Counterintelligence: Enduring Lessons from the Cold War
Written by Daniele Hadi Irandoost
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Counterintelligence: Enduring Lessons from the Cold
War
https://www.e-ir.info/2017/09/18/counterintelligence-enduring-lessons-from-the-cold-war/
DANIELE HADI IRANDOOST, SEP 18 2017
The inquiries that went into the conduct of counterintelligence before the events of 9/11 all concluded that the
intelligence community was unprepared against contemporary challenges to national security from non-state terrorist
groups, in a rapidly globalised and technologically advanced world.[1] Indeed, it was assumed that many lessons
learnt from the previous era, which was characterised by an ideological struggle between two superpowers, were all
irrelevant now. As will be demonstrated in this essay, however, this view does not hold ground upon closer
examination. Specifically, the essay will examine counterintelligence lessons drawn from case studies in the Cold
War and compare their applicability to contemporary counterintelligence affairs
But before going any further, it is first crucial to define counterintelligence. Broadly speaking, counterintelligence
concerns activities undertaken by intelligence agencies to protect the society, particularly from espionage, covert
action and deception that may be undertaken by a range of actors including states, terrorist groups, malicious
individuals, organisations and criminals amongst others.[2] Overall, these are done either proactively or defensively:
whilst the former refers to activities that attempt to ‘manipulate’ an enemy, the latter is about actions that stop the
enemy in its tracks. Examples of the former may include, for instance, planting double agents or spreading
propaganda on media, whilst ‘defensive’ examples might consist of identifying weaknesses within security
programmes, or even of gathering intelligence (of any type) to find and apprehend, say, traitors within one’s own
intelligence system.
With those in mind, the primary objective of this essay is to identify and examine enduring lessons from various case
studies in the Cold War for counterintelligence operations today. Overall, four lessons will be examined: 1)
understanding the context, 2) mitigating the politicisation of intelligence, 3) adapting ‘structures’, and 4) recognising
the everlasting relevance of the inevitability of ‘counterintelligence failures’. Due to the breadth of each lesson, the
essay will focus only on two specific case studies (one from the Cold War and one from the post-Cold War period) for
every lesson, as sample studies for understanding the broader lessons. Overall, these case studies were chosen
mainly because of their relevance as well as significance to their related lessons. It is worth noting the contemporary
case studies are drawn from within the US only, though the lessons may as well apply to other intelligence
communities around the globe.
To begin with, the first lesson concerns the significance of understanding contexts within which counterintelligence
activities operate. The term context is used here to refer to such things as social and cultural trends (differing
worldviews or narratives, in a sense) locally and globally, strengths and weaknesses as well as modus operandi of
an enemy (and certainly one’s own), not to mention past experiences and history, amongst others. The purpose,
then, is to understand how the bigger picture will shape enemy intelligence operations – objectives and conduct –
and to adapt counterintelligence accordingly.
As an illustration, a relevant case study includes the influence of changing social and historical trends on the
motivations behind espionage in the Cold War. According to Stan Tayler and Daniel Snow, spies are motivated for
various reasons including money, ideology, ingratiation, disgruntlement, fantasy, self-importance/ego, and kinship –
though almost in all cases these are combined with one another to varying degrees.[3] The authors also note that the
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two most dominant motivations during the Cold War were money and ideology, at least in the case of those 139
Americans (from 1940 to 1994) who were officially charged as traitors.[4] But the more interesting point is how these
trends, in terms of their dominance, changed from one time/space (context) to another. The obvious evidence here,
of course, is how ideology became less significant from the early 1960s onwards, unlike money which became the
most dominant of all (perhaps denoting the declining popularity of communism as a result of public knowledge of
Stalin’s purges, not to mention the rising popularity of consumerism and wealth amongst the peoples in the West).[5]
A good representation, in this instance, of the broader picture is of course the comparison between the Cambridge
Five, the likes of the Rosenbergs or Klaus Fuchs, who were ideologically motivated in the main, and Robert Hansen
and Aldrich Ames who began their espionage largely because of financial reasons later in the Cold War.[6]
Applied to the present, the most relevant case study is indeed the shifting of motivations towards religious values
advocated primarily by Islamic terrorist groups seeking information on, say, US intelligence capabilities or advanced
nuclear technology. As Harber pointed out, terrorist groups nowadays do not have the same amount of resources
that states (such as the Soviet Union) had in recruiting agents during the Cold War, leaving them instead the option
of exploiting religious values or a sense of kinship, only.[7] The overall lesson here, therefore, is the necessity to
understand the context in order to gain insight into, for instance, the ways in which an enemy may operate under
certain circumstances and to use this knowledge to adapt counterintelligence operations (defensive and/or
proactive), leading not only to effective prioritisation, but ultimately to successful counterintelligence.
Having said that, understanding the context is not sufficient on its own, for to have an accurate picture of the context
one is also required to have balanced frameworks of analysis. Probably, the most prominent obstacle against this
type of balance concerns the politicisation of intelligence, reinforced by such cognitive biases as
underestimation/overestimation, mirror-imaging, or confirmation bias, amongst others. The lesson here, in this sense,
is to recognise politicisation as a limitation and to try to actively minimise its influence when undertaking
counterintelligence operations.
To demonstrate how and why this is important, the Soviet politicisation of intelligence around the Able Archer
exercise offers an appropriate case study. Able Archer refers to a NATO annual exercise in 1983. What was
particularly significant about the event was that even though there were no plans by the West to attack the Soviet
Union, the Soviet leadership along with a number of high-level officials (for instance, the head of the KGB, Yuri
Andropov) had become fearful of an illusory attack from the West, disguised by the annual exercise.[8] Developed
over a long-term period prior to the actual event (as a result of different historical trends and events, such as
Reagan’s announcement of the Star Wars programme and the Soviet Union’s overall perception of inferiority in
economic and military terms compared to the West), the Soviet fear and pressure from the top was to such an extent
that the spies on the field were not only discouraged from offering their own more accurate views, but were instead
encouraged to look for the wrong information (such as, counting the number of lights switched on at night in
governmental departments) to confirm false assumptions held by the leadership in Moscow.[9] Indeed, anyone who
did otherwise was expected to suffer some sort of punishment from their superiors. But what is vital against this
background was the possible danger of a nuclear war from a mere politicisation of intelligence which could have led
to irreversibly grave consequences.[10] Had the Soviet leadership recognised previous cases of politicisation, and
had they combined this awareness with an understanding of the historical context to adapt their counterintelligence
operations (Operation Ryan, for one) the likelihood of this dangerous scenario could have been alleviated.
With those in mind, one may find comparable case studies in the US today: the most prominent being the 2003 Iraq
War.[11] As is most commonly known, the intelligence that was used to support the invasion of Iraq was largely
politicised to confirm the inaccurate beliefs of the political leadership.[12] And as has similarly been witnessed by
many throughout the world, the consequences of doing so have not been so pleasant either. The leadership believed
that Saddam was housing and developing WMDs in secret and in violation of international treaties and sanctions. In
fact, the belief was so ingrained in the minds of the likes of Bush that they only selected those bits of intelligence that
confirmed their biases – not unlike the Soviet leadership during the Able Archer crisis. Hence, the enduring lesson
here is to recognise the existence of the politicisation of intelligence in their different forms and to actively strive to
minimise their harmful consequences (say, through context-driven structural adaptations) having in mind at the same
time the cognitive biases that could reinforce their development.
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In turn, that leads to our third lesson: that to remove structural obstacles to effective counterintelligence is a
necessity. The third lesson, in this sense, requires the responsible actors to adapt structures around
counterintelligence operations – of course, having in mind the other two lessons examined earlier – so as to maximise
even further the efficiency and success of such operations. Indeed, it is important to note that structure refers here to
a broad number of elements that affect the conduct of counterintelligence operations. Some of the more significant
ones include organisational structures within the intelligence community (such as, the extent to which intelligence
should be shared and coordinated with other intelligence branches without compromising security), extent of
regulation over liaison with foreign intelligence agencies, legal and oversight frameworks, security programmes
(vetting, background checks, extent of classification and so forth), not to mention bureaucratic processes involved
within the intelligence cycle (appropriate dissemination methods, for one).
A successful Cold War case study that illustrates this issue in practice is the ratification of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978 which, in short, allowed intelligence agencies to prosecute traitors more easily than
was previously possible. Before FISA, evidence that was collected secretly could not be used in public courts not
only for fear of compromising valuable sources and methods of espionage, but also because of the American courts’
rejection of illegally obtained evidence. The ratification of the Act, however, made it not only possible for evidence to
be used in court, it also made sure that sources and methods remained secret: all because evidence was now
accepted in a secret court.[13] As Tayler and Snow observed, the result was intriguing: following the ratification, the
number of those prosecuted for reasons of espionage increased exponentially, compared to the previous period (23
per cent caught and prosecuted from 1945 until 1977, compared to 38 per cent from 1978 until 1994).[14] What is
noteworthy in this example, therefore, is how structural obstacles were removed according to the context of US
domestic law, leading as a result to more effective counterespionage operations.
A contemporary case study that follows along the same lines, but perhaps slightly excessively is the enactment of the
Patriot Act in October 2001, as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the one hand, it may be pointed out that the
Patriot Act was crucial for removing obstacles to more widespread surveillance powers and capabilities which
intelligence agencies so often desire. The argument goes, of course, that more surveillance always results in better
and more effective counterintelligence operations (including against terrorism).[15] On the other hand, it may be
noted the Act has been criticised for the intrusive powers it has provided for the intelligence agencies.[16] Having in
mind that this could potentially undermine human rights (taking into account the slippery-slope argument) and
therefore public support for the agencies, and that since public support is an important factor behind the functioning
of intelligence agencies,[17] it may be maintained that the structural changes have gone too far, and so need to be
reversed or even altered. The overall idea, then, is to maximise success as far as is possible through structural
changes, whilst considering also different contexts as well as dangers that could arise from the politicisation of
intelligence – that is, the previous two lessons.
Lastly, the fourth lesson concerns the ‘inevitability of counterintelligence failures’ even if the above lessons are
exercised with utmost effort.[18] Broadly speaking, this argument refers to intrinsic limitations found within the human
mind, namely that cognitive biases can never go away and that it is never possible for a human mind to have a
complete picture of the world, implying that structural as well as operational weaknesses are always bound to be
found, or even not found considering the fact that there will always be ‘unknown unknowns’ and that these may not
be so easily avoidable.[19] The many counterintelligence failures in the Cold War are indeed a clear manifestation of
this phenomenon. It is difficult to say whether the failures recounted above could have been avoided – with certainty –
had the people responsible tried their best to fulfil the lessons learnt earlier.
One example that particularly illustrates how this may be the case is the debate on whether Oleg Penkovksy was a
Soviet double agent, tasked to deceive the Americans as part of a larger deception operation, planned by
Khrushchev, to force Kennedy to remove missiles from Turkey, in exchange for removing Soviet missiles in
Cuba.[20] Although this argument is highly controversial it underscores the lesson noted above: that despite all the
ways in which counterintelligence analysts might have attempted to validate Penkovsky’s role as a double agent, one
was still not entirely sure at the time, or even now in some ways, of the whole picture – particularly when having in
mind the so-called ‘wilderness of mirrors’ which so often accompanies counterintelligence operations. What this
example demonstrates of course is that problems arise not just when there are ‘unknown unknowns’, but also when
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even there are ‘known unknowns’.
A case study that reflects a similar pattern in recent years in the US most noticeably includes the ‘tactical’
unawareness of intelligence and policing agencies before 9/11 of the exact location and timing of the attacks, despite
a more general ‘strategic’ knowledge of an impending attack on the US.[21] All of which indicate – perhaps
surprisingly – an irony inseparable from intelligence activities: that despite their responsibility to predict the future and
protect their society, intelligence agencies are merely made up of fallible humans who are not – as it were –
omniscient beings. Overall, the lesson is to recognise that mistakes are inevitable and are even a natural part of
human life and that nothing can in fact be realistically done to change the course of events at all times and at all
places.
On the whole, this essay proposed four lessons for the conduct of successful counterintelligence operations in the
contemporary US, drawn from various case studies in the Cold War: sequentially, these included understanding the
context, minimising the politicisation of intelligence, adaptation of structures, as well as awareness of the inevitability
of ‘counterintelligence failures’. To a large extent these lessons were chosen not only because of their flexibility but
also because their breadth allowed for addressing the root causes of counterintelligence failures directly. As one
characterised by secret ‘wars in the shadows’, the Cold War appeared the most suitable period for an inquiry of this
sort compared to any other in history. And although previously there have been attempts within the literature to learn
from past failures, rarely have they brought together ‘tactical/operational’ lessons into one overarching ‘strategic’
lesson as was done in the essay: this especially applies to the first and third lessons. In any event, what is above all
important to remember is that not only is there a need for moderation in all things, but that continuities do indeed
occur in history; that even though platforms change from one place and time to another, lessons learnt in one period
may well be applicable to another and therefore relevant depending on the specific context. The applicability of
counterintelligence lessons drawn from the Cold War for contemporary US challenges more than attest to this point.
Bibliography
9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017.
Andrew, C. M., and O. Gordievsky. Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations
1975-1985. London: Sceptre, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993.
Aldrich, R. “Dangerous Liaisons: Post September 11 Intelligence Alliances”. Harvard International Review 24, no. 3
(2002): 49-54.
Betts, R. K. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”. World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978):
61-89.
Epstein, E. J. Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.
Haddick, R. “Strategic Error: When the Big Picture Misses the Point”. Foreign Policy, 2012. Accessed April 1, 2017.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/24/strategic-error/.
Harber, J. R. “Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors”.International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 2 (2009): 221-236.
Kahn, D. “An Historical Theory of Intelligence”. Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (2001): 79-92.
Lowenthal, M. M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 6th ed. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: CQ Press, 2015.
Omand, D. “Can We Have the Pleasure of the Grin Without Seeing the Cat? Must the Effectiveness of Secret
Agencies Inevitably Fade on Exposure to the Light?”. Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (2008): 593-607.
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Pillar, P. R. “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”. Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 15-27.
Schaefer, B. “Forecasting Nuclear War: Stasi/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYAN”. Wilson Center.
Last modified 2014. Accessed April 1, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/forecasting-nuclear-war.
Scott, L. “Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited”. Intelligence and National Security 26,
no. 6 (2011): 759-777.
Shulsky, A. N., and G. J. Schmitt. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence . 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 2002.
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Security Intelligence, ed. by K. J. Loch, 518-536. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Taylor, S. A., and D. Snow. “Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught”.Intelligence and National
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Notes
[1] For example, see 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017), pp. 103f.
[2] A. N. Shulsky and G. J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence , 3rd ed. (Washington,
D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 99.; M. M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy , 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 2003), pp. 113.
[3] S. A. Taylor and D. Snow, “Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught”,Intelligence and
National Security 12, no. 2 (1997), pp. 102ff.
[4] Ibid. p. 103.
[5] Ibid. p. 105.
[6] Ibid.; S. A. Taylor and K. Buchanan, “Treason: ” ‘Tis Worse Than Murder””, inThe Oxford Handbook of National
Security Intelligence, ed. K. J. Loch (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 528f.
[7] J. R. Harber, “Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors”, International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 2 (2009), p. 223.
[8] C. M. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations
1975-1985, (London: Sceptre, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993), pp. 31ff.
[9] B. Schaefer, “Forecasting Nuclear War: Stasi/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYAN”, Wilson
Center, last modified 2014, accessed April 1, 2017,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/forecasting-nuclear-war.
[10] L. Scott, “Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited”, Intelligence and National
Security 26, no. 6 (2011), pp. 759-777.
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[11] It is worth noting, the case studies examined in this section are considered to be counterintelligence examples
because, broadly speaking, they were primarily concerned with the protection of their respective societies, which
meant also that intelligence was perceived as a tool for defence than offence, on the main. It may be useful here to
consider David Kahn’s understanding of intelligence as well (slightly out of context, however): that intelligence is
essential for defence but only an accompanying characteristic of the offence, possibly proposing that
counterintelligence on the whole should be our main starting point when attempting to examine intelligence activities.
D. Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (2001), pp. 85f.
[12] P. R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006), pp. 21ff.
[13] Taylor and Snow, “Cold War Spies”, pp. 110ff.
[14] Ibid., p. 113.
[15] M. T. McCarthy, “Recent Development”, Harvard Journal on Legislation 39, no. 2 (2017), p. 435.
[16] Ibid.
[17] D. Omand, “Can We Have the Pleasure of the Grin Without Seeing the Cat? Must the Effectiveness of Secret
Agencies Inevitably Fade on Exposure to the Light?”, Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (2008), p. 606.
[18] This is a slight variation of Richard Betts’ argument that ‘intelligence failures are inevitable’. R. K. Betts,
“Analysis, War, And Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable”, World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978), pp. 61-89.
[19] U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers , 2002, accessed April
1, 2017, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
[20] E. J. Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1989), p. 80.
[21] R. Haddick, “Strategic Error: When the Big Picture Misses the Point”, Foreign Policy, 2012, accessed April 1,
2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/24/strategic-error/.
Written by: Daniele Hadi Irandoost
Written at: Aberystwyth University
Written for: Dr Warren Dockter
Date written: April 2017
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