Donetsk

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples’ Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues.

Following the decision of Ukrainian president Yanukovych to suspend further Eurozone negotiations prior to the Vilnius Summit of November 28–29, 2013, several hundred students began to occupy Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in central Kyiv. After severe police brutality and further pro-Russian negotiations on the behalf of the president, this would develop into the Maidan Protests of Ukraine.  The protests that then emerged demanded government accountability, for Yanukovych to step down, and for closer European Union ties. Hundreds of thousands continued to occupy Independence Square for months, facing increasing violence from police forces, freezing temperatures, and even military action at the behest of the government. Yanukovych fled the country, elections were held, and it seemed as though the protestors finally achieved a sense of change for Ukraine. However, the outcome of this movement was much more drastic; during the protests Russian forces annexed Crimea, and a referendum was held that solidified Russian grasp over the peninsula.  Concomitantly, Eastern Ukraine became frustrated with the increasing pro-EU perspective of Kyiv and felt that their needs were not being addressed. On April 6th, 2014 the self-declared People’s Republic of Donetsk was formed, based in the heart of the Donbas region of east Ukraine. Nikolai Solntsev, a member of the Donetsk group’s political council claimed “The goal is to break away from a predominantly ethnic Ukrainian region and stage a referendum like the one in Crimea where the only choices on the ballot would be full autonomy for Donetsk Oblast or joining Russia”.  The conflict has grown since, with numerous cease fires between the government in Kyiv and the rebels in Donetsk failing. Reports of Russian support and weapons transfer have indirectly brought other actors into the conflict, including the European Union and United States. Ultimately, the question regarding the conflict is three fold: what are the underlying causes for the conflict in Ukraine?; if there is legitimate public support in the Donbas region for independence, should it be allowed by Ukraine?; if there is international military presence, should this be declared a breach of state sovereignty, and if so, what should be done by the international community?

A más de cuatro años del inicio del conflicto, el gobierno ucraniano insiste en hablar de "terrorismo", mientras que las agrupaciones internacionales que lo apoyan descartan el término y optan en cambio por "insurgentes", "militantes", "separatistas" o "formaciones armadas". La forma en la que el rival es oficialmente catalogado marca una posición política del gobierno local hacia el interior y el exterior del país, pero también pauta estrategias a futuro.

A más de cuatro años de su inicio, el conflicto en el este de Ucrania no muestra avances ni retrocesos y parece condenado a continuar estancado. Quizás por eso prácticamente ha desaparecido de los medios. Existen sólo cuatro alternativas en esta instancia, algunas menos probables que otras:
1. Reincorporación de hecho a Ucrania 2. Anexión rusa 3. Intervención internacional 4. Independencia con o sin reconocimiento.

The continuing international inattention for the Glazyev Tapes was and is surprising. If they are indeed authentic, the Glazyev Tapes should modify our understanding of the origins and nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The most important aspect of the Glazyev Tapes is arguably not their contents. What is remarkable about these conversations is the time of their recording in February-March 2014, i.e. several weeks before the post-Euromaidan civil conflict in eastern Ukraine turned into a pseudo-civil war in the Donbass.

The pro-Russian prisoners at Izoliatsiia went through similarly brutal torture often designed to extract preformulated confessions on, for instance, spying for Kyiv. The brutal persecution of “one’s own people” is a practice reminiscent of the Stalinist purges of the Bolshevik party and Soviet regime of the 1930s.

Since 2014, the inhabitants Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukrain with a total population of 7.5 million have been going through a forced transformation of their identities. The regions are divided by a frontline, and the parts of them that border Russia are not controlled by the Ukrainian government. In 2014, the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic were proclaimed in these parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since then, their de facto authorities have tried to develop new ‘national’ identities in these territories in order to legitimize and strengthen their ‘statehood.’

Az ukrán elnökválasztások második fordulóját nagy fölénnyel nyerte a humorista–producerből lett elnökjelölt, Volodimir Zelenszkij. A nagyarányú győzelem azt is megmutatta, hogy a választók nagy többségben elutasítják az elmúlt évek politikáját, és mindenáron változást szeretnének. Jelen elemzés célja rövid áttekintést adni és értékelni a második forduló eredményeit, bemutatni a győztes Zelenszkij eddig megismert személyét és csapatát, illetve ezek ismeretében felvázolni, milyen politikai változások következhetnek az elkövetkező években Ukrajnában.

2019. március 31-én elnökválasztásokat tartanak Ukrajnában. A választás tétje ezúttal nem csak arról szól, hogy ki vezetheti az országot az elkövetkező öt esztendőben: az eredmény visszajelzés is lesz a választópolgárok részéről a 2014 óta eltelt évekkel kapcsolatban. Az akkori események, a tüntetések a kijevi Majdanon és más városokban, a Krím elcsatolása, majd a kelet-ukrajnai háború a mai napig meghatározzák az ország életét, politikailag, gazdaságilag és kulturálisan egyaránt. Az elnökválasztás ráadásul azért is lesz fontos, mert az eredménye nagy hatással lehet az őszi parlamenti választásokra is.
Jelen elemzés célja, hogy röviden bemutassa a 2013-14-ben kezdődött konfliktus óta a közelgő választásig terjedő időszakban bekövetkezett változásokat, politikai és gazdasági szempontból egyaránt. Az egyes részekben látszódni fog, hogy a több mint öt éve tartó krízis sok tekintetben megváltoztatta Ukrajna életét, s ezek természetesen hatással vannak a közelgő elnökválasztásra, valamint az őszi parlamenti választásokra is.

Ackermann Sándor elemzése

... 3. Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Birth of an Independent Ukraine," Report on the USSR 3 (13 December 1991): 1-2. 4. The Ukrainian Review41 (1): 77. ... Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: A Year of Crisis," RFE/RL Research Report.3 (1): 38. ...

In the context of contemporary religious communities the Catholic Church is perhaps better placed than most for meeting the new challenges of multipolarity in international affairs and supporting its members through socio-economic developments as a result of the foreign policy of the Holy See under Pope Francis (2013– ) and changes in its ecclesiastical organization since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).

This article analyses the foundations of the constitutional and legal orders of selected non-recognized entities in Georgia and Ukraine, namely the so-called “Republic of Abkhazia”, the “Republic of South Ossetia” and the “Donetsk/Lugansk Peoples’ Republics”. Additionally, this article pursues the objective of clarifying whether the legal systems of these entities can ensure protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their residents in line with standards of international public law and European law. It is argued that the constitutional orders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Donetsk/Lugansk Peoples’ Republics are distinguished by a few undeniable similarities and “sources of inspiration”. Furthermore, residents of these entities experience similar problems regarding protection of their fundamental rights and application of international conventions on human rights.

Основные индивидуальные и коллективные субъекты, дирижирующие этими событиями, как я подозреваю, будут найдены, в конце концов, в Москве, а не в Донецке или Луганске. Если бы Куделя сделал, по крайней мере, намек в этой связи, его в остальном информативный текст можно было бы приветствовать как безоговорочно полезный вклад в изучение последних событий в Украине.

The ambiguity of the 1920s Ukrainianization is well known among its scholars. A curious fact is that it was becoming less intense and effective where the initial positions of the Ukrainian were weaker. Donbas was specifically one such region. How was this related to the everyday Soviet practices of political pretending and performing? What was the role of controversial modernization / urban development on the dialectic of identities in the now roaring Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine?

If Ukraine is a borderland, Donbas is a borderland multiplied by itself, notes the author and further claims that ”Donbas will retain its hybridity no matter the outcome of the current unrest. Still, the volatile situation brings not only risks but also yet another chance for belated modernisation.”

This paper is devoted to the new challenge for international security system – the rise of quasi-states. Though, these state-like entities exists for more than two decades, the Ukrainian crisis and the declarations of independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics brought the word attention to these “black holes” of geopolitics and international legal framework.

In the first part the article sheds the light on the problems of statehood and international recognition of state as the core issues of the quasi-sates vague existence. Further, it examines the violation of human rights as one of the crucial features of the process of their formation and current functioning on the example of Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia). It pays the special attention to the case of newly-formed Ukrainian quasi-states in terms of human rights infringements and the amnesty for the separatists.

Finally, the paper argues for implementing the transitional justice mechanisms as the one of the solutions which may heal the wounds suffered by the communities affected by the creation of quasi-states and also as one the tools which might occur useful for facilitating frozen conflicts and legal status of quasi states.

The documents signed in Minsk constitute agreements between Moscow (and its proxies in Ukraine’s Donets Basin) and Kyiv. Whether, when, and how the various aspects of this particular treaty are fulfilled should not guide any longer EU policies towards Russia. The sanctions were imposed not in connection with Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, but after a repeated and especially grave violation of basic foundations of the international order by Russia. Discussion about their prolongation, extension, or modification should thus only refer to Russian correction or non-correction of its behavior, and not to Kyiv’s actions and non-actions. Unless Kyiv’s sovereignty in the Donets Basin is restored in full, all or at least most sanctions should remain in place.

Following an event at Georgetown University hosted by the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies (CERES), the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs sat down with Dr. Andreas Umland, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kiev, Ukraine, to discuss the currently unfolding state of affairs between Russia and its eastern European neighbor.

A ceasefire was agreed between Ukraine and separatist forces on 5 September, although it is unclear whether this will hold following shelling in the city of Mariupol and near Donetsk airport on Sunday. Ellie Knott writes on public opinion within Russia toward the conflict. She notes that while Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings have increased during the Ukraine crisis, there is relatively low public support for the annexation of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

A wide range of normative implications exists between corruption and the stability of de-facto states. While some claim that corruption inherently disrupts institutional development and stumps economic growth, others argue that corruption in some cases acts as a stabilizing factor for authoritarian regimes. Regardless, corruption generally plays a role in the political economy of any state. In de-facto states, corruption tends to play an outsized role, either or equally impacting the exercise of political authority or the allocation of public goods and services. This research aims to examine the case study of the Luhansk and Donetsk "People's Republics" and the relationship between corruption and governance in these two de-facto regions to better understand how corruption and stability are interrelated. Methodologically, I plan to use mostly political economy methods, namely focusing on using Goodhand's framework of analyzing different economies during conflict. I will rely mostly on open-source information for this preliminary research to determine what the governance structure is, namely focusing on the DPR's and the LPR's respective governments.

Die der­zei­ti­gen Mili­tä­risch-Zivilen Admi­nis­tra­tio­nen (MZAs) in den ost­ukrai­ni­schen Front­ge­bie­ten werden auf­recht­erhal­ten. Sie sollten teil­weise refor­miert werden. Nach einer künf­ti­gen Befrei­ung des Donez­be­ckens können die MZAs als Modelle für eine pro­vi­so­ri­sche Über­gangs­ver­wal­tung der derzeit besetz­ten Gebiete dienen.

У статті аналізується навчальний процес у вищих духовних навчальних закладах Донецької області в 90-х роках ХХ – першому десятиріччі ХХІ століття. Для всебічного дослідження проблеми автором було залучено конфесійну періодику та нарративний матеріал (інтерв’ю з керівним складом духовних ВНЗ регіону)

Распад СССР, кроме всего прочего, создал к концу XX
в. целый ряд очагов напряженности. О своей независимости, кроме существовавших советских социалистических республик, объявили их отдельные части, которые, как правило, больше тяготели к союзному центру (ПМР, Крым, Абхазия и Южная Осетия) или соседней республике (Нагорно-Карабахская республика). Сравнительно успешно решить подобные конфликты удалось с Гагаузией в Молдавии (предоставление автономии), Аджарией в Грузии (ограниченный силовой вариант) и Крымом в Украине
(в последнем случае – временно). В то же время, и Грузия,
и Молдавия, и Украина (с 2014 г.) имеют фактически независимые регионы. Вопрос мирного урегулирования стоит
очень остро, и на взгляд авторов его решение кроется в за-
имствовании опыта КНР в отношении Сянгана (Гонконга) и
Макао (Аомэня).

The Glazyev Tapes illustrate that the allegedly social regional rationale for far-reaching new political rules in the Donbas envisaged in the Minsk Agreements, a considerable reduction of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the currently occupied territories‚ is slim. In other words, the peculiarities of the population of the occupied territories that would justify a special arrangement for the Donets Basin are more putative than real. An underlying assumption of the western interpretation of the concessions to the separatists in these agreements had been that the mere fact of an, at least, initially grassroots insurgency in the Donbas should be somehow reflected in its future status. Yet, the Glazyev Tapes now illustrate that the entire east Ukrainian uprising was from its start not as popular a phenomenon as it earlier seemed. If one acknowledges the Russian involvement in, and imperial rather than local dimension of, the insurgency, then the apparent compromise in the Minsk Agreements assumes a different notion.

The article describes religious policy of the Soviet government concerning the Protestant communities on the basis of archival materials. Two different models of Soviet policy in the field of religion are analyzed, using the activities of the Commissioner of the Council for Religious Affairs in the Donetsk region in relation to Pentecostals and Adventists as an example. Ukrainian SSR was the "Bible belt" of the Soviet Union. Donetsk region was characterized by high percentage of Protestant communities in general and Adventist communities in particular. Most of the Adventist communities in the region were officially registered, and their members did not show significant dissident inclinations. Therefore, the case of Adventists serves as an example of the more tolerant Soviet religious policy, far from the usual stereotypes about repression and atheism. A slightly harsher attitude by the Soviet authorities can be observed towards the Pentecostal community. After the events of 1945, when the Soviet government forced Pentecostals and Baptists to unite, all Pentecostal communities automatically joined the ranks of opposition. Still, during 1965-1991, some registered Pentecostals made contact with the Soviet authorities. Unregistered communities remained a big problem for the Commissioner and were persecuted until liberalization of religious policy in the late 1980s. The authors pay particular attention to the examples of the way Pentecostal and Adventist regional leaders balanced the necessity to maintain friendly relationship with the authorities and the desire to worship God. It was this kind of controversy that became the main issue of the activities of Protestant religious organizations in the late USSR.

У статті на основі польових досліджень, які провів автор, робиться спроба розглянути вищу духовну освіту в християнських громадах Донецької області в період з 1991 по 2011 рр., її історичний розвиток і особливості навчального процесу. Автор визначив основні тенденції розвитку християнських духовних навчальних закладів Донецького регіону, окреслено коло проблем, що стоять перед сучасними духовними вишами регіону.


In the article the author has made an attempt to study the higher spiritual education in the Christian communities of the Donetsk region from 1991 to 2011, its historical development and features of the learning process. The author identifies the main trends of development of the Christian religious education institutions in the Donetsk region, outlines the problems faced by modern religious universities in the region.

У статті проаналізовано особливості діяльності уповноваженого Ради у справах релігій по Донецькій області в період «пізньої» радянської історії (1965–1991 рр.). Окрім роботи безпосередньо з релігійними організаціями краю уповноважений Ради у справах релігій та його апарат займалися й суто «технічною» роботою, а саме: складанням звітів про діяльність, організацією лекцій з наукового атеїзму для населення, упорядкуванням статистики щодо релігійних громад, реакцією на скарги окремих віруючих тощо.
Мета статті – на основі наявних історичних джерел та використовуючи наукову літературу, проаналізувати роботу уповноваженого Ради у справах релігій по Донецькій області в адміністративній, діловодчій й освітній сферах.
Аналізуючи документи апарату уповноваженого на Донеччині, можна знайти не тільки офіційні свідчення та рапорти, але й зробити висновок щодо рівня обізнаності уповноваженого та його співробітників у релігійній сфері. Важливим напрямом діяльності Ради у справах релігій та її місцевих уповноважених була робота з юнаками, які планували вступ до вищих духовних навчальних закладів. Зокрема, уповноважений власне надавав рекомендації щодо вступу до семінарій. Окрім того важливе місце посідав орган у справах релігій в СРСР і у формуванні нової громадянської обрядовості, адже і у 60–80 рр. ХХ ст. не припинялися експерименти радянської влади у цій сфері. Акцент зроблено також на інформації, що не привертала увагу дослідників раніше – скаргах та відгуках пересічних вірян та їх аналізі уповноваженим. Зазначено, що незважаючи на інтерес до історії державно-церковних стосунків в Україні з боку вітчизняних дослідників, питання мікроісторії в цьому контексті зрідка стають предметом наукових пошуків вчених-гуманітаріїв.

Umland gives intellectual expression to the characteristic biases of the Ukrainian nationalists in whose midst he now works. People in this social milieu focus so single-mindedly on the (very real) machinations of the Kremlin that they fail to see the legitimate interests and genuine grievances of Ukraine’s Russian speakers as significant factors in their own right. It is sad to watch a specialist of Umland’s caliber degenerate into a propagandist for the new regime in Kiev.

LINK TO ARTICLE ADDED BELOW

The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent Russia-backed unrest in Donbas resonate with the events around the so-called "German mediatization" of the early 1800s. Russia is playing with sovereignity, at once de-mediatizing Ukrainian regions (endowing them with more independence) and mediatizing them (stripping them of their newly found sovereignty within Russia). This curiously coincides with the mediatization of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict in the sense adopted in media and communication studies.