeded activity. he thesis according to which pleasure is the supreme good is the main issue in chapter 13–14 (up to 1154a21). Christof Rapp analyses the argument in a clear and almost entertaining way. he is able to do this, because many interpreters have argued that aristotle, in asserting that pleasure is the highest good, could not have possibly been speaking in his own voice. his gives Rapp the opportunity to label the thesis the ‘shocking thesis’ and to then unfold the variety of strategies which interpreters employed in order to avoid having to attribute this thesis to aristotle. Rapp himself is much more inclined to take aristotle by the word and to even attest him a certain sympathy for such Eudoxean views. But that does not turn aristotle into a hedonist, since, as Rapp puts it, ‘a and b can be the same insofar as they coincide in a third thing, c: pleasure and the supreme good (i.e. eudaimonia) coincide in the same unimpeded activity’ (p. 219f.). he diicult task of interpreting aristotle’s few positive pronouncements about pleasure in the last bit of NE Vii is let to Gwenaelle aubry. her commentary is very rich. One of the upshots is that the continuities between aristotle and Plato come out very clearly: Whereas aristotle follows Plato in his analysis of bodily pleasure to a large extent, he does not follow him in his evaluation (p. 247), since he declares bodily pleasures to be good. aubry also discusses the deeper issues concerning the aristotelian concept of nature, the relation of bodily pleasures of restoration to the simple pleasures (which she describes as conlictual) and the simple pleasure aristotle attributes to the deity. her terminology in describing the two types of pleasure (‘pathological’ and ‘accidental’ vs. ‘energetic’) is not the most fortunate, i think. i would prefer something like ‘homoeostatic’ vs. ‘simple pleasures’ instead, but nothing important hangs on this. aubrey also provides a lucid analysis of aristotle’s claim that the pleasures of restoration are not genuine pleasures but that they only seem to be (1152b31f.) as being a claim not about the sensation REViEWS 109 of pleasure (whose reality cannot be denied), but about its cause. he latter being an energeia of the remaining part of the phusis, not the process of its restoration (1152b35f., p. 254f.). One would wish to learn more about how exactly aubrey conceives of this apparently very important activity of the remaining part. if pleasure is the energeia of a certain hexis and the pleasures of restoration are pleasant because they restore an impaired hexis, how can this impaired hexis be active and hence responsible for the sensation of pleasure? But this seems just another conundrum in aristotle’s conception of pleasure. in sum, it can be said that this collection of essays is by all means highly recommendable. it contains profound, thorough and detailed commentaries on each section of the transmitted text of NE Vii. it thereby represents the current state of research and sets high standards for future research in the ield. Because of these high scholarly standards, the book is not commendable either to beginners in aristotelian studies or to readers who know no Greek. it is a collection, not a monograph, and thus contributors do not always agree, not even on some of the more fundamental points. herefore, neither the problem of the weak akratēs (but see Charles’s contribution) nor the ‘conundrum’ of aristotle’s two conceptions of pleasure are ‘resolved’. But who would expect this from a monograph, let alone from a conference proceeding? he volume raises important and relevant questions about the nature of aristotle’s ethical project and many other important issues. it is, as said above, splendid. But there certainly will be room for future publications on NE Vii to come. Klaus Corcilius Philosophisches Seminar Universität hamburg Von-Melle-Park 6 D-20146 hamburg <klaus.corcilius@uni-hamburg.de>