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Vartiainen, Juhana
Working Paper
The Nordic development and growth models: The
riddle is still there but we may be a little bit wiser
WIDER Working Paper, No. 2010/116
Provided in Cooperation with:
United Nations University (UNU), World Institute for Development Economics Research
(WIDER)
Suggested Citation: Vartiainen, Juhana (2010) : The Nordic development and growth models:
The riddle is still there but we may be a little bit wiser, WIDER Working Paper, No. 2010/116,
ISBN 978-92-9230-354-9, The United Nations University World Institute for Development
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53973
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Working Paper No. 2010/116
The Nordic Development and Growth
Models
The Riddle is Still There but We May be a
Little Bit Wiser
Juhana Vartiainen
October 2010
Abstract
The Nordic countries are often bundled together, as representatives of a ‘model’ which
combines high living standards and an open market economy with social insurance and
ambitious public services. Yet, the economic and political development of Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden towards this model has taken quite different roads. Sweden’s economic
development from the late nineteenth century onwards can be seen as a rather spontaneous
industrial breakthrough, whereas the state has in both Norway and Finland assumed a more
active and interventionist role in mobilizing resources and managing natural endowments.
However, the four countries are quite similar in their acceptance of the market economy,
technical progress and economic openness, coupled with a pursuit of equality and a state that
has alleviated resistance to change by signalling a will to share the gains and losses due to
structural change.
Keywords: Nordic economic development
JEL classification: O11, O52
Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2010
* Konjunkturinstitutet, Stockholm, email: juhana.vartiainen@konj.se
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Country Role Models for Development
Success, directed by Augustin Kwasi Fosu.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the project by the Finnish Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, and the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of
Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden
(Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department
for International Development—DFID).
ISSN 1798-7237
ISBN 978-92-9230-354-9
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
www.wider.unu.edu
publications@wider.unu.edu
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Typescript prepared by Lisa Winkler at UNU-WIDER
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
1
Four utterly different catchwords
The Nordic countries are often bundled together in international scholarly discussions
and policy debates. Yet, any student of the fine print of these countries’ economic and
social policies is struck by the diversity of the policy experiences. The four Nordic
country papers (please see the references) have outlined some salient aspects of each
country’s growth outcome. The very diversity of the points of view of the four Nordic
country papers underlines their diversity: instead of going through similar variables and
similar time spans for all the four country cases, the papers take completely different
point of views.
Sweden seems to come close to a textbook example of a spontaneous capitalistic
breakthrough: individual companies working in congruence with a benevolent and
rational state power to increase productivity and mobilize resources. Although aided by
more ancient historical traditions, this industrial breakthrough started in the late
nineteenth century, with an interplay of technological innovations, investment,
educational reforms, and legislative efforts. Thanks to investments in human capital,
technological innovations, and attractive export markets, Sweden provided fertile
ground for the growth of many large industrial companies. Later on, the very logic of
capitalistic development created a demand for a welfare state: households dependent on
wage income were much more vulnerable to market uncertainty and shocks than what
had been the case in the agrarian society in which the extended family unit provided for
the basic material needs of household members at all times.
Norway was from the outset of the industrial era a less diversified economy, more
dependent on some key industries and raw materials bases: the shipping, shipbuilding,
fishing, and metalworking sectors in particular. From the 1970s onwards, Norway
entered an era in which one particular raw material resource—oil—drove the economy
towards a much higher level of income. Thus, the Norwegian ‘big picture’ has to do
with the management of a large natural resource base, from which various backward
and forward linkages have sprung.
Finland, in turn, managed a remarkably rapid mobilization of resources and the
accumulation of physical industrial capital in the post-Second World War period. This
remarkable catching-up was achieved by quite interventionist means: public and forced
saving, outright economic planning, the creation of publicly-owned companies,
selective industrial policy plus the rationing of credit to manufacturing sector capital
investment at the expense of households’ consumption needs. This growth regime is
reminiscent of the Asian tiger cases and a catchword for the Finnish growth regime
could as well be an interventionist developmental state of the Asian type.
Finally, Denmark’s economic growth story combines elements of a natural resource
base—agricultural products—with a spontaneous development of small and middlesized companies, aided by farmers’ cooperative efforts as well as a strive to educate and
enlighten the broad masses of citizens. Danish manufacturing and service industries
grew spontaneously like the Swedish ones, but did not proceed by large investment
projects undertaken by big companies. Rather, Denmark became a spontaneously
organized society of small businessmen.
1
The diversity of these catchwords suggests that the success of the Nordic experience
cannot really fit into many classic political controversies about economic development.
Take the classical ideological controversy of whether economic growth is best advanced
by spontaneous market forces or government laissez-faire. Well, the Nordic examples
include the spontaneous market-driven development model of Sweden, as well as the
almost planned economy managed by the Finnish developmental state. Or, to take
another example, there is a discussion about the implications of a large national resource
base, which in the case of many countries has obviously had adverse effects for societal
development: too few resources are devoted to the diversification of the economy, and
too many political resources are devoted to the division of the extraction rent. Again, as
convincingly argued by the authors (Cappelen and Mjøset) of the Norway paper,
Norway does not fit this pattern at all: with appropriate institutions, a national raw
material can be managed to the benefit of the entire society. Inspired by the Norwegian
example, the authors of the Norway country paper present an econometric analysis that
suggests that a prominent raw material base, when coupled with good economic
institutions, benefits an economy.
A third example would be the role of social cohesion and social capital. Many
policymakers and scholars believe that social capital and cohesion is one ingredient of
successful economic development. Yet, look at Finland, which underwent an extremely
violent civil war in 1918, just a couple of decades before its large-scale industrial
tradeoff, and where society, even after the civil war, was bitterly divided along the same
ideological cleavages.
Finally, a fourth example would be the role of ‘high-tech’, resources devoted to
designing new and advanced technologies as well as the effort to commercialize them—
all themes that are often investigated in new growth theory studies are often regarded as
preconditions for strong economic growth. Denmark is a good example as it has
achieved high employment and productivity without major investments in big high tech
projects. Instead, as explained in the Denmark paper (by Lundvall), the country’s
success may be more due to promoting lifelong individual learning and social skills,
whereas the share of low-tech industries in Danish manufacturing value added has
traditionally been quite high.
2
What unites the Nordic countries?
One possible conclusion of this diversity experience is that scholars should simply stop
grouping the Nordics countries together, and that is certainly one possible way of
looking at the Nordic experience. Yet, we would like to suggest at least some common
characteristics. Listing them does not amount to any theory of Nordic economic
development, but may at least be a starting point for further discussion. We would like
to present them as five ‘slogans’ that resonate in the Nordic political culture.
2.1 Yes, to both Marx and Adam Smith
It is often thought that an efficient market economy and a public economic sector that
obeys another logic must compete of the same ‘space’ in society. The Nordic experience
suggests that successful societies must have a lot of both. A powerful civil society
underpinned by publicly-owned resources is a precondition of a successful market
2
sector and a successful market sector is a precondition for a strong civil society and
public sector.
The Nordic countries, and Sweden in particular, are often labelled just as ‘socialist’. Yet
comparisons of institutions reveal that the Nordic economies are in many respects quite
market-oriented and market-driven economies, especially when compared to other
European countries. For example, product market regulation is very weak in European
comparison, the financial systems are quite efficient, and even employment protection is
on average weaker than in the large European Union countries (see Andersen et al.
2007). Thus, although the level of taxes is high, the Nordic economies are otherwise
quite effective markets societies.
Side by side with a market economy, there is a large public sector that does what public
sectors do well: education and healthcare. The Nordic countries have in international
comparison, quite ‘socialistic’ school systems. All children are expected to undergo a
public primary school system of nationally established standards of typically nine years
and there is very little ‘tracking’ of pupils before high school. This has probably implied
a remarkable equality of opportunity. A positive example is Finland, in which the
correlation of parents’ economic performance with that of their children collapsed to an
altogether lower level after the introduction of a comprehensive and unitary primary
school system (see Pekkarinen et al. 2009).
Healthcare systems are the other main sector that the public sector mostly takes care of.
It is well-known from international comparisons that public health systems tend to
produce good health outcomes with the least outlay of resources. For example, investing
in ex ante prevention of diseases instead of expensive treatments is something that can
be economical for a society, yet hard to square with the incentives of private healthcare
providers.
2.2 All men and women are born equal
Thanks to earlier land reforms and the weakness and absence of feudalist serfdom, a
culture of equality has permeated the Nordic societies. The idea of hereditary or other
forms of elites is alien to Nordic citizens, and this idea even extends to attitudes towards
gender equality. A less than full economic citizenship is not acceptable for women, and
this has implied female labour market participation rates that are high by international
standards. It has not prevented a segregation of the labour market into male- and
female-dominated industries and sectors, but it has probably increased the aggregate
level of economic resources. Some public services like childcare clearly boost the
overall labour supply of both men and women.
The role of school systems was emphasized above. Education, however, has in the
Nordic countries also been understood as emancipation towards full citizenship, a result
of many national movements that arose in the nineteenth century to organize civil
society: the temperance movement, the national sports leagues, the various free and
confessional churches, and of course the social and political movements that, to a higher
degree than what is generally appreciated, were movements of enlightenment and
emancipation for workers and farmers. The social democratic labour movements were
to a large extent self-educational movements, but so were farmers’ cooperatives already
in the nineteenth century, as emphasized in the Denmark paper. This tradition has
3
contributed to a culture of lifelong learning, with the promotion of vocational free
universities and civic academies.
The egalitarian ideals have also contributed to the creation of a welfare state that is
universalistic: many benefits are available on equal terms to all citizens and even all
residents. Thus, as explained in the Sweden paper, it has often not been necessary to
identify those groups that are particularly vulnerable. This has mitigated polarizing
conflicts between those who contribute to and those who consume welfare services and
income transfers. Furthermore, most citizens have both roles during their lifespans,
which has reinforced the political support of the welfare state and thereby the
willingness to pay taxes.
2.3 Resources have to be managed to the benefit of the entire nation
When in ownership of large natural resources, the Nordic nations have to a large degree
regarded such resources from a national and nationalistic perspective. The state has
taken an active interest in the development of resource extraction. For the Swedish and
Finnish forest sectors, as explained particularly well in the Sweden paper, national
‘forest management’ became a key policy area. This had to do with planning for a
continuous renewal of the resource in order to prevent its depletion, as well as
establishing public-private partnerships around research and training institutes that
contributed to the design of new exploitation and processing techniques. To some
extent, this national forest management presupposed limiting the choices of the private
forest owners—in Sweden, all forest owners are required to prepare a forestry plan—but
it need not amount to any full-scale nationalization. Thus, a government should not
confiscate the resources, but the resource owners should not hijack the government
either.
The prime modern example of a successful management of a big national resource base
is the Norwegian oil. In the Norwegian case, there were antecedents to this, and the
Norway paper by Cappelen and Mjøset explains how a nationally-oriented and
politically conscious bourgeois elite managed to keep national control of resources vital
to the economic development of the country already a hundred years ago. The idea of a
national control over resources was firmly rooted when oil became, from the 1970s
onwards, a new and major source of wealth. As described in the Norway paper,
discussions on how to develop a more robust oil policy in response to fluctuating oil
prices led to the establishment of a Petroleum Fund in 1996. The fund invests
government oil revenues in international assets, and the country has since then adopted
a policy according to which only a fixed return of the fund will each year be used by the
government. This rule secures that petroleum wealth is not consumed but converted into
a pool of financial assets that can help to secure a generous welfare state in the future.
2.4 Be moderately nationalist and have confidence in the nation’s future
The Nordic papers also make clear that all the Nordic growth and development regimes
have been able to establish a positive belief that life will become better and investments
will pay off. This has been true of all the countries and all the periods that the country
papers explore, and it has underpinned both learning and incentives for investment in
physical productive capital. This need not always have been associated with a generally
optimistic and sunny mood. As described in the Finland paper, the external constraint
may have worked through the scarceness of any alternatives to rapid industrialization,
4
but it did work. In all the Nordic countries, the rule of law has been strong and the
political system has strived to create predictability in economic policy. For exporters in
Finland and Sweden, for example, the soft exchange rate policy—although ultimately
unsustainable when financial markets were liberated—was a reminder that the state was
committed to the profitability of the export industry.
2.5 Be positive to economic openness and new techniques, but share the risks and
the gains
Finally, and most importantly, all the Nordic countries have espoused economic
openness and technological progress. The labour movement has never had any Luddites,
and the protectionist lobby has been weak (farming is an exception, however). Most
economists would regard this as a self-evident necessity for small economies with a
high degree of specialization: the domestic market would never be sufficient for wealth
creation. However, many other countries have not been as politically committed to
openness and globalization as the Nordic countries have been—and it is here that the
interplay of the economic growth and the welfare state has probably played the most
important role. Undertaking a process of economic restructuring and specialization is
bound to create a lot of uncertainty for many economic agents as well as many losers
whose jobs and firms just disappear. With no compensating mechanisms in place, the
risk of being a loser as well as the experience of being one would create a lot of
opposition towards technological progress and the participation into the international
economy. In the Nordic countries, however, the development of a capitalist and
internationalized market economy coincided with the introduction of social insurance
that mitigated the risks. These processes are described clearly in the Sweden and
Finland papers, with both empirical examples and theoretical models. There we have
seen a positive spiral: economic development has created the political demand for a
welfare state—pensions, unemployment, and sickness insurance in particular—and the
creation of welfare services has sustained the political popularity of further economic
integration and technological progress.
5
References
Andersen, T., B. Holmström, S. Honkapohja, S. Korkman, H. T. Söderström, and J.
Vartiainen (2007). Embracing Globalization and Sharing Risks. Etla/Taloustieto
2007.
Cappelen, Å., and L. Mjøset (2009). Can Norway be a Role Model for Natural Resource
Abundant Countries?’. Research Paper 2009/23. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Jäntti, M., and J. Vartiainen (2009). The Finish Developmental State and its Growth
Regime’. Research Paper 2009/35. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Kokko, A. (2010). ‘The Swedish Model’. Working Paper 2010/88. Helsinki: UNUWIDER.
Lundvall, B-Å. (2009). ‘The Danish Model and the Globalizing Learning Economy:
Lessons for Developing Countries’. Research Paper 2009/18. Helsinki: UNUWIDER.
Pekkarinen T., R. Uusitalo, and Sari Pekkala (2009) ‘School Tracking and
Intergenerational Income Mobility: Evidence from the Finnish Comprehensive
School Reform’. Journal of Public Economics, 93 (7–8): 965–73.
6