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Ukrainian politics, the Russian invasion and the escalating crisis of the post-Soviet world Towards the Abyss presents searching analysis of a decade of war and upheaval in Ukraine. Volodymyr Ishchenko has been among the left’s most... more
Ukrainian politics, the Russian invasion and the escalating crisis of the post-Soviet world

Towards the Abyss presents searching analysis of a decade of war and upheaval in Ukraine. Volodymyr Ishchenko has been among the left’s most significant commentators on Ukraine since 2014, when pro-EU protestors toppled the government in Kiev, Russia annexed Crimea and pro-Russian separatists seized parts of the Donbass. One of his first thoughts when he read the news of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 was that no matter how the war ends, he will no longer have a homeland.

What has happened in Ukraine ever since the Soviet collapse is a drawn-out process of de-modernization, and the downward spiral is getting faster. Ishchenko argues that the conflict being fought in Ukraine with tanks, artillery and rockets is the same conflict suppressed by police batons in Belarus and in Russia itself. The intensification of the post-Soviet crisis – the incapacity of an oligarchic ruling class in the territories of the former USSR to sustain political or moral leadership – is the root cause of the escalating violence.

Praise:

A nuanced, melancholy, sophisticated and gratifyingly intimate glimpse into war-torn Ukraine
Yanis Varoufakis, author of Technofeudalism

The huge choruses of these times will probably go down in history as mere noise. Might the lone voice of Ishchenko then sound prophetic?
Georgi Derluguian, author of Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus

A brilliant cri de cœur from a Soviet Ukrainian searching the historical horizon for a political model beyond neoliberalism and regressive nationalism
Dylan Riley, author of Microverses

[A] pugnacious debut ... those wanting a better understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict would do well to check out this left-wing analysis.
Publishers Weekly

A singular contribution to the rejuvenation of critical Eastern European scholarship ... the questions that Ishchenko raise[s] are itineraries for theoretical reflections and a hope ... for a modern and universalist politics worthy of its name
Bogdan Ovcharuk,  LeftEast

The collection is valuable for its retrospective analysis, with Ishchenko's clear-eyed insights coming at a time when few dare to examine the still-fresh wound that is recent Ukrainian history, or to think about anything but the next few months of fighting.
Signe Swanson,  Cleveland Review of Books

A rare, but necessary, corrective to the currently dominant explanation of the roots of these events in the West.
Vladimir Unkovski-Korica,  Counterfire
Chris Hann's essay serves as a valuable intervention against the tendency to normalize primordial ethnonationalism following the full-scale Russian invasion. It is not immune to the common pitfalls and omissions in the writings of many... more
Chris Hann's essay serves as a valuable intervention against the tendency to normalize primordial ethnonationalism following the full-scale Russian invasion. It is not immune to the common pitfalls and omissions in the writings of many authors whose point of criticism is aimed primarily at the role of Western elites in the conflict within and around Ukraine. But surely, Hann's core argument contains essential truths. Many social scientists have contributed to the construction of a theoretically shallow, methodologically nationalist, and culturally essentializing narrative. It is a telling fact that someone engaging the discussion has to begin with some basic facts of Ukrainian national identity formation, such as its diversity, or has to remind that the interests of the Western ruling classes in the war do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the Ukrainian subaltern classes, or that those are also likely to diverge from the interests and ideologies of their own comprador middle classes calling themselves “civil society.”
Why did the Kremlin fail to rely on the ‘soft power’ to secure its interests in Ukraine and instead opt for the military invasion? At the same time, why did the Kremlin believe that Russia could achieve its goals with relatively limited... more
Why did the Kremlin fail to rely on the ‘soft power’ to secure its interests in Ukraine and instead opt for the military invasion? At the same time, why did the Kremlin believe that Russia could achieve its goals with relatively limited forces in the course of a rapid regime-change ‘special operation’? These questions pose a puzzle for the two main arguments that dominate the vast literature on Ukrainian regionalism, which either present a largely symmetrical ‘East/West’ regional cleavage or question the salience and even the existence of any such cleavage in favor of a more fluid local diversity that the ascendant Ukrainian civic identity has ultimately encompassed. Instead, the article argues that Ukraine’s ‘regional’ cleavage could be understood as a nationally specific articulation of the class conflict common to many post-Soviet countries in the context of hegemony crisis. This perspective can better explain the disparate capacity of Ukraine’s ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-Russian’ political camps to universalize the particular class interests standing behind them and support them through civic mobilization, the rationale behind the original plan of the Russian invasion, and the reactions of supposedly ‘pro-Russian’ Ukrainian elites and regular citizens to its failure.
The article discusses the political contention around the implementation of the Minsk Accords in Ukraine, and why the pluralist nation-building project required for the success of these accords failed. The much-debated cleavage between... more
The article discusses the political contention around the implementation of the Minsk Accords in Ukraine, and why the pluralist nation-building project required for the success of these accords failed. The much-debated cleavage between the more 'pro-Western' and more 'pro-Russian' regions of Ukraine requires that such an alternative be taken seriously. The article argues that neither the change of the balance in favor of the pro-Western electorate in 2014, nor the rise of Ukraine's civic identity in response to Russian aggression can adequately explain the failure to develop a positive, pluralist nation-building project in the context of Minsk. It argues instead that the profound class and political asymmetry between Ukraine's 'Western' and 'Eastern' political camps created different capacities for the universalization of their particular interests, and for effective political mobilization for and against the Minsk Accords in the context of Euromaidan's revolutionary dynamics.
What explains the wide support for the invasion of Ukraine in Russia in the first months after it started? Many alleged that this support reflects an imperialist ideology permeating Russian society and culture. Based on a large set of... more
What explains the wide support for the invasion of Ukraine in Russia in the first months after it started? Many alleged that this support reflects an imperialist ideology permeating Russian society and culture. Based on a large set of in-depth interviews with supporters of the invasion among the regular Russian citizens, we argue that it is not a commitment to an imperialist ideology that is the most typical factor in support for the invasion but rather precisely the opposite-the deep depoliticization of Russian citizens, on which the support for Putin's regime has always been based. We explicate how the dynamics of depoliticization manifest themselves in the alienation of Russian citizens from articulating their own political positions, in the reproduction of the gap between the world of politics and of everyday life, and in the social construction of Ukrainians as a threat.
Ukrainian scholars, intellectuals and artists face a dilemma. Either we allow ourselves to become incorporated as just another ‘voice’ in a very specific field of institutionalized identity politics in the West, where Ukrainians would be... more
Ukrainian scholars, intellectuals and artists face a dilemma. Either we allow ourselves to become incorporated as just another ‘voice’ in a very specific field of institutionalized identity politics in the West, where Ukrainians would be just the latest addition to a long queue of a myriad of other minority voices. Or instead, starting from the tragedy of Ukraine, we set out to articulate the questions of global relevance, search for their solutions, and contribute to universal human knowledge. Paradoxically, this requires a much deeper and more genuine engagement with Ukraine than happens now.
The article explains the violent radicalization of the initially peaceful Maidan uprising in January 2014 as the result of failure to build efficient leverage against Viktor Yanukovych with nonviolent methods. Maidan lacked critical... more
The article explains the violent radicalization of the initially peaceful Maidan uprising in January 2014 as the result of failure to build efficient leverage against Viktor Yanukovych with nonviolent methods. Maidan lacked critical diversity of nonviolent tactics insofar as directly disruptive methods of noncooperation (e.g., strikes and boycott) remained small-scale and inefficient. The Maidan protest coalition primarily lacked social-organizational resources, i.e. authoritative civil society organizations and strong labor movement, for developing nonviolent leverage that was partially connected to gaps in ideological and regional diversity and partially to unfavorable structural conditions. However, radical nationalists actively participating in the protests possessed a unique combination of resources for initiating and diffusing efficient, coordinated, and strategic violence when it became legitimated by intensifying repressions and disillusionment in the incapacity of the oppositional political parties to propose an efficient strategy against the government. Violent radicalization facilitated geographical expansion of disruption via occupations of governmental buildings in western and central Ukrainian regions that the state was ultimately incapable of containing.
Based on a case study of Euromaidan Ukrainian nationalism, we argue that civic nationalism may derive more from a commitment to a particular political event than from a set of stable political ideas and principles. We concur that civic... more
Based on a case study of Euromaidan Ukrainian nationalism, we argue that civic nationalism may derive more from a commitment to a particular political event than from a set of stable political ideas and principles. We concur that civic nationalism can be as exclusivist as ethnocultural nationalism, and we develop specific criteria and mechanisms of civic exclusion originating from the unique experience of participating in the Euromaidan event. Challenging the conceptual dichotomy of civic vs. ethnocultural nationalism, we suggest that these categories are still fruitful; however, they should be re-conceptualized. We try to clarify the relations between civic and ethnocultural forms of nationalism instead of simply considering them in opposition to each other. We show that a belief in the existence of a civic nation can legitimize the practices of othering, among them ethnocultural exclusion, that are undertaken in the name of a civic nation.
The article traces nationalist polarization and divergence within the Ukrainian new left in response to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests in 2013–2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The ideological left-wing groups in... more
The article traces nationalist polarization and divergence within the Ukrainian new left in response to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests in 2013–2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The ideological left-wing groups in the protests were too weak to push forward any independent progressive agenda. Instead of moving the respective campaigns to the left, they were increasingly converging with the right themselves and degraded into marginal supporters of either pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian camps in the conflict. The liberal and libertarian left supported the Maidan movement on the basis of abstract self-organization, liberal values and anti-authoritarianism. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninists attempted to seize political opportunities from supporting more plebeian and decentralized Anti-Maidan protests and reacting to the far-right threat after the Maidan victory. They deluded themselves that Russian nationalists were not as reactionary as their Ukrainian counterparts and that the world-system crisis allowed them to exploit Russian anti-American politics for progressive purposes.
This is an attempt of a systematic estimation of the far right participation in Maidan protests based on a unique dataset of protest events in Ukraine during President Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. The data presented contradict the thesis... more
This is an attempt of a systematic estimation of the far right participation in Maidan protests based on a unique dataset of protest events in Ukraine during President Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. The data presented contradict the thesis supported by most of the experts on Ukrainian far right that the far right did not play any crucial or even significant role in Maidan protests. The data indicate that the far right Svoboda party was the most active collective agent in Maidan protest events, while the Right Sector was the most active group in Maidan confrontation and violence. Protests with the participation of the far right were not isolated events on the margins of larger ‘peaceful and democratic’ protest. The data indicate the timing and location of the most intense far right activity, which has previously not received much attention. In general, it highlights the importance of the underestimated, but highly intense and large-scale, Maidan protests in Ukrainian regions beyond the events in Kiev city centre. Finally, it points to how far right participation in Maidan grew from the moderate opposition parties’ increasing cooperation with Svoboda.
Статья является попыткой систематической оценки участия крайне правых в протестных событиях Майдана, основанной на уникальном массиве данных о протестных событиях в Украине в течение всего периода правления Президента Виктора Януковича.... more
Статья является попыткой систематической оценки участия крайне правых в протестных событиях Майдана, основанной на уникальном массиве данных о протестных событиях в Украине в течение всего периода правления Президента Виктора Януковича. Представленные данные опровергают утверждения, поддерживаемые большинством экспертов по крайне правым в Украине о том, что крайне правые не играли какой-либо ключевой либо значительной роли в протестных событиях Майдана. Данные указывают на то, что крайне правая партия «Свобода» была наиболее активным коллективным агентом в майдановских протестах, в то время как «Правый Сектор» был наиболее активной группой в ходе насильственного противостояния. События с участием крайне правых не были изолированными происшествиями на обочине преимущественно «мирного и демократического» протеста. Данные указывают на время и место наиболее интенсивной активности крайне правых, которая до этого не привлекала должного внимания. Статья подчеркивает важность недооцененных, но крайне значительных и масштабных протестов Майдана в украинских регионах за пределами событий в центре Киева. Наконец, данные указывают на то, как участие крайне правых на Майдане выросло из расширявшегося сотрудничества умеренных оппозиционных партий со «Свободой».
The article presents the first attempt to systematically assess significance of the far right participation in Maidan protests relying on a unique comprehensive dataset of media-reported protest events in Ukraine covering all the years of... more
The article presents the first attempt to systematically assess significance of the far right participation in Maidan protests relying on a unique comprehensive dataset of media-reported protest events in Ukraine covering all the years of Viktor Yanukovych rule. A preliminary analysis shows that the far right participation in Maidan was anything but insignificant. The far rights were the most visible identified collective actors among Maidan participants with the largest share of reported participation in Maidan protest events and specifically in violent events. The far rights were the most frequently mentioned identified collective actors at all stages of Maidan. Against expectations, the far rights were more frequently mentioned at the local maidans in the Eastern and in the Southern regions than in the Western or Central, i.e. precisely in those regions where they had the lowest support among the local residents.
In this article I point to some important problems of prefigurative political groups. Prefigurative politics implies identification of the means of social change with its ends. This solution of the means-ends dilemma may lead to strategic... more
In this article I point to some important problems of prefigurative political groups. Prefigurative politics implies identification of the means of social change with its ends. This solution of the means-ends dilemma may lead to strategic inflexibility and the reduction of activity oriented to a wide public, and to
the withdrawal of activists into their group. These problems become especially evident when prefigurative groups are weak and recently founded, when they specify radical social change as their end, and when they are acting in a “hostile” social environment. I demonstrate this in the case of two left-radical groups
in Kiev, Ukraine. Facing hostile public opinion produced by the discredit of left-wing rhetoric by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the decrease of the living standards of the Ukrainian population and therefore, a shortening of the available amount resources for activism, and, finally, from the lack of
an activist political culture, the left-wing movement was (and still is) coping with the problem of primary mobilization of resources and membership in order to transcend the limits of marginal subcultures and to put its agenda into the public discourse. In this situation a Trotskyist group “Robitnychyi Sprotyv” (RS,
“Workers’ Resistance”) attained larger outcomes in membership and material resources mobilization than an anarchist group “Tigra-Nigra” (TN). I will argue that the cause of such a result was the different general strategic solutions contained in revolutionary Marxist ideology and in anarchism1 that were
grounded on opposing solutions to the means-ends dilemma. With regard to outcome, the ideology of the Trotskyist group was more favorable as an instrumentally rational strategy, whereas the anarchists’ ideology assumed value-rational, expressive and spontaneous political behavior that turned out to be less favorable for resource mobilization.
Українські ЗМІ та українська академічна наука не шанують термін «неолібералізм» для характеристики пострадянських соціально-економічних трансформацій. Скоріш за все тому, що вони його просто не знають. Але наскільки слова «неолібералізм»... more
Українські ЗМІ та українська академічна наука не шанують термін «неолібералізм» для характеристики пострадянських соціально-економічних трансформацій. Скоріш за все тому, що вони його просто не знають. Але наскільки слова «неолібералізм» та «неоліберальний» не поширені серед українського мейнстріму, настільки ж вони поширені в текстах лівих критиків. Причому ліві автори ледь не завжди вживають їх суто ритуально, як риторичний маркер для «тих, хто в темі», з розрахунком на натренований умовний рефлекс: «неоліберальне» дорівнює «погане». Специфіка неолібералізму по-українськи досі не стала предметом серйозного аналізу.
Питання про характер і напрям розвитку українського капіталізму — це важливе питання для щонайсерйознішого дослідження і дискусії серед українських нових лівих. Від відповіді на це питання напряму залежить і наша стратегія, і наш вибір... more
Питання про характер і напрям розвитку українського капіталізму — це важливе питання для щонайсерйознішого дослідження і дискусії серед українських нових лівих. Від відповіді на це питання напряму залежить і наша стратегія, і наш вибір щодо того, на які класи ми маємо спиратися. Ця дискусія мала б і структурувати лівий рух — так само, як питання, чи може російське суспільство оминути капіталізм, було найважливішим питанням для розмежування російських революціонерів ХІХ століття на народників і марксистів. Цей випуск «Спільного» аж ніяк не закриває це питання, а, по суті, лише починає дискусію, яка мусить тривати далі й виходити на новий дослідницький рівень. У цьому коментарі до статті Дениса Горбача «Про три світи, змагання жертв і політекономію» (2014: 185), розміщеної в цьому випуску, я хочу позначити якраз ті моменти, яких подальша дискусія повинна уникати.
The article explores anti-Communist politics of memory “from below” during last years of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency in Ukraine. Using original protest events data I compare dynamics, repertoire, political actors, and targets of... more
The article explores anti-Communist politics of memory “from below” during last years of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency in Ukraine. Using original protest events data I compare dynamics, repertoire, political actors, and targets of politics of memory protests with protests against illegal constructions privatizing urban public space, as one of the most frequent social-economic protest issues, in the context of split between institutionalized and non-institutionalized “civil society”. Focusing analysis on attacks against Soviet monuments I show how state anti-Communist politics of memory provided legitimacy for the far right mobilization. Dynamics of the most successful grassroots anti-construction initiatives, “Save Old Kyiv,” shows how tightly social-economic protests might be interwoven with politics of memory, although with destructive consequences for the success of the former.
What are the prospects of „right to the city” movements in contemporary Ukraine in contrast to local urban protests by local agents against local problems? The article discusses „Save Old Kyiv” initiative case - one of the most successful... more
What are the prospects of „right to the city” movements in contemporary Ukraine in contrast to local urban protests by local agents against local problems? The article discusses „Save Old Kyiv” initiative case - one of
the most successful grassroots direct action initiatives against privatization of public space and why it failed to develop „right to the city” agenda. Under conditions of low participatory mobilization potential in Ukraine
grassroots initiatives moving beyond local level may take a form of multi-ideological transactional coalitions. However, in the same time, it makes more difficult to develop a shared framing of the problems causes and solutions.
In the paper, the major problems pertaining to the analysis of ideology in the main paradigms of the post-World War II sociology of social movements have been identified. A common flaw in the paradigms of collective behavior and “resource... more
In the paper, the major problems pertaining to the analysis of ideology in the main paradigms of the post-World War II sociology of social movements have been identified. A common flaw in the paradigms of collective behavior and “resource mobilization” was the reduction of ideology to social-psychological processes or instrumental rationality based on the fundamental dichotomy between ideological and pragmatic behavior. The “new social movements”, or identity paradigm created the necessary prerequisites for nonreductionist analysis of ideology; however, its
solution to the problem of essentialism in the form of the over-extended concept of collective identity was unsatisfactory. In conclusion, the author makes some suggestions regarding a more adequate theory of ideology based on the “relational
consensus” emerging among the researchers of social movements.
This chapter discusses the dynamics of Ukrainians' attitudes toward NATO membership from the 1990s to the present, based on a review of public opinion polls in Ukraine. Before 2014, support for NATO membership was limited to a small... more
This chapter discusses the dynamics of Ukrainians' attitudes toward NATO membership from the 1990s to the present, based on a review of public opinion polls in Ukraine. Before 2014, support for NATO membership was limited to a small minority of Ukrainians, including on the eve of the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, where a decision was made to admit Ukraine and Georgia in the indefinite future. After the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbass, support for NATO grew, but the issue remained divisive. Even on the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion, there was no evidence of a solid and stable pro-NATO majority in Ukraine. Support for NATO membership has grown since 2022, but various problems with the reliability of polling data during wartime make it questionable how large and stable this trend is.

Published in Anderson, G. (ed.) 2023. Natopolitanism: The Atlantic Alliance since the Cold War. London: Verso Books, Pp. 263-273.
This chapter analyses how the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), a communist successor party that was re-established in 1993, lost its place as the most popular party in the first decade of Ukrainian independence to become repressed and... more
This chapter analyses how the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), a communist successor party that was re-established in 1993, lost its place as the most popular party in the first decade of Ukrainian independence to become repressed and marginalised. The chapter shows how the KPU was gradually turning into a political ally of the oligarchic Party of Regions and suffered from repression after the Euromaidan revolution in 2014. It shows that the KPU failed to build more democratic and participatory structures as it failed to institutionalise internal opposition and regularly expelled dissenting radicals. It explains how young KPU members and voters had a lower commitment to the party, while the core Communist supporters were ageing. The chapter also demonstrates how the KPU failed to develop linkages to civil society but instead promoted weak front groups. Many militant communists joined the pro-Russian separatist uprising in Eastern Ukraine. The irremovable leadership that has been personally benefiting for more than 20 years from what was once the largest party in the country chose to keep a low profile. This all explains why the KPU failed to resist against terminal threats to its existence after the Euromaidan victory.

Cite as: Ishchenko, V. (2023). Ukraine. In: Escalona, F., Keith, D., March, L. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Radical Left Parties in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Pp. 665-692. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56264-7_23
In the following sections, we explicate Ukraine’s uneven incorporation into the global capitalist system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We explore Ukrainian capitalism’s internal contradictions and shifts of power between... more
In the following sections, we explicate Ukraine’s uneven incorporation into the global capitalist system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We explore Ukrainian capitalism’s internal contradictions and shifts of power between oligarchic blocs, discuss their unfolding in the context of neo-imperialist rivalry between the USA, the EU, and Russia. We zoom in on some of the major outcomes of that dialectic that facilitated a major multilevel crisis of 2013–2014 and led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia’s annexation of the southern peninsula Crimea, and the war in eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. We provide a critical review of the major narratives on the nature and role of Western and Russian imperialisms in Ukraine’s crisis. We conclude with the discussion that we started in the introduction: the one on the nature and varieties of imperialisms in the system of transforming transnational capitalism and the need for careful (re)theorizations of its workings and effects in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Published in Radical Left Movements in Europe / Ed. by M. Wennerhag, C. Fröhlich, and G. Piotrowski. Routledge, 2017, pp. 211-229. The Ukrainian new left provides an important case for understanding how radical movements build... more
Published in Radical Left Movements in Europe / Ed. by M. Wennerhag, C. Fröhlich, and G. Piotrowski. Routledge, 2017, pp. 211-229.

The Ukrainian new left provides an important case for understanding how radical movements build connections with grassroots protests, how they operate within broad coalitions and which causal mechanisms, strategies and factors account for their successes or failures. In this chapter I explore a small new left student union, “Direct Action” (DA), that was founded 2008 by ideological anarchists and Marxists and in 2010 led a mobilization involving 10,000 students in over 14 Ukrainian cities against the introduction of paid services in universities. DA was able to articulate a left-libertarian framing during large-scale student protests against the commercialization of education, which initially forced the government to make concessions, but later DA lost its hegemony in the student movement. I apply the Gramscian argument that a “weak civil society” is not an obstacle but an important structural opportunity for a radical movement. It allows radicals to exploit what I call the “primacy effect” – being the first to raise an issue ignored by everyone else – and in this way to favour their own framing of the problem and its solutions, making a serious claim for hegemony in the wider movement. Ultimately, however, retaining hegemony may require additional resources.
The Maidan and civil war from the perspective of an EU think-tank. Readers should not expect to find in its pages a balanced assessment of contending arguments or a systematic analysis of the available sources, followed by well-grounded... more
The Maidan and civil war from the perspective of an EU think-tank. Readers should not expect to find in its pages a balanced assessment of contending arguments or a systematic analysis of the available sources, followed by well-grounded conclusions. For the most part, this is a one-sided, tendentious account of Ukraine’s Maidan protests of 2013–14, the Russian intervention and the civil war, heavily reliant on web-sourced information, anonymous interviews and hectic prose, pieced together to bolster a very specific political agenda. It is driven not by a desire to investigate what actually happened and why, but rather to rebut critics—from all sides—of a Western neoliberal line. The nature of Russian policy, the legitimacy of the Yanukovych government and the character of the Maidan protests are all grist to this mill.
The paper seeks to present a balanced, well documented and nuanced discussion covering the full range of positions of the Ukrainian left and activities in relation to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and the war. It covers all the... more
The paper seeks to present a balanced, well documented and nuanced discussion covering the full range of positions of the Ukrainian left and activities in relation to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and the war. It covers all the major groups and parties who at least identify with the socialist and/or anarchist tradition: from ‘old left’ parties originating from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to ‘new left’ organisations, unions and informal initiatives that did not have any relation whatsoever to the CPSU. The paper gives a brief overview of the most important (and often still unresolved) questions about major political events in Ukraine starting from 2013. Then it describes and explains the positions and political activities of the various Ukrainian organisations on the left towards the Maidan uprising, the Anti-Maidan movement and the war in eastern Ukraine. The paper attempts to answer the following questions. How did different left wing organisations try to intervene in the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements and how successful were their interventions? To what extent were they able to defend the left agenda against liberals and (both Ukrainian and Russian) nationalists? To what extent did they rather follow the agenda of their political opponents? What were the differences not only between the different left wing organisations but also between groups in Kiev and in the provinces? What was the real scale of repression by the new government and by the far right against various left wing organisations? To what extent did the repression specifically against the left or rather against separatist forces challenge the state’s integrity? What are the current prospects and opportunities for left wing politics now in Ukraine both in the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary spheres? Are there any prospects for a ‘left turn’ in the separatist republics? What political lessons should the European and the international left draw from the political events in the Ukraine and what were their results for the local left?
Research Interests:
How has the transformation of the Russian economy and society in response to the challenges posed by the invasion of Ukraine affected popular support for the war? Scholars puzzled by the consistent majority support for the “special... more
How has the transformation of the Russian economy and society in response to the challenges posed by the invasion of Ukraine affected popular support for the war? Scholars puzzled by the consistent majority support for the “special military operation” have tried to explain it by reference to the low reliability of opinion polls in Russia, imperialist attitudes toward Ukraine ingrained in Russian culture, or the deep depoliticization characteristic of the Putin regime.

Looking at the development of the Russian war economy through the prism of the state-led macroeconomic policies known as “military Keynesianism,” however, we find that support for the war among at least part of Russian society may be rooted in material factors. The intensification of military production; the significant increase in payments to Russian soldiers, their relatives, and the police; the increase in military contracts; and import substitution in response to sanctions have all contributed to creating a conscious base of support among those groups benefiting materially from the war. If sustained over time, these effects could have significant consequences not only for the sustainability of support for a war of attrition and for Russia’s long-term confrontation with the West, but also for the transformation of the Russian economy and political regime, creating a positive feedback loop. However, the current economic and social effects of Russian military Keynesianism are contradictory—and some Russians who have seen their living standards decline due to its undesirable effects (like inflation) have become more critical of the war.

Cite as: Ishchenko, Volodymyr, Ilya Matveev, and Oleg Zhuravlev. 2023. "Russian Military Keynesianism: Who Benefits from the War in Ukraine?" PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 865. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russian-military-keynesianism-who-benefits-from-the-war-in-ukraine/
What happened to the diverse and divergent left in Ukraine, what could happen under some plausible war scenarios, and the dilemmas facing the international left.
In dem Artikel wird erörtert, was mit der Vielfalt der Linken in der Ukraine (und darüber hinaus) geschehen ist, was unter einigen plausiblen Kriegsszenarien geschehen könnte und welche strategischen Debatten und Dilemmata die... more
In dem Artikel wird erörtert, was mit der Vielfalt der Linken in der Ukraine (und darüber hinaus) geschehen ist, was unter einigen plausiblen Kriegsszenarien geschehen könnte und welche strategischen Debatten und Dilemmata die internationale Linke damit verbindet.
The invasion of Ukraine is not simply a product of Vladimir Putin’s expansionist mindset. It corresponds to a project for Russian capitalism that he and his allies have pursued since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The prevalent approaches to deradicalisation build on the concept of ‘extremism’ to understand and counter political violence. But this perspective is often inadequate in light of the rising threat of right-wing violence and presents... more
The prevalent approaches to deradicalisation build on the concept of ‘extremism’ to understand and counter political violence. But this perspective is often inadequate in light of the rising threat of right-wing violence and presents several major flaws.
Ukraine ended the 1980s as one of the most advanced parts of the Soviet super-power with a developed machine-building industry. Thirty years later, Ukraine’s major economic indicators are on a par with many Third World countries. The... more
Ukraine ended the 1980s as one of the most advanced parts of the Soviet super-power with a developed machine-building industry. Thirty years later, Ukraine’s major economic indicators are on a par with many Third World countries. The country is fundamentally dependent on the financial, political, and military support of the West, with politics dominated by a handful of powerful oligarchs, right-wing paramilitaries regularly marching on the streets, and a part of the country annexed by neighboring Russia and another part torn through by the frontline. It can rightfully be called the northernmost country of the Global South. Moreover, there is not any relevant political force with a vision of alternative progressive national development.

Several profound contradictions have defined the dynamics of Ukrainian economy, politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union: the contradiction between transnational and local capital, those between factions of the local capital, Ukrainian national identity contradictions, geopolitical contradictions with Russia, the US, and EU, and contradictions between civil society, the active public, and Ukrainian society at large. I will first expose them, and then discuss how the Ukrainian new left has been failing to respond to these contradictions with a project for Ukraine’s alternative development.
Comparative notes on anti-Lukashenka protests in Belarus in 2020
Revolutions have been plentiful in post-Soviet countries, but unlike classic revolutionary examples, they have been remarkably consistent in failing to establish a more stable political order and states autonomous from the influence of... more
Revolutions have been plentiful in post-Soviet countries, but unlike classic revolutionary examples, they have been remarkably consistent in failing to establish a more stable political order and states autonomous from the influence of patronage. Post-revolutionary leaders and parties have either quickly lost power or had significant problems with reelection. Institutional and structural changes have remained limited. It has become typical in these countries to view these revolutions as just another cycle of elite circulation that "changed nothing." How can we explain this pattern of frequent but ineffective revolutions?

We argue that post-Soviet revolutions have been responses to a severe crisis of political representation that their occurrence only reproduces and intensifies, explaining their frequency. Post-Soviet revolutions are thus deficient revolutions in which large-scale mass protest combines with revolutionary aspirations, rhetoric, and repertoires of collective action with only vaguely articulated claims, loose structures of mobilization, and weak and dispersed leadership. They generate a symbolic resource of revolutionary legitimacy, for which various political agents may compete and which they can hijack; however, they do not establish stable institutions of political representation. We illustrate this argument with the case of Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising-the most long-lasting, large-scale, violent but still deficient revolution in the post-Soviet region.
Ukraine today faces a vicious circle of nationalist radicalization involving mutual reinforcement between far-right groups and the dominant oligarchic pyramids. This has significantly contributed to a post-Euromaidan domestic politics... more
Ukraine today faces a vicious circle of nationalist radicalization involving mutual reinforcement between far-right groups and the dominant oligarchic pyramids. This has significantly contributed to a post-Euromaidan domestic politics that is not unifying the country but creating divisiveness and damaging Ukrainian relations with its strategically important neighbors. The lack of a clear institutionalized political and ideological boundary between liberal and far-right forces lends legitimacy to the radical nationalist agenda. Moreover, the oligarchic groups exploit radicalizing nationalism not out of any shared ideology but because it threatens their interests less than the liberal reformers. Local deterrents are insufficient to counter the radicalizing trend; Ukraine's far right vastly surpasses liberal parties and NGOs in terms of mobilization and organizational strength. Western pressure is needed on influential Ukrainian figures and political parties in order to help shift Ukraine away from this self-destructive development.
A nacionalista radikalizálódás háttere a posztmajdani Ukrajnában Az ukrajnai radikális nacionalista térnyerés kapcsán két fő narratíva alakult ki: a "fasiszta juntáé" és az "állampolgárok nemzetéé". A "fasisz-ta junta" megközelítést a... more
A nacionalista radikalizálódás háttere a posztmajdani Ukrajnában Az ukrajnai radikális nacionalista térnyerés kapcsán két fő narratíva alakult ki: a "fasiszta juntáé" és az "állampolgárok nemzetéé". A "fasisz-ta junta" megközelítést a Majdan-ellenes mozgalmak, az oroszpárti szakadárok és a maga az orosz kormányzat hangoztatják. "Fasisztán" elsősorban a Szvoboda (szabadság) párt és a Pravi Szektor ukrán nacionalistáit értik, amelyek a Majdan-felkelés idején a legaktívabb politikai szervezetek voltak, sőt, az előbbi néhány helyet is kapott a Majdant követő első kormányban; mi több, az egész kormányt az oroszokra és az orosz nyelvűekre veszélyesnek állították be. A "junta" Viktor Janukovics elnök alkotmányellenes elmozdítására utal, amely-lyel megtörték az ellenzéki pártokkal-külföldi erők közvetítésével-elért kompromisszumot. A 2014 szeptemberében aláírt első minszki megállapodás óta a "fasiszta junta" narratívája eltűnt az orosz médiából (a szeparatista-barát forrásokból viszont nem), ami arra a hivatalos orosz stratégiára utal, amely szerint Moszkva nem akarja megdönteni a posztmajdani ukrán kormányzatot, hanem tárgyalni kíván vele. A kritikák gyakran rámutatnak arra, hogy eltúlozzák a szélsőjobboldali pártok befolyá-sát, amelyek relatíve gyenge pozíciót töltöttek be a posztmajdani kormányzatban, rosszul szerepeltek az elnök-és parlamenti választá-sokon, 2014 októberét követőn pedig kiléptek a kormányból. Az ezzel szemben álló liberális, optimista narratíva szerint, a Maj-dan és a donbasszi háború nyomán egy új nemzet, az "állampolgárok nemzete" van születőben, amely sokkal befogadóbb az egyes régiók, kultúrák és nyelvek iránt. Ennek legfőbb bizonyítékát abban a közvé-lemény-kutatásban látják, amelynek adatai szerint, az ukrán identitás-sal kapcsolatban többségben vannak azok, akik "állampolgári", mint akik "etnikai" alapon válaszolnak. A Majdan utáni politika azonban nem a közvélemény-kutatásokat követte, hanem az ukrán identitást érintő kérdésekben éppen az ellenkező irányban fejlődött.
In this text I am briefly summarizing my recent studies on the role of radical nationalists in the Maidan protests. It is necessary to go to the roots of the denialist myth not only for the sake of academic truth but to expose certain... more
In this text I am briefly summarizing my recent studies on the role of radical nationalists in the Maidan protests. It is necessary to go to the roots of the denialist myth not only for the sake of academic truth but to expose certain parameters of ideological mobilizations that are usually ignored by commenters of post-Soviet politics, although they are becoming increasingly important for analysis of the emerging trends in Ukrainian civil society.
У цьому дописі я коротко підсумовую свої нещодавні дослідження щодо ролі радикальних націоналістів у протестах на Майдані. Необхідно розібратися з коріннями деніалістського міфу не лише заради академічної правди, а й для розкриття... more
У цьому дописі я коротко підсумовую свої нещодавні дослідження щодо ролі радикальних націоналістів у протестах на Майдані. Необхідно розібратися з коріннями деніалістського міфу не лише заради академічної правди, а й для розкриття важливих аспектів ідеологічної мобілізації, якими зазвичай нехтують коментатори пострадянської політики, попри їх дедалі більше значення для аналізу тенденцій, що з’являються в українському громадянському суспільстві.
Recognize the problem that is neither a fiction of Russian propaganda, nor it can be reduced to the inevitable but temporary effects of the war. Ukrainian radical nationalists’ unique extra-parliamentary power, which is aggravated by... more
Recognize the problem that is neither a fiction of Russian propaganda, nor it can be reduced to the inevitable but temporary effects of the war. Ukrainian radical nationalists’ unique extra-parliamentary power, which is aggravated by their interpenetration with the law-enforcement and weak liberal civil society, present a real danger to human rights and political liberties in Ukraine. The far right contribute to self-destructive nationalist radicalization dynamics destabilizing the political regime in Ukraine which is especially dangerous on the eve of Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 with unpredictable results.
Статистика протестів важлива не лише для задоволення наукового інтересу. Які проблеми найчастіше виводять людей на протест? Хто найчастіше бере участь у протестах? Проти кого спрямовані протестні дії? Як влада реагує на різні види... more
Статистика протестів важлива не лише для задоволення наукового інтересу. Які проблеми найчастіше виводять людей на протест? Хто найчастіше бере участь у протестах? Проти кого спрямовані протестні дії? Як влада реагує на різні види протестів – репресіями, поступками чи ігноруванням? Які з тактик протесту виявляються більш успішними у конкретних обставинах? Наскільки радикалізоване суспільство не на словах, а на практиці? Це все непусті питання для активістів та політиків, що мають розуміння необхідності далекоглядної стратегії боротьби. Адже в такому разі важливо спиратися не лише на суб’єктивні оцінки, не лише на далекоглядні узагальнення з одиничних подій чи кампаній, що можуть бути хибними в інших місцях та за інших обставин, а на систематично зібрані дані. Крім того, статистика протестів, як і будь-яка інша статистика може отримувати безпосереднє політичне значення і слугувати аргументом у повідомленнях для широкої громадськості, дискусіях з опонентами та владою.
Журнал соціальної критики «Спільне» - колективний некомерційний проект, покликаний аналізувати соціальну дійсність у вітчизняному та світовому масштабі. До четвертого випуску увійшли статті, що стосуються теорії та реалій класової... more
Журнал соціальної критики «Спільне» - колективний некомерційний проект, покликаний аналізувати соціальну дійсність у вітчизняному та світовому масштабі. До четвертого випуску увійшли статті, що стосуються теорії та реалій класової експлуатації та класової боротьби в сучасному світі та, в першу чергу, в постсоціалістичних країнах. Випуск також аналізує питання нестандартної зайнятості, робітничих протестів та профспілок.
Research Interests:
У брошурі представлені нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 180 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа. Проаналізовані дані охоплюють... more
У брошурі представлені нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 180 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа. Проаналізовані дані охоплюють усі (незалежно від тематики та чисельності) фактичні протестні події, що відбувалися на території України, їхню форму, учасників, цілі, вимоги, місце й час проведення. Окремі розділи присвячені протестам
найманих працівників, політичних партій і окремо крайніх правих організацій та ініціатив, «мовним» і консервативним протестам, а також репресіям проти протестувальників.
У брошурі представлені нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 150 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа. Проаналізовані дані охоплюють... more
У брошурі представлені нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 150 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа. Проаналізовані дані охоплюють усі (незалежно від тематики та чисельності) фактичні протестні події, їхню форму, учасників, цілі, вимоги місце й дати проведення, що відбувалися на території України. Окремі розділи присвячені протестам найманих працівників, дрібних підприємців, пільговиків, студентів, а також репресіям проти
протестувальників та факторам успішності протестів. Для соціальних і громадських активістів, правозахисників, журналістів, політиків, дослідників і викладачів соціальних і гуманітарних наук та всіх зацікавлених соціальними проблемами й колективними протестами в Україні.

Для соціальних активістів, журналістів, політиків, дослідників і викладачів соціальних і гуманітарних наук та всіх зацікавлених соціальними проблемами й колективними протестами в Україні.
Research Interests:
У брошурі представлені результати першої в Україні спроби систематично збирати інформацію про всі (незалежно від тематики та чисельності) фактичні протестні дії, їхню форму, учасників, цілі, вимоги, місце і час проведення тощо, що... more
У брошурі представлені результати першої в Україні спроби систематично збирати інформацію про всі (незалежно від тематики та чисельності) фактичні протестні дії, їхню форму, учасників, цілі, вимоги, місце і час проведення тощо, що відбуваються в реальному часі на території нашої країни, на основі моніторингу більше 100 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа. Окремі розділи присвячені робітничим, антизабудовним, студентським, екологічним протестам, а також протестам, що піднімають питання захисту громадянських прав, інтересів дрібних підприємців та пов’язані з історичною політикою. Подана інформація про поступки і репресії спричинені протестними діями.
Для соціальних активістів, журналістів, політиків, дослідників і викладачів соціальних і гуманітарних наук та всіх зацікавлених соціальними проблемами й колективними протестами в Україні.
Volodymyr Ishchenko è sociologo e intellettuale di sinistra. Le sue ricerche, negli ultimi anni, si sono concentrate su proteste e movimenti sociali, rivoluzioni, radicalizzazione, politica di destra e di sinistra, nazionalismo e società... more
Volodymyr Ishchenko è sociologo e intellettuale di sinistra. Le sue ricerche, negli ultimi anni, si sono concentrate su proteste e movimenti sociali, rivoluzioni, radicalizzazione, politica di destra e di sinistra, nazionalismo e società civile. Il suo saggio “Towards the abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to war” (Verso l’abisso: l’Ucraina da Maidan alla guerra”) è stato di recente pubblicato per le edizioni “Verso”. In questa chiacchierata Ishchenko, che conobbi molti anni fa a Kiev, ha preferito non rispondere a domande che presupponessero delle previsioni sul conflitto in Ucraina, ritenendo che ciò dipenda da fattori militari e diplomatici di cui non è a conoscenza, e ha quindi preferito concentrarsi sugli aspetti su cui è specializzato.
Fin dall’inizio dell’invasione dell’Ucraina politologi, storici, giornalisti, analisti – in sostanza: chiunque – si sono rincorsi nel cercare una causa allo scoppio del conflitto, invocando a seconda dei casi l’allargamento della NATO, la... more
Fin dall’inizio dell’invasione dell’Ucraina politologi, storici, giornalisti, analisti – in sostanza: chiunque – si sono rincorsi nel cercare una causa allo scoppio del conflitto, invocando a seconda dei casi l’allargamento della NATO, la follia di Putin o le vicende del principe Oleg nella Rus’ di Kiev nel IX secolo. Raramente si è fatto invece riferimento alle dinamiche di classe che attraversano le società dei due paesi. Ne abbiamo parlato con Volodymyr Ishchenko, sociologo ucraino, ricercatore della Freie Universität Berlin e autore di Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War (Verso, 2024).
Entrevista con el sociólogo ucraniano Volodymyr Ishchenko sobre la situación política y social en Ucrania, dos años después del estallido de la guerra
Der ukrainische Soziologe Volodymyr Ishchenko über den Zusammenhang von Krieg, Klassenverhältnissen und Nationalismus
Interview for Review of Democracy exploring how Ukraine is a magnifying glass into the contemporary global crisis
A long interview for the popular and "relatively" independent Chinese outlet The Paper (澎湃新闻) on how Ukrainian society has changed in the full-scale war, how civic and ethnic nationalism are intertwined, what is the logic behind political... more
A long interview for the popular and "relatively" independent Chinese outlet The Paper (澎湃新闻) on how Ukrainian society has changed in the full-scale war, how civic and ethnic nationalism are intertwined, what is the logic behind political repression, and the importance of the Soviet legacy for Ukraine's universal appeal in particular.
– Russia’s political capitalists waged war in order to survive as a class, to continue accumulating wealth through the exploitation of the state – says Volodymyr Ishchenko, a research associate at the Institute of East European Studies,... more
– Russia’s political capitalists waged war in order to survive as a class, to continue accumulating wealth through the exploitation of the state – says Volodymyr Ishchenko, a research associate at the Institute of East European Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. – However, this war, depending on what happens on the battlefield, may equally bring about a fall or a radical transformation of the whole post-Soviet order.
Volodymyr Ishchenko is socioloog, en hij werkt als onderzoeker aan het Instituut voor Oost-Europastudies aan de Vrije Universiteit van Berlijn. Voor de oorlog pleitte hij voor een structurele oplossing voor de oorlog in Oekraïne en de... more
Volodymyr Ishchenko is socioloog, en hij werkt als onderzoeker aan het Instituut voor Oost-Europastudies aan de Vrije Universiteit van Berlijn. Voor de oorlog pleitte hij voor een structurele oplossing voor de oorlog in Oekraïne en de onrust in de regio. Een overkoepelende veiligheidsstructuur zou helpen, dacht hij. Maar toen begon de oorlog, en dat veranderde alles. ‘Oekraïne is niet de plaats om te zoeken naar hoop.
A Ukrainian political sociologist, sees the Russian invasion as the consequence of a "crisis of hegemony" and failure of leadership both on the global level and inside Russia. He talks with Courthouse News.
Volodymyr Ishchenko (Ucrania, 1982) ha sido director adjunto del Centro de Investigaciones Sociales y Laborales y profesor del Departamento de Sociología del Instituto Politécnico de Kiev. En la actualidad, es investigador asociado en el... more
Volodymyr Ishchenko (Ucrania, 1982) ha sido director adjunto del Centro de Investigaciones Sociales y Laborales y profesor del Departamento de Sociología del Instituto Politécnico de Kiev. En la actualidad, es investigador asociado en el Institute de Estudios de Europa del Este de la Universidad Freie de Berlín. Está especializado en movimientos sociales, nacionalismo y la extrema derecha. En este momento, trabaja en un libro colectivo sobre la Revolución de Maidán y analiza el contexto ucraniano en distintos medios de comunicación internacionales.

Le entrevistamos por videoconferencia sobre las consecuencias en la sociedad ucraniana de la invasión rusa, pero también de la transformación que ha vivido su país desde las protestas de Maidán de 2012-2014. Por ejemplo, la prohibición del Partido comunista en 2015, tras la aprobación de la Ley de Decomunización, o la de otros 11 partidos políticos en marzo de este año, acusados de vínculos con Rusia. La mayoría de ellos habían obtenido resultados marginales en las últimas elecciones, pero la suma de los tres más importantes superaba los 2,7 millones de votos, el 18,3% del total registrado en las urnas.
The Ukrainian political sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko discusses the reasons for Kiev’s determined re-orientation to NATO and the European Union in the aftermath of the 2014 Maidan uprising—and the disastrous upshots of Putin’s invasion... more
The Ukrainian political sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko discusses the reasons for Kiev’s determined re-orientation to NATO and the European Union in the aftermath of the 2014 Maidan uprising—and the disastrous upshots of Putin’s invasion for his country.
Oricum se va termina războiul, el va schimba lumea și va afecta nu doar cele două țări implicate, dar și Europa, crede Volodimir Ișcenko, cercetător ucrainean la Institutul de Studii Est-Europene, Freie Universität din Berlin.
Investigador de los movimientos de protesta en su país, Ishchenko habló con Brecha de los debates sobre Ucrania en la izquierda global, del crecimiento del extremismo y del futuro de la identidad ucraniana.
Regardless of whether the war ends in total Russian occupation, a victory for Ukraine, or some kind of negotiated settlement in the middle, the repercussions of the war will be felt in both countries — and around the world —for years to... more
Regardless of whether the war ends in total Russian occupation, a victory for Ukraine, or some kind of negotiated settlement in the middle, the repercussions of the war will be felt in both countries — and around the world —for years to come. What will it mean for the future of Ukraine? How will it impact the Left in Eastern and Western Europe? To get answers to these and other questions, Jerko Bakotin of the Croatian weekly Novosti spoke with Volodymyr Ishchenko, one of the most prominent intellectuals on the Ukrainian Left and a co-founder of Commons: Journal of Social Criticism, a partner organization of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.
Der ukrainische Protestforscher Wolodymyr Ischtschenko befürchtet, dass die Ukraine in zwei Länder aufgeteilt wird. Doch auch eine soziale Revolution in Russland hält er für möglich. Ein Gespräch über den Krieg, den Widerstand und die... more
Der ukrainische Protestforscher Wolodymyr Ischtschenko befürchtet, dass die Ukraine in zwei Länder aufgeteilt wird. Doch auch eine soziale Revolution in Russland hält er für möglich. Ein Gespräch über den Krieg, den Widerstand und die Aufgabe der westlichen Linken.
Bojim se da, ukoliko sve ostane na sankcijama i isporukama oružja, to znači da je zapad zapravo zainteresiran za ovaj rat. Putin ne može sebi dopustiti da izgubi, pa će rat voditi što je duže moguće. To će značiti ogroman broj mrtvih i... more
Bojim se da, ukoliko sve ostane na sankcijama i isporukama
oružja, to znači da je zapad zapravo zainteresiran za ovaj rat.
Putin ne može sebi dopustiti da izgubi, pa će rat voditi što je
duže moguće. To će značiti ogroman broj mrtvih i potpuno
uništenje ukrajinskih gradova. Mislim da nato-ove elite
razumiju kako bi zona zabrane letenja iznad Ukrajine značila
rat između nato-a i Rusije.
If you’ve relied on establishment media to follow the events in Ukraine these past eight years, then chances are what you know is wrong. Despite — or, more likely, because — the tumult in Ukraine has reared its head prominently in both US... more
If you’ve relied on establishment media to follow the events in Ukraine these past eight years, then chances are what you know is wrong. Despite — or, more likely, because — the tumult in Ukraine has reared its head prominently in both US foreign policy and its domestic politics these past few years, the country’s history and its ongoing internal conflicts have been some of the most propagandized for Western audiences.

Dr Volodymyr Ishchenko, a sociologist and research associate at the Institute for East European Studies, has spent years writing about Ukrainian politics, the country’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the messy intersection of protests, social movements, revolution, and nationalism. He recently spoke with Jacobin’s Branko Marcetic about what Western audiences need to understand about Ukraine and the ongoing international standoff over it.
In this tug-of-war over Ukraine, the voices of Ukrainians themselves appear lost as officials in Kyiv contradict Western accounts of events, while surveys show ordinary Ukrainians are not as keen on NATO as their government. To find out... more
In this tug-of-war over Ukraine, the voices of Ukrainians themselves appear lost as officials in Kyiv contradict Western accounts of events, while surveys show ordinary Ukrainians are not as keen on NATO as their government. To find out more, Al Jazeera spoke with Volodymyr Ishchenko, a Ukrainian sociologist and research associate at the Institute of East European Studies, Freie Universität Berlin.
An interview for Iranian Labor News Agency by Kamran Baradaran
Volodymyr Ishchenko interviewed by Kamran Baradaran, via ILNA on the anniversary of Euromaidan.
Research Interests:
Although none of the candidates in the upcoming elections offer a particularly radical or progressive vision for the country, voters will at least be able to decide whether to endorse Poroshenko’s current course or throw their support... more
Although none of the candidates in the upcoming elections offer a particularly radical or progressive vision for the country, voters will at least be able to decide whether to endorse Poroshenko’s current course or throw their support behind another figure. Loren Balhorn of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung spoke with Kiev-based sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko to get a better understanding of the candidates, the state of the county, and what is at stake for the people of Ukraine in 2019.
Ukraine's politics are dominated by oligarchs. Its streets are more and more run by the far right.
Der Ukrainer Volodymyr Ishchenko über die politische Krise in seinem Land und die Macht der Oligarchen Volodymyr Ishchenko (31), arbeitet am Zentrum für Gesellschaftsforschung (Center für Society Research) in Kiew. Auf Einladung der... more
Der Ukrainer Volodymyr Ishchenko über die politische Krise in seinem Land und die Macht der Oligarchen
Volodymyr Ishchenko (31), arbeitet am Zentrum für Gesellschaftsforschung (Center für Society Research) in Kiew. Auf Einladung der Gruppe der LINKEN im Europäischen Parlament war er vergangene Woche in Brüssel. Katharina Strobel befragte ihn für »nd« über die Lage in der Ukraine und mögliche Auswege aus der politischen Krise.
Interview with Volodymyr Ishchenko, Deputy Director of the Center for Society Research in Kiev (28 February) Volodymyr Ishchenko On Thursday, 27 February, Norbert Hagemann – accredited assistant of MEP Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL) –... more
Interview with Volodymyr Ishchenko, Deputy Director of the Center for Society Research in Kiev (28 February)

Volodymyr Ishchenko
On Thursday, 27 February, Norbert Hagemann – accredited assistant of MEP Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL) – organized a Round Table discussion on the Ukrainian crisis together with the Transnational Institute (Amsterdam) and the Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements (Moscow). Actors of the European civil society, including transform! europe, met with analysts from Ukraine and Russia and discussed the situation, as well as the challenges faced by the country. A focus was given to the Ukraine-EU Free Trade Agreement, abandoned by ex-President Yanukovych shortly before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius but which should soon be put back at the top of the political agenda by the new Ukrainian government.

Volodymyr Ishchenko*, from the Social Protests Research Department of Kiev, responded to our questions and provided us with key insights on the political situation of Ukraine.
Interview for Spanish magazine Eurasianet.es on Eastern/Central Europe and the Middle East. Did Ukraine become more "European" after a year since Euromaidan? What are the perspectives for the left in Ukraine under the "decommunization"... more
Interview for Spanish magazine Eurasianet.es on Eastern/Central Europe and the Middle East. Did Ukraine become more "European" after a year since Euromaidan? What are the perspectives for the left in Ukraine under the "decommunization" laws? What are the perspectives for peace in Donbass?
My extended interview for the Flamman newspaper, Sweden, about Maidan protests, Ukrainian left, labor unions, radical nationalists, and civil society.
Interview for Il Manifesto about Ukrainian far right nationalists done by Yuri Colombo. Published on June 24, 2017, p. 8.
An article by Jens Malling in German press based on an interview with me
Research Interests:
Jens Malling's article in a Norwegian newspaper Utenriks based on an extensive interview with me
Research Interests:
An interview for Lithuanian public broadcaster LRT Kovo gale Ukrainoje vyks prezidento rinkimai, jau antrieji po Euromaidano revoliucijos ir įsiplieskusio konflikto su Rusija. Ankstesnieji rinkimai 2014 metais vyko didelės įtampos ir dar... more
An interview for Lithuanian public broadcaster LRT

Kovo gale Ukrainoje vyks prezidento rinkimai, jau antrieji po Euromaidano revoliucijos ir įsiplieskusio konflikto su Rusija. Ankstesnieji rinkimai 2014 metais vyko didelės įtampos ir dar didesnių lūkesčių atmosferoje: išrinktasis prezidentas Petro Porošenka, kuris pakeitė į Rusiją pabėgusį Viktorą Janukovyčių, turėjo reformuoti šalį, atsukti ją į Vakarus ir įgyvendinti euromaidaniečių iškeltus tikslus.

Praėjo penkeri metai, bet Ukraina neišsprendė įsisenėjusių struktūrinių problemų, o kai kuriose srityse padėtis tik blogėjo, sako sociologas Volodymyras Iščenka, Kijevo politechnikos instituto dėstytojas.

Socialinius protestus studijuojantis mokslininkas ir žurnalo „Spilne“ įkūrėjas V. Iščenka nuo pat pradžių kritiškai vertino Euromaidano protestus, perspėdamas apie abiejose pusėse kylančią šovinistinę isteriją ir pagundą viską vertinti „juoda-balta“ kategorijomis.

Jo manymu, nors Vakarai ir tarptautinės organizacijos spaudžia Ukrainą kovoti su korupcija, tačiau tai – tik paviršinė problema, kylanti iš gilių struktūrinių priežasčių, kurių nesprendžia ne tik valdantysis oligarchinis elitas, bet nepadeda spręsti ir Vakarų partneriai. Į Europos rinką Ukraina integruojama kaip periferinė žaliavų tiekėja, o savo politine ir ekonomine sąranga šalis tampa panašesnė į Lotynų Ameriką nei Vakarų Europą.

LRT.lt kalbėjosi su V. Iščenka apie Ukrainos prezidento rinkimus, politinę isteriją šalyje, viešąjį diskursą uzurpavusią „patriotinę mažumą“ ir kodėl didelė dalis Ukrainos visuomenės skeptiškai vertina integraciją į euroatlantines struktūras.
An extended interview for Rob Ferguson and Tomáš Tengely-Evans on recent military defeats of Ukrainian army, draft evasion, collapsing economy, global imperialist rivalry, and the right and left in Ukraine.
Since the start of the Maidan protests six months ago, Ukraine has been at the centre of a crisis which has exposed and deepened the fault-lines—geopolitical, historical, linguistic, cultural—that traverse the country. These divisions... more
Since the start of the Maidan protests six months ago, Ukraine has been at the centre of a crisis which has exposed and deepened the fault-lines—geopolitical, historical, linguistic, cultural—that traverse the country. These divisions have grown through the entwinement of opposed political camps with the strategic ambitions of Russia and the West, the former bidding to maintain its grip over its ex-Soviet bailiwick even as the latter relentlessly expands its sphere of influence. The fall of Yanukovych at the hands of a pro-Western protest movement in February brought a surge of opposition in the east of the country, spilling into separatist agitation after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in March. At present, the Ukrainian army is engaged in what it calls an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against an array of militias in Donetsk and Luhansk, composed of a blend of local residents and Russian nationalist fighters. The spectre of a dismemberment of the country, previously raised as a distant nightmare, has given way to a de facto partition, as Ukraine enters what may be the larval stages of a civil war. The combination of escalating local tensions and great-power rivalries poses significant challenges for analysis and political judgement. Here, Kiev-based sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko discusses the unfolding of the Ukrainian crisis and its outcomes to date, against the backdrop of the political and economic order that emerged after 1991. Born in 1982 into a Soviet technical intelligentsia family, Ishchenko came of age politically at the turn of the new century, in the tent camps and rallies of the ‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’ movement of 2000—one of the precursors of the 2013 Maidan. He became part of Ukraine’s Marxist milieu while studying at the National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy, where, despite the institution’s pro-Western orient­ation, a small leftist subculture emerged in the later 2000s; this included the journal Spilne (Commons), of which he is one of the founding editors. Within an intellectual scene dominated by nationalist themes, Spilne sought to redirect attention to socio-economic questions from an explicitly internationalist, and anti-capitalist, perspective. Such concerns have been still further marginalized as the pressures of the country’s ongoing emergency have borne down on its political culture, diminishing the space for independent critical thinking. As casualties begin to mount in the east, the ultimate consequences of Ukraine’s crisis remain troublingly uncertain.
The best solution—though the most difficult and not the most probable solution—would be for Western Ukrainians and Eastern Ukrainians to unite on some common ground, some common platform of shared demands for social justice, and to fight... more
The best solution—though the most difficult and not the most probable solution—would be for Western Ukrainians and Eastern Ukrainians to unite on some common ground, some common platform of shared demands for social justice, and to fight against the ruling class, against Russian intervention, against possible Western intervention, and against both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian far-Right nationalists.
В Украине снова неспокойно. Решение правительства Азарова — Януковича приостановить переговоры об ассоциации с Европейским Союзом вывело на улицы сторонников евроинтеграции. Власть уже успела отметиться попыткой силового разгона Майдана,... more
В Украине снова неспокойно. Решение правительства Азарова — Януковича приостановить переговоры об ассоциации с Европейским Союзом вывело на улицы сторонников евроинтеграции. Власть уже успела отметиться попыткой силового разгона Майдана, а её оппоненты попыткой силового же прорыва к Администрации Президента, насилием в отношении профсоюзных активистов и актами уличного вандализма. Противостояние продолжается.
О парадоксах украинской политики мы беседуем с социологом, редактором журнала социальной критики «Спільне» Владимиром Ищенко.
Редакция информационного бюллетеня "The Bridge/MOCT" продолжает представление академических журналов, выходящих на постсоветском пространстве. В предыдущем номере мы рассказывали о двух научных изданиях, имеющих институциональную историю... more
Редакция информационного бюллетеня "The Bridge/MOCT" продолжает представление академических журналов, выходящих на постсоветском пространстве. В предыдущем номере мы рассказывали о двух научных изданиях, имеющих институциональную историю в несколько десятков лет. Однако в последние годы на постсоветском пространстве возникло немало новых научные журналов. В этом выпуске мы публикуем интервью с Владимиром Ищенко*, редактором украинского журнала социальной критики Спiльне/Commons, который начал выходить около двух лет назад.
Interview for a student magazine SVоє on public sociology career
С 2009 года действует левый интернет-ресурс «Спильне» и издается одноименный журнал. Это первый подобного рода украинский интеллектуальный проект, известный не только украинским, но и зарубежным читателям. Коллектив журнала обращается к... more
С 2009 года действует левый интернет-ресурс «Спильне» и издается одноименный журнал. Это первый подобного рода украинский интеллектуальный проект, известный не только украинским, но и зарубежным читателям. Коллектив журнала обращается к широкому кругу тем: политэкономия кризиса, приватизация общественного городского пространства, коммерциализация образования, антикапиталистические движения в Украине и мире, современное искусство, история социальной борьбы и др. О задачах «Спильне» и особенностях украинской ситуации с редактором журнала Владимиром Ищенко специально для Рабкор.ру беседовал Дмитрий Райдер.
The war in Ukraine has divided anarchists. Some struggle against the Russian invasion by supporting Ukrainian society (and, at least to some extent, the Ukrainian state); others profess a principled opposition to both sides in the... more
The war in Ukraine has divided anarchists. Some struggle against the Russian invasion by supporting Ukrainian society (and, at least to some extent, the Ukrainian state); others profess a principled opposition to both sides in the conflict. Some mobilize historical parallels; others explain differences in political positions by referencing differing regional experiences. In order to capture and understand the variety of anarchist positions, and to reflect on points of agreement and disagreement among them, during summer and early autumn 2023, we posed the following questions to a selection of activists, theorists, scholars of anarchism, and researchers of anarchist movements:
What have we learned from the reactions of Ukrainian, Russian, Belarussian, and international anarchist movements?
Do we know anything now that we did not know before?
Do the differences among anarchists have deep-seated causes?
Will these differences endure and have long-term effects?
Has the war changed elements of the anarchist point of view?
How Russia's military Keynesianism changes the economy and society, turns a significant minority of Russians into direct beneficiaries of the invasion, and creates a basis for active and conscious support for a much longer war.
The suspensions have more to do with the post-Euromaidan polarisation of Ukrainian politics than genuine security concerns related to the Russian invasion. During the weekend, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government suspended 11... more
The suspensions have more to do with the post-Euromaidan polarisation of  Ukrainian politics than genuine security concerns related to the Russian invasion.

During the weekend, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government suspended 11 Ukrainian political parties citing their alleged “links with Russia”. While the majority of the suspended parties were small, and some were outright insignificant, one of them, the Opposition Platform for Life, came second in the recent elections and currently holds 44 seats in the 450-seat Ukrainian Parliament.

It is true that these parties are perceived as “pro-Russian” by many in Ukraine. But it is important to understand what “pro-Russian” means in the country today.
While the world is entering a major political and economic crisis as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, it may put an end to the long-standing crisis of the post-Soviet condition. The war could end it either by finally dismantling the... more
While the world is entering a major political and economic crisis as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, it may put an end to the long-standing crisis of the post-Soviet condition. The war could end it either by finally dismantling the very post-Soviet space, or by ultimately determining the contours and directions of development towards more stable political, economic and ideological structures in this tumultuous part of the world. What is the post-Soviet condition? The best answer would be that it is undefinable beyond the prefix "post", as something that replaced Soviet state socialism. But what exactly is the "something" that replaced it?
But faced with warmongering narratives and panic, which are damaging the Ukrainian economy, the Ukrainian president has to go beyond mustering independent rhetoric. He needs to undertake proactive foreign policy in the interests of all... more
But faced with warmongering narratives and panic, which are damaging the Ukrainian economy, the Ukrainian president has to go beyond mustering independent rhetoric. He needs to undertake proactive foreign policy in the interests of all Ukrainian citizens that would take seriously the critical issues behind the escalation. Ignoring them or unequivocally rejecting them on dubious grounds could deprive Ukraine of a say in its own future as decisions are taken on its behalf by foreign powers.
The U.S. and U.K. officials and media have long been warning against the “imminent” Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whatever the prospects of such an invasion are, it also raises an important question about the character of the Russian... more
The U.S. and U.K. officials and media have long been warning against the “imminent” Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whatever the prospects of such an invasion are, it also raises an important question about the character of the Russian political regime and how the invasion may change it.

Let us hypothetically assume, as many have, that Russia can defeat the Ukrainian army and occupy a large part of Ukraine (especially the southeastern and central regions). The question is what to do with this part of Ukraine. The problem is not the unlikely massive Ukrainian guerrilla war against the Russian army. The problem is that the Russian state, such as it is now, has little to offer Ukrainians as well as to the world.
After weeks of media scare about a purported Russian military invasion of Ukraine, the conflict may get a chance to be solved in a negotiated way. The public conversation on the current escalation of the Russian-Western conflict over... more
After weeks of media scare about a purported Russian military invasion of Ukraine, the conflict may get a chance to be solved in a negotiated way. The public conversation on the current escalation of the Russian-Western conflict over Ukraine is, however, quite ironic. At least on the surface, it focuses on guarantees that Ukraine would not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military alliance, which is not only far from inviting Ukraine to join but which most Ukrainians themselves do not want to enter.
After the 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine may give a unique perspective on the post-Soviet condition in general and understand it as the ongoing unresolved crisis of the fundamental relation of representation... more
After the 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine may give a unique perspective on the post-Soviet condition in general and understand it as the ongoing unresolved crisis of the fundamental relation of representation between the political elites and social groups interests.
30 Jahre nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion kann die Ukraine eine besonders klare Perspektive auf den post-sowjetischen Gesellschaftszustand geben, der als ungelöste Krise der grundlegenden Beziehung zwischen politischen Eliten und... more
30 Jahre nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion kann die Ukraine eine besonders klare Perspektive auf den post-sowjetischen Gesellschaftszustand geben, der als ungelöste Krise der grundlegenden Beziehung zwischen politischen Eliten und Interessen sozialer Gruppen verstanden werden kann.
Selenskyjs Erfolg war ein formvollendetes Symptom der Krise der politischen Repräsentation. Zu seinem Sieg verhalf ihm nicht die Kraft, die der vage Reiz des »neuen Gesichts« ausübte, sondern das extreme Misstrauen gegenüber den »alten«... more
Selenskyjs Erfolg war ein formvollendetes Symptom der Krise der politischen Repräsentation. Zu seinem Sieg verhalf ihm nicht die Kraft, die der vage Reiz des »neuen Gesichts« ausübte, sondern das extreme Misstrauen gegenüber den »alten« Eliten. Ohne eine echte Partei, eine Bewegung oder auch nur ein funktionierendes Team mit einem klaren Plan ließ Selenskyj den politischen Moment von 2019 ungenutzt vorüberziehen
The astonishing results for Zelenskiy and his party are indisputable signs of a profound crisis of Ukraine’s political, economic, as well as intellectual, elites. The presidential and political elections of 2019 showed a huge demand for... more
The astonishing results for Zelenskiy and his party are indisputable signs of a profound crisis of Ukraine’s political, economic, as well as intellectual, elites. The presidential and political elections of 2019 showed a huge demand for alternative ones. The demand for a deeper change — and an alternative project for national development — can only grow as disappointment with these “new faces” mounts. Indeed, for a poor country torn by many internal and geopolitical contradictions, achieving such change is a question of survival.
In Sunday’s election Ukrainian voters dealt a decisive rebuttal to the post-Maidan establishment. Yet well-organized nationalist forces represent a time bomb under the new president-elect.
Volodymyr Zelenskiy has united a polarised country by rejecting angry nationalism – but his politics offer no panacea
Размышления о некоторых проблемах журнала социальной критики "Спільне" и украинских новых левых, перспективах в изменившейся политической ситуации после 2014 года.
The Ukrainian Euromaidan protests started on 21 November 2013 and culminated in the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych at the end of February 2014. As with other mass uprisings, it brought together, to the streets and squares,... more
The Ukrainian Euromaidan protests started on 21 November 2013 and culminated in the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych at the end of February 2014. As with other mass uprisings, it brought together, to the streets and squares, people with different grievances. However, those with the least progressive grievances significantly shaped the protests and, in the end, benefited the most from them.
Jens Malling's article in Danish newspaper Information based on an extensive intervew with me
Research Interests:
Unedited version of the comment for The Guardian, December 18, 2015
Comment on bloodshed in Kiev during far right protests against changes in Ukrainian Constitution on August 31, 2015
Despite the hypocritical instrumentalisation of the ‘antifascist’ rhetoric by Russian propaganda and pro-Russian separatists, the Ukrainian authorities and mainstream opinion in Ukraine indeed continue to show unacceptable ignorance of... more
Despite the hypocritical instrumentalisation of the ‘antifascist’ rhetoric by Russian propaganda and pro-Russian separatists, the Ukrainian authorities and mainstream opinion in Ukraine indeed continue to show unacceptable ignorance of the danger from the far right and even openly neo-Nazi forces, cooperating with them in elections and allowing them to take positions within law enforcement.
On July 24 the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Oleksandr Turchynov announced the disbanding of the parliamentary group of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) over a ridiculous technicality. The court trial over CPU’s ban as a... more
On July 24 the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Oleksandr Turchynov announced the disbanding of the parliamentary group of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) over a ridiculous technicality. The court trial over CPU’s ban as a political party started the same day withsimonenko the next session of the court scheduled for mid-August.  The CPU is accused of supporting ‘terrorism’ and the separatism of Eastern Ukrainian pro-Russian rebels. While Ukrainian and international left should not have any illusions about the CPU just because of the “communist” word in its name, nevertheless, we should worry and actively oppose its ban pushed forward in the context of a major anti-democratic assault after the president Yanukovych has been toppled down.
As in the case of the great revolutions of the past, foreign intervention is a major factor in curtailing even such weak liberation potential as was found in Euromaidan where rising nationalist feelings pushed aside civic control over the... more
As in the case of the great revolutions of the past, foreign intervention is a major factor in curtailing even such weak liberation potential as was found in Euromaidan where rising nationalist feelings pushed aside civic control over the government and other social agendas. Thus, should social-economic unrest arise once again – this time against the new government’s austerity measures and its overt oligarchic rule – it will be led most probably by the populist far right, and not by the incomparably weaker new left. As such it will leave little room for the development of a broader all-national movement so necessary in a culturally divided country, and, more than likely, it will fuel the dynamics of state disintegration without leading toward social transformation.
We should support the progressive wings of both factions, not tie ourselves up with hypocritical justifications of one or the other.
10 марта вместе с Захаром Поповичем мы выступили на дискуссии о политической ситуации в Украине в Палате общин по приглашению члена Британского парламента Джона МакДоннела. Деньги на покрытие дешевых билетов Визз-Эйр и дорогих английских... more
10 марта вместе с Захаром Поповичем мы выступили на дискуссии о политической ситуации в Украине в Палате общин по приглашению члена Британского парламента Джона МакДоннела. Деньги на покрытие дешевых билетов Визз-Эйр и дорогих английских виз собрал краудфандингом среди лондонских левых наш товарищ Крис Форд. Антон Шеховцов, не присутствуя на дискуссии, публично обвинил нас на своей страничке в фейсбуке в том, что мы «говорили в британской Палате Общин о том, что к власти в Украине пришли фашисты», что «эти два типа приехали в Лондон… абсолютно сознательно дискредитировать Украину», что мы «солидаризовались с Британской национальной партией», что я «назвал “фашистами” Сергея Квита, Андрея Парубия и Татьяну Чорновол».
My post on facebook on the coming war in Crimea suddenly became very popular and was translated into English, Bulgarian, Latvian, Portuguese, Greek, Czech, Romanian, Italian, French, Dutch, Serbo-Croatian and maybe other languages. Adding... more
My post on facebook on the coming war in Crimea suddenly became very popular and was translated into English, Bulgarian, Latvian, Portuguese, Greek, Czech, Romanian, Italian, French, Dutch, Serbo-Croatian and maybe other languages. Adding slightly different Russian and English versions and all the links on other language versions I found.
Two popular labels are being ascribed to events in Ukraine: it was either a democratic – or even social – revolution, or it was a rightwing – or even neo-Nazi – coup. In fact, both characterisations are wrong. What we have have seen is a... more
Two popular labels are being ascribed to events in Ukraine: it was either a democratic – or even social – revolution, or it was a rightwing – or even neo-Nazi – coup. In fact, both characterisations are wrong. What we have have seen is a mass rebellion, overwhelmingly supported in western and central Ukraine without majority support in the eastern and southern regions, leading to a change of political elites. But there are no prospects for democratic, radical change, at least under the new government.
A number of academics have expressed their concern about the international media's misrepresentation of the protests in Ukraine. They say that the media have over-emphasised the significance of the far right in what is a broad and diverse... more
A number of academics have expressed their concern about the international media's misrepresentation of the protests in Ukraine. They say that the media have over-emphasised the significance of the far right in what is a broad and diverse protest movement; and such exaggerations may serve Russia's imperialist interests in Ukraine.

Appeals for balanced coverage can never be irrelevant. But politically liberal academics are turning the real problem upside down. It is a very real far right, not sensational media reports or an imagined Kremlin conspiracy, that is discrediting Euromaidan.
The far right has infiltrated a movement that in itself does not reflect all the people. There must be an alternative to this senseless violence.
Recently a number of internationally recognized scholars and public intellectuals signed a letter in full support of Euromaidan protests, backing ‘Ukrainian society’ against ‘Ukrainian government’. Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Craig... more
Recently a number of internationally recognized scholars and public intellectuals signed a letter in full support of Euromaidan protests, backing ‘Ukrainian society’ against ‘Ukrainian government’. Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Craig Calhoun, Claus Offe, Saskia Sassen, Charles Taylor, Michel Wieviorka, Slavoj Žižek and many others celebrated the ‘legal’ and ‘peaceful’ protests embodying, as they claimed, ‘the best European values’, demanded a ‘Marshall-like plan’ for Ukraine, and expressed the hope that, if welcomed to EU, Ukrainians would help to build ‘a new Europe and a fairer world’.

Unfortunately, the letter shows an unacceptable level of understanding, simplification and misrepresentation of very contradictory Ukrainian protests containing very dangerous trends which will be only legitimized more if unrecognized by such esteemed academics.
С сожалением отмечаю распространенное мнение, что ТВ-картинки со сжигающими флаги ЕС протестующими европейцами — это все якобы манипуляции путинской пропаганды. Якобы на самом деле европейцы протестуют только против конкретных... more
С сожалением отмечаю распространенное мнение, что ТВ-картинки со сжигающими флаги ЕС протестующими европейцами — это все якобы манипуляции путинской пропаганды. Якобы на самом деле европейцы протестуют только против конкретных экономических мер, а не против каких-то «абстракций». А против Евросоюза как такового выступают якобы только «националистические троглодиты».
Британские PhD-студенты и молодые доктора в шоке и возмущении. В Университете Эссекса открыли постдокторскую исследовательскую вакансию «без стипендии». Т.е. никак не оплачиваемую и по умолчанию предполагающую совмещение с другой работой.... more
Британские PhD-студенты и молодые доктора в шоке и возмущении. В Университете Эссекса открыли постдокторскую исследовательскую вакансию «без стипендии». Т.е. никак не оплачиваемую и по умолчанию предполагающую совмещение с другой работой. Которая, возможно, будет весьма далекой от ожидаемой после 8-12 лет, потраченных на высшее образование и получение степени PhD, — например, придется готовить кофе и заклеивать конверты ради заработка. В блогах на сайте знаменитой Лондонской школы экономики вышла очередная заметка об ужасах прекаризированной работы в западной неолиберальной академии: на краткосрочных и малооплачиваемых контрактах, не гарантирующих никакого надежного будущего и плохо совместимых с семейной жизнью.
Радикализация антиправительственных протестов в Болгарии, продолжающихся уже свыше 40 дней, привлекла внимание левых, для которых эти выступления могут казаться органичным элементом общеевропейских кампаний против неолиберальных мер... more
Радикализация антиправительственных протестов в Болгарии, продолжающихся уже свыше 40 дней, привлекла внимание левых, для которых эти выступления могут казаться органичным элементом общеевропейских кампаний против неолиберальных мер суровой экономии, «оккупаций» или очередной волнойв серии глобальных выступлений, спровоцированных «арабской весной». Опубликованный на портале Лива перевод статьи Ивы Александровой, вцелом достаточно подробной и дающей необходимый контекст социально-экономических протестов последних лет, является хорошим примером подобного наивно симпатизаторского взгляда на протесты, на самом деле очень близкого к тому, что транслируется мейнстримными СМИ. Эти протесты гораздо более комплексные и неоднозначные, о чем я могу судить, непосредственно наблюдая их в Софии на прошлой неделе и обсуждая с болгарскими новыми левыми. И здесь есть что обсуждать – болгарские протесты ставят нам сложные вопросы.
СМИ всегда с удовольствием сообщают о протестных настроениях, но далеко не всегда подчеркивают, что это лишь декларативная готовность выходить на улицы. Как она соотносится с реальным количеством и численностью протестов в Украине,... more
СМИ всегда с удовольствием сообщают о протестных настроениях, но далеко не всегда подчеркивают, что это лишь декларативная готовность выходить на улицы. Как она соотносится с реальным количеством и численностью протестов в Украине, насколько мне известно, никто до сих пор систематически не проанализировал. Граждане могут годами возмущаться и ругать власть на кухне в кругу семьи и друзей, призывать перестрелять всех депутатов, но никогда так и не выйти на улицы.
Нещодавно близько сорока представників української гуманітарної інтелігенції звернулися до об’єднання опозиційних партій з «Комітету опору диктатурі» із закликом припинити співпрацю з крайньо правою партією ВО «Свобода». Риторика листа... more
Нещодавно близько сорока представників української гуманітарної інтелігенції звернулися до об’єднання опозиційних партій з «Комітету опору диктатурі» із закликом припинити співпрацю з крайньо правою партією ВО «Свобода». Риторика листа цілком типова для мейнстріму української політики. Незвичайними є підписи під цим листом від кількох знакових фігур для нового лівого руху. Адже, попри гідну справу опору легітимації крайніх правих на українській політичній арені, деякі ліві інтелектуали надали свою моральну підтримку праволіберальній та орієнталістській риториці.
ЦДС розглядає збір, узагальнення, аналіз і поширення інформації про протестні події не тільки як дослідницьку задачу, а й як один з необхідних перших кроків у налагодженні горизонтальних мереж солідарності та довіри задля створення... more
ЦДС розглядає збір, узагальнення, аналіз і поширення інформації про протестні події не тільки як дослідницьку задачу, а й як один з необхідних перших кроків у налагодженні горизонтальних мереж солідарності та довіри задля створення масових і потужних рухів на захист базових соціальних прав мешканців нашої країни. У дусі публічної соціальної науки, розвиток якої є однією з головних задач Центру дослідження суспільства, наукове пояснення не є самоцінним, а, в першу чергу, є засобом і поштовхом до прогресивних змін у суспільстві.
Заводя речь о «среднем классе», следует понимать, что это очень противоречивое понятие, хотя и часто используемое. Под одним термином объединяются довольно разные группы и даже классы (в более строгом значении этого слова). Прежде всего,... more
Заводя речь о «среднем классе», следует понимать, что это очень противоречивое понятие, хотя и часто используемое. Под одним термином объединяются довольно разные группы и даже классы (в более строгом значении этого слова). Прежде всего, выделяют «старый» и «новый» средний класс. «Старый средний класс» – это мелкие торговцы, лавочники, ремесленники, фермеры, то есть традиционная мелкая буржуазия, сами себе хозяева, которые не нанимаются ни к какому работодателю. Но и сами они чаще всего не имеют наемных работников, работая своими руками либо используя труд членов семьи, помогающих семейному предприятию или хозяйству.
The seminar introduces students to the major issues of Ukrainian nationalism and national identity. What does it mean to be Ukrainian and what are the major variations of Ukrainian identity? What are the origins of the regional split in... more
The seminar introduces students to the major issues of Ukrainian nationalism and national identity. What does it mean to be Ukrainian and what are the major variations of Ukrainian identity? What are the origins of the regional split in Ukrainian politics? Was Ukraine a colony under Russian Empire and the Soviet Union? Why are the memories about the massive violence in the first half of XX century divergent in Ukraine? Why is the issue of Russian language presence in the public sphere so politically contentious in Ukraine? How post-Soviet political regime in Ukraine has been perceived by Ukrainian nationalists? What do Euromaidan uprising in 2013-14 and the following war in eastern Ukraine have to do with Ukrainian national identity split and what impact did they have on it? Has Ukrainian nationalism become more civic, unifying and inclusive since 2014?

These key issues have not only been recurrent in political discussions within Ukraine but have become important for the recent escalation of geopolitical conflict between US, EU, and Russia about Ukraine. We will discuss these questions in depth with a focus on their diverging interpretations by various groups within Ukrainian society as well as by various kinds of Ukrainian nationalists. The course will be of interest for the student who would like to deepen their knowledge of Ukrainian contemporary politics, history, and culture as well as interested in the international relations around “Ukraine crisis” since 2014.
The syllabus for the course I taught at XXI. Greifswalder Ukrainicum summer school in 2016
Research Interests:
with Kerstin Kaiser (die Linke, Brandenburg Landstag, Germany), Bakar Berekashvili (Georgian-American University, Tbilisi, Georgia). Kyiv, National Technical University “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, 7th of September 2015 Few people doubt... more
with Kerstin Kaiser (die Linke, Brandenburg Landstag, Germany), Bakar Berekashvili (Georgian-American University, Tbilisi, Georgia). Kyiv, National Technical University “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, 7th of September 2015

Few people doubt that the post-Soviet education should be reformed systematically. But what kind of reforms should be conducted and in what directions? Which education models should we be guided by? The discussion raises questions about problematic sides of the models of higher education to which representatives of Ukrainian education community often refer. Which achievements, inner problems and disadvantages are there in higher education of the EU countries and Georgia? What should we adopt and what should we not? Participants raise questions on the models alternative to popular and idealized ones, on the models which are less known in Ukraine and which might be more appropriate for education reform in Ukraine.
Research Interests:
Powerpoint slides accompanying paper presented at the 10th Danyliw Research Seminar in the University of Ottawa. This paper presents the very first preliminary analysis of a unique and comprehensive protest event dataset for Ukrainian... more
Powerpoint slides accompanying paper presented at the 10th Danyliw Research Seminar in the University of Ottawa. This paper presents the very first preliminary analysis of a unique and comprehensive protest event dataset for Ukrainian Maidan which indicate a highly significant far right participation in Maidan. This is the first attempt for systematic assessment of the far right participation in Maidan protests and, particularly, in the violent protests, their dynamics and important regional variation.
Звіт представляє нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 190 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа у 2013 році. Проаналізовані дані... more
Звіт представляє нові результати систематичного дослідження протестів, репресій та перемог протестувальників в Україні на основі моніторингу більше 190 національних, обласних та активістських веб-медіа у 2013 році. Проаналізовані дані охоплюють усі (незалежно від тематики та чисельності) фактичні протестні події, що відбувалися на території України, їхню форму, учасників, цілі, вимоги, місце й час проведення.

Спеціальний фокус зроблений на регіональному розподілі протестіа, а також на забутих під час Майдану соціально-економічних (зокрема, робітничих) протестах. Соціально-економічні протести продовжували зростати і, як і в попередні роки,  фактично в усіх регіонах України лишалися найбільш частими видами протестів, які виводили людей на вулиці.
Lecture for “Civil society and political protest” course
Profile of labor and small business protests in Ukraine in 2010-2011 based on Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data monitoring project