Enlargement and Integration in the EU

This study focuses on the European Union’s (EU) discursive construction, and representation in the process of its enlargement. It problematizes the presently common tendency of doing so in ways which portray EU expansion as an expansion of Europe. At issue are thus practices conflating and equating the EU and Europe which pervade much of related academic, political and public debates and discourses, and so structure how we know of and imagine enlarging EU. Embracing post-structuralist and discourse-theoretical analytical and interpretative framework, this work points to the political character of representing the EU in this and, for that matter, any other fashion. Pursuit of this assertion necessitates a ‘step back’ from, and critical consideration of mainstream political and scholarly presuppositions concerning the Union and its enlargement in their arbitrariness. The very problematization of practices equating the EU and Europe, or of their allied ‘Europe-building’ concept of ‘European identity’, is conceivable and ‘meaningful’ only once we admit that these are not politically innocent components of an ‘objective’ grasp on ‘present’ or ‘emergent’ social realities in Europe and the EU but instead ‘merely’ value-laden interpretative possibilities biased in favour of the EU-official federalist integration project. Anticipating a divergence in conceptions and portrayals of the Union by senior EU members, elite and institutions on the one hand, and the new post-communist Member States on the other, this study examines national discursive spaces in the so-called Visegrad countries. On the basis of this extensive empirical enquiry, it reports rather distinctive understandings of the EU/European integration therein, affirming thus the suspected dissonance from the EU mainstream. They are attributed to several factors, considerations and concerns which are posited to be very likely shared more widely among post-communist member countries. The Visegrad societies’ conceptions of the EU and of its relation to Europe converge on a number of crucial points. These can be seen and interpreted as combining into a latent alternative European integration project which envisions persisting primacy of national identifications and maintenance of the current social and political organization of European space. The EU is conceived of as enlarging common political superstructure of Europe of nations and their states rather than a certain culture-bound, ‘thicker’ community of ‘post-national’ subjects of a ‘pan-European’ federal entity with centre in Brussels. The study challenges in this context the prevalent political and scholarly tendency to reduce debates on and contention over the character and future of European integration to a binary conflict between the so-called ‘Euroenthusiasts’ vs. ‘Eurosceptics’. Building on insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis as deployed by discourse theorists, it suggests that it may be precisely the suppressed democratic conflict of competing visions and projects of European integration which greatly contributes to the lacking popular identification with the process and the EU, and prompts some ‘obscene’ or more ‘excessive’ expressions of discontent with it.

The European Union (EU) has closely correlated different aspects of the peace process in Bosnia with progress towards European accession. The ‘power of attraction’ of EU membership would presumably induce the Bosnian authorities to accept the adaptation costs of political and economic transformation. However, the Europeanisation approach has not produced the expected results. The track record of the EU’s policies towards Bosnia represents a paradigmatic case of what would happen if almost nothing works as efficiently as in the case of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The article investigates the causes of EU policy failure in Bosnia and claims that the EU has not effectively responded to three challenges: 1) adjust the process to the needs of an ethnically divided post-war state; 2) preserve the credibility of accession conditionality, and 3) convey the proper messages on how to comply with EU rules. Therefore, the article argues for a more cohesive and consistent EU approach towards Bosnia.

This paper will focus on the policies developed by the European Union towards the Western Balkans, especially those related to human mobility and visa liberalization. The main target of the paper will be to show how the conditionality policies towards these countries have been developed related to security, geopolitical needs and interests, instead of the objective/technical criteria stated in the communitarian official documents. We will see how the last enlargements of the Union have affected considerably the different positions adopted by member states in their approach toward the Balkan countries, especially in relation to chapters 23 and 24 of the negotiation agreements, dealing with issues of Justice and Home Affairs. Since then, the pragmatic approach of the Union has been reinforced, so that the accession of candidates has been delayed in time. However, some things might change, if we take into consideration the current refugee and Ukraine crises, the new relationships that ...

Τhe EU has attempted to push forward essential reforms for the stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presenting them as conditions for progress towards EU accession. However, this Europeanisation approach has not produced the expected results. Nikolaos Tzifakis investigates the causes of EU policy failure in Bosnia and claims that the EU has not managed to deal successfully with three main challenges: adjusting the process to the needs of an ethnically divided state; preserving the credibility of accession conditionality; and conveying the proper message on how to comply with EU rules.

This article, which introduces a Special Issue of the JCES on the challenges of EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, critically examines the geopolitical turn of the EU’s institutional thinking on enlargement since 2017. After several high-ranked EU officials and leaders of member states more or less explicitly voiced their concerns about the declining influence of the EU in the Western Balkans, the European Commission – which has traditionally been responsible for carrying out administrative-technical aspects of the accession process – adopted a more geopolitical approach to enlargement policy in February 2018, and has since sought to advance Western Balkan accession more decisively. However, this geopolitical turn to the EU’s institutional thinking on enlargement has so far failed to translate discourse into concrete results. The article argues that the main reasons for this failure can be found in a lack of support by EU members, which either do not share the Commission’s sense of urgency, or are eager to use enlargement policy and the accession process to advance their national interests. The article concludes with a brief presentation of the structure of the special issue and introduces the contributing articles.

In the Western Balkans, as elsewhere around the world, governments took extraordinary measures to effectively contain the spread of COVID-19, measures that entailed serious restrictions to individual freedoms. They also introduced extra powers that upset the ordinary division and balance of governmental power. In this context, several analysts have expressed concern that the authoritarian trend observed in the region during the last decade will become further entrenched. The worst fear, that some of the Western Balkan leaderships may retain extraordinary powers indefinitely, has not been confirmed. However, constitutionally prescribed procedures were disregarded and the operation of formal and informal mechanisms of checks and balances ignored. The article argues that the ease with which the Western Balkan leaders removed any checks and controls over their rule raises the valid question of how they may deal with future circumstances which may endanger their power.

The United Kingdom is still keen to express rhetorical support for EU enlargement, but its overall attitude towards the dossier, and its ability to shape the Union’s policies in this area, have been dampened by an increasingly hostile immigration debate, coupled with rising Euroscepticism and growing support for the UK Independence Party. To be sure, all political parties in the country have become increasingly hard-line on the subject of immigration, so that the freedom of movement within the EU has been conflated with the arrival of people from outside the European Union. In addition, the question of whether the United Kingdom will leave the EU has arguably weakened the weight of its views on new members and its influence on the Balkan region. To the extent that there is a strong and specific British interest in the accession of the Balkans, it is narrowly focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the interrelated paths of Serbia and Kosovo. Beyond that, there are no underlying historical, cultural or economic factors driving Britain’s commitment to the European perspective of the Balkan region.

Energy is one of the most topical issues at the moment, in particular as regards the response the EU could or should provide in this respect. Likewise, the latest enlargement to central and Eastern Europe is considered the main EU development in the latest years. This thesis links these two independent events.
Presently there is no “energy policy” at the EU level, in the sense that the Union is not able to act in a comprehensive way in this realm. An EU “energy policy” would necessarily rely on three pillars, theoretically distinct but in practice largely interdependent: security of supply, environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness. It is shown here that each of these dimensions is affected, one way or another, by the latest EU enlargement, but essentially in the sense of a furthering and accentuating existing tendencies.
Due to their specific situation resulting from their recent history, their geographical situation and their economic structures, there is much at stake behind the energy issues in the central and Eastern European countries. As full members of the EU, they do have a say now in the European institutions, which are the ideal venues to defend their interests. If there is little doubt about their efforts to promote a more-energy oriented agenda and to provide more integrated answers to this challenge, there is nonetheless little certainty on their capacity to achieve these goals. Thus, if a more common handling of the energy question is likely in the near future, this evolution may result from other factors than the pressure exerted by the newcomers: the international landscape is, per se, the most powerful incentive to move forward in this direction.
After a presentation of the different dimensions of the energy challenge in the world, in the EU and inside the central and Eastern European countries, this thesis analyses the extent to which the EU needs concerning energy are affected by the 2004 enlargement: the necessity for the Union to act in this realm has become more acute now that the new member states are part of the “club”, in the sense that the existing imperatives are reinforced by their presence. This work finishes with an assessment of the change in the EU capacity to handle the energy question: though in a moderate way, the central and Eastern European countries provide additional means to this end.

In this article, Kurt Bassuener assesses the Biden administration's recent strong advocacy for the "Open Balkan" initiative, championed by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, in the context of the current security crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Not only has the Biden administration effectively adopted a variant of the Trump administration's transactional policy in the Western Balkans, the policy represents an embrace of the EU's functionalist approach in the region - a failure. What this means is a de facto embrace of a Serbian/Albanian/Croatian co-prosperity sphere in the region.

The possibility of Turkey’s accession to the European Union has been problematic. Initially, the EU’s pursuit of regional economic integration and enlargement of membership, at the exclusion of Turkey, strained relations between the two. It was not until 1999, and under pressure from the US, that Turkey was considered as a potential candidate for membership.

This book seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the fluctuating relations between the EU and Turkey in the twenty-first century. Applying complementary theoretical models to evaluate prospects for Turkey’s membership, analysis includes; Turkey’s report card on the Copenhagen criteria, public opinion in Europe and Turkey, and benefits and challenges based on projection estimates. The results show that whilst both sides stand to make significant gains from Turkey’s membership, the current state of affairs point in the direction of a failure.

Examining complex issues surrounding EU-Turkey relations and addressing the critical question of what will happen if Turkey is rejected by the EU, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of politics, Turkey and the wider Middle East.

Was the attack on Charlie Hebdo offices in January 2015 an act of violence against media freedom or was it an act of revenge for presumed blasphemy? This article, employing a poststructuralist discourse analysis tries to find a broader meaning for Charlie Hebdo Attack (CHA). In this article, texts from EU, media, militant organisations and scholarly works are selected and it is argued that CHA was an act of political violence aimed at achieving certain political goals. It is claimed that post-CHA statements, narratives and discourses from EU or militant organisations create ‘self/other’ dichotomy as dividing practices which have certain power effects and implications. The ‘identity/difference’ debate is elaborated through existing discourses and scholarship showing that the ‘self/other’ dichotomy is multi-layered and multifold. This article analyses the role of political Islam in Europe through scholarly discourse and argues that the practices of Muslims in Europe are better understood if seen as political and not as religious or cultural. Finally, the article argues that the security risk narrative in Europe is magnified that brings the faulty Clash of Civilisations discourse into action which is in sharp contrast to the EU foundations and ideals of freedom and integration.

The Euro Area, the Schengen Area, and Airbus - the 'Anglosphere', the Franco-German 'motor' and Nordic cooperation – each illustrates how differentiation has become a pervasive feature of European integration. Which Europe? offers an authoritative and comprehensive examination of differentiated integration in its functional and territorial aspects. It focuses on its implications for both the practice and the theory of European integration. Is it strengthening or weakening the EU and its Member States? Are territorial identities being undermined or strengthened? Are new theories of integration required? In particular, this book looks at the relationship between the growth in use of differentiated integration and the widening of European Union membership, the broadening in its policy scope, and the deepening in integration.

EN : This master thesis aims to fill the gaps in the literature addressing the issue of the European influence over environmental public policies throughout the Western Balkans. It is focused on the analysis of the transformative role played by the European Union in Albania in the framework of the accession negotiations. Based on 17 interviews of Albanian civil servants, experts and environmentalists, this cross-disciplinary research combines public policy analysis with ecology, as well as European, Balkan, Communist and Post-Communist studies. We argue that (1) the European conditionality strategy exerts a pressure on the domestic level in order to increase the compliance of domestic policy principles, legal provisions, procedures, administrative structures with EU standards. However (2) this coercive Europeanization process is substantially impeded by the many routines and habits that domestic actors have inherited from the past. We then distinguish a new dynamic defined as a horizontal Europeanization: some of the Albanian stakeholders are spontaneously taking advantage of numerous resources made available by the EU with the aim of maximising their own political benefits. This thesis makes a contextualized and nuanced contribution to the sometimes very theoretical debate about the notion of Europeanization.     
FR : Pour pallier au manque de travaux traitant de l’influence européenne sur les politiques publiques environnementales dans les Balkans occidentaux, ce mémoire se consacre à l’étude du rôle transformatif de l’Union Européenne sur son voisinage proche, l’Albanie, en matière d’action publique environnementale, et ce, dans le cadre du processus d’intégration européenne. Fondé sur les résultats de 17 entretiens conduits auprès d’administrateurs, d’experts et de militants écologistes albanais, ce travail transversal conjugue tant l’analyse des politiques publiques, les études européennes et balkaniques que les études post-communistes ou l’écologie. Ce mémoire montre que (1) la politique européenne de conditionnalité exerce une pression à l’adaptation sur les acteurs albanais, altérant principes d’action, procédures, réglementation, structures administratives, etc. Cependant, (2) ce processus d’européanisation coercitive est considérablement contrarié par le poids de l’histoire et des routines des acteurs nationaux. Emerge donc une nouvelle dynamique, l’européanisation horizontale, caractérisée par l’appropriation spontanée par certains acteurs albanais des multiples ressources offertes par l’UE pour maximiser leurs bénéfices politiques. Ainsi, ce mémoire contribue de manière contextualisée et nuancée au débat parfois trop théorique consacré à la notion d’européanisation.

The EU sees itself as a beacon of LGBT-friendliness and seeks to promote these norms in its external relations. However, such identity claims and norm promotion are inherently political and should be critically examined as such. Taking a relational approach, this article conceptualises and examines the Othering processes within the EU enlargement to highlight the political nature of what is often described as a technocratic. Through exploring the triangulation of the EU enlargement, Othering processes, and crises, it is argued that 1) the use of LGBT rights as a measure of Europeanness is based on a longer tradition of defining the EU’s symbolic boundaries, but that 2) it is in perceived moments of crisis that the EU redraws and strengthens the boundaries between the Self and the different type of Others through changing combinations of Othering mechanisms. Finally, the article also argues that LGBT rights promotion is not only a tool in constructing the EU’s identity but also a source of an identity crisis, as is shown by the rise of anti-gender politics.

Práca sa zaoberá vnútornou politikou Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1994 až 1998 v kontexte jej snáh o úspešnú integráciu do európskych a transatlantických štruktúr. Špeciálny zreteľ je v práci braný na nedemokratické prejavy zneužívania moci prezentované vládnou koalíciou, ktoré postupne viedli k vylúčeniu SR z prvej vlny
krajín, prijímaných ako do Európskej únie, tak aj do NATO.
Práca v prvej časti mapuje politický život najvýraznejšej osoby tohto obdobia, Vladimíra Mečiara, od jeho prvého výstupu do popredia až po politický pád v roku 1998 a podrobne sa venuje mediálne aj politicky najdôležitejším kauzám jeho kabinetu a tiež konfliktu s prezidentom M. Kováčom. V druhej časti popisuje priebeh integračného procesu SR vo vymedzenom období, vrátane reakcií zahraničia na vnútropolitické dianie v krajine a hodnotí, do akej miery sa V. Mečiar a ním vedená vládna koalícia podieľali na neúspechu celého procesu.

Bakalárska práca (2012), Univerzita Karlova v Prahe, hodnotené známkou "výborný"

Në këtë dokument politikash u krye një analizë e krahasuar midis fuksioneve dhe rolit të GNP-ve që prej krijimit të tyre, veçanërisht të përformancës së tyre gjatë plotësimit së pyetësorit të KE-së, dhe
të rishikimit të rolit dhe funksioneve, sikurse parashikohet në kuadrin e përgatitjeve për statusin kandidat. Analiza bazohet në intervista ballë për
ballë me drejtues të nivelit të lartë të Ministrisë së Integrimit Evropian (MIE), anëtarë të GNP-ve gjatë procesit të plotësimit së pyetësorit të KE-së, dhe anëtarë aktual të GNP-ve. Për më tepër, janë marrë gjithashtu në konsideratë gjetjet dhe rekomandimet e raporteve të progresit të KE-së
mbi performancën e GNP-ve.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has its roots in the successes and consequences of enlargement but it developed in a context where membership seemed less and less available for countries of the periphery. One might therefore ask whether the ENP has been a substitute for enlargement. Reviewing the origins, content, achievements and evolutions of the policy, this contribution argues that whilst the ENP was not necessarily designed as an alternative for accession it certainly constituted an attempt to replicate the kind of transformative power generated in the framework of enlargement policy; an attempt that was ultimately without success. The ENP should instead move away from the ghost of enlargement and be constituted as more coherent and more assertive foreign policy instrument.

"After a concise introduction into Todorova's assumptions and approaches concerning the phenomenon of "Balkanism", I am going to examine whether the concept, which is linked to the Balkans as a historical region, can be applied to the seemingly neutral geopolitical EU-term Western Balkans. In the consequence, we have to shed some light on the enlargement process of the EU as such, and how it is adapted for the respective countries. Then some key documents from 2010 will be inspected, especially the conclusion papers by the European Commission addressed to the European parliament, which examine the overall progress of the countries who wish to join the EU. These documents, together with opinion communiqués and some general information, form the analytical corpus of this paper. In the consequence, a synthesis and comparison follow, where the results of the document analysis are faced with the critical Balkanism concept. Maybe we can detect a similarly negative insider-outsider discourse at hand like in the case of Turkey's EU aspirations [Madeker 2005: esp.
179-80], which is simultaneously overshadowed with emotional and historical-affective reasons instead of mere political, economic or judicial arguments against soon EU membership."

This e-book is a collection of papers focussing on the discursive dimension of the 'eastern enlargement' of the European Union, relying on lessons from post-colonial scholarship, world-systems analysis and critical race studies. The empirical material comes from discourse of 'eastern enlargement' process in the late 1990s-early 2000s .

There has been  a shortage of a general discussion  about the benefits and shortcomings for the public in Iceland in relations to the possibility of Iceland joining the European Union (EU) and European Monetary Union  (EMU). The main  reason  is probably  due to  shortage of conclusion regarding this specific subject.
The aim of this research is to scrutinize this subject with the following research question in mind:

What are the benefits and shortcomings of joining the EU & EMU for the Icelandic worker?

An insight into the foundations of EU, EMU and the agreement on the
European  Economic Association (EEA agreement) will be provided
before looking  into  the three fundamental subjects that are of great
importance for the Icelandic public. They are: common social factors,
prices on food and beverages as well as interest rates on loans and the  monetary policy.
The paper concludes that there are many benefits at stake for the public if Iceland decides to join the EU and EMU. The common social factor would change the least due to the EEA agreement but as for the food and beverages cost it is clear that it would dramatically change for the benefit of the public. In regard to interest rates and monetary policy in Iceland the EMU would change the scenery in those areas to the better.
However the most important factor for the Icelandic worker is
regarding rates and loan cost due to high debts of Icelandic families.

La Question macédonienne. Retour d'un voyage. Pieter Lagrou Le dimanche 30 septembre, la population de l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine répondait dans un référendum consultatif à 91 % de façon positive à la question « Êtes-vous pour l'adhésion à l'Union Européenne et à l'OTAN, en acceptant l'accord entre la République de Macédoine et la République hellénique ? » Or, les adversaires à l'accord avaient appelé au boycott du référendum et avec un taux de participation de 36 % ils estiment que le résultat revient à un rejet massif. Le dernier recensement date de 2003 et 400 000 des 1 800 000 habitants auraient choisi les voies de l'émigration, ce qui laisse ouverte la question du taux d'abstention effectif. L'accord en question a été signé par les Premiers ministres Zoran Zaev et Alexis Tsipras le 17 juin dernier. Il est censé mettre un terme à un contentieux qui a débuté avec la dissolution de la Yougoslavie en 1991. La République de Macédoine est avec la Slovénie la seule ancienne République yougoslave qui n'a pas connu de guerre civile dans les années 1990, mais là où la Slovénie fut la première à être admise comme membre de l'UE, la Macédoine n'a même pas pu ouvrir la première étape de la procédure d'adhésion. En cause est le véto que la Grèce a systématiquement opposé dans toutes les organisations internationales dont elle fait partie contre l'adhésion d'un pays dont elle estime qu'il usurpe une appellation qui lui appartient. Historiquement, la Macédoine fut une des républiques de la Fédération yougoslave, alors que la Macédoine grecque se compose de trois régions qui entre elles composent la plus grande région de la Grèce en superficie, et la deuxième en nombre d'habitants. Si avant 1991, une appellation régionale était partagée par deux pays voisins, depuis 1991, c'est un État souverain qui revendique le nom pour lui tout seul, revendication qui, aux yeux des Grecs, dans une péninsule des Balkans déchirée par les conflits territoriaux, ne peut qu'annoncer des velléités irrédentistes. Là où le blocage grec imposait aux organisations internationales l'acronyme FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), l'accord de Prespes propose le nouveau nom de Macédoine du Nord pour le pays, tout en maintenant le nom de Macédoniens pour les habitants et de macédonien pour la langue. L'accord est plus impopulaire encore en Grèce, où les sondages indiquent que 71,5 % de la population y est hostile, qu'en Macédoine. À Athènes et Thessalonique, les opposants ont mobilisé des dizaines de milliers de manifestants dans les rues, dont des intellectuels et des figures phares de la gauche historique comme Mikis Theodorakis. Tsipras et Zaev jouent donc leur survie politique en tentant de sortir d'une impasse qui dure depuis 27 ans. Pour Ioannis Armakolas, professeur d'études balkaniques à l'Université de Macédoine à Thessalonique, le contentieux oppose une Grèce arrogante qui ne perd rien à condamner son voisin à une attente indéfinie avant de pouvoir entamer les négociations d'adhésion à une Macédoine de plus en plus exaspérée, économiquement asphyxiée, ravagée par l'instabilité politique, la corruption et l'émigration massive. L'accord porte la promesse d'un début de stabilisation dans une région qui ne s'est toujours pas remise des guerres des années 1990. Skopje a donc vu défiler un comité de soutien impressionnant pour le « oui », de la chancelière allemande au secrétaire général de l'OTAN, en passant par le ministre de la défense américain. S'ils réussissent leur pari, Tsipras et Zaev pourront accéder au rang d'hommes d'État capables de forcer un accord historique. Ils étaient d'ailleurs en lice pour le prix Nobel de la Paix dans les jours qui ont suivi le référendum. Mais de quoi donc la Macédoine est elle le nom ? Comment expliquer qu'un jeu de mots conditionne l'avenir politique d'une région, mobilise des dizaines de milliers de manifestants, monopolise la vie politique de deux pays et impose le déplacement des dirigeants politiques les plus puissants du monde dans une petite ville des Balkans ? Pour le comprendre nous nous

The ratification of the Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia marked the end of one of the longest diplomatic disputes in Europe. EU officials were quick to praise the agreement not only as a positive example for resolving bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans, but also as an illustration of the power of attraction of the EU. Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that the agreement aligns with EU strategic interests and its normative agenda of transformation of its near abroad, we argue that a closer look into the history of the dispute and the ratification process in each country reveals tensions that cut across the internal governance of the EU and the conduct of its external relations. Our analysis of the Prespa Agreement as an instance of this internal-external nexus of EU governance showcases lingering stresses that today's mode of European integration generates between state elites, EU institutions and democratic communities across the EU's internal and external periphery.

The emergence of social and economic rights as an accession criterion, in addition to civil and political rights, is a recent development in the EU’s enlargement policy. This new category of social rights accession conditionality has been mainly applied to the Western Balkans, due to the countries’ historical and political background. But what has been the impact of social rights accession conditionality in the region? Using the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this paper argues that social rights accession conditionality has had a limited effect on the domestic perception of social and economic rights. The legacies of war and of socialism, as well as problems of limited statehood, drastically attenuate its transformative power. The concretization of the EU social acquis through the use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the active involvement of local communities could reinforce social rights accession conditionality.

The author looks at continuing impediments to NATO membership for Western Balkan "stragglers" BiH, Macedonia, and Kosovo. He calls for reaffirmation of binding Western security commitments to BiH and Kosovo, as well as offers of direct security guarantees against threats to challenges to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia and Serbia.

This paper expands on recent debates over the merits of online crowdfunding platforms (CFPs) by looking at the extent to which these sorts of funding sites have the potential to contribute to the development of civic society ideals in Europe. In particular, it looks at how online CFPs and other peer-to-peer lending sites are beginning to alter the way in which charities and non-governmental organisations finance their activities. In addition, it also discusses how these sorts of investment platforms have the capacity to affect the way in which individual actors engage with one another at both the local and transnational level. Overall, then, what this paper shows is that, aside from their evident financial and economic benefits, CFPs also have the capacity to help foster and strengthen non-parliamentary democratic structures and practices. As such, they should be supported and encouraged as part of a framework of further European democratisation and civic integration.

The analysis aims at describing North Macedonia’s identity debate with
Bulgaria which hinders its EU accession process currently. Referring to this debate, Sofia has been blocking Skopje’s EU accession talks since Autumn 2020 and indirectly Tirana’s accessions, too. Bulgaria’s EU membership makes the two countries relations asymmetric, and maintains North Macedonia’s vulnerable position which inclines it
to make concession in several questions. The six disputed issues set by Sofia put a huge burden on North Macedonia. Despite the new Bulgarian government formed in November 2021 wants to give a fresh impetus to solve the problems, there will be no breakthrough in the upcoming months either.

In the following sections, we explicate Ukraine’s uneven incorporation into the global capitalist system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We explore Ukrainian capitalism’s internal contradictions and shifts of power between oligarchic blocs, discuss their unfolding in the context of neo-imperialist rivalry between the USA, the EU, and Russia. We zoom in on some of the major outcomes of that dialectic that facilitated a major multilevel crisis of 2013–2014 and led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia’s annexation of the southern peninsula Crimea, and the war in eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. We provide a critical review of the major narratives on the nature and role of Western and Russian imperialisms in Ukraine’s crisis. We conclude with the discussion that we started in the introduction: the one on the nature and varieties of imperialisms in the system of transforming transnational capitalism and the need for careful (re)theorizations of its workings and effects in Ukraine and elsewhere.