Donbass

Current military-civil administration in eastern Ukrainian frontline districts need to be kept in place and partially reformed. Should the Donets Basin return to Ukrainian control, they could provide institutional templates for a temporary special regime within the currently occupied territories.

What are the origins of the armed conflict that has been raging in eastern Ukraine since 2014? Which role did Russia play in the emergence and escalation of the originally unarmed confrontation, in the Donets Basin (Donbas), after the victory of the Euromaidan revolution? When, how and to what degree exactly did Moscow get involved? Which relative weight did local sources of the conflict compared to the impact of foreign factors, i.e. the Kremlin’s covert actions in Ukraine? These and similar questions are not only academic topics hotly debated in Ukraine and the West. The way one answers them has also far-reaching implications for Western thinking, policies and diplomacy with regard to Russia and Ukraine today and tomorrow. Since 2014, an array of new evidence and research has emerged that helps clarifying the picture.

This article considers the use of multiple languages in the
songs of the ongoing war in Donbas, in eastern Ukraine. In examining
how and to what end different languages are employed in these songs,
I seek to shed light on the underlying assumptions about the
languages involved and about the communities using them. 
The key language combination examined in this article is that
of Russian and Ukrainian, which are the two languages most
commonly used in the songs under study. I compare the strategies of
multilingual songwriting utilized by predominantly or originally
Russophone Ukrainian artists to those used by their Ukrainophone
Ukrainian counterparts, revealing significant differences between the
two. While Russophone artists employ multilingualism in their songs
as a way of signalling a pro‐Ukrainian position in the war, their
Ukrainophone counterparts largely resort to multilingual expression
to cast the Russian language as the language of the enemy. This
divergence makes it possible to speak of at least two distinct strategies
or varieties of multilingualism in the songs of the War in Donbas.
I explore these key trends both through the corpora of
multilingual artists and through individual songs written in more
than one language. While my primary focus resides in the lyrics of the
songs, I also consider, where necessary, visual material (particularly
music videos) as well as the musical elements of the songs in
accordance with the methodological principles of multimodal
discourse analysis.

Політичні та міжнародно-правові механізми деокупації та віднов-
лення територіальної цілісності держави: світовий досвід і
Україна: Наукова записка / Кресіна І.О. (керівник авт. кол.),
Кресін О.В., Проценко І.М., Савчук К.О., Стойко О.М. К.: Інститут
держави і права ім. В. М. Корецького НАН України, 2017. 130 с.
ISBN 978‐966‐02‐8398‐5
Розглянуто теоретико-методологічні підходи до вирішення проблем
відновлення територіальної цілісності держави та деокупації. Проаналізовано
світову практику вирішення таких проблем.
Охарактеризовано стан законодавчої бази України щодо статусу окремих
районів Донецької і Луганської областей, Автономної Республіки Крим.
Розглянуто законодавчі ініціативи щодо деокупації, реінтеграції, відновлення
суверенітету Української держави на цих територіях, запропоновано
розглядати її як комплекс заходів, що містять військову, адміністративну,
економічну та реінтеграційну складові.

The leaked email accounts of Putin’s aide on Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, are vast primary source collections that shed light on the backstage happenings of the Kremlin’s politics in the Donbas war. Surkov is an excellent dramaturg; he writes scripts, casts actors, analyzes their performance and narratives, runs promotions, and puts the repertoire into motion to achieve intended reactions of the target audience. Methods and resources employed against Ukraine have much in common with political technology that helps the Kremlin to manipulate public opinion as well as election systems using pseudo-experts, technical parties, fake civic organizations and youth movement such as Nashi, and covert media techniques. Moscow tactically promoted the myth of “Novorossiya”—later the circumstances forced Surkov to replace it with “Donbas.” These tactics gave false credibility to “separatists” who would voice Moscow’s objections to any attempts of Ukraine to drift westward, creating an illusion in the domestic and international audience: the separatists are not puppets of Moscow but desperately fight against Kyiv junta for their localized identity, and Russia is just there to offer them a helping hand. The Russian policy toward Ukraine after the 2013 fall is an extension of its “virtual” domestic politics, but not traditional diplomacy at all.

At those times the place is like hell, or at any rate like my own mental picture of hell. Most of the things one imagines in hell are if there — heat, noise, confusion, darkness, foul air, and, above all, unbearably cramped space. Everything except the fire, for there is no fire down there except the feeble beams of Davy lamps and electric torches which scarcely penetrate the clouds of coal dust. George Orwell, " Down the Mine " 1937

Resumen: el estudio presente trata de dilucidar si la política exterior de Rusia responde a un modelo de neorrealismo ofensivo o defensivo. Con tal objeto se ha establecido un marco teórico comparativo entre ambas escuelas de las Relaciones Internacionales, incluyendo parámetros cualitativos diferenciadores. Así mismo, el análisis de datos se desarrolla de acuerdo con una metodología basada en un estudio de caso focalizado en la historia reciente de Rusia y en la guerra de Ucrania, y en tres variables: ideología, geopolítica y cultura. La actitud competitiva en el espacio exsoviético y la ruptura del statu quo y el uso de la fuerza en Ucrania mostrarían una tendencia ofensiva

Abstract: the present research tries to determine if Russia's foreign policy responds to a model of offensive or defensive realism. To this end, a theoretical framework has been established between the two schools of International Relations, including qualitative and parameters to differentiate. Likewise, the data analysis is developed according to a methodology based on a case study focused on the recent history of Russia and the war in Ukraine, and on three variables: ideology, geopolitics and culture. The competitive attitude in the ex-Soviet space and the rupture of the status quo and the use of the force in the Ukraine would show an offensive tendency.

Suite à la révolution russe de février 1917, la définition du territoire de l'Ukraine est devenue un enjeu important. Une des controverses majeures concernait l'appartenance de sa partie orientale, région fortement industrialisée et se trouvant à mi-chemin entre le noyau russe et la périphérie ukrainienne de l'Empire russe. Cet article s'intéresse au clivage au sein du Parti bolchevique qui opposait les adeptes de l'appartenance du Donbass à l'Ukraine aux défenseurs d'une république de Donets-Krivoï Rog rattachée à la Russie. Nous démontrons qu'il ne s'agissait pas tant du conflit idéologique entre les « pro-russes » et les « pro-ukrainiens », mais d'une divergence d'opinions quant à la stratégie militaire et politique à mettre en place afin de préserver les acquis de la révolution et de rendre possible son expansion. La décision de Moscou d'appuyer le projet d'une Ukraine soviétique, excluant de ce fait toute possibilité de séparation de sa région orientale, trouve son explication tant dans la volonté de remédier aux problèmes immédiats (contourner les dispositions d'un traité de paix, renforcer le contrôle sur les institutions soviétiques locales) que dans la recherche de solutions à long terme (faire avancer la révolution mondiale, garantir la stabilité d'un État multiethnique issu de la désintégration de l'Empire russe).

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples’ Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues.

La guerra del Donbass supera ya los 6 años y se han registrado numerosos abusos y violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidos por todas las partes en conflicto. El sistema jurídico internacional actual no atribuye responsabilidad legal a los actores no estatales, por lo que es necesario preguntarse el objetivo de atribuirle responsabilidad exclusiva a un Estado sobre lo que suceda en un territorio que no controla.

У роботі проаналізовано міжнародно-правові аспекти миротворчості, правове регулювання миротворчої діяльності ООН, механізми її ініціювання, здійснення, фінансування, інституційні особливості ухвалення рішень ООН щодо проведення миротворчих операцій, визначено види миротворчих операцій, їх принципи, критерії, класифікацію, нормативно-правові засади співпраці ООН у цій сфері з регіональними та субрегіональними організаціями. Представлено аналіз досвіду здійснення основних видів сучасних миротворчих операцій, визначено основні чинники успішності миротворчих операцій.
Здійснено міжнародно-правову характеристику ситуації на сході України і доведено, що збройне втручання Російської Федерації слід однозначно кваліфікувати як збройну агресію. Показано, що визначення РФ державою-агресором рішенням Ради Безпеки є практично нереалістичним, і можливим шляхом припинення воєнного конфлікту на Донбасі й відновлення територіальної цілісності України є розгортання міжнародної миротворчої операції. Проаналізовані можливі варіанти визначення її мандату.
Встановлено, що законодавство України не враховує специфіки міжнародної миротворчої операції (правовий статус операції, порядок її участі в цивільних та господарських правовідносинах, ектратериторіальний статус її приміщень, непідлеглість членів операції юрисдикції України, а також привілеї та імунітети операції та її членів тощо). Обгрунтовані й запропоновані пропозиції щодо внесення змін і доповнень до законодавства України.
The authors analyzed the international legal aspects of peacekeeping, the legal regulation of the UN peacekeeping activities, mechanisms for its initiation, implementation, financing, institutional peculiarities of the UN decision making on peacekeeping operations, types of peacekeeping operations, their principles, criteria, classification, normative-legal principles of cooperation UN in this area with regional and sub-regional organizations. The analysis of the experience of implementation of the main types of modern peacekeeping operations is presented, the main factors of the success of peacekeeping operations are determined.
The international legal characterization of the situation in the east of Ukraine was carried out and it was proved that armed intervention of the Russian Federation should be categorically classified as armed aggression. It is shown that the definition of Russia as an aggressor by the decision of the Security Council is practically unrealistic, and the cessation of the military conflict in the Donbas and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine is possible through the deployment of an international peacekeeping operation. Possible options for determining its mandate are analyzed.
It has been established that Ukrainian legislation does not take into account the specifics of an international peacekeeping operation (the legal status of the operation, the procedure for its participation in civil and commercial legal relations, the extraterritorial status of its premises, the non-compliance of its participants to the Ukrainian jurisdiction, and the privileges and immunities of the operation and its members, etc.). The proposals for amendments and additions to the legislation of Ukraine are substantiated and proposed.

“GREY CAN BE plenty bright! What do you know about it? I can discern twenty shades of it. If I had a better education, I’d come up with a name for each shade, like they were all separate colours.” Andrey Kurkov does just that on behalf of his protagonist: he describes the shades of gray so vividly that you learn to tell them apart better and better as you leaf through the pages of Grey Bees.' https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/frenemies-in-a-war-zone-on-andrey-kurkovs-grey-bees

THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT VERSION. FOR THE APPROVED AND EDITED VERSION WITH PAGE NUMBERING PLEASE GO TO THE PUBLISHER'S WEBSITE USING THE LINK ABOVE. The developments in Ukraine in 2014, including Euromaidan demonstrations, annexation of Crimea by Russia, and war in the country's two Eastern regions, became so intensely reported by Russian media that they often overshadowed internal news.1 In this review, I will try to take a closer look at the Russian discourses on Ukraine.

The crisis in Ukraine has been a truly divisive event. On almost all levels and aspects of the crisis we have witnessed, and continue to witness different understandings and, indeed, narratives of individual events, processes and the crisis in general. Several examples of such narratives stand out, for example, narratives on Crimea, MH17, and Donbas. Principally what we see is a narrative created and disseminated by Kyiv and the post-maidan government, and a (counter)narrative offered by the Ukrainian opposition, and the rebels in Donbas. Narratives also exist at the international, global level, with the United States and the European Union generally, though not quite always, supporting and promoting the Kyiv narrative, whilst Russia and some anti-western sympathisers, support the opposition/rebel narrative. It is also important to note that often the narrative does not start within Ukraine itself, but is created outside and then brought to Ukraine. One such narrative that exists at the local, national, and international level is that of fascism in post-maidan Ukraine. The different narratives on this have been very visible within media, but far less widely discussed than those of Crimea or MH17. The aim of this essay, therefore, is to put forward the main narratives on fascism in Ukraine, particularly supposed fascism in government. The essay seeks primarily to highlight the key narratives and the actors who create them, whilst some analysis of the validity and truth of the different narratives will also be offered, particularly analysing whether post-maidan Ukraine has indeed embraced fascist elements and personalities, what role such people play, and what does this mean for Ukraine.

The monograph which we have presented to your attention is an attempt to intellectually irrigate the «bloody lands», which include the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region. They were those who suffered the most during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries from world wars, the confrontation of totalitarian systems, and the implementation by the Soviet government of the Vae victis principle.

The book shows Russia continues to use aggressive policy not only on its own territory, consistently reducing the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens, but also trying to implement it at least in the post-Soviet space. The phantom pains of the empire due to the lost influence do not pass easily.

Authors: Kazimierz Wóycicki,  Yevhen Mahda, Serhiy Fedunyak, Vira Yastrebova, Andriy Klymenko, Ruslan Sidorenko, Tomasz Lachowski, Evhen Tsybulenko, Ivanna Tetera

La economía ucraniana  ha sido duramente afectada por la guerra en Donbass. No sólo ha debido afrontar importantes gastos militares, destrucción de infraestructura y pérdida de control territorial, con la consecuente pérdida de recursos naturales. Además ha perdido a Rusia como principal socio comercial. Los acuerdos con la Unión Europea abren un nuevo camino pero aún no logran compensar la caída del PBI a partir de 2014. Mientras tanto, al otro lado de la línea de contacto, la República Popular de Donetsk busca la forma de sobrevivir frente a un bloqueo comercial, sin moneda propia y con una economía que depende casi exclusivamente de aportes rusos.

Este trabajo consiste en un análisis de los factores y de los actores que llevaron a Ucrania a la actual guerra civil, desde sus precedentes: el Euromaidán y el conflicto Crimea. Dado que es un tema actual, la información es poca y sesgada, por lo que se ha basado, principalmente, en un análisis periodístico y de los trabajos ya realizados acerca de Ucrania antes de estos sucesos. El resultado es una visión total, conjunta y real de los
acontecimientos así como un conocimiento del enfrentamiento entre dos bloques que parecen volver a chocar: Occidente y Rusia.

Il lavoro di analisi si concentra sugli eventi che hanno colpito e messo in ginocchio la nazione Ucraina a partire dalla primavera del 2014; un excursus storico che ha inizio fin dai primi insediamenti nei territori ove oggi sorgono varie nazionalità est europee. A sostegno un analisi sociale e culturale in senso critico per comprendere le recenti dinamiche tra i confini interni ed esterni dell'Ucraina. Un legame sull'argomento che si stringe con il ruolo dei gruppi nazionalisti, organizzati sia a livello politico che paramilitare, all'interno del teatro post-Majdan e della destabilizzazione nella zona del Donbass.

This paper analyzes the role of far right in the Ukrainian politics during the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas. The issue of the involvement of Ukrainian far right organizations in the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas have been politicized and polarized. Russian and separatist politicians and the media often presented the “Euromaidan” as a “fascist coup” and the Maidan government as a “fascist junta.” In contrast, the governments and the mainstream media in Western countries tended to present the role of the far right in the “Euromaidan” and in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically in the conflict in Donbas, as marginal. Previous academic studies generally reached similar conclusions. They focused on numerical strength and electoral support for the far right parties and ignored other aspects of influence of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi parties, specifically their role in the political violence, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas. However, the number of academic studies of the contemporary far right in Ukraine is generally limited.
            The research question is as follows: What is the role of the far right in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan”? This study analyzes the involvement of specific Ukrainian radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations in the “Euromaidan,” the Odesa massacre, and the war in Donbas, their performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and the 2015 local elections in Ukraine. The analysis focuses on major Ukrainian far right organizations, such as Svoboda (Freedom), the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly, the White Hammer, the UNA-UNSO, Bratstvo, and C14, and paramilitary formations or special police and National Guard units organized and controlled to various extent by them, such as the Azov regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. It uses various sources of data, such as online recordings of live broadcasts and videos of the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas, official database of court decisions in Ukraine concerning investigations of the involvement of the far right in major cases of political violence, video recordings of the Maidan massacre trial, information posted on websites and social media groups of far right organizations, and media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages.
            The study shows that the far right organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters, the post-Maidan governments, and in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. However, the analysis also shows that the far right organizations and football ultras played a key role during violent attacks, such as attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the parliament of Ukraine in January and on February 18, 2014. There is also various evidence of the Right Sector involvement in a violent attack of the Berkut police during its highly publicized dispersal of protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda and smaller organizations had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police on February 18-20, 2014. The study demonstrates that the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly/ Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of football ultras were involved in the Odesa massacre on May 2, 2014. This paper also shows that the far right organizations and their volunteer battalions and paramilitary units had a significant role in the civil war in Donbas but a comparably minor role in fighting with several regular Russian military units during direct military interventions by Russia in August 2014 and February 2015. Major implications of this study for the Ukrainian politics and the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine are discussed in the conclusion. This paper implies that the far right has significant but not dominant role in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan.” But far right organizations and their armed units had a key role in major cases of political violence during and after the “Euromaidan,” and they attained ability to overthrow by force the government of the one of the largest European countries.

The aim of the paper is to explore the cultural context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. From this perspective, the conflict in Donbas has to be seen not only in the context of a political game, socioeconomic transition and geopolitical interests, but also in the light of a cultural conflict rooted in history. According to Ukrainian researcher Mykola Riabchuk, Ukraine is divided, not between ethnic Rus-sians and Ukrainians, but between two different types of Ukrainian identity. These profound differences have been exacerbated by the events of the " Euromaidan " and, subsequently, the violent conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics on the one hand and the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government on the other. This article focuses on how the cultural divisions of Ukrainian society have been used since the beginning of Ukrainian independence by the political elite as a tool of symbolic politics, contributing to the mass mobilization of Ukrainian society and the outbreak of a violent conflict.

Ukraine previously experienced significant regional political divisions, including separatism in Crimea and Donbas. However, in contrast to post-communist countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and former Yugoslavia, prior to 2014 Ukraine was able to avoid a war and a break-up. This study examines the role of separatists, the Yanukovych government, the Maidan opposition and the Maidan government, far-right organizations, Russia, the US, and the EU in the conflict in Donbas. It uses a specially commissioned survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2014 to analyse public support for separatism in Donbas, compared to other regions of Ukraine, and the major factors which affect such support. It concludes that all these actors contributed in various ways to the conflict in Donbas, which involved both a civil war and a direct Russian military intervention since August 2014. The study links this conflict to the 'Euromaidan', specifically, the government overthrow by means of the Maidan massacre, and the secession and Russia's annexation of Crimea. The KIIS survey shows that support for separatism is much stronger in Donbas compared to other regions, with the exception of Crimea, and that the break-up of Ukraine is unlikely to extend to its other parts.

Since the outbreak of the war in Donbas in 2014, the term opolchenie (insurgency) has become firmly associated with the militant groups controlling parts of eastern Ukraine. The word emerged as their preferred autonym, adopted by the progovernment Russian media and snubbed by Ukrainian outlets. Historically applied to the Russian volunteer military formations, "opolchenie" foregrounds the contentious idea of the grassroots nature of Donbas militias. Politically, it gestures towards the symbolic totality of the "Russian World" ("Russkii mir") mobilized to fight off foreign invaders. Using multimodal discourse analysis, I scrutinize the myth behind the name, examining how the image of the "opolchenets" ("insurgent") is cultivated as a transhistorical embodiment of heroic and virtuous Russianness in contemporary popular songs about the war in Donbas. I argue that songs serve to construct and popularize the new "opolchenets" identity in the Donbas region, simultaneously as an alternative to and extension of extant complex local identities.

Before 24 February 2022, the Russian-Ukrainian agreements signed in the capital of Belarus in 2014–2015 were seen by many observers as a path to a settlement of the Donbas conflict. However, the contradictory Minsk deals were signed under duress. Contrary to a common belief held over the past seven years, the various documents the Kremlin forced on Kyiv in the context of devastating Ukrainian military defeats by regular and irregular Russian forces in September 2014 and February 2015 were not a solution but part of the problem. These agreements were partially in manifest violation of international law as they undermined such principles as the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-use of force and national self-determination. Their welcome and legitimization by various Western states effectively helped to make more permanent transgressions that undermined the post-1945 international system. The Minsk Agreements also implicitly undermined basic democratic standards. They constituted Kremlin instruments to harvest the fruits of Russia’s initially covert military aggression against Ukraine. Oddly, Western states furthered the Kremlin’s obvious subversion of the European Security Order by condoning the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements and pressuring Ukraine to implement their more dubious provisions, while also insufficiently supporting a normatively acceptable interpretation of the agreements and not holding Moscow accountable for its violations of the agreements and subversion of the negotiations in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and elsewhere. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/russias-dictated-non-peace-for-ukraine-in-2014-2022/

Seemingly sensible proposals to Kyiv to partially satisfy Moscow’s demands in Eastern Ukraine are counterproductive. They ignore the record of compromising with Russian revanchism, and underestimate the unexplored potential of serious sanctions. They also do not take into account the political mood that has emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014.

The article analyses political mobilisation towards the establishment of an independent Ukrainian national church. Ukraine had three Orthodox churches, the largest of which is under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, while the others lacked ecclesiastical legitimacy.
On 11 October 2018, in a dramatic decision with geopolitical consequences, the Kyiv Patriarchate received ecclesiastical recognition from the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarchate. Drawing on 16 interviews with key clergy, academics and policy practitioners working on church-state relations in Kyiv, a literature review, and online data from Bulgarian,
Greek, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Ukrainian sources, the article argues that the conflict in Donbas has been a key factor in the national and international mobilisation towards autocephaly. This article demonstrates that in Eastern Orthodoxy, churches perform state-like
functions in three areas, namely establishing diplomatic channels of communication; mobilising the faithful at national and international levels; and advancing human security discourses on violence, survival and tolerance.

This article examines representations of the enemy in the Ukrainian satirical songs pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. I focus primarily on the output of Orest Liutyi (the stage persona of Antin Mukhars'kyi) and the semianonymous Mirko Sablich (Mirko Sablic) collective. Using the method of multimodal discourse analysis, I examine how the enemy opposing the Ukrainian Army is portrayed in the song lyrics and the accompanying music videos. Considering the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of uniformity in the backgrounds of the warring parties, I am particularly interested in who and why is identified as the enemy in the songs. The enemy appears in several guises: "moskal's" -- Russian or pro-Russian aggressors from outside Ukraine; "separs" -- Ukrainian collaborators who support, often through military efforts, the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine; and "vatniks" -- passive anti-Ukrainian individuals who live in Ukraine and whose inaction is perceived to be harmful to Ukraine's wartime efforts. Whereas these songs call upon Ukrainians to repel the external enemy ("moskal's") in armed combat, no clear strategy is suggested for how the internal enemies ("separs" and "vatniks") should be dealt with or, in some cases, even identified. As a result, Liutyi and Sablic, while positioning themselves as "counterpropaganda" projects, risk labelling as "the enemy," and thus alienating, the audiences most susceptible to propaganda, who could otherwise benefit most from their myth-debunking efforts.

Ein Friedensschluss zwischen Russland und der Ukraine ist ein wichtiges Ziel. Doch zeigt die Erfahrung, dass Konzessionen an Russland keinen dauerhaften Frieden im postsowjetischen Raum sichern. Westliche Nachgiebigkeit und ukrainische Schwäche sind das falsche Signal. Zugeständnisse Kiews an Moskau führen nicht zur Lösung des Grundkonflikts und könnten die Ukraine destabilisieren.

Ukraine's war against Donbass separatists is based on the discursive construction of an enemy and is much helped by demonization of the opponent. Ethnicization of the essentially political and economic differences between Ukraine’s regions makes compromise difficult to reach. The invocation by the Ukrainian politicians and diplomats of the identity markers of a savage, beastly outgroup, a “scum”, “subhumans,” “bastards,” when referring to the separatists, cannot but confirm the worst worries of those who might still be leaning to the idea of devolution and power sharing. The threats of legal punishment and status marginalization propel continued resistance.

Quarterly Scientific Journal "Economic Herald of the Donbass" was founded in 2004 by the Institute of the Economy of Industry of the NAS of Ukraine. Certificate on state registration PR № 1442-3413 issued on 14.08.2008. The journal is included in the List of specialized scientific editions of Ukraine. The Journal is numbered ISSN 1817-3772 (Print). Journal materials are focused on informing the academic community, experts, local and national government representatives, and everyone else interested in research about the trends in modern science progress, economic and industrial policy problems of Donbass and ways to overcome them, based on a thorough scientific analysis of the theory and practice of Ukraine and leading foreign countries, as well as economic and mathematical calculations. Journal publications aim at promoting implementation of original research results into Ukrainian economy.
The journal covers a wide range of theoretical and applied problems of the economy in following topics: Economic Theory, International and Regional Economics, Finance, Marketing, Management, Management of Innovations, Management of Labour and Safety.

Current issue: #2(40) 2015, 215 p.

Content:
Scientific articles
Buleev I.P., Rassujday E.Ya. The Methodical Approaches to the Marking of Nature Capital of Mines
Nadich A.B. System of Local Exchange Services and Products as a Tool to Reduce Unemployment in Areas of Concentration of Internally Displaced Persons
Blagodarniy A.I., Korshikova I.A., Pluzhnikova E.A. Agglomerations of the Donetsk Region
Pavlov K.V. The Relationship of Economic Theory and Regional Economy
Kondratieva T.V. Bifurcation points on the path of socio-economic systems
Mokhnachev S.A., Shamaeva N.P. The Formation of Clusters at the Old-industrial Region of Russia
Marchenko V. Minerals of Ukraine as a Factor of Economic Growth and Regional Development
Gulaliyev M., Aliyev R. The Foreign Investments to Azerbaijan Oil Sector and their Impacts to Foreign Trade Relations
Rasulev A.F., Trostyanskiy D.V., Islamova O.A. Innovative Potential and Industrial Enterprises Innovative Activity of Uzbekistan
Tonkikh S.A., Tyurev V.K., Ostaltsev A.S. The Standard Dynamics of Indicators of the Economic Growth for Oil Companies
Pokatayeva O.V., Kucherova G.Yu. Strategic Planning of Taxation Development in the EU Countries
Sazonets O.N., Malashenko J.A. Features of foreign trade activities of service enterprises
Kolosova K.A. Management of commercial risks of industrial enterprises
Lazareva N.O. Understanding the Business performance Management
Vynogorov G.G. Social Responsibility of Business : the Economical Aspect
Dyuzhev V.G., Suslikov S.V. Formation of innovative susceptibility enterprise environment based on an integrated approach to improving human resource management system
Zemlyankin A.I., Lyakh I.I. Determining the Role of Innovation Policy in Ensuring the Development of the Industrial City
Antonuk V. Higher Education of Ukraine in the System Labor Market Relations

In December 2008, the EU launched its new program "Eastern Partnership" (EaP) as a continuation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which due to the extensiveness of the EU's borders does not allow full commitment to the countries of the eastern neighborhood. The main agenda of the program is to stabilize and democratize countries through a deeper and more substantial link with the EU. The program includes association agreements, creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, training for administration and civil society, financial assistance, visa liberalization, but not the strongest instrument of EU foreign policy, which is the enlargement policy for entry into the Union. Through these "soft power" foreign policy instruments the expectations are that the countries will achieve rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, as well as high standards in the economy and institutions. For the situation to be even more complex, there are frozen conflicts in many of the countries where the EU should play a role in the reconciliation and preservation of the sovereignty of the states.
The paper will review the mechanisms available to the Union in the "Eastern Partnership", its attempts to resolve conflicts, and the potential for enlargement in the countries of the East. For the presentation of this foreign policy of EU, we will be guided through the theoretical prism of realism and its concepts to measure or put into context the effects on frozen conflicts in the countries.
The main goal will be to answer the question what is the effect and success of EU foreign policy in resolving frozen conflicts in the countries of the "Eastern Partnership" through the prism of realism? Does the foreign policy so far have the capacity to overcome obstacles and achieve its underlying goals? Can the basic concepts of realism be transformed by liberal concepts and constructivist visions of international relations in the countries from this region?
The basic guides of realism and neo-realism clearly identify the need for "hard power politics" as the primary instance in resolving and transforming conflicts as a catalyst and instrument for change to the desired direction from the big players. The main hypothesis that will guide the structure of this thesis is that the absence of hard power politics and the changing and vague attitudes of EU’s foreign policy are the main reason for the failure to resolve frozen conflicts in the countries of the "Eastern Partnership".
All countries covered by the program differ and bear their own specific characteristics. Every country has problems with non-democratic and non-liberal practices that are the remnants of the previous system. This means that everyone has a difficult and long-lasting transition process. Many of them have unresolved conflicts and divided societies. Some have an open desire to join the Union and are in a long waiting period to open their negotiations. While the Union has variable attitudes towards the enlargement process and sends mixed signals and does not provide enough stimulation to transform countries with clear and firm stances in their foreign policy.
Lastly, there is Russia, which has its influence and interests in the countries covered by this program. Realism and neo-realism are not sufficiently included in the academic circles to describe the functioning of the EU, but Russia's intensified policy towards its neighbors and the poor efficiency of the Union's underlined objectives are sufficient justification to consider the impact of this theory in this new context. Also, to give some insights on some of the new components needed to resolve the status of these countries because the situation and geographical proximity with Russia is very different than with the big enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe in the past.
The work will be processed through the methodology of a critical approach by interpreting the sources and arguments guided by the theoretical framework of realism and neo-realism. As with the comparative method in the argumentation of the EU's success with the countries of the region.

This essay provides an economic geography perspective on the causes and consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine. It focuses on the controversial proposition that the armed conflict in 2014 was triggered by domestic, economically determined factors. The essay argues that economic and material circumstances in the region had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin’s military intervention was paramount for the commencement of hostilities. As the human and economic costs of the war continue to mount, Ukraine’s war-ravaged eastern regions face further depopulation, economic decline and erosion of development.

Quarterly Scientific Journal "Economic Herald of the Donbass" was founded in 2004 by the Institute of the Economy of Industry of the NAS of Ukraine. Certificate on state registration PR № 1442-3413 issued on 14.08.2008. The journal is included in the List of specialized scientific editions of Ukraine. The Journal is numbered ISSN 1817-3772 (Print). Journal materials are focused on informing the academic community, experts, local and national government representatives, and everyone else interested in research about the trends in modern science progress, economic and industrial policy problems of Donbass and ways to overcome them, based on a thorough scientific analysis of the theory and practice of Ukraine and leading foreign countries, as well as economic and mathematical calculations. Journal publications aim at promoting implementation of original research results into Ukrainian economy.
The journal covers a wide range of theoretical and applied problems of the economy in following topics: Economic Theory, International and Regional Economics, Finance, Marketing, Management, Management of Innovations, Management of Labour and Safety.

Current issue: #4(42) 2015, 196 p.

Content:
Scientific articles
Petrova V. Hicksian Income and Contemporary Accounting
Rozmainsky I.V. The Big-bang Strategy and Non-rational Behavior in the Russian Transitional Economy in the 1990s
Payonk K., Lyashenko V., Kvilinskyi O. Operation of a Business Entity in the Context of Globalization
Lis P., Mazurkiewicz J. Combating Energy Poverty in the Social Housing Stock
Kolosov A.M. The Factors of Economic Mechanism for Recovery the Domestic Market of Donbas
Blashchyk P., Zvershchlevsky S. Challenges for the Nominal Convergence in Poland in the Face of the Uniform Policy of the Eurozone
Shabalina L.V., Karaman E.G. The Ways of Improving the Efficiency of the Import Substitution Strategy of Russian Federation
Kovalova O., Gavrysh O. School Social Educators’ Group Work in Germany
Logutova T., Poltoratskyi M. Comprehensive Modernization of Railway Transport as an Innovative Efficient Instrument to Raise Competitive Capacity of a Company
Rad N.S. Conception of the Present-day Pension System as a Result of Transformation Processes in Global Determination
Simeonova R. Methods and Systems for Allocating and Reporting Indirect Costs in Management Accounting
Dimitrov P.V. Set-off as a Means for Extinguishing Financial (Public) Obligations in the Republic of Bulgaria
Derevyanko O.V. Assessment of Competitiveness of Commercial Banks and Method of Detection Competitors in the Banking Market
Bessonova S.I. Non-Negotiable Assets Accounting and Analysis of their Status
Akimova O.V. The Use of Typological Research in the System of Internal Financial Monitoring
Usik I.A. Financial Cycles Nature and its Role in the Crisis Processes Development
Stolyarov V.F., Artemenko D.M. Specifics of Determining the Market Assessment Rights Requirement for Obligations Arising from the Implementation of the Bank Credit Operations of Different Quality that are Secured and Unsecured Collaterally
Ivanova Z.S. Risks Associated with the Market Behaviour of Bulgarian Industrial Enterprises
Rogoza M.E., Vergal K.Yu. Investigation of the Integrated Trade Structure Environment Using Agentoriented Approach
Ivchenkova H.Y., Lyakh A.O. Analysis of Mathematical Methods and Models which are Used for the Process of Management of Commodity Stocks in Retail Trade
Ivanova M.І. Studies of Formation and Content of the Term ‘Logistics Activities’: Theoretical Aspects
Gonchar V., Kalinin O. Marketing Aspects of Steady Growth Business Strategy
Khomenko Y.V., Khomenko I.A., Borodina E.S. The Impact of Globalization on Corporate Culture and Communication
Drachuk Yu.Z., Trushkina N.V. Development of Innovative Business on Principles Public-Private Partnerships
Vishnevsky A.S. Paradigmatic Basics of Strategic Management
Tubychko K.V., Zaruba V.Y., Pignasty O.M., Khodusov V.D. The Overview of Manufactured Systems Models
Naberezhnyh T.S., Shevchenko N.Y. Planning of Steady Industrial Enterprise Development under Condition of Environment Instability
Gavrylov M., Zerkina O. Methodological Bases of Personnel Policy Formation in the Context of Innovative Development of the Region
Bersutska S., Kamenska O. Formalization of an Industrial Enterprise Human Capital under the Innovation Development Conditions
Shaulska L.V., Sereda G.V., Shkurat M.Y. The Development of Soft Skills in the Provision of Competitiveness of Graduates
Parkhomenko Yu.M. The Development of Social Investment and Responsibility of Business in Ukraine
Boychenko V. The Formation of the Key Assets of Human Capital at the Corporate Level
Kabachenko G. Features of Formation and Development of the Youth Segment of the Regional Labour Market

The lie of Vladimir Putin's adherents destroys not only the mentality of Russians — it destroys their brains, bringing them dementia. // Ложь адептов Владимира Путина разрушает не только ментальность россиян — она разрушает их мозг, неся им слабоумие.