Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe

What are the origins of the armed conflict that has been raging in eastern Ukraine since 2014? Which role did Russia play in the emergence and escalation of the originally unarmed confrontation, in the Donets Basin (Donbas), after the victory of the Euromaidan revolution? When, how and to what degree exactly did Moscow get involved? Which relative weight did local sources of the conflict compared to the impact of foreign factors, i.e. the Kremlin’s covert actions in Ukraine? These and similar questions are not only academic topics hotly debated in Ukraine and the West. The way one answers them has also far-reaching implications for Western thinking, policies and diplomacy with regard to Russia and Ukraine today and tomorrow. Since 2014, an array of new evidence and research has emerged that helps clarifying the picture.

As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its “hybrid war” in the Donbas, the present-day nonproliferation regime, with its exceptional treatment of the permanent Security Council members, could in the future, paradoxically, encourage rather than stem the construction or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

The world's progress towards net-zero ambitions will bring down fossil fuel utilization and imports over time. However, crises such as COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have raised questions about the reliability of nonrenewables and what actions could be taken by policymakers to immediately mitigate reliance on fossil fuels for vulnerable importers. The responses to the recent crises could reorient energy geopolitics by the decentralization of the global energy system and speeding up renewables deployment. These superb targets require a concerted and sustained energy policy effort across multiple industries, alongside strong international communication on energy security. Clear dialogue between governments, the green power generation industries, and consumers is also a crucial element for successful renewable energy implementation. The world's energy crisis has unveiled that the transition to renewable energy has been too slow, and serious efforts are required to speed up the transition away from fossil fuels toward renewables.

Wenn ein Unterzeichnerland des Vertrages selbst vor einem der fünf Garanten des Sperrabkommens nicht sicher sein kann: Welchen Sinn hat dann das Verbot der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen? Im Austausch gegen einen Abbau von Nuklearwaffen erteilen drei atomwaffenbesitzende UNO-Sicherheitsratsmitglieder dem abrüstenden Land kollektive, ausdrückliche und schriftlich fixierte Sicherheitszusagen. Eines dieser Großmächte erklärt jedoch 20 Jahre später diese Vereinbarung für nichtig: Welches Land ohne eigene Atomwaffen oder enges Bündnis mit einer Nuklearmacht kann sich nun der Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen noch sicher sein? Wenn selbst eine mit Ausnahmerechten ausgestattete Vetomacht im UNO-Sicherheitsrat sich auf Kosten eines Nachbarstaates territorial ausdehnen kann, dann wird das internationale Atomwaffensperrregime zum Selbstbedienungsladen der offiziellen Nuklearmächte.

The paper suggest looking into the portrayals of India and Ukraine in Russia and the UK in the context of postcolonial theory based on Edward Said's conceptualisation of orientalism as discourse. The results of the research which was carried out on the holistic basis of both quantitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis emphasize interesting similarities and dissimilarities in the functioning of orientalist discourses in the media of formerly imperial states.

One of the most popular narratives favored by the Kremlin and critical Western commentators such as Carpenter is the idea of Ukraine as a hotbed of right-wing extremism. Such claims are rooted in Soviet-era propaganda which aimed to sully Ukraine’s national liberation movement by associating it solely with World War II Nazi collaboration.  In reality, Ukraine’s nationalist parties enjoy less support than similar political parties in a host of EU member states. Notably, in the two Ukrainian parliamentary elections held since the outbreak of hostilities with Russia in 2014, nationalist parties have failed miserably and fallen short of the five percent threshold to enter Ukrainian parliament.

Ця книга відкриває дослідження братовбивчої стихії, яка переслідувала східнослов’янську історію, і намагається сформулювати імпровізований договір, спрямований на стримування цього елемента, який уже є відповідальним за загибель мільйонів українців.

Tesi di Laurea triennale in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali
Relatore: Ch.mo Prof. Paolo Wulzer

Questa tesi ha per oggetto l’analisi della politica estera italiana nel contesto della crisi in Ucraina. Tra le diverse tensioni geopolitiche che affliggono la comunità transatlantica e la Federazione russa sulla scena mondiale, la crisi ucraina, anche se gradualmente trascurata e accantonata dai media internazionali, continua a rappresentare una delle principali fonti di discordia tra un Occidente sempre meno coeso e una Russia sempre più assertiva nella costante ricerca di un nuovo equilibrio internazionale di potere.

This paper analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and attitudes towards separatism and foreign policy orientation in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan,” which turned into a violent internal conflict and one of the biggest international conflicts involving Western countries and Russia. The research question is whether the regional divisions concerning domestic politics, separatism and foreign orientation have changed significantly in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the “Euromaidan” in 2014. This paper employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2012, 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, and the 2014, 2010, and 2004 presidential elections, to examine effects of historical legacies, ethnicity, language, age, and economic factors on regional support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. The study also analyses support for separatism in Crimea and Donbas after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.” It uses a brief survey, conducted for this study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April and May 2014, to examine determinants of pro-separatist attitudes. The paper also employs Razumkov Center and KIIS surveys to analyze changes in 2002-2014 in regional preferences for joining the European Union (EU), NATO, and a union with Russia. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards joining the EU, NATO, and a Russia-led union. After the “Euromaidan,” such divisions in foreign policy orientation and, to a lesser extent, support for presidential candidates and political parties remained. A significant rise in separatist sentiments helped to fuel separatist takeovers of power in Crimea and Donbas and Russian military intervention in these regions.

JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015). Paperback. 334 pp. €34.00. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS: http://cup.columbia.edu/book/journal-of-soviet-and-post-soviet-politics-and-society/9783838207261
IBIDEM PRESS: http://www.ibidemverlag.de/Series/Journal-of-Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society/Journal-of-Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society.html

Die größte strategische Herausforderung für die Herausbildung eines stabilen und geeinten ukrainischen Nationalstaats und das größte strukturelle Hindernis für eine erfolgreiche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Ukraine bleiben weiterhin die russischen Maßnahmen der hybriden Kriegsführung. Obwohl auch weitere ukrainische Reformfortschritte wichtig sind, wird westliches Engagement entscheidend dafür sein, die Effekte des fortdauernden russischen Hybridkrieges gegen die Ukraine einzuschränken. Vor diesem Hintergrund beschreibt der Aufsatz sechs alternative Entwicklungsszenarien der kommenden Jahre.

The crisis in Ukraine has been a truly divisive event. On almost all levels and aspects of the crisis we have witnessed, and continue to witness different understandings and, indeed, narratives of individual events, processes and the crisis in general. Several examples of such narratives stand out, for example, narratives on Crimea, MH17, and Donbas. Principally what we see is a narrative created and disseminated by Kyiv and the post-maidan government, and a (counter)narrative offered by the Ukrainian opposition, and the rebels in Donbas. Narratives also exist at the international, global level, with the United States and the European Union generally, though not quite always, supporting and promoting the Kyiv narrative, whilst Russia and some anti-western sympathisers, support the opposition/rebel narrative. It is also important to note that often the narrative does not start within Ukraine itself, but is created outside and then brought to Ukraine. One such narrative that exists at the local, national, and international level is that of fascism in post-maidan Ukraine. The different narratives on this have been very visible within media, but far less widely discussed than those of Crimea or MH17. The aim of this essay, therefore, is to put forward the main narratives on fascism in Ukraine, particularly supposed fascism in government. The essay seeks primarily to highlight the key narratives and the actors who create them, whilst some analysis of the validity and truth of the different narratives will also be offered, particularly analysing whether post-maidan Ukraine has indeed embraced fascist elements and personalities, what role such people play, and what does this mean for Ukraine.

Before 24 February 2022, the Russian-Ukrainian agreements signed in the capital of Belarus in 2014–2015 were seen by many observers as a path to a settlement of the Donbas conflict. However, the contradictory Minsk deals were signed under duress. Contrary to a common belief held over the past seven years, the various documents the Kremlin forced on Kyiv in the context of devastating Ukrainian military defeats by regular and irregular Russian forces in September 2014 and February 2015 were not a solution but part of the problem. These agreements were partially in manifest violation of international law as they undermined such principles as the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-use of force and national self-determination. Their welcome and legitimization by various Western states effectively helped to make more permanent transgressions that undermined the post-1945 international system. The Minsk Agreements also implicitly undermined basic democratic standards. They constituted Kremlin instruments to harvest the fruits of Russia’s initially covert military aggression against Ukraine. Oddly, Western states furthered the Kremlin’s obvious subversion of the European Security Order by condoning the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements and pressuring Ukraine to implement their more dubious provisions, while also insufficiently supporting a normatively acceptable interpretation of the agreements and not holding Moscow accountable for its violations of the agreements and subversion of the negotiations in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and elsewhere. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/russias-dictated-non-peace-for-ukraine-in-2014-2022/

This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia's demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions by Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in the Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation.

В этом очерке не раскрывается весь многогранный и динамичный феномен новых добровольческих частей 2014 года. Вместо этого, я сфокусируюсь лишь на предыстории и некоторых аспектах возникновения одного особого и несколько девиантного примера общего феномена добровольцев6, а именно на раннюю историю одного из самых знаменитых из этих подразделений – полка «Азов». Более того, история этой структуры здесь рассматривается лишь с точки зрения политических, а не военных наук, т.е. как разновидность негражданского общества, а не вооруженных сил Украины. Иными словами, я сконцентрируюсь здесь на определенных особенностях создания «Азова», а не на боевых действиях, заслугах или возможных промахах этого подразделения. Последние представляют собой ещё более трудно исследуемые сюжеты, которые я не в состоянии обоснованно и компетентно оценить. Не столько сама известность, сколько причина западного медийного внимания к «Азову» – а именно, эксцентричные политические взгляды создателей подразделения – стали и для меня поводом для краткого рассмотрения специфики его предыстории, идеологии, руководства и создания. Неонацистские, как будет показано ниже, тенденции в этой теперь уже сравнительно большой военной части представляют собой проблему сразу в нескольких отношениях. Некогда явно фашистские взгляды главных командиров полка ставят под вопрос как его сегодняшнюю, в других отношениях, возможно, заслуживающую уважение боевую деятельность, так и послевоенное будущее «Азова».

Die aufgeführten Tatsachen und eine Reihe anderer aufschlussreicher Aspekte der denkwürdigen Ereignisse vom Februar-März 2014 sind in der Ukraine und unter Osteuropaexperten an Universitäten und Think-Tanks sowie bei Regierungen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen im Westen bekannt. Dennoch scheinen viele westliche Beobachter, die schnell mit Kommentaren über die Vergangenheit, Annexion und Zukunft der Krim bei der Hand sind, einige oder gar die meisten dieser Tatsachen nicht zu kennen beziehungsweise zu ignorieren. Stattdessen schenken etliche Kommentatoren dem apologetischen Narrativ des Kreml Glauben: Ein lediglich etwas holprig initiiertes Referendum hat jedenfalls zu einer Grenzverschiebung geführt, die angeblich von der übergroßen Mehrheit der Krimbewohner lange und entschieden gewollt worden war und vorgebliches historisches Unrecht wieder gut machte.

I explore six possible scenarios—options and strategies for the development of Ukraine’s (as well as, to a lesser degree, Georgia's and Moldova’s) security situation during the coming five to 15 years. As long as Russia’s current regime continues to exist, Moscow’s aggressive stance towards Kyiv will probably last, and Ukraine has no easy way to achieve international organizational embeddedness, as detailed below. The scenarios are: (1) thecontinuation of the current “gray zone” status of Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tbilisi (the capitals of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, respectively); (2) Ukraine and Georgia’s permanent neutrality as a result of some Western-Russian bargain; (3) Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia’s accession to the EU; (4) Ukraine and Georgia’s entry into NATO; (5) Ukraine and Georgia’s Major Non-NATO Ally status with the United States; and (6) the creation of an Intermarium (“land between the seas”) coalition of East-Central European NATO member states on the one hand, and post-Soviet non-NATO countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and perhaps Azerbaijan) on the other. These six scenarios for Ukraine’s foreign affairs may or may not materialize in the foreseeable future and vary in terms of likelihood that they will occur; they would demand very different approaches and would have highly diverging implications for both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian actors in Eastern Europe.

CORRECTION: The phrase "a firm conduit across the passage between the Kerch and Crimean peninsulas" needs to read: "a firm conduit across the passage between the Kerch peninsula of Crimea, and the Russian Federation." This mistake was the result of an editorial change that I failed to notice when checking the pages for proof. The respective formulations in the previously published German, Russian and Ukrainian versions are correct.

Ukraine’s, Georgia’s and Moldova’s European aspirations have already been publicly and repeatedly acknowledged by the EU’s Commission and Council. Moreover, the European Parliament asked the EU’s executive bodies several times to finally offer the three post-Soviet countries a clear membership prospect. In March 2022, Ukraine was even singled out, by the European Council, as belonging to "our European family" – whatever that means. None of these official yet inconsequential statements has so far opened, for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the path to accession, however.

Opponents of a formal accession path argue that all three countries are partially occupied by Russia: an ongoing war in Ukraine and frozen conflicts with unrecognized Russian puppet states in the case of Moldova and Georgia. Were these three to become members, the EU would essentially be importing unresolved military conflicts with Russia. Indeed, the EU’s de facto constitution, the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, includes a mutual defense clause obliging other members to “aid and assistance by all the means in their power.” However, these concerns were ignored when Cyprus, whose northern half is occupied by Turkey, became a member in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon’s defense clause has never been invoked. What worked for Cyprus should work for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia too.

The focus of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric mechanisms utilized by Russia to solidify its authority in the post-communist space. The four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining Russian expansionism were described and critically assessed. Apart from this, the Russian and foreign political philosophic thought of the 19-21 centuries was referred to, to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tradition and national identity. On the other hand, the paper assesses the features of post-colonial Ukrainian political culture and unveils premises for the emergence of its statehood in the 1990s. The major differences between Russian and Ukrainian political cultures and identities are emphasized. Finally, the hypothesis tested is that a democratic Ukraine – strengthened by cooperation with its Western allies – will become an obstacle of Russian expansionism in the future.

European misperceptions of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are the result of, among others, lacking expert knowledge about Ukraine, in the member states of the EU. The most recent example of continuing misunderstanding is a Western fixation on quality of governance issues, and not on the Ukrainian state’s principal chances of survival. In Ukraine today, a major strategic task is the de-poisoning of the investment climate, especially in the South-Eastern Azov and Black Sea regions. In light of ongoing threats from Russia, Kyiv needs Western-backed guarantees to insure foreign direct investment against political risks, especially in Ukraine’s russophone parts.

We strongly support Ukraine's candidate status in the European Union and call on EU leadership and its Member States to grant this status to Ukraine in June 2022, opening the door to Ukraine's membership and fulfilling the aspirations of the Ukrainian people.

Since its first issues, Engramma has come to terms with images in war. In 2001, after the attack on the Twin Towers; in 2015, an issue dedicated to the abecedaries of Aby Warburg, Bertolt Brecht, and Ernst Jünger; at the end of 2015, an issue on the martyrdom of Palmyra, dedicated to the archaeologist Khaled Al Asaad. But already since 2008 Engramma has hosted various contributions and devoted several monographic issues to the protection of cultural heritage, wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction. March 2022 – and it is war time again. The first section of this special issue is dedicated to James Hillman and his reflections on Ares and the "terrible love of war". The third section collects interviews and interventions by Italian intellectuals who speak with voices that are dissonant with the stadium choirs that pollute the senses and dull critical intelligence: Nadia Fusini, Luciano Canfora, Lorenzo Braccesi, Moni Ovadia, Massimo Cacciari, and Salvatore Settis. At the heart of this issue of Engramma, you can find an Image Gallery, edited by Seminario Mnemosyne in six chapters: I. Enlisting Icons; II. Pornographic Romanticism; III. The Crusade of the Children; IV. "Still Dead"; V. In hoc signo; VI. Despite everything, Images.

Ob es einen Staatsbankrott geben wird oder nicht, hängt von den laufenden Verhandlungen Kiews mit seinen Gläubigern ab. Er würde zu einer neuen Abwertungsspirale führen und die Inflation nochmals anheizen. Bereits jetzt häufen sich kleinere soziale Proteste, die vom Kreml gern gesehen und medial begleitet werden. Sollte sich die Wirtschaftslage weiter destabilisieren, droht dem Land eine Protestwelle mit unvorhersehbaren politischen Folgen.

In January 2022, articles by international commentators appeared in the media about the first steps towards a new union in Europe. The United Kingdom initiated this development following the declaration about the strategic partnership with Ukraine, which concluded in the fall of 2020. One can assume that the government of Boris Johnson took these steps as a logical continuation of his long-term policy that led to the implementation of Brexit.

An effective cooperation of a legitimate Ukrainian government in a country-wide demilitarization would be difficult for Russia to secure. A direct demilitarization by a Russian occupation or puppet regime would, in turn, be difficult to implement.

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

Доктор Андреас Умланд – персона весьма известная даже в мировом масштабе, а уж тем паче – на постсоветском пространстве, которое стало центральным полем его деятельности. Специалист по экстремистам, правым, ультраправым, фашистам, неофашистам – ну и еще по многочисленным названиям, описывающих одно и то же проклятое Западом явление… Разумеется, всё это он нашел на территории рухнувшего Советского Союза. Умланда особо привлекает Россия: его две диссертации как раз посвящены соответственно деятельности А. Г. Дугина и политическому взлёту ЛДПР (выводы, которые он делает в своих исследованиях, являются именно теми, которых так вожделеет либеральная Европа – грань между либеральным политологом и пропагандистом либерализма зачастую настолько тонка, что её будто бы и нет). Помимо всего прочего, Умланд преподает в Киевском Национальном Университете им. Тараса Шевченко, а также читает лекции в рамках программы академических обменов DAAD. Фактически, мы видим: Умланд не менее, чем манифестация самого Европейского Союза – как жрец в отдельных архаических обществах считался манифестацией самого Бога. Умланд – образец для подражания всего украинского народа, мало того – он осуществляет в Украине самоотверженное служение, в надежде на то, что ему удастся научить, убедить, утешить и приободрить примитивных аборигенов дикого, но всё же европейского, Востока. Показав утопическую модель западного либерализма – направить инертную массу в нужном направлении, к светлому будущему западных ценностей… Наверно, таким представляет себя сам Умланд, а в особенности – его многочисленные почитатели из числа отечественных либералов, которым почтенный доктор политологии также дает советы левой рукой, а правой в то же время клеймит «врагов открытого общества», которые затаились в глубинах российского политикума. Оказывается, что приезжий Умланд разбирается в каждой мелочи нашего общества, и, как писал Энгельс о Марксе, видит дальше и глубже, чем кто‐либо – в особенности, чем все ещё советские люди, homines sovietici…

Conferenza | Aula gradoni, Tolentini, Venezia

Presentazione del volume: Engramma 190. Figli di Marte 2022
conversazione tra Aldo Ferrari e la Redazione di Engramma
interverrà Rino Rocchelli, padre di Andy.

Marzo 2022, ed è di nuovo tempo di guerra. Questa volta la guerra è molto più vicina, non solo per la geografia ma per la titanica invasione mediatica e per la violenza dell’occupazione dello spazio del pensiero. La guerra ci fa orrore ma la risposta non può essere un facile pacifismo, né si può essere pacificati o arresi allo stato delle cose. Una definizione di pace al negativo, come assenza di conflitto, non serve a impedire le stragi e le distruzioni. Questo numero di Engramma nasce come risposta all’attacco che la guerra sempre muove alla ragione e all’intelligenza critica: perciò ospita una serie di interventi di figure rilevanti nel panorama culturale italiano, ma il suo motore è un altro, ovvero l’urgenza di articolare una viva forma della militanza psichica in un lavoro scientifico svolto in forma corale.

Per seguire la conferenza via streaming: http://live.iuav.it/streaming_aula.html?aula=tole_sala_gradoni

Obwohl die Ukraine den territorial zweitgrößten Staat Europas darstellt, ist sie nur selten Objekt adäquater Medienberichterstattung, tiefgehender öffentlicher Diskussionen und politischer Auseinandersetzung in Deutschland. Im Resultat ist das deutsche Engagement für die Gazprom-Unterwasserpipelines Nord und South Stream von unzureichender Berücksichtigung des Spannungspotentials dieser Projekte für die russisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen gekennzeichnet. Der niedrige Stellenwert der Ukraine im deutschen öffentlichen Diskurs steht im Widerspruch zur erheblichen geo- und sicherheitspolitischen Bedeutung des Landes. Eine Neuorientierung der europäischen und deutschen Ostpolitik ist überfällig. While territorially being the second largest state of Europe, Ukraine is only rarely the object of adequate media representation, deep public discussions or political debate in Germany. As a result, the German involvement in Gazprom’s underwater pipelines Nord and South Stream is characterized by a lack of attention to their potential of increasing tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The low salience of Ukraine in German public discourse is in contradiction to the geopolitical importance of the country. A reorientation of the EU’s and Germany’s Eastern policies is overdue.

Für die kommenden Jahre wird die geostrategische Grauzone zwischen der NATO und EU einerseits sowie der Moskau-dominierten Organisation des Kollektiven Sicherheitsvertrages und Eurasischen Wirtschaftsunion andererseits die Hauptquelle von Unsicherheit und Instabilität in Europa bleiben.

The research presents analysis the framing of anti-Russian sanctions, in Russian government's official newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta. The dominant frames of the newspaper were Economic, Strategic game, and the combination of Suffering Europe frame and optimistic frames, which can be combined as Positive frames.
An important finding was that  The sanctions were presented not as a respond to the Russian involvement in Ukrainian crisis, but as a tool to punish Russia for it's independent foreign policy and opposing the West, particularly USA.
Pro-government stance of the newspaper was evident in its use of sources. 15 out of 32 selected articles used quotes from the governmental and official sources. The newspaper also used  interviews, reports etc. with the representatives of the European business community and with officials in more friendly European countries.
The coverage was skillful and designed to produce the impression of objectivity. The newspaper was trying to position itself as a source that was not trying to hide the problems of the Russian economy because of the sanctions, but to discuss them. While highlighting the economic problems in Russia, the newspaper focused on economic alternatives and on ways to minimize the losses, drawing mostly optimistic picture of the economic future of Russia. This editorial strategy was clearly in line with the government's official view, and was logical for the official newspaper of the government to adopt.

Попри дивну історію СНА/ПУ, навіть у специфічному контексті українського правого екстремізму, до кінця осені 2014 року деякі з її керівників разом з їхнім тимчасовим спільником Ляшком через свою широко розрекламовану участь у створенні, розвитку та боях «Азову» змогли перетворитися з політичних статистів на, у крайньому разі, тимчасово поважних персонажів українського публічного життя. Лише на перший погляд вони тим самим пройшли шлях, схожий на злет інших раніше невідомих командирів добровольчих батальйонів. Сукупність дивних аспектів виникнення батальйону/полку «Азов» — тобто політтехнологічні акції, до яких творці «Азову» були причетні до війни, демонстративний неонацизм СНА/ПУ, як і тимчасова співпраця Білецького & Ко з такими політичними провокаторами, як Юрій Збітнєв, Дмитро Корчинський та Олег Ляшко, — виокремлюють минуле «Азову» серед історій інших нових добровольчих частин України.

Cet article envisage la crise ukrainienne comme le résultat d’un double processus de fond qui repose d’une part sur le délitement des mécanismes de sécurité euro-atlantique hérité de la Guerre Froide, et d’autre part, sur l’incapacité chronique des Russe et des Européens à construire un espace sécuritaire commun. La sécurité en Europe a en effet reposée depuis la seconde moitié du XXe siècle non seulement sur une forte solidarité transatlantique, mais aussi sur un ensemble de mécanismes et de traités qui ont été, au cours des deux dernières décennies, remis en question. L’élargissement de l’Union européenne et de l’OTAN s’est heurté à la détermination de la Russie à préserver de facto une zone d’influence dans les espaces partagés, en particulier en mer Noire. L’article conclut sur la possibilité pour la Russie et l’Europe de renouer les discussions à travers l’établissement d’un dialogue multilatéral entre Bruxelles et l’Union économique eurasiatique

Seit der Annexion der Krim und der Unterstützung der ostukrainischen Separatisten durch Russland ist
die Ukraine bestrebt, die Energiebeziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern auf ein Minimum zu reduzieren.
Die Kooperation im Bereich der Atomwirtschaft wurde, mit Ausnahme des Imports von Brennelementen,
bereits eingestellt. Seit November 2015 kauft die Ukraine auch kein Erdgas aus Russland mehr und beabsichtigt
dies laut ihrer Energiestrategie auch künftig nicht zu tun. Allein an der Beibehaltung des Öl- und Gastransits ist die Ukraine noch interessiert, während Russlands »Gazprom« den durch die Ukraine verlaufenden Gasexport Richtung Europa und Türkei auf die Unterwasserpipelines »Nord Stream-2« und »Turkish
Stream« umleiten will.

«Русский мир» как геополитическая и идеологическая концепция стал приста-
нищем для целого ряда весьма разнородных течений русской антизападной и
неоимперской мысли, объединенных, как правило, идеей «особого пути» России
как государства и русского народа как исторически сложившейся общности. Не-
смотря на то, что сама геополитическая утопия «русского мира» возникла отно-
сительно недавно, ее базовые метафоры, символы и риторические приемы ухо-
дят корнями в имперскую идеологию 19-го века. Вобрав в себя целый сонм раз-
личных идеологем и концептов (начиная от литературных образов русской клас-
сики и евразийских идей межвоенного периода, заканчивая советским велико-
державным пафосом и поиском «национальной идеи» в послесоветской России),
формула «русского мира» сегодня перешла в сферу политической практики, став
с одной стороны легитимирующим принципом неофициального российского во-
енного вторжения в Украину, а с другой – формулой в значительной мере опре-
деляющей идеологическую атмосферу в самой России.

Ο πασίγνωστος Χένρυ Κίσσινγκερ επανεμφανίστηκε πρόσφατα και έκανε δήλωση σχετικά με την ανησυχία του για την ρωσοουκρανική σύρραξη. Το γεγονός δεν θα προκαλούσε εντύπωση, εάν δεν συνέτρεχαν δύο καθοριστικής σημασίας λόγοι, δηλαδή: Πρώτον, η ηλικία του. Σήμερα ο Κίσσινγκερ είναι ενενήντα εννέα (99) χρονών. Δεύτερον, το περιεχόμενο της δήλωσής του. Αντί να στραφεί εναντίον των Ρώσων, άφησε αιχμές γενικώς κατά της πολιτικής των ΗΠΑ στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη.

This book first proves that the rationale behind Russia’s aggressive actions in its neighborhood resides in its goal of achieving certain geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined by the state’s imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were once Russian. In other words, Russia constantly remains an expansion-oriented and centralized state regardless of epochs and political regimes ruling over it. That is its geopolitical modus operandi successfully tested throughout history. This book also scrutinizes Ukraine as a young post-colonial and post-communist state which, unlike Russia, is more prone to democratize and decentralize. To understand the logics of the ongoing Ukrainian transformation, its domestic and international developments are assessed in their connection to the Soviet political tradition and the medieval legacy of the Cossack statehood (15–18 centuries). This book outlines differences between the political cultures of Ukrainian and Russian nations. This envisages scrutiny of historical experiences and their impacts on the Ukrainian and Russian state-building, institutional structures, national identity, religious issues, and other features of sovereignty. Based on these discoveries, a structure of symbolic thinking which predefines indigenous understandings of justice and order has been constructed for Ukrainians and Russians.