Russian war in Ukraine

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

Les raisons de l'enlisement de l'armée russe Comment la deuxième plus grande armée du monde dont le budget dépasse les 60 milliards $ par année qui a eu recours à 190 000 hommes et à plus de 1200 chars d'assaut a-t-elle pu être freinée par la 22 ème armée du monde ? Voilà une situation qui a été extrêmement surprenante pour plusieurs.

Hai-Nyzhnyk Pavlo. Russian-Ukrainian War — War for Life (2014—2022): Periodization // Ukrainian Studies. – 2022. – №1. – C.51–76.

Гай-Нижник П. Російсько-українська війна – Війна за Життя (2014–2022 рр.): періодизація // Українознавство. – 2022. – №1. – C.51–76.

Агресія Росії проти України: історичні передумови та сучасні виклики / П.П.Гай-Нижник (керівник проекту, упоряд. і наук. ред.); авт. кол.: П. П. Гай-Нижник, Л. Л. Залізняк, І.Й.Краснодемська, Ю.С.Фігурний, О.А.Чирков, Л.В.Чупрій. – К.: «МП Леся», 2016. – 586 с.

Автори колективної монографії «Агресія Росії проти України: історичні переду-
мови та сучасні виклики» подали увазі читача власний погляд на історичні витоки та паралелі російської агресії проти України, здійснили наукову оцінку Російській Федерації як державі-агресору та спонсору міжнародного тероризму, проаналізували російсько-українську війну, що розпочалася у 2014 р. внаслідок віроломного нападу Росії, а також сучасні виклики та шляхи зміцнення системи національної безпеки України. Пропонується увазі державних органів влади, істориків, політологів, викладачів вищих навчальних закладів, студентів й усіх, хто цікавиться новітньою історією України і є небайдужим до долі соборної і самостійної України.
Колективна монографія містить результати досліджень, проведених за грантової підтримки Державного фонду фундаментальних досліджень за конкурсним проектом (Ф-72/21443) «Історичні передумови та сучасні суспільні наслідки агресії Російської Федерації проти України».

Dans son discours du 24 février 2022, Vladimir Poutine en a choqué plus d'un en justifiant l'intervention militaire de la Russie en Ukraine par sa volonté de « démilitariser et de dénazifier » le régime de Volodymyr Zelenski. Qu'insinuait donc dire le Président russe par cette déclaration qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre ?

The war in Ukraine is heavily mediated by connected devices and social media platforms. The smartphone for example is being used for all sorts of purposes, ranging from calling home to sharing news about the war. Crucially these devices also provide targeting information that can be used by both sides to identify what to attack and how successful attacks have been. The implication is that civilian and military information infrastructures for both information sharing and targeting are now tightly bound. On the one hand this creates new attack surfaces even as it hardens the resiliency of the kill chain. On the other, the use of a smartphone might be interpreted as a hostile act, the consequence of which is to blur civilian and combatant status.

Російська агресія проти України: правда і вигадки, причини і наслідки / П.П.Гай-Нижник (керівник проекту, упоряд. і наук. ред.); авт. кол.: П.П.Гай-Нижник, І.Й.Краснодемська, Ю.С.Фігурний, О.А.Чирков, Л.В.Чупрій. – К.: «МП Леся», 2018. – 435 c.

This post will reveal the history of Ukraine’s continuing warning to Europe, and in particular to German authorities about the security dangers of the violent Russian regime and politics. It will demonstrate how the ignorant and weak reaction of German politics to these threats (given the prevalence of economic interests over security and European values) indirectly supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and how the Russian regime abused European languidness and neutrality to launch a large-scale war in Europe. This blogpost is not so much about condemning the mistakes of European politicians, but about suggesting ways to solve these problems, taking into account the experience with obvious mistakes.

Ukraine’s armed forces have outsourced parts of the kill chain to civilians. Civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army by using their smartphones. This information can be verified and crosschecked against data points provided by other smartphone users and/or other intelligence sources. The Ukrainian armed forces can then direct remote fire onto the targets that civilians have identified. On the battlefields outside Kyiv, civilians have become sensors, extending the targeting cycle into civil society. This has the effect of creating a more resilient targeting process but also means that anyone with a smartphone may become a target of enemy action. There are a lot of unknowns – especially in relation to how the new war ecology (see part 1 dated 8 April 2022) is geared for targeting. This paper outlines the initial questions that need further research.

Before 24 February 2022, the Russian-Ukrainian agreements signed in the capital of Belarus in 2014–2015 were seen by many observers as a path to a settlement of the Donbas conflict. However, the contradictory Minsk deals were signed under duress. Contrary to a common belief held over the past seven years, the various documents the Kremlin forced on Kyiv in the context of devastating Ukrainian military defeats by regular and irregular Russian forces in September 2014 and February 2015 were not a solution but part of the problem. These agreements were partially in manifest violation of international law as they undermined such principles as the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-use of force and national self-determination. Their welcome and legitimization by various Western states effectively helped to make more permanent transgressions that undermined the post-1945 international system. The Minsk Agreements also implicitly undermined basic democratic standards. They constituted Kremlin instruments to harvest the fruits of Russia’s initially covert military aggression against Ukraine. Oddly, Western states furthered the Kremlin’s obvious subversion of the European Security Order by condoning the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements and pressuring Ukraine to implement their more dubious provisions, while also insufficiently supporting a normatively acceptable interpretation of the agreements and not holding Moscow accountable for its violations of the agreements and subversion of the negotiations in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and elsewhere. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/russias-dictated-non-peace-for-ukraine-in-2014-2022/

Ukraine’s civilians can provide crowdsourced geolocated target information to the Ukrainian Army. This has the effect of creating a more resilient targeting process but also implies that anyone with a smartphone may become a target of enemy action. Now the question is whether raising a smartphone to photograph an enemy column constitutes a hostile act. There is already video evidence online showing how people using smartphones to record Russian military activity have found themselves under fire.  In addition, The Economist reporter Tim Juddah observes that, ‘The Russians arrested people and shot them in the street to make an example because what they were really frightened of was the Ukrainians using their phones to report to Ukrainian forces their positions’.  This does not justify the atrocities committed by the Russians but it remains an open question as to how the spiral of violence was triggered given the evidence so far accumulated.

Ein Überblick über die verschiedenen Kriegstheater.
1. Rund um Kiew befinden sich die russischen Verbände auf dem Rückzug.
2. Bei Charkiw operieren ukrainische mechanisierte Verbände erfolgreich.
3. Bei Isium droht die Entscheidungsschlacht um die Donbas-Regionen.
4. Die Kämpfe in Mariupol dauern an und führen auf beiden Seiten zu schweren Verlusten.
5. Bei Cherson am rechten Dnjepr-Ufer wurden die Russen in die Defensive gedrängt.
6. Eine russische Landung in Odessa scheint immer unwahrscheinlicher.

This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia's demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions by Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in the Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation.

The Northern-Eastern neighbour was destroying Kyiv since 12th century. Those were lands where Moscoviya was born, and a new ethnicity was formed, which substantially differed from kyivan rusychi, halychany, volyniany, siveriany by national character, world-view, mentality. However, the motive of that neighbor to eliminate Ukrainians became evident since the 17th century when it stole the name of the old State of Kyivan Rus, thus be named Russia and started to do everything possible to eliminate the descendants of Kyivan Rus who, after the name of their state was stolen, chose another name - Ukraine. In November 1708 Baturyn, the Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa's capital, was burnt to ashes by emperor Peter I armed forces headed by Menshykov. This tragedy took lives of more than 16000 civilians of the city, mostly women, children and elderly people, with relatively small number of militaries - Cossacks. President of Ukraine in 2005-2010 Victor Yushchenko fairly considers this date to be the date of deep and all-embracing enslavement of Ukrainians by Russians. Since then one may trace the ongoing genocide of Ukrainians by Russians which has been conducting with the intent to destroy Ukrainians by means of different acts and in different forms: physical annihilation, deportations, imprisonment, attacks on the Ukrainian language, culture, religion, intelligence, and on everything important for existence of a nation. There were culminations in that ongoing genocide, like 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine within the Holodomor-genocide in the first half of the 20th century. What we are witnessing since 24 th February 2022 is another culmination of Russian genocide against the Ukrainian nation - a crime, which is being committed with clear intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Ukrainian nation as such. This short paper examines some proofs of genocidal intent of Russia.

This article examines representations of the enemy in the Ukrainian satirical songs pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. I focus primarily on the output of Orest Liutyi (the stage persona of Antin Mukhars'kyi) and the semianonymous Mirko Sablich (Mirko Sablic) collective. Using the method of multimodal discourse analysis, I examine how the enemy opposing the Ukrainian Army is portrayed in the song lyrics and the accompanying music videos. Considering the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of uniformity in the backgrounds of the warring parties, I am particularly interested in who and why is identified as the enemy in the songs. The enemy appears in several guises: "moskal's" -- Russian or pro-Russian aggressors from outside Ukraine; "separs" -- Ukrainian collaborators who support, often through military efforts, the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine; and "vatniks" -- passive anti-Ukrainian individuals who live in Ukraine and whose inaction is perceived to be harmful to Ukraine's wartime efforts. Whereas these songs call upon Ukrainians to repel the external enemy ("moskal's") in armed combat, no clear strategy is suggested for how the internal enemies ("separs" and "vatniks") should be dealt with or, in some cases, even identified. As a result, Liutyi and Sablic, while positioning themselves as "counterpropaganda" projects, risk labelling as "the enemy," and thus alienating, the audiences most susceptible to propaganda, who could otherwise benefit most from their myth-debunking efforts.

У першому томі авторського видавничого проєкту “Воїни світла” зібра-
но 13 інтерв’ю із учасниками бойових дій російсько-української війни (з
2014 р.), доля яких пов’язана зі Львівським національним університетом
імені Івана Франка. Наші респонденти – студенти, випускники, працівники
університету, які стали військовослужбовцями чи добровольцями фронту. У
розповідях відтворені мотиваційні контексти, питання матеріального забез-
печення фронту, побратимства, труднощі, із якими довелося зіштовхнутись,
перебуваючи на війні тощо. Мета проєкту – показати інтелектуальну та від-
повідальну особистість перед воєнними викликами сьогодення. Усі інтерв’ю
записані за допомогою методу усної історії, що дає можливість максимально
зберегти автентичність мови та джерельних свідчень. Розповіді проілюстро-
вані фотографіями з особистих архівів оповідачів і картами, що відображають
ситуацію у зоні проведення АТО у 2014–2017 рр.
Книга призначена для дослідників російсько-українського конфлікту,
психологів, соціологів, учнів, студентів і викладачів шкіл і вишів, військово-
службовців та всіх зацікавлених.

Der ukrainische Außenminister Dmytro Kuleba hat im amerikanischen 'Foreign Affairs'-Magazin einen Artikel geschrieben, in dem er erklärt, wie die Ukraine den aktuellen Krieg gegen Russland gewinnen wird.

Dies ist die deutsche Übersetzung mitsamt einer Zusammenfassung davon.

Obwohl die Neutralität ein Markenzeichen der Schweiz darstellt, wurde sie seit der Gründung des modernen Bundesstaates im Jahre 1848 nie im Zweckartikel der Bundesverfassung erwähnt. Dies deshalb, weil sie immer als Mittel zum Zweck, als rationales Kalkül der Aussenpolitik galt. Dass die die Neutralität dermassen mythologisiert wurde, hängt mit ihrer wichtigen Rolle für ein nationales Geschäftsmodell zusammen, das heute in einer tiefen Krise steckt. Das Interview geht der Frage nach, wie eine neutrale Haltung künftig ausgestaltet werden könnte, damit sie in einer Zeit, in der sich andere Länder von ihr abwenden, weiterhin Sinn macht.

Abstract: In this contribution, information security and hybrid war are examined through the media terrain of modern conflict between Russia and other nations. This paper explores common instances of reaction to Russian information aggression against Ukraine, the European Union and other countries. In their battle for public opinion in Russia itself, Europe and overseas, state-controlled Russian media employ well known or new methods of propaganda. Russian agents of influence work not only at RT Channel worldwide but can also make the respected media in the United Kingdom, France or other countries publish Russian spin-doctors’ messages. The internet has also become a battlefield for Russian trolls and hackers. The common ways of responding to these challenges by Ukraine and other East-Central European countries are examined and discussed to identify their weaknesses.

Keywords: information security, information warfare, hybrid warfare, Russia, Ukraine, EU, NATO.

The lie of Vladimir Putin's adherents destroys not only the mentality of Russians — it destroys their brains, bringing them dementia. // Ложь адептов Владимира Путина разрушает не только ментальность россиян — она разрушает их мозг, неся им слабоумие.

Contribution to a symposium on Polanyi and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Held by the International Karl Polanyi Society.
Other contributors: Fred Block, Florin Poenaru, Katharina Pistor, Maria Markantonatou, Maja Savevska, Mariavittoria Catanzariti, Michael Brie, Michele Cangiani, Claus Thomasberger.

Since its first issues, Engramma has come to terms with images in war. In 2001, after the attack on the Twin Towers; in 2015, an issue dedicated to the abecedaries of Aby Warburg, Bertolt Brecht, and Ernst Jünger; at the end of 2015, an issue on the martyrdom of Palmyra, dedicated to the archaeologist Khaled Al Asaad. But already since 2008 Engramma has hosted various contributions and devoted several monographic issues to the protection of cultural heritage, wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction. March 2022 – and it is war time again. The first section of this special issue is dedicated to James Hillman and his reflections on Ares and the "terrible love of war". The third section collects interviews and interventions by Italian intellectuals who speak with voices that are dissonant with the stadium choirs that pollute the senses and dull critical intelligence: Nadia Fusini, Luciano Canfora, Lorenzo Braccesi, Moni Ovadia, Massimo Cacciari, and Salvatore Settis. At the heart of this issue of Engramma, you can find an Image Gallery, edited by Seminario Mnemosyne in six chapters: I. Enlisting Icons; II. Pornographic Romanticism; III. The Crusade of the Children; IV. "Still Dead"; V. In hoc signo; VI. Despite everything, Images.

Sanctions contre la Russie : Comment l'Occident pourrait être victime de sa propre médecine « Étouffer l'économie russe » et « imposer une guerre économique totale à la Russie » : voilà en quelques mots quelle était l'intention des États occidentaux lorsqu'ils ont imposé des sanctions économiques d'une sévérité sans précédent. À défaut de faire la guerre directement à Vladimir Poutine, l'objectif consistait donc à faire de la Russie un paria mondial et à retourner sa population ainsi que ses élites contre son dirigeant. L'Occident se frotte les mains et se réjouit de sa stratégie qui ne peut échouer. Mais, est-ce vraiment le cas ? Y at -il réellement matière à se réjouir ?

Ob es einen Staatsbankrott geben wird oder nicht, hängt von den laufenden Verhandlungen Kiews mit seinen Gläubigern ab. Er würde zu einer neuen Abwertungsspirale führen und die Inflation nochmals anheizen. Bereits jetzt häufen sich kleinere soziale Proteste, die vom Kreml gern gesehen und medial begleitet werden. Sollte sich die Wirtschaftslage weiter destabilisieren, droht dem Land eine Protestwelle mit unvorhersehbaren politischen Folgen.

Anotações e reflexões sobre a Guerra da Ucrânia, atualizando o conceito de um 'nuclear crazy state', formulado por Yehezkel Dror em 1980. E anotações sobre a sua repercussão na política brasileira. (Textos publicados e datados em minha página do Facebook)

Méditation sur le rêve européen et russe de Kiev, et hommage à la capitale ukrainienne menacée par l’armée russe (18 mars 2022).

"Kiev belongs by right to the dreams of Europe, but we do not want Kiev to exist only in our dreams: we also want a real Kiev, a Kiev in reality”
Meditation on the European and Russian dream of Kiev, and tribute to the Ukrainian capital threatened by the Russian army (18 March 2022).

An effective cooperation of a legitimate Ukrainian government in a country-wide demilitarization would be difficult for Russia to secure. A direct demilitarization by a Russian occupation or puppet regime would, in turn, be difficult to implement.

Продолжающаяся война в Украине является не только вооруженным конфликтом, но и столкновением искаженных восприятий, мифов и эмоционально нагруженных нарративов, артикулируемых как с российской, так и с украинской стороны, но также активно использующихся в западном экспертном сообществе и масс-медиа. Поэтому, говоря о событиях в Украине последних двух лет, необходимо не упускать из виду и те риторические стратегии, которые активно используются для интерпретации и категоризации этого конфликта.

In the spring of 2021, particularly in March and April, international news agencies began reporting Russian military build-up along Ukraine's borders and in the Crimean Peninsula, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Although the war rhetoric in news agencies relatively softened over the summer, it has begun to escalate once again starting in October 2021 which led to Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. This article seeks to answer the following questions: Why did Russia decide to invade Ukraine despite its upper hand in the peace negotiations with Kyiv? What is Russia’s endgame in Ukraine? Should we focus on relations between Russia and the United States, bypassing Ukraine, to find out a plausible explanation for the war? To what extent do Putin’s personal desires play a role in escalating tensions?

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

Taking into consideration the scale of Ukrainian resistance on the ground and the unprecedented unity of the collective West against Russia at the geopolitical level, it is easy to assume that the world will not be transformed in the direction expected by Putin any more than it was transformed in the direction desired by the Japanese militarists after Pearl Harbor. However, this does not necessarily mean that it will go in the direction expected or desired by the West either. A dangerous, uncertain transition to a different global system may lie ahead, due to the structural and economic reasons detailed below, which bring the impact of the war to practically every doorstep worldwide.

Since its first issues, Engramma has come to terms with images in war. In 2001, after the attack on the Twin Towers; in 2015, an issue dedicated to the abecedaries of Aby Warburg, Bertolt Brecht, and Ernst Jünger; at the end of 2015, an issue on the martyrdom of Palmyra, dedicated to the archaeologist Khaled Al Asaad. But already since 2008 Engramma has hosted various contributions and devoted several monographic issues to the protection of cultural heritage, wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction. March 2022 – and it is war time again. The first section of this special issue is dedicated to James Hillman and his reflections on Ares and the "terrible love of war". The third section collects interviews and interventions by Italian intellectuals who speak with voices that are dissonant with the stadium choirs that pollute the senses and dull critical intelligence: Nadia Fusini, Luciano Canfora, Lorenzo Braccesi, Moni Ovadia, Massimo Cacciari, and Salvatore Settis. At the heart of this issue of Engramma, you can find an Image Gallery, edited by Seminario Mnemosyne in six chapters: I. Enlisting Icons; II. Pornographic Romanticism; III. The Crusade of the Children; IV. "Still Dead"; V. In hoc signo; VI. Despite everything, Images.

Conferenza | Aula gradoni, Tolentini, Venezia

Presentazione del volume: Engramma 190. Figli di Marte 2022
conversazione tra Aldo Ferrari e la Redazione di Engramma
interverrà Rino Rocchelli, padre di Andy.

Marzo 2022, ed è di nuovo tempo di guerra. Questa volta la guerra è molto più vicina, non solo per la geografia ma per la titanica invasione mediatica e per la violenza dell’occupazione dello spazio del pensiero. La guerra ci fa orrore ma la risposta non può essere un facile pacifismo, né si può essere pacificati o arresi allo stato delle cose. Una definizione di pace al negativo, come assenza di conflitto, non serve a impedire le stragi e le distruzioni. Questo numero di Engramma nasce come risposta all’attacco che la guerra sempre muove alla ragione e all’intelligenza critica: perciò ospita una serie di interventi di figure rilevanti nel panorama culturale italiano, ma il suo motore è un altro, ovvero l’urgenza di articolare una viva forma della militanza psichica in un lavoro scientifico svolto in forma corale.

Per seguire la conferenza via streaming: http://live.iuav.it/streaming_aula.html?aula=tole_sala_gradoni

This paper analyses how the Soviet-style memory of WWII was gradually reinterpreted and integrated into Russian foreign policy in order to oppose what Russians see as Western expansionism, particularly in relations with Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states. The enlargement of NATO (1999 and 2004) and the EU (2004 and 2007) is considered by Russian leadership as one-sided revision of the post-WWII order in Europe. Since then, the use of WWII in Russia's foreign and internal politics has reflected the growing revanchist mood in the Russian leadership and Russian society. The references to the WWII were frequently made by Russian leadership and mass-media in 2014 in order to legitimize Russia's annexation of Crimea and military interference in Donbas as well as to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Effacer la culture russe ? Pourquoi la question se pose Depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine, des voix se sont rapidement élevées en Occident pour déclarer indésirables les produits, institutions, acteurs culturels russes ou liés à la Russie. Ce texte propose de revenir sur le contexte propre à l'aire slave, non pour suggérer qu'il faudrait effectivement effacer la culture russe, mais pour faire comprendre pourquoi la question se pose.

This book first proves that the rationale behind Russia’s aggressive actions in its neighborhood resides in its goal of achieving certain geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined by the state’s imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were once Russian. In other words, Russia constantly remains an expansion-oriented and centralized state regardless of epochs and political regimes ruling over it. That is its geopolitical modus operandi successfully tested throughout history. This book also scrutinizes Ukraine as a young post-colonial and post-communist state which, unlike Russia, is more prone to democratize and decentralize. To understand the logics of the ongoing Ukrainian transformation, its domestic and international developments are assessed in their connection to the Soviet political tradition and the medieval legacy of the Cossack statehood (15–18 centuries). This book outlines differences between the political cultures of Ukrainian and Russian nations. This envisages scrutiny of historical experiences and their impacts on the Ukrainian and Russian state-building, institutional structures, national identity, religious issues, and other features of sovereignty. Based on these discoveries, a structure of symbolic thinking which predefines indigenous understandings of justice and order has been constructed for Ukrainians and Russians.

Od początku lat siedemdziesiątych w Charkowie działały liczne grupy fotograficzne, zbierające się w nieformalnie działających klubach, zjawisko zwane dziś potocznie charkowską szkołą fotografii. Działali w opozycji do tego, co proponowała radziecka propaganda, w tym czasie „jedyna i słuszna”. Grupa fotografów spotykała się, aby rozmawiać o sztuce, też tej poza granicami ZSRR. Jednym z nich, krytycznym komentatorem sowieckiej rzeczywistości, jest Boris Mikhailov (ur. 1938), którego fotografie dryfują na pograniczu dokumentu, fotografii społecznej i sztuki konceptualnej. W latach siedemdziesiątych był członkiem grupy Vremya (ros. Czas), do której należeli też Yuri Rupin i Evgeny Pavlov. Charkowska tradycja pracujących wspólnie grup fotograficznych stała się inspiracją dla grupy Shilo, założonej w 2010 roku przez Sergiy’a Lebedynskyy’ego, Vadyma Trykoza i Vladyslava Krasnoshchoka; naukowca, inżyniera i chirurga. Młodzi twórcy znaleźli rok wcześniej pamiętnik Rupina, prywatne notatki o fotograficznym życiu Charkowa w latach osiemdziesiątych, co było na tyle inspirujące, że postanowili ożywić umarłe po rozpadzie ZSRR charkowskie środowisko fotograficzne.