- King's College London, War Studies, AlumnusUniversity of Mississippi, Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, Faculty MemberNational Intelligence University, Strategic Intelligence, Faculty Memberadd
- History, Political Science, Russia, Numismatics, Islamic Numismatics, Intelligence Studies, and 18 moreParliamentary Oversight over Security and Defense Sector, Intelligence Analysis, History of Security, Counterintelligence and Intelligence, Cold War, Soviet Union (History), Soviet, post-Soviet, Russian politics, Post-Soviet Regimes, Intelligence Studies (History and Political Economy of Intelligence services), Soviet History, Counterintelligence, Intelligence Services, The History of KGB, Kgb, Intelligence, Russian / Soviet military and diplomatic history, Russian Military Reform, Russian Foreign Policy, and Russian Military Theoryedit
- Researcher of Soviet and Eastern European intelligence history and defectorsedit
Soviet intelligence officer defectors arrived in their new countries lacking skills that translated easily into post-defection jobs. To earn money, they often turned to the one asset they had—their stories. To publish their stories, they... more
Soviet intelligence officer defectors arrived in their new countries lacking skills that translated easily into post-defection jobs. To earn money, they often turned to the one asset they had—their stories. To publish their stories, they had to work with a variety of facilitators who connected them with publishing companies and distributed their works. Those helpers can be characterized into four categories: activists/dissidents, academics, journalists, and intelligence practitioners. Helpers were sometimes connected to and supported by a Western government, particularly the United States or United Kingdom, and the resulting work reflected the Cold War ideological competition. However, government sponsorship was not always the case, and some helpers expressed views that extended beyond the receiving government’s policy or that criticized the handling agency. In any case, most defectors could not have published their works without the helpers’ support.
Research Interests:
https://intelligencestudiesreview.blog/2024/05/04/russia-is-already-at-war-with-nato-whether-nato-believes-it-or-not/ Since the beginning of 2024, NATO military leaders have stated in multiple forums that NATO countries need to... more
https://intelligencestudiesreview.blog/2024/05/04/russia-is-already-at-war-with-nato-whether-nato-believes-it-or-not/
Since the beginning of 2024, NATO military leaders have stated in multiple forums that NATO countries need to prepare for future war with Russia. Russian leaders see it differently. In their minds, war with NATO is not a distant theoretical future. It is a current reality. Russia’s intelligence and covert activities bear witness to Russia’s perceptions of NATO. beginning in mid-2023, and especially since March 2024, a series of sabotage operations have targeted NATO assets involved the Ukraine weapons supply chain. NATO countries should not be surprised by Russian covert sabotage operations directed at logistics networks shipping weapons to Ukraine. It is a logical and expected extension of Russia’s way of war. Russian officials have telegraphed it publicly. And it is not five to ten years in the future—GU sabotage actions show that it is now.
Since the beginning of 2024, NATO military leaders have stated in multiple forums that NATO countries need to prepare for future war with Russia. Russian leaders see it differently. In their minds, war with NATO is not a distant theoretical future. It is a current reality. Russia’s intelligence and covert activities bear witness to Russia’s perceptions of NATO. beginning in mid-2023, and especially since March 2024, a series of sabotage operations have targeted NATO assets involved the Ukraine weapons supply chain. NATO countries should not be surprised by Russian covert sabotage operations directed at logistics networks shipping weapons to Ukraine. It is a logical and expected extension of Russia’s way of war. Russian officials have telegraphed it publicly. And it is not five to ten years in the future—GU sabotage actions show that it is now.
Research Interests:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2024.2322807 The war in Ukraine has transformed Russian intelligence activities. It has drawn the bulk of Russian intelligence collection resources, both inside Ukraine and further... more
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2024.2322807
The war in Ukraine has transformed Russian intelligence activities. It has drawn the bulk of Russian intelligence collection resources, both inside Ukraine and further afield, to focus on war-related, often low-level operational/tactical targets. Even strategic collection is related to the war, especially directed toward bolstering Russia’s global reputation. However, the war has also led to the dismantling of a large portion of Russia’s intelligence apparatus, including both human and signals intelligence, especially in Europe, just when it is needed the most. It has prompted greater scrutiny and international counterintelligence cooperation against Russian intelligence activities than has been seen since the 1980s. Russia’s own actions have drawn those reactions. Nevertheless, Russian intelligence services are resilient and persistent. They learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances.
The war in Ukraine has transformed Russian intelligence activities. It has drawn the bulk of Russian intelligence collection resources, both inside Ukraine and further afield, to focus on war-related, often low-level operational/tactical targets. Even strategic collection is related to the war, especially directed toward bolstering Russia’s global reputation. However, the war has also led to the dismantling of a large portion of Russia’s intelligence apparatus, including both human and signals intelligence, especially in Europe, just when it is needed the most. It has prompted greater scrutiny and international counterintelligence cooperation against Russian intelligence activities than has been seen since the 1980s. Russia’s own actions have drawn those reactions. Nevertheless, Russian intelligence services are resilient and persistent. They learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances.
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https://intelligencestudiesreview.blog/2024/03/03/did-vladimir-putin-kill-aleksei-navalny/
An alternative analysis to the predominant narrative that Navalny's death was an intentional move by the Putin regime.
An alternative analysis to the predominant narrative that Navalny's death was an intentional move by the Putin regime.
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In September 2023, five Bulgarians--Orlin, Rusev, Vanya Gaberova, Ivan Stoyanov, and Bizer Dzhambazov and Katrin Ivanova as a couple--appeared in a British court charged with 'conspiring to collect information intended to be directly or... more
In September 2023, five Bulgarians--Orlin, Rusev, Vanya Gaberova, Ivan Stoyanov, and Bizer Dzhambazov and Katrin Ivanova as a couple--appeared in a British court charged with 'conspiring to collect information intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy', in other words, espionage. Some have assessed that the five Bulgarians were Russian intelligence illegals similar to others arrested since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, like Mikhail Mikushin/José Assis Giammaria, who was arrested while working at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø, and Sergey Cherkasov/Viktor Muller Ferreira, who was refused entry into the Netherlands to start a position at the International Criminal Court. Both Mikushin and Cherkasov were affiliated with the Russian military intelligence service, the GU (formerly known as the GRU). However, several aspects of the Bulgarians' case are different and cast doubt on the assessment that they were illegals like Mikushin and Cherkasov.
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Although plausible deniability is a definitional characteristic of covert actions, numerous Russian actions have been unveiled and attributed to Russia over the past decade. The reason for these frequent revelations can be explained by... more
Although plausible deniability is a definitional characteristic of covert actions, numerous Russian actions have been unveiled and attributed to Russia over the past decade. The reason for these frequent revelations can be explained by three factors: ignorance, indifference, and incompetence. Russian actions often display ignorance about the reactions they might elicit, indifference to global opinion if they are caught, and incompetence that allows foreign governments to unpeel the sometimes thin veneer of clandestinity that is supposed to cover Russian actions. Frequent revelations based on a combination of those factors have given Russia a reputation of aggressiveness in the international arena, while also limiting Russia's own actions, even in overt areas such as diplomacy and economic relations, because of that reputation.
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Between 1946 and 1991, over 1,500 Soviet officials-mostly intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover-were expelled from diplomatic and other government representations around the world. Expulsions often involved single or... more
Between 1946 and 1991, over 1,500 Soviet officials-mostly intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover-were expelled from diplomatic and other government representations around the world. Expulsions often involved single or small groups of officials, but occasionally occurred en masse. Countries chose to expel Soviet officials for four reasons: in reaction to anti-Soviet regime changes and political reversals, in retaliation for Soviet covert activities and political manipulation, in reaction to Soviet intelligence officer defectors and intelligence obtained from penetrations of Soviet intelligence services, and, most frequently, in retaliation for espionage. Recent expulsions are modern adaptations of a method that was common during the Cold War with commonalities of purpose, but some variations, especially in scale and level of international cooperation.
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Russian leaders’ public bluster has been a regular element of the wartime narrative since the beginning of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Menacing language has reached a fever pitch since early 2023. At what point do... more
Russian leaders’ public bluster has been a regular element of the wartime narrative since the beginning of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Menacing language has reached a fever pitch since early 2023. At what point do Russian doomsday threats turn farcical, especially those issued by Russia’s blusterer-in-chief, Dmitriy Medvedev? Russia has energized its diplomatic, economic, informational, and intelligence levers to align with some of the public threats, although not all. It has proven less capable of applying the military lever beyond missile attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Yet, military retaliatory rhetoric is still having an impact on Western governments; most prominently, NATO has not formally entered the war, despite its continued support for Ukraine. So far, the threats are working.
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https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/history-and-continuing-relevance-soviet-bloc-illegal-intelligence-operatives Kevin Riehle analyzes a formerly secret Polish Ministry of Interior document concerning the use of "illegal" intelligence... more
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/history-and-continuing-relevance-soviet-bloc-illegal-intelligence-operatives
Kevin Riehle analyzes a formerly secret Polish Ministry of Interior document concerning the use of "illegal" intelligence operatives in the 1970s.
Although technology has advanced since the Polish document was written in the 1970s, many of the operational concepts described in it remain in use, including training operatives, organizing operations, and the basic purposes for dispatching illegals. With the mass expulsion of Russian legal intelligence officers from Europe and the United States in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s intelligence services may need to turn more to illegals to collect the intelligence they desperately need. This Polish document may help to understand that need.
Kevin Riehle analyzes a formerly secret Polish Ministry of Interior document concerning the use of "illegal" intelligence operatives in the 1970s.
Although technology has advanced since the Polish document was written in the 1970s, many of the operational concepts described in it remain in use, including training operatives, organizing operations, and the basic purposes for dispatching illegals. With the mass expulsion of Russian legal intelligence officers from Europe and the United States in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s intelligence services may need to turn more to illegals to collect the intelligence they desperately need. This Polish document may help to understand that need.
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This article analyzes the postservice lives of Soviet and Russian intelligence and state security officers to explore the meanings behind the phrase, “There is no such thing as a former chekist” (“бывших чекистов че бывает”). The article... more
This article analyzes the postservice lives of Soviet and Russian intelligence and state security officers to explore the meanings behind the phrase, “There is no such thing as a former chekist” (“бывших чекистов че бывает”). The article analyzes four possible scenarios in which a Soviet/ Russian intelligence or state security officer might be considered “former,” organized around the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate ways of leaving the service, as well as genuine and deceptive reasons. Those two concept pairs create a matrix of possibilities for Soviet intelligence and state security personnel who consider leaving the service: legitimate/genuine, made up of officers who leave with no negative ramifications; legitimate/deceptive, made up of officers who claim to leave the service but remain connected; illegitimate/genuine, made up of defectors and arrested officers; and illegitimate/deceptive, made up of false defectors. Whether the statement “there is no such thing as a former chekist” is true depends on whom one asks: those who claim to have genuinely left the service would refute the statement, while those who are still in a Russian intelligence or state security service, as well as those whose departure is not genuine, hold firmly to it.
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Russia is looking for a reason to attack NATO. It will claim to do so for defensive reasons but could justify its action by destroying Western weapons being sent to Ukraine. Russia has a history of telegraphing its strategic movements as... more
Russia is looking for a reason to attack NATO. It will claim to do so for defensive reasons but could justify its action by destroying Western weapons being sent to Ukraine. Russia has a history of telegraphing its strategic movements as well as a history of conducting violent actions to prevent weapons from reaching Ukraine. Russia has the capability and intent to launch a preemptive attack; weapons being shipped to Ukraine may give it the opportunity.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/recent-statements-indicating-russia-planning-war-against-kevin-riehle/
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/recent-statements-indicating-russia-planning-war-against-kevin-riehle/
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Russia’s operations in the information domain are an integral part of Russia’s interactions in the international environment. As one of Russia’s levers of national power, information operations work in concert with all other levers of... more
Russia’s operations in the information domain are an integral part of Russia’s interactions in the international environment. As one of Russia’s levers of national power, information operations work in concert with all other levers of national power to achieve a defined list of Russia’s national security objectives. Judging from pronouncements, policies, doctrine, and actions, it appears that Russia’s objectives are: 1) Protect the Putin regime; 2) Control the post-Soviet space; 3) Counterweigh the unipolar actor in the world; 4) Portray Russia as an indispensable player in world affairs; and 5) Divide and disrupt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Russian information operations can be traced through information themes directly to those Russian national security objectives. Some themes can address multiple objectives simultaneously, and the methods for communication can differ based on the target. However, Russian information operations are not standalone activities but work in concert with all other levers of national power to achieve Russia’s overarching objectives.
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Find interview at https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/spycast/511/notes
Interview about Soviet intelligence defectors and their impact. Aired on 9 November 2021.
Interview about Soviet intelligence defectors and their impact. Aired on 9 November 2021.
Research Interests:
https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/10883/kgb-gru-fsb-russian-intelligence-history-and-present After, well, thirty-four publications (plus the others already scheduled), it was time to cover one of the most fascinating topics in... more
https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/10883/kgb-gru-fsb-russian-intelligence-history-and-present
After, well, thirty-four publications (plus the others already scheduled), it was time to cover one of the most fascinating topics in intelligence history. Yes, we are talking about the Russian intelligence and the KGB from the Czarist foundation to our days. The KGB was considered by many as the most powerful intelligence service globally, which should probably raise immediately the question of where and under what conditions such a powerful state institution is indeed legitimate in the first place. This is already enough for presenting this interview but let me add a couple of observations. We should not consider the KGB as a rule in the intelligence realm or as an example to be followed. We must consider it as what to avoid at any cost. Intelligence history is never “just” history (assuming that there is history that is “just” history). For this reason, I approached Professor Kevin Riehle (National Intelligence University, USA). This interview will accompany the reader from the inception of the Russian intelligence to the current institutional frame and organization. It is a deep dive into the Russian intelligence world. The first time I met Kevin, we were in Aberystwyth (back then… in person). We briefly discussed the relationship between intelligence and democracy and the importance of grounding the intelligence activity to the values inscribed into the constitution. More recently, during research on intelligence teaching, I had the pleasure to read one of his papers, this one on intelligence education (highly recommended), and to hear his presentation at the last International Studies Association Convention. It is then with my distinct pleasure to publish the interview on Scuola Filosofica – for those who don’t know it yet; it is one of the leading cultural blogs in Italy. In the name of Scuola Filosofica Team, our readers, and myself, Giangiuseppe Pili, Kevin: thank you!
After, well, thirty-four publications (plus the others already scheduled), it was time to cover one of the most fascinating topics in intelligence history. Yes, we are talking about the Russian intelligence and the KGB from the Czarist foundation to our days. The KGB was considered by many as the most powerful intelligence service globally, which should probably raise immediately the question of where and under what conditions such a powerful state institution is indeed legitimate in the first place. This is already enough for presenting this interview but let me add a couple of observations. We should not consider the KGB as a rule in the intelligence realm or as an example to be followed. We must consider it as what to avoid at any cost. Intelligence history is never “just” history (assuming that there is history that is “just” history). For this reason, I approached Professor Kevin Riehle (National Intelligence University, USA). This interview will accompany the reader from the inception of the Russian intelligence to the current institutional frame and organization. It is a deep dive into the Russian intelligence world. The first time I met Kevin, we were in Aberystwyth (back then… in person). We briefly discussed the relationship between intelligence and democracy and the importance of grounding the intelligence activity to the values inscribed into the constitution. More recently, during research on intelligence teaching, I had the pleasure to read one of his papers, this one on intelligence education (highly recommended), and to hear his presentation at the last International Studies Association Convention. It is then with my distinct pleasure to publish the interview on Scuola Filosofica – for those who don’t know it yet; it is one of the leading cultural blogs in Italy. In the name of Scuola Filosofica Team, our readers, and myself, Giangiuseppe Pili, Kevin: thank you!
Research Interests:
https://thechekistmonitor.blogspot.com/2021/04/soviet-mil-intel-illegal-litvin-interview.html An interview with Zalman Volfovich Litvin, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) illegal intelligence officer who served in China in the 1930s... more
https://thechekistmonitor.blogspot.com/2021/04/soviet-mil-intel-illegal-litvin-interview.html
An interview with Zalman Volfovich Litvin, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) illegal intelligence officer who served in China in the 1930s and the United States during World War II. Litvin's legend during his time in the United States was as a student at the University of Southern California, and his initial target was Japanese Americans who could provide intelligence on Imperial Japan. His operation ended only because Igor Gouzenko defected in 1945, forcing Litvin to escape the United States to avoid arrest. The interview was originally conducted in 1992 in Russian, not long before Litvin's death. An English translation can be read in full on The Chekist Monitor via the link above.
An interview with Zalman Volfovich Litvin, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) illegal intelligence officer who served in China in the 1930s and the United States during World War II. Litvin's legend during his time in the United States was as a student at the University of Southern California, and his initial target was Japanese Americans who could provide intelligence on Imperial Japan. His operation ended only because Igor Gouzenko defected in 1945, forcing Litvin to escape the United States to avoid arrest. The interview was originally conducted in 1992 in Russian, not long before Litvin's death. An English translation can be read in full on The Chekist Monitor via the link above.
Research Interests:
Intelligence and security studies degree programs at non-government universities offer a variety of diplomas, from bachelor’s degrees, to graduate certificates, to master’s degrees. In most cases, universities market intelligence studies... more
Intelligence and security studies degree programs at non-government universities offer a variety of diplomas, from bachelor’s degrees, to graduate certificates, to master’s degrees. In most cases, universities market intelligence studies degree programs to two audiences: those who aspire to a job in a security-related career (intelligence, law enforcement, or homeland security); and those already in one of those careers who want to improve their qualifications for career advancement. This article proposes three additional audiences—intelligence scholars, students seeking to improve critical thinking and analytic skills, and any informed student—that would also benefit from such degree programs, with each requiring a different combination and weighting of competencies, thus necessitating a different level of emphasis in an intelligence degree program.
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When Igor Gouzenko defected in September 1945, be brought with him a package of documents, supplemented by what he carried in his memory, that gave a clear picture of the types of agents Soviet military intelligence was tasked to recruit... more
When Igor Gouzenko defected in September 1945, be brought with him a package of documents, supplemented by what he carried in his memory, that gave a clear picture of the types of agents Soviet military intelligence was tasked to recruit and the information the GRU sought from them. Historians differ on the role Gouzenko and his revelations played at the outset of the Cold War, some seeing it as pivotal, while others pay little attention to it at all. This article sits between those two poles to explore the question: what insights did Gouzenko's revelations give about GRU priorities--and thence Soviet priorities--at the end of World War II? This article examines the categories of information that the GRU sought, including military, science and technology, and political information. GRU collection of this information, the sources it targeted for recruitment, and the urgency it placed on clandestinity of handling those sources, revealed the military and political intelligence the Soviet Union sought to fight the next war. Taken together, Gouzenko's material showed a Soviet Union that was preparing for war against the United States and Great Britain even before World war II ended.
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This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/84JRHWIWIFIGZV39AR64/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2021.1877405 Thomas Kent’s and Nina Jankowicz’s recent books on Russian information warfare start from the premise... more
This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/84JRHWIWIFIGZV39AR64/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2021.1877405
Thomas Kent’s and Nina Jankowicz’s recent books on Russian information warfare start from the premise that Russian information operations and political warfare will destroy our democratic society. But what if that premise is wrong? What if we just have to wait for Russia to shoot itself in the foot enough times that it no longer enjoys credibility in the world, while healing the divisions in our own societies that fuel Russian disin- formation campaigns? It might be soothing to claim that Russia is the root of our problems, and Russia certainly has no desire to help us solve those problems. Nevertheless, Russia’s actions have placed it back on the table as an adversary, just as its Soviet predecessor was, which is not in Russia’s best interests. Russia is not capable of destroying a democratic society; the society can only do that to itself. Democratic societies survived the Soviet- era information onslaught and will survive the current one if they can reduce internal anger and divisiveness, while Russia offers nothing con- structive to the world.
Thomas Kent’s and Nina Jankowicz’s recent books on Russian information warfare start from the premise that Russian information operations and political warfare will destroy our democratic society. But what if that premise is wrong? What if we just have to wait for Russia to shoot itself in the foot enough times that it no longer enjoys credibility in the world, while healing the divisions in our own societies that fuel Russian disin- formation campaigns? It might be soothing to claim that Russia is the root of our problems, and Russia certainly has no desire to help us solve those problems. Nevertheless, Russia’s actions have placed it back on the table as an adversary, just as its Soviet predecessor was, which is not in Russia’s best interests. Russia is not capable of destroying a democratic society; the society can only do that to itself. Democratic societies survived the Soviet- era information onslaught and will survive the current one if they can reduce internal anger and divisiveness, while Russia offers nothing con- structive to the world.
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This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/BDIGZY2M5CE3TFY4BAZK/full?target=10.1080/23800992.2020.1839839. The Soviet-sponsored communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 prompted hundreds of... more
This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/BDIGZY2M5CE3TFY4BAZK/full?target=10.1080/23800992.2020.1839839.
The Soviet-sponsored communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 prompted hundreds of government officials to seek opportunities to escape or to remain abroad. Among those who sought opportunities to escape were nine Czechoslovakian military intelligence officers from the Main Staff Second Directorate, who defected to American or British occupation forces in Germany and Austria from March 1948 to May 1949. Based on the lives of these officers as reflected in archival records, this article pieces together a picture of early communist Czechoslovakian intelligence targets, communist suspicion of Western allies, and the officers’ motivations for leaving their intelligence positions, to show the effects of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia on intelligence officers and operations.
The Soviet-sponsored communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 prompted hundreds of government officials to seek opportunities to escape or to remain abroad. Among those who sought opportunities to escape were nine Czechoslovakian military intelligence officers from the Main Staff Second Directorate, who defected to American or British occupation forces in Germany and Austria from March 1948 to May 1949. Based on the lives of these officers as reflected in archival records, this article pieces together a picture of early communist Czechoslovakian intelligence targets, communist suspicion of Western allies, and the officers’ motivations for leaving their intelligence positions, to show the effects of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia on intelligence officers and operations.
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Download at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/RYNMD8A28AD8UNIENDJV/full?target=10.1080/08850607.2019.1670021. Both the Western Alliance and the Eastern Bloc experienced defections from their intelligence services during the early Cold... more
Download at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/RYNMD8A28AD8UNIENDJV/full?target=10.1080/08850607.2019.1670021.
Both the Western Alliance and the Eastern Bloc experienced defections from their intelligence services during the early Cold War, although the problem was on a greater quantitative scale in the westbound direction than the eastbound. Intelligence-affiliated defectors were at times motivated by ideology, but it took more than political dissatisfaction to persuade them to break permanently with their home country. Another proximate cause, such as personal security or relationships, often accompanied ideology and pushed the defector over the edge. Each side used defectors they received to further their objectives in the Cold War rivalry, to improve counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and to strengthen propaganda messages against the other side. The Eastern Bloc was more inclined to parade defectors before tightly controlled press conferences, while defectors to Western Alliance countries, particularly to the United States and Great Britain, more often published their stories in articles and books or in Congressional hearings. Unintentionally, defectors sometimes fueled domestic political rivalries within their adopted countries. At their foundation, though, intelligence-affiliated defectors reflected the anxieties of the time, and they crossed the Iron Curtain in both directions because they felt they could no longer live in their home country, either because of their ideological orientation, their lifestyle, or their hopes for their families.
Both the Western Alliance and the Eastern Bloc experienced defections from their intelligence services during the early Cold War, although the problem was on a greater quantitative scale in the westbound direction than the eastbound. Intelligence-affiliated defectors were at times motivated by ideology, but it took more than political dissatisfaction to persuade them to break permanently with their home country. Another proximate cause, such as personal security or relationships, often accompanied ideology and pushed the defector over the edge. Each side used defectors they received to further their objectives in the Cold War rivalry, to improve counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and to strengthen propaganda messages against the other side. The Eastern Bloc was more inclined to parade defectors before tightly controlled press conferences, while defectors to Western Alliance countries, particularly to the United States and Great Britain, more often published their stories in articles and books or in Congressional hearings. Unintentionally, defectors sometimes fueled domestic political rivalries within their adopted countries. At their foundation, though, intelligence-affiliated defectors reflected the anxieties of the time, and they crossed the Iron Curtain in both directions because they felt they could no longer live in their home country, either because of their ideological orientation, their lifestyle, or their hopes for their families.
Research Interests:
Download at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5JGCDYPXCZBBFXNYHWNW/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1719460. This article explores the enduring value of Russia’s intelligence illegals program, concluding that Russia’s urgency to employ... more
Download at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5JGCDYPXCZBBFXNYHWNW/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1719460.
This article explores the enduring value of Russia’s intelligence illegals program, concluding that Russia’s urgency to employ illegals is at least as great today as it has ever been. Technological advancements have made clandestine human intelligence operations increasingly risky. Nevertheless, the Russian illegals program has overcome challenges and compromises before, and Russian leaders today continue to glorify illegals from the past and present. Consequently, for a variety of reasons – historical and practical – it is highly unlikely that Russia will replace the intelligence illegals program that it still needs today.
This article explores the enduring value of Russia’s intelligence illegals program, concluding that Russia’s urgency to employ illegals is at least as great today as it has ever been. Technological advancements have made clandestine human intelligence operations increasingly risky. Nevertheless, the Russian illegals program has overcome challenges and compromises before, and Russian leaders today continue to glorify illegals from the past and present. Consequently, for a variety of reasons – historical and practical – it is highly unlikely that Russia will replace the intelligence illegals program that it still needs today.
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The British and US governments entered World War II without policies or defined practices for handling, interrogating, and disposing of Soviet defectors. This gradually changed, necessitated by a post-war surge of defectors and deserters.... more
The British and US governments entered World War II without policies or defined practices for handling, interrogating, and disposing of Soviet defectors. This gradually changed, necessitated by a post-war surge of defectors and deserters. Although the United States and Great Britain initially took different paths toward defector policies, diverging and evolving at different rates, both countries ultimately arrived at nearly the same destination. By 1950 their policies were founded on two broad benefits of defectors: they were sources of valuable intelligence; and they presented opportunities for propaganda, hopefully positive, for the West.
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‘Illegals’ are extensively trained individuals dispatched abroad under false identities with no observable links to their operating country. Technology has made possible a new kind of ‘virtual illegal,’ one that extends beyond the... more
‘Illegals’ are extensively trained individuals dispatched abroad under false identities with no observable links to their operating country. Technology has made possible a new kind of ‘virtual illegal,’ one that extends beyond the operating country’s borders without putting a human at risk. When this is done in a targeted manner by a sophisticated attacker it is called an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This article draws from historical illegals cases to identify parallels in the preparation, insertion, and control of malware by APTs. Ultimately, the methods for countering the two parallel phenomena can also be similar, despite their physical differences.
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Counterintelligence (CI) analysts serve a wide variety of customers across a spectrum from national-level policymakers to tactical commanders. That variety, however, is at the core of confusion, even among CI analysts themselves,... more
Counterintelligence (CI) analysts serve a wide variety of customers across a spectrum from national-level policymakers to tactical commanders. That variety, however, is at the core of confusion, even among CI analysts themselves, surrounding the nature and purpose of CI analysis. This article proposes a typology of CI analysis to define the discipline more clearly, differentiating it by the customers it serves, the targets it pursues, and the nature of the resulting analysis.
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Leaders use their state intelligence systems to supply the information they need to achieve their high-priority strategic objectives. Hence, by looking at the activities of a state’s intelligence system and asking why certain intelligence... more
Leaders use their state intelligence systems to supply the information they need to achieve their high-priority strategic objectives. Hence, by looking at the activities of a state’s intelligence system and asking why certain intelligence capabilities are tasked to collect what they collect, an analyst can glean the priorities that form the core of strategic information needs. Understanding a country’s fundamental national security objectives or a non-state actor’s organizational objectives is both a prerequisite to, and a product of, effective counterintelligence work. Counterintelligence is the intelligence discipline that monitors a competing state’s intelligence activities. Consequently, counterintelligence activities are often good sources of information about a country’s or non-state actor’s strategies and priorities, either directly through penetration of an intelligence service, or indirectly through reflections projected by the target of a counterintelligence activity.
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Applying the threat equation, Threat = intent x capability x opportunity, to foreign intelligence threat provides a mechanism for breaking down the activities of a foreign intelligence threat to its finest elements and determining which... more
Applying the threat equation, Threat = intent x capability x opportunity, to foreign intelligence threat provides a mechanism for breaking down the activities of a foreign intelligence threat to its finest elements and determining which of those elements target friendly interests, and thus which require a countering response.
Research Interests:
https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/The-Russian-FSB Since its founding in 1995, the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, has regained the majority of the domestic security functions of the Soviet-era KGB. Under Vladimir Putin, who... more
https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/The-Russian-FSB
Since its founding in 1995, the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, has regained the majority of the domestic security functions of the Soviet-era KGB. Under Vladimir Putin, who served as FSB director just before becoming president, the agency has grown to be one of the most powerful and favored organizations in Russia. The FSB not only conducts internal security but also has primacy in intelligence operations in former Soviet states. Their activities include anti-dissident operations at home and abroad, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal investigations of crimes against the state, and guarding Russia’s borders.
The Russian FSB, provides a brief history of the FSB’s origins, placed within the context of Russian history, the government’s power structure, and Russia’s wider culture. He describes how the FSB’s mindset and priorities show continuities from the tsarist regimes and the Soviet era. The book’s chapters analyze origins, organizational structure, missions, leaders, international partners, and cultural representations such as the FSB in film and television.
Based on both English and Russian sources, this book is a well-researched introduction to understanding the FSB and its central role in Putin’s Russia.
Since its founding in 1995, the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, has regained the majority of the domestic security functions of the Soviet-era KGB. Under Vladimir Putin, who served as FSB director just before becoming president, the agency has grown to be one of the most powerful and favored organizations in Russia. The FSB not only conducts internal security but also has primacy in intelligence operations in former Soviet states. Their activities include anti-dissident operations at home and abroad, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal investigations of crimes against the state, and guarding Russia’s borders.
The Russian FSB, provides a brief history of the FSB’s origins, placed within the context of Russian history, the government’s power structure, and Russia’s wider culture. He describes how the FSB’s mindset and priorities show continuities from the tsarist regimes and the Soviet era. The book’s chapters analyze origins, organizational structure, missions, leaders, international partners, and cultural representations such as the FSB in film and television.
Based on both English and Russian sources, this book is a well-researched introduction to understanding the FSB and its central role in Putin’s Russia.
Research Interests:
https://www.sovietdefectors.com/ --------- This online resource provides a comprehensive database dedicated to the study of intelligence and state security officer defectors from the Soviet Union. This database serves as a resource for... more
https://www.sovietdefectors.com/
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This online resource provides a comprehensive database dedicated to the study of intelligence and state security officer defectors from the Soviet Union. This database serves as a resource for scholars, researchers, and enthusiasts seeking to understand the stories and revelations of individuals who made the choice to defect from the Soviet Union during its tumultuous existence.
Each person listed in this database worked at some point in their career as a full-time Soviet intelligence or state security officer, and each defected from that employment to another country.
This is the first installment of this database, covering 102 individuals who defected between 1924 and 1954.
The five groups of defectors currently in the database include:
1. Early defectors--1924-1930
2. Yezhovshchina Era--1937-1940
3. WWII Era--1941-1946
4. Early Cold War--1947-1951
5. Post-Stalin Purge--1953-1954
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This online resource provides a comprehensive database dedicated to the study of intelligence and state security officer defectors from the Soviet Union. This database serves as a resource for scholars, researchers, and enthusiasts seeking to understand the stories and revelations of individuals who made the choice to defect from the Soviet Union during its tumultuous existence.
Each person listed in this database worked at some point in their career as a full-time Soviet intelligence or state security officer, and each defected from that employment to another country.
This is the first installment of this database, covering 102 individuals who defected between 1924 and 1954.
The five groups of defectors currently in the database include:
1. Early defectors--1924-1930
2. Yezhovshchina Era--1937-1940
3. WWII Era--1941-1946
4. Early Cold War--1947-1951
5. Post-Stalin Purge--1953-1954
Research Interests:
Download at https://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Riehle_Russian-Intelligence.pdf Kevin Riehle delivers the definitive guide to Russian intelligence and security—an indispensable resource for sorting through and interpreting the... more
Download at https://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Riehle_Russian-Intelligence.pdf
Kevin Riehle delivers the definitive guide to Russian intelligence and security—an indispensable resource for sorting through and interpreting the huge amounts of publicly available information about Russian clandestine and covert activities today. The core responsibility of the Russian intelligence services is to preserve the Russian regime and protect it from internal and external threats. This book explains the organization of the services, the missions they undertake, and the human and technical platforms they use. This comprehensive volume:
--Uses a case-based approach to show current missions and functions.
--Avoids the hyperbole often found in media portrayals of Russian intelligence.
--Explains the historical interplay between Russian intelligence and security elements.
Kevin Riehle delivers the definitive guide to Russian intelligence and security—an indispensable resource for sorting through and interpreting the huge amounts of publicly available information about Russian clandestine and covert activities today. The core responsibility of the Russian intelligence services is to preserve the Russian regime and protect it from internal and external threats. This book explains the organization of the services, the missions they undertake, and the human and technical platforms they use. This comprehensive volume:
--Uses a case-based approach to show current missions and functions.
--Avoids the hyperbole often found in media portrayals of Russian intelligence.
--Explains the historical interplay between Russian intelligence and security elements.
Research Interests:
Snippet attached. The book is available at https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-soviet-defectors-hb.html Go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSuDgtEQrOI for a discussion of the book. This book is an analysis of the insider... more
Snippet attached. The book is available at https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-soviet-defectors-hb.html
Go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSuDgtEQrOI for a discussion of the book.
This book is an analysis of the insider information and insights that over eighty Soviet intelligence officer defectors revealed during the first half of the Soviet period
--Identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officer defectors for the period 1917 to 1954, representing a variety of specializations; the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date.
--Shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system.
--Shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government.
--Compiles for the first time corroborative primary sources in English, Russian, French, German, Finnish, Japanese, Latvian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish.
When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state. This book identifies a group of those defectors from the Soviet elite - intelligence officers - and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Stalin’s strategic priorities and concerns, thus to open a window into Stalin’s impenetrable national security decision making. This book uses their information to define Soviet threat perceptions and national security anxieties during Stalin’s time as Soviet leader.
Go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSuDgtEQrOI for a discussion of the book.
This book is an analysis of the insider information and insights that over eighty Soviet intelligence officer defectors revealed during the first half of the Soviet period
--Identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officer defectors for the period 1917 to 1954, representing a variety of specializations; the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date.
--Shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system.
--Shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government.
--Compiles for the first time corroborative primary sources in English, Russian, French, German, Finnish, Japanese, Latvian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish.
When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state. This book identifies a group of those defectors from the Soviet elite - intelligence officers - and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Stalin’s strategic priorities and concerns, thus to open a window into Stalin’s impenetrable national security decision making. This book uses their information to define Soviet threat perceptions and national security anxieties during Stalin’s time as Soviet leader.
Research Interests:
This book contains a indexed descendancy of Ludwig Riehl and Veronica Fisher down to their fourth great-grandchildren, with separate chapters for each of their four children who had progeny. It also contains a history of Ludwig, Veronica,... more
This book contains a indexed descendancy of Ludwig Riehl and Veronica Fisher down to their fourth great-grandchildren, with separate chapters for each of their four children who had progeny. It also contains a history of Ludwig, Veronica, and their descendants, and an explanation of the usage of the name "Riehl."
Research Interests:
https://networks.h-net.org/group/discussions/20024144/h-diplo-review-essay-547-riehle-lebedeva-russian-studies-international. Marina Lebedeva’s book, "Russian Studies of International Relations," provides a clear and succinct... more
https://networks.h-net.org/group/discussions/20024144/h-diplo-review-essay-547-riehle-lebedeva-russian-studies-international.
Marina Lebedeva’s book, "Russian Studies of International Relations," provides a clear and succinct description of how Russian experts have analyzed and written on international relations topics. the book is particularly valuable for readers who do not routinely read Russian academic literature. It traces the thinking, the institutions where that thinking was done, and the educational institutions where international relations was taught. It contains an extensive bibliography of Russian publications on international topics, covering the spectrum from global integrators and isolationists. The bibliography alone is a valuable resource for studying Russian experts’ views of the world and Russia’s place in it. Lebedeva’s analysis of that literature places it in an understandable context.
Marina Lebedeva’s book, "Russian Studies of International Relations," provides a clear and succinct description of how Russian experts have analyzed and written on international relations topics. the book is particularly valuable for readers who do not routinely read Russian academic literature. It traces the thinking, the institutions where that thinking was done, and the educational institutions where international relations was taught. It contains an extensive bibliography of Russian publications on international topics, covering the spectrum from global integrators and isolationists. The bibliography alone is a valuable resource for studying Russian experts’ views of the world and Russia’s place in it. Lebedeva’s analysis of that literature places it in an understandable context.
Research Interests:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743 Review of Boris Volodarsky, "The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History’s Greatest Heist 1917–1927" (Frontline Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2023).... more
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743
Review of Boris Volodarsky, "The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History’s Greatest Heist 1917–1927" (Frontline Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2023).
Volodarsky's latest book is the first of a six-volume “new history of the KGB.” Such a series of works, if done objectively and thoroughly, such a book would be a valuable contribution to Soviet intelligence history. However, roughly half of the book is not dedicated to the history of Soviet state security or intelligence at all. Instead, large sections describe other foreign intelligence activities directed against the Bolshevik regime and the newly established Soviet Union, especially those conducted by the British government and anti-Soviet émigrés, but also by the French, German, American, Turkish, and to a lesser extent Japanese and Czechoslovak governments. In the midst of the voluminous material about Western intelligence personnel, structure, and operations, there is a curious absence of several prominent sources about Soviet intelligence history. In general, Volodarsky provides a flood of details, some of which are documented and others not, some of which are relevant and others not, and some of which are well argued and others not. A reader could easily get lost in the minutia and incoherent narrative, but still come away with a greater understanding of British failures than of Soviet state security history.
Review of Boris Volodarsky, "The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History’s Greatest Heist 1917–1927" (Frontline Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2023).
Volodarsky's latest book is the first of a six-volume “new history of the KGB.” Such a series of works, if done objectively and thoroughly, such a book would be a valuable contribution to Soviet intelligence history. However, roughly half of the book is not dedicated to the history of Soviet state security or intelligence at all. Instead, large sections describe other foreign intelligence activities directed against the Bolshevik regime and the newly established Soviet Union, especially those conducted by the British government and anti-Soviet émigrés, but also by the French, German, American, Turkish, and to a lesser extent Japanese and Czechoslovak governments. In the midst of the voluminous material about Western intelligence personnel, structure, and operations, there is a curious absence of several prominent sources about Soviet intelligence history. In general, Volodarsky provides a flood of details, some of which are documented and others not, some of which are relevant and others not, and some of which are well argued and others not. A reader could easily get lost in the minutia and incoherent narrative, but still come away with a greater understanding of British failures than of Soviet state security history.
Research Interests:
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2229661 Nicholas Burlak published his two-volume autobiography, "Love and War: An American Volunteer in the Soviet Red Army" in 2013 under the pseudonym M. J. Nicholas. The Russian version is titled,... more
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2229661
Nicholas Burlak published his two-volume autobiography, "Love and War: An American Volunteer in the Soviet Red Army" in 2013 under the pseudonym M. J. Nicholas. The Russian version is titled, "Американский Доброволец в Красной Армии: На Т-34 от Курской Дуги до Рейсхтага." Burlak describes his life as a young American immigrant boy in the Soviet Union who became eager to fight the Nazis and joined the Red Army, while retaining his loyalty to the United States. Recently released KGB materials indicate that, far from being the loyal American that he portrays himself to be, Burlak was a productive Soviet intelligence agent after World War II and probably a Soviet intelligence illegal beginning in 1952.
Nicholas Burlak published his two-volume autobiography, "Love and War: An American Volunteer in the Soviet Red Army" in 2013 under the pseudonym M. J. Nicholas. The Russian version is titled, "Американский Доброволец в Красной Армии: На Т-34 от Курской Дуги до Рейсхтага." Burlak describes his life as a young American immigrant boy in the Soviet Union who became eager to fight the Nazis and joined the Red Army, while retaining his loyalty to the United States. Recently released KGB materials indicate that, far from being the loyal American that he portrays himself to be, Burlak was a productive Soviet intelligence agent after World War II and probably a Soviet intelligence illegal beginning in 1952.
Research Interests:
Review of Lubomir Luciuk's book, "Operation Payback: Soviet Disinformation and Alleged Nazi War Criminals in North America." The book is less about a Soviet disinformation operation, as the title suggests, than it is about animosities... more
Review of Lubomir Luciuk's book, "Operation Payback: Soviet Disinformation and Alleged Nazi War Criminals in North America."
The book is less about a Soviet disinformation operation, as the title suggests, than it is about animosities that grew out of severe societal trauma suffered by two peoples: Jews and Ukrainians. There is no question that Soviet active measures intended to deepen the divide between Jews and Ukrainians and portray Ukrainian nationalists as terrorists—Operation "Payback" (or more appropriately, Operation “Retribution”) and other KGB covert operations clearly demonstrate that such campaigns existed. The real questions, however, are: how fertile was the ground in which active measures operations were sown and how much difference did they make? Beside the KGB’s exaggeration of its own effectiveness, Soviet disinformation operations could never create the divisions that they were designed to stoke. Soviet disinformation could only exploit already existing anger, hatred, and anxiety. It fed on negativity and fueled it further. Luciuk’s book reflects the very anger and divisions that Soviet operations could exploit.
The book is less about a Soviet disinformation operation, as the title suggests, than it is about animosities that grew out of severe societal trauma suffered by two peoples: Jews and Ukrainians. There is no question that Soviet active measures intended to deepen the divide between Jews and Ukrainians and portray Ukrainian nationalists as terrorists—Operation "Payback" (or more appropriately, Operation “Retribution”) and other KGB covert operations clearly demonstrate that such campaigns existed. The real questions, however, are: how fertile was the ground in which active measures operations were sown and how much difference did they make? Beside the KGB’s exaggeration of its own effectiveness, Soviet disinformation operations could never create the divisions that they were designed to stoke. Soviet disinformation could only exploit already existing anger, hatred, and anxiety. It fed on negativity and fueled it further. Luciuk’s book reflects the very anger and divisions that Soviet operations could exploit.
Research Interests:
Reassessing and re-adjudicating Cold War espionage cases has become increasingly possible as archives open and new insights come to light from previously classified materials. Amy Knight did so in her 2005 book How the Cold War Began,... more
Reassessing and re-adjudicating Cold War espionage cases has become increasingly possible as archives open and new insights come to light from previously classified materials. Amy Knight did so in her 2005 book How the Cold War Began, writing a defense of those whose names Soviet military intelligence code clerk Igor Gouzenko revealed when he defected in Ottawa in September 1945. In their 2006 book Early Cold War Spies, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr used material from the U.S. Venona program that were made public in the 1990s to reassess the controversial case of U.S. Department of State official Alger Hiss among others. Margaret Murányi Manchester has taken on the task of re-adjudicating a less prominent case in which two American and British businessmen, Robert A. Vogeler and Edgar Sanders, were arrested in Hungary for espionage in 1949. Manchester claims that the two suspects were, in fact, guilty as charged, despite ardent complaints by the American and British governments that the cases were little more than Communist propaganda. Manchester’s article provides no smoking gun that Vogeler and Sanders were guilty of espionage. In instances where such a smoking gun might materialize, the records are not available.
Research Interests:
This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/39CIU2ICZ6VV5TEHNTQH/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1794302 This review essay looks at two books that cover the topic of Russian covert operations: Thomas Rid,... more
This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/39CIU2ICZ6VV5TEHNTQH/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1794302
This review essay looks at two books that cover the topic of Russian covert operations:
Thomas Rid, "Active Measures: The Soviet History of Disinformation and Political Warfare"
and
Scott Jasper, "Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict"
Rid uses a historical approach to show continuity and development over time, while Jasper focuses exclusively on recent “cyber” operations, paying little attention to how they fit into the context of history. As Russian cyber operations are at their essence covert, Rid’s book allows for a more complete analysis of those operations. Rid’s treatment is more effective than trying to detangle recent “cyber” operations divorced from history.
This review essay looks at two books that cover the topic of Russian covert operations:
Thomas Rid, "Active Measures: The Soviet History of Disinformation and Political Warfare"
and
Scott Jasper, "Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict"
Rid uses a historical approach to show continuity and development over time, while Jasper focuses exclusively on recent “cyber” operations, paying little attention to how they fit into the context of history. As Russian cyber operations are at their essence covert, Rid’s book allows for a more complete analysis of those operations. Rid’s treatment is more effective than trying to detangle recent “cyber” operations divorced from history.
Research Interests:
This book review essay can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YKZYKJRURMJIWHMTUZPF/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1764701 Review of "Russians among us: sleeper cells, ghost stories, and the hunt for Putin’s spies," by... more
This book review essay can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YKZYKJRURMJIWHMTUZPF/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1764701
Review of "Russians among us: sleeper cells, ghost stories, and the hunt for Putin’s spies," by Gordon Corera, and "Женщина, которая умеет хранить тайны" ("The woman who knows how to keep secrets"), by Andrey Bronnikov and Yelena Vavilova.
Operation Ghost Stories is the FBI code name for a decade-long operation involving multiple Russian intelligence officers operating as illegals in the United States, with further connections to others in Germany, Canada, and beyond. BBC journalist Gordon Corera has presented the most comprehensive and contextualized portrayal of the FBI’s Ghost Stories operation to date in his book "Russians Among Us." Vavilova was among the illegals arrested in the 2010 FBI Ghost Stories arrests, and her book adds first-hand insights into the life of an illegal.
Review of "Russians among us: sleeper cells, ghost stories, and the hunt for Putin’s spies," by Gordon Corera, and "Женщина, которая умеет хранить тайны" ("The woman who knows how to keep secrets"), by Andrey Bronnikov and Yelena Vavilova.
Operation Ghost Stories is the FBI code name for a decade-long operation involving multiple Russian intelligence officers operating as illegals in the United States, with further connections to others in Germany, Canada, and beyond. BBC journalist Gordon Corera has presented the most comprehensive and contextualized portrayal of the FBI’s Ghost Stories operation to date in his book "Russians Among Us." Vavilova was among the illegals arrested in the 2010 FBI Ghost Stories arrests, and her book adds first-hand insights into the life of an illegal.
Research Interests:
Downlaod at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/XEESNYEAPQJVBJIAAR5C/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1711559. Sean Kalic, professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, has undertaken the ambitious... more
Downlaod at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/XEESNYEAPQJVBJIAAR5C/full?target=10.1080/02684527.2020.1711559.
Sean Kalic, professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, has undertaken the ambitious task of describing in a single volume what he calls the “espionage game”—the competition between Soviet and U.S. intelligence services—throughout the whole course of the Cold War. The book gives a broad overview of that game and the evolution of priorities, methods, and technology that went into it.
Sean Kalic, professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, has undertaken the ambitious task of describing in a single volume what he calls the “espionage game”—the competition between Soviet and U.S. intelligence services—throughout the whole course of the Cold War. The book gives a broad overview of that game and the evolution of priorities, methods, and technology that went into it.
Research Interests:
Soviet soldiers may have allowed themselves to be captured because they had lost hope in the face of an overwhelming German onslaught. At the other end of the spectrum, some Soviet soldiers “voted with their feet” against a repressive... more
Soviet soldiers may have allowed themselves to be captured because they had lost hope in the face of an overwhelming German onslaught. At the other end of the spectrum, some Soviet soldiers “voted with their feet” against a repressive Stalinist regime and actively supported the German effort to defeat the Soviet Union. Mark Edele, in his brief, brilliantly documented book Stalin’s Defectors: How Red Army Soldiers became Hitler’s Collaborators, 1941-1945, seeks to explain the motivations of soldiers across all of those variations, but he focuses his attention on Soviet soldiers who did, in fact, collaborate with German forces, in some cases participating in brutal and murderous Nazi actions against the peoples of Eastern Europe.
Research Interests:
I began reading Howard Blum’s book, In the Enemy’s House, wondering what it would add to the already solid foundation of scholarship on the Venona program. The two main figures in the initial exploitation of the Venona intercepts—and the... more
I began reading Howard Blum’s book, In the Enemy’s House, wondering what it would add to the already solid foundation of scholarship on the Venona program. The two main figures in the initial exploitation of the Venona intercepts—and the two central characters in Blum’s book—were Robert (Bob) Lamphere, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent; and Meredith Gardner, a cryptologist at the Army Security Agency (ASA). These two individuals, who were opposites in personality but similar in drive, formed the unlikely team that combined their talents and the capabilities of their agencies to identify the real people behind the code names in Soviet intelligence operational cables.
Research Interests:
Kaarlo Tuomi was one of over 20 Soviet-era KGB and GRU illegals who defected. Tuomi was, however, a reluctant defector, and he maintained that he continued loyal to his Soviet convictions to the end. Despite his loyalty, Tuomi felt... more
Kaarlo Tuomi was one of over 20 Soviet-era KGB and GRU illegals who defected. Tuomi was, however, a reluctant defector, and he maintained that he continued loyal to his Soviet convictions to the end. Despite his loyalty, Tuomi felt betrayed by his GRU handlers, who he claims failed to prepare him for the possibility that he might fall into the hands of U.S. counterintelligence. He felt, when that in fact occurred, that he was left to his own devices, and that he had no choice but to cooperate with the FBI and then to remain in the United States when the Soviet Union made plans to bring him home. Tuomi died in 1995, but this English edition of his autobiography was published in 2014, a translation of the Finnish edition published 30 years earlier.
Research Interests:
Information about the Canadian double agent codenamed GIDEON first appeared in 1982, when Canadian journalist John Sawatsky unearthed information about the operation while researching a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) official,... more
Information about the Canadian double agent codenamed GIDEON first appeared in 1982, when Canadian journalist John Sawatsky unearthed information about the operation while researching a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) official, Leslie James Bennett. Donald Mahar’s new book compiles most previously published information about GIDEON, whose real name was Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Brik, along with RCMP Constable James Morrison, who compromised him to the Soviet Union. However, as a retired Canadian intelligence officer and Brik’s handler, Mahar’s first-hand exposure to the Brik case gives his book a personal feel. Mahar also supplements published material and corrects myths that have circulated about the case. Because of his direct access to RCMP files, Mahar provides more credible background information about Brik than has appeared previously.
Research Interests:
Jonathan Haslam intertwines two separate narratives into his book Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. One narrative gives a running assessment of Soviet intelligence senior leaders across the history of the... more
Jonathan Haslam intertwines two separate narratives into his book Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. One narrative gives a running assessment of Soviet intelligence senior leaders across the history of the Soviet Union. The other portrays the challenges the Soviet Union faced in developing cryptography both for defensive and offensive purposes. The two narratives share few intersection points, and the book oscillates between them in roughly parallel chronologies. While Haslam’s compilation of materials, particularly about the uneven progress of Soviet cryptography, makes this book worth reading for a serious student of Soviet intelligence history, it does not live up to its aspiration of telling the whole story of Soviet intelligence, and a comprehensive study of Soviet intelligence history is still to be written.
Research Interests:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQwbxneyzbI: Interview with BelsatTV on recent events related to Russian intelligence and the targets that Russian intelligence services are pursuing.
Research Interests:
https://whalehunting.projectbrazen.com/craft-kevin-riehle/ In this edition of CRAFT, Kevin Riehle tells us about his decades-long career in counterintelligence, a former supervisor who turned out to be a Russian mole, which country... more
https://whalehunting.projectbrazen.com/craft-kevin-riehle/
In this edition of CRAFT, Kevin Riehle tells us about his decades-long career in counterintelligence, a former supervisor who turned out to be a Russian mole, which country received the most Soviet defectors and more.
Whale Hunting is FREE if you subscribe.
In this edition of CRAFT, Kevin Riehle tells us about his decades-long career in counterintelligence, a former supervisor who turned out to be a Russian mole, which country received the most Soviet defectors and more.
Whale Hunting is FREE if you subscribe.
Research Interests:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gF5jsdi89kg&t=14s Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's intelligence services and their global activities. He wrote the book on Russian Intelligence, and takes us inside the cloak & dagger world... more
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gF5jsdi89kg&t=14s
Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's intelligence services and their global activities.
He wrote the book on Russian Intelligence, and takes us inside the cloak & dagger world of modern spycraft. Dr. Kevin Riehle discusses the origin, evolution, and operations of Russian Intelligence agencies and describes some of their key success and failures.
Dr. Kevin Riehle is an Associate Professor at University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies. Dr. Riehle literally “wrote the book” on Russian Intelligence, along with a definitive book on Soviet Defectors, as well as dozens of papers on Russian espionage, spycraft, military strategy, and cold war history.
Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's intelligence services and their global activities.
He wrote the book on Russian Intelligence, and takes us inside the cloak & dagger world of modern spycraft. Dr. Kevin Riehle discusses the origin, evolution, and operations of Russian Intelligence agencies and describes some of their key success and failures.
Dr. Kevin Riehle is an Associate Professor at University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies. Dr. Riehle literally “wrote the book” on Russian Intelligence, along with a definitive book on Soviet Defectors, as well as dozens of papers on Russian espionage, spycraft, military strategy, and cold war history.
Research Interests:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTCXlmLl_3Q Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's war, its origins, and prospects for the future. Was Russia's invasion provoked by Ukraine's bid to join NATO, or is there more to the story? Dr.... more
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTCXlmLl_3Q
Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's war, its origins, and prospects for the future.
Was Russia's invasion provoked by Ukraine's bid to join NATO, or is there more to the story? Dr. Kevin Riehle discusses the conflict's origins, Russia's strategic goals, NATO encirclement, the Donbas dispute, Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, and the potential for future escalation.
Interview with Tim Ventura about Russia's war, its origins, and prospects for the future.
Was Russia's invasion provoked by Ukraine's bid to join NATO, or is there more to the story? Dr. Kevin Riehle discusses the conflict's origins, Russia's strategic goals, NATO encirclement, the Donbas dispute, Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, and the potential for future escalation.
Research Interests:
The core responsibility of the Russian intelligence services is to preserve the Russian regime and protect it from internal and external threats. How exactly do they do that? And what can be learned? Dr. Kevin Riehle, Associate Professor... more
The core responsibility of the Russian intelligence services is to preserve the Russian regime and protect it from internal and external threats. How exactly do they do that? And what can be learned?
Dr. Kevin Riehle, Associate Professor at University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, mined all the open-source information he could find to discover the answer. With his new book, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present, he has created the definitive guide to Russian intelligence and security.
Join SPY historian Dr. Andrew Hammond for a discussion with Riehle about the organization of the Russian services, the missions they undertake, and the human and technical platforms they use. They’ll cover the basics of who or what is targeted and why. And they will also explore the nitty gritty of how. From the use of non-intelligence personnel like Maria Butina to the key themes that Russia repeats in all disinformation campaigns, Riehle has systematically explored and detailed the inner workings of Russian intelligence. Find out why he calls Russian intelligence a formidable adversary, but not one that is “10 feet tall and bullet proof.”
NOTE: Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present may be downloaded for free from the National Intelligence University.
Dr. Kevin Riehle, Associate Professor at University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, mined all the open-source information he could find to discover the answer. With his new book, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present, he has created the definitive guide to Russian intelligence and security.
Join SPY historian Dr. Andrew Hammond for a discussion with Riehle about the organization of the Russian services, the missions they undertake, and the human and technical platforms they use. They’ll cover the basics of who or what is targeted and why. And they will also explore the nitty gritty of how. From the use of non-intelligence personnel like Maria Butina to the key themes that Russia repeats in all disinformation campaigns, Riehle has systematically explored and detailed the inner workings of Russian intelligence. Find out why he calls Russian intelligence a formidable adversary, but not one that is “10 feet tall and bullet proof.”
NOTE: Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present may be downloaded for free from the National Intelligence University.
Research Interests:
"Den kække brasilianske forsker havde altid døren lukket. Hvordan en russisk agent endte på et norsk universitet," https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sejdmyL9-a8l4XGdY-03c27 Interviewed for article by Mathias Mencke and Oscar Wils... more
"Den kække brasilianske forsker havde altid døren lukket. Hvordan en russisk agent endte på et norsk universitet," https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sejdmyL9-a8l4XGdY-03c27
Interviewed for article by Mathias Mencke and Oscar Wils Raagevang, Zetland.dk, 16 December 2022.
Article discusses Mikhail Mikushin, a Russian GRU illegal officer who was arrested in Norway in October 2022 posing as a Brazilian researcher at the Arctic University of Norway.
Interviewed for article by Mathias Mencke and Oscar Wils Raagevang, Zetland.dk, 16 December 2022.
Article discusses Mikhail Mikushin, a Russian GRU illegal officer who was arrested in Norway in October 2022 posing as a Brazilian researcher at the Arctic University of Norway.